AOR Exam Supreme Court
Cases and Material related to Supreme Court AOR Exam:
Supreme Court Leading Case Laws with Citations:
- His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] Supp SCR 1
- Maneka Gandhi v Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621
- Minerva Mills Ltd and Ors v Union of India and Ors [1981] 1 SCR 206
- Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88
- A R Antulay v R S Nayak and Anr [1988] Supp 1 SCR 1
- Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu and Others [1992] 1 SCR 686
- Indra Sawhney and Ors v Union of India and Ors [1992] Supp 2 SCR 454
- S R Bommai and Ors v Union of India and Ors [1994] 2 SCR 644
- L Chandra Kumar v Union of India and Ors [1994] Supp 6 SCR 261
- Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India and Ors [1996] Supp 5 SCR 241
- D K Basu v State of West Bengal [1996] Supp 10 SCR 284
- Mafatlal Industries Ltd v Union of India [1996] Supp 10 SCR 585
- Vishaka and Ors v State of Rajasthan and Ors [1997] Supp 3 SCR 404
- Githa Hariharan and Anr v Reserve Bank of India and Anr [1999] 1 SCR 669
- Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Hurra and Anr [2002] 2 SCR 1006
- Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Ors v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors [2002] 3 SCR 100
- P Rama Chandra Rao v State of Karnataka [2002] 3 SCR 60
- TMA Pai Foundation and Ors v State of Karnataka and Ors [2002] Supp 3 SCR 587
- P A Inamdar v State of Karnataka (2004) 8 SCC 139
- Technip SA v SMS Holding Pvt Ltd and Ors [2005] Supp 1 SCR 223
- SBP and Co v Patel Engineering Ltd and Anr [2005] Supp 4 SCR 688
- Rameshwar Prasad and Ors v Union of India and Anr [2006] 1 SCR 562
- IR Coelho Dead by LRs v State of Tamil Nadu [2007] 1 SCR 706
- Common Cause v Union of India and Ors [2008] 6 SCR 262
- State of West Bengal and Ors v The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights [2010] 2 SCR 979
- Selvi and Ors v State of Karnataka [2010] 5 SCR 381
- Re Special Reference No 1 of 2012 [2012] 9 SCR 311
- Republic of Italy and Ors v Union of India and Ors [2013] 4 SCR 595
- Novartis AG v Union of India and Ors [2013] 13 SCR 148
- Dr Balram Prasad v Dr Kunal Saha and Ors [2013] 12 SCR 30
- Lalita Kumari v Govt of UP and Ors [2013] 14 SCR 713
- National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and Ors [2014] 5 SCR 119
- Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust and Ors v Union of India and Ors [2014] 11 SCR 712
- Kailash Nath Associates v Delhi Development Authority and Anr [2015] 1 SCR 627
- Shreya Singhal v Union of India [2015] 5 SCR 963
- Supreme Court AOR Association and Anr v Union of India [2015] 13 SCR 1
- Union of India v V Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613
- Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v EMCO Limited and Ors [2016] 1 SCR 857
- Mukesh and Anr v State for NCT of Delhi and Ors [2017] 6 SCR 1
- Excel Crop Care Limited v Competition Commission of India and Another [2017] 5 SCR 901
- Common Cause v. Union of India and Ors. [2017] 13 SCR 361
- Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others [2017] 9 SCR 797
- Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [2017] 10 SCR 569
- Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India & Another [2018] 6 SCR 1
- Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr. v. BVG India Limited and Ors. [2018] 6 SCR 861
- Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Others [2018] 3 SCR 770
- Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India thr. Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice [2018] 7 SCR 379
- Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2018] 8 SCR 1
- Jarnail Singh & Others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Others [2018] 10 SCR 663
- Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018] 11 SCR 765
- Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited and Others [2018] 14 SCR 489
- Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2019] 3 SCR 535
- Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) [2019] 7 SCR 522
- Ashwani Kumar v Union of India and Anr [2019] 12 SCR 30
- Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd and Ors [2019] 16 SCR 1
- CPIO v Subhash Chandra Agarwal [2019] 16 SCR 424
- Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel v Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors [2019] 16 SCR 275
- Shanti Conductors Pvt Ltd v Assam State Electricity Board and Ors [2019] 16 SCR 252
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v The Honble Speaker and Ors [2020] 2 SCR 132
- Sushila Aggarwal and Ors v State NCT of Delhi and Anr [2020] 2 SCR 1
- Dheeraj Mor v High Court of Delhi [2020] 2 SCR 161
- Internet and Mobile Association of India v RBI [2020] 2 SCR 297
- Indore Development Authority v Manoharlal [2020] 3 SCR 1
- Madras Bar Association v Union of India and Anr [2020] 2 SCR 246
Supreme Court Rules 2013
PART I GENERAL
Order II - Offices of the Court sittings and vacation etc
Order III - Officers of the court etc
Order IV - Advocates
Order V - Business in chambers
Order VI - Constitution of Division Courts and Powers of a Single Judge
Order VII - Proceedings by or against minors or persons of unsound mind
Order VIII - Documents
Order IX - Affidavits
Order X - Inspection, Search etc
Order XI - Notices of Motion
Order XII - Judgments, Decrees and Orders
Order XIII - Copying
Order XIV - Payment into and out of court of suitors funds
Order XV - Petitions Generally
PART-II APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(A) GENERAL
Order XVI - Hearing of Appeals
Order XVII - Miscellaneous
Order XVIII - Appeals and Applications by indigent person
(B) CIVIL APPEALS
Order XIX - Appeals on Certificate by High Court
(C) CRIMINAL APPEALS
Order XX - Criminal Appeals
(D) PROVISIONS REGARDING SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Order XXI - Special Leave Petitions (Civil) SLP
Order XXII - Special Leave Petitions in Criminal Proceedings
(E) APPEALS UNDER THE SPECIAL ACTS
Order XXIII - appeals under section 38 of the advocates act, 1961(25 of 1961)
Order XXIV - Appeals under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986
PART- III ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
(A) ORIGINAL SUITS
Order XXV - Parties to Suits
Order XXVI - Plaints
Order XXVII - Issue and Service of Summons
Order XXVIII - Written Statement, Set-off and Counter-Claim
Order XXIX - Pleadings Generally
Order XXX - Discovery and Inspection
Order XXXI - Admissions
Order XXXII - Summoning and attendance of Witnesses
Order XXXIII - Adjournments
Order XXXIV - Hearing of the Suit
Order XXXV - Withdrawal and adjustment of Suits
Order XXXVI - Payment into court
Order XXXVII - Special Case
(B) PETITIONS UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Order XXXVIII - Application for enforcement of fundamental rights (Article 32 of Constitution)
(C) APPLICATIONS FOR TRANSFER OF CASES
Order XXXIX - Applications for transfer of criminal proceeding under section 406 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and Section 11 of the Terrorist affected areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984
Order XL - Application for transfer under Article 139A (1) of the Constitution
Order XLI - Application for Transfer Under Article 139A(2) of constitution and section 25 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908
(D) REFERENCES
Order XLII - Special Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution
Order XLIII - Reference made by the President under Article 317(1) of the Constitution or any statute
Order XLIV - Reference made by the central Government / Statutory Tribunal under statutes
Order XLV - Reference under section 257 of the Income Tax Act 1961
(E) ELECTION PETITIONS
Order XLVI - Election Petitions under Part III of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952 (31 of 1952)
PART-IV
Order XLVII - Review
Order XLVIII - Curative Petition
PART-V
Order XLIX - Costs
Order L - Taxation
PART-VI
Order LI - Notice of Proceedings to the Attorney General for India or Advocate General of States
Order LII - Forms to be used
Order LIII - Service of documents
Order LIV - Commissions
Order LV - Power to dispense and inherent powers
PART-VII
Order LVI - Destruction of Records
PART- VIII
ORDER LVII - REPEAL
The Supreme Court Rules, 1966 stand repealed.
PART-IX
SCHEDULES
FIRST SCHEDULE
RULES AS TO PRINTING OF RECORD
SECOND SCHEDULE
Fees Payable to Advocates
THIRD SCHEDULE
TABLE OF COURT FEES
PART I ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
PART II APPELLATE JURISDICTION
PART III MISCELLANEOUS
PART IV SUBJECT CATEGORIES
FOURTH SCHEDULE FORMS
NO. 1 Application for the Registration of a Clerk
NO. 2 Form of Summons for an Order in Chambers
NO. 3 Notice of Appeal from Registrar
NO. 4 Notice of Motion
NO. 5 Form of oath by Translator
NO. 6 Application for production of Record
NO. 7 Notice to the Respondent of Lodgment of Petition of Appeal
NO. 8 Memorandum of Appearance in Person
NO. 9 Memorandum of Appearance through Advocate-on-Record
NO. 10 Certificate to the Advocate appointed at the cost of the State
NO. 11 Notice to Respondent of Lodging of Appeal
NO. 12 Summons for Disposal of Suit
NO. 13 Notice of Appearance
NO. 14 Summons for Directions
NO. 15 Notice of Payment of Money into Court
NO. 16 Acceptance of sum paid into Court
NO. 17 Notice to the Attorney-General for India of Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India
NO. I8 Notice to parties of Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India
NO. 19 Summons to attend Taxation
NO. 20 Affidavit of Service of Summons
NO. 21 Affidavit of Service by Post
NO. 22 Certificate of Taxation
NO. 23 Notice for Proceedings to Attorney-General for India or Advocate-General of a State
NO. 24 Writ of Commission
NO. 25 form of Lodgment Schedule
NO. 26 Deposit Repayment Order and Voucher
NO. 27 Form of Bank Guarantee
NO. 28 Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Special Leave Petition
NO. 29 Application for Issue of Certified copy / Unauthenticated "Copy"
No. 30 Appearance Slip
Advocates Act, 1961
(Act no. 25 of 1961)
Contents
Sections Particulars
Introduction
Preamble
Chapter I Preliminary
1 Short title, extend and commencement
2 Definitions
Chapter II Bar Councils
3 State Bar Councils
4 Bar Council of India
5 Bar Council to be body corporate
6 Functions of State Bar Councils
7 Functions of Bar Council of India
7A Membership in International Bodies
8 Terms of office of Members of State Bar Council
8A Constitution of Special Committee in the absence of elections
9 Disciplinary committees
9A Constitution of Legal Aids Committee
10 Constitution of committees other than disciplinary committees
10A Transaction of Business by Bar Councils and committees thereof
10B Disqualification of Members of Bar Council
11 Staff or Bar Council
12 Accounts and audit
13 Vacancies in Bar Councils and Committees thereof not to invalidate action taken
14 Election of Bar Council not to be questioned on certain grounds
15 Power to make rules
Chapter III Admission And Enrolment Of Advocates
16 Senior an other advocates
17 State Bar Councils to maintain roll of advocates
18 Transfer of name from one State roll to another
19 State Bar Council to send copies of rolls of advocates to the Bar Council of India
20 Special provision for enrolment of certain Supreme Court Advocates
21 Disputes regarding seniority
22 Certificate of enrolment
23 Right of pre-audience
24 Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll
24A Disqualification for enrolment
25 Authority to whom applications for enrolment may be made
26 Disposal of an application for admission as an Advocate
26A Power to remove names from roll
27 Application once refused not to be entertained by another Bar Council except in certain circumstances
28 Power to make rules
Chapter IV Right To Practice
29 Advocates to be the only recognized class of persons entitled to Practice law
30 Right of Advocates to practice
31 [Omitted]
32 Power of Court to permit appearances in particular cases
33 Advocates alone entitled to practice
34 Power of High Courts to make rules
Chapter V Conduct Of Advocates
35 Punishment of Advocates for misconduct
36 Disciplinary powers of Bar Council of India
36A Changes in constitution of disciplinary committees
36B Disposal of disciplinary proceedings
37 Appeal to the Bar Council of India
38 Appeal to the Supreme Court
39 Application of sections 5 and 12 of Limitation Act, 1963
40 Stay of order
41 Alteration in roll of Advocates
42 Powers of disciplinary committee
42A Powers of Bar Council of India and other Committee India and other Committee
43 Cost of proceedings before a disciplinary committee
44 Review of orders by disciplinary committee
Chapter VI Miscellaneous
45 Penalty for persons illegally practicing in courts and before other authorities
46 [Omitted]
46A Financial Assistance to State Bar Councils
47 Reciprocity
48 Indemnity against legal proceedings
48A Power of Revision
48AA Review
48B Power to give directions
49 General power of the Bar Council of India to make rules
49A Power of Central Government to make rules
50 Repeal of certain enactments
51 Rule of construction
52 Saving
Chapter VII Temporary And Transitional Provisions
53 Elections to first State Bar Council
54 Terms of office of members of first State Bar Council
55 Rights of certain existing legal practitioners not affected
56 Dissolution of existing Bar Council
57 Power to make rules pending the constitution of a Bar Council
58 Special provisions during the transitional period
58A Special provision with respect to certain Advocates
58AA Special provisions in relation to Union Territory of Pondicherry
58AB Special provisions with respect to certain provisions enrolled by Mysore State Bar Council
58AC Special provisions with respect to certain provisions enrolled by Uttar Pradesh State Bar Council
58AD Special provisions with respect to certain persons migrating to India
58AE Special provisions in relation to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu
58AF Special provisions in relation to Jammu and Kashmir
58AG Special provisions in relation to Articled Clerks
58B Special provisions relating to certain disciplinary proceedings
59 Removal of difficulties
60 Power of Central Government to make rules
Schedule
Supreme Court Leading Case Laws with Citations:
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] Supp SCR 1Maneka Gandhi v Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621
A nine Judges Bench, in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(2007) 1 SCR 706] determined the nature and character of protection provided by Article 31-B of the Constitution to the laws added to the Ninth Schedule by amendments made after the date of the judgment in the Kesavananda Bharati case.
The Bench held that a law that abrogates or abridges rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution may violate the basic structure doctrine or it may not and if former is the consequence of law, whether by amendment of any Article of Part III or by an insertion in the Ninth Schedule, such law will have to be invalidated in exercise of judicial review power of the Court; that all amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th April, 1973, by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various laws therein, shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principles underlying them. The Bench further held that applying the above tests to the Ninth Schedule laws, if the infraction affects the basic structure then such a law(s) will not get the protection of the Ninth Schedule; and if the validity of any ninth Schedule law has already been upheld by this Court, it would not be open to challenge such law again on the principles declared by this judgment and any action taken and transactions finalized as a result of the impugned Acts shall not be open to challenge.
On 24 October, 2013, in the case of Dr. Balram Prasad v. Dr. Kunal Saha and Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 2867 of 2012], the Court observed that “the doctors, Hospitals, the Nursing Homes and other connected establishments are to be dealt with strictly if they are found to be negligent with the patients who come to them pawning all their money with the hope to live a better life with dignity. The patients irrespective of their social, cultural and economic background are entitled to be treated with dignity which not only forms their fundamental right but also their human right.”
The Court further observed that the “Central and the State governments may consider enacting laws wherever there is absence of one for effective functioning of the private Hospitals and Nursing Homes.”
On 12 November, 2013, a Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. Of U.P. and Ors. [W.P.(Crl.) No. 68 of 2008], examined the question whether a police officer is bound to register a FIR upon receiving any information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 CrPC or the police officer has the power to conduct a “preliminary inquiry” in order to test the veracity of such information before registering the same.
The Court held that (i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. (ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. (iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such
(notes from other place) On 2nd December, 2015, in the case of Union of India vs. V.Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. [Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014], while dealing with the issue pertaining to grant of remission to the life convicts in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, a Constitution bench per majority held that imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of IPC only means imprisonment for rest of life of the convict and that the right to claim remission, commutation, reprieve etc. as provided under Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution will always be available being Constitutional Remedies untouchable by the Court. It was further held that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda case that a special category of sentence may be made for the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years and that category put beyond application of remission is well-founded. The Bench further held that the exercise of power of remission under Sections 432 and 433 of CrPC is available to the Appropriate Government even if such consideration was made earlier and exercised under Article 72 by the President or under Article 161 by the Governor.
As far as the application of Article 32 of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is concerned, it was held that the powers under Sections 432 and 433 are to be exercised by the Appropriate Government statutorily and it is not for the Supreme Court to exercise the said power and it is always left to be decided by the Appropriate Government. The Bench further held that "the cases which fall within the four corners of Section 432(7)(a) by virtue of specific Executive Power conferred on the Centre, the same will clothe the Union Government the primacy with the status of Appropriate Government. Barring cases falling under Section 432(7)(a), in all other cases where the offender is sentenced or the sentence order is passed within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned State, the State Government would be the Appropriate Government."
Mukesh & Another v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors. [Date of Judgment: 5 May 2017] A three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal filed by four convicts against the death sentence awarded to them by the trial court on September 13, 2013 and upheld by the Delhi High Court on March 12, 2014 in one of the most brutal rape and murder case which shook the collective conscience of whole nation. The Bench termed the incident as “Tsunami of shock” while describing the nature and gravity of offence committed by the convicts.
In a voluminous judgment (430 pages), the Bench held the attitude of offenders as “beastial proclivity” and said “It sounds like a story from a different world where humanity is treated with irreverence.”
ShayaraBano v.Union of India [Date of Judgment: 22 August 2017] In a path-breaking judgment, by a majority of 3:2, the Supreme Court set aside the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ – triple talaq. The majority view was recorded in two separate judgments, albeit, with different lines of reasoning. In one majority judgment, it was held that this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form of Talaq must, therefore, be held to be violative of the fundamental right contained under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the other majority judgment, it was held that triple talaq is against the basic tenets of the Holy Quran and what is held to be bad in the Holy Quran, cannot be good in Shariat and, in that sense, what is bad in theology is bad in law as well.
The dissenting judges, however, regarded triple talaq as an inalienable part of Muslim personal law in India and opined that the practice does not contravene Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution and directed the Union of India to consider appropriate legislation, particularly with reference to ‘talaq-e-biddat’.
On 9th March, 2018, in the case of Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India and Another [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 215 of 2015], a five Judge Constitution Bench “laid down the principles relating to the procedure for execution of Advance Directive and provided the guidelines to give effect to passive euthanasia in both circumstances, namely, where there are advance directives and where there are none, in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution” and the law stated in Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others, (1997) 6 SCC 241. It was held that “the directive and guidelines shall remain in force till the Parliament brings a legislation in the field.”
It was held that “there is an inherent difference between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia as the former entails a positive affirmative act, while the latter relates to withdrawal of life support measures or withholding of medical treatment meant for artificially prolonging life.” The Bench held that “a competent person who has come of age has the right to refuse specific treatment or all treatment or opt for an alternative treatment, even if such decision entails a risk of death. The ‘Emergency Principle’ or the ‘Principle of Necessity’ has to be given effect to only when it is not practicable to obtain the patient’s consent for treatment and his/her life is in danger. But where a patient has already made a valid Advance Directive which is free from reasonable doubt and specifying that he/she does not wish to be treated, then such directive has to be given effect to.”
It was held that the “right to life and liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution is meaningless unless it encompasses within its sphere individual dignity. With the passage of time, this Court has expanded the spectrum of Article 21 to include within it the right to live with dignity as component of right to life and liberty.” “The right to live with dignity also includes the smoothening of the process of dying in case of a terminally ill patient or a person” in persistent vegetative state (PVS) “with no hope of recovery.”
The Bench held that “a failure to legally recognize advance medical directives may amount to non-facilitation of the right to smoothen the dying process and the right to live with dignity.” “Though the sanctity of life has to be kept on the high pedestal yet in cases of terminally ill persons or PVS patients where there is no hope for revival, priority shall be given to the Advance Directive and the right of self-determination.” It was however clarified that “in the absence of Advance Directive, the procedure provided for the said category” shall be applicable. It was held that “when passive euthanasia as a situational Palliative measure becomes applicable, the best interest of the patient shall override the State interest.”
Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr. v. BVG India Limited and Ors. [2018] 6 SCR 861
Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Others [2018] 3 SCR 770
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India thr. Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice [2018] 7 SCR 379 -
On the test of its Constitutionality, it was held that the Aadhaar Act met the concept of Limited Government, Good Governance and Constitutional Trust and was validly passed as ‘Money Bill’ within the meaning of Article 110 of the Constitution
Jarnail Singh & Others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Others [2018] 10 SCR 663
Further, observing that when the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same path, the Court found it appropriate to declare Section 198 CrPC, which dealt with the special procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery, also unconstitutional, to that extent.
On 5th December, 2018, in the case of Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited and Others [Civil Appeal No. 11843 of 2018], wherein information /application was filed under Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 before the Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging formation of an anti-competitive agreement/cartel by three major telecom operators (Incumbent Dominant OperatorsIDOs), the question for consideration was whether it was premature for the CCI to entertain the information for want of determination of such issues that fell within the domain of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (TRAI Act).
The Supreme Court did “not agree with the appellants that CCI could have dealt with this matter at this stage itself without availing the inquiry by TRAI.” It also did “not agree with the respondents that insofar as the telecom sector is concerned, jurisdiction of the CCI under the Competition Act is totally ousted.”
It was held that till the jurisdictional issues were “straightened and answered by the TRAI which would bring on record findings” on the various aspects concerned, the CCI was “ill-equipped to proceed in the matter.” It was further held that “only when the jurisdictional facts in the present matter were “determined by the TRAI against the IDOs, the next question would arise as to whether it was a result of any concerted agreement between the IDOs” and the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) “supported the IDOs in that endeavour.” The Court said that “it would be at that stage the CCI can go into the question as to whether violation of the provisions of TRAI Act amounts” to ‘abuse of dominance’ or ‘anti-competitive agreements’, which “also follows from the reading of Sections 21 and 21A of the Competition Act.”
On 25th January, 2019, in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 99 of 2018], the constitutional validity of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was upheld.
The Supreme Court held that “the primary focus of the legislation is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and from a corporate death by liquidation” and the Insolvency Code “is thus a beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back on its feet, not being a mere recovery legislation for creditors. The interests of the corporate debtor have, therefore, been bifurcated and separated from that of its promoters / those who are in management. Thus, the resolution process is not adversarial to the corporate debtor but, in fact, protective of its interests.” It was held that “the moratorium imposed by Section 14 is in the interest of the corporate debtor itself, thereby preserving the assets of the corporate debtor during the resolution process. The timelines within which the resolution process is to take place again protects the corporate debtor’s assets from further dilution, and also protects all its creditors and workers by seeing that the resolution process goes through as fast as possible so that another management can, through its entrepreneurial skills, resuscitate the corporate debtor to achieve all these ends.”
On 8th May, 2019, in the case of Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) [Civil Appeal No.4779 of 2019], the Supreme Court of India examined the scope of appeal against an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
In the case at hand, dispute arose out of a contract between the parties for construction of a four-lane bypass on National Highway. Under the contract, price adjustment was payable to the appellant towards certain components to be used in the construction by using the Wholesale Price Index [WPI] published by the Ministry of Industrial Development, which followed the years 1993-94 = 100 [Old Series]. However, later, the Ministry stopped publishing the WPI for the Old Series and started publishing indices under the WPI series 2004-05 = 100 [New Series]. On 15.02.2013, Respondent issued a Policy Circular, in which a new formula for determining indices was used by applying a “linking factor” based on the year 2009-10. Respondent stated that the NHAI Circular would have to be applied to the contract in question, and thus, a linking factor would have to be provided by which the Old Series was connected to the New Series, but, this was disputed by the Appellant. A three member arbitral tribunal, per majority, held against the appellant stating that the NHAI Circular could be applied as it was within contractual stipulations. Subsequently, Appellant filed a Section 34 petition which was rejected by the High Court, whereupon the Appellant put forth challenge before the Supreme Court primarily relying upon three sub-sections of s.34, namely, s.34(2)(a)(iii), s.34(2)(a)(iv) and s.34(2)(b)(ii).
As regards the ground under s.34(2)(a)(iv), i.e. decision on matters beyond scope of submission to arbitration, the Supreme Court observed that, on facts, the dispute was “certainly something which would fall within the arbitration clause or the reference to arbitration that governs the parties” and “this being the case”, Section 34(2)(a)(iv) “would not be attracted.” However, with regard to the ground under s.34(2)(a)(iii), i.e. inability of a party to present its case, the Supreme Court observed that in the facts of the case, there was no doubt “that the government guidelines that were referred to and strongly relied upon by the majority award to arrive at the linking factor were never in evidence before the Tribunal” and in fact, the Tribunal relied “upon the said guidelines by itself” stating “that they are to be found on a certain website”. Observing that “the respondent also agreed that these guidelines were never, in fact, disclosed in the arbitration proceedings”, the Supreme Court held that it was “clear that the appellant would be directly affected as it would otherwise be unable to present its case, not being allowed to comment on the applicability or interpretation of those guidelines” and “for this reason, the majority award needs to be set aside under Section 34(2) (a)(iii).”
On the ground of appeal under s.34(2)(b)(ii), i.e. arbitral award in conflict with public policy of India, the Supreme Court observed that “this ground can be attracted only in very exceptional circumstances when the conscience of the Court is shocked by infraction of fundamental notions or principles of justice.” It was observed by the Supreme Court that “indeed, the Circular itself expressly stipulates that it cannot apply unless the contractors furnish an undertaking/affidavit that the price adjustment under the Circular is acceptable to them” but “the appellant gave such undertaking only conditionally and without prejudice to its argument that the Circular does not and cannot apply.” The Supreme Court held that it was clear “that the majority award has created a new contract for the parties by applying the said unilateral Circular and by substituting a workable formula under the agreement by another formula de hors the agreement. This being the case, a fundamental principle of justice has been breached, namely, that a unilateral addition or alteration of a contract can never be foisted upon an unwilling party, nor can a party to the agreement be liable to perform a bargain not entered into with the other party. Clearly, such a course of conduct would be contrary to fundamental principles of justice as followed in this country, and shocks the conscience of this Court.” However, the Supreme Court also added a note of caution that the ground under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) “is available only in very exceptional circumstances, such as the fact situation in the present case” and “under no circumstance can any Court interfere with an arbitral award on the ground that justice has not been done in the opinion of the Court” since “that would be an entry into the merits of the dispute which”, “is contrary to the ethos of Section 34 of the 1996 Act”.
Accordingly, on facts, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the majority arbitral award with the observation that “under the Scheme of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the disputes that were decided by the majority award would have to be referred afresh to another arbitration.” However, it was also noted by the Supreme Court that “this would cause considerable delay and be contrary to one of the important objectives of the 1996 Act, namely, speedy resolution of disputes by the arbitral process under the Act.” Therefore, “in order to do complete justice between the parties”, invoking its’ “power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and given the fact” that there was a minority award which awarded “the appellant its claim based upon the formula mentioned in the agreement between the parties”, the Supreme Court upheld the minority award, stating “that it is this award, together with interest, that will now be executed between the parties.”
On 13 November 2019, in the case of Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal [Civil Appeal Nos. 10044, 10045 and 2683 of 2010], the Supreme Court examined the issue of limits of transparency under the Right to Information Act, 2005 in the context of records of the collegium for appointment and elevation of judges to the Supreme Court and to the High Courts and declaration of assets by Judges.
The Court upheld the order of the CIC directing the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to furnish information on the judges of the Supreme Court who had declared their assets, and in doing so further held, that “such disclosure would not, in any way, impinge upon the personal information and right to privacy of the judges. The fiduciary relationship rule in terms of clause (e) to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act is inapplicable. It would not affect the right to confidentiality of the judges and their right to protect personal information and privacy, which would be the case where details and contents of personal assets in the declaration are called for and sought, in which event the public interest test as applicable vide Section 8(1)(j) and proviso to Section 11 (1) of the RTI Act would come into operation.”
Sushila Aggarwal & Others v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Another [Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.7281-7282 of 2017; 29 January 2020]: The Supreme Court held that the protection granted to a person under Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it should inure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time.
The Court held that normal conditions under Section 437 (3) read with Section 438 (2) should be imposed and if there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event) etc. It was held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till the end of the trial. However, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.
Dheeraj Mor v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi [Civil Appeal No. 1698 of 2020; 19 February, 2020]: The Supreme Court examined question in regard to eligibility of members of the subordinate judicial service for appointment as District Judge as against the quota reserved for the Bar by way of direct recruitment. The central issue was whether a person in judicial service with experience of 7 years practice at the Bar, before joining service (or combined with service as a judicial officer), can stake a claim as against the posts reserved for those having experience of 7 years as an advocate/ pleader.
The Court held that for direct recruitment as District Judge as against the quota fixed for the advocates/pleaders, incumbent has to be practicing advocate and must be in practice as on the cut-¬off date and at the time of appointment he must not be in judicial service or other services of the Union or State. The Court held that that the purpose is recruitment from bar of a practicing advocate having minimum 7 years’ experience, and for constituting experience of 7 years of practice as advocate, experience obtained in judicial service cannot be equated/ combined and advocate/ pleader should be in practice in the immediate past for 7 years and must be in practice while applying on the cut¬off date fixed under the rules and should be in practice as an advocate on the date of appointment. It was held that the members in the judicial service of the State can be appointed as District Judges by way of promotion or limited competitive examination.
Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 528 of 2018; 4 March 2020]: The Supreme Court set aside a RBI circular which directed entities regulated by RBI not to deal in virtual currencies (VCs) nor provide services for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling virtual currencies.
The Supreme Court observed that trading in VCs and functioning of VC exchanges were sent to comatose by the impugned circular by disconnecting their lifeline namely, the interface with the regular banking sector; and this was done (i) despite RBI not finding anything wrong about the way in which these exchanges functioned and (ii) despite the fact that VCs were not banned. It was held that when the consistent stand of RBI is that they have not banned VCs and when the Government of India is unable to take a call despite several committees coming up with several proposals including two draft bills, both of which advocated exactly opposite positions, the impugned circular cannot be held to be proportionate.
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors. etc. [Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016; 6 March 2020]: The Supreme Court held that under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings and compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid.
It was further held that the expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or nondeposit of compensation in court. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition
(Short Notes / Summary of Leading Cases for AOR Exam)
List of materials on ethics in respect of Paper-III (Illustrative and not exhaustive)
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