Ranbir Singh Vs SK Roy, Chairman, Life Insurance Corp. of India & Anr.

Ranbir Singh Vs SK Roy, Chairman, Life Insurance Corp. of India & Anr. - Supreme Court Case -

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

INHERENT JURISDICTION

Miscellaneous Application No. 1150 of 2019

Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 1921 of 2017

Civil Appeal No. 6950 of 2009

Ranbir Singh …Applicant/Petitioner

Versus

SK Roy, Chairman, Life Insurance …Respondents

Corp. of India & Anr.

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J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis. They are:

A Introduction...................................................................................................... 7

B Dogra Report................................................................................................. 23

C LIC’s objections to the Dogra Report ............................................................ 30

D The E Prabavathy Group .............................................................................. 32

E Sequel to E Prabavathy ................................................................................ 37

F Submissions .................................................................................................. 41

G Prelude – Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and their Aftermath ........................ 52

H Srivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court........................................ 57

I Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report.............................................. 69

J The Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and Section 48 of the

LIC Act 1956........................................................................................................ 74

K Structuring the Relief..................................................................................... 84

PART A

A Introduction

1 This litigation has a long and chequered history. The dispute, a familiar terrain

in service jurisprudence, pertains to the claim for absorption of persons who were

engaged by the Life Insurance Corporation of India1 as temporary/badli/part-time

workers. Section 23(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act 19562 enables LIC to

employ such number of persons as it thinks fit to discharge its functions. Pursuant to

clauses (b) and (d) of Section 49(2), LIC has framed the Life Insurance Corporation

of India (Staff Regulations) 19603

. Regulation 8 empowers LIC to appoint persons

on a temporary basis in Class III and Class IV posts. After an amendment which was

notified on 7 August 1971, Regulation 8 provides as follows:

“8. Temporary Staff:-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations

the Managing Director or Executive Director (Personnel), a

Zonal Manager or a Divisional Manager may employ staff in

classes III and IV on a temporary basis, subject to such

general or special directions as may be issued by the

Chairman from time to time.

(2) No person appointed under sub-regulation (1) shall only

by reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption in the

services of the Corporation or claim preference for

recruitment to any post.”

2 On 31 January 1981, Sections 48 and 49 were amended to impart statutory

force to the Staff Regulations. According to LIC, its staff and employees are

governed by the parent enactment and fall outside the purview of the Industrial

1 “LIC” 2 “LIC Act” 3 “Staff Regulations”

PART A

Disputes Act 19474

. The validity of the amendment to Sections 48 and 49 has been

upheld by this Court in A V Nachane v. Union of India5

3 On 13 August 1982, an industrial dispute was raised by the Western Zonal

Insurance Employees Association alleging that LIC had been engaging in unfair

labour practices by employing temporary, badli and part-time workers and was

restricting their employment to short tenures to deprive them of the claim for

permanency.

4 On 20 May 1985, the dispute was referred for adjudication by the Central

Government to the National Industrial Tribunal6

, Bombay presided over by Justice R

D Tulpule7

, a former Judge of the Bombay High Court. The terms of reference were

as follows:

“What should be the wages and other conditions of service of

badli, temporary and part-time workmen of the Life Insurance

Corporation of India as well as the conditions of their

absorption into regular cadre?”

5 On 15 January 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal issued an interim order restraining

LIC from recruiting regular employees and from terminating the services of the ad

hoc workers working with LIC.

4 “ID Act” 5 (1982) 1 SCC 205 (“A V Nachane”). See also: M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC, Machilipatnam, (1994)

2 SCC 323; and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raghavendra Seshagirirao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461 6 “NIT” 7 “Tulpule Tribunal”

PART A

6 On 18 April 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal passed an award8 which was gazetted

on 7 June 1986 stipulating that those ad hoc workers who were in employment

between 1 January 1982 and 20 May 1985 will be entitled for absorption. The

award, inter alia, stipulated that:

(i) Workers claiming absorption in Class III posts should have worked for 85

days in a period of two years; and

(ii) Workers in Class IV posts should have worked for 70 days in a period of three

years.

The calculation of the number of days worked was to be up to the date of the

reference. The award contemplated that in the future there would be no occasion for

LIC to employ workers in temporary and badli categories, save and except for

occasional and temporary work.

7 On 1 June 1987, LIC issued circulars for implementing the Tulpule Award.

These circulars were disputed by the Unions and Associations representing the

workers. Following this dispute over the LIC circulars, the Central Government

referred the Tulpule Award for interpretation under Section 36-A of the ID Act to

another NIT presided over by Justice M S Jamdar9

, a former Judge of the Bombay

High Court. The terms of reference were:

“Can the Award dated 17/4/1986 special reference to

paragraph 44,45,46, 48, 49, 51,52,54,56,57,60,64 and 66 and

the interim order dated 14/3/1986 be interpreted to mean that

the central office of the Life Insurance Corporation of India is

8 “Tulpule Award” 9 “Jamdar Tribunal”

PART A

empowered to issue instructions/ guidelines, as contained in

their circulars issued in this behalf to implement the directions

of the Award. If not what could be the correct interpretation of

various directions covered by the said paragraphs in the

circumstances of the case? Whether the term ‘absorption’

referred to at various places in the Award can be interpreted

to mean ‘recruitment’?”

8 By an interim order dated 29 June 1987, the Jamdar Tribunal prohibited LIC

from recruiting persons to Class III and Class IV posts from the ‘open market’ during

the pendency of the proceedings. LIC has argued before this Court that on account

of the restraint imposed on it from recruiting regular employees (through the interim

orders dated 15 January 1986 of the Tulpule Tribunal and 29 June 1987 of the

Jamdar Tribunal), a large number of ad hoc workers were appointed to carry out the

day-to-day administration of LIC all over India.

9 The Jamdar Tribunal rendered its award on 26 August 198810 and it was

notified in the gazette on 1 October 1988. It held that the absorption contemplated in

the Tulpule Award did not imply recruitment. LIC challenged the interpretation

rendered by the Jamdar Award under Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court

granted leave in the proceedings11. During the pendency of the proceedings, terms

of compromise were arrived at between LIC and all the Unions representing the

workers, save and except the Akhil Bharatiya Jeevan Bima Nigam Chathurthi Sreni

Karmachari Sangh12. The terms of compromise envisaged that the Jamdar and

Tulpule Awards should be substituted by the terms and conditions of the

10 “Jamdar Award” 11 SLP (Civil) No 14906 of 1988, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No 1790 of 1989 on the grant of leave 12 “Karmachari Sangh”

PART A

compromise “in relation to the question of regular employment of the workmen

concerned in the said references”. The terms of compromise which were filed before

this Court are extracted below:

“TERMS OF COMPROMISE

1. The Management and the workmen agree that the Award

of the National Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr.

Justice R.D. Tulpule, in Reference No.NTB-1 of 1988,

published on 7th June 1986, and the Award of the

National Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr. Justice

M.S. Jandar, dated 26th August 1988 in Reference No.

NTB-1 of 1987, published on 1st October 1988, be

substituted by the Terms and Conditions of Compromise

set out hereinafter in relation to the question of regular

employment of the workmen concerned in the said

Reference.

2. The Management agrees to consider the

temporary/part-time/badli workmen employed by the

petitioner for 85 days in any two years in a Class III

post and for 70 days in any three years in a Class IV

post in any of its establishments during the period

1.1.82 to 20.5.85, for regular employment on the basis

and in the manner stated hereinbelow. The

temporary/part-time/badli workmen who had made

applications for regular employment on or before 7.7.86

or those temporary/part-time/badli workmen whose

applications had been received after 7.7.86 but before

6.3.87 and had been rejected on account of late

submission, shall be eligible for consideration for regular

employment. The selection of the candidate shall be

made on the basis of the following qualifications, age

test, interview and also having regard to the number

of days worked by the candidates. A panel of selected

candidates shall be made and the selected

candidates shall be appointed in regular employment

from the panel in the order of merit prospectively

from the dates to be notified as and when vacancies

in sanctioned posts for regular employment are filled

in from time to time :-

PART A

(i) QUALIFICATIONS – As per Circular

No.Per/A/2D/492/ASP/79, dated 27.11.79, prescribed for

Class III employee subject to relaxation only in regard to

percentage of marks, required as per the qualifications as

may be decided by the Managing Director of the PetitionerCorporation.

Per/A/2D/526/ASP/81, dated 24.6.1981 subject to relaxation

in the matter of basic qualifications as may be decided by the

Managing Director of the Petitioner-Corporation.

(ii) AGE – As per Regulation No. 18 of (Staff)

Regulations, 1960, made by the Petitioner.

(iii) TEST – As per Circular dated 27.11.1979, for Class III

as well as Class IV workmen and, in addition, as per

Circular dated 4.6.1981 for Class IV workmen only.

(iv) INTERVIEW – As per Circular dated 27.11.79 for both

Class III and Class IV workmen.

3. The temporary/part-time/badli workmen who had already

qualified in the written test held earlier for consideration

for eligible workmen for regular employment, will not be

required to appear again for test and they shall be

considered for interview on the basis of the test already

held.

4. The test and interview for regular employment to be held

for the purpose of selection of the temporary/parttime/badli workmen aforementioned, shall be commenced

within one month of the order of this Hon’ble Court in

terms of this Compromise. The selected candidates shall

be appointed in regular employment in accordance with

the panel of selected candidates till it is exhausted. The

petitioner shall, however, be entitled to made recruitment

straightway wherever vacancies are more than the

candidates in any Division in view of the necessity or

expediency for such recruitment.

5. The recruitment of the temporary/part-time/badli workmen

in the categories of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe,

shall be considered first and if any vacancy may remain

unfulfilled in that category, the petitioner shall be entitled

to made recruitment in accordance with its usual

procedure according to its requirements.

6. In view of the abovementioned Terms of Compromise no

dispute in relation to the workmen concerned, as referred

in Clause 1 hereinabove, survives in regard to the matter

PART A

covered by this Compromise between the parties and the

respective rights and obligations of the parties in relation

to regular employment of the said workman concerned

shall be determined and given effect accordingly, if any

controversy may arise.”

(emphasis supplied)

The terms of compromise were accepted by an interim order of a two-judge Bench

of this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen13 on 1 March 1989. The order is extracted

below:

“Special leave is granted. It appears that out of nine Unions

eight Unions said to be representing about 99% of the

workers have entered into a compromise with the

Management. In the circumstances pending the final disposal

of the appeal, we permit the Management and the members

of the said eight Unions to implement the terms of

compromise by way of interim measure without however, any

prejudice to the rights and contentions of the members of the

other Union, who have not entered into such compromise with

the management.”

10 On 7 February 1996, the above civil appeal in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra)

was disposed of. This Court accepted the contention of LIC that since eight unions

had already accepted the compromise, the ninth union (Karamchari Sangh) should

fall in line and act on the terms and conditions of the compromise in the interest of

industrial peace. Since the litigating workers in Class IV posts were unable to take

the test during the pendency of the proceedings, LIC was directed to exempt Class

IV workers from appearing for the test and interview, if the management had power

to do so under the regulations or the instructions governing their conditions of

13 Civil Appeal No 1790 of 1989 (1 March 1989) (“LIC v. Their Workmen”)

PART A

service. The Court observed that in the event that the management had no such

power, it had “no doubt” that the test prescribed for the workers would be of a lower

standard than what had been prescribed under the two circulars mentioned in the

compromise. Pursuant to the compromise, LIC appointed 1875 persons to Class III

posts and 1324 persons to Class IV posts in various divisions.

11 The genesis of the present dispute relates to a demand raised by the Unions

on 4 March 1991, pertaining to the claim for regularisation of those workers who

were employed from 20 May 1985 till the date of reference on 4 March 1991. Acting

on the demand, the Central Government made the following reference to the Central

Government Industrial Tribunal14 under Sections 10(1)(d) and 2A of the ID Act:

“Whether the action of the Management of Life Insurance

Corporation of India in not absorbing badli/temporary and

part-time workmen employed in the establishment of LIC after

20.05.1985 is justified? If not, to what relief the workmen are

entitled?”

12 On 18 June 2001, the CGIT which was presided over by Shri K S Srivastav,

pronounced the award15 by directing the absorption of the temporary/badli workers

on the same terms as the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, with some modifications.

The Srivastav Award held that:

“88. In view of the fact I am of the definite view that such type

of workmen belonging to temporary/badly/ part time

categories in class III and Class IV service of the corporation

who were employed after following the procedure and were

allowed to continue service beyond the qualifying period and

14 “CGIT” 15 “Srivastav Award”

PART A

were eligible and suitable to every respect should be given

absorption in the service from date of the vacancy in the

service in which they could have been absorbed. It will also

apply to these employees whose service were terminated by

the corporation.”

13 In its ultimate directions, the Srivastav Award directed that the temporary,

badli and part-time workers who were employed after 20 May 1985 should be

granted absorption on the same terms and conditions as was stipulated in the

Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (in respect of workers who were employed from 1

January 1982 to 20 May 1985). LIC was directed to publish a notice in the

newspapers for inviting applications from individual workers for absorption. If no

regular vacancy was available, the award directed supernumerary posts to be

created. Paragraph 94 of the Srivastav Award is extracted below:

“94. In view of the matter I find and conclude that the action of

corporation denying the absorption of these

temporary/badli/part time workmen as dealt with above in the

body of this award and employed after 20-05-85 is not

justified. I further find that these workmen employed after 20-

5-85 should be given absorption in their job on the same

terms and conditions as laid down in the aforesaid two

awards namely Hon’ble Mr Justice R.D. Tulpule and of

Hon’ble Mr Justice M.S. Jamdar in respect of the workmen

employed with effect from 1-1-82 to 20-05-85 and dealt with

by me as above. It is directed that the corporation shall take

into consideration for the absorption of the workmen, on their

eligibility and suitability as dealt with above in the award. The

case of those workmen belonging to the category of

temporary, badli, part-time who had become eligible for their

absorption in their job after completing the qualified period of

working and were suitable in every respect but their services

were terminated and they were turned out of the job by the

corporation should also considered for the absorption of such

terminated workmen of the corporation shall publish a notice

in the daily newspaper having wide circulation throughout

India and if in compliance of the notice the workman

PART A

concerned consent in writing within stipulated period which

could be given in the said notice the case of such workman

should also be considered for their absorption in the regular

vacancy then existing. At the time of the consideration of

absorption of such workmen if it is found that no regular

vacancy is available to such workmen, supernumerary posts

should also be created and such workmen should be given

absorption in it. It is also directed that the cases of these

workmen for absorption in existing vacancies should be taken

for consideration first irrespective of the regular recruitment if

taken. The case of the contractual workmen for absorption

shall be taken into consideration as per observation made in

the body of the award and on the basis on conditions as

stated above.”

14 The Srivastav Award was challenged by LIC in a writ petition16 before the

Delhi High Court. By a judgment dated 15 April 2004, a Single Judge of the Delhi

High Court set aside the award and held that the decisions of this Court in E

Prabavathy v. Life Insurance Corporation of India17 and LIC of India v. G

Sudhakar18 directing LIC to formulate a scheme for regularisation were binding on

the CGIT. The judgment of the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court was the subject

matter of a batch of Letters Patent Appeals19 preferred by six Unions/Associations.

The appeals were dismissed on 21 March 2007 by the Division Bench. The Division

Bench also issued directions for age relaxation and weightage of past service to the

workers:

“20. In that view of the matter, while dismissing the appeals

filed by the appellants, we issue directions in the following

manner:

16 W P No 4346 of 2001 (High Court of Delhi) 17 SLP (Civil) No 10393 of 1992 (“E Prabavathy”) 18 Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000 (“G Sudhakar”) 19 LPA 678 of 2004 with LPA 690 of 2004, LPA 710 of 2004, LPA 722 of 2004, LPA 1023 of 2004 and LPA 1165 of

2004

PART A

(a) for the next three years whenever an advertisement is

made by the respondent corporation for filling up

vacancies in Class III and Class IV posts, an opportunity

shall be given to the appellants to submit their

applications, which, if submitted, shall be considered

along with all other candidates but giving age relaxation to

the appellants and also giving due weightage to the past

services rendered by the appellants.

21. In terms of the aforesaid order, the appeals stand

disposed of.”

15 The judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was assailed in a

batch of Special Leave Petitions20 filed by six Unions and Associations representing

the workers. In the meantime, LIC began the process of implementing the judgment

of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on 21 March 2007 by issuing an

advertisement for recruitment of Assistants, by allowing age relaxations and

weightage for temporary workers to compete with candidates from the open market.

On 11 February 2008, this Court directed the maintenance of status quo. The civil

appeals were eventually disposed of by a two-judge Bench of this Court on 18

March 2015 in Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees

Association v. Life Insurance Corporation of India21 which concluded that the

Srivastav Award was binding. While restoring the Srivastav Award, the judgment of

this Court directed LIC to implement its directions and set aside the judgment of the

Delhi High Court.

20 Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No 15269 of 2007 with SLP (Civil) No 18943 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No 19958 of 2007,

SLP (Civil) No 20058 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No 22712 of 2007 and SLP (Civil) No 23623 of 2007 21 (2015) 9 SCC 62 (“TN Terminated Employees Association”)

PART A

16 Following the judgment of this Court, LIC issued an advertisement on 21 July

2015 calling for applications from workers who were employed as

badli/temporary/part-time workers in its establishment from 20 May 1985 to 4 March

1991, in terms of the eligibility criteria determined by the award. This led to the

institution of contempt proceedings before this Court on the ground that by

restricting the eligibility for recruitment to workers who were engaged between 20

May 1985 and 4 March 1991, LIC was in breach of the directions of this Court in TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra). LIC also instituted review petitions

against the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra). The

review petitions and the contempt petitions were directed to be heard together. On 9

August 2016, the review sought by LIC was partially allowed22 by restricting the

award of back-wages to 50 per cent. The relevant part of the directions of this Court

is reproduced below:

“The temporary and badli workers of LIC, who are entitled for

regularisation as permanent workmen in terms of the

impugned judgment and order dated 18.03.2015 passed by

this Court, by applying the terms and conditions of the

modified award dated 26.08.1988 passed by Justice Jamdar,

are held to be entitled to full back wages as well. However,

keeping in mind the immense financial burden this would

cause to LIC, we deem it fit to modify the relief only with

regard to the back wages payable and therefore, we award

50% of the back wages with consequential benefits. The back

wages must be calculated on the basis of the gross salary of

the workmen, applicable as on the date as per the periodical

revisions of pay scale as stated supra. The computation

must be made from the date of entitlement of the

workmen involved in these cases, that is, their

absorption, till the age of superannuation, if any concerned

workman has attained the age of superannuation as per the

22 (2016) 9 SCC 366

PART A

regulations of the review petitioner-LIC, as applicable to the

concerned workman.”

(emphasis supplied)

17 The curative petitions instituted by LIC challenging the judgment in review

were rejected on 22 February 2017. In March 2017, LIC sorted out and distributed

the applications which had been received in pursuance of its notice dated 21 July

2017 through its zonal offices for implementation of the decision in TN Terminated

Employees Association (supra). On 16 May 2017, LIC issued directions to the

Zonal Managers to implement the Srivastav Award and the order of this Court in the

review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra). The circular prescribed

the following norms of eligibility for absorption:

(i) The worker should have been engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4 March

1991;

(ii) The name of the worker should figure in the list submitted by the Unions to

the CGIT in the industrial reference;

(iii)Class III workers ought to have been engaged for at least 85 days in two

calendar years while Class IV workers should have been engaged for at least

70 days in three calendar years;

(iv)The Union or the Association should have been an appellant before the

Supreme Court;

PART A

(v) The claimant worker should have submitted a biodata in pursuance of the

notice issued by the LIC on 21 July 2015 for recruitment in regularised

positions; and

(vi)The worker should have been engaged in accordance with the rules prevalent

in LIC.

18 In 2017, various divisions of LIC found 245 workmen to be eligible and they

were offered absorption by the Zonal Offices. This led to the initiation of contempt

proceedings23 by the Unions who sought the absorption of all temporary, part-time

and badli workers and daily wagers who were engaged after 20 May 1985 till date.

19 On 11 May 2018, a two-judge Bench of this Court24 directed the petitioning

Unions in the contempt proceedings to submit material documents to show the

engagement of the workers between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991. This Court

also directed LIC to nominate a senior official to scrutinise the documents and to

take a final decision in accordance with the prescribed conditions. Consequently,

LIC received about eighty-three thousand representations. Upon scrutiny, LIC found

seventy-six workers to be eligible for absorption. By an order dated 7 September

2018, a two-judge Bench of this Court25 directed the CGIT at New Delhi to decide

upon the eligibility of the claims made by the Unions, Associations and individual

workers within a period of three months. However, the Court found that there was no

23 Contempt Petition (Civil) 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal 6950 of 2009 24 Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of

2009 (11 May 2018) 25 Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of

2009 (7 September 2018)

PART A

breach of the judgment dated 18 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees

Association (supra). The order of this Court is extracted below:

“The crucial dispute in these proceedings is regarding the

beneficiaries of the Award dated 18.06.2001 in I.D. No.27 of

1991 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT),

New Delhi.

The Award has been finally upheld by this Court in the

judgment rendered in Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time

Temporary LIC Employees Association v. Life Insurance

Corporation of India and Others, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 62.

Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India

appearing for the respondents/LIC, submits that for want of

documents/materials, the LIC is not in a position to verify as

to who are the actual beneficiaries of the Award. Learned

counsel appearing for the Union(s) and the individual

workers, however, would submit that despite producing the

records and despite availability of the original records with the

LIC, no positive decision is taken by it.

Faced with such a situation, we are of the view that the

CGIT, New Delhi should look into the matter with regard to

the claims made by the Union(s)/individual workmen,

regarding entitlement to the benefits under the Award and

submit a report to this Court. Accordingly, we direct the CGIT,

New Delhi to look into the claims made by the

Union(s)/individual Workmen and submit a report to this Court

within three months.

There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents

that the benefit of Award should be made available to those

who have been engaged as Badli workers after 4.3.1991.

That is a matter for interpretation by this Court. For the time

being, CGIT, New Delhi would limit its enquiry only to the

claims of the Badli workers between 20.05.1989 and

04.03.1991, as already indicated by this Court in the order

dated 11.05.2018.

We do not find that it is a case of contempt. Therefore, the

contempt notices are discharged. However, the

applications/petitions be kept pending for the purpose of

necessary assistance to the Court.”

PART A

On 10 September 201826, the above order was modified by the same two-judge

Bench in the following terms:

“There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents

that the benefit of Award should be made available to those

who have been engaged as Badli/Part-time/Temporary

workers after 4.3.1991. That is a matter for interpretation by

this Court. For the time being, CGIT, New Delhi would limit its

enquiry only to the claims of the Badli workers between

20.05.1985 and 04.03.1991, as already indicated by this

Court in the order dated 11.05.2018.”

(emphasis supplied)

20 Thereafter, on 12 December 201827, while dealing with the batch of contempt

petitions, a two-judge Bench of this Court directed the CGIT, in terms of this Court’s

previous directions dated 7 September 2018 in the same contempt proceedings, to

“look into the matter with regard to the claims made by the Union(s) individual

workmen”. The CGIT was directed to submit its report within four months, as

contemplated by the order dated 7 September 2018 and modified on 10 September

2018 in the contempt proceedings. Between October 2018 and 16 May 2018, the

CGIT issued notice to the Unions and individuals in the earlier industrial reference to

submit their claims. As many as 15,500 claims were submitted on behalf of the

Unions, Associations and individual workers claiming absorption and the benefit of

the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001. LIC submitted its responses before the

CGIT. The CGIT submitted its report on 31 May 201928 to this Court. The report of

26 Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of

2009 (10 September 2018) 27 Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of

2009 (12 September 2018) 28 “Dogra Report”

PART B

the CGIT will be referred to as the Dogra Report, adopting the name of the presiding

officer.

B Dogra Report

21 Before the presiding officer of the CGIT, LIC set up the plea that only those

workers whose names were mentioned in the original certified list in the industrial

reference were entitled to the benefit of the Srivastav Award. LIC argued that this

was also the direction issued by the Supreme Court in the contempt proceedings

arising out of a review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) on 10

September 2018 and reiterated on 12 December 2018. On the other hand, the

Unions representing the workers, as well as the individual workers, claimed that they

were entitled to the benefit of the award irrespective of whether their claim found

place in the original list as certified before the CGIT in the industrial reference.

Dealing with this aspect, the Dogra Report concluded that though the order dated 10

September 2018 required the CGIT to verify the list which was already on the

record, this did not imply that only those workers whose names figured in the

certified list were entitled to absorption, to the exclusion of others. Paragraphs 24

and 25 of the Dogra Report have a bearing on the present proceedings and are

hence extracted below:

“24. To my mind, answer to this question has to be given

in the light of backdrop of the circumstances which

culminated into passing of the Award in ID case No.27 of

1991 which was admittedly upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court

in its judgment dated 18/3/2015 reported as (2015) 9 SCC 62

– Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC

Employees Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India. No doubt,

PART B

Hon’ble Apex Court in its order dated 10/9/2018 has observed

that this Tribunal will verify the list which is available on

record. But this does not mean that only such workmen

whose names are mentioned in the original/certified list

attached with the reference, are liable to be considered for

absorption, to the exclusion of other workmen. This Tribunal

has to keep in mind that contempt petitions were earlier filed

by members of Various Unions before Hon’ble Supreme

Court and LIC had also filed contempt petitions in High Court

of Delhi against Regional Labour Commissioner. During

pendency of said petition, E. Prabhavati and others were

impleaded as party at the instance of LIC vide order dated

25/9/2008. Thereafter, memo of parties was filed by LIC by

adding Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees

Welfare Association as Respondent No.47. In view of this, the

contention of the LIC that members of E. Prabhavati & others

or Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Welfare

Association are not entitled to any relief, is not tenable, when

the said Association has been held to be necessary party.

There is not even a whisper in any of the judgment/order of

Hon’ble High Court or Hon’ble Supreme Court that only

workmen whose names are mentioned in the certified/original

list of CGIT Award are to be granted relief. An overall

examination of the order dated 10/9/2018 of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court shows that this Tribunal is required to verify

the list available on record but there is no direction to exclude

members of other Union/workmen inasmuch as Hon’ble the

Apex Court while considering the claims of contempt

petitioners has ordered this Tribunal to consider the claims of

those workers who were employed as Badli workers with the

Management of LIC during the period from 20/5/1985 to

4/3/1991 subject to fulfilment of number of days as mentioned

in the Award.

25. It is settled principle of law that while considering the

order/judgment of Constitutional Court, this Tribunal is

required to keep in mind entire spectrum of the orders as well

as background of the case. It is not proper to cull out a single

para or a sentence from the order/judgment so as to defeat

the very purpose of the order so passed by Hon’ble Supreme

Court. If the orders dated 11/5/2018, 7/9/2018 and 10/9/2018

are taken into consideration, it is crystal clear that claims of all

such workmen and Union/s who worked as Badli workers

during the period from 20/5/1985 to 4/3/1991 are required to

be considered by this Tribunal. Although I am in full

agreement with the submission made on behalf of the

PART B

Management/LIC that initial onus is always upon the

workmen concerned to prove that they were in the

employment of the Management at the relevant time,

however this Tribunal cannot ignore the fact that UC has not

filed on record any document/record relating to employment

of various workmen rather has simply taken a plea that same

being old record is not traceable.”

22 The Dogra Report noted that LIC had admitted that 321 workers were found

to be eligible for absorption in terms of the Srivastav Award. The report found fault

with LIC for making contradictory claims that 321 workers were eligible for

absorption when the records of workers were allegedly old and not traceable. The

Dogra Report drew an adverse inference against LIC for having failed to maintain

the records in pursuance of the burden cast upon it by Section 25-D of the ID Act,

particularly when the reference was pending since 1991. Paragraph 29 of the report

is extracted below:

“29) During the course of arguments as well as in the reply

filed on behalf of the Management/LIC, it is clear that

Management has admitted that till date 321 Nos. of

employees were found to be eligible in terms of the Award

and they were considered eligible for absorption. It is not

understandable to this Tribunal as to what were the basis for

the Management/LIC for coming to the conclusion that only

321 Nos. of workmen/employees were found to be eligible

and covered by the Award of CGIT in ID case No.27/1991,

when the Management has come up with a plea that record

relating to the workmen being old record is not traceable. It is

worthwhile to mention here that Section 25-D of the ID Act

specifically provides that it is the duty of every Employer to

maintain a muster roll and to provide for the making of entries

therein by the workmen who may present themselves for

work at the establishment. This Tribunal has to keep in mind

a vital fact that since the reference bearing ID No.27/1991 is

pending before various Courts since 1991, the

Management/LIC was/is required to keep the record in safe

custody when the case of such a huge magnitude was

PART B

pending before the Courts. In such circumstances, this

Tribunal is constrained to draw adverse inference against the

management.”

23 Based on the above hypothesis, the report proceeded to decide “prima facie”

the claims of the Unions and individual workers. While taking up the claims made by

the All India Life Insurance Employees Association and its affiliate, Life Insurance

Employees Association, Delhi, the report notes that 6998 claims had been filed (as

contained in Annexure A). Upon scrutiny, LIC drew the attention of the CGIT to the

fact that 3592 duplicate entries were found in the claims which were submitted (as

contained in Annexure A-1). Noting that the “Unions have not seriously disputed the

same”, the Dogra Report concludes that “such claimants are to be given benefit of

absorption only once”. The Dogra Report also notes that workers who had started

working beyond the cut-off date of 4 March 1991 would not be covered in the

enquiry. This observation in the Dogra Report was in view of the order of this Court

in the contempt proceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated Employees

Association (supra) on 7 September 2018, which had specifically observed that

whether the benefit of the Srivastav Award should be given to those who had been

engaged as badli workers after 4 March 1991 was a matter for interpretation by this

Court. Hence, for the time being, CGIT had been directed to limit its enquiry only to

the claims for the period between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991 (as contained in

Annexure A-2). In this context, the Dogra Report held that those workers who had

commenced work after 4 March 1991 would not be covered by its enquiry.

PART B

24 The Dogra Report accordingly found the following workers to be entitled to

absorption:

a) The All India Insurance Employees Association Calcutta and Western Zone

Insurance Employees Association had filed a claim on behalf of 3337 workers

as part of the list contained in Annexure B. LIC argued that in this list of 3337

workers, 3332 workers did not find mention in the original certified list. The

Dogra Report perused the documents and found that all 3337 workers were

entitled to the benefit of absorption;

b) All India LIC Employees Association had filed claims on behalf of 97 workers

as a list contained in Annexure C. The Dogra Report found that all 97 workers

(except one who commenced work post 4 March 1991) were entitled to

absorption and LIC’s argument of fabrication of documents was baseless

when considered against the general practice of the Branch Managers at LIC;

c) National Organization of Insurance Workers filed a claim on behalf of workers

as a part of Annexure D. The Dogra Report found that all 401 workers in

accordance with Annexure D were eligible for absorption;

d) The All India National Life Insurance Federation Bombay filed two claims on

behalf of 1674 workers of the Nagpur Association (Annexure E) and 371

workers of the Hyderabad Association (Annexure F). The Nagpur Association

conceded that approximately 84 entries were blank, and 38 workers who had

worked after 4 March 1991 and three who worked prior to 1 January 1982

would not be entitled to any benefit. Thus, the 1590 remaining workers of the

PART B

Nagpur Association were found to eligible for absorption (contained in

Annexure E-1). The legal heirs of two deceased workers were held to be

entitled to monetary benefit in lieu of service. As regards the 371 workers of

the Hyderabad Association, the Dogra Report excludes those who had either

worked prior to 20 May 1985 or after 4 March 1991 and those eligible for

absorption were detailed out in Annexure F-1;

e) The Akhil Bhartiya Jivan Nigam filed claims on behalf of 890 workers as a part

of a list contained in Annexure G. It was admitted that of the 890 workers, 692

were engaged after 4 March 1991, there were 8 repeat entries and 2 workers

were engaged prior to 1985. Consequently, after carrying out the exclusions,

Annexure G-1 represented the list of eligible workers identified by the Dogra

Report for absorption;

f) The Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Welfare

Association filed claims on behalf of 376 workers in Annexure H. After

excluding those who had worked prior to or after the cut-off date, a list of

eligible employees was tabulated by the Dogra Report in Annexure H-1.

Workers who had reached the age of superannuation were held entitled to

receive all consequential benefits from LIC; and

g) Annexure I contained the names of a group of workers, described as the “EPrabhavati workmen”

29 containing 1333 workers. After excluding those who

had worked less than the requisite number of days for absorption and those

who had been engaged after 4 March 1991, the Dogra Report found the

29 Interchangeably referred as “E Prabavathy”

PART B

remaining workers to be eligible for absorption and their claims were

tabulated in Annexure I (A). The specific case of the E Prabhavati group of

workers will be dealt with in the course of the present judgment. At this stage,

it is be material to note that LIC had contended that this batch of workers had

been specifically excluded by paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award.

Notwithstanding this, the Dogra Report has held that this batch of workers

would also be entitled to absorption.

25 Apart from the persons named in the annexures mentioned above, the Dogra

Report has concluded that the following claims by the Union for absorption would

have to be allowed:

(i) Annexure J filed on behalf of 36 workers by the LIC Workers Union Kanpur –

where 35 workers were allowed absorption (except 1 worker recruited after

the cut-off date);

(ii) Annexure K filed on behalf of 17 workers by the LIC Workers Union, Gujarat

Unit – where 4 out of the 17 workers were held eligible;

(iii)Annexure L filed on behalf of 119 workers from the Jodhpur Division of LIC –

where all were held eligible for absorption (while it was noted that 1 worker’s

name appeared twice);

(iv)Annexure M – 22 workers were held entitled to absorption;

(v) Annexure N – 2 workers out of the 54 were held entitled to absorption since

only these two worked during the relevant period;

PART C

(vi) Annexure O – 1 out of 9 workers was held entitled to absorption, since the

others had been employed after the cut-off date of 4 March 1991;

(vii) Annexure P – 4 workers were held entitled to absorption;

(viii) Annexure Q – workers in this list were held not entitled to the benefit of

absorption as they had worked after the cut-off date of 4 March 1991; and

(ix)Apart from the above annexures, the Dogra Report scrutinized the claim of

several individual workers and determined whether they were entitled to

absorption.

C LIC’s objections to the Dogra Report

26 Broadly speaking, LIC has urged the following objections to the Dogra Report:

(i) The CGIT was not entrusted with the task of adjudication but of verification;

(ii) The orders passed by this court in the contempt proceedings arising out of the

review of the decision in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) on

11 May 2018, 7 September 2018 and 10 September 2018 indicate that:

(a) In the course of verification, CGIT was not entitled to travel beyond the

Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001;

(b) The CGIT had to verify only those claims where the workers were

engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991; and

and part-time workers whose names were contained in the original

PART C

certified list in the reference leading to the Srivastav Award dated 18 June

2001;

(iii)The CGIT was duty-bound to verify only the documents produced by LIC to

determine whether the workers were working during the specified period. The

Dogra Report has found that almost all the names of workers submitted by

the Union were eligible without due verification;

(iv)A total of 15,465 claims were submitted, which include:

(a) Persons who were engaged beyond the stipulated period between 20 May

1985 and 4 March 1991;

(b) Persons whose names were not in the certified list before the CGIT in the

industrial reference; and

Srivastav Award, as expressly set out in paragraph 75 of the award;

(v) During the course of the verification by LIC, it was found that the

documents/material produced by several workers were fabricated and there

was a duplication of names; and

(vi)Though paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award had categorically held that the

group of workers described as the “E Prabhavati” group were not entitled to

relief, the Dogra Report held them to be entitled for absorption. LIC has also

submitted objections to the certification which has been carried out in respect

of certain workers whose names are set out in the annexures to the Dogra

Report.

PART D

27 At this stage, it would be material to note that the original certified list of

workers in the reference contained the names of 4024 workers. According to LIC, if

the certification exercise carried out in the Dogra Report were to be accepted, about

11,780 workers would be entitled to absorption.

D The E Prabavathy Group

28 The Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001 details the history pertaining to this

group of workers. Paragraphs 19-20 and 75 of the Award are extracted below:

“19. Thereafter the employees employed as temporary,

badli and part time after 20th May 1985 raised demand for

their absorption regularising too in the regular service. When

their demands were not accepted by the corporation several

writ petitions in this respect were filed before the Hon’ble High

Court of Madras. These writ petitions were filed before the

Hon’ble High Court of Madras between the years 1989 to

1991. The writ petition No.10367/89 filed was between the

terminated full time temporary LIC Welfare Association and

Senior Divisional Manager, LIC, Khanjawar. This writ petition

alongwith other writ petitions total 18 writ petitions were listed

for hearing before the full bench of Hon’ble High Court of

Madras. After hearing the parties of all the writ petitions the

Hon’ble High Court of Madras gave judgment which is

reported as 1993(1) LLJ 1030 between terminated full

temporary employees welfare association and Senior

Divisional Manager, LIC, Khanjawar. All the writ petitions

were dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras.

20. Parties had then preferred civil appeal before the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India against judgment of the

Hon’ble High Court of Madras. These civil appeals were

numbered as SLP (C) 10393 to 10413/92 E. Prabhawati and

others Vs. LIC of India and others. It appears that in the said

civil appeal on the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

Corporation had framed a scheme for the regularization of the

employees who were granted ad hoc appointments for 85

days at intervals from time to time was placed before the

PART D

Hon’ble Supreme Court. After hearing the parties by means of

interim order dated 23-10-92 found the scheme as

reasonable and was approved to the existence of the scheme

contained in clauses (a) and (d) of paragraph 1 and the

corporation was directed to proceed to regularise the

employees eligible in accordance with the scheme. The

clauses of (a) and (d) of the scheme have been reproduced in

the order by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. With the

aforesaid direction all the civil appeals were disposed of by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

[…]

75. Now as regard the binding effect of the order dated 23-

10-92 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP No.

10393-10411/92 E. Prabhawathy and others Vs. Life

Insurance Corporation of India and another confirming the

scheme of absorption/regularisation as argued on behalf of the

corporation in my view can be well accepted. The order

passed I find is between the same parties. E. Prabhawathy

and other is the party in this proceeding being impleaded at

the subsequent stage of the proceeding. Statement of claim

has been filed in the present case by the aforesaid workmen.

The said order dated 23-10-92 of Hon’ble Supreme Court is

thus between same parties of the case and in view of the

circumstances. I find that workmen has no ground to challenge

the legality of the said order dated 23.10.92. The conditions of

the workmen made in this regard are not accepted.”

29 At this stage, it would be material to note that on 23 October 1992, a threejudge Bench of this Court specifically dealt with the above group of workmen in E

Prabavathy (supra). The judgment of this Court is extracted below in its entirety:

“ORDER

Special Leave granted.

In State of Haryana & Ors. etc. etc. v. Piara Singh & Ors. etc.

etc., (JT 1992(5) S.C. 179), this court indicated how

regularization of adhoc/temporary employees in Government

and Public Sector Undertakings should be effected. While

PART D

laying down the guidelines in this behalf, this court observe in

paragraph 43 as under:-

"The normal rule, of course, is regular

recruitment through the prescribed agency

but exigencies of administration may

sometimes call for an adhoc or temporary

appointment to be made. In such a situation,

effort should always be to replace such an

adhoc/temporary employee by a regularly

selected employee as early as possible.

Such a temporary employee may also

compete along with others for such regular

selection/appointment. If he gets selected,

well and good, but if he does not, he must

give way to the regularly selected candidate.

The appointment of the regularly selected

candidate cannot be withheld or kept in

abeyance for the sake of such an

adhoc/temporary employee."

The LIC was asked to work out a scheme for the purpose of

regularization of employees who were granted adhoc

appointments for 85 days at intervals from time to time. The

learned counsel for the LIC has placed before us a Scheme

for regularization of such adhoc employees. We have given

our anxious consideration to the Scheme proposed by the LIC

and have also heard both Mr. Ramamurthy and Mr. Salve at

length and we are of the opinion that the Scheme proposed

by LIC is a reasonable one and commands acceptance, save

and except the fact that the recruitment scheduled for

November, 1992 will be postponed by not less than six weeks

to enable the eligible adhoc employees to compete with

others for selection at the said recruitment. We are of the

opinion that the relaxation granted to these adhoc employees

for having worked with the LIC in the past in the matter of age

and qualification suffices. The further provision that if such an

adhoc employee has worked between 20th May, 1985 and till

date for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years, is a

reasonable stipulation for eligibility for regularization. We are

of the opinion, the scheme is in consonance with the

guidelines which we have laid down in paragraphs 43 to 49 of

Piara Singh's judgment. Mr. Salve, the learned counsel for the

LIC, also informed us that in regard to future adhoc

appointments/regularization the LIC is in the process of

making a scheme consistent with the guidelines laid down in

PART D

Piara Singh's case so that this device of employment for 85

days which has not been approved may not be resorted to in

future. The Scheme contained in Clauses (a) to (d) of

paragraph 1, which is as under, is approved subject to the

postponement of the recruitment scheduled in November,

1992 by at least six weeks and the LIC will proceed to

regularize the employees eligible under the Scheme;

(a) All those temporary employees who have worked

for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years

with the Life Insurance Corporation between 20th

May, 1985 uptill date and who confirmed to the

required eligibility criteria for regular recruitment on

the dates of their initial temporary, appointment will be

permitted to compete for the next regular recruitment

to be made by the Life Insurance Corporation after

the regular recruitment for these posts currently

scheduled for November, 1992.

(b) These candidates will be considered on their

merits with all other candidates who may apply for

such appointments, including those from the open

market.

for applying for regular recruitment provided that they

were eligible on the date of their first temporary

appointment for securing regular appointment with the

Life Insurance Corporation.

(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can

apply for regular recruitment in the normal course.

This regularization will, in the circumstances, be by selection

for appointment. We make the above clauses of the Scheme

as part of our order.

Mr. Ramamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners,

further submitted that certain questions of law in regard to the

interpretation of section 84 of the LIC Act, 1956, as amended

by the LIC Amendment Act, 1981, and Section 2(oo) (bb) of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, arise for consideration in

the present case in view of the judgment of the Madras High

Court. We may state that we express no opinion on the said

questions of law as they do not survive in view of the scheme

PART D

which LIC has worked out and which we have approved. It is

not necessary for us to go into those questions and we leave

them open for decision in an appropriate case in future.

The Civil Appeals will stand disposed of accordingly with no

order as to costs.”

30 The above order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) indicates

that LIC had been directed by the Court to work out a scheme for the purpose of

regularising workers who were granted ad hoc appointment for a period of 85 days

from time to time. A scheme was prepared by LIC. The three-judge Bench had given

“its anxious consideration to the scheme proposed by the LIC” and having heard

both counsel for the workers and for LIC, held that it was “of the opinion that the

scheme proposed by LIC is reasonable one and commands acceptance”. The only

modification was a postponing of the recruitment which was scheduled on 1

November 1992 to allow eligible ad hoc workers to compete with others for selection

at the recruitment. This Court affirmed the relaxation of age and qualifications

granted by the scheme to eligible ad hoc workers who had worked between 20 May

1985 “till date” in any two calendar years. This Court accepted the scheme which

was proposed by LIC, subject to the modification noted above. This Court held that

regularisation would be by selection for appointment. The clauses of the scheme

were incorporated as a part of the order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy

(supra). In this backdrop, paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award specifically excluded

the claims of the E Prabavathy workers who were governed by the order of this

Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra). The grievance of the LIC is

PART E

that despite this, the Dogra Report concludes that this group of workers would be

eligible for absorption in terms of the Srivastav Award.

E Sequel to E Prabavathy

31 Following the order of this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy

(supra), LIC framed the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employment of

Temporary Staff) Instructions 1993. A contempt petition was moved before this

Court alleging that the scheme which was notified by LIC on 28 June 1993 was not

in accordance with the order in E Prabhavathy (supra). The contempt petition was

dismissed by this Court on 12 July 1993.

32 In 1998, a batch of writ petitions was filed in the High Court of Andhra

Pradesh seeking the relief of absorption on a permanent basis. Among the petitions

was a petition instituted by G Sudhakar and others. A Single Judge of the High

Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed the petition, placing reliance on the decision in

E Prabavathy (supra). On 3 November 1998, the Division Bench of the High Court

directed LIC to frame a scheme for regularisation. LIC preferred a Special Leave

Petition against the judgment of the Division Bench in G Sudhakar (supra) which

was allowed by this Court30 on 22 November 2001. A two-judge Bench of this Court

held in G Sudhakar (supra) that the scheme approved in E Prabavathy (supra)

shall govern the absorption of all ad hoc workers in the country. This Court’s order

dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra) is extracted below:

30 Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000

PART E

“This appeal is by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (for

short “the Corporation”) against the Division Bench Judgment

of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Respondents filed a

Writ Petition praying for a mandamus to the corporation for

their absorption on permanent basis which stood dismissed.

On an appeal being carried, the Division Bench of the High

Court disposed of the appeal with a direction to the

corporation to frame a scheme for regularisation of the

employees and regularise their services in accordance with

such scheme. It is this direction of the High Court which is the

subject matter of challenge in this Appeal.

Mr. Salve, the learned Solicitor General appearing for the

Corporation stated that, in fact, in the case of E. Prabhavathy

& Ors. v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. (Civil

Appeals arising out of SLPs Nos. 1039-10413/1992), this

Court was in seisin of a similar problem and during the

hearing of that appeal, a tentative scheme was produced

before this Court and the Court framed the terms of those

schemes as a part of the order and disposed of the appeal in

terms of the said scheme on 23rd October, 1992. The four

clauses of the said scheme which formed a part of the order

are quoted hereinbelow in extenso :-

“Scheme :

(a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85

days in any two consecutive calendar years with the Life

Insurance Corporation between 20th May, 1985 uptill date

and who conformed to the required eligibility criteria for

regular recruitment on the dates of their initial temporary

appointment will be permitted to compete for the next regular

recruitment to be made by the Life Insurance Corporation

after the regular recruitment for these posts currently

scheduled for November, 1992;

(b) These candidates will be considered on their merits with

all other candidates who may apply for such appointments,

including those from the open market.

applying for regular recruitment provided that they were

eligible on the date of their first temporary appointment for

securing regular appointment with the Life Insurance

Corporation;

(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can apply

for regular recruitment in the normal course.

PART E

According to the learned Solicitor General, since a scheme is

in existence, it is no longer necessary to evolve a fresh

scheme for these employees who were the parties before the

Andhra Pradesh High Court. He also stated that in the

meantime, a set of instructions have been framed called the

“Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employment of

Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993” which takes care of such

employees who were continuing for a fairly long period

without being regularised.

Mr. Krishnamurthy, the learned Senior Counsel, on the other

hand, contended that the aforesaid instructions will not

govern the case of the employees who were there before the

High Court, as they were the appointees between 1986 and

1993. He further contended that a similar matter, in the case

of The Management of the LIC of India v. Their Workmen

(C.A. Nos. 1790/89) a Bench of this Court has disposed of

with a direction to consider the case of regularisation

considering the suitability at a lesser standard by its judgment

dated 7th February, 1996 and, therefore, there is no infirmity

with the impugned direction of the High Court.

Having examined the judgment dated 7th February, 1996 of

this Court in C.A. Nos. 1790/89, we find that the earlier 3

judge bench decision dated 23rd October, 1992 has not been

noticed. The aforesaid three-judge bench decision

unequivocally makes the provisions of the scheme as a part

of the order. Necessarily, therefore, the case of regularisation

of the employees of the corporation could be dealt with in

accordance with the said scheme and it would not be

necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a group of

employees. Mr. Krishnamurthy further contended that the E.

Prabhavathy’s case (supra) relates to the employees of Tamil

Nadu division. But, it is not disputed that they are the

employees of the Corporation. If the Corporation has evolved

a scheme assuming for the Tamil Nadu division, then the

same could be equally applicable to the employees of all

Divisions in the country. That being the position, the scheme

which has been approved and formed a part of the order of

this Court dated 23-10-1992 should govern the case of these

respondents who were writ petitioners before the High Court

of Andhra Pradesh

Needless to mention, in the earlier decision of this Court

dated 23-10-1992 this Court has not limited the applicability of

PART E

the scheme only to the employees of the Tamil Nadu Division.

In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court of Andhra

Pradesh was not justified in issuing the impugned direction to

the Corporation to evolve a new set of scheme to govern the

case of the employees who had filed writ petitions in the High

Court. We, therefore, set aside the impugned direction of the

Division Bench of the High Court and substitute the same with

the direction that the case of regularisation of these

respondents shall be considered in accordance with the

scheme which formed a part of the order of this Court dated

23-10-1992, if not already considered. This appeal

accordingly stands disposed of.”

33 The above judgment of this Court in G Sudhakar (supra) lays down that:

(i) The order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) made the scheme

as a part of its order. Necessarily, the case for the regularisation of the

workers of LIC would be dealt with in accordance with the scheme. Hence, it

was not necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a different group of workers;

(ii) Though E Prabavathy (supra) dealt with workers of the Tamil Nadu Division,

the scheme which was evolved by LIC would equally be applicable to workers

of all divisions in the country;

(iii)The decision in E Prabavathy (supra) has not limited the applicability of the

scheme only to the workers of the Tamil Nadu division; and

(iv)The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was not justified in

evolving a new scheme to govern the workers who had filed a Writ Petition

and its judgment accordingly stands set aside.

34 The decision of a two-judge Bench of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC

v. Their Workmen (supra) arising out the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards has not

PART F

noticed the earlier decision dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench in E

Prabavathy (supra). Subsequently, on 18 January 2011 in LIC v. D V Anil Kumar31,

a two-judge Bench of this Court disposed of the appeal by accepting the terms of the

scheme framed by LIC for the absorption of Class IV workers. The attention of this

Court has also been drawn to an order dated 20 October 2016 of this Court in

Hashmuddin v. LIC32 followed by an order dated 15 January 2020, which accepted

a scheme formulated by LIC for workers who had rendered service for more than

sixteen years.

F Submissions

35 On behalf of LIC, Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel, made the following

submissions:

(i) As a consequence of the Dogra Report, LIC would be required to regularise

about 11,780 workers who claim to have worked for a limited number of days.

No verification of these claims has been done either by the LIC or by the

CGIT in the Dogra Report. This would amount to an illegal backdoor entry,

which would be contrary to the statutory regulations framed by the LIC.

Further, LIC would also face the issue of a lack of sanctioned posts for these

workers;

31 Civil Appeal Nos 953-968 of 2005 (“LIC v. D V Anil Kumar”) 32 Civil Appeal No 2268 of 2011

PART F

(ii) The Tulpule Award dated 17 April 1986 and the Jamdar Award dated 26

August 1988 directed the regularisation of persons working between 1

January 1982 and 20 May 1985 who: (a) had worked as Class IV workers for

a minimum period of 70 days in any three calendar years; or (b) had worked

as Class III workers for a minimum period of 85 days in any two calendar

years. However, these awards were substituted by a settlement which was

arrived at in the civil appeals before this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen

(supra), which were finally adjudicated upon by an order dated 7 February

1996;

(iii)Both the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards directed regularisation and absorption

without verifying the existence of sanctioned posts. During the pendency of

the litigation, LIC was injuncted from making fresh recruitment till the awards

were pronounced. As a result of the interim orders dated 15 January 1986

and 29 June 1987, LIC could not pursue an open, competitive and

transparent process for selection on the basis of an advertisement followed by

a written examination and interview. The last recruitment process took place

in 1984, and till 1993 there was no fresh recruitment. This necessitated the

making of temporary appointments between 1985 and 1991 to operate LIC’s

2048 branches across India;

(iv)The Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001 arose out of a reference dated 4

March 1991, which required the tribunal to adjudicate whether LIC’s action of

not absorbing badli/temporary/part-time workers employed after 20 May 1985

was justified. The award directed the absorption of “the concerned workmen”,

PART F

i.e., those employed after 20 May 1985 (and thus not covered by the Tulpule

and Jamdar Awards) who had worked as Class III workers for a minimum of

85 days in two calendar years or who had worked as Class IV workers for a

minimum of 70 days in three calendar years. The award directed that if

regular vacancies did not exist to accommodate these persons,

supernumerary posts would have to be created by LIC. Such a direction

would be contrary to the principles which have been enunciated in the

decision of this Court in ONGC v. Krishan Gopal33. LIC as a statutory

corporation is governed by its regulations, and no appointment beyond the

vacancies in sanctioned posts can be made;

(v) The LIC Act was amended by Act 1 of 1981. The amendment to Section

48(2A) stipulates that the regulations which have been framed prior to 1981

are deemed to be rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). Further, Section

48(2C) stipulates that the rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc) would override

the provisions of the ID Act. The provision has been held to be constitutionally

valid by this Court in M. Venugopal v. LIC34;

(vi)Though LIC is bound by the judgment of this Court in TN Terminated

Employees Association (supra) which has restored the Srivastav Award

(subject to its modification in the review petition in regards the quantum of

back wages), it is also bound by:

33 2020 SCC OnLine SC 150 34 (1994) 2 SCC 323 (“M. Venugopal”)

PART F

(a) The order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench of this Court in E

Prabavathy (supra) which upheld the scheme formed by LIC for

absorption of ad hoc workers;

(b) The order dated 22 November 2001 of a two-judge Bench of this Court in

G Sudhakar (supra) which held that the scheme which was accepted in E

Prabavathy (supra) would not be limited only to the workers in that case

but would be applicable to all the workers of LIC in all its divisions across

India; and

was recorded by this Court while disposing of the civil appeals by its final

order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra);

(vii) On 16 May 2017, LIC issued instructions under Regulation 4 of its Staff

Regulations to all Zonal Managers to implement the Srivastav Award and this

Court’s orders. Consequently, 245 workers were offered absorption after

being found eligible;

(viii) In terms of the order of this Court dated 18 January 2011 in LIC of India v.

D V Anil Kumar (supra), LIC framed a scheme to regularise Class IV workers

who were engaged for 5 years or more and consequently, 4770 persons were

appointed on regular posts;

(v) Following the order of this Court dated 11 May 2018 in the contempt

proceedings35, LIC received 8300 representations from individuals claiming to

be covered by the Srivastav Award, which were then scrutinised by a senior

35 Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009

PART F

officer. Subsequently, 76 claimants were found to be eligible for absorption in

addition to the 245 individual claimants who had been absorbed earlier;

(vi)By the order of this Court dated 7 September 2018 in the contempt

proceedings arising out a review of TN Terminated Employees Association

(supra), it was expressly made clear that:

(a) The question whether the benefit of the Srivastav Award should be made

available to those who were engaged as badli and temporary workers after

4 March 1991 is a matter for interpretation before this Court;

(b) The CGIT would limit its inquiry only to the claims of the workers who were

employed between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991; and

(vii) The above position is further clarified by this Court’s order dated 10

September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising out the review of TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra), in terms of which CGIT was

directed to verify the list which was available on its record. Thus, the CGIT

was required to scrutinise the applications claiming the benefit of the award

against the list of workers who were before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award.

Hence, LIC scrutinized the claims of only those who were part of the certified

list before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award and had worked between 20 May

1985 and 4 March 1991;

(viii) All India Life Insurance Employees Association and Life Insurance

Employees Association (R6 and R2 in the Dogra Report), All India Insurance

Employees Association and Western Zone Insurance Employees Association

PART F

(R3 and R4 in the Dogra Report), National Organisation of Insurance Workers

(R7 in the Dogra Report) and All India National Life Insurance Employees

Federation (R9 in the Dogra Report) were all signatories to the compromise

which substituted the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and was noted in this

Court’s interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra).

Further, by the order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their

Workmen (supra), the Karamchari Sangh (R10 in the Dogra Report) was also

directed to follow the terms of compromise. Hence, these Unions and

Associations who had entered into the compromise substituting the Tulpule

and Jamdar Awards are governed by its terms;

(ix)The scrutiny which was envisaged by the order of this Court required the

CGIT to: firstly, check the presence of the names of the claimants in the CGIT

list in the Srivastav Award; and secondly, conduct a verification of documents

such as appointment letters, extension letters and relieving letters to

scrutinise whether the claimants were actually employed for 70/85 days for

three/two years respectively. Based on this scrutiny, the 321 eligible workers

(245+76) who were beneficiaries of the Srivastav Award have already been

absorbed, and any other claims by the workers individually or through the ten

Unions are not maintainable;

(x) The Dogra Report has erroneously held that the compromise which was

arrived at between the parties was in addition to the rights declared in the

Tulpule and Jamdar Awards. To support its reasoning, the Report relies on

the findings of this Court at paragraph 39 to 41 of its judgment dated 18

PART F

March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra). However,

those observations have only adverted to the interim order dated 1 March

1989 of this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), and not its final order

dated 7 February 1996;

(xi)Instead of carrying out the task of verification, the Dogra Report only takes a

prima facie view and has merely stated that the majority of the workers were

eligible for absorption without carrying out the process of verification;

(xii) Though the Unions have admitted that they do not possess either the

residential addresses or other particulars of the claimants situated in various

regions, the Dogra Report has found 1452 workmen to be eligible across the

country; and

(xiii) In summary, the Dogra Report is flawed because it:

(a) Does not consider the CGIT certified list of the Srivastav Award, as

directed in the order of this Court dated 10 September 2018;

(b) Ignores that it was not carrying out an adjudicatory function but only a

verification exercise;

not being scrutinised, yet the final directions consider many such claims;

and

(d) Ignores paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award and gives benefit to persons

who are governed by the scheme accepted by this Court in E Prabavathy

(supra).

PART F

36 On behalf of the Unions, Associations and workers, arguments have been

addressed by Dr Manish Singhvi, Mr Pallav Sishodia, Mr R Singaravelan, Mr V

Prakash and Mr Salman Khurshid, Senior Counsel. In addition to the submissions of

Senior Counsel, we have heard Mr Nandakumar, Mr Rakesh Shukla and Mr

Shailesh Madiyal. In addition, Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers in various

Miscellaneous Applications have been furnished with an opportunity of being heard

in seriatim. The submissions which have been urged on behalf of the workers are

summarised below:

(i) The present proceedings in the Miscellaneous Applications pertain to the

implementation of the Srivastav Award dated 22 June 2001. The Srivastav

Award has been upheld in the decision of this Court in TN Terminated

Employees Association (supra);

(ii) The review petitions arising from the decision in TN Terminated Employees

Association (supra) were dismissed by the judgment in T N Terminated Full

Time Temporary LIC Employees Assn. v. LIC36 and the curative petition

was also dismissed on 22 February 2017. Thus, the Srivastav Award has

attained finality subject to the modification that the quantum of back-wages

has been reduced to fifty per cent. The doctrine of res judicata applies

between the parties and at this stage, it would not be open to set aside or

alter the contents of the award;

36 (2016) 9 SCC 366

PART F

(iii)Though the contempt petitions were disposed of, the CGIT was directed to

look into the implementation of the Srivastav Award. The Dogra Report dated

31 May 2019 has been prepared by the CGIT in pursuance of the mandate of

this Court;

(iv) Four grounds have been advanced on behalf of LIC to assail the Dogra

report:

(a) No documents were produced to establish that the workers had worked for

85 days and 70 days across a period of two and three years respectively;

(b) The Dogra Report had to consider only the CGIT certified list which was

part of the reference proceedings;

after 4 March 1991; and

(d) The Dogra Report also permits the absorption of the workers governed by

the judgment of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra);

(v) In response to the above grounds, it is submitted that the Dogra Report has

correctly drawn an adverse inference against LIC for not producing the

records which were in their possession, while approving the lists. Further, the

report duly notes that a majority of the workers had produced documents,

which have been accepted after verification;

(vi)In the event, however, that this Court is inclined to remit the proceedings back

for proper verification of the workers who are covered by the Srivastav Award,

the following methodology should be adopted:

PART F

(a) LIC has now stated before this Court that its divisional offices are in

possession of the records. LIC must produce in the first instance the

records available with it for the purpose of verification; and

(b) The verification to be carried out under the directions of this Court should

not be confined to any particular document and the primary onus must lie

on LIC to show whether the workers have actually worked during the

relevant period;

(vii) The Srivastav Award did not only deal with the cases of workers who had

actually filed cases in the industrial reference. The award specifies that it

would apply to all workers, and consequently directed that an advertisement

be issued for that purpose. If the award was intended to be limited to the

CGIT certified list, there was no occasion to direct a verification to be carried

out by the CGIT since the certified list was already available with LIC. Hence,

the direction in the order of this Court dated 10 September 2018 in the

contempt proceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated

Employees Association (supra), that the verification would be carried out of

the CGIT list, cannot be read out of context. Consistent with the principles of

collective bargaining under the ID Act, all workers who were beneficiaries of

the Srivastav Award should be granted absorption;

(viii) The plea that workers employed after 4 March 1991 are not entitled to relief

under the Srivastav Award is contrary to the provisions of Section 18(3)(d) of

the ID Act. The purpose of Section 18(3)(d) is to ensure that an award

governs not only those who are in service when it is made but to subsequent

PART F

workers as well. In any event, at least those workers who were in employment

on 18 June 2001, when the award was made, should be granted relief;

(ix)The applicability of the orders of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and G

Sudhakar (supra) has been considered in the judgment of this Court in TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra), and that interpretation has

attained finality. Hence, those orders ought not to become the basis to reopen

the present proceedings;

(x) As a matter of fact, the Dogra Report suffers from under-inclusion since the

claims of workers who were engaged after 4 March 1991 have not been

considered, though they may have applied in pursuance of the advertisement

issued by the LIC to implement the Srivastav Award;

(xi)The compromise which was arrived at before this Court, as noted in its orders

dated 1 March 1989 and 7 February 1996, indicates that it was confined to

persons who worked from 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985. Hence, it has no

relevance to the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001, which relates to

persons who were engaged after 20 May 1985;

(xii) The terms of reference which resulted in the Srivastav Award related to the

employment of badli, temporary and part-time workers after 20 May 1985.

Consequently, there is no warrant for restricting the operation of the award to

the period up to 4 March 1991 (which was the date of reference). The benefit

of the award must enure not only to the workers who were engaged as

temporaries or badlis after 20 May 1985 till the date of reference but the same

principle must also apply to workers who have been engaged thereafter; and

PART G

(xiii) The judgment of this Court has directed the payment of fifty per cent backwages. For the period after the date of the Srivastav Award, full back-wages

should be granted to those who have been absorbed. Back-wages cannot be

granted only for the period of 70/85 days, and at the rates which were made

applicable to the badli workers.

37 The rival submissions would now fall for analysis.

G Prelude – Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and their Aftermath

38 The Tulpule Award dated 17 April 1986 was made in the context of a

reference to the NIT pertaining to the absorption of badli/temporary/part-time

workers as regular employees of LIC. The award held that all workers who had

worked in any capacity, temporary, badli or part-time, between 1 January 1982 till 20

May 1985, should be considered as eligible for absorption provided that: (a) Class IV

workers ought to have worked for 70 days in any three calendar years; and (b) Class

III workers ought to have worked for 85 days in any two calendar years.

39 The Jamdar Award dated 26 August 1998 clarified the meaning of the Tulpule

Award dated 17 April 1986. The award discussed the object of the earlier reference,

and indicated that LIC had engaged badli/temporary/part-time workers on a largescale and restricted their employment to a particular number of days in order to

prevent them from gaining the status of permanency on the basis of the number of

days worked. Hence, it held that the object of the reference was to put an end to

PART G

such unfair legal practices, to regularise the employment of persons who would have

been ordinarily absorbed but for such practices and to reduce to a minimum the

disproportionately large contingent of such employees who had been deprived of

security of service. The Jamdar Award noted that the Tulpule Award did not

contemplate that in computing the number of work days only the days worked in

two/three consecutive calendars year should be taken into consideration. Further, it

noted that when the Tulpule Award spoke of “absorption”, it did not mean

“recruitment”.

40 The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were the subject matter of a challenge

before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in LIC v. Their Workmen

(supra). On 1 March 1989, this Court while granting leave to appeal recorded that

eight out of the nine Unions, representing about 99 per cent of the workers, had

entered into a compromise with LIC. It was in this backdrop that, pending the

disposal of the civil appeals, this Court permitted LIC and these eight Unions to

implement the terms of compromise, without prejudice to the rights of the ninth

Union. The terms of compromise envisaged that it would operate in substitution of

the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards on the question of the regular employment of the

workers concerned in those references. The terms of the compromise adopted the

norm of employment for 85 days in any two years for Class III workers and

employment for 70 days in any three calendar years for Class IV workers between 1

January 1982 and 20 May 1985. Temporary, part-time and badli workers who had

made applications before a stipulated date were held eligible to be considered for

PART G

regular employment. The compromise envisaged that the selection of candidates

shall be made on the basis of qualifications, age, written test and interview, and also

having regard to the number of days worked. According to the compromise, initially

a list of selected candidates was to be drawn up, from which regular employment

would be offered in order of merit prospectively from the dates notified, as and when

vacancies in sanctioned posts for regular employment were filled up from time to

time. Further, as a result of the compromise, the process of recruitment for these

candidates would be subject to certain relaxations. Finally, it was envisaged that the

dispute in relation to the workers concerned, which had resulted in the Tulpule and

Jamdar Awards, would no longer survive, and the rights and obligations of the

parties in relation to regular employment would be governed only by the

compromise.

41 The compromise was ultimately adopted in the final order of this Court dated

7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), which disposed of the civil

appeals. In the order, this Court accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out

of nine Unions (representing an overwhelming majority of workmen) had accepted

the compromise, the ninth Union must also act on the basis of its terms and

conditions. The Court, however, directed that LIC shall exempt Class IV workers

(whom the ninth Union was representing) from a test and interview, if it had the

power to do so under the regulations and instructions governing their conditions of

service. In the alternative, if there was no such power, it directed that the test which

PART G

was prescribed for these workers should be of a lower standard than the test

prescribed in the two circulars mentioned in the compromise.

42 There is absolutely no manner of doubt that the compromise which was

arrived at by eight out of nine Unions indicated that the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards

would stand substituted by the terms of the compromise. The compromise clearly

stipulated that the workers who fulfilled the requisite days of work in Class III or, as

the case may be, Class IV posts would be eligible. As and when vacancies would

arise, they would be offered regular appointment.

43 Prior to the final order of this Court in the civil appeals arising from the Tulpule

and Jamdar Awards, the litigation in the E Prabavathy batch was settled by the order

dated 23 October 1992. In the order, the Court found that the scheme for absorption

which was propounded by LIC was reasonable. The scheme envisaged that all

temporary workers who had worked for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar

years with LIC between 20 May 1985 and 23 October 1992 and who conformed to

the required eligibility criteria for regular appointment on the date of their initial

appointment, would be permitted to compete at the next regular recruitment to be

made by LIC. These candidates would be considered on their merit as against the

other candidates who applied for these posts, including from the open market. They

would also be given an age relaxation while applying for a post, if they were eligible

for it on the date of their first temporary appointment. This scheme was approved,

subject to the postponement by at least six weeks of a recruitment scheduled for

November 1992, in order to enable all eligible ad hoc workers to compete with

PART G

others for selection at that recruitment. The decision in E Prabavathy (supra) was

evidently not noticed in this Court’s order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their

Workmen (supra).

44 The order of a two-judge Bench of this Court dated 22 November 2001 in G

Sudhakar (supra) noted that in E Prabavathy (supra), a Bench of three-judges had

embodied the clauses of the scheme as a part of their order. Hence, the order in G

Sudhakar (supra) expressly clarified that though the scheme before this Court in E

Prabavathy (supra) was evolved in relation to a case from the Tamil Nadu Division

of the LIC, it would be equally applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC in the

country. Consequently, in G Sudhakar (supra), it was held that the scheme would

apply to workers who were before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh as well, and

there was no occasion for the High Court to direct that a new scheme should be

framed by LIC.

45 It is important to note that the orders of this Court dated 23 October 1992 (in

E Prabavathy (supra)) and 7 February 1996 (disposing the civil appeals challenging

the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards) pre-date the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001.

On the other hand, the order in G Sudhakar (supra), which was dated 22 November

2001, was evidently passed after the Srivastav Award.

PART H

H Srivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court

46 The reference before the tribunal leading up to the Srivastav Award was

made on 4 March 1991. The reference was in relation to the justification of LIC’s

non-absorption of persons recruited as temporary, badli and part-time workers after

20 May 1985. The Srivastav Award contains an observation that LIC was not guilty

of unfair labour practices by continuing persons recruited as temporary, badli and

part-time workers as non-regular employees. The above observation in the award

was in view of the submission of LIC (which was not refuted by the workers) that the

workers were continuing in their positions on the basis of injunction orders issued by

tribunals and the court, and due to the pressure of the Unions. However, the award

also noted that the terms of the reference did not encompass this aspect and the

tribunal was not recording a finding.

47 Paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award referred to the order of this Court dated

23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) which governed the scheme of

absorption/regularisation for that batch of workers. It noted that the E Prabavathy

group of workers were impleaded to the proceedings leading to the award, and had

filed a statement of claim. However, the award concluded that since the order dated

23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) was between the same parties, the

legality of the order of this Court could not be challenged by the workers before the

tribunal. Hence, the contention of the workers in that regard was not accepted.

48 In paragraph 88, the Srivastav Award concluded:

PART H

“88. In view of the fact, I am of definite view that such type of

workmen belonging to temporary and part time categories in

class III and class IV service of corporation who were

employed after following the procedure and were allowed to

continue service beyond the qualifying period and were

eligible and suitable in every respect should be given

absorption in the service from date of the vacancy in the

service in which they could have been absorbed. It will also

apply to those such employees whose services were

terminated by the corporation”

The award finds that LIC was not justified in denying absorption to those

temporary/badli/part-time workers who were employed after 20 May 1985, and that

they should be given absorption on the terms and conditions which were stipulated

in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (which were in respect of workers employed

between 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985). LIC was directed to take into

consideration their claim for absorption on the basis of their eligibility and suitability,

as dealt with in the Srivastav Award. Thus, all the badli, part-time and temporary

workers who have rendered the qualifying period of service and were suitable would

also have to be considered for absorption by LIC by publishing a notice in the

newspaper. The Srivastav Award directed that in case no regular vacancy was

available, supernumerary posts shall be created by LIC for the purpose of

absorption and that the case for absorption against existing vacancies would be

considered first, irrespective of regular recruitment.

49 The Srivastav Award was set aside by the Single Judge of the Delhi High

Court. The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of the Single Judge. Eventually,

PART H

the dispute travelled to and resulted in the decision of this Court in TN Terminated

Employees Association (supra).

50 The judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), dated 18

March 2015, arose from concurring judgments of a Single Judge and of the Division

Bench of the Delhi High Court by which the Srivastav Award had been set aside. In

appeal, the principal issue which came for consideration before this Court was:

“34.1. (i) Whether the setting aside of the award passed by

CGIT dated 18-6-2001 by the learned Single Judge by

placing reliance upon compromise reached between the

parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988, which was filed against the

award of Justice Tulpule, which award was clarified and

affirmed by Justice SM Jamdar, legal and valid?”

The next issue, in relation to the workers’ claim for relief, was consequential in

nature. After noticing the interim order dated 1 March 1989 passed by this Court in

the proceedings arising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their

Workmen (supra), Justice Gopala Gowda, speaking for the two-judge Bench,

observed:

“40. From the perusal of the above order of this Court

in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated

1-3-1989 (SC)] , nowhere has it been stated in the terms of

the compromise between the parties that the award of Justice

R.D. Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 which was clarified upon

reference made by the Central Government under Section

36-A of the Act by Justice Jamdar, is either set aside by this

Court or substituted the compromise terms in the place of the

award except the order referred to supra passed in the above

SLP No. 14906 of 1988. In fact, on the other hand it is clearly

stated that the compromise terms are between the parties to

the said SLP and that it shall not prejudice the respective

rights and obligations in relation to the members of the other

PART H

union. Therefore, the effect of the award of Justice R.D.

Tulpule with regard to the direction given to the Corporation

regarding absorption of badli, temporary employees as

permanent employees has not been substituted by terms and

conditions of the compromise.”

In the above extract, the Court referred to the interim order of this Court dated 1

March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) by which, pending the disposal of the

appeals, eight out of the nine Unions who had entered into terms of compromise

with LIC were permitted to implement it as an interim measure, without prejudice to

the rights and contentions of the remaining Union which had not entered into a

compromise. Relying exclusively on the interim order of this Court, it was held:

“41. The award of Justice R.D. Tulpule dated 17-4-1986

reiterated by way of clarification in the award passed by

Justice Jamdar dated 26-8-1988, in the dispute subsequently

has been operative even after the compromise arrived at

between the parties to the compromise in LIC v. Workmen [

SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1-3-1989 (SC)]

before this Court. Therefore, the contention of the learned

Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation that the said

awards are not in operation and that only the terms and

conditions of compromise and orders of this Court are binding

upon the workmen concerned in these appeals is both not

factually and legally correct. This abovesaid argument of the

learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation is not

tenable in view of the categorical statement made by this

Court in its orders passed in SLP referred to supra, wherein,

this Court has permitted the management and members of

the said 8 unions to implement the terms of compromise by

way of interim measure without any prejudice to the rights

and contentions of the members of other union who have not

entered into compromise with the management of the

Corporation. It is not the case of the Corporation in these

appeals either before CGIT or before the High Court or in

these proceedings the workmen concerned have also

accepted the said terms and conditions of the compromise

arrived at between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988. This

Court in the order passed in the abovesaid SLP which is

PART H

extracted hereinabove has made it very clear that the said

compromise was entered into between unions therein, but it

does not prejudice the rights and contentions of the workmen

concerned whose disputes are in relation to their absorption

in their respective posts who were appointed after 20-5-1985.

Further, even if some of the workmen are bound under the

said compromise that arose out of SLP No. 14906 of 1988,

this in no way deters their right to raise an industrial dispute

and get the same adjudicated vide order of reference by the

appropriate Government to CGIT. The award of CGIT was

concluded after rightly examining the facts, circumstances of

the case and the legal principles laid down in the awards

passed by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. More

importantly CGIT award was passed after rightly appreciating

the points of dispute referred to it and on the merits of the

case.”

The interpretation of the interim order which has been placed by the Court emerges

from the following extract:

“46. Further, by a careful reading of the said order

in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated

1-3-1989 (SC)] , it has been made clear that the awards

passed by NIT (by Justice Jamdar and Justice Tulpule) after

adjudicating the points of dispute in the industrial dispute

raised by similarly placed workmen is not disturbed by

substituting the terms and conditions of compromise between

the parties therein in SLP No. 14906 of 1988. Therefore, the

awards in relation to the absorption of the workmen as

permanent workmen in the Corporation have got statutory

force. This is what is stated by CGIT in its award dated 18-6-

2001 on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record, which

was erroneously set aside by the High Court by assigning

erroneous reasons which is sought to be justified by the

Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation by placing

reliance upon the orders and the Scheme framed in E.

Prabavathy [E. Prabavathy v. LIC, SLP (C) No. 10393 of

1992, order dated 23-10-1992 (SC)] and G. Sudhakar [ Civil

Appeal No. 2104 of 2000, order dated 22-11-2001 (SC)]

cases which Scheme has no application to the case of the

workmen concerned involved in these appeals referred to

supra.”

PART H

51 The Court proceeded to hold that both the award of Justice Tulpule, reiterated

by way of the clarificatory award of Justice Jamdar, are operative and they have not

been terminated by either of the parties as provided by Section 19(6) of the ID Act.

The Court held that the terms of compromise and the scheme formulated in E

Prabavathy (supra) and G Sudhakar (supra) do not result in the substitution of the

awards made by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. The Court held that the

Srivastav Award would have to be observed by LIC until it was replaced by another

settlement in relation to the service conditions of the workers under Section 12 read

with Section 18(3) of the ID Act or by another award following the termination of the

awards which are in operation. The judgment of this Court concluded that:

(i) The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue to remain operative;

(ii) The Awards do not stand substituted by the interim order of this court dated 1

March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra);

(iii)The orders of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and G Sudhakar (supra)

would not stand in the way of an adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal; and

(iv)Unless the awards are substituted either by another award or settlement, the

Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue to remain operative and binding.

52 On this basis, the Court concluded that the Srivastav Award was legal and

valid and shall be implemented by LIC by absorption of the workers concerned in

permanent posts. The operative direction which was issued by this Court is

extracted below:

PART H

“54. It is needless to mention that since we are of the view

that the award passed by CGIT in ID No. 27 of 1991 is legal

and valid, it shall be restored and implemented by the

Corporation by absorbing the workmen concerned in the

permanent posts and if they have attained the age of

superannuation, the Corporation will be liable to pay all

consequential benefits including the monetary benefits taking

into consideration the pay scale and revised pay scale from

time to time by the Corporation.”

53 None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers in the present batch

of cases disputed the factual position, asserted on behalf of LIC, that the judgment

of the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra)

affirming the validity of the Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoever to the

final order dated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civil appeals arising from the

Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra). The interim order

dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), which forms the basis of the

judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), was passed in the

backdrop of a compromise which was arrived between LIC and eight out of the nine

Unions and Associations representing the workers. Since the appeals were pending

at that stage, the Court granted liberty to the parties to the compromise to implement

its terms as an interim measure, without prejudice to the contentions of the ninth

Union which had not entered into the compromise. But noticeably, there is a clear

omission on the part of the Court in TN Terminated Employees Association

(supra) to refer to the admitted position that subsequently on 7 February 1996, this

Court in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) accepted the submission of LIC that since

eight out of the nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workers in Class

PART H

III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise, there was no justification for

the ninth Union to object. The Court held that it would be in the interest of industrial

peace that the ninth Union should also fall in line and act on the terms of the

compromise. The civil appeals in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) were disposed of in

terms of the above order dated 7 February 1996. The terms of compromise clearly

envisaged that the management and the workers had agreed that the awards of the

NIT dated 17 April 1986 (Tulpule Award) and 26 August 1988 (Jamdar Award) “be

substituted by the terms and conditions of compromise in relation to the question of

regular employment of the workmen concerned in the said references”. Once the

awards were substituted by the terms of compromise, it would be an impermissible

interpretation of law to hold that the awards continued to be operative and binding,

notwithstanding the final order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their

Workmen (supra). The final order dated 7 February 1996 has not been adverted to

by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra). The

factual finding is based only on the interim order dated 1 March 1989. The final order

dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) had a crucial bearing on

the special leave petitions arising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court setting

aside the Srivastav Award.

54 That having been said, it is necessary to also advert to the interpretation

which was placed on the decisions of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and G

Sudhakar (supra). The two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees

Association (supra) opined that the scheme which was framed in E Prabavathy

PART H

(supra) was the outcome of an order which was passed in writ petitions filed by the

workers and not in the course of the adjudication of an industrial dispute. On this

ground, the Court held that the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) would not come in

the way of an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while deciding a reference under

Section 10 of the ID Act. The background of the decision in E Prabavathy (supra)

has already been noticed earlier. The decision was rendered on 23 October 1992 in

a batch of civil appeals which was being considered by a three-judge Bench. During

the pendency of the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC to formulate a scheme

for the regularisation of workers who had been granted ad hoc employment for at

least 85 days from time to time. The three-judge Bench held, after assessing the

terms of the scheme proposed by LIC, that it was reasonable and commended itself

for acceptance. The scheme proposed by LIC was approved by this Court with a

specific observation that the clauses of the scheme extracted in the order would

form a part of the order of this Court. The decision of three Judges in E Prabavathy

(supra) was thereafter interpreted by a two-judge Bench in its order dated 22

November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra). Noticing that the scheme which has been

accepted in E Prabavathy (supra) governed workers of the Tamil Nadu Division of

LIC, the Court held that the scheme would be equally applicable to the workers of all

divisions of LIC in the country. The Court therefore held that it was not necessary to

evolve a fresh scheme for a different group of workers, in that case under the

directions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. As a matter of fact, it is also material to

note that in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award itself there was a specific finding

that though the E Prabavathy group of workers had been impleaded in the reference

PART H

and had filed a statement of the claim, having regard to the fact that the order of this

Court dated 23 October 1992 was between the same parties, the workers had no

valid ground to challenge the legality of this Court’s order before the tribunal.

Despite the clear observations in the Srivastav Award, the judgment of the two-judge

Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) has come to the

conclusion that the order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) would

not preclude an industrial adjudication by the tribunal. The two-judge Bench which

delivered the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) was

bound by the order in E Prabavathy (supra), which was of a larger Bench of three

judges, and the interpretation which was placed on it by another two-judge Bench in

G Sudhakar (supra). If the two-judge Bench differed, it had to refer the matter to a

larger Bench but it was not at liberty to take a final view at variance with binding

decisions of a larger Bench and of a co-ordinate Bench.

55 A plea has been urged on behalf of the workers that the judgment in TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra) has attained finality following the

dismissal of the review petition on 9 August 2016 (save for the modification by which

the quantum of back-wages was reduced to fifty per cent) and the subsequent

dismissal of a curative petition. We are cognizant that the ground, submitting that the

decision ignored the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen

(supra), was specifically pleaded in review. The only observation in the judgment in

review is that LIC has not submitted anything on record to indicate that the judgment

PART H

suffers from an error apparent in law. However, having regard to the immense

financial burden, the quantum of back-wages would be reduced to fifty per cent.

56 Now, there cannot be any dispute over the principle that the judgment in TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra), followed by the order in review dated

9 August 2016, are between the present parties and finality has attached to them.

LIC is, however, before this Court urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwide

presence, it is faced with a situation involving conflicting directions of this Court. LIC

has submitted that while on the one hand, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were

substituted by the terms of compromise on 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their

Workmen (supra), this was preceded by the order dated 23 October 1992 of a

three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) which accepted the scheme of

absorption proposed by LIC and followed by the order dated 28 November 2001 of a

two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar (supra) which interpreted the decision in E

Prabavathy (supra) as being applicable to all divisions of LIC. The impact of the

judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) is to substitute and

supplant the schemes which were evolved before this Court for providing absorption

on specified terms. The essence of the schemes which were accepted by this Court

was that those temporary, badli and part-time workers who fulfilled the requirement

of the threshold period of service would be eligible to be considered for the grant of

the permanency, subject to certain conditions. The orders passed by this Court

envisage that these workers would be considered for the grant of permanency in the

course of a recruitment process. The impact of the judgment of the two-judge Bench

PART H

in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) is that while on the one hand

the Court’s orders dated 23 October 1992, 7 February 1996 and 22 November 2001

continued to hold the field, on the other hand the restoration of the Srivastav Award

brings in place a regime in conflict with what has been accepted by this Court in

these orders. Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court to step in

and to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused by the decision in TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra) which has been urged to be per

incuriam. The consequence of not doing so is serious.

57 The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of the workers that the

principle which has been enunciated in the Srivastav Award and which has been

restored by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association

(supra) must apply to all workers subsequently engaged by applying Section

18(3)(d) read with Section 17A of the ID Act. Hence, a balance will now have to be

drawn by this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the

Constitution, which while on the one hand factors in the finality which has attached

to the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) but on the

other hand also factors in the essential concerns which have been expressed before

this Court by LIC. The formula of providing absorption to part-time, badli or

temporary workers who have put in 85 days in any two calendar years in a Class III

post or 70 days in any three calendar years in a Class IV post will, unless a balance

were to be drawn, become an avenue for disregarding the need for an open and

transparent process of recruitment by a public sector corporation governed by the

PART I

rule of law and the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The judgments

of this Court, in the context of public employment, lay stress on providing equality of

opportunity. As we have recorded earlier in the course of the statements of facts,

LIC had been restrained, due to the interim orders which were passed in the course

of the various proceedings, from taking recourse to recruitment through the open

market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders from pursuing an open

recruitment process, the situation which has now arisen is that unless a balance

were to be drawn, absorption of part-time and badli workers would become a

substitute for a recruitment process based on sanctioned posts, consistent with the

principles of reservation and pursued on the basis of a structured recruitment which

gives equal opportunities to all applicants. Such a consequence is a serious

detriment to constitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a public employer to

follow a process which is fair and in consonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution. An open and competitive process for recruitment will enable LIC to

recruit the best among the available talent. Substituting this by a back-door entry will

be detrimental to the interests of the corporation which is governed by statute.

I Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report

58 Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of LIC, assailed the

Dogra Report on the ground that the remit before the CGIT was only to verify and

not to adjudicate. There is no doubt about the premise that the task which was

PART I

entrusted to CGIT by the order of this Court dated 7 September 2018 in the

contempt proceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated Employees

Association (supra) was of verification. But it becomes necessary to consider

whether the remit to the CGIT was only confined to the certified list of workers in the

industrial reference. It is true that by the order of this Court dated 10 September

2018, the CGIT was directed to verify the list on the record. However, an isolated

sentence in the order of this Court cannot be read torn from its context. Paragraph

94 of the Srivastav Award required LIC to also consider the case of those workers

who belonged to the temporary, badli and part-time category, who had completed

the qualified period of working and were suitable in every respect but whose

services had been terminated. LIC was directed to publish a notice in the daily

newspapers so as to enable such workers to lodge their claims for absorption. LIC

issued a public notice in the newspapers on 21 July 2015. Each applicant was

required to submit a form for being considered for absorption, of which item 10(b)

required a disclosure of the details of the petition before the CGIT including whether

the applicant was a petitioner in the industrial reference. The crucial aspect,

however, is that the verification which was carried out by the CGIT was not

specifically restricted to the certified list of workers. The judgment of this Court in the

course of the proceedings in review, records the following submissions being made

on behalf of LIC:

“6. The learned Attorney General further submits that as on

31-3-2015, LIC had 55, 427 Class III employees and 5190

Class IV employees. If LIC is directed to consider the

absorption of the workmen to the advertisement, then the

PART I

number of Class III employees will increase by 11.14% and

Class IV employees by 56.65% and the same will affect the

employee's ratio in addition to the increase in its financial

burden and that the same will be contrary to the interests of

the policy-holders. The learned Attorney General estimates

the financial liability for implementing the order of this Court at

approximately Rs 7087 crores, with the annual liability at

around Rs 728 crores per year and that this will be a huge

financial burden for LIC to bear.”

The above submission indicates that if LIC were directed to consider the absorption

of the workers pursuant to the advertisement, the strength of the Class III employees

would increase by 11.1 per cent and Class IV employees by 56.65 per cent,

resulting in an annual financial liability of Rs 728 crores. Hence, there is merit in the

contention of the Counsel for the workers that the above submission, which is

recorded in paragraph 6 of the judgment in review, does not comport with LIC’s

present stance that the verification was to be confined only to the certified list.

59 This having been said, it is evident that the Dogra Report suffers from clear

and manifest errors. As we have already noted earlier, LIC had drawn the attention

of the Presiding Officer to the fact that the claims which had been submitted by the

Unions, Associations and individual workers during the course of the verification

contained duplicate entries. LIC has produced a chart containing details of various

workers and claimants. For convenience of reference, the chart is extracted below:

Chart containing details of various Workmen/Claimants from various Associations before the Ld. CGIT Court, New

Delhi in I.D. No. 27/1991.

NAME OF

UNION/ASSO

CIATION

All

India

Insur

ance

Empl

All

India

LIC

Empl

oyee

All

India

Life

Insur

ance

All

India

Natio

nal

Life

All

India

Natio

nal

Life

EP &

Ors

(TFTT

UCE

WA)

Tamil

Nadu

Termi

nated

Temp

Akhil

Bhar

atiya

Jeev

LIC

Work

ers’

Unio

IND

IVID

UAL

TOTAL

PART I

oyee

Asso

ciatio

Fede

ratio

Empl

oyee

Asso

ciatio

Insur

ance

Empl

oyee

Fede

ratio

nBNP

Insur

ance

Empl

oyee

Fede

ratio

n-VN

orary

Full

Time

LIC

Empl

oyees

Asson

Bima

Niga

Chat

hurth

Sreni

Kara

mch

ari

Sang

Kanp

A Claimants as

per their list 3337 97 6996 1674 371 1333 376 890 35 10

5 252 15465

Less DUPLICATE

ENTRIES 0 0 3582 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 3592

Less BLANK

ENTRIES 0 0 9 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93

B Net 3337 97 3404 1590 371 1333 375 881 35 10

5 252 11780

Less ENGAGED

AFTER

04.03.1991,

not reckoned

as per

Hon’ble SC

order

07.09.18

5 1 2109 38 22 477 102 692 1 10

0 33 3580

Less ENGAGED

BEFORE

20.05.1985,

not reckoned

as per

Hon’ble SC

order

07.09.18

0 0 2 3 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 10

C Net 3332 96 1293 1549 347 856 272 187 34 5 219 8190

Less Name not

found in

certified lists

received from

CGIT

3332 94 1184 1543 339 0 61 186 34 5 219 6997

Less Engaged less

than 85 days

(CIII)

0 0 9 1 0 11 90 0 0 0 0 111

Less Engaged less

than 70 days

(CIV)

0 0 7 1 6 6 36 0 0 0 0 56

D Net 0 2 93 4 2 839 85 1 0 0 0 1026

Less Party in E.P &

Ors 0 0 0 0 0 839 83 0 0 0 0 922

E Net 0 2 93 4 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 104

Less Documents 0 0 26 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 32

PART I

not submitted

to prove

eligibility

Less Criminal Case

pending 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Less Fabricated

Documents 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6

Found

eligible,

Absorbed

0 0 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65

Note:- 2 Individual Petitioners Sl.no. 29 & 31 have now submitted their claim through INTUC-BNP,

however no substantiating documents have been submitted”

60 The Dogra Report eventually concludes that the group of workers, who are

governed by the order of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra), would also be eligible

for absorption. By considering the workers who are governed by the order in E

Prabavathy (supra) to be eligible for absorption, the Dogra Report has fallen into a

clear error. The report has considered those workers who were clearly outside the

ambit of its remit since they were governed by a specific order of this Court. That

apart, it is evident that the Dogra Report has proceeded on a generalised

assumption that a majority of workers had produced documents are eligible for

absorption (having drawn a negative inference from LIC’s non-production of

documents). In this backdrop, it would be necessary to bring about a proper

verification before the claims of the workers can be truly considered. The deficiency

of the Dogra Report in carrying out a proper verification stands clearly established.

PART J

J The Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and Section

48 of the LIC Act 1956

61 Section 48 of the LIC Act confers a rule making power on the Central

Government. Clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48 was introduced by Act 1 of

1981 with effect from 31 January 1981. Under clause (cc), the Central Government

is empowered to frame rules dealing with the following matters:

“(cc) the terms and conditions of service of the employees

of the Corporation, including those who became employees of

the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act;”

62 Simultaneously by the Amending Act, sub-Sections (2A), (2B) and (2C) were

introduced into Section 48. These Sections provide as follows:

“(2A) The regulations and other provisions as in force

immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance

Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the

terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of

the Corporation including those who became employees and

agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this

Act, shall be deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of

sub-section (2) and shall, subject to the other provisions of

this section, have effect accordingly.

(2B) The power to make rules conferred by clause (cc) of

sub-section (2) shall include-

(i) The power to give retrospective effect to such rules;

and

(ii) The power to amend by way of addition, variation or

repeal, the regulations and other provisions referred to in subsection (2A), with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier

than the twentieth day of June, 1979.

(2C) The provisions of clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and subsection (2B) and any rules made under the said clause (cc)

PART J

shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective

effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect

from that date, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order

of any court, tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding

anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of

1947), or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award

or other instrument for the time being in force.”

63 By virtue of sub-Section (2A), the regulations governing the terms and

conditions of service of the employees and agents of LIC which were in force

immediately before Amending Act 1 of 1981, are deemed to be rules made under

clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) and have effect subject to the other provisions of the

Section. By a deeming fiction of law, the regulations which were in existence on the

date of the Amending Act in relation to the terms and conditions of service are given

the status of rules framed under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48. The

effect of sub-Section (2C) is that the provision of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) and

any rules made under it with retrospective effect, shall also be deemed to have had

effect from that date notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court,

tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act, or in

any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time

being in force. The rules which are framed under Section 48(2)(cc) operate with a

non-obstante clause which prevails, inter alia, notwithstanding anything contained in

the ID Act. The vires of the Amending Act was upheld in a judgment of a three-judge

Bench of this Court in A V Nachane (supra). Justice A C Gupta, speaking for

himself and Justice R S Pathak (as the learned Chief Justice then was), repelled the

challenge to the validity of the Amending Act based on Article 14 of the Constitution.

PART J

The Court also rejected the submission that sub-Section (2C), which was introduced

into Section 48 by the Amending Act, suffered from the vice of excessive delegation.

While upholding the Amending Act, the Court held:

“8. The contention that Article 14 is infringed arises on the

provision of sub-section (2-C) of Section 48 that any rule

made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of that section

touching the terms and conditions of service of the employees

of the Corporation shall have effect notwithstanding anything

contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is true that

after rules are made regarding the terms and conditions of

service, the right to raise an industrial dispute in respect of

matters dealt with by the rules will be taken away and to that

extent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will cease

to be applicable. It was argued that there was no basis on

which the employees of the Corporation could be said to form

a separate class for denying to them the protection of the

Industrial Disputes Act. The reply on behalf of the Union of

India and the Life Insurance Corporation was that the

remuneration that was being paid to Class III and Class IV

employees of the Corporation was far in excess of what was

paid to similarly situated employees in other establishments in

the public sector. Some material was also furnished to

support this claim though that were certainly not conclusive.

The need for amending the Life Insurance Corporation Act,

1956 as appearing from the preamble of the Amendment Act

and the Ordinance is as follows: “... for securing the interests

of the Life Insurance Corporation of India and its policyholders and to control the cost of administration, it is

necessary that revision of the terms and conditions of service

applicable to the employees and agents of the Corporation

should be undertaken expeditiously.” Referring to the

preamble of the Act the Attorney-General appearing for the

Union of India and the Corporation submitted that the problem

of mounting cost of administration led to the making of the

impugned law. He added that it was felt that no improvement

in the situation was possible by the process of adjudication

and a policy decision was taken that in the circumstances the

proper course was legislation and that is why the Amendment

Act was passed and the impugned Rules were framed. The

learned Attorney-General submitted that it was for Parliament

to decide whether the situation was remediable by

adjudication or required legislation. According to him the Life

PART J

Insurance Corporation Act as amended and the Rules made

after amendment placed the Corporation in the same position

as other undertakings, that the advantages being enjoyed by

the employees of the Corporation which were not available to

similarly situated employees of other undertakings have been

taken away removing what he described as discrimination in

favour of the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation.

We have already said that the material produced on behalf of

the Union of India and the Corporation to show that the terms

and conditions of service of the employees in several other

undertakings in the public sector compared unfavourably to

those of the Corporation employees was not conclusive. But

the burden of establishing hostile discrimination was on the

petitioners who challenged the Amendment Act and the

Rules. It was for them to show that the employees of the Life

Insurance Corporation and the employees of the other

establishments to whom the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act were applicable were similarly circumstanced to

justify the contention that by excluding the employees of the

Corporation from the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act

they had been discriminated against. There is no material

before us on the basis of which we can hold that the

Amendment Act of 1981 and the Rules made on February 2,

1981 infringe Article 14. We do not think that on the facts of

this case Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of

India [AIR 1958 SC 578 : 1959 SCR 12 : (1961) 1 LLJ 339] ,

and Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager [AIR 1964 SC 600 :

(1964) 5 SCR 683 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467] relied on by the

petitioners, have any application.”

64 The Court, however, held that Rule 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation of

India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules

198137 could not nullify the effect of a writ issued by this Court in its earlier decision

in LIC v. D.J. Bahadur38, which directed LIC to give effect to the industrial

settlement relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, award or

legislation. Holding that the Amending Act of 1981 and the Bonus Rules were

37 “Bonus Rules” 38 (1981) 1 SCC 315

PART J

relevant legislation, the Court held that these would operative prospectively from the

date of the publication of the rules. There was also a concurring opinion of Justice O

Chinappa Reddy. While dealing with the constitutional validity under Article 14, the

main judgment notes that after rules are made regarding the terms and conditions of

service, the right to raise an industrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the

rules is taken away and to that extent the provisions of the ID Act will cease to be

applicable.

65 In the subsequent decision of another Bench of three-judges of this Court in

M Venugopal (supra), the impact of the Amending Act of 1981 on the application of

the ID Act came up for consideration. The services of the appellant, who was a

probationary Development Officer in LIC, were terminated on his failure to fulfil the

targets assigned. A writ petition challenging the termination was allowed by a Single

Judge of the High Court on the ground that the termination amounted to a

retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, and that the

termination was void due to the failure to comply with Section 25F. In appeal, the

Division Bench held that as a result of clause (bb) which was introduced in Section

2(oo) from 18 August 1984, the termination of a probationer would not amount to a

retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo). Regulation 14(2) of the Staff

Regulations was, as a consequence of Section 48(2A) as introduced by the

Amending Act, deemed to be rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). Clause (4) of

Regulation 14 permitted LIC to discharge an employee during the period of

probation. Before the introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, there

PART J

were only three exceptions which excluded a termination of service from the ambit of

retrenchment, namely:

(i) Voluntary retirement;

(ii) Retirement on superannuation; and

(iii)Termination due to continued ill-health.

After the introduction of clause (bb), Parliament excluded from the purview of

retrenchment, in addition, the following:

(i) Termination as a result of the non-renewal of a contract of employment upon

its expiry; and

(ii) Termination of a contract under a stipulation in that behalf contained in the

contract of employment.

It was held that in this case the termination of the services of the probationer was in

terms of the contract of an employment in terms of the stipulation contained in

Regulation 14, and hence non-compliance with Section 25F would not vitiate the

orders of termination.

66 Justice N P Singh, speaking for the three-judge Bench, then went on to

elucidate on the impact of Amending Act 1 of 1981, more particularly the insertion of

clause (cc) into sub-Section (2) and the insertion of sub-Sections (2A), (2B) and (2C)

in Section 48. The Court held that the ID Act and the LIC Act have both been framed

by Parliament, with the amendments introduced from 31 January 1981 in Section 48

PART J

containing a non-obstante clause in sub-Section (2C) making the intent of

Parliament “apparent and obvious”. The Court held:

“The framers of the Corporation Act through the amendments

aforesaid have given the provisions of the Corporation Act an

overriding effect over the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, so far as the provisions relating to the terms and

conditions of employment, which are in conflict with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned.

Unless the said attempt is held to be ultra vires being in

conflict with any of the provisions of the Constitution it was

open to the Parliament to treat the employees and agents of

the Corporation as a separate class for purpose of fixing their

terms and conditions of service.”

67 The Court held that earlier the employees were governed by the regulations

framed by LIC under Section 49 as well as by the provisions of the ID Act. Hence, it

was open to the workers to enforce their rights and remedies in terms of the

regulations framed under the LIC Act or in accordance with the provisions of ID Act.

However, after the amendments which were introduced by Parliament in Section 48,

the employees of LIC would not be entitled to the protection of the ID Act to which

they were entitled before the enforcement of the amendment. The Court held that

the validity of the amendment had been upheld in the earlier decision in A V

Nachane (supra), and concluded:

“14. The amendments introduced in Section 48 of the

Corporation Act have clearly excluded the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act so far as they are in conflict with the

rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). The result whereof will

be that termination of the service of the appellant shall not be

deemed to be a “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section

2(oo) even if sub-section (bb) had not been introduced in the

said section. Once Section 2(oo) is not attracted, there is no

question of application of Section 25-F on the basis of which

PART J

the termination of the service of the appellant can be held to

be invalid. The termination of the service of the appellant

during the period of probation is in terms of the order of

appointment read with Regulation 14 of the Regulations,

which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section

48(2)(cc) of the Corporation Act.”

68 Therefore, in view of the amended provisions of Section 48(2A) and (2C), the

termination of the service of the appellant was held not to amount to a retrenchment

even when clause (bb) had not been introduced in Section 2(oo) of the ID Act. Since

Section 2(oo) would anyways not stand attracted where the services of a

probationer were terminated under Regulation 14(4) of the Staff Regulations which,

deemed to be a part of the rules under Section 48(2)(cc), has an overriding effect

over the ID Act and would prevail.

69 The above provisions of Section 48 were specifically placed before the twojudge Bench of this Court, as is evident from a bare reading of the judgment in TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra). However, the Court declined to go

into the submission based on the provisions of Section 48, holding that the Staff

Regulations provided only two types of employment: (i) Regular; and (ii) Temporary.

The Court held that employment in the capacity of badli/part-time workers was not

provided in the Staff Regulations, and there was no specific nomenclature of that

nature in the Staff Regulations. The decision of the two-judge Bench evidently does

not notice either the judgment in A V Nachane (supra) or the decision in M

Venugopal (supra), both of which have been delivered by three-judge Benches.

They are binding precedents and could not have been brushed aside.

PART J

70 That apart, it becomes necessary at this stage to advert to the provisions of

Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulations. Regulation 8(1) deals with temporary staff and

is prefaced with a non-obstante provision. Clause (1) of Regulation 8 is an enabling

provision empowering LIC to employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis,

subject to such general or specific directions which may be issued by the

Chairperson from time to time. Clause (2) of Regulation 8 stipulates that no person

who is appointed under Regulation 8(1) is, only by reason of such appointment, to

be entitled to absorption in the service of LIC or to claim preference for recruitment

to any post. The expression “shall only by reason of such appointment be entitled to

absorption” in this sub-clause (2) is crucial. What the expression postulates is that a

person who is appointed on a temporary basis can nether claim an entitlement to

absorption or a preference in recruitment merely by having been appointed on a

temporary basis. In other words, Regulation 8(2) does not postulate an absolute bar

to a claim for absorption but it stipulates that absorption cannot be claimed merely

on the ground that a person was engaged on a temporary basis. Regulation 8(2), for

instance, will not preclude a claim for absorption being made in terms of a scheme

which is propounded by LIC, so long as the scheme contains provisions which

facilitate absorption on stipulated terms and conditions. But the mere fact that a

person is appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does not entitle such a person

ipso jure to seek absorption merely by virtue of or only by reason of such an

appointment.

PART J

71 The impact of the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2), sub-Section

(2A) and sub-Section (2C) of Section 48 on the clams of the workers appointed after

4 March 1991 must now be considered. The workers who have worked as

temporary, badli or part-time workers after 4 March 1991, seek to assert their claims

on the basis of Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Section 18 specifies the person on

whom settlements and awards are binding. Section 18(3)(a) stipulates that a

settlement or award would bind all the parties to the industrial dispute. Further,

clause (d) specifies that where a party to the dispute is composed of workers, the

settlement and award binds not only persons who are employed in the

establishment to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute but all persons

who subsequently become employees in that establishment or a part of it. Section

18(3)(d), in other words, extends the applicability of a settlement or award beyond

the workers who were engaged on the date of the dispute to all persons who

subsequently become employees in the establishment. Regulation 8 of the Staff

Regulation expressly permits the engagement of temporary workers and clause (2)

contains a provision to the effect that a person who engaged under its clause (1)

shall not, only by reason of such appointment, be entitled to absorption or to claim a

preference for recruitment on any post. The effect of sub-Section (2A) of Section 48

is that Regulation 8 is deemed to be a rule which is framed under clause (cc) of subSection (2) of Section 48. Moreover, the provisions of Section 48(2C) postulate that

a rule which is made under the clause shall have effect notwithstanding anything

contained in the ID Act. Hence, the workers who have been recruited post 4 March

1991 cannot make a claim for absorption ipso jure under Section 18(3)(d) of the ID

PART K

Act, as a result of the overriding provision which is contained in sub-Section (2C) of

Section 48.

K Structuring the Relief

72 For the reasons recorded above during the course of analysis, LIC as a

statutory corporation is bound by the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution. As a public employer, the recruitment process of the corporation must

meet the constitutional standard of a fair and open process. Allowing for back-door

entries into service is an anathema to public service.

73 In structuring the relief in present proceedings, it is essential to recapitulate

the key legal findings that will govern the determination of rights and equities:

(i) On 7 February 1996, a two-judge Bench of this Court in LIC v. Their

Workmen (supra) had accepted the terms of compromise which was arrived

at on 1 March 1989 between the management of LIC and eight Unions, and

imposed them upon the ninth Union as well. In addition, the two-judge Bench

of this Court had issued certain directions:

(a) LIC should exempt Class IV workers from a test and interview, if the

management has the power to do so under the regulations/instructions

governing their conditions of service; and

(b) In the event that the management of LIC does not possess such a power,

the test to be prescribed for these workers would be of a lesser standard

PART K

compared to other applicants from the open market till the next regular

recruitment;

(ii) On 23 October 1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court, while disposing of the

civil appeals in E Prabavathy (supra), specifically accepted the scheme

formulated by LIC for regularising the workers who were engaged on a

temporary basis. The scheme was also specifically incorporated as a part of

the order in the following terms:

“(a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85

days in any two consecutive calendar years with the Life

Insurance Corporation between 20th May 1985 uptil date and

who confirmed to tehe required eligibility criteria for regular

recruitment on the dates of their initial temporary appointment

will be permitted to complete for the next regular recruitment

to be made by the Life Insurance Corporation after the regular

recruitment for these posts currently scheduled for November,

1992.

(b) These candidates will be considered on their merits with

all other candidates who may apply for such appointments,

including those from the open market.

applying for regular recruitment provided that they were

eligible on the date of their first temporary appointment for

securing regular appointment with the Life Insurance

Corporation.

(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can

apply for regular recruitment in the normal course. This

regularisation will, in the circumstances, be by selection for

appointment. We make the above clauses of the scheme as

part of our order.”

The three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) held that the scheme

proposed by LIC is reasonable and that: (a) the regularisation will be by

PART K

selection for appointment; and (b) the above clauses of the scheme would

constitute a part of the order of this Court;

(iii)On 22 November 2001, a two-judge Bench of this Court in G Sudhakar

(supra) directed that though the order dated 23 October 1992 in E

Prabavathy (supra) applied to the workers of the Tamil Nadu division, the

scheme would equally be applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC in

the country;

(iv)The judgment of the two-judge Bench of this Court dated 8 March 2015 in TN

Terminated Employees Association (supra) failed to notice that as a result

of the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),

the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards had been substituted by the terms of

compromise. The two-judge Bench of this Court overlooked the final order

dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) and while adverting

only to the interim order dated 1 March 1989, it arrived at a palpably

erroneous conclusion that the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards were still operative

and binding; and

(v) Though the petition seeking review of TN Terminated Employees

Association (supra) and the curative petition stand dismissed, LIC is

confronted with a situation in which it is equally bound by the earlier decision

of the three-judge Bench dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra), the

judgment of the two-judge Bench dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their

Workmen (supra) dealing with the appeals arising out of the Tulpule and

PART K

Jamdar Awards and the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated 22 November

2001 in G Sudhakar (supra).

74 The position as it now stands, results in a palpable conflict between the twojudge Bench decision in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) dated 18

March 2015 on the one hand and the earlier binding decision of a larger Bench in E

Prabavathy (supra) on 23 October 1992 and of subsequent Benches. This conflict

must be harmonised by taking recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article

142 of the Constitution. In arriving at a conclusion, this Court finds that:

(i) The remit of the CGIT which resulted in the Dogra Report was confined to the

process of verification, as distinct from an adjudication of rights and liabilities;

(ii) The Dogra Report is flawed because:

(a) The report failed to carry out an accurate verification of only those Class III

workers who had put in at least 85 days of work in a period of two years

and Class IV workers who had put in 70 days of work in a period of three

years;

(b) The lists which are appended to the report contain patent inconsistencies

and errors as a consequence of a failure to carry out an adequate

verification; and

specifically governed by the decision of this Court in E Prabavathy

(supra), in spite of an express stipulation to the contrary in the order of this

PART K

Court dated 23 October 1992 as well as in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav

Award;

(iii)A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carry out a mass

absorption of over 11,000 workers on such flawed premises without following

a recruitment process which is consistent with the principles of equality of

opportunity governed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such an

absorption would provide the very back-door entry, which negates the

principle of equal opportunity and fairness in public employment, which has

been specifically decried by this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v.

Umadevi39.

75 The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back to nearly four decades. Finality

has to be wrung down on the dispute to avoid uncertainty and more litigation. Nearly

thirty-one years have elapsed since 1991. We have come to the conclusion that the

claims of those workers who are duly found upon verification to meet the threshold

conditions of eligibility should be resolved by the award of monetary compensation

in lieu of absorption, and in full and final settlement of all claims and demands. Thus,

this Court directs the following:

(i) A fresh verification of the claims of workers who claim to have been employed

for at least 70 days in Class IV posts over a period of three years or 85 days

in Class III posts over a period of two years shall be carried out;

39 (2006) 4 SCC 1

PART K

(ii) The verification shall be confined to persons who were working between 20

May 1985 and 4 March 1991;

(iii)All persons who are found to be eligible on the above norm shall be entitled to

compensation computed at the rate of Rs 50,000 for every year of service or

part thereof. The payment of compensation at the above rate shall be in lieu

of reinstatement, and in full and final settlement of all claims and demands of

the workers in lieu of regularisation or absorption and notwithstanding the

directions issued by this Court in TN Terminated Employees Association

(supra);

(iv)In carrying out the process of verification, the Committee appointed by this

Court shall not be confined to the certified list before the CGIT and shall

consider the claims of all workers who were engaged between 20 May 1985

and 4 March 1991;

(v) For the purpose of verification, LIC shall make available all the records at the

Divisional level to the Committee appointed by this Court;

(vi)It will be open to the workers concerned or, as the case may be, the Unions

and Associations representing them, to make available such documentary

material in their possession for the purpose of verification;

(vii) The process of verification shall be carried out independently without regard

to the Dogra Report, which is held to be flawed;

(viii) The payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement shall be effected by

LIC within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the report of

verification by the Committee; and

PART K

(ix) The task of verification shall be carried out by a Committee consisting of:

(a) Mr Justice P K S Baghel, former Judge of the Allahabad High Court; and

(b) Shri Rajiv Sharma, former District Judge and member of the UPHJS.

LIC shall provide all logistical assistance to the Committee and bear all expenses,

including secretarial expenses, travel and incidental expenses, as well as the fees

payable to the members of the Committee. Justice P K S Baghel shall fix the terms

of remuneration payable to the members of the Committee.

76 The Miscellaneous Applications and the Writ Petitions shall be governed by

the above directions and are disposed of in the above terms.

77 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…….…………………………...............................J.

[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…….…………………………...............................J.

[Surya Kant]

…….…………………………...............................J.

[Vikram Nath]

New Delhi;

April 27, 2022

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Ranbir Singh Vs SK Roy, Chairman, Life Insurance Corp. of India & Anr.

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