M/S FROST INTERNATIONAL LIMITED VS M/S MILAN DEVELOPERS AND BUILDERS (P) LIMITED & ANR.

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1689 OF 2022

M/S FROST INTERNATIONAL LIMITED APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

M/S MILAN DEVELOPERS AND

BUILDERS (P) LIMITED & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA J.

1. This appeal is preferred by defendant no.1 in C.S. No.1065

of 2009 filed before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division)

Bhubaneswar, by assailing order dated 19th January, 2016

passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in WP(C) No.7059

of 2013. By the said order, the application filed by the appellant

herein/defendant no.1 under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of

Civil Procedure 1908 (for short, the ‘CPC’) has been ordered to be

reconsidered by the District Court at Khurda, Bhubaneswar

(revisional court) by restoring C.R.P. No.5 of 2012 filed by the

defendant no.1 herein. The said revision was filed by defendant

no.1 being aggrieved by the dismissal of the said application

being C.S. No.1065 of 2009 by the trial court, namely, the Court

of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar, praying for

rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein shall be

referred to in terms of their rank and status before the trial

court.

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that, respondent

no.1 herein/plaintiff had filed a suit against the appellant

herein/defendant no.1 and respondent no.2 herein/defendant

no.2 seeking the following reliefs:

“(i) Let it be declared that the plaintiff had

handed over the cheque to Sri Dilip Das,

Advocate as a security;

(ii) Let it be declared that the said cheque has

been illegally handed over by the defendant

no.2 to the defendant no.1 by violating term

and condition of the memorandum of

understanding dated 17.01.2009;

(iii) Let it be declared that the plaintiff is not

liable to give delivery of 3876 MT of iron ore

fines to the defendant no.1 nor the cheque

amount since the defendant no.1 has failed

to save the plaintiff’s plot from cancellation;

(iv) Let the cost of the suit be decreed in favour

of the plaintiff and against the defendants;

(v) Let any other decree/decrees be passed in

favour of the plaintiff to which the plaintiff

is entitled to under law and equity.”

4. According to the plaintiff, which is a Private Limited

Company, incorporated under the provisions of the Companies

Act, 1956, it is engaged in the business of export of iron ore from

Paradeep Port while defendant no.1 is also a Company

incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956,

having its registered office at Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, and also

having its Branch at Kolkata in West Bengal. Defendant no.1

carries on business at Paradeep Port, Orissa in supplying and

exporting iron ore from the said Port to various destinations

overseas. That plaintiff had a plot namely Plot No.RS4 on

licence from Paradeep Port Trust Authority for the purpose of its

export business in iron ore. That defendant no.1 and the plaintiff

had entered into a Cooperation Agreement on 24th December,

2007 but according to the plaintiff, the same was not given effect

to. That defendant no.1, through its Managing Director Sunil

Banna, tried to blackmail the plaintiff in various ways and

threatened him that he would intimate Paradeep Port Trust

Authority that the plaintiff had sublet his licence in respect of

Plot No.RS4 to defendant no.1 by violating the terms and

conditions of licence.

According to the plaintiff, defendant no.1 in January 2009

stated that plaintiff had illegally exported stock of 4000 MT of

iron ore and when the plaintiff through its Managing Director

refuted the claim of defendant no.1, a complaint was lodged at

Paradeep Police Station on 8th January, 2009 and thereafter, on

10th January, 2009 alleging theft of 4000 MT iron ore fines

belonging to defendant no.1.

According to the plaintiff, defendant no.1 lodged another

false complaint with the Paradeep Port Trust Authority to the

effect that the plaintiff was violating the terms and conditions of

his licence in respect of Plot No.RS4 which had been sublet to

defendant no.1 and a copy of the Cooperation Agreement dated

24th December, 2007 which was in fact not acted upon was also

filed along with complaint. Acting on the said complaint,

Paradeep Port Trust Authority had issued show cause notice to

the plaintiff on 20th January, 2009 and thereafter, cancelled the

licence of the plaintiff visàvis Plot No.RS4 by letter dated 18th

February, 2009.

5. Being apprehensive of the cancellation of the licence to Plot

No.RS4, the Managing Director of the plaintiff Company agreed

to the proposal of the representative of defendant no.1 viz.,

Rabindra Banthia, that in case plaintiff agreed to supply 3876

MT of iron ore fines to defendant no.1, they would manage to

withdraw their complaint and would save the licence of the plot

from cancellation.

6. That in January, 2009, plaintiff had outstanding dues of

Rs.21.50 lakhs against defendant no.1 and at the behest of

defendant no.2, a Memorandum of Understanding (for short,

‘MoU’) was arrived at on 17th January, 2009 on certain terms

and conditions that defendant no.1 would take steps to protect

the licence of the plot given to the plaintiff from cancellation in

seven days’ time and it was further agreed that defendant no.1

would give a cheque of Rs.21.50 lakhs to the plaintiff towards

the outstanding dues to the plaintiff. Similarly, the plaintiff

would issue a cheque for Rs.56 lakhs in favour of defendant no.1

and the same would remain in the custody of Sri Dilip Das,

Advocate defendant no.2 as security, which is equivalent to the

cost of 3876 MT of iron ore. The plaintiff would supply 3786 MT

of iron ore fines to defendant no.1 if defendant no.1 succeeded in

protecting the licence of the said plot of the plaintiff from being

cancelled. Accordingly, plaintiff furnished a cheque for Rs.56

lakhs in favour of defendant no.1 and handed over the same to

Sri Dilip Das, Advocate defendant no.2 in the suit, as security.

Defendant no.2 wrote a letter to the Managing Director of the

plaintiff on 20th January, 2009 intimating therein that both

cheques would be in his custody and the cheque drawn by the

plaintiff amounting to Rs.56 lakhs would not be handed over to

defendant no.1 unless defendant no.1 fulfilled its undertaking as

per the MoU dated 17th January, 2009. Further, the cheque

would be handed over to defendant no.1 only when the plot

licence of the plaintiff was saved from cancellation by defendant

no.1 and if the plaintiff failed to supply the iron ore to defendant

no.1.

7. According to the plaintiff, defendant no.1 did not take any

step to save the licence of the plot of the plaintiff from

cancellation and the licence was cancelled on the complaint of

defendant no.1 by letter dated 18th February, 2009 by the

Paradeep Port Trust Authority. According to the plaintiff, the

question of handing over the cheque to defendant no.1 by

defendant no.2 did not arise at all. Plaintiff had approached the

High Court in a writ petition visàvis the cancellation of the

licence in respect of the plot and an order of stay on the

cancellation was granted.

It is the further case of the plaintiff that when the matter

stood thus, defendants no.1 and 2 colluded with each other and

defendant no.2 committed breach of trust and betrayed the

plaintiff as the cheque for Rs.56 lakhs was handed over by

defendant no.2 to defendant no.1. On receipt of the cheque,

defendant no.1 pressurized the plaintiff to either supply 3876

MT iron ore fines or they would present the cheque for

encashment. Since the plaintiff did not agree to supply iron ore,

defendant no.1 presented the cheque for encashment but the

same was dishonoured as the plaintiff had issued stop payment

instructions to the Bank on coming to know about the collusion

between defendant no.1 and defendant no.2. Thereafter,

defendant no.1 issued notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, the ‘N.I. Act’) through their

advocate on 10th June, 2009 to the plaintiff through its

Managing Director, to which a reply was sent on 23rd June,

2009. It was, inter alia, stated in the reply that the defendants

were trying to harass the plaintiff and having no other

alternative, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking a declaration that

the cheque which was dishonoured was handed over by the

plaintiff to defendant no.2 as a security and that defendant no.1

had not acquired any right over the said cheque as the plaintiff

had no liability to discharge visàvis defendant no.1. It was

averred in the plaint that defendant no.1 was liable to pay a sum

of Rs.21.50 lakhs to the plaintiff towards its outstanding dues

for which a cheque was issued on 17th January, 2009 which was

also kept with defendant no.2 and in respect of which the

plaintiff reserved its right to initiate appropriate proceeding for

recovery of the said amount from defendant no.1. There were

further correspondences between the parties and ultimately the

aforementioned suit was filed by the plaintiff against the

defendants.

8. On receipt of the summons sent by the trial court,

defendant no.1 appeared and filed an application under Order

VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground

that the suit was not maintainable being barred under the

provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, the ‘SR Act’)

and secondly, the suit was frivolous and instituted as a

subterfuge to defeat the legitimate claim of defendant no.1

without having any right to sue. Objection was filed to the said

application by the plaintiff. The said application was considered

by the trial court and dismissed by refusing to reject the plaint.

9. Being aggrieved, defendant no.1 preferred C.R.P. No.5 of

2012 before the Court of District Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar

under Section 115 of the CPC. By order dated 20th March, 2013,

the revisional court allowed the said revision petition, set aside

the order of the trial court refusing to reject the plaint, and

rejected the plaint. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff filed W.P.(C)

No.7059 of 2013 before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack

which set aside the order of the revisional court and remanded

the matter to the said court for fresh consideration by holding

that the revisional court had exceeded its jurisdiction in rejecting

the plaint. Being dissatisfied with the order of the High Court

defendant no.1 has preferred this appeal.

10. We have heard Mrs. Rajdipa Behura, learned counsel for

the appellant and Sri Anirudh Sanganeria, learned counsel for

the respondents and perused the material on record.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High

Court was not right in setting aside the order passed by the

revisional court and remanding the matter to the said court for

reconsideration of the application filed by the appellant under

Order VII Rule 11 of CPC on the premise that revisional court

had exceeded its jurisdiction. It was contended that the

application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was filed by the

appellant/defendant no.1 in the suit filed by respondent

no.1/plaintiff seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that

the prayers sought in the suit could not have been granted and

the suit as such was not maintainable and was barred under the

provision of Section 41 of the SR Act. Further there was no

cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit against the

defendants. The trial court did not appreciate the reasons as to

why an application was filed by defendant no.1 seeking rejection

of the plaint and dismissed the same. Being aggrieved the

appellant/defendant no.1 filed revision petition in C.R.P. No.5 of

2012 before the District Court having regard to Section 115 of

the CPC and particularly proviso thereto as, if the application

filed by defendant no.1 under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC was to be

allowed by the revisional court, then, the proceedings before the

trial court would conclude. The revisional court rightly

appreciated the case of appellant herein and rejected the plaint.

However, the High Court on a writ petition filed by the plaintiff

held that the revisional court while exercising its power of

revision had exceeded its jurisdiction by rejecting the plaint

instead of remanding the matter to the trial court to do so. While

adverting to Section 115 of the CPC [vide Orissa Act 26 of 1991,

Section 2 (w.e.f. 7th November, 1991)], learned counsel for the

appellant contended that when the trial court failed to exercise

jurisdiction vested in it and refused to reject the plaint by

allowing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC

by the appellant herein, the revisional court rightly allowed the

said revision and rejected the plaint which finally disposed of the

suit in terms of the second proviso to the said Section. It was

contended that the High Court has not taken into consideration

the Orissa amendment and has further misconstrued the object

and import of Section 115 of the CPC visàvis the provisions of

the revisional court and has erroneously set aside the order of

the revisional court rejecting the plaint and remanding the

matter to the revisional court for fresh consideration.

12. Drawing our attention to the order of the High Court, it

was contended that the said order is contrary to Section 115 of

CPC (Orissa amendment) and hence the impugned order may be

set aside and the order of the revisional authority may be

restored. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant

that as against the order of the revisional authority rejecting the

plaint, respondent no.1 herein/plaintiff could not have filed a

writ petition.

13. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.1/plaintiff

supported the impugned order passed by the High Court and

contended that when a plaint is rejected by allowing an

application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, it results in a

decree being passed within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the

CPC and hence the High Court directed the revisional court to

consider the matter afresh and if necessary, to remand the

matter to the trial court for considering the aspect regarding

rejection of plaint. Learned counsel for respondent no.1/plaintiff

contended that there is no merit in this appeal and the same

may be dismissed.

14. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties the

following points would arise for our consideration:

(a) Whether the High Court was justified in setting

aside the order passed by the revisional court in

C.R.P. No.5 of 2012 and thereby remanding the

matter to the said court for reconsideration on the

premise that the revisional court had exceeded its

jurisdiction in rejecting the plaint?

(b) What order?

The reliefs sought by the plaintiff in the suit have been

extracted above.

15. Having regard to the averments in the plaint summarised

above and the reliefs sought in the plaint, defendant

no.1/appellant herein filed an application under Order VII and

Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. The rejection of

the plaint was sought for three reasons : firstly, the suit was

barred under the provisions of the SR Act; secondly, the suit was

frivolous and was filed as a subterfuge to defeat the legitimate

claim of defendant no.1; and thirdly, the suit has been

deliberately undervalued. Objections were filed to the said

application of defendant no.1. By order dated 19th May, 2012,

the trial court dismissed the said application. Being aggrieved,

defendant no.1 filed C.R.P. No.5 of 2012 under Section 115

(Orissa amendment).

16. The revisional court considered the revision and allowed

the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC which had

the effect of finally disposing of the suit. It is against the said

order that the plaintiff filed the writ petition before the High

Court which was allowed and the matter was remanded to the

revisional court for fresh consideration with an observation that

the revisional court may, in turn, remand the matter to the trial

court if necessary. This was on the premise that the revisional

court had exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it by acting illegally

in allowing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.

17. In order to consider the correctness of the impugned order

passed by the High Court, it would be useful to refer to Section

115 of the CPC as well as the Orissa Amendment. For immediate

reference, the same are extracted as under:

“115. Revision — (1) The High Court may call

for the record of any case which has been

decided by any Court subordinate to such High

Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if

such subordinate Court appears—

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in

it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so

vested, or

illegally or with material irregularity, the High

Court may make such order in the case as it

thinks fit:

Provided that the High Court shall not, under

this Section, vary or reverse any order made, or

any order deciding an issue, in the course of a

suit or other proceeding, except where the order,

if it had been made in favour of the party

applying for revision would have finally disposed

of the suit or other proceedings.

(2) The High Court shall not, under this Section,

vary or reverse any decree or order against

which an appeal lies either to the High Court or

to any Court subordinate thereto.

(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit

or other proceeding before the Court except

where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by

the High Court.

Explanation.—In this Section, the expression

“any case which has been decided” includes any

order made, or any order deciding an issue in

the course of a suit or other proceeding.”

ORISSA AMENDMENT

“115. Revision The High Court, in cases

arising out of original suits or other proceedings

of the value exceeding one lakh rupees, and the

District Court, in any other case including a

case arising out of an original suit or other

proceedings instituted before the

commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Orissa Amendment) Act, 1991 may call for the

record of any case which has been decided by

any Court subordinate to the High Court or the

District Court, as the case may be, and in which

no appeal lies thereto, and if such Subordinate

Court appears

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in

it by law; or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so

vested; or

illegally or with material irregularity;

the High Court or the District Court, as the case

may be, may make such order in the case as it

thinks fit;

Provided that in respect of cases arising out of

original suits or other proceedings of any

valuation decided by the District Court, the High

Court alone shall be competent to make an

order under this Section;

Provided further that the High Court or the

District Court shall not, under this Section, vary

or reverse any order, including an order deciding

an issue, made in the course of a suit or other

proceedings, except where

(i) the order, if so varied or reversed

would finally dispose of the suit or

other proceedings; or

(ii) the order, if allowed to stand,

would occasion a failure of justice or

cause irreparable injury to the party

against whom it was made.

Explanation In this Section, the expression

'any case which has been decided' includes any

order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or

other proceeding".”

18. On a perusal of the same it is noted that the Orissa

amendment differs from the main Section 115 of CPC in the

following ways:

(i) Firstly, the main Section 115 deals with revisional powers

of the High Court only, whereas, Section 115 of CPC

(Orissa amendment) confers the power of revision not only

on the High Court but also on the District Court which

may call for the record of any case which has been decided

by any court subordinate to the High Court or the District

Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies

thereto, if such subordinate court appears (a) to have

exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to

have failed to exercise a jurisdiction, so vested; or (c) to

have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with

material irregularity. In such a case, the High Court or the

District Court, as the case may be, may make such order

in the case as it thinks fit.

(ii) Secondly, subsection (2) of Section 115 of the main

provision, states that the High Court shall not, under the

said Section, vary or reverse any decree or order against

which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any

Court subordinate thereto. But under the second proviso to

Section 115 of CPC (Orissa amendment), the High Court or

the District Court shall not under the said Section, vary or

reverse any order, including an order deciding an issue,

made in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except

where – (i) the order, if so varied or reversed would finally

dispose of the suit or other proceedings; or

(ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure

of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against

whom it was made.

Thus, the first proviso to main Section 115 of CPC restricts

the revisional power of the High Court inasmuch as a revision is

maintainable only if it is filed by a party who is aggrieved by an

order passed by the court subordinate to the High Court on an

order deciding an issue which, had it been made in favour of the

party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the

suit or other proceeding. But as per the second proviso to

Section 115 of CPC (Orissa amendment), the High Court or the

District Court, as the case may be, under the said Section can

vary or reverse any order including an order deciding an issue,

made in the course of a suit or other proceeding only if the order

if so varied or reversed would finally dispose of the suit or other

proceeding or the order if allowed to stand would occasion a

failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against

whom it was made. In other words, under Orissa amendment to

Section 115 of CPC, an express power is conferred on the High

Court or the District Court, as the case may be, being the

revisional courts, to vary or reverse an order of the court

subordinate thereto only when it would finally dispose of the suit

or other proceedings or if the impugned order is allowed to stand

would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to

the party against whom it was made.

19. It would also be pertinent to mention that the instant suit

was filed in the year 2009 and therefore the Orissa amendment

to Section 115 CPC vide Orissa Act 26 of 1991, Section 2, would

be applicable. However, by Orissa Act 14 of 2010, SubSection

2, Section 115 was amended by the Orissa Legislature and

second proviso to Section 115 has been amended and SubSection 2 of Section 115 has been added which states that the

High Court or District Court, as the case may be, shall not

under this Section, vary or reverse any order including an order

deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other

proceeding, except where the order, if it has been made in favour

of the party applying for revision, would finally dispose the suit

or other proceeding.

20. Further, clause 1 of the second proviso of Section 115 has

been omitted by the amendment made in the year 2010 and

SubSection 3 has been added. This provision states that a

revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding

before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is

stayed by the High Court or District Court, as the case may be.

SubSection 1 of Section 115 is in pari materia with the Orissa

Amendment of 1991 except its reference to the Orissa

Amendment Act of 2010. For immediate reference, Section 115

of the CPC as per the 2010 amendment made (Orissa

Amendment) is extracted as under:

“Amendment of Section 115. In the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for Section

115, the following Section shall be substituted,

namely:

115. Revision.(1) The High Court, in cases

arising out of original suits or other proceedings

of the value exceeding five lakhs rupees and the

District Court, in any other cases, including a

case arising out of an original suit or other

proceedings instituted before the

commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure

( Orissa Amendment) Act, 2010, may call for the

record of any case which has been decided by

any Court subordinate to the High Court or the

District Court, as the case may be, and in which

no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate

Court appears

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in

it by law; or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so

vested; or

illegally or with material irregularity,

the High Court or the District Court, as the case

may be, may make such order in the case as it

thinks fit:

Provided that in respect of cases arising out of

original suits or other proceedings of any

valuation decided by the District Court, the High

Court alone shall be competent to make an

order under this Section

(2) The High Court or the District Court, as the

case may be, shall not under this Section, vary

or reverse any order, including an order deciding

an issue, made in the course of a suit or other

proceedings, except where the order, if it had

been made in favor of the party applying for

revision, would have finally disposed of the suit

or other proceedings.

(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit

or other proceeding before the Court except

where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by

the High Court or District Court, as the case

may be.

ExplanationIn this Section, the expression,

"any case which has been decided" includes any

order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or

other proceeding.".

[Vide the Orissa Act 14 of 2010, s. 2]”

21. Therefore, we hold that the High Court was not right in

observing that the revisional court had exceeded its jurisdiction

and it could not have allowed the application filed under Order

VII Rule 11 of CPC and thereby reversed the order of the trial

court and finally disposed of the suit. In fact, the High Court has

failed to appreciate the second proviso to Section 115 of CPC

(Orissa amendment) in its true perspective. The revisional court,

being the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be,

can reverse an order which would finally dispose of the suit or

other proceeding. That is exactly what has been done by the

revisional court being the District Court in the petition being

C.R.P. No.5 of 2012.

22. Hence, we find that the High Court was not justified in

setting aside the said order and remanding the matter to the

revisional court (District Court) to consider afresh, the

application filed by defendant no.1/appellant herein under Order

VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. In fact, we

would observe that exercise of jurisdiction by the revisional court

in the instant case is in accordance with second proviso to

Section 115 of CPC (Orissa amendment).

In this regard, we could also usefully refer to the following

decisions:

(a) Gajendragadkar, CJ., in a judgment passed by the five

Judges Bench of this Court in Pandurang Dhondi

Chougule and Others vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav and

Others – [AIR 1966 SC 153] dealt with the question of

jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, as follows:

“10. The provisions of Section 115 of the Code

have been examined by judicial decisions on

several occasions. While exercising its

jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not

competent to the High Court to correct errors of

fact however gross they may, or even errors of

law, unless the said errors have relation to the

jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself.

As clauses (a), (b) and (e) of Section 115

indicate, it is only in cases where the

subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction

not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a

jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the

exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with

material irregularity that the revisional

jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly

invoked. It is conceivable that points of law may

arise in proceedings instituted before

subordinate courts which are related to

questions of jurisdiction. It is well settled that a

plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a

plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of

the court which tries the proceedings. A finding

on these pleas in favour of the party raising

them would oust the jurisdiction of the court,

and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas

can be said to be concerned with questions of

jurisdiction which fall within the purview of

Section 115 of the Code. But an erroneous

decision on a question of law reached by the

subordinate court which has no relation to

questions of jurisdiction of that court, cannot be

corrected by the High Court under Section 115.”

(b) Nariman, J. while discussing Section 115 CPC and proviso

thereto held that revision petitions filed under Section 115

CPC are not maintainable against interlocutory orders in

the case of Tek Singh vs. Shashi Verma and Another –

[(2019) 16 SCC 678]. The following observations were

made in the said case:

“6. Even otherwise, it is well settled that the

revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is

to be exercised to correct jurisdictional errors

only. This is well settled. In DLF Housing &

Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh [DLF

Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup

Singh, (1969) 3 SCC 807 : (1970) 2 SCR 368]

this Court held: (SCC pp. 81112, para 5)

“5. The position thus seems to be

firmly established that while

exercising the jurisdiction under

Section 115, it is not competent to

the High Court to correct errors of

fact however gross or even errors of

law unless the said errors have

relation to the jurisdiction of the

court to try the dispute itself.

Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on

their plain reading quite clearly do

not cover the present case. It was

not contended, as indeed it was not

possible to contend, that the learned

Additional District Judge had either

exercised a jurisdiction not vested in

him by law or had failed to exercise

a jurisdiction so vested in him, in

recording the order that the

proceedings under reference be

stayed till the decision of the appeal

by the High Court in the

proceedings for specific performance

of the agreement in question. Clause

the case in hand. The words

“illegally” and “with material

irregularity” as used in this clause

do not cover either errors of fact or

of law; they do not refer to the

decision arrived at but merely to the

manner in which it is reached. The

errors contemplated by this clause

may, in our view, relate either to

breach of some provision of law or to

material defects of procedure

affecting the ultimate decision, and

not to errors either of fact or of law,

after the prescribed formalities have

been complied with.”

Therefore, in the instant case the High Court was not right

in holding that the revisional court had no jurisdiction to reject

the plaint filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The reasoning of

the High Court is contrary to the express proviso of Section 115

(Orissa Amendment).

23. No doubt rejection of a plaint is a decree within the

meaning of Section 2(2) of CPC and an appeal lies from every

decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the

Court authorised to hear appeals from a decision of such court.

However, it must be borne in mind that when a revisional court

rejects a plaint, in substance, an application filed under Order

VII Rule 11 is being allowed. Under such circumstances, the

remedy by way of a writ petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution could be availed and respondent no.1/plaintiff has

resorted to the said remedy in the instant case; although if the

plaint had been rejected by the trial court i.e. court of original

jurisdiction, it would have resulted in a right of appeal under

Section 96 of CPC.

24. Having regard to the second proviso to Section 115 of CPC

(Orissa amendment), a revisional court while allowing the

application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC would in

substance reject the plaint but since the said decree is not

passed by the court of original jurisdiction, namely the trial

court, the remedy by way of writ petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution would be available to the aggrieved party and

respondent no.1 has availed the said remedy.

25. Having held as above, we now proceed to consider,

whether, the revisional court (District Court) was justified in

allowing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC

and thereby rejecting the plaint filed by the plaintiff/respondent

no.1 herein. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer

to the following judgments of this Court in respect with Order VII

Rule 11 CPC:

a) In T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. – [(1977)

4 SCC 467], this Court observed, in the following words,

that while considering an application under Order VII Rule

11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint

discloses a real cause of action, or something purely

illusory:

“5. We have not the slightest hesitation in

condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of

the process of the court repeatedly and

unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of

the facts found in the judgment of the High

Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now

pending before the First Munsif's Court,

Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of

the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif

must remember that if on a meaningful — not

formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly

vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not

disclosing a clear right to sue, he should

exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC

taking care to see that the ground mentioned

therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has

created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in

the bud at the first hearing by examining the

party searchingly under Order 10, CPC. An

activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law

suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively

on examining the party at the first hearing so

that bogus litigation can be shot down at the

earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful

enough to meet such men, (Cr. XI) and must be

triggered against them. In this case, the learned

Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard

Shaw remarked on the assassination of

Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too

good.”

b) In Azhar Hussain vs. Rajiv Gandhi – [1986 Supp SCC

315], this Court discussed the very purpose of the power

conferred under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by observing thus:

“12. The whole purpose of conferment of such

power is to ensure that a litigation which is

meaningless, and bound to prove abortive

should not be permitted to occupy the time of

the Court, and exercise the mind of the

respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be

kept hanging over his head unnecessarily

without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary

civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the

power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose

any cause of action.”

c) In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. vs. Assistant

Charity Commissioner and Others [(2004) 3 SCC 137],

it was held that Rule 11 of Order VII lays down an

independent remedy made available to the defendant to

challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective

of his right to contest the same on merits. The law

ostensibly does not contemplate any stage when the

objections can be raised, and also does not say in express

terms about the filing of a written statement. It was held

that the word ‘shall’ is used to clearly imply that a duty is

cast on the Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the

plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities

provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without

intervention of the defendant. Elaborating on the aspect of

cause of action by quoting I.T.C Ltd. vs. Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal and Ors. – [(1998) 2 SCC 70], it was

held that the basic question to be decided while dealing

with an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the

Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in

the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated

with a view to get out of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

d) This Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. vs.

M.V. Sea Success I & Anr. [(2004) 9 SCC 512] held that

a plaint must be construed as it stands without any

amendments. The same is extracted herein as follows

“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of

action or not is essentially a question of fact.

But whether it does or does not, must be found

out from reading the plaint itself. For the said

purpose the averments made in the plaint in

their entirety must be held to be correct. The

test is as to whether if the averments made in

the plaint are taken to be correct in its entirety,

a decree would be passed.”

e) We could allude to the exposition of this Court in

Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal –

[(2017) 13 SCC 174], wherein it was held as under:

“7. …..The averments of the plaint have to be

read as a whole to find out whether the

averments disclose a cause of action or whether

the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to

observe that the question as to whether the suit

is barred by any law, would always depend upon

the facts and circumstances of each case. The

averments in the written statement as well as

the contentions of the defendant are wholly

immaterial while considering the prayer of the

defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when,

the allegations made in the plaint are taken to

be correct as a whole on their face value, if they

show that the suit is barred by any law, or do

not disclose cause of action, the application for

rejection of plaint can be entertained and the

power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC can be

exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has

created the illusion of a cause of action, the

court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that

bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.”

f) In Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)

Dead through Legal Representatives and Others –

[(2020) 7 SCC 366], Indu Malhotra, J., while dealing with

an appeal against an order allowing rejection of a suit at

the threshold, had an occasion to consider various

precedents discussing the intent and purpose of Order VII

Rule 11 CPC while setting out principles in relation to the

same. It was held that the provision of Order VII Rule 11 is

mandatory in nature and that the plaint “shall” be rejected

if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) is made

out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a

cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the

Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. The relevant

portion of the judgment is extracted as below:

“23.1 X X X X X

23.2 The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is

an independent and special remedy wherein the

court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit

at the threshold, without proceedings to record

evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of

the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the

action should be terminated on any of the

grounds contained in this provision.

23.3 The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11

(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is

disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation

under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit

the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the

proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would

be necessary to put an end to the sham

litigation, so that further judicial time is not

wasted.

23.4 In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, this

Court held that the whole purpose of conferment

of powers under this provision is to ensure that

a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to

prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste

judicial time of the court.

23.5 The power conferred on the court to

terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic

one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII

Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.

23.6 Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on

the Court to determine whether the plaint

discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the

averments in the plaint, read in conjunction

with the documents relied upon, or whether the

suit is barred by any law.

23.7 X X X X X

23.8 Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14, the

documents filed with the plaint, are required to

be taken into consideration for deciding the

application under Order 7 Rule 11(a). When a

document referred to in the plaint, forms the

basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part

of the plaint.

23.9 In exercise of power under this provision,

the Court would determine if the assertions

made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law,

or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for

rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

23.10 At this stage, the pleas taken by the

defendant in the written statement and

application for rejection of the plaint on the

merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be

adverted to, or taken into consideration.”

g) In a recent judgment of Rajendra Bajoria and Others vs.

Hemant Kumar Jalan and Others [2021 SCC Online

SC 764], this Court while elucidating on the underlying

object of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and considering various

precedents of this Court, held as under :

“20. It could thus be seen that this Court has

held that the power conferred on the court to

terminate a civil action is a drastic one, and the

conditions enumerated under Order VII Rule 11

of CPC are required to be strictly adhered to.

However, under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, the

duty is cast upon the court to determine

whether the plaint discloses a cause of action,

by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read

in conjunction with the documents relied upon,

or whether the suit is barred by any law. This

Court has held that the underlying object of

Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is that when a plaint

does not disclose a cause of action, the court

would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily

protract the proceedings. It has been held that

in such a case, it will be necessary to put an end

to the sham litigation so that further judicial

time is not wasted.”

26. Relying on the case of Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. vs. Hede &

Co. – [(2007) 5 SCC 614], it was held that it is not permissible to

cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is

the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked

into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without

addition or subtraction of words. Further delving upon the ratio

in D. Ramachandran vs. R.V. Janakiraman – [(1999) 3 SCC

367], it was held that if the allegations in the plaint prima facie

show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an

enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.

27. It was further held that if on a meaningful reading of the

plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and

without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court

would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule

11 CPC. Placing reliance on Saleem Bhai vs. State of

Maharashtra – [(2003) 1 SCC 557], it was held that the power

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at

any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint or after

issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the

trial.

28. On a reading of the plaint, in the instant case it is noted

that it discloses a cause of action inasmuch as the MoU dated

17th January, 2009, entered into between the plaintiff and

defendant no.1 in the presence of defendant no.2 and the acts

done pursuant to the said MoU is the basis for the grievance of

the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, a cheque for Rs. 56 lakhs

was issued by him in favour of defendant no.1 and handed over

to Sri Dilip Das, Advocate – defendant no.2 as security with an

understanding that the said cheque will not be handed over by

defendant no.2 to defendant no.1 unless defendant no.1 fulfils

its undertaking and carries out the responsibility of saving the

licence to plot No. RS4, issued in favour of the plaintiff by the

Paradeep Port Trust Authority, from being cancelled. As a result,

the plaintiff would continue to remain as the licensee of the

Paradeep Port Trust Authority visavis the said plot. According

to the plaintiff, defendant no.1 did not take any step to save

licence of the plaintiff from cancellation and it was cancelled on

the basis of the complaint made by defendant no.1 vide letter

dated 18th February, 2009, by the Paradeep Port Trust Authority.

Hence, the question of defendant no.2 handing over the cheque

for Rs. 56 lakhs to defendant no.1 did not arise. Further,

plaintiff was pressurized to either supply 3876 MT of iron ore

fines to defendant no.1 or else defendant no.1 would present the

cheque for encashment. Since plaintiff did not agree to the illegal

demand of defendant no.1, the cheque for Rs.56 lakhs which

had been handed over by defendant no.2 to defendant no.1, was

presented by defendant no.1 and it was dishonoured. According

to the Plaintiff, defendant no.2 and defendant no.1 colluded with

each other to make an illegal gain and defendant no.2 could not

have handed over the cheque to defendant no.1. Hence, a letter

was written to the Bank directing them to stop the payment of

the cheque and the same was conveyed to the defendants. The

said cheque was dishonoured. Defendant no.1 issued notice

under Section 138 of NI Act dated 10th June, 2009, to the

plaintiff through its Managing Director, to which a reply was

given on 23rd June, 2009. According to the plaintiff, defendant

no.1 owes the plaintiff Rs. 21.50 lakhs but the plaintiff does not

have to pay anything to defendant no.1. Hence, defendant no.1

is duty bound to return the cheque to the plaintiff but, on the

other hand, the defendants are trying to harass the plaintiff by

presenting the cheque and hence certain reliefs were sought in

the suit. The relief of declaration was sought to the effect that

the cheque handed over by the plaintiff to defendant no.2 was as

a security; that the cheque had been illegally handed over by

defendant no.2 to defendant no.1 in violation of the terms and

conditions of the MoU dated 17th January, 2009 and that the

plaintiff is neither liable to deliver 3876 MT of iron ore fines to

defendant no.1 nor to pay an amount of Rs. 56 lakhs since

defendant no.1 had failed to save the licence of plaintiff’s plot

from cancellation by the Paradeep Port Trust Authority.

29. At the outset, we hold that on perusal of the plaint

averments, the plaintiff has indeed made out a cause of action

for filing the suit. In fact, in para 2 of the application filed under

Order VII Rule 11 CPC, defendant no.1 has also encapsulated

the averments made in the plaint. Therefore, on that score the

plaint cannot be rejected.

30. The other contention of defendant no.1 is that from the

pleadings and averments in the plaint and the prayers sought

therein, it appears that only certain declaratory reliefs have been

sought and further, consequential reliefs have been omitted to

be prayed. Hence, the suit is barred under the provisions of the

SR Act and is liable to be dismissed and the plaint is liable to be

rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

31. In the objections filed to the application under order VII

Rule 11 CPC, it has been averred that the plaint averments

would clearly show a cause of action for filing the suit and

further that the suit is not barred by any law. Further, the

declaratory reliefs have been valued properly and appropriate

court fee has been paid. Hence, the application is liable to be

rejected.

Thus, the main thrust of the application seeking rejection

of the plaint is that apart from the fact that the plaint does not

disclose a cause of action which has been negated by the

revisional court and rightly so, plaintiff has sought only

declaratory reliefs and has not sought further or consequential

reliefs. In the circumstances, the suit is barred under the

provisions of the SR Act.

Section 34 of the SR Act reads as under:

“34. Discretion of court as to declaration of

status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal

character, or to any right as to any property,

may institute a suit against any person denying,

or interested to deny, his title to such character

or right, and the court may in its discretion

make therein a declaration that he is so entitled,

and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for

any further relief:

Provided that no court shall make any such

declaration where the plaintiff, being able to

seek further relief than a mere declaration of

title, omits to do so.

Explanation.—A trustee of property is a “person

interested to deny” a title adverse to the title of

some one who is not in existence, and whom, if

in existence, he would be a trustee.”

The proviso to Section 34 states that no court can make

any declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further

relief than mere declaration of title, omits to do so. The said

question will have to be considered at the time of final

adjudication of the suit as the question of granting further relief

or consequential relief would arise only if the court grants a

declaration. If the plaintiff is unsuccessful in seeking the main

relief of declaration, then, the question of granting any further

relief would not arise at all. Therefore, omission on the part of

the plaintiff in praying for further consequential relief, would

become relevant only at the time of final adjudication of the suit.

Hence, in view of the above, the plaint cannot be rejected at this

stage by holding that the plaintiff has only sought declaratory

reliefs and no further consequential reliefs.

32. The other reason cited for rejection of the plaint is that the

suit is an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to deprive

defendant no.1 of its legitimate dues. In other words, the

plaintiff is seeking a declaration that the cheque for Rs. 56 lakhs

issued in the name of defendant no.1 and handed over to

defendant no.2 in turn to be handed over to defendant no.1 at

the appropriate time was only as a security. According to the

plaintiff it was not liable to pay the cheque amount to defendant

no.1 since defendant no.1 had not fulfilled its obligations under

the terms of the MoU. The declaratory reliefs sought are worded

as under:

“(i) Let it be declared that the plaintiff had

handed over the cheque to Sri Dilip Das,

Advocate as a security;

(ii) Let it be declared that the said cheque has

been illegally handed over by the defendant

no.2 to the defendant no.1 by violating term

and condition of the memorandum of

understanding dated 17.01.2009;

(iii) Let it be declared that the plaintiff is not

liable to give delivery of 3876 MT of iron ore

fines to the defendant no.1 nor the cheque

amount since the defendant no.1 has failed

to save the plaintiff’s plot from

cancellation;”

Hence, it is contended by defendant no.1 that the suit filed

by the plaintiff is an attempt to frustrate the possibility of the

defendant no.1 initiating action under the provisions of the N.I.

Act for the dishonour of cheque. In this regard, reference could

be made to Sections 118 (a) and 138 of N.I. Act, which reads as

under:

“118. Presumptions as to negotiable

instruments. —Until the contrary is proved, the

following presumptions shall be made:—

(a) of consideration —that every negotiable

instrument was made or drawn for

consideration, and that every such instrument,

when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated

or transferred, was accepted, indorsed,

negotiated or transferred for consideration;

XXX XXX XXX

138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc.,

of funds in the account.—Where any cheque

drawn by a person on an account maintained by

him with a banker for payment of any amount of

money to another person from out of that

account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of

any debt or other liability, is returned by the

bank unpaid, either because of the amount of

money standing to the credit of that account is

insufficient to honour the cheque or that it

exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from

that account by an agreement made with that

bank, such person shall be deemed to have

committed an offence and shall, without

prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be

punished with imprisonment for [a term which

may be extended to two years’], or with fine

which may extend to twice the amount of the

cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this

section shall apply unless—

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank

within a period of six months from the date on

which it is drawn or within the period of its

validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the

cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand

for the payment of the said amount of money by

giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer of the

cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of

information by him from the bank regarding the

return of the cheque as unpaid; and

payment of the said amount of money to the

payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in

due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of

the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,

“debt of other liability” means a legally

enforceable debt or other liability.”

33. On a reading of the same, it is clear that there is a

rebuttable presumption that every negotiable instrument

including a cheque was made or drawn for a consideration and

every such instrument when it has been accepted is for a

consideration.

34. In the instant case, on a reading paragraph 13 of the

plaint, it is evident that cheque issued had been dishonoured

and defendant no.1 had issued notice under Section 138 of N.I.

Act on 10th June, 2009, to the plaintiff and its Managing Director

replied to the same through their advocate on 23rd June, 2009.

Therefore, it is evident that the plaintiff by seeking the aforesaid

reliefs is in substance frustrating the right of defendant no.1 to

take steps under the provisions of N.I. Act for releasing the

amount of cheque issued by the plaintiff to defendant no.1 for a

sum of Rs. 56 lakhs by filing a civil suit and/or by initiating a

criminal prosecution. In other words, by seeking such a

declaration that the cheque was issued as a security and that

the same was illegally handed over by defendant no.2 to

defendant no.1 in violation of the terms and conditions of the

MoU, the plaintiff in substance is making an attempt to frustrate

proceedings being initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act or

for recovery of the amount by filing a civil suit.

35. On a holistic reading of the plaint and on consideration of

the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, we find that the said reliefs are

barred by law inasmuch as no plaintiff can be permitted to seek

relief in a suit which would frustrate the defendants from

initiating a prosecution against plaintiff or seeking any other

remedy available in law. In fact, the attempt made by the

plaintiff to seek such a declaratory relief is, in substance, to seek

a relief of injunction against the defendants, particularly

defendant no.1, but framed it in the nature of a declaratory

relief. In other words, the plaintiff has sought an injunction

against defendant no.1 from seeking remedies in law on account

of the cheque issued by the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 56 lakhs

being dishonoured.

36. We may refer to Sections 41 (b) and (d) of SR Act which are

extracted as under:

“41. Injunction when refused. xxx

(b) to restrain any person from

instituting or prosecuting any

proceeding in a Court not

subordinate to that from which the

injunction is sought;

xxx xxx xxx

(d) to restrain any person from

instituting or prosecuting any

proceeding in a criminal matter;”

In the above context, following decisions are useful to

be referred to:

(a) In the case of Cotton Corporation of India Limited

vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and Ors.

[(1983) 4 SCC 625], this Court highlighted the

equitable principle underlying Section 41 (b) of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963 as under:

“8. It is, therefore, necessary to unravel the

underlying intendment of the provision

contained in Section 41(6). It must at once be

conceded that Section 41 deals with perpetual

injunction and it may as well be conceded that it

has nothing to do with interim or temporary

injunction which as provided by Section 37 are

dealt with by the Code of Civil Procedure. To

begin with, it can be said without fear of

contradiction that anyone having a right that is

a legally protected interest complains of its

infringement and seeks relief through court

must have an unhindered, uninterrupted access

to law courts. The expression ‘court’ here is used

in its widest amplitude comprehending every

forum where relief can be obtained in

accordance with law. Access to justice must not

be hampered even at the hands of judiciary.

Power to grant injunction vests in the court

unless the legislature confers specifically such

power on some other forum. Now access to court

in search of justice according to law is the right

of a person who complains of infringement of his

legally protected interest and a fortiori therefore,

no other court can by its action impede access

to justice. This principle is deducible from the

Constitution which seeks to set up a society

governed by ride of law. As a corollary, it must

yield to another principle that the superior court

can injunct a person by restraining him from

instituting or prosecuting a proceeding before a

subordinate court. Save this specific carving out

of the area where access to justice may be

impeded by an injunction of the court, the

legislature desired that the courts ordinarily

should not impede access to justice through

court. This appears to us to be the equitable

principle underlying Section 41(b). Accordingly,

it must receive such interpretation as would

advance the intendment, and thwart the

mischief it was enacted to suppress, and to keep

the path of access to justice through court

unobstructed.”

(b) In the case of Ratna Commercial Enterprises Ltd. vs.

Vasutech Ltd. – [AIR 2008 Del 99], it was held:

“29. The other issue concerns the

maintainability of the suit itself in terms of the

Section 41(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

(‘SRA’) which reads as under:

“41. An injunction cannot be granted

…. (d) to restrain any person from

instituting or prosecuting any

proceeding in a criminal matter.”

The law concerning the interpretation of

Section 41(d) of the SRA is fairly well settled. It

has been held In Re N.P. Essappa Chettiar AIR

1942 Mad. 756 and in Gauri

Shanker v. District Board AIR 1947 All. 81

that a suit to restrain criminal proceedings being

initiated is not maintainable. In Aristo Printers

Pvt. Ltd. v. Purbanchal Trade Centre AIR

1992 Gau. 81 a Division Bench of the Gauhati

High Court was dealing with a case where

cheques issued by the plaintiff to the defendant

had been dishonoured and notice had been

issued to the defendant under Section 138 NI

Act. The plaintiff then filed a suit to restrain the

defendant from instituting proceedings under

the NI Act. The Court referred to a judgment of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of

Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta AIR 1952 SC

12 and Cotton Corporation of India

Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. AIR 1983

SC 1272 and held that “an order of injunction

of the nature issued in this case cannot be

granted and the hands of the criminal court

cannot be fettered by the civil court.”

30. The decision of this Court in Atul Kumar

Singh v. Jalveen Rosha AIR 2000 Del 38 was

in a case where the plaintiff had issued four

cheques issued in favour for the defendant for a

value of Rs. 7 lakhs. The cheques when

presented were dishonoured. After service of

notice under Section 138 NI Act, the plaintiff

filed a suit for a declaration that “the defendant

is not entitled to any benefit on account of

holding the cheques” and to injunct the

defendant “from using or claiming any benefit by

virtue of possessing the instruments.” This

Court, while allowing the defendant's application

for rejecting the plaint, held that (AIR, p.40):

“The reliefs claimed in this suit are

in substance for an injunction

restraining the defendant from

prosecuting the criminal case

instituted against the plaintiff.

Section 41(b) of the SRA denies to

the Court the jurisdiction to grant

an injunction restraining any person

from prosecuting any proceedings in

a Court. Consequently, the

injunction sought by the plaintiff

cannot be granted since it would

have the effect of preventing the

defendant from prosecuting the

criminal case against the plaintiff.”

Further, the nature of the declaratory reliefs sought

already arises out of the MoU dated 17th January, 2009, between

the plaintiff and defendant no.1 in respect of which the plaintiff

could seek appropriate remedies, if there is a breach of the said

MoU by defendant no.1, but the plaintiff cannot seek declaratory

reliefs to the effect that the plaintiff was not liable to carry out

his obligation under the terms of the MoU. If the plaintiff has

failed to do so then the defendant no.1 would have a cause of

action against the plaintiff, but there cannot be a frustration of

the right to seek a remedy in law by means of seeking

declaration under a contract or MoU as in the instant case.

37. Moreover, the right of defendant no.1 to prosecute the

plaintiff owing to the dishonour of the cheque issued by the

plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 56 lakhs cannot be frustrated by

seeking a declaration that the said cheque was handed over as a

security. Such a declaration cannot be ex facie granted as it

would be contrary to the provisions of the N.I. Act and

particularly Section 118(a) thereof. If the plaintiff is aggrieved on

account of breach of the terms and conditions of the MoU

committed by defendant no.1 then it could seek appropriate

reliefs in accordance with law. Whether the plaintiff was not

liable to issue the cheque for Rs. 56 lakhs to defendant no.1

under the terms of the MoU is a matter which has to be

considered in an appropriate proceeding to be initiated by

defendants on account of dishonour of the said cheque under

Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The plaintiff can always prove that it

had no legal liability or debt to be discharged visavis defendant

no.1 under the terms of the MoU, if any proceeding is to be

initiated by defendant no.1 on account of the dishonour of the

said cheque. Further, if defendant no.1 is to seek any relief for

the nonsupply of 3876 MT of iron ore fines by the plaintiff

under the very same MoU then the plaintiff is entitled to take

appropriate defences as are available in law. If the plaintiff has a

grievance against the defendants and particularly defendant

no.1, arising from the MoU, such prayers have not been sought

by the plaintiff. Such reliefs could have been sought by the

plaintiff inasmuch as there is no prayer seeking recovery of Rs.

21.50 lakhs from defendant no.1 which according to the plaintiff

is due to it.

38. In the circumstances, we hold that while the plaintiff has

certain grievances arising from the MoU, against the defendants

which may give rise to seek appropriate remedies in law, the

aforesaid three declaratory reliefs sought in the plaint are barred

by law. Hence, the plaint is liable to be rejected in exercise of

jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. In our view, the

revisional court was justified in rejecting the plaint but the High

Court has erroneously set aside the order of the revisional court

without appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case

and has simply remanded the matter to the revisional court to

reconsider the revision afresh on the premise that the revisional

court did not have the jurisdiction to reject the plaint under

Section 115 of the CPC.

39. In the result, the impugned Order of the High Court is set

aside and the Order of the revisional court passed in C.R.P. No.5

of 2012 dated 23.02.2013 is restored. The plaint in C.S. No.

1065 of 2009 is rejected. This appeal is accordingly allowed.

40. However, it is clarified that the rejection of the plaint would

not come in the way of the plaintiff filing a suit against

defendant no.1 for seeking appropriate reliefs in accordance with

law, if so advised.

Parties to bear their respective costs.

…..………..…………………..J.

[M.R. SHAH]

…………………………………J.

[B.V. NAGARATHNA]

NEW DELHI;

April 01, 2022.

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Indian Constitution

M/S FROST INTERNATIONAL LIMITED VS M/S MILAN DEVELOPERS AND BUILDERS (P) LIMITED & ANR.

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