UNION OF INDIA & ORS. VS MAJOR R. METRI Case
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. VS MAJOR R. METRI Case
Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2196 OF 2017
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MAJOR R. METRI NO. 08585N ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 537538 OF 2018
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. These two crossappeals challenge the judgments and
orders passed by the learned Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional
bench, Kochi (hereinafter referred to as “the learned AFT”)
dated 2nd March, 2017, passed in O.A. (Appeal) No.2 of 2014
and 30th May, 2017, passed in M.A. No.271 of 2017.
1
2. Criminal Appeal No.2196 of 2017 is filed by the Union of
India and others, challenging that part of the judgment and
order dated 2nd March, 2017, of the learned AFT, vide which the
learned AFT, while setting aside the order of conviction, under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as “the P.C. Act”) read with Section 69 of the Army
Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Army Act”) and the
sentence of cashiering from service and suffering of rigorous
imprisonment for one year, dated 28th April, 2013 passed by the
General Court Martial (hereinafter referred to as “GCM”), has
convicted the respondentMajor R. Metri (appellant in
connected appeals being Criminal Appeal Nos.537538 of 2018)
[hereinafter referred to as “the respondentofficer”] under
Section 63 of the Army Act, and in turn, sentenced him to
punishment of forfeiture of seniority of rank of Major and of
severe reprimand. The learned AFT has also directed that the
respondentofficer be reinstated in service, with no pay and
2
allowance for the period he remained out of service, but,
without any service break.
3. Criminal Appeal Nos. 537538 of 2018 have been filed by
the respondentofficer, aggrieved by that part of the said
judgment and order of the learned AFT, convicting him for
offence punishable under Section 63 of the Army Act and
sentencing him to punishment of forfeiture of seniority of rank
and of severe reprimand.
4. The facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeals
are as under:
5. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to
hereunder as are found in Criminal Appeal No. 2196 of 2017.
6. In the year 2008, the respondentofficer was posted as the
Recruiting Medical Officer, Army Recruiting Office, Jhunjhunu,
Rajasthan. At the relevant time, P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore
3
was the Director of the Army Recruiting Office, Jhunjhunu,
Rajasthan.
7. Between 16th December, 2008 and 18th December, 2008,
an Army Recruitment Rally took place in Udaipur. According to
the prosecution, P.W.8Major BSRK Prasad as well as P.W.12
Major D. Srinivas, who were also working as Recruiting Medical
Officers, contacted the respondentofficer and told him that
they help the candidates by making them medically fit and
asked his help for clearing certain candidates by declaring them
medically fit. It is the case of the prosecution that, though, at
first, the respondentofficer was reluctant, at the insistence of
P.W.8Major BSRK Prasad, he helped clearing certain
candidates within acceptable range.
8. It is further the prosecution case that when the
respondentofficer went to his native place at Dharwad on 28th
December, 2008, he was informed by P.W.8Major BSRK
Prasad that an amount of Rs.65,000/ would be paid to him
4
towards his share. It is further the prosecution case that the
respondentofficer asked P.W.8Major BSRK Prasad that the
said amount be deposited in the account of his fatherinlaw.
Accordingly, an amount of Rs.65,000/ was deposited in the
account of the fatherinlaw of the respondentofficer.
9. It is the further case of the prosecution that there was
another Recruitment Rally in Dausa in January, 2009. In the
said rally, P.W.12Major D. Srinivas requested the respondentofficer to help some candidates and the respondentofficer,
though reluctant, helped in clearing some candidates within the
acceptable range. It is the prosecution case that the
respondentofficer’s wife delivered a baby girl on 16th February,
2009, and as such, the respondentofficer wanted to
immediately rush to his native place. Since he was not having
sufficient funds to buy an airticket, he requested P.W.12Major
D. Srinivas to lend an amount of Rs. 20,000/. The said
amount of Rs.20,000/ was deposited in the account of the
5
respondentofficer by P.W.10Varalakshmi Srinivas, i.e., the
wife of P.W.12Major D. Srinivas. It is the case of the
prosecution that P.W.12Major D. Srinivas told the respondentofficer that the said amount of Rs.20,000/ was towards his
share for helping the candidates in Dausa Recruitment Rally.
10. It is further the case of the prosecution that there were
also Recruitment Rallies in Jodhpur and Ganganagar in May,
2009 and June, 2009 respectively. It is the allegation that in
the said rallies also, certain malpractices of clearing some
candidates as medically fit, who were not otherwise fit, took
place.
11. It is further the prosecution case that in the month of
July, 2009, there was another Recruitment Rally at Ajmer. The
respondentofficer, along with P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore,
went to Ajmer to take part in the said Recruitment Rally. When
the Recruitment process was going on at Ajmer, a First
Information Report (hereinafter referred to as “FIR”) No.125 of
6
2009, came to be registered in Police Station Adarsh Nagar,
Ajmer on 11th July, 2009, at the instance of one Narendra
Singh, under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”), complaining about the
malpractices in the Army Recruitment Rally. P.W.6 Mohd.
Anwar Khan, Circle Inspector, took up the investigation and
arrested 10 persons, who were alleged to be touts.
12. It is the prosecution case that on 13th July, 2009, certain
reports were published in Media at Ajmer. In the media
reports, the name of three officers, namely, (1) the respondentofficer; (2) P.W.8Major BSRK Prasad; and (3) P.W.12Major D.
Srinivas and three Junior Commissioned Officers, namely, (1)
Subedar Major VP Singh; (2) Subedar Surjan Singh and (3)
Subedar Major Jaswant Singh were mentioned.
13. It is the case of the prosecution that, on 14th July, 2009,
in the evening, the respondentofficer went to P.W.1Col. Anil
Singh Rathore. They had gone to a nearby temple and on the
7
stairs of the temple, the respondentofficer confessed about his
involvement. P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore asked the
respondentofficer to give his confession in writing. It is further
the case of the prosecution that the respondentofficer initially
came with a draft confession on 15th July, 2009, on which,
P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore told him that there was no need
for him to see the draft and he should submit a final statement.
Accordingly, on the same day, at around 8.00 p.m., the
respondentofficer gave a written statement to P.W.1 Col. Anil
Singh Rathore in the presence of P.W. 3 Col. Bharat Kumar
and P.W.4Col. Balraj Singh Sohi. On 16th July, 2009, the
Office of Superintendent of Police sought the presence of the
respondentofficer to interrogate him and others in the FIR in
question. The statement of the respondentofficer was recorded
by the Police on 18th July, 2009.
14. On 14th December, 2009, the Court of Inquiry proceedings
were convened. The General Officer in Commanding
8
(hereinafter referred to as “GOC”), South West Command, vide
Note dated 14th December, 2009, directed disciplinary action to
be taken against the respondentofficer and two other officers,
namely P.W.12Major D. Srinivas and P.W.8Major BSRK
Prasad and three Junior Commissioned Officers.
15. The respondentofficer and others challenged the Court of
Inquiry proceedings by way of Original Applications before the
learned AFT, Jaipur. The same were rejected by the learned
AFT, Jaipur, vide order dated 9th April, 2010.
16. The GCM proceedings were ordered to be instituted
against the respondentofficer and five others on 28th June,
2012, on the following Charges:
"a) Charge No.1:
Army Act Sec 69 Committing a civil
offence, that is to say, being a public
servant, obtaining for himself a
gratification other than legal
remuneration as a reward for doing an
9
official act, contrary to section 7 of
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.
In that he
At Dharwad during January 2009,
which came to the knowledge of
authority competent to initiate action
on 14 Dec 2009, while performing the
duties of Recruiting Medical Officer
Jhunjhunu, being a public servant,
obtained Rs.65000/ from MR08309 L
Major BSRK Prasad as a reward of his
share for helping the candidates for
recruitment in the Army, in Udaipur
rally.
b) Charge No.2:
Army Act Sec 69 Committing a civil
offence, that is to say, being a public
servant, obtaining for himself a
gratification other than legal
remuneration as a reward for doing an
official act, contrary to Section 7 of
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.
In that he
At Dharwad during Feb 2009, which
came to the knowledge of authority
competent to initiate action on 14 Dec
10
2009, while performing the duties of
Recruiting Medical Officer Army
Recruiting Office Jhunjhunu, being a
public servant, obtained Rs.20,000/
from Mrs. Vara Laxmi wife of MR08205
K Major D Srinivas as a reward of his
share for helping the candidates for
recruitment in the Army in Dausa rally.
(c) Charge No.3:
Army Act Sec 69 Committing a civil
offence, that is to say, being a public,
servant, obtaining for himself a
gratification other than legal
remuneration as a reward for doing an
official act, contrary to Section 7 of
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.
In that he
At Jodhpur, between January 2009 and
April 2009, which came to the
knowledge of authority competent to
initiate action, on 14 Dec 2009, while
performing the duties of Recruiting
Medical Officer, Army Recruiting Office
Jhunjhunu, being a public servant
obtained SIM No.9784341343 from Mr.
Taru Lai, as a motive for helping his
11
candidates for recruitment in the
Army."
17. At the conclusion of the trial, the GCM found the
respondentofficer guilty of charge Nos.1 and 2 and not guilty of
charge No.3. The GCM, therefore, vide order dated 28th April,
2013, sentenced the respondentofficer to be cashiered from
service and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The
GOC confirmed the findings and sentence of the GCM, but
remitted the unexpired portion of the sentence of rigorous
imprisonment, vide order dated 29th December, 2013. Being
aggrieved thereby, the respondentofficer preferred an appeal
before the learned AFT by way of O.A. (Appeal) No.2 of 2014.
The same has been partly allowed by the impugned judgment
and order dated 2nd March, 2017, as aforesaid. Being aggrieved
thereby, the present appeals.
18. We have heard Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional
Solicitor General (“ASG” for short), appearing on behalf of the
12
Union of India and others and Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondentofficer.
19. Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASG, submits that the
scope of interference by the learned AFT under Section 15 of
the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as
“the AFT Act”) is very limited. He submitted that the
reappreciation of evidence by the learned AFT is not
permissible. It is submitted that the interference by the learned
AFT would be warranted only on three grounds, as is
mentioned under subsection (4) of Section 15 of the AFT Act.
In this respect, reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court
in the case of Union of India and others vs. Sandeep Kumar
and others1
.
20. Shri Banerjee further submitted that the learned AFT has
grossly erred in holding that the confessional statement made
by the respondentofficer was not voluntary. It is submitted
1 (2019) 10 SCC 496
13
that when the respondentofficer made the confessional
statement, he was not an accused, and as such, the learned
AFT has grossly erred in relying on Article 20(3) of the
Constitution of India. In this respect, he relies on the judgment
of Elevenjudge Bench of this Court in the case of The State of
Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and others2
.
21. Shri Banerjee further submits that the learned AFT itself
has come to a conclusion that the respondentofficer has
indulged in financial misconduct, and therefore, the
punishment of cashiering from service for such misconduct
ought not to have been sustained. Reliance in this respect is
placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Chandra
Kumar Chopra vs. Union of India and others3
.
22. Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondentofficer, on the contrary, submits that the
2 (1962) 3 SCR 10
3 (2012) 6 SCC 369
14
learned AFT has rightly held that the confessional statement
was not voluntary. He submitted that the extrajudicial
confession is a very weak piece of evidence and conviction on
the basis of the same cannot be sustained, unless there is some
corroboration. He submits that the news about the respondentofficer being already involved in the FIR, registered on 11th July,
2009, was already published in the newspapers on 13th July,
2009. He submits that the Police had already started
interrogation with regard to the FIR and there was discussion
between the Police officials and the Army officials. He
submitted that the learned AFT has come to a conclusion that
it was a huge recruitment scam and in order to save the higher
officials, the possibility of the respondentofficer being forced to
give such a confession by promising him that he would also be
saved, is a possible view. He, therefore, submits that no
interference would be warranted with the findings of the
learned AFT in that regard.
15
23. He further submitted that even the evidence of P.W.1Col.
Anil Singh Rathore, Director, Army Recruitment Centre,
Jhunjhunu; P.W.2Brigadier Arun Kumar Tuli, Dy. Director
General, Recruitment Zone Rajasthan at Jaipur; and P.W. 4
Col. Balraj Singh Sohi, Director Recruiting Office, Jaipur would
reveal that not a single person was found, who could be said to
have been medically declared fit, though being unfit. He
further submitted that, on the contrary, the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses would itself reveal that actual tests were
conducted by independent members and the medical team was
only assisting the independent members in the conduct of
tests, measurements and the medical examination. He further
submits that the evidence of prosecution witnesses would itself
show that there was no material to establish that the
respondentofficer had received any amount from the touts as a
consideration for clearing any candidate.
16
24. Shri Agrawal further submits that from the evidence of
P.W.10Varalakshmi Srinivas, it is clear that the amount of
Rs.20,000/ was deposited by her, on the directions of her
husband, P.W.12Major D. Srinivas, since the respondentofficer was in dire need of the said money as he had to rush to
his home town at Dharwad by flight. He submitted that from
the evidence of P.W.12Major D. Srinivas, it would be clear that
the said amount of Rs.20,000/ was returned by the
respondentofficer to P.W.12Major D. Srinivas, on his return
from Dharwad.
25. Insofar as the amount of Rs.65,000/ alleged to have been
received from P.W.8Major BSRK Prasad is concerned, Shri
Agrawal would submit that P.W.8Major BSRK Prasad had
taken a loan of Rs.65,000/ from the fatherinlaw of the
respondentofficer, since he wanted to purchase a plot of land.
He submits that the amount of Rs.65,000/ deposited in the
account of the fatherinlaw of the respondentofficer was
17
towards the repayment of the said loan. He submits that the
said fact would be evident from the evidence of P.W.8Major
BSRK Prasad.
26. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties,
we have scrutinized the material on record. Insofar as the first
submission with regard to scope of Section 15 of the AFT Act is
concerned, it will be relevant to refer to subsection (4) of
Section 15 of the AFT Act, which reads as under:
“15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority
in matters of appeal against courtmartial. (1) ………………………………
(2) ……………………………………….
(3) ……………………………………….
(4) The Tribunal shall allow an appeal
against conviction by a courtmartial
where
(a) the finding of the courtmartial is
legally not sustainable due to any
reason whatsoever; or
18
(b) the finding involves wrong decision
on a question of law; or
(c) there was a material irregularity in
the course of the trial resulting in
miscarriage of justice, but,
in any other case, may dismiss the appeal
where the Tribunal considers that no
miscarriage of justice is likely to be caused
or has actually resulted to the appellant:
Provided that no order dismissing the
appeal by the Tribunal shall be passed
unless such order is made after recording
reasons therefor in writing.”
27. It could thus be seen that, in view of clause (a) of subsection (4) of Section 15 of the AFT Act, the learned AFT would
be justified in interfering with the finding of the courtmartial
where its finding is legally not sustainable due to any reason
whatsoever. Under clause (b) thereof, it would be permissible
for the learned AFT to interfere with such a finding when it
involves a wrong decision on a question of law. Under clause
(c) thereof, the learned AFT would be justified in allowing an
19
appeal against conviction by a courtmartial when there was a
material irregularity in the course of the trial resulting in
miscarriage of justice.
28. Insofar as reliance placed by Shri Vikramjit Banerjee,
learned ASG on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Sandeep Kumar and others (supra) is concerned, this Court
in the said case itself has observed thus:
“46. Section 15 of the Act confers wide
power on the Tribunal so as to allow an
appeal against conviction by a court martial
where the finding of the court martial is
legally not sustainable due to any reason;
the finding involves wrong decision on a
question of law or there was a material
irregularity in the course of the trial
resulting in miscarriage of justice. Even
though the power of the Tribunal is wide
but it is not merely a different opinion on
the appreciation of the evidence to interfere
with the findings recorded by the court
martial. The first ground of interference is
whether the finding of the court martial is
“legally not sustainable”. Therefore, to
exercise such power, there has to be error of
law by the court martial which would confer
20
jurisdiction on the Tribunal to interfere
against the conviction recorded by the court
martial. The second ground is “wrong
application on a question of law”. However,
the Tribunal, in the present case, has
committed grave error in interfering with the
finding of the court martial by misreading
an Army Order. There is no material
irregularity pointed out by the Tribunal
inasmuch as the irregularity pointed out is
with regard to confessional statements by
military officer which is not a bar either
under the Evidence Act or under the Army
Order issued under the Act. The Tribunal
could reappreciate evidence to find out if
any findings of the court martial are legally
not sustainable due to any reason; or that
the finding involves wrong decision on a
question of law or there was a material
irregularity in the course of the trial
resulting in miscarriage of justice. But such
wide powers do not confer jurisdiction to the
Tribunal to reverse the findings merely
because it finds that different view is
possible.”
29. It could thus be seen that this Court itself has held that
the learned AFT was entitled to reappreciate evidence to find
out if any findings of the court martial are legally not
21
sustainable due to any reason; or that the finding involves
wrong decision on a question of law; or there was a material
irregularity in the course of the trial resulting in miscarriage of
justice. We find that the reliance placed by the learned ASG on
the sentence, i.e., “But such wide powers do not confer
jurisdiction to the Tribunal to reverse the findings merely
because it finds that different view is possible”, is being pressed
into service without context. In the said case, on facts, this
Court came to the conclusion that there was no material
irregularity pointed out by the Tribunal inasmuch as the
irregularity pointed out was with regard to confessional
statements by military officer which was not a bar either under
the Evidence Act or under the Army Order issued under the
Act. This Court, therefore, came to a specific conclusion that
the finding recorded by the Tribunal was on misreading of an
Army order. The sentence which is pressed into service will
have to be read in the context of those findings. We are unable
22
to accept the contention urged on behalf of the Union of India
that the learned AFT is not entitled to reappreciate the
evidence. Such reappreciation of evidence is permissible to find
out if any findings of the court martial are legally not
sustainable due to any reason.
30. It is not in dispute that the GCM has passed its conviction
basically on the confessional statement made by the
respondentofficer. Reliance in this respect is placed on the
judgment of the Elevenjudge Bench of this Court in the case of
The State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and others
(supra). It will be relevant to refer to the following observations
of this Court in the said case:
“(1) An accused person cannot be said to
have been compelled to be a witness
against himself simply because he made
a statement while in police custody,
without anything more. In other words,
the mere fact of being in police custody
at the time when the statement in
question was made would not, by itself,
23
as a proposition of law, lend itself to the
inference that the accused was
compelled to make the statement,
though that fact, in conjunction with
other circumstances disclosed in
evidence in a particular case, would be a
relevant consideration in an enquiry
whether or not the accused person had
been compelled to make the impugned
statement.”
31. It is to be noted that this Court, in the aforesaid case
itself, has held that the question, as to whether a person was
compelled to make a statement or not, is a question of fact in
each case to be determined by the Court on weighing the facts
and circumstances disclosed in the evidence before it.
32. In the present case, the learned AFT, upon perusal of the
evidence of P.W.1 Col. Anil Singh Rathore, P.W.3 Col. Bharat
Kumar and P.W.4Col. Balraj Singh Sohi, has come to a
conclusion that from the circumstances as emerged, it cannot
be said that the confessional statement was voluntary.
24
33. The finding as recorded by the learned AFT, was recorded
while allowing the appeal preferred by the respondentofficer
against the judgment and order of the GCM dated 28th April,
2013, as confirmed by the GOC vide order dated 29th December,
2013, holding him guilty for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the P.C. Act read with Section 69 of the Army Act.
As such, in the present matter, while considering the appeal of
the Union of India and others, we will be guided by the
parameters that weigh while considering an appeal against
acquittal. If the view taken by the learned AFT is found to be a
plausible one, it will not be permissible for this Court to
interfere with the same only because this court finds the other
view to be more probable/plausible. Equally, unless the finding
of the learned AFT is found to be perverse or impossible, an
interference would not be justified.
34. From the perusal of evidence of P.W.1Col. Anil Singh
Rathore, it would reveal that he himself has stated that after he
25
was posted as Director, Army Recruiting Office, Jhunjhunu,
Rajasthan in May, 2008, he had received various calls from
unauthorized elements seeking favours for recruitment. He had
told them to lay off. However, in spite of this, the said callers
increased the frequency of making calls seeking favours and
also started using threatening language. He stated that the
issue was discussed in detail with all Directors of the Army
Recruiting Office under the zone. He stated that, in the
Conference, he had informed the Additional Director General
Recruiting, Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence
(Army) that, though the recruiting system was free and fair, yet
about 90% of the persons recruited, pay varying amounts to the
touts. He further stated that in the month of May, 2009, when
the Recruitment Rally was held at Jodhpur, the respondentofficer was detailed as a member of the medical team for the
said Recruitment Rally. When the Recruitment Rally was in
process, he received a call from the respondentofficer
26
informing him that the respondentofficer had received calls
from undesirable elements asking favours from the respondentofficer. P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore has further stated that
he told the respondentofficer not to do any favour to anyone
and report the matter to the Director of Host Army Recruiting
Office, i.e., P.W.3Col. Bharat Kumar.
35. P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore further stated in his
evidence that another Recruitment Rally was held in June 2009
at Ganganagar, where he was the Host Army Recruiting Office.
He had a meeting with Detachment Commander of South
Western Command Intelligence Unit, who provided him some
inputs about the touts’ activities in the area. He has stated in
his evidence that the respondentofficer was one of the
members of the medical team at the Recruitment Rally held at
Ganganagar.
36. It will be apposite to reproduce the following part of the
crossexamination of P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore:
27
“As far as I remember, first time the
accused informed me about having
received calls from undesirable elements
was sometime in the month of December,
2008 when I came back from leave.
Subsequently, he informed me about the
same from Jodhpur recruitment rally.
Further in Ganganagar, I heard the
medical officers including the accused
discussing about such calls being received
by them on the dining table during
breakfast time. Finally the same
information was given by the accused in
his verbal and written confessional
statement made on 14 and 15 July 2009
respectively.”
37. P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore has further stated in his
evidence that he along with the respondentofficer, who was
also one of the members of team ‘B’ as Medical Officer, went to
Ajmer on 9th July, 2009 for the Recruitment Rally to be held on
11th July, 2009. He states about the news being published in
newspapers on 13th July, 2009 about the Police taking action
against the touts. He states that the respondentofficer came to
28
him on 14th July, 2009 and wanted to confess his involvement
in the recruitment racket with the touts. They went to a nearby
temple where he narrated about his involvement over a
duration of two hours or so. He told the respondentofficer to
give everything in writing about what he has narrated. He has
further stated that on 15th July, 2009, the respondentofficer
came to him and handed over a written statement in the
presence of P.W.3Col. Bharat Kumar and P.W.4Col. Balraj
Singh Sohi.
38. P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore, in his crossexamination,
has admitted that he and the other Recruiting Officers had
been interacting with the Media at the site of the Recruitment
Rally. He has further admitted that during interaction on 13th
July, 2009, a number of media persons had arrived in the
stadium, where the Recruitment Rally was being conducted.
Though he has denied that the details of information published
in the newspaper dated 13th July, 2009 were given by him, it is
29
not denied that he has interacted with the Police on 13th July,
2009.
39. It could thus be seen that when the respondentofficer
allegedly made an oral confession on 14th July, 2009 and gave a
written statement on 15th July, 2009, the news with regard to
the recruitment racket was already known to one and all.
40. P.W.3Col. Bharat Kumar, who was the Director of Army
Recruiting Office at the relevant time, has stated in his
examinationinchief that during Jodhpur Recruitment Rally,
held between 11th May, 2009 and 21st May, 2009, the
respondentofficer had come to him, totally shattered with tears
in his eyes, and informed that he had received threatening calls
and SMS messages from the touts’ seeking favours for some
candidates.
41. It is thus clear from the evidence of P.W.1Col. Anil Singh
Rathore and P.W.3Col. Bharat Kumar that from December
30
2008 itself, they were aware about the racket of touts in the
recruitment scam. Not only this, but P.W.1Col. Anil Singh
Rathore has gone on record to say that, in the recruitment
process, 90% of the persons recruited pay varying amount to
touts, though the selection process was free and fair. P.W.1
Col. Anil Singh Rathore has admitted that the respondentofficer had informed him about the phone calls as early as in
December, 2008. Insofar as P.W.3Col. Bharat Kumar is
concerned, he has also admitted that the respondentofficer
had informed him about the phone calls in the month of May,
2009. The finding of the learned AFT that, in view of the
circumstances, it appears unnatural that the respondentofficer
would make a voluntary confession on 14th July, 2009 and the
written statement on 15th July, 2009 and that many more
persons might be involved in the recruitment scam and in order
to find a scapegoat, the possibility of the respondentofficer
being asked to make a confessional statement with an
31
assurance that no action will be taken against him, cannot be
said to be an impossible view.
42. P.W.2 Brigadier Arun Kumar Tuli, at the relevant time,
was the Deputy Director General, Recruitment Zone Rajasthan
at Jaipur. He has also admitted in his examinationinchief
that, when he assumed the office of Deputy Director General
Recruiting Zone, the first Recruitment Rally was conducted at
Jodhpur, sometime between 11th May, 2009 and 18th/19th May,
2009. He has admitted that during this Recruitment Rally, he
came to know about the receipt of complaints from Medical
Officers, including the respondentofficer, that they had
received unwanted calls and SMS messages with threatening
contents. He has also admitted in his evidence that, on 14th
July, 2009, he received local newspapers, which were full of
news on recruitment racket. He has also admitted that, on 14th
July, 2009, a meeting was arranged with the Superintendent of
Police, Ajmer, who informed him about the FIR.
32
43. It could thus be seen that, on cumulative appreciation of
evidence of P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore, P.W.2 Brigadier
Arun Kumar Tuli and P.W.3Col. Bharat Kumar, the view that
the confessional statement made by the respondentofficer did
not appear to be voluntary cannot be said to be a perverse view.
This is particularly so, when P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore has
admitted that the respondentofficer had intimated him about
such calls as early as in December, 2008, and also, P.W.2
Brigadier Arun Kumar Tuli and P.W.3Col. Bharat Kumar have
admitted about they having knowledge about such calls much
earlier to 14th July, 2009 and 15th July, 2009, i.e., the dates of
oral/written confession.
44. This Court in the case of Sahadevan and another vs.
State of Tamil Nadu4
, after surveying various judgments on
the issue, has laid down the following principles:
“The principles
4 (2012) 6 SCC 403
33
16. Upon a proper analysis of the
abovereferred judgments of this Court, it
will be appropriate to state the principles
which would make an extrajudicial
confession an admissible piece of evidence
capable of forming the basis of conviction
of an accused. These precepts would guide
the judicial mind while dealing with the
veracity of cases where the prosecution
heavily relies upon an extrajudicial
confession alleged to have been made by
the accused:
(i) The extrajudicial confession is a
weak evidence by itself. It has to be
examined by the court with greater care
and caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and
should be truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence.
(iv) An extrajudicial confession
attains greater credibility and
evidentiary value if it is supported by a
chain of cogent circumstances and is
further corroborated by other
prosecution evidence.
34
(v) For an extrajudicial confession to
be the basis of conviction, it should not
suffer from any material discrepancies
and inherent improbabilities.
(vi) Such statement essentially has to
be proved like any other fact and in
accordance with law.”
45. It could thus be seen that the extrajudicial confession is a
weak piece of evidence. Unless such a confession is found to be
voluntary, trustworthy and reliable, the conviction solely on the
basis of the same, without corroboration, would not be justified.
46. In the present case, there is no corroboration at all. On
the contrary, P.W.1Col. Anil Singh Rathore in his evidence has
himself admitted that the respondentofficer was part of team
‘B’. It will be relevant to refer to the following part of his
examinationinchief:
“In any recruitment rally there are three
teams, Host Army Recruiting Office,
35
team 'A' and 'B'. Host Army Recruiting
Office is responsible for documentation
and administration. Team 'A' is
responsible for physical tests and run
while team 'B' is responsible for
measurements of the candidate and their
medical examination. Actual tests are
conducted by independent members.
These team only assist the independent
members in conduct of tests,
measurements and the medical
examination.
47. It could thus be seen that a single officer like the
respondentofficer cannot declare a candidate medically fit, if
he is otherwise not. His evidence would show that the team
like the one of which the respondentofficer was a member, only
assists the independent members in the conduct of tests,
measurements and the medical examination.
48. All the three witnesses have admitted that they had no
knowledge if any candidate, declared fit by the respondentofficer, was subsequently found to have been medically unfit.
36
All the three witnesses have also admitted that there was no
material to establish that the amount, which was deposited in
the account of the respondentofficer and his fatherinlaw was
an amount received as illegal gratification.
49. We are, therefore, of the view that no error could be found
with the findings of the learned AFT that the respondentofficer
deserves to be acquitted of the offence punishable under
section 7 of the P.C. Act.
50. That leaves us with the appeals of the respondentofficer.
51. Perusal of the evidence of P.W.10Varalakshmi Srinivas
and P.W.12Major D. Srinivas would reveal that they have
stated in their evidence, that since the wife of the respondentofficer had given birth to a girl child on 16th February, 2009, he
wanted to rush to his native place at Dharwad and did not have
sufficient funds. As such, he had requested P.W.12Major D.
Srinivas to give a loan of Rs.20,000/, which amount was
37
deposited by P.W.10Varalakshmi Srinivas in the account of the
respondentofficer, on the instructions of her husband P.W.12
Major D. Srinivas. From the evidence of P.W.12 Major D.
Srinivas, it would reveal that on his return from his native
place, the respondentofficer had returned the said amount.
52. Insofar as the amount of Rs.65,000/ is concerned, P.W.8
Major BSRK Prasad, in his evidence, has stated that he had
taken a loan of Rs.65,000/ from the fatherinlaw of the
respondentofficer for purchase of a plot of land. The amount
of Rs.65,000/ deposited by him in the account of the fatherinlaw of the respondentofficer was towards repayment of the said
loan amount.
53. It could thus be seen that the respondentofficer had
discharged the burden to prove, as to how the said amount of
Rs.20,000/ was deposited in his account and as to how the
amount of Rs.65,000/ was deposited in the account of his
fatherinlaw. As such, that part of the order, which convicts
38
the respondentofficer for the offence punishable under Section
63 of the Army Act, in our view, is not sustainable.
54. In the result, we pass the following order:
A. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2196 OF 2017
(i) Criminal Appeal No. 2196 of 2017 filed on behalf of the
Union of India and others is dismissed.
B. CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 537538 OF 2018
(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.537538 of 2018 filed on behalf of
the appellantMajor R. Metri No.08585N are allowed.
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 2nd March,
2017, passed by the learned AFT, convicting the
appellantMajor R. Metri No.08585N for the offence
punishable under Section 63 of the Army Act and
sentencing him to forfeiture of seniority of rank and of
severe reprimand is quashed and set aside.
39
(iii) The appellantMajor R. Metri No.08585N is acquitted of
all the charges, charged with.
(iv) The appellantMajor R. Metri No.08585N is directed to
be reinstated forthwith with continuity of service.
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the appellantMajor R. Metri No.08585N will not be
entitled for backwages for the period during which he
was out of employment.
55. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
…..….......................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
…….........................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 04, 2022
40
Comments
Post a Comment