ABID-UL-ISLAM VS INDER SAIN DUA

ABID-UL-ISLAM VS INDER SAIN DUA - Supreme Court Case

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9444 OF 2016

ABID-UL-ISLAM .. APPELLANT

VERSUS

INDER SAIN DUA .. RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

M. M. Sundresh, J.

1. Focus in this appeal is on the exercise of the revisional power by the High Court

of Delhi in its invocation of proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control

Act, 1958 (for short “the Act”).

2. Heard Mr. Amit Andley, learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent,

party-in-person. We have perused all the documents filed along with written

arguments.

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BRIEF FACTS:

3. Shri Haji Badrul Islam (since deceased) was the original owner of the two shops

leased out to the respondent orally way back in the year 1970. The lease

continued for decades. After the demise of the original landlord, his son Shri

Sajid-Ul-Islam became the owner both by inheritance and by virtue of an award

dated 11.03.1980. He too expired on 21.11.1986 and the appellant, who claims

through the award and inheritance by operation of law, filed the eviction petition

under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act in the year 2014.

4. The respondent filed an application seeking leave to defend, inter alia, raising

three primary contentions, namely, (i) the appellant is not having title over the

property; (ii) the property actually belongs to the Government of India under the

Enemy Property Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as “Enemy Property Act”)

and (iii) there are alternative accommodations by way of other properties

available for carrying out the business of the appellant as such the need of the

appellant is not bona fide.

5. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the application holding that the title of

the appellant cannot be questioned by the respondent, the averments regarding

the suitability of alternative accommodation are vague and the embargo under

the Enemy Property Act would not be made applicable to the properties in

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question. Incidentally, the bona fide need of the appellant has also been

discussed by the learned Rent Controller.

6. The respondent, being dissatisfied with the said decision of the learned Rent

Controller, approached the High Court of Delhi invoking the proviso to Section

25B(8) of the Act. Despite holding that the respondent cannot question the title

of the appellant, having filed a suit acknowledging the said factum, the revision

was allowed on the premise that there are triable issues as the denial of the

appellant on the defence of the appellant qua the issue of alternative

accommodation is vague.

7. Assailing the aforesaid decision rendered by the High Court, the present appeal

is before us.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT:

8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the jurisdiction available to the

High Court being limited and restrictive, the decision made without a specific

finding on the reasoning of the learned Rent Controller would amount to

exercising a jurisdiction not vested. The respondent has not made out a case

even on facts. It is not for the respondent being a tenant to insist upon a

particular property, especially when a clear statement has been made on

possession. The appellant has specifically denied ownership of any alternate

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properties mentioned by the respondent in his application seeking leave to

defend.

9. On the additional documents filed by the respondent, it is submitted that the

subsequent proceeding initiated under the Enemy Property (Amendment and

Validation) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “Amended Act”) was one

without jurisdiction, especially when the earlier one was closed after conducting

a preliminary inquiry. To substantiate the same, reliance is made on the report

dated 04.11.2015. The learned counsel has also stated that the proceedings

challenging the subsequent notices are pending before the High Court of Delhi

wherein an order of “no coercive steps should be taken” has been passed. In the

aforesaid proceedings the application filed by the respondent to implead himself

was rejected for want of bona fides, which stood confirmed by this Court.

10. To buttress the submissions, learned counsel has relied on the following

judgments rendered by this Court:

 Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610

 Balwant Singh alias Bant Singh and Anr. v. Sudarshan Kumar and Anr.

2021 SCC OnLine SC 114

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SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

11.The respondent, who appears as a party-in-person, submitted that there are

triable issues involved and, therefore, the High Court was right in allowing the

revision. There is a serious cloud over the title of the appellant as some of the

owners of the properties are living in the neighbouring country of Pakistan. The

award obtained on 11.03.1980 is under cloud and thus liable to be ignored. The

authority constituted under the Amended Act has recognized the status of the

respondent as its tenant. It was further submitted that the appellant is in

possession of alternative accommodations available for running the business.

Thus, while confirming the order of the High Court, the subsequent events

having taken place as evidenced by the documents filed, will have to be taken

note of. The respondent sought the dismissal of the present appeal. Seeking to

strengthen his case further, the respondent took us through the following

judgments of this Court:

 M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. (1981) 3 SCC 36

 P.V. Papanna and Ors. v. K. Padmanabhaiah (1994) 2 SCC 316

 Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain (1986) 4 SCC 736

 D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC424

 Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva (1982) 3 SCC 270

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 Liaq Ahmed and Ors. v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman (2000) 5 SCC 708

 India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and Ors. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla

(Dead) by LRs and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178

 Gram Panchayat v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 543

DISCUSSION

Relevant Provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

Section 14(1)(e):

“14. Protection of tenant against eviction: (1) Notwithstanding

anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or

decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any

court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the

prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the

premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-

xxx xxx xxx

(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by

the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any

member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or

for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the

landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential

accommodation.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, "premises let for

residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for

use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used

incidentally for commercial or other purposes;”

 SECTION 19:

“19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry: (1) Where a

landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance

of an order made under clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section

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14, Ins. By Act 57 of 1988, sec. 10 (w.e.f.1-12-1988) [or under sections

14A, 14B, 14C, 14D and 21], the landlord shall not, except with the

permission of the Controller obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the

whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of

obtaining such possession, and in granting such permission the Controller

may direct the landlord to put such evicted tenant in possession of the

premises.

(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as aforesaid and

the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose

benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such

possession, or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within

three years from the date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other

than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller

under sub-section (1) or the possession of such premises is transferred to

another person for reasons which do not appear to the! Controller to be

bona fide, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf

by such evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct the

landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him such

compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”

Section 25B

 “25B. Special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on

the ground of bona fide requirement:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if

the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the

landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the

premises on the ground specified in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section

(1) of section 14, or under section 14A.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of

possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the

procedure specified in this section:

Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an

order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for

the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.”

Requirement Under Section 14(1)(e):

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12. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction. Thus,

in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking possession of the

tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, the learned Rent Controller

may dispense with the protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an

order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is

no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”. Therefore, there has to be

satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii)

the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such

reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the

landlord and not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to the

conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that

there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions

mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied.

13. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal

Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706:

“9. Chapter III-A deals with summary trial of certain applications expressly

stating that every application by a landlord for recovery of possession on the

ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14

of the Act, or under Section 14-A or 14-B or 14-C or 14-D shall be dealt

with in accordance with the special provisions prescribed in Section 25-B of

the Act. As per the broad scheme of this Chapter a tenant is precluded from

contesting an application filed for eviction on the grounds mentioned in the

aforementioned provisions unless he obtains leave from the Controller to

contest the eviction petition. In default of obtaining leave to defend or leave

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is refused to him an order of eviction follows. It appears recourse to

summary trial is adopted having due regard to nature of the grounds on

which the eviction is sought with a view to avoid delay so that the landlord

should not be deprived or denied of his right to immediate possession of

premises for his bona fide use.

10. At the same time, it is well settled and accepted position in law that no

one shall be subjected to suffer a civil consequence like eviction from a

premises resulting in hardship to him without providing adequate and

effective opportunity to disprove the case against him and establish his case

as pleaded.

11. As is evident from Sections 25-B(4) and (5) of the Act, burden placed on

a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed by him discloses

such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the

recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause

(e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act, with which we are concerned

in this case, are good enough to grant leave to defend.

12. A landlord, who bonafidely requires a premises for his residence and

occupation should not suffer for long, waiting for eviction of a tenant. At the

same time a tenant cannot be thrown out from a premises summarily, even

though prima facie he is able to say that the claim of the landlord is not bona

fide or untenable and as such not entitled to obtain an order of eviction.

Hence the approach has to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing

leave to defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition within the broad

scheme of Chapter III-A and in particular having regard to the clear terms

and language of Section 25-B(5).

13. We are of the considered view that at a stage when the tenant seeks leave

to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out a case by disclosing such

facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. It

would not be a right approach to say that unless the tenant at that stage itself

establishes a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend

should not be granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25-B(5). A

leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a

routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special provisions

contained in Chapter III-A of the Act. Leave to defend cannot be refused

where an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of a landlord to

recover possession of the premises from a tenant under clause (e) of the

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14, when as a matter of fact the

requirement may not be bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case

leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him

and his family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is

granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction. At the

stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits in support of the

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rival contentions. Assertions and counter-assertions made in affidavits may

not afford safe and acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative

conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong and acceptable

evidence available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by

the tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or most

unreasonable. Take a case when possession is sought on the ground of

personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his need and not his mere

desire. The ground under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of

Section 14 enables a landlord to recover possession of the tenanted premises

on the ground of his bona fide requirement. This being an enabling

provision, essentially the burden is on the landlord to establish his case

affirmatively. In short and substance, a wholly frivolous and totally

untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend, but when a

triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the Rent Controller by the statute

itself to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave the real test should be

whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave to defend prima

facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from obtaining an order of

eviction and not whether at the end defence may fail. It is well to remember

that when leave to defend is refused, serious consequences of eviction shall

follow and the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth

of the averments made in the eviction petition by cross-examination. It may

also be noticed that even in cases where leave is granted provisions are

made in this very Chapter for expeditious disposal of eviction petitions.

Section 25-B(6) states that where leave is granted to a tenant to contest the

eviction application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the

application as early as practicable. Section 25-B(7) speaks of the procedure

to be followed in such cases. Section 25-B(8) bars the appeals against an

order of recovery of possession except a provision of revision to the High

Court. Thus a combined effect of Sections 25-B(6), (7) and (8) would lead

to expeditious disposal of eviction petitions so that a landlord need not wait

and suffer for a long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave

to defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great

hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having regard to

competing claims.”

14.We further wish to place reliance on the judgment of this Court in Anil Bajaj

and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610:

“6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant 1) is

carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a narrow lane, the

tenant is in occupation of the premises located on the main road which the

landlord considers to be more suitable for his own business. The materials

on record, in fact, disclose that the landlord had offered to the tenant the

premises located in the narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises

which offer was declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant's case that the

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landlord, Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted premises from

which eviction is sought for the purposes of his business. It is also not the

tenant's case that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep vacant the tenanted

premises after obtaining possession thereof or to use the same is any way

inconsistent with the need of the landlord. What the tenant contends is that

the landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying on

different businesses and further that the landlord has other premises from

where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be effectively

carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of

law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the

property belonging to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose

of his business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from

various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the

tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for

his own business.”

15.For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25B(5), a mere

assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption

subject to the satisfaction of the learned Rent Controller qua bona fide need in

favour of the landlord which is obviously rebuttable with some material of

substance to the extent of raising a triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent

Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend is obviously

subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderance forming the

subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is

between a mere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the

rejection of a normal application for eviction.

16.Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound to place prima facie

material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the

presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object of

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Section 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B has to be seen in the light of yet another

provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the

dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of

the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended

purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the

application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus,

Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a

speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section 25B(8),

denying a right of appeal.

17. Dealing with a pari materia provision, this Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa v.

Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778, was pleased to clarify the aforesaid position

holding the procedure as summary. In such a case, the tenant is expected to put

in adequate and reasonable materials in support of the facts pleaded in the form

of a declaration sufficient to raise a triable issue. One cannot lose sight of the

object behind Section 25B in facilitating not only the expeditious but effective

remedy for a class of landlords, sans the normal procedural route. In this regard,

we wish to quote the decision of this court in Baldev Singh (supra):

“14. The phrase “bona fide requirement” or “bona fide need” or “required

reasonably in good faith” or “required”, occurs in almost all Rent Control

Acts with the underlying legislative intent which has been considered and

demonstrated innumerable times by various High Courts as also by this

Court, some of which we would like to refer to. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar

Chander [(1988) 3 SCC 131] it is said that the bona fide need should be

12

genuine and honest, conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that the

landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has

inevitably a subjective element in it, and that desire, to become a

“requirement” in law must have the objective element of a “need”, which

can be decided only by taking all the relevant circumstances into

consideration so that the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered

illusory or whittled down.

15. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 273] it was held by

this Court that the words “reasonable requirement” undoubtedly postulate

that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish.

The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind

but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire.

16. In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India [(1991) 2 SCC 87] a three-Judge

Bench of this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 99, para 20)

“20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as

against the claim of the classified landlords. The fact that there is no

reference to the words bona fide requirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D

does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is

bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact

every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one.

There is also enough indication in support of this construction from

the title of Section 25-B which states ‘special procedure for the

disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide

requirement’.”

17. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]

this Court while dealing with the aspect of bona fide requirement has said

that the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in

contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, refers to a

state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the

mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by

placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to

himself — whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need

to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest.

xxx xxx xxx

19. … In our view there are inbuilt protections in the relevant provisions for

the tenants that whenever the landlord would approach the court he would

approach when his need is genuine and bona fide. It is, of course, subject to

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the tenant's right to rebut it but with strong and cogent evidence. In our

view, in the proceeding taken up under Section 13-B by the NRI landlords

for the ejectment of the tenant, the court shall presume that the landlord's

need pleaded in the petition is genuine and bona fide. But this would not

disentitle the tenant from proving that in fact and in law the requirement of

the landlord is not genuine. A heavy burden would lie on the tenant to prove

that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. To prove this fact the

tenant will be called upon to give all the necessary facts and particulars

supported by documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in the

affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and

decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord. A

mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the

strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of

occupation of the premises is real and genuine.”

18.We further wish to place reliance upon a recent decision of this Court in Ram

Krishan Grover v. Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 506, wherein this Court

considered the aforesaid decisions in Inderjeet Kaur (supra) and Baldev Singh

(supra) and interpreted the burden on the tenant to be rebutted at the stage of

leave to defend and observed:

“39. The requirement of a “strong case” for obtaining leave to defend means

a good case that brings to fore reasonable and well-grounded basis on which

the tenant seeks leave to contest the eviction proceedings. It does not mean

setting up and establishing at that stage a case beyond any scintilla of doubt

and debate. The grounds and pleas raised should reflect clear and strong

defence and relate to the grounds mentioned in para 25 in Baldev Singh

Bajwa [Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778] . The

standard applied is similar to parameters elucidated in Inderjeet

Kaur v. Nirpal Singh [(2001) 1 SCC 706], in which this Court had held that

the leave to defend should not be granted on mere asking but when the pleas

and contentions raise triable issues and the dispute on facts demands that the

matter be properly adjudicated after ascertaining the truth of affidavits filed

by the witnesses in their cross-examination. Each case has to be decided on

its merits and not on the basis of any preconceived suppositions and

presumptions. By providing for a simplified procedure of eviction by the

Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-B does not dilute the rights of tenants. It

gives a chance to the tenants on merits to establish their case and when

justified and necessary to take the matter to trial. By no means, therefore,

Section 13-B can be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable.”

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SCOPE OF REVISION

19. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to

Section 25B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not

providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over

an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is

very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further

second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously

through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.

20. Proviso to Section 25B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision

against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of

superintendence over an inferior court on the decision making process, inclusive

of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and

supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercising the appellate

jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of

interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there

is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the

absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb

such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters

which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into

that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. We do

15

not wish to go further on this settled proposition of law, except by quoting the

decision of this Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,

(1998) 8 SCC 119:

“5. Section 25-B of the Act lays down “special procedure for the disposal of

application for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement”. Subsection (1) says that every application for recovery of possession on the

ground specified in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act shall be dealt with in

accordance with the procedure specified in Section 25-B. Sub-section (8)

says that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the

recovery of possession of any premises made by the Rent Controller in

accordance with the procedure specified in this section. The proviso to that

sub-section reads thus:

“Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that

an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call

for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks

fit.”

6. The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory

in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to

law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when

perusing the records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that

the order of the Rent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words,

the High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any

illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the order

under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise

to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent

Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should

have reached such a finding on the materials available.

7. Although, the word “revision” is not employed in the proviso to Section

25-B(8) of the Act, it is evident from the language used therein that the

power conferred is revisional power. In legal parlance, distinction between

appellate and revisional jurisdiction is well understood. Ordinarily, appellate

jurisdiction is wide enough to afford a rehearing of the whole case for

enabling the appellate forum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammelled by

the conclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course, the

statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width

of such appellate powers. Revisional power, on the contrary, is ordinarily a

power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within the bounds of

law. Expansion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon

how the statute has couched such power therein. In some legislations,

revisional jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity,

16

legality or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate court.

In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar [(1980) 4 SCC

259] this Court considered the scope of the words (“the High Court may call

for and examine the records … to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such

proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order

…”) by which power of revision has been conferred by a particular statute.

Dealing with the contention that the above words indicated conferment of a

very wide power on the revisional authority, this Court has observed thus in

the said decision: (SCC p. 262, para 3)

“The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words ‘to

satisfy itself’ under Section 25 appears to be that the power conferred

on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of

superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in

Section 25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with

findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of

the subordinate authority.”

8. Dealing with Section 32, the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act, 1952,

which is almost identically worded as in the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of

the Act, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has stated thus in Hari

Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury [AIR 1963 SC 698 : 1962 Supp (1)

SCR 933] :

“The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to

correct error of jurisdiction to which Section 115 is limited. But it

must not be overlooked that the section — in spite of its apparent

width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass

such order as the High Court might think fit, — is controlled by the

opening words, where it says that the High Court may send for the

record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is ‘according to

law’. It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there

should be a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate

remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.”

9. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavadas [(1969) 1 SCC

688] another three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering a similarly

worded proviso in Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.

Though, learned Judges did not give an exhaustive definition of the

expression “according to law”, a catalogue of instance in which the High

Court may interfere under the said proviso was given in the decision as the

following [Ed.: The passage quoted is an extract from Beaumont, C.J.'s

judgment in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Wamen Hemrai, (1938) 40 Bom LR 125

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which was approved by the Supreme Court in the case cited.]: (SCC p. 691,

para 7)

“They are cases in which the Court which made the order had no

jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence

which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful

party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the

burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever

the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not

had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere.”

10. The Bench has, however, cautioned that the High Court should not

interfere merely because it considered that “possibly the Judge who heard

the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not

have arrived at”.

11. Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present case has

reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding

as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while

exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but

that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion

arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. A reading of the

impugned order shows that the High Court has overstepped the limit of its

power as a revisional court. The order impugned on that score is hence

vitiated by jurisdictional deficiency.

12. Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act affords one of the

grounds to the landlord to seek recovery of possession of the building

leased. The said clause reads thus:

“14. (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required

bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or

for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner

thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and

that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable

residential accommodation;

Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, ‘premises let for

residential purposes’ include any premises which having been let for

use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used

incidentally for commercial or other purposes;”

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13. If the landlord has another residential accommodation which is

reasonably suitable, he is not permitted to avail himself of the benefit

afforded in the ground set out in the clause. Learned Single Judge of the

High Court has noted that the landlord in this case has “admitted in her

deposition that the house in Calcutta was a 3-bedroom house with

drawing/dining room and one of the bedrooms was used by her, another by

her son with his wife and another bedroom was kept for her daughter who

used to come and stay”. This was one of the reasons which persuaded the

learned Single Judge to interfere with the order of eviction. To deprive a

landlord of the benefit of the ground mentioned in Section 14(1)(e) on

account of availability of alternative residential accommodation, it is not

enough that such alternative accommodation is in a far different State. Such

accommodation must be available in the same city or town, or at least within

reasonable proximity thereof if it is outside the limits of the city. The said

limb of clause (e) cannot be interpreted as to mean that if the landlord has

another house anywhere in the world, he cannot seek recovery of possession

of his building under clause (e). The High Court therefore went wrong in

observing that since the landlord has possession of another flat at Calcutta

she is disentitled to seek recovery of possession of the tenanted premises

situated at Delhi.

14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the

Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted

premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his

building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on

the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other

conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima

facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the

requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is

not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust

himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding

the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite

unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have

adjusted himself.”

21. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved by this Court

in the case of Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327:

“22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(1998) 8

SCC 119] had an occasion to consider the scope of proviso to Section 25-

B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court found, that though the

word “revision” was not employed in the said proviso, from the language

used therein, the legislative intent was clear that the power conferred was

revisional power. This Court observed thus: (SCC p. 124, para 11)

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“11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present case

has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a different

finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt

even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence

can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain

whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly

unreasonable.”

It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court while

exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was

exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to reappraise

the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the

conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.

23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141], this Court

had an occasion to consider the aforesaid powers under the Delhi Rent

Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus: (SCC p. 148, para 12)

“12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition under

Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very

limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the

proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine

the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a

firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case.

Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic if)

in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law,

certainly it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with

such a matter.”

It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the High

Court was very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or

propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court

could examine the facts available in order, to find out whether he had

correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide

the case. It has also been held, that pure findings of fact may not be open to

be interfered with, but in a given case, if the finding of fact is given on a

wrong premise of law, it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere

with the same.”

ON MERITS:

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22. Learned Rent Controller passed a detailed speaking order. On undertaking such

an exercise, he found that the bona fide need is satisfied; the averments of the

respondent regarding alternative accommodation are vague; the title of the

appellant cannot be questioned; and the embargo under the Enemy Property Act

does not get attracted. Thus, having found that the defense set up by the

respondent is only a moonshine, the application filed seeking leave to defend

was accordingly rejected.

23. After completing the aforesaid process, the Court made certain observations in

addition to the order on merits, giving its indictment on the conduct of the

respondent, who dropped the names of not only a District Judge but also a High

Court Judge, certainly not germane to the case.

24. The High Court, while ignoring the aforesaid conduct of the respondent, as

noted by the learned Rent Controller, proceeded to allow the revision by treating

it like an appeal. It did not even reverse the findings of the learned Rent

Controller, but proceeded to hold that the denials of the appellant in his reply to

the application seeking leave to defend are vague, qua the plea of alternative

accommodation, notwithstanding the rejection of the contention of the

respondent that he cannot question the title. This approach, in our considered

view, cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

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25. Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of a bona fide purpose. The

contention regarding alternative accommodation can at best be only an

incidental one. Such a requirement has not been found to be incorrect by the

High Court, though it is not even open to it to do so, in view of the limited

jurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise. Therefore, the very basis upon

which the revision was allowed is obviously wrong being contrary to the very

provision contained in Section 14(1)(e) and Section 25B(8).

26. We have already discussed the scope of Section 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section

25B(8) of the Act. Therefore, the mere existence of the other properties which

are, in fact, denied by the appellant would not enure to the benefit of the

respondent in the absence of any pleadings and supporting material before the

learned Rent Controller to the effect that they are reasonably suitable for

accommodation.

27.The respondent made substantial claims on the judgment of this Court in

Precision Steel (supra). We do not find the said decision helping the case of the

respondent, in the light of the discussion made on the scope of the relevant

provisions, as leave to defend cannot be granted on mere asking. We can only

reiterate that we do not find any perversity in the decision rendered by the

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learned Rent Controller and the High Court has not only certainly abdicated its

jurisdiction, but also exceeded in a way.

28. We are constrained to note that the respondent continued to drop the names of

persons holding high offices even before us. He proudly proclaimed during his

argument that the proceedings under the Enemy Property Act, as amended, were

initiated only at his instance on his personally meeting with an Hon’ble Union

Minister. We can only adopt the process undertaken by the learned Rent

Controller by not letting the said statement come in the way of deciding the

matter on merits, despite it being unconscionable and shockingly brazen.

29. Much reliance has been made on the documents indicating the re-creation of

tenancy right in favour of the respondent by the authority constituted under the

Amended Act. We do not wish to state anything on that, nor the said

communication would have an impact on our order. Neither the said Authority is

before us, nor its existence or viability can be gone into in these proceedings.

The scope of the Enemy Property Act, as amended, vis a vis the proceedings for

eviction was already dealt with by the learned Rent Controller, though not

touched upon by the High Court. Further, the attempt of the respondent to

implead himself in a pending case before the High Court of Delhi on a challenge

made to the notices passed under the Amended Act got miserably failed with an

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observation by the High Court that it smacked of mala fides. We may further

note, notwithstanding the earlier conclusion by way of a report dated 04.11.2015

wherein the Assistant Custodian of Enemy Property under the Enemy Property

Act has observed that the predecessors of the appellant are non-evacuees and

that the properties owned by them by no stretch of imagination can be termed as

enemy property, there is another action initiated on which we don’t wish to

express any view. The decision of the High Court rejecting the respondent’s

impleadment was not only confirmed by the dismissal of the intra-court appeal,

but also that of the rejection of the special leave petition by this Court. On fact,

the proceedings initiated under the Enemy Property Act, as amended, are also

stayed by the High Court having considered the report dated 04.11.2015, by a

reasoned order.

30. On the aforesaid analysis, we have no hesitation in setting aside the order of the

High Court by restoring the order passed by the learned Rent Controller. The

appeal stands allowed. No costs.

…….………………………J.

(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)

……………………………J.

 (M.M. SUNDRESH)

New Delhi

April 07, 2022

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