ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS VS AVTAR BHUSHAN BHARTIYA

ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS VS AVTAR BHUSHAN BHARTIYA

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 32554 OF 2018

ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS.       …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

AVTAR BHUSHAN BHARTIYA              ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 9096 OF 2019

O R D E R

1. Aggrieved by an order of reinstatement with 50% back­wages,

but all other consequential benefits in full, passed by the High Court

of Judicature at Allahabad, the Management of the Allahabad Bank

has   come   up   with   one   Special   Leave   Petition   and   the   delinquent

Officer has come up with the other Special Leave Petition.

2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties.

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3. Since one of these Special Leave Petitions is by the Management

of the Bank and other SLP is by the delinquent Officer, we shall refer

to the parties as “the Bank” and “the Officer­employee”.

4. The Officer­employee was first appointed as a Clerk way back in

the year 1974. He was promoted to the post of Junior Manager GradeII in 1982 and to the post of Manager in 1987. In July, 1988 he was

issued   with   a   charge   memorandum,   comprising   of   3   articles   of

charges. A departmental enquiry followed and the Enquiry Officer held

the charges proved. After finding that the Report of the Enquiry Officer

was not very happily drafted, the disciplinary authority analysed the

evidence on record independently and passed an order of penalty of

dismissal from service on 31.03.1989.

5. The   Officer­employee   filed   a   departmental   appeal   under

Regulation 17 of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees (Discipline

and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, contending among others, that the

findings of the Enquiry Officer were not even enclosed to the final

order of penalty.

6. The appellate authority, by an order dated 28.02.1990 dismissed

the appeal, despite recording a finding that the copy of the enquiry

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report was not enclosed to the final order of penalty. However, the

Appellate Authority attempted to overcome this defect by holding that

after the Officer­employee filed the statutory appeal, a copy of the

enquiry report was sent to his address on 02.06.1989 and that the

same returned undelivered.

7. After filing a petition for Review and getting it dismissed, the

Officer­employee   moved   the   High   Court   with   a   writ   petition   in

W.P.No.29426 of 1990. After referring to Regulation 9 of the Allahabad

Bank  Officer Employees (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Regulations,  1976

which provides for a supply of the copy of the enquiry report, the High

Court   allowed   the   writ   petition   by   an   order   dated   27.04.2011,

directing  the   Management  to  supply  a  copy of   the  enquiry report

within one month and giving liberty to the Officer­employee to file a

fresh Appeal with a further direction to the appellate authority to

decide the appeal expeditiously.

8. The Bank filed a Special Leave Petition (C) CC No. 13418 of 2011

and   the   same   was   dismissed   by   this   Court   by   an   Order   dated

26.08.2011. The Bank then sought a review before the High Court but

the same also got rejected.

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9. In an interesting twist, the Bank sent a letter dated 8.05.2012 to

the Officer­employee, claiming that the copy of the enquiry report was

not traceable and that he will be free to submit a statutory appeal,

raising   all   issues.   Aggrieved   by   the   stand   so   taken,   the   Officeremployee filed a fresh Writ Petition in W.P No.1403 of 2013. The said

Writ   Petition   was   allowed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at

Allahabad,   setting   aside   the   order   of   penalty   and   directing

reinstatement with 50% of the back wages, but with all consequential

benefits including post retirement benefits to which he would have

been entitled had he not been dismissed from service. This was for the

reason that the employee attained superannuation on 28.02.2013.

The operative portion of the Order dated 01.10.2018 passed by the

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is reproduced as follows:

“... Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed.

The   order   dated   31.03.1989   whereby   the

punishment   of   dismissal   has   been   imposed   upon   the

petitioner is hereby quashed. We also quash the order

dated 15.09.2016 rejecting the statutory appeal preferred

by the petitioner against the order of dismissal.

The petitioner will thus be entitled to be given all

consequential   benefits,   including   the   post   retirement

benefit to which he would have been entitled had he not

been dismissed from service of the bank, for the reason

that he has since attained the age of superannuation. We,

however, direct that so far as the back wages, including

the wages to be determined by giving notional promotions

to the petitioner, if any, are concerned, he shall be entitled

only   to   50%   of   total   back   wages.   The   consequential

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benefits arising out of this judgment and order shall be

made available to the petitioner within a period of two

months  from  the  date  a certified  copy of  this order  is

furnished to the competent authority.

Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances

of the case and also considering that the petitioner has

been litigating since the year 1990, we also direct cost to

be paid by the respondent­bank to the petitioner which we

quantify to be Rs.50,000/­.”

10. It is against the aforesaid order that the Bank has come up

with Special Leave Petition (C) No.32554 of 2018. On 03.01.2019,

this Court directed the issue of notice in the said Special Leave

Petition limited to the quantum of back wages. The order dated

03.01.2019 passed by this Court reads as follows:­

“Heard.

We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned

order of the High Court insofar as the petitioner­Bank has

been   directed   to   pay   all   the   retiral   dues   to   the   first

respondent.  

Issue notice limited to the quantum of back­wages.

In   the   meanwhile,   there   shall   be   stay   of   the

impugned order so far as the back­wages are concerned.”

11. Thereafter the Officer­employee came up with Special Leave

Petition   (C)   No.9096   of   2019,   challenging   that   portion   of   the

impugned order whereby he was deprived of 50% of the back wages.

Therefore, on 5.04.2019, this Court ordered the issue of notice in

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the said Special Leave Petition also and directed the matter to be

tagged along with the Special Leave Petition of the Bank.

12. In view of the order passed by this Court on 3.01.2019, the

only question that we are called upon to decide is, whether the

Officer­employee is not entitled to back wages at all or whether he is

entitled only to 50% of the back wages as held by the High Court or

whether he is entitled to full back wages.

13. For finding an answer to the above question, we have to see

primarily, as to who was at fault.

14. Admittedly,   the   Bank   initiated   disciplinary   proceedings   in

terms of Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)

Regulations 1976, for a major misconduct. The three articles of

charges framed against the Officer­employee were as follows:­

“ARTICLE OF CHARGE I

While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Nighasan

Branch   during   the   year   1986­87   Shri   Avtar   Bhushan

Bhartiya failed to maintain integrity and devotion to duty

and did not act with diligence in as much as he allowed

advances   to   several   borrowers   in   an   indiscriminate

manner without observing the norms of the Bank and the

spirit of the scheme under which such advances were

allowed   at   a   grave   risk   and   has   thereby   violated

regulation   3(1)   of   Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees'

(Conduct) Regulations amounting to a misconduct under

regulation 24 of the aforesaid regulations.

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ARTICLE OF CHARGE II

While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Nighasan

Branch   during   the   year   1986­87   Shri   Avtar   Bhushan

Bhartiya has failed to maintain integrity and devotion to

duty in as much as he allowed indiscriminate advances

for   patthar   udhyog   in   village   Jhandi   &   Khairani   in

complicity   with   one   Shri   Raj   Kumar   with   intent   to

misutilise the subsidy availed on such advances by not

observing the norms of the Bank and the rules of the

scheme   under   which   advances   were   allowed.   Shri

Bhartiya has thereby violated regulation 3(1) of Allahabad

Bank   Officer   Employees'   violated   Regulation,   1976

amounting to a misconduct under regulation 24 of the

aforesaid regulations.

ARTICLE OF CHARGE III

While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Tikonia

Branch in Distt. Lakhimpur during the year 1985, Shri

Bhartiya has failed to act with diligence and devotion to

duty in as much as he failed to conduct appraisal and

verification of the identity of Shri Tarsem and has thereby

violated   regulation   3(1)   of   Allahabad   Bank   Officer

Employees'   (Conduct)   Regulations   amounting   to   a

misconduct   under   regulation   24   of   the   aforesaid

regulations.”

15. The   departmental   enquiry   commenced   on   21.11.1988   and

concluded on 09.01.1989. The enquiry report dated 09.03.1989 was

forwarded to the disciplinary authority vide letter dated 13.03.1989.

The   disciplinary   authority   passed   an   order   of   penalty   on

31.03.1989.   It   is   obvious   from   the   order   of   penalty   dated

31.03.1989 that the copy of the enquiry report was neither sent

beforehand nor even enclosed to the order of penalty. Interestingly,

the disciplinary authority agreed with the conclusions reached by

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the   enquiry   officer   but   felt   that   the   reasoning   was   deficient.

Therefore, the disciplinary authority chose to analyse the evidence

on record independently. The relevant portion of the order of the

disciplinary authority reads as follows:­

“From the enquiry officer's report I find that while

holding the charges leveled against Shri Bhartiya in the

aforesaid charge sheet dated 26.7.88 as proved against

him he has not analysed the facts brought on the records

of the enquiry proceedings and has also not highlighted

the   merits/demerits   of   the   evidences   brought   on   the

records of enquiry proceedings. Accordingly evidences on

records of the proceedings would first be discussed and

analysed by me chargewise separately each here under as

the same exercise has become necessary for the reasons

mentioned above.”

16. In the statutory appeal filed by the Officer­employee, he raised

a specific contention that the enquiry report was not furnished.

Despite recording a finding that the copy of the enquiry report was

not   even   enclosed   to   the   final   order   of   penalty,   the   Appellate

Authority attempted to overcome the same on the ground that after

the appeal was filed, the copy of enquiry report was sent by post

and that the same returned undelivered. The relevant portion of the

order of the Appellate Authority reads as follows:­

Also,   a   copy   of   the   Enquiry   Officer's   report/findings,

although not enclosed with the Disciplinary Authority's

Order, has been subsequently provided to the appellant.

However,   the   same,   which   was   sent   at   the   recorded

address of the appellant on 2.6.1989, has been returned

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undelivered by the Post Office with the remark : "Pane

wale bar bar jane par nahi milte, intezar ke bad wapas." 

17. At the time when the final order of penalty dated 31.03.1989

was passed and at the time when the appeal was dismissed by the

order dated 28.02.1990, the law in this regard was actually in a

state of flux. After the decision of the Constitution Bench of this

Court in Union of India and Another  vs. Tulsiram Patel1

, a two

member Bench doubted its authenticity or applicability to cases

where a copy of the enquiry report was not supplied. Therefore, in

Union  of   India  And  Others    vs.  E. Bashyan2

,  a reference was

made, which led to the decision in Union of India and Others  vs.

Mohd.  Ramzan  Khan3

.  The position became very clear after the

decision   in  Managing   Director,   ECIL   ,   Hyderabad    vs.    B.

Karunakar4

.

18. Therefore, by the time the writ petition challenging the final

order of penalty was decided on 27.04.2011, the law in this regard

was no longer res integra.

1 (1985) 3 SCC 398

2 AIR 1988 SC 1000

3 (1991) 1 SCC 588

4 1994 SCC Supp.(2) 391

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19. Dehors  the   development   of   law   as   aforesaid,   the   Officeremployee had an advantage in the form of Regulation 9 of the

Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal)

Regulations 1976. This Regulation 9 reads as follows:­

“9. COMMUNICATION OF ORDERS:

Orders   made   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   under

Regulation 7 or Regulation 8 shall be communicated to

the   officer   employee   concerned,   who   shall   also   be

supplied with a copy of the report of enquiry, if any.”

20. Therefore,   by   the   order   dated   27.04.2011,   the   High   Court

allowed the writ petition of the Officer­employee, on the basis of the

above Regulation. The operative portion of the order of the High

Court dated 27.04.2011 reads as follows:­

“In view of above, the writ petition is allowed. A writ

in   the   nature   of   certiorari   is   issued   quashing   the

impugned appellate order dated 28.2.1990 and the order

dated   3.7.1990   (Annexure­8)   passed   on   the   review

petition.   A   cost   of   Rs.50,000/­   is   imposed   upon   the

respondents which shall be deposited in this Court within

a period of two months. The respondents shall supply a

copy of the enquiry report within one month from today.

Thereafter, the petitioner may prefer an appeal setting up

grounds and pointing procedural illegality including the

plea raised before this Court within the next one month.

The   appellate   authority   shall   decide   the   appeal,

expeditiously say within a period of two months from the

date   of   filing   of   fresh   appeal.  In   case   the   cost   is   not

deposited, the same shall be realised through the District

Magistrate as arrears of land revenue. It shall be open for

the petitioner to withdraw an amount of Rs.25,000/­ and

the rest shall be remitted to the Mediation Centre of this

Court at Lucknow. Registry to take follow­up action.”

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21. The aforesaid order of the High Court has attained finality with

the dismissal of the SLP on 26.08.2011. The order of dismissal of

the SLP reads as follows:­

“Delay condoned.

Having considered the pleadings in the case, the

materials placed on record and the submissions of the

learned counsel, we do not find any merit in the Special

Leave   Petition   and   hence   the   special   leave   petition   is

dismissed.”

22. The Bank thereafter took a chance by filing a petition for

review before the High Court, but the same also got dismissed on

29.02.2012. Thereafter, the Bank took a very strange position by

holding out that the copy of the enquiry report was not traceable.

The   communication   dated  08.05.2012  sent  by  the   Bank  to   the

Officer­employee in this regard reads as follows:­

“In reference to the captioned matter we have to

advise that the copy of the finding of Enquiry Officer is

not traceable and this fact has been brought to the notice

of Hon'ble High Court in the writ petition, and also to you

vide letter No.ZOLK/INSPECTION/693 dated 08.09.2011.

You are requested to submit your statutory appeal and

the same will be considered and you will be provided all

reasonable   opportunity   to   put   forth   your   case   even

personal hearing, if required, will also be afforded to you,

but since the copy of finding of Enquiry Officer is not

traceable we are unable to provide the same. Kindly bear

with us and submit your appeal which will be considered

by the Bank on the basis of records available.”

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23. In view of the aforesaid turn of events, the Officer­employee

moved a contempt petition before the High Court. Finding that the

Management of the Bank cannot be penalized for not being able to

trace the copy of the enquiry report, the High Court closed the

contempt petition with liberty to the employee to re­agitate the issue

on the basis of the subsequent cause of action. The relevant portion

of the order dated 21.05.2013 passed by the High Court in the

contempt petition filed by the employee reads as follows:­

“…Since by the letter dated 8.5.2012, the respondents

had communicated that inquiry report is not available in

absence of inquiry report, cause of action arose contrary

to   finding   recorded   by   the   judgment   and   order   dated

27.4.2011.  It is open for the petitioner to approach this

Court  again to ventilate his grievance on the basis of

subsequent cause of action…”

24. Therefore, the Officer­employee was driven to the necessity of

filing a fresh writ petition in W.P.No.1403(S/B) of 2013. During the

pendency of the said writ petition, an order was passed by the High

Court   on   03.08.2016   holding   that   the   stand   of   the   Bank   was

unacceptable and that in any case an appeal may be preferred and

the same may be decided by the Appellate Authority. Accordingly,

an appeal was preferred. The Appellate Authority considered the

appeal once again but obviously without the copy of the enquiry

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report   and   rejected   the   appeal.   This   fact   is   borne   out   by   the

impugned   order   itself,   the   relevant   portion   of   which   reads   as

follows:­

“…During pendency of this writ petition, an order

was   passed   by   the   Court   in   these   proceedings   on

03.08.2016 wherein it has been observed that the stand

of   the   respondent­Bank   that   enquiry   report   was   not

available, cannot be accepted in view of the finding of this

Court   recorded   earlier   i.e.   the   finding   recorded   in  the

judgment and order dated 27.04.2011.   It was further

observed that the obligation cast upon the respondentBank has not been carried out on the lame excuse.  The

Court   further   observed   that   the   Bank   may,   however,

decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner taking into

consideration the direction issued earlier, vide judgment

and order dated 27.04.2011…”

25. In the light of the aforesaid facts, no great deal of research was

necessary on the part of the High Court to arrive at the conclusion

that the Management of the Bank was clearly at fault. Therefore,

the High Court allowed the writ petition. The operative portion of

the impugned order is already extracted earlier.

26. It is not as though the High Court proceeded solely on the

basis of the failure of the Management to supply the copy of the

enquiry report. The High Court found that the charges related to a

Government   sponsored   Scheme   and   that   the   beneficiaries   were

identified and were short­listed by a Government agency, namely

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the District Rural Development Agency. The High Court also found

that no bad motive was either attributed to the employee nor proved

in the departmental proceedings.

27. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the High Court could

have granted all the reliefs in full, including full back­wages. But

considering the fact that from the date of his dismissal namely,

31.03.1989, upto the date of his superannuation on 28.02.2013, a

period of nearly 24 years had passed, the High Court thought it fit

to limit the back­wages to 50%. In such circumstances, we do not

think that the Management can make out any grievance, especially

(i) after having violated Regulation 9; (ii) after their failure to point

out to the High Court in the first round of litigation that the copy of

the enquiry report was not available; and (iii) after their inability to

comply with the order of the High Court passed in the first round of

litigation, which was also confirmed by this Court.

28. Therefore,   the   Special   Leave   Petition   filed   by   the   Bank

deserves to be dismissed.

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29. Having dealt with the SLP filed by the Management, let us now

come to the SLP filed by the Officer­employee with regard to the

grant of back wages only to the extent of 50%.

30. The   learned   counsel   for   the   Officer­employee   places   heavy

reliance   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in  Deepali   Gundu

Surwase  vs.  Kranti Junior Adhyapak  Mahavidyalaya (D. ED.)

&  Ors.

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, in support of his contention that the grant of full back

wages is a normal rule in cases of wrongful termination of service.

But the ratio laid down in the said decision cannot be pressed into

service by the Officer­employee in this case. This is for the reason

that the Officer­employee in this case was originally appointed as a

Clerk way back in the year 1974. He was promoted to the post of

Junior   Management   Grade­II   in   the   year   1982   and   as   Branch

Manager in the year 1987. This is why he was governed by the

Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal)

Regulations, 1976. Courts should always keep in mind the different

yardsticks   to   be   applied   in   the   cases   of   workman   category

employees   and   managerial   category   employees.   In   appropriate

5 (2013) 10 SCC 324

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cases, the distinction between labour law and service law may also

have to be kept in mind. Many times, Courts wrongly apply, in

matters   arising   under   service   law,   the   principles   laid   down   in

matters arising under labour laws.  

31. As a matter of fact, the propositions elucidated in  Deepali

Gundu Surwase (supra),  read as follows:­

“38. The propositions which can be culled out from the

aforementioned judgments are:

38.1  In   cases   of   wrongful   termination   of   service,

reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages

is the normal rule.

38.2  The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while

deciding   the   issue   of   back   wages,   the   adjudicating

authority or the Court may take into consideration the

length of service of the employee/workman, the nature

of   misconduct,   if   any,   found   proved   against   the

employee/workman,   the   financial   condition   of   the

employer and similar other factors.

38.3 Ordinarily,   an   employee   or   workman   whose

services are terminated and who is desirous of getting

back wages is required to either plead or at least make

a   statement   before   the   adjudicating   authority   or   the

Court  of first instance that he/she was not gainfully

employed   or   was   employed   on   lesser   wages.   If   the

employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages,

then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to

prove   that   the   employee/workman   was   gainfully

employed and was getting wages equal to the wages

he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service.

This is so because it is settled law that the burden of

proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the

person   who   makes   a   positive   averments   about   its

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existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact

than   to   prove   a   negative   fact.   Therefore,   once   the

employee shows that he was not employed, the onus

lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that

the employee was gainfully employed and was getting

the same or substantially similar emoluments.

38.4 The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial

Tribunal   exercises   power   under Section   11­A of   the

Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947   and   finds   that   even

though the enquiry held against the employee/workman

is consistent with the rules of natural justice and / or

certified   standing   orders,   if   any,   but   holds   that   the

punishment   was   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct

found   proved,   then   it   will   have   the   discretion   not   to

award   full   back   wages.   However,   if   the   Labour

Court/Industrial   Tribunal   finds   that   the   employee   or

workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that

the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will

be ample justification for award of full back wages.

38.5 The   cases   in   which   the   competent   Court   or

Tribunal   finds   that   the   employer   has   acted   in   gross

violation   of   the   statutory   provisions   and/or   the

principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the

employee   or   workman,   then   the   concerned   Court   or

Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full

back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should

not   exercise   power   under Article   226 or   136   of   the

Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the

Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility

of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the

employee/workman   to   get   full   back   wages   or   the

employer’s obligation to pay the same. The Courts must

always be kept in view that in the cases of wrongful /

illegal   termination   of   service,   the   wrongdoer   is   the

employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and

there is no justification to give premium to the employer

of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay

to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full

back wages.

38.6 In a number of cases, the superior Courts have

interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory

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authority on the premise  that  finalization of litigation

has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases

the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of

infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for

delay  in   the   disposal   of   cases.  For   this   the   litigants

cannot   be   blamed   or   penalised.   It   would   amount   to

grave   injustice   to   an   employee   or   workman   if   he   is

denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of

time between the termination of his service and finality

given to the order of reinstatement. The Courts should

bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is

in an advantageous position vis­à­vis the employee or

workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain

for   prolonging   the   agony   of   the   sufferer,   i.e.,   the

employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of

spending money on a lawyer with certain amount  of

fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to

adopt   the   course   suggested   in Hindustan   Tin   Works

Private Limited v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works

Private Limited (1979) 2 SCC 80.

38.7 The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v.

K.P. Agrawal (2007) 2 SCC 433  that on reinstatement

the   employee/workman   cannot   claim   continuity   of

service   as   of   right   is   contrary   to   the   ratio   of   the

judgments   of   three   Judge   Benches   referred   to

hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This

part of the judgment is also against the very concept of

reinstatement of an employee/workman.”

32. Even if we apply the propositions enunciated by this Court in

Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), the Officer­employee may not be

entitled to full back wages. This is for the reason that there is

nothing on record to show whether he was gainfully employed after

his dismissal from service. A careful look at the pleadings in the

writ petition W.P. No.1403 of 2013 would show that he has not

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pleaded about his non­employment. Though in paragraphs 36 to 38

of his writ petition, the employee has pleaded about the sudden set

back to his health in the year 2011 and the financial hardships he

was facing, there was no assertion about his non­employment.  The

employee had his pleadings amended after the dismissal of his

appeal   during   the   pendency   of   the   writ   petition.   Even   in   the

amended pleadings, there was no averment relating to his nonemployment.   Therefore,   even   if   we   apply   the   ratio   in  Deepali

Gundu  Surwase  (supra), the employee may not satisfy the third

proposition found in para 38.3 thereof.

33. The   reliance   placed   upon   the   decision   in  Pawan   Kumar

Agarwala  vs.  General   Manager­II   and   Appointing   Authority,

State Bank of India and Others6 may not also be of help to the

employee. It is a case where this Court applied the propositions laid

down in Deepali Gundu Surwase  (supra). This Court found that

there   was   nothing   to   show   that   the   employee   was   gainfully

employed after the date of dismissal.  It is needless to point out that

in   the   first   instance,   there   is   an   obligation   on   the   part   of   the

6 (2015) 15 SCC 184

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employee to plead that he is not gainfully employed. It is only then

that   the   burden   would   shift   upon   the   employer   to   make   an

assertion and establish the same.

34. The   decision   in  Fisheries   Department,   State   of   Uttar

Pradesh vs. Charan Singh7 arose out of an award of the Industrial

Tribunal under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore,

the same has no relevance to the case on hand.

35. In  Jayantibhai   Raojibhai   Patel  vs.  Municipal   Council,

Narkhed  and  Others8

, this Court referred to the principles laid

down in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. vs. Employees9

 and to the

propositions culled out in the  Deepali  Gundu  Surwase  (supra).

Though this Court held that the denial of back wages in entirety

was   not   justified,   this   Court   awarded   only   a   lump­sum

compensation in that case.

36. Therefore,   even   applying   the   ratio   laid   down   in   various

decisions, we do not think that the employee could be granted

anything more than what the High Court has awarded.

7 (2015) 8 SCC 150

8 (2019) 17 SCC 184

9 (1979) 2 SCC 80

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37. As we have pointed out at the beginning, the total period of

service rendered by the Officer­employee before his dismissal from

service, was about 15 years, from 1974 to 1989 and he attained the

age of superannuation in February, 2013, meaning thereby that he

was out of employment for 24 years.  The High Court has taken this

factor into consideration for limiting the back wages only to 50%

and we find that the High Court has actually struck a balance. We

do not wish to upset this balance. Therefore, the Special Leave

Petition of the Officer­employee is also liable to be dismissed.

38. Accordingly, both the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed, no

costs.

………………………………….J.

(Indira Banerjee)

………………………………….J.

(V. Ramasubramanian)

New Delhi

April  22, 2022

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