ASHISH SHELAR vs MAHARASHTRA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

ASHISH SHELAR vs MAHARASHTRA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY - Supreme Court Case 2022 - 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.797 OF 2021

ASHISH SHELAR & ORS.  ...PETITIONERS

VERSUS

THE MAHARASHTRA LEGISLATIVE

ASSEMBLY & ANR.     …RESPONDENTS

WITH

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.807 OF 2021

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.800 OF 2021

AND

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.808 OF 2021

JUDGMENT

A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.

1. The petitioners have been duly elected as members of the

current Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (2019­2024).  They

got   elected   from   different   constituencies   in   the   State   of

Maharashtra.   They belong to the Bharatiya Janata Party1

,

the principal Opposition Party in the Maharashtra Legislative

1 for short, “BJP”

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Assembly.  The Ruling Party is a coalition between the Shiv

Sena, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and the Indian

National Congress (INC) christened as “Maha Vikas Aghadi”.

2. This  lis  emanates from the events as unfolded during the

Monsoon Session of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly on

5.7.2021.   The proceedings of the House witnessed heated

exchanges between the members of the Opposition Party and

the Ruling Party due to an impression formed by the former

that   the   business   of   the   House   was   being   conducted   in

unilateral manner, with conscious and engineered effort to

suppress voice of the Opposition Party.   In that, even the

Leader of Opposition was denied an opportunity to speak on a

crucial motion under consideration.  At the relevant time, the

House was presided over by the Chairman nominated under

Rule 8 of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Rules2

, who

according   to   the   petitioners,   denied   opportunity   to   the

Opposition   Party   to   speak   including   to   the   Leader   of

Opposition.

2 for short, “Rules” 

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3. It is alleged that in the meeting of the Business Advisory

Committee,   which   preceded   the   actual   Assembly   Session,

there was a concerted effort on behalf of the members of the

Ruling Party to cut short the Assembly Session for a period of

two days especially when the State was facing unprecedented

situation   owing   to   pandemic,   which   needed   elaborate

deliberation in the House.  The concerted effort was to strip of

all legislative tools available to the Opposition Party so as to

make sure that voice of opposition is muffled and suppressed.

4. The Chair of the Speaker of the House was vacant at the

relevant time due to stepping down by the incumbent.  The

election for appointing a new Speaker of the Assembly was yet

to be conducted.   As per Rule 8 of the Rules, in such a

situation   other   nominated   member   of   the   House   had   to

preside   on   5.7.2021.     As   aforesaid,   a   general   feeling   had

developed amongst the members of the Opposition Party that

the   business   of   the   House   was   not   being   transacted   in

congenial   manner   and   they   were   prevented   from   raising

important questions and express their views on matters of

public importance.  To wit, when the Minister was moving a

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resolution in relation to the empirical data pertaining to OBC,

the   Leader   of   Opposition   wanted   to   object   to   the   same.

However, he was denied that opportunity.  That eventually led

to heated exchanges between the members of both sides and

consequently, the House was adjourned.  

5. Thereafter, some of the members of the Opposition went to

meet the Deputy Speaker in his chamber to vent out their

grievance   regarding   the   unfair   manner   of   conducting

proceedings by the nominated Chairman.  At that time, some

members of the Ruling Party (Shiv Sena) arrived and engaged

in   heated   exchanges.     When   the   House   resumed,   the

nominated Chairman referred to the fact that some members

of the Shiv Sena were present in the chamber and involved in

heated  exchanges, but  no  action was  being taken  against

them   as   both   the   sections   had   apologised   to   each   other.

According to the petitioners, when the House resumed, by

way of courtesy a sincere apology was graciously tendered by

the   Leader   of   Opposition   to   the   Chairman   for   the   earlier

incident while adverting to the fact that none of the MLAs

belonging   to   the   Opposition   Party   (BJP)   including   the

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petitioners   herein   had   abused   the   Chairman.     Soon

thereafter, to the utter surprise of the petitioners (and other

members   of   the   Opposition   Parties),   the   Minister   for

Parliamentary Affairs moved a resolution for initiating action

against 12 MLAs of the BJP for having committed contempt of

the House.   That motion was tabled in the House and the

Chairman was called upon to do the needful.  The Chairman

then called upon the House to pass the said resolution.  The

House in turn passed that resolution by majority votes after it

was put to vote at 14:40 hours on 5.7.2021.  The same reads

thus:

“P.H.: Contempt of the House by objectionable behavior

M.H.:   Resolution   of   Minister   for   Parliamentary   Affairs

regarding suspension of M.L.A.s for Contempt of

the House due to objectionable behavior.

1) Dr. Sanjay Kute,

2) Adv. Ashish Shelar,

3) Shri Abhimanyu Pawar

4) Shri Girish Mahajan

5) Shri Atul Bhatkhalkar

6) Adv. Parag Alavani,

7) Shri Harish Pimple

8) Shri Ram Satpute,

9) Shri Jaikumar Rawal,

10) Shri Yogesh Sagar,

11) Shri Narayan Kuche,

12) Shri Kritikumar @ Bunty Bhangdiya, M.L.A.

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Adv.  Anil  Parab  (Minister  for  Parliamentary Affairs):

Hon’ble   Speaker,   I   wish   to   move   the   following

resolution with your kind permission.

“On 5th July 2021 when the business of the House was

being conducted, Hon’ble M.L.As Dr. Sanjay Kute, Adv.

Ashish Shelar, Sarvashree Abhimanyu Pawar, Girish

Mahajan,   Atul   Bhatkhalkar,   Adv.   Parag   Alvani,

Sarvashree   Harish   Pimple,   Ram   Satpute,   Jaikumar

Rawal, Yogesh Sagar, Narayan Kuche, Kirtikumar @

Bunty Bhangdia misbehaved in the House, addressed

the Chairman in the Speaker’s Chair unparliamentary

language, tried to take the mike and Rajdand, despite

repeated warnings, all these members misbehaved in

the   chamber   of   the   Hon’ble   Speaker   even   after   the

House was adjourned and abused and manhandled the

Chairman   in   the   Speaker’s   Chair.     Due   to   the

indisciplined   and   unbecoming   behavior   resulting   in

maligning the dignity of the House, this House resolves

to suspend the membership of Sarvashree Dr. Sanjay

Kute,   Adv.   Ashish   Shelar,   Sarvashree   Abhimanyu

Pawar, Girish Mahajan, Atul Bhatkhalkar, Adv. Parag

Alvani,   Sarvashree   Harish   Pimple,   Ram   Satpute,

Jaikumar   Rawal,   Yogesh   Sagar,   Narayan   Kuche,

Kirtikumar @ Bunty Bhangdia for a period of one year.

Similarly, during the period of suspension they may be

restrained from entering into the premises of Vidhan

Bhawan at Mumbai and Nagpur.”

Hon’ble   Speaker,   I   request   the   House   to   pass   this

resolution.

Resolution has been tabled.

Chairman   in   the   Speaker’s   Chair:   Now   I   put   this

resolution to vote.

Resolution has been passed after putting it to vote.”

6. According   to   the   petitioners,   the   Leader   of   Opposition

thereafter   wrote   four   letters   to   the   Deputy   Speaker   on

7.7.2021 for furnishing relevant information including CCTV

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footage, video recording of the entire proceedings and a copy

of the verbatim proceedings of the record of the Legislative

Assembly   dated   5.7.2021   and   6.7.2021.     Thereafter,   the

petitioners also sent letters to the Deputy Speaker requesting

him to furnish relevant material of the proceedings including

recording of the proceedings in the House dated 5.7.2021 and

6.7.2021.

7. Eventually,   on   22.7.2021,   the   petitioners   approached   this

Court by way of these writ petitions under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India, for issuing appropriate writ, order or

direction   so   as   to   quash   and   set   aside   the   impugned

resolution   dated   5.7.2021   passed   by   the   Maharashtra

Legislative Assembly being unconstitutional and grossly illegal

and   for   enforcement   of   their   fundamental   rights   as

guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

8. It is urged that the impugned resolution dated 5.7.2021 has

been passed in undue haste and is politically motivated.  It is

primarily intended to adversely impact the numbers of the

Opposition Party in the House.  It has been passed without

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giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners much less

calling upon them to offer written explanation.   To buttress

this ground, reliance has been placed on a decision of twoJudge Bench of this Court in Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj &

Ors. vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly & Anr.3

.

9. It is urged that the events, as unfolded, on the face of it,

would   indicate   the   undue   haste   in   which   the   impugned

resolution came to be passed within a matter of hours, that

too, without granting opportunity to the petitioners to meet

the case against them.  This was grossly and patently violative

of Article 14 of the Constitution.  For, there was absolutely no

material before the Chairman or the Minister to substantiate

the need for suspending the petitioners, that too for such a

long period.

10. Further, even the impugned resolution dated 5.7.2021

does not refer to any material on the basis of which such

extreme step of suspension  had  been  taken  against  these

petitioners.  There is no indication in the resolution as to how

3 (2016) 6 SCC 82

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the 12 members (petitioners herein) were identified from a

huge crowd of people and singled out for initiating the action

of suspension.  As a matter of fact, the impugned resolution

itself alludes to unruly behaviour on the floor of the House

and outside the chamber of the Speaker.  The video footage of

the alleged incident, which is in public domain, shows a large

crowd of people and there is absolutely no way of identifying

the 12 MLAs (petitioners herein) who have been suspended

and   singled   out.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   Minister   who

brought the motion was not even present in the chamber of

the   Speaker.     In   a   similar   situation,   this   Court   in

Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj4

 had to quash the resolution for

lack of evidence to identify the suspended members of the

Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly.

11. In the present case, the impugned resolution makes no

reference to any material much less video footage, etc., which

has   been   relied   upon   before   bringing   an   action   for

suspension.  Moreover, it is amply clear from the impugned

resolution   that   the   action   against   the   petitioners   was   for

4 supra at Footnote No.3

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alleged unruly behaviour/misconduct and not for breach of

privilege that is covered by an independent dispensation.  As

regards suspension of a member of the House, as per Rule 53

of   the   Rules   such   action   could   be   initiated   “only”   by   the

Speaker after complying with the principles of natural justice

and fair play.  The provision, such as Rule 53, is engrafted to

put a check on the majoritarian attitude of the Government.

The Speaker is expected to act fairly, in particular during the

conduct   of   proceedings   in   the   House   towards   both   sides,

namely,   members   of   the   Ruling   Party   as   well   as   of   the

Opposition Party.   So to speak, he exercises quasi­judicial

function.

12. It is urged that a motion for unruly behaviour in the

House can never be a subject matter of voting since it would

enable the political party in power to virtually wipe out the

opposition for some trivial acts committed by their members,

by suspending as many members of the Opposition Party.

The   decision   of   suspension,   therefore,   must   rest   with   the

Speaker and not the House.   Notably, Rule 53 of the Rules

prescribes a maximum period of suspension not exceeding

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remainder   of   the   Sessions.     Thus,   suspension   of   the

petitioners for a period of one year is grossly unconstitutional

and illegal.  If the impugned resolution was allowed to prevail,

nothing   would   prevent   the   political   party   in   power   (in

majority) to resort to such mechanism and to suspend a large

number of members of Opposition Party upto five years or

remainder of the term of the Legislative Assembly by resorting

to voting in the House.

13. It is also urged that the erstwhile Speaker had stepped

down, as a result of which, he ceased to be the Chairman.  As

such, heated exchanges allegedly occurring between him and

the petitioners outside the House, would not invite action of

suspension, inasmuch as after stepping down as Speaker, he

would   continue   only   as   an   ordinary   MLA.     Further,   the

Chairman   nominated   under   Rule   8   of   the   Rules   is   not

empowered to exercise powers under Rule 53, considering the

fact that there was a Deputy Speaker of the House who could

have   discharged   the   functions   of   the   Speaker   after   his

stepping down or during his absence as per Article 180 of the

Constitution.   In that sense, the impugned resolution dated

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5.7.2021 is nullity and  non est  in the eyes of law, having

passed without authority of law.

14. These writ petitions came up for preliminary hearing on

14.12.2021.  After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners

and   for   the   State   of   Maharashtra,   the   Court   passed   the

following order:

“We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners

and for the State of Maharashtra.

These   matters   involve   issues   of   moment   for   a

Westminster form of Democracy.

It   is   urged   by   the   petitioners   that   the   impugned

resolution by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly dated

05.07.2021 suffers from the vice of denial of opportunity

of being heard and adherence to the rules of natural

justice.

It is also urged that the resolution neither follows the

procedure prescribed under Rule 53 of the Maharashtra

Legislative   Assembly   Rules   (for   short   "The   Rules"),

namely, for suspension of member of the House by the

Speaker nor predicated in Part XVIII including Rule 273

to take action against the member for breach of privilege

of the House.

It is also urged that the power of Legislative Assembly

though absolute in certain respects, the decision reached

by the House can always be questioned on the settled

principles   amongst   others   being   manifestly   grossly

arbitrary or irrational, violating the fundamental rights

and   such   other   grounds,   as   may   be   permissible   and

delineated in the decision of the Constitution Bench of

this   Court   in   Raja   Rampal   Vs.   Hon'ble   Speaker,   Lok

Sabha & Ors. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 184, including

the two Judge decision of this Case in Alagaapuram R.

Mohan Raj & Ors. Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly &

Anr. reported in (2016) 6 SCC 82. Further, for the nature

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of impugned resolution, it not only abridges the rights of

as   many   as   twelve   members,   as   guaranteed   to   them

under Article 194 of the Constitution of India, but also of

the constituencies represented by each of them by merely

invoking the route of majority opinion of the House, an

unprecedented and unconventional move not backed by

any   similar   precedent.   In   any   case,   the   period   of

suspension of one year is unconscionable and manifestly

arbitrary and irrational.

On the other hand, it is urged by the learned counsel

for the State that Article 212(1) of the Constitution of

India makes it amply clear that it is not open to the Court

to explore the argument of proper procedure not followed

by the House. Further, it is not open to the Court to do

judicial   review   of   the   final   decision   on   the   basis   of

abstract arguments and grounds urged before this Court;

and even if a sui generis procedure has been adopted by

the House, it is the absolute prerogative of the House to

regulate its business.

It is also urged by the learned counsel for the State

that the petitioners have not refuted the case made out

against   them   about   misbehaviour   in   the   House   and

outside the House as well. Indeed, this plea has been

countered   by   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the

petitioners.

All   these   are   debatable   issues   and   would   require

deeper consideration.

As a result, we deem it appropriate to issue a formal

notice to the respondents, returnable on 11.01.2022. 

Mr.   Sachin   Patil,   Advocate   waives   notice   for

respondent No. 2­State.

Additionally, the petitioner is permitted to serve dasti

notice on the respondent No.1.

Needless to observe that pendency of these petitions

will not come in the way of the petitioners to explore the

possibility of urging upon the House to show leniency

and   reconsider   the   decision   impugned   in   these   writ

petitions, at least,  to the  extent  of reducing  the term

specified therein. That is a matter to be considered by the

House appropriately.”

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By this order, the Court had expressed a sanguine hope that the

matter would get resolved in the ensuing Session scheduled in the

following week.  Presumably, no effective headway had been made

in that regard.

15. It appears that notice sent to respondent No.1, as per

office report, has been duly served.  We have been informed

by the learned counsel appearing for the State as well as the

petitioners that respondent No.1 would not be appearing in

the present proceedings.   The respondent­State, however, is

defending the impugned resolution by filing counter affidavit

dated 7.1.2022 sworn by         Mr. Satish Baban Waghole, In

Charge   Secretary,   Parliamentary   Affairs   Department.     The

reply   affidavit   amongst   others   points   out   that   the   issues

raised   by   the   petitioners   are   essentially   the   matters

concerning   procedure   in   the   House   of   the   Legislative

Assembly and at best regarding some procedural irregularities

committed during the proceedings.  That cannot be the basis

to invoke jurisdiction of this Court which is constricted by the

mandate of Article 212 of the Constitution, as it concerns the

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powers and privileges of the House.  Thus, the petitioners are

not entitled for any relief under Article 32 of the Constitution.

16. It is urged that the suspension for unruly conduct in the

House   is   not   solely   referrable   to   Rule   53   of   the   Rules.

Whereas, it is open to the Legislature to depart from the Rules

and take a decision which could exceed the period prescribed

in the Rules.   The period of one year suspension cannot be

said to be arbitrary or disproportionate as such when the

Legislature has the prerogative to reprimand or admonish its

members, independent of the power of the Speaker of the

House to order withdrawal of members under the Rules.  The

House   has   the   power   to   take   suitable   action   against   its

members who transgress the limits laid down in Article 194(1)

of the Constitution, being its inherent power and it is not

open to the Judicature to have a second­guess approach in

that regard.

17. It is urged that from the averments in the writ petitions

itself, it is conceded that the Leader of Opposition had to

apologise for the unruly behaviour of the members of the

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Opposition including that of the petitioners.  The petitioners

had   committed   acts   which   resulted   in   undermining   and

maligning the dignity of the House in the face of the House

and   for  which  reason,   the   House  decided  to  suspend  the

petitioners.     In   such   a   situation,   there   is   no   question   of

granting any opportunity of hearing or for furnishing written

explanation, being a case of contempt of the House on the

face   of   it   while   it   was   in   Session.     The   reply   affidavit

essentially rebuts the legal arguments of the petitioners and

reiterates the factual position emanating from the impugned

resolution   itself   and   urges   this   Court   to   dismiss   the   writ

petitions being devoid of merits.

Submissions ­ Petitioners:

18. The   petitioners   are   represented   by   Mr.   Mahesh

Jethmalani,  Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul and

Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel.  The sum

and substance of their submission is as follows.   First, the

impugned   resolution   passed   by   the   House   is   without

jurisdiction.   For, the power to suspend as per applicable

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Rules is bestowed “only” upon the Speaker of the House and

as the Office of the Speaker was vacant at the relevant time,

upon   the   Deputy   Speaker   as   per   Article   180   of   the

Constitution.  Further, the exercise of power by the Speaker is

a quasi­judicial decision which must, therefore, precede with

a   formal   inquiry,   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   member

concerned and recording of satisfaction about the nature of

misdeeds committed by the member concerned amounting to

grossly   disorderly   conduct.     In   short,   the   House   had   no

jurisdiction to pass the impugned resolution much less the

manner   in   which   it   has   been   passed,   in   undue   haste.

Second, no known or prescribed procedure has been followed

to   order   withdrawal   of   the   members   from   the   Assembly.

Thus, a gross illegality has been committed by the House.

The House is bound to adhere to the Rules framed by it for

that   purpose   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution.     The

applicable Rules provide for different dispensation.  The power

to order withdrawal of its member, is provided in Rule 53 and

regarding breach of its Privileges is governed by Part XVIII of

the Rules (vide Rules 273 to 289).  A 15 days’ notice regarding

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the motion introduced in the House is required to be given

under Part XII of the Rules being Rule 106 of the Rules.  None

of these have been followed in tabling of the subject motion

and in passing the impugned resolution.   Thus, it is not a

case   of   mere   procedural   irregularity,   but   of   being

unconstitutional,   grossly   illegal   and   irrational   resolution

adopted   by   the   House   including   the   direction   to   the

petitioners   to   withdraw   from   the  House   for   one   year   vide

impugned resolution.  Thirdly, there has been gross violation

of   principles   of   natural   justice.     In   that,   no   opportunity

whatsoever was afforded to the petitioners much less a formal

notice calling upon them to offer their explanation.  Had such

an opportunity been given, it would have been possible for the

petitioners   to   demonstrate   that   they   were   not   part   of   the

unruly mob which had indulged in activities amounting to

grossly disorderly conduct.

18.(a) It   is   also   urged   that   at   any   rate   the   impugned

resolution suspending the petitioners for a period of one year

cannot   be   countenanced   in   law   being   unconstitutional,

grossly illegal and irrational.  Inasmuch as, Rule 53 provides

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for   a   graded   approach   to   be   adopted   by   the   Speaker   for

ensuring   orderly   conduct   of   business   in   the   House   by

directing withdrawal of a member, who in his opinion, had or

was creating obstruction in that regard.  Inasmuch as, if it is

his first instance of such type, the Speaker could order his

withdrawal for the remainder of the day’s meeting.  In case of

repeat   misconduct   during   the   same   Session,   the   Speaker

could order withdrawal of such member for the remainder of

the Session.  Had it been a case of exercise of power under

Rule 53, the member so directed to be absent shall, during

the period of such absence, is deemed to be absent with the

permission of the Assembly within the meaning of clause (4)

of Article 190 of the Constitution.   However, the impugned

resolution makes no reference to this aspect at all.

18.(b) On the stated position taken by the respondents that the

power has been exercised by the House and is not ascribable

to Rule 53, but the inherent power of the House, even in that

case, the suspension of the member of the House cannot go

beyond   the   ongoing   Session.     Inasmuch   as,   excess   and

unnecessary period of suspension of the member from the

20

House is not only undesirable in the matter of democratic

values enunciated in the Constitution, but substantively or

grossly illegal and irrational, if not bordering on perversity.

For, longer period of suspension beyond the ongoing Session

would not only be unnecessary, but nearer to being arbitrary,

irrational and perverse.  Taking any other view would entail in

validating   grossly   illegal   and   irrational   resolution   of   the

House.     To   buttress   this   argument,   support   is   drawn

additionally   from   the   dispensation   predicated   in   the

concerned Standing Order of the United Kingdom regarding

the   Parliamentary   Procedure   as   well   as   extracts   from   Sir

Thomas   Erskine   May’s   Treatise   on   The   Law,   Privileges

Proceedings and Usage of Parliament.   It is urged that the

consequence of absence of suspended member of the House

beyond   sixty   days   would   entail   in   vacation   of   the   seat

occupied by him/her, as predicated in Article 190(4); and in

which case, in law, the concerned constitutional Authority

would be obliged to initiate process to fill in the vacant seat(s)

not later than six months from the date of such vacancy in

21

terms of Section 151A5

  of the Representation of the People

Act,   19516

.     This   is   essential   also   to   ensure   that   the

concerned constituency does not remain unrepresented in the

Legislative Assembly for more than six months owing to the

action against its duly elected representative by the House.

Had it been a case of expulsion, it would not have resulted in

punishment   either   to   the   concerned   member   or   the

constituency represented by him.  For, the member concerned

in that case could get re­elected to occupy the vacant seat not

later   than   six   months.     Thus   understood,   the   timeline   of

suspension   of   the   petitioners   prescribed   in   the   impugned

resolution is worst and operates as inflicting penalty upon the

petitioners as well as the constituency represented by them.

In other words, it is worse than expulsion of a member of the

House. 

5 151A. Time limit for filling vacancies referred to in sections 147, 149, 150 and 151.—

Notwithstanding anything contained in section 147, section 149, section 150 and section 151,

a bye­election for filling any vacancy referred to in any of the said sections shall be held within

a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy:

       Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply if—

(a) the remainder of the term of a member in relation to a vacancy is less than

one year; or 

(b)   the   Election   Commission   in   consultation   with   the   Central   Government

certifies that it is difficult to hold the bye­election within the said period.

6 for short, “1951 Act”

22

18.(c) In the present case, learned counsel contends that the

House  had   to   assemble   for  only   two   days   of   the   ongoing

Session.   The suspension, therefore, ideally could not have

been for a period more than the remainder of the Session in

terms of Rule 53 of the Rules.  Moreover, as the motion was

introduced in the House for initiating contempt, it ought to

have proceeded only under Part XVIII of the Rules by following

procedure   prescribed   therein   which   includes   giving

opportunity of hearing to the member before the Committee of

Privileges.   If it was to be regarded as an ordinary motion,

then the procedure under Rule 106 of the Rules would have

required 15 clear days’ notice.  Further, Rule 1107

 postulates

that the resolution if moved by the Minister, it should precede

with seven days’ notice.   Even this requirement had been

violated.  In either case, the impugned resolution suffers from

the vice of denial of principles of natural justice, besides being

arbitrary,   perfunctory   and   founded   on   unsubstantiated

allegations   against   the   petitioners.     To   buttress   this

7 110. Government   Resolutions.—  (1)   The   provisions   of   rule   106   shall   not   apply   to

resolutions of which notice is given by a Minister or the Advocate General.

(2) Seven days’ notice shall be necessary in respect of such resolutions

(emphasis supplied)

23

submission,   reliance   has   been   placed   on   the   dictum   in

Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj8

.  

18.(d) It  is   then   urged  that   at   any  rate   the  time  period   of

suspension as specified in the impugned resolution is manifestly

arbitrary and grossly disproportionate and excessive, besides being

grossly illegal and unconstitutional being hit by Articles 14 and 21

of the Constitution.  For, the impugned resolution entails in denial

of representation even to the concerned constituency for such a

long time, much less   beyond   the   period   specified   in   the

Constitution [Article 190(4)]   and   the   mandate   of   conducting

elections   not   later   than   six   months     from     the     date     of

vacancy     vide     Sections   150   and   151A   of   the   1951   Act.

Reliance  is  placed  on  Barton  vs.  Taylor9

, Sushanta  Kumar

Chand     &     Ors.     vs.     The     Speaker,     Orissa   Legislative

Assembly    and     Anr.10

,   M.S.M.     Sharma     vs.     Sri   Krishna

Sinha   &   Ors.11, Special   Reference   No.1   of   196412, Jagjit

Singh  vs.  State  of  Haryana  &                  Ors.13, Raja Ram

8 supra at Footnote No.3 (paras 38 to 42)

9 (1886) 11 AC 197

10 AIR 1973 Ori 111 (Division Bench)

11 AIR 1959 SC 395 (5­Judge Bench) (paras 25,26,28 and 29)

12 AIR 1965 SC 745 (7­Judge Bench) (paras 31,32,35,36,39 to 41,56,60,61,124 and 125)

13 (2006) 11 SCC 1 (3­Judge Bench) (para 44)

24

Pal vs. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors.14  and Amarinder

Singh vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha & Ors.15

.

18.(e) It was also argued that suspension of members beyond

the period specified in Rule 53 tantamounts to deviation from the

logic   stated   therein.     And   being   a   case   of   deviation   from   the

applicable Rules, it was essential to first suspend Rule 53.  That

could be done by way of a motion under Rule 5716.  Moreover, the

general powers of the Speaker have been constricted in terms of

Rule 5817, namely, limited to matters not specifically provided for in

the rules.

Submissions – Respondent (State of Maharashtra):

19. Mr.   C.   Aryama   Sundaram,   learned   senior   counsel

appearing for the State of Maharashtra, however, would urge

that   much   argument   of   the   petitioners   is   founded   on

untenable assumption that the Rules were binding on the

14 (2007) 3 SCC 184 (5­Judge Bench)

15 (2010) 6 SCC 113 (5­Judge Bench) (paras 47,62,64 and 65)

16 57. Suspension of rules.— Any member may, with the consent of the Speaker, move that

any rule may be suspended in its application to a particular motion before the House; and if

the motion is carried, the rule in question shall be suspended for the time being.

17 58. General Powers of Speaker.— All matters not specifically provided for in these

rules and all questions relating to the detailed working of these rules shall be regulated in

such manner as the Speaker may, from time to time direct.

(emphasis supplied)

25

House; and it was not open to the House to proceed dehors

the rules formulated under Article 208 of the Constitution.

He submits that it is open to the Legislature to deviate from

the Rules, even if framed under Article 208.  Such rules are

only   akin   to   the   byelaws   of   the   society   which   are   not

enforceable   nor   can   it   be   regarded   as   statutory   rules.

Further, grounds of challenge set forth by the petitioners are

essentially questioning the procedure adopted by the House

in   adopting   the   impugned   resolution.     Such   a   challenge

cannot be maintained nor could be entertained by the Court

in light of bar under Article 212(1) in particular.   It is not

open to the Court to question the decision of the House on the

ground of irregularities in the procedure.  For, the House has

the prerogative to adopt its own procedure even  dehors  the

rules framed under Article 208.  In a given situation, the rules

being procedural rules can be deviated by the House, if the

need so arises.  The Court can only enquire into the question

as to whether the House had jurisdiction to adopt such a

resolution and no further.

26

19.(a) He further submits that it is cardinal that the powers

and privileges of the House of Legislatures as delineated in

Article 194 of the Constitution are non­justiciable, forming

part of Chapter III (the State Legislature) in Part VI of the

Constitution.     It   is   so   mandated   by   Article   212(1)   of   the

Constitution.   That gives enough room to the Legislature to

adopt its own procedure for upholding the privileges of the

House   of   Legislature   and   its   members   which   includes

proceeding   against   even   non­member   in   case   of   breach.

Thus,   it   is   not   open   to   even   remotely   suggest   that   the

Legislature lacks jurisdiction.

19.(b) He   submits   that   the   fact   that   Rule   53   of   the   Rules

provides   for   exercise   of   power   by   the   Speaker   to   order

withdrawal of member in graded manner, that does not and

cannot prevent the House from passing a resolution to even

expel   the  erring   member.   Thus,   the   House  can   certainly

direct   suspension   of   its   member   for   a   period   beyond   the

remainder   term   of   the   Session.     The   Legislature   while

adopting such resolution is not required to give any reason.

For, no judicial review of reasons which had weighed with the

27

Legislature to pass the resolution is permissible, unless it is

further shown that the resolution adopted by the House is

unconstitutional.  In the present case, the House had adopted

resolution which is self­eloquent.   In that, it mentions the

necessity for passing such a resolution of suspension of the

petitioners   for   a   term   of   one   year.     The   power   has   been

exercised by the Legislature, which is inherent in it especially

regarding   the   conduct   of   its   business.     The   impugned

resolution,   therefore,   is   not   unconstitutional.     He   would

submit   that   in   the   guise   of   asserting   that   the   impugned

resolution   is   irrational,   the   petitioners   in   effect   are

questioning the proportionality of the period of suspension.

This enquiry by the Court is impermissible.  For, the decision

of the House regarding quantum or the period of suspension

is non­justiciable

19.(c) He   vehemently   urged   that   this   Court   ought   not   to

venture   into   the   factual   matrix   and   have   a   second­guess

approach regarding the opinion expressed by the House in the

impugned resolution.   To buttress his submissions, he has

placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in

28

Jagdishbhai   Thakore   &   Anr.   vs.   Chandrikaben

Chudasma   &   Ors.18,   which   follows   the   exposition   of   the

Division   Bench   of   the   same   High   Court   in  Chhabildas

Mehta,   M.L.A. vs. The   Legislative   Assembly,   Gujarat

State19.  He has also placed reliance on K.A. Mathialagan

vs. P. Srinivasan & Ors.20

, A.M. Paulraj vs. The Speaker,

Tamil   Nadu   Legislative   Assembly,  Madras  &   Anr.21

,  K.

Anbazhagan & Ors.  vs. The Secretary, The Tamil Nadu

Legislative   Assembly,  Madras  &   Ors.22,  V.C.   Chandhira

Kumar, Member of Legislative Assembly & Ors. vs. Tamil

Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat & Anr.23, Special

Reference No.1 of 196424

,   Kihota Hollohon vs. Zachilhu

&  Ors.25

,  M.C.  Mehta  vs.  Union  of   India  &  Ors.25A

,  Raja

Ram Pal26 and Amarinder Singh27

.

18 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 402 (para 8): 2007 (48) 4 GLR 2998 (Single Judge Bench)

19 (1970) 11 GLR 729 (Division Bench) (paras 14 to 16)

20 AIR 1973 Madras 371 (Full Bench)

21 AIR 1986 Madras 248 (Full Bench)

22 1987 SCC OnLine Mad 89 (Division Bench) (paras 87 to 92, 101, 108 to 110 and 160)

23 2013 (6) CTC 506 (Division Bench) (paras 4.19 to 4.30)

24 supra at Footnote No.12 (paras 31,34,35 and 39 to 41)

25 AIR 1993 SC 412:1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 (5­Judge Bench) 

25A (1999) 6 SCC 237 (paras 18 to 21)

26 supra at Footnote No.14 (paras 125, 160 to 162, 163, 271 to 300, 451 to 453, 530, 531,

534, 536, 598 and 696 to 705)

27 supra at Footnote No.15 (paras 54 and 66)

29

20. He   would   further   submit   that   the   Maharashtra

Legislative   Assembly   even   in   the   past   on   more   than   one

occasion   had   passed   similar   resolution   to   suspend   its

member for one year period.  That is the legitimate inherent

power of the House in the matter of upholding its privilege.

Article 190(3) prescribes no limitation in this regard.  Further,

the invocation of Article 190(4) and Section 151A of the 1951

Act by the petitioners, is completely misplaced.  For, Article

190(4) has no application unless the absence of the member

concerned is voluntary and without permission of the House.

Article 190(4) cannot override the powers and privileges of the

Legislature endowed in Article 190(3).   Article 190(4) is an

enabling provision envisaging occurrence of vacancy only if

the Legislature so resolves/decides, unlike ipso facto vacancy

occurring in situations referred to in Article 190(1) to 190(3).

For issuing declaration under Article 190(4) that vacancy has

arisen,   it   ought   to   be   done   by   the   Legislature   if   such

recommendation is made by the Committee constituted under

Rule 229 of the Rules known as Committee on Absence of

Members from the Sittings of the House.  The functions of the

30

stated Committee are spelt out in Rule 230.  The procedure

noted in Rules 231 and 232 is clearly indicative of the fact

that   the   absence   of   the   member   must   be   voluntary   and

without   permission   of   the   House.     In   fact,   the   period   of

absence noted in Article 190(4) is sixty days28 of meetings and

not English calendar days.  In this case, only seven days of

meetings had been conducted so far.   Thus, invocation of

Article   190(4)   in   the   fact   situation   of   the   present   case   is

unavailable.  Further, in the case of absence of member from

the   House   owing   to   his/her   suspension   by   the   House

presupposes that the House itself has restricted the entry of

the concerned member during the meetings and it can be

safely   regarded   as   deemed   permission   of   the   House   for

absence for the relevant period.   Similarly, the constituency

cannot complain about its non­representation in the House

having   elected   someone   who   conducts   himself/herself

inappropriately in the meetings.  In Raja Ram Pal29, similar

plea   had   been   negatived.     Concededly,   suspended   elected

representative continues to represent the constituency from

28 Out of total 98­100 days in a year in three Sessions, namely, Budget, Monsoon and Winter

altogether.

29 supra at Footnote No.14

31

where he/she has been elected for all other purposes except

attending the meetings owing to suspension.  The argument

of   the   petitioners   is   more   fixed   on   the   basis   of   morality

approach.  That cannot be countenanced.  As a matter of law,

the House has inherent powers to direct suspension of its

member for one year period and there is no express bar or

restriction provided for by the Constitution or by virtue of any

statutory provision.  In substance, it is urged that the Court

cannot enquire into the grievances as made, essentially being

about the irregularity of procedure in adopting the impugned

resolution by the House.

21. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and

the   respondent­State.     As   aforesaid,   respondent   No.1   has

chosen not to appear despite service.

Consideration:

22. The moot question is about the maintainability of the

challenge in respect of the stated resolution adopted by the

Legislative Assembly.  The scope of interference by the Court

has   been   well­delineated   in   successive   decisions   of   the

32

Constitution Bench of this Court.  This Court has consistently

expounded   that  the   judicial   scrutiny   regarding  exercise  of

legislative privileges (including power to punish for contempt

of the House) is constricted and cannot be stricto sensu on the

touchstone of judicial review as generally understood in other

situations.   In that, there is complete immunity from judicial

review   in   matters   of   irregularity   of   procedure.     The

Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Raja   Ram   Pal30

delineated the principles on the basis of catena of decisions

noted in the said decision as follows:

“Summary  of  the  principles   relating  to  parameters

of   judicial   review   in   relation   to   exercise   of

parliamentary provisions

431. We   may   summarise   the   principles   that   can   be

culled out from the above discussion. They are:

(a) Parliament is a coordinate organ and its views do

deserve deference even while its acts are amenable to

judicial scrutiny;

(b)   The   constitutional  system   of   government   abhors

absolutism and it being the cardinal principle of our

Constitution that no one, howsoever lofty, can claim to

be   the   sole   judge   of   the   power   given   under   the

Constitution, mere coordinate constitutional status, or

even   the   status   of   an   exalted   constitutional

functionaries,   does   not   disentitle   this   Court   from

exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review of actions

which   partake   the   character   of   judicial   or   quasijudicial decision;

30 supra at Footnote No.14

33

(c) The expediency and necessity of exercise of power or

privilege by the legislature are for the determination of

the legislative authority and not for determination by

the courts;

(d) The judicial review of the manner of exercise of

power of contempt or privilege does not mean the said

jurisdiction is being usurped by the judicature;

(e) Having regard to the importance of the functions

discharged by the legislature under the Constitution

and the majesty and grandeur of its task, there would

always   be   an   initial   presumption   that   the   powers,

privileges,   etc.   have   been   regularly   and   reasonably

exercised, not violating the law or the constitutional

provisions, this presumption being a rebuttable one;

(f)   The   fact  that  Parliament   is   an   august  body  of

coordinate   constitutional  position  does  not  mean

that   there   can   be   no   judicially   manageable

standards to review exercise of its power;

(g)   While   the   area   of   powers,   privileges   and

immunities of the legislature being exceptional and

extraordinary   its   acts,   particularly   relating   to

exercise   thereof,   ought   not   to   be   tested   on   the

traditional   parameters   of   judicial   review   in   the

same manner as an ordinary administrative action

would be tested, and the Court would confine itself

to the acknowledged parameters of judicial review

and   within   the   judicially   discoverable   and

manageable   standards,   there   is   no   foundation   to

the   plea   that   a   legislative   body   cannot   be

attributed jurisdictional error;

(h) The judicature is not prevented from scrutinising

the validity of the action of the legislature trespassing

on the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens;

(i) The broad contention that the exercise of privileges

by   legislatures   cannot   be   decided   against   the

touchstone of fundamental rights or the constitutional

provisions is not correct;

34

(j) If a citizen, whether a non­Member or a Member of

the legislature, complains that his fundamental rights

under Article 20 or 21 had been contravened, it is the

duty of this Court to examine the merits of the said

contention,   especially   when   the   impugned   action

entails civil consequences;

(k) There is no basis to the claim of bar of exclusive

cognizance or absolute immunity to the parliamentary

proceedings in Article 105(3) of the Constitution;

(l)   The   manner   of   enforcement   of   privilege   by   the

legislature   can   result   in   judicial   scrutiny,   though

subject   to   the   restrictions   contained   in   the   other

constitutional provisions, for example Article 122 or

212;

(m) Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) displace the broad

doctrine of exclusive cognizance of the legislature in

England   of   exclusive   cognizance   of   internal

proceedings of the House rendering irrelevant the caselaw  that emanated from courts in that  jurisdiction;

inasmuch   as   the   same   has   no   application   to   the

system of governance provided by the Constitution of

India;

(n) Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) prohibit the validity

of any proceedings in legislature from being called in

question   in   a   court   merely   on   the   ground   of

irregularity of procedure;

(o) The truth or correctness of the material will not be

questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy

of the material or substitute its opinion for that of the

legislature;

(p) Ordinarily, the legislature, as a body, cannot be

accused of having acted for an extraneous purpose or

being actuated by caprice or mala fide intention, and

the court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse,

giving allowance for the fact that the legislature is the

best judge of such matters, but if in a given case, the

allegations   to  such   effect   are   made,   the   court   may

35

examine the validity of the said contention, the onus

on the person alleging being extremely heavy;

(q) The rules which the legislature has to make for

regulating   its   procedure   and   the   conduct   of   its

business have to be subject to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(r)   Mere   availability   of   the   Rules   of   Procedure   and

Conduct of Business, as made by the legislature in

exercise of enabling powers under the Constitution, is

never a guarantee that they have been duly followed;

(s)   The   proceedings   which   may   be   tainted   on

account   of   substantive   or   gross   illegality   or

unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial

scrutiny;

(t) Even if some of the material on which the action is

taken is found to be irrelevant, the court would still

not interfere so long as there is some relevant material

sustaining the action;

(u)   An   ouster   clause   attaching   finality   to   a

determination   does   ordinarily   oust   the   power   of

the court to review the decision but not on grounds

of lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity for some

reason   such   as   gross   illegality,   irrationality,

violation   of   constitutional   mandate,   mala   fides,

non­compliance   with   rules   of   natural   justice   and

perversity.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. These principles have been restated by the subsequent

Constitution Bench in Amarinder Singh31, in paragraphs 53

and   54.     Further,   it   would   be   useful   to   advert   to   the

observations in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the same decision in

31 supra at Footnote No.15

36

the   context   of   the   concerns   about   the   intrusion   into   the

powers of the Legislature.  The same reads thus:

“Concerns   about   intrusion   into   the   executive   and

judicial domain

87. The   doctrine   of   separation   of   powers   is   an

inseparable   part   of   the   evolution   of   parliamentary

democracy   itself.   Renowned   French   philosopher

Montesquieu   had   drawn   the   attention   of   political

theorists to the dangers inherent in the concentration of

legislative, executive and judicial powers in one authority

and stressed on the necessity of checks and balances in

constitutional   governance.  Our   institutions   of

governance  have  been   intentionally   founded  on   the

principle   of   separation   of   powers   and   the

Constitution  does  not  give  unfettered  power  to  any

organ. All the three principal organs are expected to

work  in  harmony  and  in  consonance  with  the  spirit

and   essence   of   the   Constitution.   It   is   clear   that   a

legislative   body   is  not   entrusted  with   the  power   of

adjudicating  a  case  once  an  appropriate  forum   is  in

existence under the constitutional scheme.

88. It   would   be   pertinent   to   cite   the   following

observations made by M.H. Beg, J. (as His Lordship then

was) in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain32: (SCC p. 149,

para 392)

    “392. … One of these basic principles seems to me

to be that, just as courts are not constitutionally

competent   to   legislate   under   the   guise   of

interpretation, so also neither our Parliament nor

any State Legislature, in the purported exercise of

any   kind   of   law­making   power,   perform   an

essentially   judicial   function   by   virtually

withdrawing   a   particular   case,   pending   in   any

court, and taking upon itself the duty to decide it

by  an  application  of   law  or   its  own  standards  to

the facts of that case. This power must at least be

first   constitutionally   taken   away   from   the   court

concerned and vested in another authority before it

32 1975 Supp SCC 1

37

can be lawfully exercised by that other authority. It is

not   a   necessary   or   even   a   natural   incident   of   a

‘constituent power’. As Hans Kelsen points out, in his

‘General Theory of Law and the State’ (see p. 143),

while creation and annulment of all general norms,

whether   basic   or   not   so   basic,   is   essentially   a

legislative   function,   their   interpretation   and

application   to   findings   reached,   after   a   correct

ascertainment of facts involved in an individual case,

by   employing   the   judicial   technique,   is   really   a

judicial   function.  Neither   of   the   three

constitutionally   separate   organs   of   State   can,

according to the basic scheme of our Constitution

today,   leap   outside   the   boundaries   of   its   own

constitutionally   assigned   sphere   or   orbit   of

authority into that of the other. This is the logical

meaning   of   the   principle   of   supremacy   of   the

Constitution.””

(emphasis supplied)

24. To the same end, dictum of the Constitution Bench in

Sub­Committee   on   Judicial   Accountability   vs.   Union   of

India  &   Ors.33 may be apposite.   In paragraph 61 of the

reported decision, the Court observed thus:

“61. But   where,   as   in   this   country   and   unlike   in

England,   there   is   a   written   Constitution   which

constitutes the fundamental and in that sense a “higher

law” and acts as a limitation upon the legislature and

other   organs   of   the   State   as   grantees   under   the

Constitution,  the   usual   incidents   of   parliamentary

sovereignty do not obtain and the concept is one of

‘limited   government’.  Judicial   review   is,   indeed,   an

incident   of   and   flows   from   this   concept   of   the

fundamental and the higher law being the touchstone

of  the   limits  of  the  powers  of  the  various  organs  of

the State which derive power and authority under the

Constitution   and   that   the   judicial   wing   is   the

33 (1991) 4 SCC 699 (5­Judge Bench)

38

interpreter of the Constitution and, therefore, of the

limits   of   authority   of   the   different   organs   of   the

State. It is to be noted that the British Parliament with

the Crown is supreme and its powers are unlimited and

courts have no power of judicial review of legislation.”

(emphasis supplied)

The Court then noted that this doctrine is in one sense the doctrine

of ultra vires in the constitutional law and in a federal set up, the

judiciary becomes the guardian of the Constitution.  It enunciated

that   the   rule   in  Bradlaugh   vs.   Gossett34  was   inapplicable   to

proceedings   of   colonial   legislature   governed   by   the   written

Constitution.  In paragraph 66, the Court expounded as follows:

“66. The   principles   in Bradlaugh35 is   that   even   a

statutory   right   if   it   related   to   the   sphere   where

Parliament and not the courts had exclusive jurisdiction

would be a matter of the Parliament's own concern. But

the principle cannot be extended where the matter is

not  merely  one  of  procedure  but  of   substantive   law

concerning   matters   beyond   the   parliamentary

procedure.   Even   in   matters   of   procedure   the

constitutional   provisions   are   binding   as   the

legislations are enforceable. Of the interpretation of the

Constitution and as to what law is the courts have the

constitutional   duty   to   say   what   the   law   is.   The

question whether the motion has lapsed is a matter to be

pronounced   upon   the   basis   of   the   provisions   of   the

Constitution and the relevant laws. Indeed, the learned

Attorney General submitted that the question whether as

an   interpretation   of   the   constitutional   processes   and

laws, such a motion lapses or not is exclusively for the

courts to decide.”

(emphasis supplied)

34 (1884) 12 QBD 271: 50 LT 620

35 supra at Footnote No.34

39

25. In the Indian context, the power of the Legislature is not

absolute, as noted by the Constitution Bench in  Raja Ram

Pal36 in paragraph 398.  The same reads thus:

“398. We are of the view that the manner of exercise of

the  power   or  privilege   by  Parliament   is   immune  from

judicial scrutiny only to the extent indicated in Article

122(1), that is to say the court will decline to interfere if

the grievance brought before it is restricted to allegations

of   “irregularity   of   procedure”.  But   in   case   gross

illegality  or  violation  of   constitutional  provisions   is

shown, the judicial review will not be inhibited in any

manner by Article 122, or for that matter by Article

105.   If   one   was   to   accept   what   was   alleged   while

rescinding the resolution of expulsion by the Seventh Lok

Sabha with the conclusion that it was “inconsistent with

and violative of the well­accepted principles of the law of

parliamentary   privilege  and   the   basic   safeguards

assured   to   all   enshrined   in   the   Constitution”,   it

would be a partisan action in the name of exercise of

privilege. We are not going into this issue but citing the

incident as an illustration.”

(emphasis supplied)

After having said as above, the Court proceeded to examine the

extent of circumspection to be observed by the courts.  That had

been exposited in following words:

“414. In State   of   Rajasthan v. Union   of   India37 while

dealing with the issues arising out of communication by

the then Union Home Minister to the nine States asking

them to advise their respective Governors to observe the

36 supra at Footnote No.14

37 (1977) 3 SCC 592 : AIR 1977 SC 1361

40

Legislative Assemblies and therefore seek mandate from

the people, this Court observed in para 40 as under:

(SCC p. 616)

“40.  This   Court   has   never   abandoned   its

constitutional   function   as   the   final   judge   of

constitutionality   of   all   acts   purported   to   be   done

under the authority of the Constitution. It has not

refused to determine questions either of fact or of

law so long as it has found itself possessed of power

to do it and the cause of justice to be capable of

being   vindicated   by   its   actions.   But, it   cannot

assume   unto   itself   powers   the   Constitution   lodges

elsewhere   or   undertake   tasks   entrusted   by   the

Constitution to other departments of State which may

be better equipped to perform them. The scrupulously

discharged   duties   of   all   guardians   of   the

Constitution include the duty not to transgress the

limitations of their own constitutionally circumscribed

powers   by   trespassing   into   what   is   properly   the

domain of other constitutional organs. Questions of

political wisdom or executive policy only could not

be subjected to judicial control. No doubt executive

policy must also be subordinated to constitutionally

sanctioned   purposes.   It   has   its   sphere   and

limitations. But, so long as it operates within that

sphere,   its   operations   are   immune   from   judicial

interference. This is also a part of the doctrine of a

rough separation of powers under the supremacy of

the   Constitution   repeatedly   propounded   by   this

Court and to which the Court unswervingly adheres

even when its views differ or change on the correct

interpretation   of   a   particular   constitutional

provision.”

(emphasis supplied)

415. We reaffirm the said resolve and find no reason

why   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   at   hand   this

Court should take a different view so as to abandon

its   constitutional   functions   as   the   final   judge   of

constitutionality   of   all   acts   purported   to   be   done

under   the   authority   of   the   Constitution,   though   at

the same time refraining from transgressing into the

sphere that is properly the domain of Parliament.

41

416. Learned Additional Solicitor General submits that

in U.P.   Assembly   case   (Special   Reference   No.   1   of

1964)38 the Court had placed reliance on Articles 208 and

212 which contemplate that rules can be framed by the

legislature   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the

Constitution   which   in   turn   implies   that   such   rules

are   compliant   with   the   fundamental   rights

guaranteed  by  Part   III.  He  submits  that   if  the  rules

framed   under   Article   118   (which   corresponds   to

Article   208)   are   consistent   with   Part   III   of   the

Constitution  then  the  exercise  of  powers,  privileges

and   immunities   is   bound   to   be   a   fair   exercise   and

Parliament can be safely attributed such an intention.

417. While it is true that there is no challenge to the

Rules   of   Procedure   and   Conduct   of   Business   in   Lok

Sabha   and   the   Rules   of   Procedure   and   Conduct   of

Business in the Council of States, as made by the two

Houses   of   Parliament   in   exercise   of   enabling   powers

under Article 118(1), we are of the opinion that mere

availability   of   rules   is  never   a   guarantee   that   they

have been duly followed. What we are concerned with,

given   the   limits   prescribed   in   Article   122(1),   is   not

“irregularity   of   procedure”   but   illegalities   or

unconstitutionalities.”

(emphasis supplied in bolds)

26. From   the   exposition   in   these   successive   Constitution

Bench   decisions   referred   to   above,   it   is   not   possible   to

countenance the submission of the learned counsel for the

respondent­State that the enquiry must be limited to one of

the parameters specified in Raja Ram Pal39 and, in this case,

only clause (s) – “The proceedings which may be tainted on

38 supra at Footnote No.12

39 supra at Footnote No.14

42

account   of   substantive   or   gross   illegality   or

unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny”.

On the other hand, we lean in favour of taking the view that

each of the parameters is significant and permissible area of

judicial   review   in   relation   to   exercise   of   parliamentary

privileges including clauses (f), (g), (s) and (u).  In one sense,

clause (u) is a comprehensive parameter articulated by the

Constitution Bench in Raja Ram Pal40, as it predicates that

“an  ouster clause attaching finality to a determination does

ordinarily oust the power of the court to review the decision

but not on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity

for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation

of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non­compliance with

rules of natural justice and perversity”. 

27. The   Constitution,   by   itself,   does   not   specify   the

limitation   on   the   privileges   of   the   Legislature,   but,

indubitably, those privileges are subject to the provisions of

the   Constitution   (as   is   predicated   in   the   opening   part   of

Article 194(1) as also in Article 208(1) requiring the House of

40 supra at Footnote No.14

43

the Legislature to make rules for regulating its procedure),

which ought to include the rights guaranteed to the citizens

under   Part   III   of   the   Constitution.     The   moment   it   is

demonstrated that it is a case of infraction of any of the rights

under   Para   III   of   the   Constitution   including   ascribable   to

Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the exercise of power

by the Legislature would be rendered unconstitutional.   For

attracting Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, it is open to

the   petitioner   to   demonstrate   that   the   action   of   the

Legislature is manifestly arbitrary.  The arbitrariness can be

attributed to different aspects.  Applying that test, it could be

a case of irrationality of the resolution/decision of the House.

Indeed, in this case, the Court is not called upon to enquire

into the proportionality of such a resolution/decision.

28. There   is   marked   distinction   between   the   expression

“rational” and “proportional”.  The expression “proportion” is

derived from a latin word “proportio”  or “proportionalis”.   It

means corresponding in size or amount to something else.  To

wit, the punishment should be proportional to the crime —

whereas, expression “rational” is derived from a latin word

44

“ratio”  or  “rationalis”.   It means action is based on  or in

accordance with the reason or logic or so to say sensible or

logical.  The rationality of action can be tested, both on the

ground of power inhering in the Legislature and the exercise

of that power.  

29. Keeping the stated principles in mind, we must proceed

to analyse the grounds of challenge in these petitions.   The

foremost  ground   is   that   it   is   imperative  for  the   House  to

adhere to the procedure prescribed in the Rules framed by the

House under Article 208 of the Constitution.

30. The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  M.S.M.

Sharma41 had occasion to deal with the efficacy of the rules

so   framed   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution.     In

paragraph 2942, the Court noted that Article 194(3) read with

41 supra at Footnote No.11

42 (29) Seeing that the present proceedings have been initiated on a petition under Art. 32 of

the Constitution and as the petitioner may not be entitled, for reasons stated above, to avail

himself of Art. 19(1)(a) to support this application, learned advocate for the petitioner falls

back upon Art. 21 and contends that the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges

threaten to deprive him of personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with procedure

established by law. The Legislative Assembly claims that under Art. 194(3) it has all the

powers,   privileges   and   immunities   enjoyed   by   the   British   House   of   Commons   at   the

commencement of our Constitution. If it has those powers, privileges and immunities, then it

can certainly enforce the same, as the House of Commons can do. Article 194(3) confers on

the Legislative Assembly those powers, privileges and immunities and Art. 208 confers

power on it to frame rules. The Bihar Legislative Assembly has framed rules in exercise

45

rules framed under Article 208 had laid down the procedure

for enforcing its powers, privileges and immunities.  Further,

the   Legislative   Assembly   has   the   powers,   privileges   and

immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is

deprived of his personal liberty as a result of the proceedings

before the Committee of Privileges, such deprivation will be in

accordance   with   procedure   established   by   law   and   the

petitioner   cannot   complain   of   the   breach,   actual   or

threatened, of his fundamental right under Article 21.  This

dictum presupposes that action taken under the rules framed

under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution   and   in   conformity

therewith is compliance of the procedure established by law

for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution.  

of its powers under that Article. It follows, therefore, that Art. 194(3) read with the rules

so   framed   has   laid   down   the   procedure   for   enforcing   its   powers,   privileges   and

immunities.   If,   therefore,   the   Legislative   Assembly   has   the   powers,   privileges   and

immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually deprived of his

personal liberty as a result of the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges, such

deprivation will be in accordance with procedure established by law and the petitioner

cannot complain of the breach, actual or threatened, of his Fundamental Right under

Art. 21.

(emphasis supplied)

46

31. In  Ratilal   Bhanji   Mithani   vs.   Asstt.   Collector   of

Customs, Bombay & Anr.43

, the Constitution Bench restated

the aforenoted position in the following words:

“…..   As   explained   in Pandit   Sharma’s   case44

,  these

powers and the procedure prescribed by the rules has

the sanction of enacted law and an order of committal

for   contempt   of   the   Assembly   is   according   to

procedure  established  by   law. Das, C.J., speaking for

four learned Judges said at page 861: “Art. 194(3) confers

on the Legislative Assembly those powers, privileges and

immunities and Art. 208 confers power on it to frame

rules. The Bihar Legislative Assembly has framed rules in

exercise   of   its   powers   under   that   Article.   It   follows,

therefore, that Art. 194(3) read with the rules so framed

has laid down the procedure for enforcing its powers,

privileges   and   immunities.   If,   therefore,   the   Legislative

Assembly has the powers, privileges and immunities of

the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually

deprived   of   his   personal   liberty   as   a   result   of   the

proceedings   before   the   Committee   of   Privileges,   such

deprivation   will   be   in   accordance   with   procedure

established by law and the petitioner cannot complain of

the breach, actual or threatened, of his fundamental right

under Art. 21.” Subba Rao, J. in his minority judgment in

that case and the Court in Special  Reference   No.  1 of

196445 did not say anything to the contrary on this point.”

(emphasis supplied)

32. It is settled law that even rules made to exercise the

powers   and   privileges   of   State   Legislature   constitute   law

within the meaning of Article 13.  This is exposited in Special

43 (1967) 3 SCR 926 (at p. 929)

44 supra at Footnote No.11

45 supra at Footnote No.12

47

Reference  No.1  of  196446

.   It is held that when the State

Legislatures   purport   to   exercise   this   power,   they   will

undoubtedly be acting under Article 246 read with Entry 39

of List II.  The enactment of such a law will, therefore, have to

be treated as a law within the meaning of                 Article

13.

33. In the backdrop of these observations, the plea taken by

the   State   that   the   rules   are   neither   statutory   rules   nor

binding   on   the   House   will   be   of   no   avail.     Indeed,   the

Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Sub­Committee   on

Judicial Accountability47 in paragraph 94 noted as follows:

“94. Second view is to be preferred. It enables the entire

process of removal being regulated by a law of Parliament

—   ensures   uniformity   and   reduces   chances   of

arbitrariness.  Article   118   is   a   general   provision

conferring on each House of Parliament the power to

make its own rules of procedure. These rules are not

binding on the House and can be altered by the House

at  any  time.  A  breach  of   such  rules  amounts   to  an

irregularity   and   is  not   subject   to   judicial   review   in

view of Article 122.”

(emphasis supplied)

46 supra at Footnote No.12

47 supra at Footnote No.33

48

These observations have been noted while deliberating over the

legal question as to whether the law made by the Parliament in the

matter of removal of a judge of the High Court ought to prevail over

the Rules framed by the House under Article 118 (corresponding to

Article 208, applicable to State Legislative Assembly).  This Court

held that the parliamentary law is of higher quality and efficacy

than the Rules under Article 118.  This, however, had not whittled

down the legal exposition that the Rules framed by the Legislative

Assembly under Article 208 of the Constitution is the procedure

established by law for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution.

34. Be that as it may, it is well­settled that the rules so

framed can be altered by the House at any time.   Until the

rules are altered, however, the House is ordinarily guided by

the procedure prescribed in the rules framed under Article

208 of the Constitution.  At the same time, proceedings inside

the Legislature cannot be called into question on the ground

that the same have not been carried on in accordance with

the rules of business as restated in Kihota Hollohon48

.  It is,

however, enough for the present to observe that the rules

48 supra at Footnote No.25 (para 42)

49

framed  under  Article  208 acquire  the  status  of  procedure

established   by   law   for   the   purpose   of   Article   21   of   the

Constitution   as   noticed   in  M.S.M.   Sharma49.     This

observation   has   been   quoted   with   approval   by   another

Constitution Bench again in  Raja  Ram  Pal50

, inter alia,  in

paragraphs 53, 167, 338, 416 and 417.

35. Viewed   thus,   even   though   the   Legislature   has   the

prerogative to deviate from the rules including to alter the

rules; until then, and even otherwise, it is expected to adhere

to the “express substantive stipulation” (which is not mere

procedure)   in   the   rules   framed   under   Article   208   of   the

Constitution   and   the   principle   underlying   therein,   being

procedure established by law.  

36. As   aforesaid,   the   dispensation   prescribed   under   the

Rules   to   exercise   power   to   order   withdrawal   of   member

(suspension) is ascribable to Rule 53 of the Rules which reads

thus:

“53. Power   to   order   withdrawal   of   member.—   The

Speaker may direct any member who refuses to obey his

49 supra at Footnote No.11

50 supra at Footnote No.14

50

decision, or whose  conduct  is, in his opinion,  grossly

disorderly, to withdraw immediately from the Assembly

and   any   member   so   ordered   to  withdraw   shall   do   so

forthwith and shall absent himself during the remainder

of   the   day’s   meeting.   If   any   member   is   ordered   to

withdraw   a  second   time in   the   same   Session,   the

Speaker may direct the member to absent himself from

the meetings of the Assembly for any period not longer

than the remainder of the Session, and the member so

directed shall absent himself accordingly. The member so

directed to be absent shall, during the period of such

absence, be deemed to be absent with the permission of

the Assembly within the meaning of clause (4) of Article

190 of the Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

This Rule not only speaks about the procedure to be adopted for

passing the drastic order of withdrawal of a member from the

House but also about the substantive disciplinary or the rationality

of the self­security measure to be taken in a graded (objective

standard) manner.   The non­compliance of or deviation from the

former (procedure) may be non­justiciable.  However, in regard to

the substantive disciplinary or the rationality of the self­security

measure   inflicted   upon   the   erring   member,   is   open   to   judicial

review on the touchstone of being unconstitutional, grossly illegal

and irrational or arbitrary.

37. In terms of above Rule, the power is exercised by the

Speaker being a quasi­judicial order directing the member to

51

withdraw from the meetings of the Assembly.  The Speaker is

expected to exercise this power only in case of conduct of the

member being “grossly disorderly” and in a graded objective

manner.  The raison d’etre is to ensure that the business of

the House on the given day or the ongoing Session, as the

case may be, can be carried on in an orderly manner and

without any disruption owing to misconduct of one or more

members.  The expression used in the stated Rule is “grossly

disorderly”.

38. The expression “grossly disorderly” has not been defined

in the Rules.  The meaning of expression “gross” as given in

the Black’s Law Dictionary51 reads thus:

“gross,  adj.  (14c) 1.  Conspicuous by reason of size or

other attention­getting qualities; esp., obvious by reason

of   magnitude   <a   gross   Corinthian   column>.  2.

Undiminished by deduction; entire <gross profits>. 3. Not

specific or detailed; general <a gross estimate>. 4. Coarse

in   meaning   or   sense   <gross   slang>.  5.  Repulsive   in

behavior or appearance; sickening <a gross fellow with

gross habits>. 6. Beyond all reasonable measure; flagrant

<a gross injustice>.”

“Grossly”, is an adverb and indicative of relatively higher degree of

misconduct or so to say extremely wrong and deviant.  

51 11th Edition

52

39. The   expression   “disorder”   as   defined   in   Black’s   Law

Dictionary52 is as follows:

“disorder.  (1877)  1.  A   lack   of   proper   arrangement

<disorder of the files>.  2.  An irregularity <a disorder in

the proceedings>.  3.  A public disturbance; a riot.   See

CIVIL DISORDER. 4. A disturbance in mental or physical

health <an emotional disorder> <a liver disorder>.”

The expression “disorderly” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary53

is as follows:

“Disorderly.   Contrary to the rules of good order and

behavior;   violative   of   the   public   peace   or   good   order;

turbulent, riotous, or indecent.”

In the Concise Oxford Dictionary54, the expression “disorderly” has

been defined thus:

“disorderly adj. 1 untidy; confused. 2 irregular; unruly;

riotous. 3 Law contrary to public order or morality.”

The   expression   “disorderly   conduct”   as   defined   in   Black’s   Law

Dictionary55 is as follows:

“disorderly conduct. See CONDUCT

Conduct,  n.  (15c) Personal behavior, whether by action

or inaction, verbal or nonverbal; the manner in which a

person behaves; collectively, a person’s deeds.  Conduct

does not include the actor’s natural death or a death that

52 11th Edition

53 6

th Edition

54 8

th Edition

55 11th Edition

53

results   from   behavior   consciously   engaged   in   but   not

reasonably expected to have this result. — conduct, vb.”

40. Taking   the   totality   of   the   meaning   of   expressions

“grossly” and “disorderly”, it must follow that the conduct of

the   member   is   such   that   it   was   impeding   the   smooth   or

orderly functioning of the House, and may also be of such a

nature that it is likely to bring disrepute to the House.  It may

involve varied situations and, therefore, implied exercise of

rational corrective mechanism is quintessential.  The action of

suspension or directing withdrawal of a member from the

meetings of the Assembly is in the nature of self­security and

is essentially directed  to  ensure  that  the  House can  then

protect   itself   against   obstruction,   or   disturbance   of   its

ongoing proceedings owing to the misconduct of any of its

members.  That power is different from the privilege to inflict

punishment on a member, which may require higher degree

of deprivation of the member over and above participating in

the proceedings of the House during the Session.  In a given

case, it can be in the form of expulsion being the highest

degree   of   exclusion   of   the   member   from   the   House.     Yet

54

another would be penal, in case of ordering imprisonment

owing to act of contempt of the House.  We shall elaborate on

this aspect a little later while dealing with the challenge on

the ground of impugned resolution being grossly irrational.

41. Suffice it to observe that Rule 53 of the Rules provides

for a graded (rational and objective standard) approach to be

adopted by the Speaker for ensuring orderly conduct of the

business of the House.   In the present case, however, the

Minister for Parliamentary Affairs introduced a motion in the

House for initiating action for contempt of the House, which

the Chairman allowed it to be put to vote instantly at 14:40

hours on the same day and it was passed by the House by

majority in no time.  Indeed, if it is a case of grossly disorderly

behaviour in the House, the Speaker/Chairman himself is

free to take instantaneous decision to order withdrawal of the

member   from   the   meetings   of   the   Assembly   during   the

remainder of the day’s meeting and if it is a case of repeat

misconduct in the same Session — for the remainder of the

Session.  

55

42. Concededly,   there   is   nothing   in   the   constitutional

scheme or the rules framed under Article 208 to prevent a

member   of   the   House   to   move   a   motion   for   directing

withdrawal   of   a   member   on   the   ground   of   his   grossly

disorderly conduct.   Further, if the Speaker can  suo motu

direct the member to withdraw from the Assembly on the

same   day   instantly   to   secure   smooth   functioning   of   the

proceedings, for the same logic, even the House could pass a

resolution itself on a motion being moved by a member of the

House instantly with the concurrence of the Speaker on such

a motion.

43. In   the   present   case,   the   Chairman   entertained   the

subject motion and called upon the House to vote thereon,

which had the effect of giving tacit consent if not explicit

concurrence to the same.   In that sense, it is not a case of

resolution passed by the House (to suspend its members) as

being without jurisdiction.  It is a different matter that if the

Speaker/Chairman was to do so, it could be only under Rule

53 in a graded manner for the remainder of the day and for

repeat misconduct in the same Session — for the remainder

56

of the Session.  That would be a logical and rational approach

consistent with the constitutional tenets.

44. If the House takes upon itself to discipline its members,

it is expected to adopt the same graded (rational and objective

standard) approach on the lines predicated in Rule 53.  That

would be a case of rational action taken by the House as per

the procedure established by law.  The expression “rational” is

defined in Black’s Law Dictionary56 as follows:

“rational, adj.  (14c)  1.  Endowed  with   the   faculties  of

cognition   traditionally   thought   to   distinguish   humans

from the brutes <man as a rational being>. 2. Based on

logic   rather   than   emotion;   attained   through   clear

thinking; not absurd, preposterous, foolish, or fanciful <a

rational conclusion>. 3. (Of a person) able to think clearly

and sensibly; clear­headed and right­minded <Jones was

rational at the time of the woman’s death>.”

As opposed to a rational decision, it would be a case of irrational or

preposterous approach.  The expression “irrational” as defined in

Black’s Law Dictionary57 is as follows:

“irrational, adj. (16c) Not guided by reason or by a fair

consideration of the facts <an irrational ruling>.   See

ARBITRARY.

arbitrary,  adj.  (15c)  1.  Depending   on   individual

discretion; of, relating to, or involving a determination

made   without   consideration   of   or   regard   for   facts,

circumstances,   fixed   rules,   or   procedures.  2.  (Of   a

56 11th Edition

57 11th Edition

57

judicial   decision)   founded   on   prejudice   or   preference

rather than on reason or fact.

 This   type   of   decision   is   often   termed  arbitrary   and

capricious. Cf. CAPRICIOUS. — arbitrariness, n.”

45. A  priori,  if the resolution passed by the House was to

provide for suspension beyond the period prescribed under

the stated Rule, it would be substantively illegal, irrational

and   unconstitutional.     In   that,   the   graded   (rational   and

objective standard) approach  predicated in Rule 53 is the

benchmark to be observed by the Speaker to enable him to

ensure smooth working of the House, without any obstruction

or impediment and for keeping the recalcitrant member away

from the House for a period maximum upto the remainder of

the entire Session.

46. Inflicting   suspension   for   a   period   “beyond   the   period

necessary” than to ensure smooth working/functioning of the

House during the Session “by itself”; and also, as per the

underlying   objective   standard   specified   in   Rule   53,

indubitably, suffer from the vice of being grossly irrational

measure   adopted   against   the   erring   member   and   also

substantively illegal and unconstitutional.

58

47. It is a different matter if the House had ended up with

resolution of expulsion of the member, which power in a given

situation it could legitimately exercise, as held in Raja Ram

Pal58

.    That   action   would   not   visit   the   member   with

disqualification and also allow him to get re­elected from the

same constituency within the statutory period of six months

from the date of vacation of his seat.  However, if it is a case

of   suspension   for   a   period   beyond   the   remainder   of   the

Session,   it   would   entail   in   unnecessary   (unessential)

deprivation.  And longer or excessive deprival would not only

be   regarded   as   irrational,   but   closer   to   or   bordering   on

perversity.  Resultantly, such an action would be violative of

procedure established by law and also manifestly arbitrary,

grossly irrational and illegal and violative of Articles 14 and

21 of the Constitution.

48. Be   it   noted   that   suspension   beyond   the   remainder

period   of   the   ongoing   Session   would   not   only   be   grossly

irrational   measure,   but   also   violative   of   basic   democratic

values   owing   to   unessential   deprivation   of   the   member

58 supra at Footnote No.14

59

concerned   and   more   importantly,   the   constituency   would

remain unrepresented in the Assembly.  It would also impact

the   democratic   setup   as   a   whole   by   permitting   the   thin

majority   Government   (coalition   Government)   of   the   day   to

manipulate the numbers of the Opposition Party in the House

in an undemocratic manner.   Not only that, the Opposition

will   not   be   able   to   effectively   participate   in   the

discussion/debate in the House owing to the constant fear of

its members being suspended for longer period.  There would

be no purposeful or meaningful debates but one in terrorem

and as per the whims of the majority.   That would not be

healthy for the democracy as a whole.  

49. It   is   well­established   that   fundamental   rights   are

guaranteed   by   Part   III   of   the   Constitution,   out   of   which

Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the most frequently invoked to test

the validity of the executive as well as legislative actions when

these actions are subjected to judicial scrutiny.   Different

Articles   in   the   Constitution   under   chapter   Fundamental

Rights and the Directive Principles in Part IV ought to be read

as   an   integral   and   incorporeal   whole   with   possible

60

overlapping with the subject matter of what is to be protected

by its various provisions particularly the fundamental rights.

The sweep of Article 21 is expansive enough to govern the

action   of  dismembering  a   member   from  the   House   of  the

Legislative Assembly in the form of expulsion or be it a case of

suspension by directing withdrawal from the meeting of the

Assembly for the remainder of the Session.

50. Be   that   as   it   may,   it   is   evident   from   the   impugned

resolution that it has been passed by the majority votes in the

House immediately after it was put to vote by the Chairman.

It was in fact introduced as a motion for initiating action for

having committed contempt of the House which ordinarily

ought to have proceeded under Part XVIII of the Rules dealing

with Privileges.   That would have required constitution of a

Committee of Privileges to enquire into the entire matter by

giving   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   persons   concerned.

Instead of adopting that procedure, the House itself chose to

direct withdrawal of the petitioners from the meetings of the

Assembly for a period of one year — which direction is neither

61

ascribable to the dispensation prescribed in Part XVIII of the

Rules or Rule 53 enabling the Speaker to do so.

51. As   aforementioned,   it   is   not   a   case   of   procedural

irregularity as such.   Whereas, the decision taken by the

House in this case, is one of substantive illegality in directing

suspension beyond the period of remainder of the Session in

which the motion was presented.   We say so because, the

period of suspension in excess of the period essential to do so

much   less   in   a   graded   manner   including   on   principle

underlying   Rule   53,   would   be   antithesis   to   rational   or

objective standard approach for ensuring orderly functioning

of the House during the ongoing Session.

52. Reverting to the challenge to the impugned resolution

being grossly irrational.  As noticed earlier, Rule 53 provides

for a graded (rational and objective standard) approach.  The

timeline as specified in Rule 53 is with a view to address the

immediate concern of the House for ensuring orderly conduct

of the business of the House in the given Session.  This action

is implied on the doctrine of necessity.  The Speaker and for

62

that matter, even the House as a whole or by majority, would

be within its power to resort to such a mechanism being

rational   measure.     Exceeding   the   stated   timeline   is   a

substantive   matter   and   not   a   procedural   irregularity.     It

would raise a basic question as to what purpose would be

served   by   withdrawing   the   member   from   the   House   for

successive Sessions falling within that period of one year.

Indeed, if the conduct of the member is gross warranting his

removal from the Assembly even beyond the period of sixty

days [Article 190(4)] or six months (Section 151A of the 1951

Act), the House is capable of invoking its inherent power of

expulsion of such a member, which is a greater power.

53. Indubitably, suspension for a day or for the remainder of

the Session, would be of a lesser degree of exercise of that

power.   However, it is not open to contend that the higher

degree of power would include power to suspend the member

beyond the period essential to keep him/her away from the

Assembly for ensuring orderly conduct of the business of the

House.  As expounded in Amarinder Singh59, the important

59 supra at Footnote No.15 (paras 47 and 66)

63

consideration   for   scrutinising   the   exercise   of   legislative

privileges is whether the same is necessary to safeguard the

integrity   of   the   legislative   functions.     This   Court   had

recognised   that   the   Legislature’s   power   to   punish   for   its

contempt was not untrammelled.   That power of legislative

chamber to punish for its own contempt must coincide with

the   Legislature’s   interest   in   protecting   the   integrity   of   its

function. In other words, the suspension of a member must

be   preferred   as   a   short­term   or   a   temporary   measure   for

restoring order in the functioning of the concerned Assembly

Session for completing its scheduled business within time

and by way of disciplinary measure against the incorrigible

member(s).

54. The   word   “suspension”   is   necessarily   linked   to

attendance   of   the   member   in   the   House.     Thus,   the

suspension may be resorted to merely for ensuring orderly

conduct of the business of the House during the concerned

Session.     Anything   in   excess   of   that   would   be   irrational

suspension.   This is so because the member represents the

constituency from where he has been duly elected and longer

64

suspension would entail in deprivation of the constituency to

be represented in the House.  It is true that right to vote and

be represented is integral to our democratic process and it is

not an absolute right.  Indeed, the constituency cannot have

any   right   to   be   represented   by   a   disqualified   or   expelled

member.  However, their representative cannot be kept away

from   the   House   in   the   guise   of   suspension   beyond   the

necessary (rational) period linked to the ongoing Assembly

Session, including the timeline referred to in Article 190(4) of

the Constitution and Section 151A of the 1951 Act.

55. Be   that   as   it   may,   suspension   is   essentially   a

disciplinary measure.   It must follow that suspension for a

period of one year would assume the character of punitive

and punishment worse than expulsion.  For, suspension for

long period and beyond the Session has the effect of creating

a  de   facto  vacancy   though   not   a  de   jure  vacancy.     The

argument   of   the   State   that   despite   suspension   from   the

House, the members would continue to discharge all other

functions   outside   the   House   as   an   elected   representative.

This plea, in our view, is tenuous.   For, the effect of such

65

suspension is visited not only on the constituency that goes

unrepresented for potentially long and unessential time, but

also on the functioning of the Assembly itself.  Apart from a

role in bringing to light the special needs or difficulties of the

constituency, a member also plays a role in various motions,

debates, votes, etc.60.   In any case, this plea cannot whittle

down the logic requiring limited action essential for orderly

functioning of the House on the given day or at best, the

Session   for   completion   of   its   scheduled   business   for   the

relevant Session.  

56. Suffice it to observe that one­year suspension is worse

than “expulsion”, “disqualification” or “resignation” — insofar

as the right of the constituency to be represented before the

House/Assembly is concerned.   In that, long suspension is

60 Some of the functions of the elected representative in the House/Assembly (taken from the

Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Rules) would indicate that the member would not be able to

take part in following matters, if suspended:

(a) Moving of a motion which requires decision by the Assembly, including by Division

(Rules 23, 40, 41); (b) Taking part in a debate on a motion including speeches (Rules 33,34);

(c) Asking Questions on Statements made by Ministers (Rule  47); (d) Making of personal

explanations (Rule 48); (e) Questions on matters of public concern from Ministers (Rule 68);

(f) Short Notice questions for immediate reply on questions of urgent nature (Rule  86); (g)

Private member bills (Rule 111); (h) Discussions on matters of sufficient public importance

(Rule 94);                                  (i) No confidence motions (Rule 95); (j) Adjournment motions

(Rule   97);   (k)   Participation   as   members   of   Committees,   including   the   Committee   for

consideration of matters of public importance, Business Advisory Committee, Public Accounts

Committee, Committee on Estimates, etc (Part XV of the Rules).

66

bound to affect the rights harsher than expulsion wherein a

mid­term election is held within the specified time in terms of

Section 151A of the 1951 Act, not later than six months.

Thus, the impugned resolution is unreasonable, irrational,

and arbitrary and liable to be set aside.  

57. Having said this, we may now turn to two decisions of

the   Privy   Council   referred   to   and   discussed   by   the

Constitution Bench in Raja Ram Pal61

, in paragraphs 284 to

293.  The same reads thus:

“284. Finally, in Barton62 it involved the suspension of a

Member   from   the   Legislative   Assembly   of   New   South

Wales. The power of suspension for an indefinite time was

held to be unavailable to the Legislative Assembly as it

was said to have trespassed into the punitive field. The

judgment was delivered by the Earl of Selborne. Referring

to Kielley63 and Doyle64 the Court observed:

“It results from those authorities that no powers of

that   kind  are incident   to or inherent   in a  Colonial

Legislative   Assembly   (without   express   grant),   except

‘such as are necessary to the existence of such a body,

and the proper exercise of the functions which it is

intended to execute’.

Powers   to   suspend   toties   quoties,   sitting   after

sitting, in case of repeated offences (and, if may be, till

submission   or   apology),   and also   to   expel   for

aggravated   or   persistent   misconduct,   appear   to   be

sufficient to meet even the extreme case of a Member

whose conduct is habitually obstructive or disorderly.

61 supra at Footnote No.14

62 supra at Footnote No.9

63 Edward Kielley vs. William Carson, (1842) 4 Moore PC 63 : 13 ER 225

64 Thomas William Doyle vs. George Charles Falconer, (1865­67) LR 1 PC 328 : 36 LJPC 33 :

15 WR 366

67

To  argue  that expulsion  is the  greater power, and

suspension   the   less,   and   that   the   greater   must

include   all   degrees   of   the   less,   seems   to   their

Lordships   fallacious. The   rights   of   constituents

ought not, in a question of this kind, to be left out

of   sight.   Those   rights   would   be   much   more

seriously   interfered   with   by   an   unnecessarily

prolonged   suspension   than   by   expulsion,   after

which a new election would immediately be held.”

(emphasis supplied)

285. The Court went on to examine what is necessary

and found that an indefinite suspension could never be

considered necessary.

286. The learned counsel for the petitioners have relied

on the above distinction and submitted that the limited

power does not envisage expulsion and can only be used

for ex facie contempts.

287. We   are   not   persuaded   to   subscribe   to   the

propositions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Even if

we were to accept this distinction as applicable to the

Indian   Parliament,   in   our  opinion,   the   power   to   expel

would be available.

288. Firstly, Barton65  which   allows   only   a   limited

power to punish for contempt, finds that even though

the Legislative Assembly does not have the power to

indefinitely suspend, as  that  was  punitive   in  nature,

the   Assembly   would   have   the   power   to   expel,

considering expulsion a non­punitive power. Secondly,

the objection that the  limited power could only deal

with ex facie contempt, is not tenable.

289. In   the   above   context,   reference   may   be   made

to Harnett v. Crick66. This case involved the suspension

of a Member of the Legislative Assembly of New South

Wales until the verdict of the jury in the pending criminal

trial   against   the   Member   had   been   delivered.   The

65 supra at Footnote No.9

66 Lawrence Joseph Harnett vs. William Patrick Crick, 1908 AC 470 : 78 LJPC 38 : 99 LT 601

(PC)

68

suspension was challenged. When the matter came up

before the Privy Council, the respondents argued that:

“The Legislative Assembly had no inherent power to

pass [the Standing Order]. Its inherent powers were

limited to protective and defensive measures necessary

for the proper exercise of its functions and the conduct

of   its   business.   They   did   not   extend   to   punitive

measures in the absence of express statutory power in

that behalf, but only to protective measures. … The

fact   that   a   criminal   charge   is   pending   against   the

respondent does not affect or obstruct the course of

business   in   the   Chamber   or   relate   to   its   orderly

conduct.”

290. This argument was rejected and the House of Lords

allowed   the   appeal.   Lord   MacNaghten,   delivering   the

judgment, initially observed that:

“… no one would probably contend that the orderly

conduct   of   the   Assembly   would   be   disturbed   or

affected by the mere fact that a criminal charge is

pending against a Member of the House.” (475)

291. But he found that certain peculiar circumstances of

the case deserved to be given weight. The Court went on

to hold thus:

“If the House itself has taken the less favourable

view of the plaintiff's attitude [an insult and challenge

to   the   House], and   has   judged   that   the   occasion

justified   temporary   suspension,   not   by   way   of

punishment, but in self­defence, it seems impossible for

the Court to declare that the House was so wrong in its

judgment, and the Standing Order and the resolution

founded   upon   it   so   foreign   to   the   purpose

contemplated by the Act, that the proceedings must be

declared invalid.”(476)

(emphasis supplied)

292. The above case thus establishes that even if the

House of legislature has limited powers, such power is

not   only   restricted   to ex   facie contempts,   but   even

acts committed outside  the  House. It is  open  to the

Assembly to use its power for “protective” purposes,

and the acts that it can act upon are not only those

that are committed in the House, but upon anything

69

that   lowers   the   dignity   of   the   House.   Thus,   the

petitioners' submission that House only has the power to

remove   obstructions   during   its   proceedings   cannot   be

accepted.

293. It is axiomatic to state that expulsion is always in

respect of a Member. At the same time, it needs to be

borne in mind that a Member is part of the House due to

which his or her conduct always has a direct bearing

upon the perception of the House. Any legislative body

must   act   through   its   Members   and   the   connection

between the conduct of the Members and the perception

of the House is strong.  We,   therefore,   conclude   that

even   if   Parliament   had   only   the   limited   remedial

power   to   punish   for   contempt,   the   power   to   expel

would   be   well   within   the   limits   of   such   remedial

contempt power.”

(emphasis supplied in bolds)

The two decisions of the Privy Council (Barton67 and Lawrence

Joseph Harnett68) were pressed into service in that case to answer

the plea that the Legislature has inherent limited remedial power to

punish  for contempt by way of suspension of its member and

cannot resort to expulsion of the member.  The Constitution Bench

noticed   that   even   these   two   decisions   of   the   Privy   Council,

recognised inherent power of the Legislature to expel its member

and, thus, negatived the plea of the petitioner in that regard.  This

Court   after   analysing   the   said   decisions   concluded   that   the

Legislatures  established  in India  by  the Constitution, including

67 supra at Footnote No.9

68 supra at Footnote No.66

70

Parliament under Article 105(3), need not be denied the claim to

the power of expulsion arising out of remedial power of contempt.

58. What emerges from the stated conclusion is that the

Constitution Bench declared that the inherent power of the

Legislature  is  not   absolute,  but  limited  remedial  power to

punish   for   contempt   and   to   take   such   measures   as   are

necessary for orderly functioning of the proceedings of the

House.

59. The case of  Barton69 has been noticed in paragraph

284, which in turn had dealt with suspension of the member

from the Legislative Assembly of the New South Wales.   In

that case, the resolution passed by the House did not mention

about the time frame of suspension of the member.  That was

challenged   by   the   aggrieved   member   being   irrational   and

unnecessary.  That plea was considered by the Privy Council

keeping in mind its earlier decisions in Edward Kielley70 and

Thomas   William   Doyle71.     (These   decisions   have   been

adverted to in paragraph 283 by the Constitution Bench as

69 supra at Footnote No.9

70 supra at Footnote No.63

71 supra at Footnote No.64 

71

well).   After noticing these decisions, the Privy Council in

Barton72 noted that those authorities had dealt with situation

that no powers of that kind are incident to or inherent in a

Colonial Legislative Assembly (without express grant), except

such as are necessary to the existence of such a body, and

the proper exercise of the functions which it is intended to

execute.

60. It must follow that in absence of any express provision

bestowing power in the Legislature to suspend its member(s)

beyond the term of the ongoing Session, the inherent power of

the Legislature can be invoked only to the extent necessary

and for proper exercise of the functions of the House at the

relevant point of time.  No more.  For that purpose, it could

resort to protective and self­defensive powers alone and not

punitive at all.   This logic is reinforced from the dictum in

Barton73 wherein the Privy Council noted as follows:

“…“If a member of a Colonial House of Assembly is guilty

of disorderly conduct in the House while sitting, he may

be removed or excluded for a time, or even expelled ….

The right to remove for self­security is one thing, the right

to inflict punishment is another …. If the good sense and

72 supra at Footnote No.9

73 supra at Footnote No.9

72

conduct of the members of Colonial Legislatures prove

insufficient to secure order and decency of debate, the law

would   sanction   the   use   of   that   degree   of   force   which

might be necessary to remove the person excluded from

the place of meeting, and to keep him excluded.””74

61. The Privy Council in the same decision then proceeded

to observe as follows:

“… The principle on which the implied power is given

confines it within the limits of what is required by the

assumed   necessity.   That   necessity   appears   to   their

Lordships   to   extend   as   far   as  the  whole  duration  of

the  particular  meeting  or  sitting  of  the  Assembly   in

the   course   of   which   the   offence   may   have   been

committed. It seems to be reasonably necessary that

some   substantial   interval   should   be   interposed

between   the   suspensory   resolution   and   the

resumption   of   his   place   in   the   Assembly   by   the

offender,   in   order   to   give   opportunity   for   the

subsidence of heat and passion, and for reflection on

his own conduct by the person suspended; nor would

anything   less   be   generally   sufficient   for   the

vindication   of   the   authority   and   dignity   of   the

Assembly. …”

(emphasis supplied)

These observations are significant and apposite in the context of

the issue under consideration.   And we must lean in favour of

adopting the same.   Inasmuch as this exposition recognises the

fact that implied or inherent power of the Legislature must be

reckoned to the extent only to what is required to be done by the

House for effective and orderly functioning of its business during

74 1 L.R, P.C. 340

73

the ongoing Session and not beyond.   This is more emphatically

expounded by the Privy Council in the following words:

“The power, therefore, of suspending a member guilty of

obstruction or disorderly conduct during the continuance

of any current sitting, is, in their Lordships' judgment,

reasonably   necessary   for   the   proper   exercise   of   the

functions of any Legislative Assembly of this kind; and it

may very well be, that the same doctrine of reasonable

necessity would authorize a suspension until submission

or apology by the offending member; which, if he were

refractory, might  cause it  to be prolonged (not by the

arbitrary discretion of the Assembly, but by his own wilful

default) for some further time. …”

Again, it went on to observe as follows:

“… If these are the limits of the inherent or implied power,

reasonably   deducible   from   the   principle   of   general

necessity, they have the advantage of drawing a simple

practical line between defensive and punitive action on

the   part   of   the   Assembly.  A   power   of   unconditional

suspension,   for   an   indefinite   time,   or   for   a   definite

time depending only on the irresponsible discretion of

the Assembly itself, is more than the necessity of selfdefence seems to require, and is dangerously liable, in

possible cases, to excess or abuse. …”

(emphasis supplied)

62. The essence of the analysis done in  Barton75 is about

the   logic   and   rationality   behind   the   need   to   suspend   a

member.   It unambiguously held that the same be regarded

as   temporary   by   way   of   self­protective   mechanism   of   the

Legislature to ensure orderly conduct of its business in the

House   during   the   sitting.     For   that   very   reason,   Rule   53

75 supra at Footnote No.9

74

provides for a graded corrective action, namely, on the first

occasion,   the   Speaker   may   suspend   the   member   for   the

remainder of the day and if the misbehaviour is repeated in

the same Session — for the remainder of the Session.   The

observations in Barton76 would reinforce this logic of need to

adhere to a graded approach, which reads thus:

“   …“Suspension”   must   be   temporary;   the   words,

“suspended   from   the   service   of   the   House,”   may   be

satisfied   by   referring   them   to   the   attendance   of   the

member in the House during that particular sitting. So

much   as   this   is   necessary   to  make   the   suspension

effective, more is not. …”

(emphasis supplied)

63. In light of this decision, it must follow that only a graded

approach is the essence of a rational and logical approach;

and only such action of the Legislature which is necessary for

orderly   conduct   of   its   scheduled   business   of   the   ongoing

Session can be regarded as rational approach.   Suspension

beyond the Session would be bordering on punishing not only

the   member   concerned,   but   also   inevitably   impact   the

legitimate rights of the constituency from where the member

had been elected.

76 supra at Footnote No.9

75

64. In the case of Lawrence Joseph Harnett77

, the question

was   about   the   challenge   to   the   Standing   Order   which

provided as follows:

“Whenever it shall have been ruled or decided (whether

before or after the approval of this Standing Order) that

the House may not proceed on a matter which has been

initiated in the House affecting the alleged misconduct of

a   Member,   because   thereby   the   said   member   may   be

prejudiced in a criminal trial then pending on charges

founded on such misconduct, the House may suspend

such member from the service of the House until the

verdict of the jury has been returned, or until it is further

ordered.”

This   Standing   Order   was   approved   by   the   Governor.     In   that

context, the Privy Council observed that it seems impossible for the

Court to declare that the House was so wrong in its judgment, and

the Standing Order and the resolution founded upon it so foreign

to   the   purpose   contemplated   by   the   Act,   so   as   to   declare   the

proceedings against the member invalid.  In other words, the Privy

Council was considering a written Standing Order and its efficacy.

65. In the present case, the House has already adopted the

Rules for conduct of its business and Rule 53 of the Rules

expressly provides for the mechanism regarding suspension of

its member.  Indubitably, the source of powers and privileges

77 supra at Footnote No.66

76

of Legislatures in India is derived from Article 105(3) in case

of   Parliament   and   Article   194(3)   concerning   the   State

Legislature.  In absence of a law to define such powers and

privileges, as of now, it can only exercise those powers as

existed in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United

Kingdom at the commencement of the Constitution.

66. In the celebrated treatise of Sir Thomas Erskine May78

dealing   with   the   Parliamentary   privileges,   it   is   noted   as

follows:  

“if for a subsequent occasion, in default of an order by the

House that the suspension of the member shall terminate

when   the   House   orders   that   it   shall   do   so,  the

suspension shall be for the remainder of the Session.”

(emphasis supplied)

He then noted that the first or subsequent occasion would mean

the first or the subsequent occasion in the same session.

67. Further, the position as obtained in United Kingdom at

the relevant time to suspend its members was governed by

the House of Commons Standing Order Relative to Public

78 The Law, Privileges Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, Fifteenth (1950) Edition (See

Chapter VII under the heading “Proceedings upon the naming of a Member” at pages 451­

452.)

77

Business 1948. The relevant Standing Order is No. 22 (1 to 4)

as reproduced hereunder:

“22. Order in debate.— (1) Whenever a Member shall have

been   named   by   Mr.   Speaker   or   by   the   chairman,

immediately   after   the   commission   of   the   offence   of

disregarding the authority of the chair, or of persistently

and willfully obstructing the business of the House by

abusing the rules of the House, or otherwise, then, if the

offence   has   been   committed   by   such   Member   in   the

House, Mr. Speaker shall forthwith put the question, on a

motion   being   made,   no   amendment,   adjournment,   or

debate being allowed, “That such Member be suspended

from the service of the House”; and if the offence has been

committed   in   a   committee   of   the   whole   House,   the

chairman shall forthwith suspend the proceedings of the

committee and report the circumstances to the House;

and Mr. Speaker shall on a motion being made forthwith

put the same question, no amendment, adjournment, or

debate   being   allowed,   as   if   the   offence   had   been

committed in the House itself.

(2) If any member be suspended under this order, his

suspension on the first occasion shall continue until the

fifth day, and on the second occasion until the twentieth

day, on which the House shall sit after the day on which

he was suspended, but on any subsequent occasion until

the   House   shall   resolve   that   the   suspension   of   such

Member do terminate.

(3)   Not more than one Member shall be named at the

same   time,   unless   two   or   more   members,   present

together,   have   jointly   disregarded   the   authority   of   the

chair.

(4) If a Member, or two or more Members acting jointly,

who   have   been   suspended   under   this   order   from   the

service of the House, shall refuse to obey the direction of

Mr.   Speaker,   when   severally   summoned   under   Mr.

Speaker’s orders by the Serjeant at Arms to obey such

direction,   Mr.   Speaker   shall   call   the   attention   of   the

House to the fact that recourse to force is necessary in

order   to   compel   obedience   to   his   direction,   and   the

Member or Members named by him as having refused to

obey   his   direction   shall   thereupon   and   without   any

78

further question being put be suspended from the service

of the House during the remainder of the session.”

On conjoint reading of sub­clause (2) and (4) of the above­cited

Standing Order No. 22, it is seen that suspension of a member on

the first occasion can be for a period of five days or the remainder

of the session whichever is earlier. Even for the second occasion

the period of suspension is only twenty days or remainder of the

Session,  whichever  is   earlier.   On   any  subsequent   occasion   the

period of suspension shall be until the House shall resolve that the

suspension of such member do terminate.  

68. The Orissa High Court in  Sushanta  Kumar   Chand79

had occasion to deal with a case of warrant issued by the

Speaker of the Assembly to detain the contemnor for seven

days’   simple   imprisonment.     It   was   urged   that   as   the

unexpired period of sentence was beyond the term of the

Session of the House, the same had lapsed in law.  The High

Court answered the challenge in favour of the petitioners after

noticing   passage   from   Sir   Thomas   Erskine   May   and

Halsbury’s Laws of England.  The Sir Thomas Erskine May’s

79 supra at Footnote No.10

79

Parliamentary Practice relied upon in that decision, expounds

thus:

“Persons   committed   by   the   Commons,   if   not   sooner

discharged by the House, are immediately released from

their confinement on a prorogation, whether they have

paid the fees or not. If they were held longer in custody,

they would be discharged by the Courts upon a writ of

habeas corpus.”

And Halsbury’s Law of England relied upon in the same decision

observes thus:

“The Lords claim to have power to commit an offender for

a specified period even beyond the period of a session.

This course was also formerly pursued by the Commons

but was later abandoned; and it would now seem that

they no longer have power to keep offenders in prison

beyond the period of session……………”

(emphasis supplied)

The rationale for limiting all remedies for breach of privilege, as a

rule, to a Session in which the House takes action for such breach

is the effect of prorogation. According to Erskine May’s Treatise80, it

is stated as under:

“The effect of a prorogation is at once to  suspend   all

business  until  Parliament   shall  be   summoned   again.

Not only are the sittings of Parliament at an end, but

all   proceedings   pending   at   the   time   are   quashed,

except   impeachments   by   the   Commons,   and   appeals

before the House of Lords. Every bill must therefore be

renewed   after   a   prorogation,   as   if   it   had   never   been

introduced.”

(emphasis supplied)

80 1950 Edition at page 32 under the heading “Effect of a Prorogation”

80

69. A  priori,  if   the   Legislature   intended   to   depart   from

mechanism predicated in Rule 53, it ought to have expressly

provided for that dispensation.  If it had done that by a law or

in   the   form   of   Rules   framed   under   Article   208   of   the

Constitution, the legality and constitutionality thereof could

have been tested.   Suffice it to note, in absence thereof, it

would   inevitably   be   exercise   of   power   without   an   express

grant in that regard.   In such a case, the exercise of power

can only be implied or inherent and limited to the logic of

general necessity by way of self­protective or self­defensive

action   reasonably   necessary   for   proper   exercise   of   the

functions of the House during the ongoing Session.  Anything

in excess then for a day or the remainder of the ongoing

Session, would not be necessary much less rational exercise

of inherent power of the Assembly.   Even, Rule 53 bestows

authority in the Speaker to take action against the member

only for ensuring orderly functioning of the House.   Same

logic must apply to the exercise of inherent limited power by

the House, even if it may not be de facto under Rule 53.

81

70. Be   it   noted,   had   it   been   a   case   of   expulsion   of   the

member by the House in terms of Section 151A of the 1951

Act, the Election Commission would move into action and

rather be obliged to take steps not later than six months to fill

in the vacancy so caused subject to the situation referred to

in the proviso therein — so that the constituency could be

duly represented in the House at the earliest opportunity.

Concededly, the Legislative Assembly is a conglomeration of

members   chosen   by   direct   election   from   the   territorial

constituencies   in   the   State   (as   per   Article   170).     That

presupposes that all territorial constituencies must be duly

represented in the Assembly in continuum.  In any case, their

representation   cannot   be   deprived   for   longer   period   than

necessary for the orderly functioning of the House during the

Session.  For that reason, the statutory mandate postulated

vide Parliamentary law81  (which must be regarded as higher

law and acts as a limitation upon the Legislature as well, as

expounded   in  Sub­Committee   on   Judicial

81 Section 151A of the 1951 Act

82

Accountability82),   the   constituency   cannot   be   denied

representation in the House beyond a limited period due to

fortuitous situation.  Moreover, the expelled member would be

free to contest the mid­term election and get re­elected from

the same constituency.  In that, the member does not incur

any disqualification due to expulsion or even removal by the

House.  In case of suspension beyond the period of remainder

of the Session or sixty days or six months, as the case may

be, even though is not a case of disqualification incurred by

the   member,   it   would   entail   in   undue   deprivation   of   the

constituency to be represented in the House by their duly

elected   representative.     It   is,   therefore,   a   drastic   measure

trenching upon imposing penalty more than disciplinary or

corrective measure, beyond the limited inherent powers of the

House.

71. Learned  counsel  for  the   respondents  had   invited   our

attention to the judgments of the Gujarat High Court wherein

it had been held that the rules framed under Article 208 of

the   Constitution   are   neither   statutory   nor   binding   on   the

82 supra at Footnote No.33 (para 61)

83

Legislative Assembly.  Those decisions have not taken note of

the   efficacy   of   the   observations   made   by  the   Constitution

Bench of this Court in M.S.M. Sharma83 as back as in 1959

— that the rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution

would have the effect of procedure established by law for the

purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution and which dictum

has   been   consistently   followed   in   subsequent   decisions

including by the Constitution Bench which dealt with the

case of Raja Ram Pal84

.   Accordingly, the decisions pressed

into service by the respondents cannot take the matter any

further.   The respondents have relied upon other decisions

including of this Court which, however, has had no occasion

to deal with the legality and efficacy of direction or order

issued by the House such as vide impugned resolution of

suspending duly elected members for a period of one year

instead of maximum period of remainder of the same Session.

Indeed, the decision of Madras High Court in V.C. Chandhira

Kumar,   Member   of   Legislative   Assembly85 held   the

83 supra at Footnote No.11

84 supra at Footnote No.14

85 supra at Footnote No.23

84

resolution of the Assembly reducing the original period of one

year to six months as valid, however, for the view that we

have taken, the said decision will be of no avail.

72. Resultantly, we have no hesitation in concluding that

the   impugned   resolution   suffers   from   the   vice   of   being

unconstitutional, grossly illegal and irrational to the extent of

period of suspension beyond the remainder of the concerned

(ongoing) Session.  Further, it is not a case of mere procedural

irregularity committed by the Legislature within the meaning

of Article 212(1) of the     Constitution.

73. Although learned counsel appearing for the parties had

raised diverse contentions, we need not dilate further having

opined that in exercise of inherent power of the House, the

suspension   of   the   members   could   not   have,   in   any   case,

exceeded the remainder period of the ongoing Session.   The

concerned Session having concluded long back in July 2021,

the petitions ought to succeed and could be disposed of with a

declaration   that   suspension   beyond   the   remainder   of   the

ongoing   Session   in   which   the   resolution   was   passed,   is

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nullity,   unconstitutional   and   grossly   illegal   and   irrational.

The same cannot be given effect to beyond the remainder

period of the concerned Session and must be regarded as non

est in the eyes of law beyond that period.  For that reason, it

is unnecessary for us to dilate on other aspects of the matter.

Thus, we do not wish to examine the same.

Epilogue:

74. It is unnecessary to underscore that Parliament as well

as   the   State   Legislative   Assembly   are   regarded   as   sacred

places, just as the Judicature as temple of justice.   As a

matter of fact, the first place where justice is dispensed to the

common man is Parliament/Legislative Assembly albeit  by a

democratic process.  It is a place where policies and laws are

propounded for governing the citizenry.   It is here that the

entire range of activities concerning the masses until the last

mile, are discussed and their destinies are shaped.  That, in

itself, is the process of dispensing justice to the citizens of

this   country.     These   are   places   where   robust   and

dispassionate debates and discussion inspired by the highest

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traditions of truth and righteousness ought to take place for

resolving the burning issues confronting the nation/State and

for dispensing justice — political, social and economic.  The

happenings in the House is reflection of the contemporary

societal   fabric.     The   behavioural   pattern   of   the   society   is

manifested or mirrored in the thought process and actions of

the members of the House during the debates.  It is in public

domain (through print, electronic and social media) that the

members of the Parliament or Assembly/Council of the State,

spend   much   of   the   time   in   a   hostile   atmosphere.     The

Parliament/Legislative   Assembly   are   becoming   more   and

more intransigent place.   The philosophical tenet, one must

agree  to   disagree  is  becoming  a  seldom scene  or  a  rarity

during the debates. It has become common to hear that the

House could not complete its usual scheduled business and

most of the  time had been spent  in jeering and  personal

attacks against each other instead of erudite constructive and

educative debates consistent with the highest tradition of the

august body.  This is the popular sentiment gaining ground

amongst   the   common   man.     It   is   disheartening   for   the

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observers.     They   earnestly   feel   that   it   is   high   time   that

corrective steps are taken by all concerned and the elected

representatives would do enough to restore the glory and the

standard of intellectual debates of the highest order, as have

been chronicled of their predecessors.   That legacy should

become more prominent than the rumpus caused very often.

Aggression during the debates has no place in the setting of

country governed by the Rule of Law.  Even a complex issue

needs to be resolved in a congenial atmosphere by observing

collegiality and showing full respect and deference towards

each other.   They ought to ensure optimum utilisation of

quality time of the House, which is very precious, and is the

need of the hour especially when we the people of India that is

Bharat,   take   credit   of   being   the   oldest   civilisation   on   the

planet   and   also   being   the   world’s   largest   democracy

(demographically).     For   becoming   world   leaders   and   selfdependant/reliant, quality of debates in the House ought to

be   of   the   highest   order   and   directed   towards   intrinsic

constitutional and native issues confronting the common man

of   the   nation/States,   who   are   at   the   crossroad   of   semi­

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sesquicentennial or may we say platinum or diamond jubilee

year on completion of 75 years post­independence.   Being

House   of   respected   and   honourable   members,   who   are

emulated   by   their   ardent   followers   and   elected   from   their

respective   constituency,   they   are   expected   to   show

statesmanship and not brinkmanship.   In the House, their

goal is and must be one — so as to ensure the welfare and

happiness of we the people of this nation.  In any case, there

can be no place for disorderly conduct in the House much

less “grossly disorderly”.   Such conduct must be dealt with

sternly for ensuring orderly functioning of the House.   But,

that action must be constitutional, legal, rational and as per

the procedure established by law.  This case has thrown up

an occasion for all concerned to ponder over the need to

evolve and adhere to good practices befitting the august body;

and   appropriately  denounce  and  discourage   proponents   of

undemocratic   activities   in   the   House,   by   democratically

elected representatives.  We say no more.

Conclusion:

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75. In conclusion, we have no hesitation in allowing these

writ petitions and to declare that the impugned resolution

directing suspension of the petitioners beyond the period of

the remainder of the concerned Monsoon Session held in July

2021 is non est in the eyes  of  law, nullity,  unconstitutional,

substantively     illegal     and   irrational.        The       impugned

resolution       is,   thus,       declared     to     be

ineffective in law, insofar as the period beyond the remainder

of  the  stated Session in which the resolution came to  be

passed.

Order:

76. As a result of the stated declaration, the petitioners are

entitled for all consequential benefits of being members of the

Legislative Assembly, on and after the expiry of the period of

the remainder of the concerned Session in July 2021.   The

writ petitions are allowed in the above terms.  No order as to

costs.

Postscript:

77. While parting, we need to express a word of appreciation

for the able assistance given by the learned counsel appearing

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for the concerned parties enabling us to deal with the complex

issues on hand.   That they did despite the handicaps and

uncertainty of online interaction in virtual Court hearing.

Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

..……………………………J.

          (A.M. Khanwilkar)

………………………………J.

          (Dinesh Maheshwari)

………………………………J.

          (C.T. Ravikumar)

New Delhi;

January 28, 2022.

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले