State of Madhya Pradesh vs Jogendra

State of Madhya Pradesh vs Jogendra Supreme Court Case 2022

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ….. APPELLANT

VERSUS

JOGENDRA & ANR. ….. RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

Hima Kohli, J.

1. The present appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya

Pradesh, being aggrieved by the judgment dated 10th September, 2008

passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, whereby the judgment of

conviction and sentence dated 17th December, 2003 imposed by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge on the original accused No.1,

Jogendra – husband of the deceased, Geeta Bai[respondent No. 1

herein] and the original accused No.2, Badri Prasad – father-in-law of

the deceased[respondent No. 2 herein] has been set aside under

Sections 304-B and 306 of the Indian Penal Code,1

 while maintaining the

order of conviction imposed on the original accused no. 1 – Jogendra

1 For short ‘IPC’

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

under Section 498-A IPC and reducing the sentence from three years to

the period already undergone by him, but setting aside the conviction

and sentence imposed on the accused No. 2, Badri Prasad even under

Section 498-A IPC.

2. A quick glance of the relevant facts is necessitated. The

deceased was 18 years old when she got married to the respondent No.

1 [A1] in a social marriage organisation function2

 conducted on 7th May,

1998. Before her marriage, Geeta Bai along with her mother, Kamla Bai

and her brother used to reside with her maternal uncle, Bansi Lal [PW1]. In less than four years of her marriage, Geeta Bai committed suicide

at her matrimonial home by pouring kerosene oil and setting herself on

fire. She was admitted in a burnt condition in the Community Health

Centre, Baroda on 20th April, 2002 and breathed her last on the same

day. At that time, she was five months pregnant. On receiving

information from the attending doctor, an FIR was lodged on 23rd April,

2002 [Exhibit P-13]. On completion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed and the case was committed for trial in the Sessions

Court.

3. After examining the evidence produced by the prosecution and the

defence, the trial Court acquitted Sushila [A-3] – mother-in-law and

2 Samuhik VIvaah Sammelan

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

Jitender [A-4] – brother-in-law of the deceased, but convicted both the

respondents[A-1 and A-2] [husband and father-in-law of the deceased]

under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC and imposed a sentence of

rigorous imprisonment3

 for life for the first offence, RI for a period of

seven years with fine for the second offence and RI for three years with

fine for the third offence. The conviction and sentence imposed on the

respondents was primarily based on the evidence of Bansi Lal [P.W.-1],

Shyam Bihari [P.W.-2] and Amrit Lal [P.W.-4], maternal uncles of the

deceased who stated that the respondents had been demanding money

from the deceased for constructing a house which her family members

were unable to give. As a result, she was constantly harassed and

subjected to cruelty, finally leading to her committing suicide. Dr. V.K.

Garg [P.W.-8], who had conducted the post-mortem examination [Ex. P7] on the dead body of the deceased, had deposed that on examining

the uterus, there was a foetus of five months in a dead condition and, in

his opinion, the death of Geeta Bai had taken place due to burning.

4. On the respondents preferring an appeal against the judgment of

conviction dated 17th December, 2003 passed by the Sessions Court, the

High Court gave a clean chit to the respondent No. 2 [A-2], while setting

aside the order of conviction in respect of the respondent No.1 [A-1]

under Sections 304B and 306 IPC. However, the conviction of the

3 For short ‘RI’

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

respondent No.1 was sustained under Section 498-A IPC, but the

sentence of RI for three years imposed on him was reduced to the period

already undergone by him. For arriving at such a conclusion, the High

Court was persuaded by the rulings in K. Prema S. Rao and Another v.

 Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others4

, Saro Rana and Others v. State of

 Jharkhand5

 and Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra6

and held that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot

be treated as a demand for dowry. The High Court agreed with the

submission made by the learned counsel for A-1 and A-2, respondents

herein that the offence under Section 304-B was not established against

them as the demand allegedly made on the deceased was for money to

construct a house, which cannot be treated as a dowry demand for

connecting her death to the said cause. The respondents were also

acquitted for the offence under Section 306 IPC as the High Court was of

the opinion that, from a scrutiny of the depositions of P.W.-1, P.W.-2,

P.W.-4 and P.W.-6, there was nothing to sustain the conclusion that the

respondents had abetted the deceased to commit suicide. As for the

offence under Section 498-A relating to cruelty meted out to the

deceased, the High Court acquitted the respondent No. 2, while

maintaining the conviction order in respect of the respondent No. 1.

4 (2003) 1 SCC 217

5 2005 Crl.L.J. 65 delivered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand

6 (2007) 9 SCC 721

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal has been filed by the

State of Madhya Pradesh.

5. Mr. Prashant Singh, learned Advocate General for the appellantState has assailed the impugned judgment and contended that the High

Court has failed to appreciate the harassment caused to the deceased

at the hands of the respondents who had been constantly demanding

money from her to construct a house and purchase a plot of land; that

the High Court did not consider the testimonies of Bansi Lal [P.W.-1],

Shyam Bihari [P.W.-2], Amrit Lal [P.W.-4] and Rajesh Bhai [P.W.-6], who

had unanimously stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her

parental home, she would complain that she was being subjected to

assault by the respondents for bringing a sum of ₹50,000/- [Rupees Fifty

thousand] for constructing a house and that it was due to this

harassment caused by them that the deceased got fed up and was

forced to commit suicide. Learned counsel argued that contribution of

money to construct a house, as demanded by the respondents from the

deceased ought to be treated as a dowry demand and it is quite

apparently a case where the offence under Section 304-B was made

out. It was also submitted that this was a clear-cut case of abetment to

commit suicide and both the respondents had rightly been convicted for

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

the said offence by the trial Court, which order has been erroneously

overturned in appeal.

6. For the purpose of deciding the present appeal, it is considered

appropriate to extract below the statement of the uncle of the deceased,

Bansi Lal [PW-1], who has been found to be a reliable witness by both

the Courts below: -

“2. Whenever Gitabai had used to come then she had used

to say that she is beaten. She had told about beating by fatherin-law and husband. They had used to demand rupees fifty

thousand for construction of house. So they had used to beat

her. Since I had no money so I did not give. I and people of

society had also convinced to son-in-law and father-in-law but

they did not agree. Gitabai had also discussed about demand

of rupees fifty thousand with my sister and wife.

3. We had received the information of death of Gitabai by

phone at 11 o’clock of night. We did not give rupees fifty

thousand thereafter Gitabai was beaten consequently her finger

was also fractured. Her husband has committed beating.

Badriprasad had also expelled to Gitabai and Jogendra from

the house. After ouster from the house, Gitabai and Jogendra

had lived near the father of Badriprasad in Khanpur. Then both

of them had come to Kota from there. They had lived in Kota

for 7-8 months. After spending of money in Kota, both of them

arrived near my sister Kamlabai in Takarbada. Both of them

had stayed in Takarbada for 1-2 days. Jogendra demanded

rupees twenty thousand from my sister in Takarbada. My sister

had told me about it. Rupees twenty thousand was demanded

for purchase of a plot in Kota. The both Gitabai and Jogendra

arrived near me in Sultanpur from Takarbada. Jogendra also

demanded rupees twenty thousand from me. Rupees was

demanded for purchase of plot to construct the house. Money

was used to demand as dowry. I had not given rupees. Then

due to not giving of money, threatening to my niece Gitabai, he

had carried her to Kota.

4. I saw to Gitabai at that time. Then she was pregnant.

Subsequently Badriprasad, Jitendra and Sushila went near

Jogendra and Gitabai in Kota and keeping their luggage

forcibly, they brought the luggage and they also brought to

Gitabai and Jogendra in their house. After three months of

carrying from Kota, I received the news of death of Gitabai.”

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

7. Some of the relevant statements made by P.W.-1 during his crossexamination are also extracted below:

“13. After about 6 months of it, Gitabai had again come to

in-laws house and she had stayed for 6-7 months and when

we had used to go to take her then in-laws of Gitabai had not

used to send her. Witness himself said that their harassment

process had started during this time. My younger brother

had gone to take her for 6-7 times in this period. I had used

to live in Kota. After this when my mother had died then

Gitabai had come and she had also come for one more

programme. When Gitabai had gone to in-laws house after

6 months then after that I had met with her at the time of

death of my mother. When my mother had died then Gitabai

had come then she had stayed with my brother for 6 months.

When my mother had died then Jogendra had come with

Gitabai on third day and he had also caused beating before

us. He had not got tea so Jogendra had caused beating.

When Gitabai lived with brothers for 6 months then I had

gone there for many times during that period. Accused and

Sushilabai and Badri had also come there at the time of

death of my mother. I had stayed in the village for 12 days.

It is incorrect to say when Gitabai had stayed in Takarwada

at the time of death of mother then she had not made any

complaint of in-laws there. This fact is correct that first of all

Gitabai had complained at the time of death of mother.

Jogendra had stayed in our village for 2 days.

xxx xxx xxx

18. When Badriprasad had come at the time of death of

mother. After that, I have not met with Badriprasad till today.

Badriprasad demands rupees fifty thousand for construction

of house. Gitabai had told me this fact when Gitabai had

come after death of mother then she had told this fact that

Badriprasad demands rupees fifty thousand for construction

of house. Sister Kamlabai had told me this fact. Besides

her, any other person did not tell the fact of demand of

rupees fifty thousand. After 7 – 8 months of death of mother,

Kamlabai had told me the fact of rupees fifty thousand.

Which fact Kamlabai had told me, after 4 - 5 months of that,

Gitabai and Jogendra had come near me for demand of

rupees twenty thousand.”

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

8. It is clear that during his extensive cross-examination, P.W.-1 firmly

stuck to his statements that the harassment of his niece, Geeta Bai had

started within six months of her wedding with the respondent No.1 who

had asked her to fetch a sum of ₹20,000/-[Rupees Twenty thousand]

from her mother and P.W.-1 for construction of a house. The said

demand was also made by the respondent No.1 on P.W.-1 directly.

P.W.-1 stated that the deceased had also informed him that her father-inlaw, respondent No.2 had raised a demand of ₹50,000/- [Rupees Fifty

thousand] on her for construction of a house, which she was asked to

convey to him. The said witness was consistent in his deposition that

he used to give money to his deceased niece and her husband –

respondent No. 1 towards expenses and that both of them had

demanded a sum of ₹50,000/-[Rupees Fifty thousand] for construction

of a house, which he had declined to give. Pertinently, Shyam Bihari

[P.W.-2] and Amrit Lal [P.W.-4], both maternal uncles of the deceased,

had the same version to narrate as P.W.-1. Thus, the prosecution

version was that the respondents used to harass the deceased and that

the respondent No. 1 had demanded a sum of ₹20,000/-[Rupees Twenty

thousand], whereas the respondent No. 2 had demanded ₹50,000/-

[Rupees Fifty thousand] from the deceased for constructing a house and

for buying a plot of land. Fed up with the constant dowry demands made

on her by the respondents, which her family could not satisfy, Geeta Bai

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

had committed suicide by immolating herself at her matrimonial home

within seven years of her marriage.

9. The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of

Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry

death. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304-B

have been reiterated in several rulings of this Court. Four pre-requisites

for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-

B are as follows:

(i) that the death of a woman must have been caused

by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than

under normal circumstance;

(ii) that such a death must have occurred within a

period of seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty

or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon

before her death; and

(iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been

for or related to any demand for dowry.

10. As the word “dowry” has been defined in Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 19617

, the said provision gains significance and is

extracted below:

“2. Definition of ‘dowry’ - In this Act, “dowry” means any

property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either

directly or indirectly –

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the

marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage by any other

person, to either party to the marriage or to any other

person;

7 For short ‘the Dowry Act’

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with

the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or

mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal law

(Shariat) applies.

Explanation I.— xxx xxx xxx8

Explanation II.— The expression “valuable security” has the

same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of

1860).”

11. In a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rajinder Singh v.

 State of Punjab9

, Section 2 of the Dowry Act has been split into six

distinct parts for a better understanding of the said provision, which are

as follows:

“8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can

be broken into six distinct parts:

(1) Dowry must first consist of any property or

valuable security— the word “any” is a word of

width and would, therefore, include within it

property and valuable security of any kind

whatsoever.

(2) Such property or security can be given or even

agreed to be given. The actual giving of such

property or security is, therefore, not necessary.

(3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to

be given either directly or indirectly.

(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only

by one party to a marriage to the other but also by

the parents of either party or by any other person to

either party to the marriage or to any other person. It

will be noticed that this clause again widens the

reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing

the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.

(5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It

can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage.

Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is

solemnised.

(6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with

the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression

“in connection with” would in the context of the social

evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act

mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.”

8 Omitted by Act 63 of 1984 (w.e.f. 2.10.1985)

9 (2015) 6 SCC 477

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

12. In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and

takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion,

the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for

construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. In

Appasaheb’s case [supra] referred to in the impugned judgment, this

Court had held that a demand for money from the parents of the

deceased woman to purchase manure would not fall within the purview

of “dowry”, thereby strictly interpreting the definition of dowry. This view

has, however, not been subscribed to in Rajinder Singh’s case [supra]

wherein it has been held that the said decision as also the one in the

case of Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by

 Public Prosecutor10, do not state the law correctly. Noting that the

aforesaid decisions were distinct from four other decisions of this Court,

viz., Bachni Devi and Another v. State of Haryana11

, Kulwant Singh

 and Others v. State of Punjab12

, Surinder Singh v. State of

 Haryana13, and Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab14, the Court opined

that keeping in mind the fact that Section 304-B was inserted in the IPC

to combat the social evil of dowry demand that has reached alarming

10 (2013) 3 SCC 684

11 (2011) 4 SCC 427

12 (2013) 4 SCC 177

13 (2014) 4 SCC 129

14 (2014) 12 SCC 582

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

proportions, it cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the

language used in the provision, the same ought to be construed strictly

as that would amount to defeating the very object of the provision. In

other words, the Court leaned in favour of assigning an expansive

meaning to the expression “dowry” and held thus :-

“20. Given that the statute with which we are

dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common

sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be

achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment

in Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra,

(2007) 9 SCC 721(2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri)

468] followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal [Vipin

Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC

(Cri) 15] do not state the law correctly. We, therefore,

declare that any money or property or valuable

security demanded by any of the persons mentioned

in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before

or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably

connected to the death of a married woman, would

necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the

marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and

unequivocally point otherwise.”

 [emphasis added]

13. The Latin maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat” i.e, a liberal

construction should be put up on written instruments, so as to uphold

them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intention of the parties, sums it

up. Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very intention

of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation that will

promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislation meant

to uproot a social evil like dowry demand. In this context the word

“Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a

valuable security of any nature. When dealing with cases under Section

304-B IPC, a provision legislated to act as a deterrent in the society and

curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the shift in the approach of

the courts ought to be from strict to liberal, from constricted to dilated.

Any rigid meaning would tend to bring to naught, the real object of the

provision. Therefore, a push in the right direction is required to

accomplish the task of eradicating this evil which has become deeply

entrenched in our society.

14. In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the trial

Court has correctly interpreted the demand for money raised by the

respondents on the deceased for construction of a house as falling within

the definition of the word “dowry”. The submission made by learned

counsel for the respondents that the deceased was also a party to such

a demand as she had on her own asked her mother and maternal uncle

to contribute to the construction of the house, must be understood in the

correct perspective. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had

been constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approach

her family members for money to build a house and it was only on their

persistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask them to

contribute some amount for constructing a house. The Court must be

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hail. The fact that the

marriage of the deceased and the respondent No.1 was conducted in a

community marriage organization where some couples would have tied

the knot goes to show that the parties were financially not so well off.

This position is also borne out from the deposition of P.W.-1 who had

stated that he used to bear the expenses of the couple. Before the

marriage of the deceased also, P.W.-1 had stated that he used to bear

her expenses and that of her mother and brother [his sister and nephew]

as her father had abandoned them. In this background, the High Court

fell in an error in drawing an inference that since the deceased had

herself joined her husband and father-in-law, respondents herein and

asked her mother or uncle to contribute money to construct a house,

such demand cannot be treated as a “dowry demand”. On the contrary,

the evidence brought on record shows that the deceased was

pressurized to make such a request for money to her mother and uncle.

It was not a case of complicity but a case of sheer helplessness faced by

the deceased in such adverse circumstances.

15. Now, coming to the second point urged by learned counsel for the

State that the High Court has overlooked the fact that Geeta Bai had

been subjected to cruelty/harassment at the hands of the respondents

soon before her death, which submission is strictly contested by learned

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

counsel for the respondents, we may note that the meaning of the

expression “soon before her death” has been discussed threadbare in

several judgments. In Surinder Singh (supra), while relying on the

provisions of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 187215 and

Section 304-B IPC, where the words “soon before her death” find

mention, the following pertinent observations have been made: -

“17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in Section

113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-

B IPC. For the presumptions contemplated under these

sections to spring into action, it is necessary to show

that the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before

the death. The interpretation of the words “soon before”

is, therefore, important. The question is how “soon

before”? This would obviously depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case. The cruelty or harassment

differs from case to case. It relates to the mindset of people

which varies from person to person. Cruelty can be mental or

it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades.

It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or

humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her

or her near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of

economic resources or essential amenities of life. It can be

putting restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing

her to talk to the outside world. The list is illustrative and not

exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating or

causing pain and harm to the person of a woman. Every

such instance of cruelty and related harassment has a

different impact on the mind of a woman. Some instances

may be so grave as to have a lasting impact on a woman.

Some instances which degrade her dignity may remain

etched in her memory for a long time. Therefore, “soon

before” is a relative term. In matters of emotions we

cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from

case to case. This must be kept in mind while examining

each case of dowry death.

18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of

this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207 :

2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court considered the term

“soon before”. The relevant observations are as under: (SCC

pp. 222-23, para 15)

“15. … ‘Soon before’ is a relative term which

is required to be considered under specific

circumstances of each case and no

15 For short ‘the Evidence Act’

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

straitjacket formula can be laid down by

fixing any time-limit. This expression is

pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The

term ‘soon before’ is not synonymous with

the term ‘immediately before’ and is opposite

of the expression ‘soon after’ as used and

understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of

the Evidence Act. These words would imply that

the interval should not be too long between the

time of making the statement and the death. It

contemplates the reasonable time which, as

earlier noticed, has to be understood and

determined under the peculiar circumstances of

each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the

circumstances showing the existence of

cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not

restricted to a particular instance but

normally refer to a course of conduct. Such

conduct may be spread over a period of time.

If the cruelty or harassment or demand for

dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be

deemed to be ‘soon before death’ if any other

intervening circumstance showing the nonexistence of such treatment is not brought on

record, before such alleged treatment and the

date of death. It does not, however, mean that

such time can be stretched to any period.

Proximate and live link between the effect of

cruelty based on dowry demand and the

consequential death is required to be proved by

the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or

harassment based upon such demand and the

date of death should not be too remote in time

which, under the circumstances, be treated as

having become stale enough.”

Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of

dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand

and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to

be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the

facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a

pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the

confines of law.

[emphasis added]

16. In Rajinder Singh [supra], falling back on the rulings in Kans Raj

 v. State of Punjab and Others16

, Dinesh v. State of Haryana17 and

16 (2000) 5 SCC 207

17 (2014) 12 SCC 532

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

 Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana18, it has been emphasized

that “soon before” is not synonymous to “immediately before” and the

following observations have been made: -

“24. We endorse what has been said by these two

decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen.

What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon”

does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic

construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has

led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear

that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags

may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is

that the demand for dowry should not be stale but

should be the continuing cause for the death of the

married woman under Section 304-B.”

 [emphasis added]

17. In the above context, we may usefully refer to a recent decision of

a three Judge Bench of this Court in Gurmeet Singh v. State of

 Punjab19 that has restated the detailed guidelines that have been laid

down in Satbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana20, both

authored by Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, relating to trial under Section

304-B IPC where the law on Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of

the Evidence Act has been pithily summarized in the following words:

“38.1. Section 304-B IPC must be interpreted keeping in

mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride

burning and dowry demand.

38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the

existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting

an offence under Section 304-B IPC. Once these

ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of

causality, provided under Section 113-B of the Evidence

Act operates against the accused.

38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-

B IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”.

18 (2015) 3 SCC 724

19 (2021) 6 SCC 108

20 (2021) 6 SCC 1

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and

live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment

for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

38.4. Section 304-B IPC does not take a pigeonhole

approach in categorising death as homicidal or suicidal or

accidental. The reason for such non-categorisation is due to

the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal

circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or

accidental.”

 [emphasis added]

18. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the marriage between

the deceased and the respondent No. 1 – accused had taken place on

7

th May, 1998 and the deceased was brought in a severely burnt

condition from her matrimonial home to the Health Care Centre at

Baroda on 20th April, 2002 and she had expired on the very same day. It

is also not in dispute that the death had occurred on account of the

deceased dowsing kerosene oil and setting herself on fire. The

evidence brought on record amply demonstrates that the harassment of

the deceased for money had commenced within a few months of her

marriage and had continued thereafter on several occasions. This fact is

borne out from the deposition of PW-1, which shows that on not being

able to fulfil the demand for ₹50,000/- [Rupees Fifty thousand] made by

the respondent No. 2 [father-in-law], he had thrown out the deceased

and the respondent No.1 from the matrimonial home. They had then

shifted to Kota and resided there. Thereafter, respondent No.2 had

brought the couple back to Baroda and had again started demanding

money from the deceased. Then the deceased and the respondent No.

Page 18 of 20

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

1 moved to Tankarwada. This time, it was respondent No. 1 who had

demanded a sum of ₹20,000/- [Rupees Twenty thousand] from the

deceased and her uncle for constructing a house. On being persistently

hounded with the repeated demands for money made on her which her

family could not fulfil, the hapless deceased who was well into the

second trimester of her pregnancy, immolated herself at her matrimonial

home.

19. The above glairing circumstances when viewed together, can

hardly mitigate the offence of the respondents or take the case out of the

purview of Section 304-B IPC, when all the four pre-requisites for

invoking the said provision stand satisfied, namely, that the death of

Geeta Bai took place at her matrimonial home within seven years of her

marriage; that the said death took place in abnormal circumstances on

account of burning and that too when she was five months pregnant; that

she had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the respondents

soon before her death and such cruelty/harassment was in connection

with demand for dowry. Though the High Court found the testimony of

P.W.-1 [maternal uncle of the deceased] to be trustworthy and consistent

and no credible evidence could be produced by the respondents to

demolish the prosecution version, surprisingly, their conviction under

Section 304-B IPC has been set aside and furthermore, respondent No.

Page 19 of 20

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

2 has been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A

IPC.

20. Taking into account the evidence brought on record by the

prosecution, particularly, the testimony of P.W.-1, this Court has no

hesitation in holding that the analysis of the trial Court was correct and

the respondents deserved to be convicted under Sections 304-B and

498-A IPC. However, we do not propose to disturb the findings

returned by the High Court that has acquitted the respondents for the

offence of abetment to commit suicide under Section 306 IPC, as the

prosecution could not bring any conclusive evidence on record to

satisfactorily demonstrate that it was due to the abetment on the part of

the respondents that the deceased had committed suicide by immolating

herself. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by

the trial Court in respect of both the respondents under Section 304-B

and Section 498-A IPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on

them by the trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years,

which is the minimum sentence prescribed for an offence under Section

304-B IPC.

21. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present appeal is partly

allowed. The respondents shall surrender before the trial Court within

Page 20 of 20

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

four weeks to undergo the remaining period of their sentence. The

appeal is allowed in the above terms.

.................................CJI

[N. V. RAMANA]

......................................J.

 [A. S. BOPANNA]

 .....................................J.

New Delhi, [HIMA KOHLI]

January 11, 2022.

Page 21 of 20

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले