Indrajeet Yadav vs Santosh Singh and Anr.

Indrajeet Yadav vs Santosh Singh and Anr. 

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 577 OF 2022
 Indrajeet Yadav   .. Appellant
Versus
Santosh Singh and Anr.   .. Respondents
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 578 OF 2022
Indrajeet Yadav             ..Appellant
Versus
Avdhesh Singh @ Chhunnu Singh and Anr.     ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
2
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
common judgment and order dated 30.03.2019 passed by the
High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   in   Criminal   Appeal
No.1083 of 2012 and Criminal Appeal No.1178 of 2012 by which
the High Court has allowed the said appeals preferred by the
original   accused   and   has   acquitted   them   for   the   offences
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’), the original complainant/informant
has preferred the present appeals.
2. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant –
original complainant/informant and learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the State have drawn our attention to the fact that
in the present case the arguments in the appeals were concluded
on 30.03.2019 and the High Court allowed the said appeals on
the very day and pronounced the operative portion of the order
and set aside the judgment and order of conviction passed by
the learned Trial Court and directed the accused who was in jail
3
to   be   released,   but   a   reasoned   judgment   and   order   was
pronounced after a period of approximately five months.
3.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant –
original   complainant/informant   has   heavily   relied   upon   the
recent decision of this Court dated 29.10.2020 in Civil Appeal
No.3564 of 2020 in the case of Balaji Baliram Mupade & Anr.
versus The State of Maharashtra,  by which such a practice of
pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment has
been deprecated.  It is submitted that in the aforesaid case this
Hon’ble Court considered another decision of this Court in the
case of State of Punjab & Ors. versus Jagdev Singh Talwandi,
(1984) 1 SCC 596 as well as other decisions referred in para 4
of   the   said   decision.     It   is   submitted   that   this   Court   also
considered in detail another decision in the case of  Anil  Rai
versus State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318 by which guidelines
have been issued by this Court regarding the pronouncement of
judgments and orders.
4
4. Applying the law laid down in the case of  Balaji Baliram
Mupade   (supra)  and the earlier decisions of this Court in the
case of Jagdev Singh Talwandi (supra) to the facts of the case
on hand, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court is unsustainable.
4.1 In   the   case   of  Balaji   Baliram   Mupade   (supra)  in
paragraphs 1 to 4 it is observed and held as under:
“1.   Judicial   discipline   requires   promptness   in
delivery   of   judgments   –   an   aspect   repeatedly
emphasized   by   this   Court.   The   problem   is
compounded where the result is known but not
the reasons. This deprives any aggrieved party of
the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal
in the next tier of judicial scrutiny.
2. A Constitution Bench of this Court as far back
as in the year 1983 in the State of Punjab & Ors.
v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi ­ 1984 (1) SCC 596 drew
the attention of the High Courts to the serious
difficulties   which   were   caused   on   account   of   a
practice which was increasingly being adopted by
several High Courts, that of pronouncing the final
orders   2   without   a   reasoned   judgment.   The
relevant paragraph is reproduced as under: 
“30.  We  would   like  to  take  this  opportunity  to
point out that serious difficulties arise on account
of the practice increasingly adopted by the High
Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a
reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final
order   which   the   High   Court   intends   to   pass
should   not   be   announced   until   a   reasoned
judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose,
5
for example, that a final order without a reasoned
judgment is announced by the High Court that a
house shall be demolished, or that the custody of
a child shall be handed over to one parent as
against the other, or that a person accused of a
serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is
unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a
detenu be released from detention. If the object of
passing   such   orders   is   to   ensure   speedy
compliance with them, that object is more often
defeated   by   the   aggrieved   party  filing  a   special
Leave   Petition   in   this   Court   against   the   order
passed by the High Court. That places this Court
in a predicament because, without the benefit of
the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for
this   Court   to   allow   the   bare   order   to   be
implemented.   The   result   inevitably   is   that   the
operation of the order passed by the High Court
has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned
judgment.” 
3.   Further,   much   later   but   still   almost   two
decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of
Bihar ­ 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to
provide   some   guidelines   regarding   the
pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to
be followed by all concerned under the mandate of
this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the
directions   except   to   state   that   normally   the
judgment is expected within two months of the
conclusion   of   the   arguments,   and   on   expiry   of
three   months   any   of   the   parties   can   file   an
application in the High Court with prayer for early
judgment.   If,   for   any   reason,   no   judgment   is
pronounced for six months, any of the parties is
entitled to move an application before the then
Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to
re­assign the case before another Bench for fresh
arguments. 
4.   The   aforementioned   principle   has   been
forcefully   restated   by   this   Court   on   several
occasions including in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh
& Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [AIR 2004 SC
6
3467   paras   80­82],   Mangat   Ram   v.   State   of
Haryana (2008) 7 SCC 96 paras 5­10] and most
recently   in   Ajay   Singh   &   Anr.   Etc.   v.   State   of
Chhattisgarh & Anr.­ AIR 2017 SC 310.”
4.2 Despite the strong observations made by this Court as far
as back in the year 1984 and thereafter repeatedly reiterated,
still the practice of pronouncing only the operative portion of the
judgment without a reasoned judgment and to pass a reasoned
judgment subsequently has been continued.  Such a practice of
pronouncing the final orders without a reasoned judgment has
to be stopped and discouraged.
4.3 For immediate reference the order passed in the present
case speaks for itself.  The High Court heard the arguments on
30.03.2019 and passed only the following order on that day:
"Heard   Sri   V.   M.   Zaidi,   Senior   Advocate
assisted by Sri M. J. Akhtar, learned counsel for
the appellant in the Criminal Appeal No. 1083 of
2012 and Sri Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellant in connected Criminal Appeal No. 1178
of 2012, Sri J. K. Upadhyay, learned A.G.A. for the
State and Sri P. C. Srivastava, learned counsel for
the informant. 
We are making the operative order here and
now. We will give reasons later. 
Both the appeals are allowed. The impugned
judgement and order dated 24.02.2012 passed by
Additional District and ∙ Session Judge, T.E.C.P.,
7
Court No. 1, Azamgarh in S.T. No. 151 of 2009 is
hereby set­aside. 
Appellant Santosh Singh in Criminal Appeal
No.   1083   of   2012   is   on   bail.   He   need   not
surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled and his
sureties discharged. 
Appellant Avdhesh Singh @ Chhunnu Singh
in connected Criminal Appeal No. 1178 of 2012 is
in jail. He shall be released forthwith unless he is
wanted in some other case. 
Both the appellants shall comply with the
provisions  of  Section  437­A  Cr.P.  C. within  one
month from today. 
There shall however, be no order as to costs."
4.4 From   the   record   of   proceedings   it   appears   that   the
reasoned judgment was pronounced and uploaded after a period
of almost five months.  Therefore, applying the law laid down by
this Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove, we set aside
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
without   further   entering   into   the   merits   of   the   case   nor
expressing anything on merits in favour of either party.   We
remand the appeals to the High Court to decide the same afresh
in accordance with law and on its own merits.  We request the
High Court to finally decide and dispose of the appeals at the
earliest and preferably within a period of six months from the
8
date of the receipt of the present order.  However, it is observed
that during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court
the accused need not surrender and they may be treated to have
been released on bail and continued to be released on bail,
however subject to the ultimate outcome of the appeals before
the High Court.  If the conviction is sustained the accused shall
surrender within a period of two weeks from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment.  
Present appeals are accordingly allowed  to the aforesaid
extent.     Registry   is   directed   to   return   the   record   of
proceedings of the case received to the High Court forthwith.
….…………………………….J.
                                                      [M. R. Shah]
…………………………………J
[B.V. Nagarathna]
New Delhi, 
April 19, 2022

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