Manoj Kumar Khokhar vs State of Rajasthan

Manoj Kumar Khokhar vs State of Rajasthan - Supreme Cour Case 2022

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.36 OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.4062 OF 2020)

MANOJ KUMAR KHOKHAR            …..APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.           ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA J. 

This   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the

informant­appellant   assailing   Order   dated   7th  May,   2020

passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   of   Rajasthan,   at

Jaipur, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No.

3601/2020, whereby bail has been granted to the accused

who   is   the   second   respondent   in   the   instant   appeal,   in

connection with FIR No. 407/2019 Police Station Kalwar. 

2.  According to the appellant, he is the son of the deceased,

Ram Swaroop Khokhar and is the person who lodged the First

Information Report being FIR No. 407/2019 on 8th December,

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2019 for the offence of murder of his father, under Section

302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as

“IPC” for the sake of brevity) against the second respondentaccused herein viz. Ram Narayan Jat.

3. The said FIR dated 8th December, 2019 had been lodged by

the appellant herein between 23:00 hrs and 23:30 hrs in the

night stating that earlier on that day, at about 16:00 hrs, his

father, aged about 55 years, was attacked by the respondentaccused, at the Lalpura Pachar bus stand, with the intention

of   killing   him.   That   the   respondent­accused   pinned   the

deceased   to   the   ground,   sat   on   his   chest   and   forcefully

strangled him, thereby causing his death. Some associates of

the respondent­accused who were present at the spot of the

incident, helped him in attacking and killing the deceased.

The informant­appellant further stated in the FIR that there

was a pre­existing rivalry between the respondent­accused,

his brothers namely, Arjun, Satyanarayn and Okramal and

the deceased. That the deceased had previously informed the

appellant and certain family members about such rivalry and

had communicated that he was apprehensive about his safety

owing to the same. That even on the day of the incident, the

respondent­accused along with one of his brothers, Okramal

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had gone to the appellant’s house in the morning and had

abused   the   deceased.   The   report   of   the   post­mortem

examination conducted on 9th December, 2019 has recorded

that the deceased had died as a result of “asphyxia due to

ante mortem strangulation.”

4.  The respondent­accused was arrested in connection with

the said FIR No. 407/2019 on 10th December, 2019 and was

sent to judicial custody. The respondent­accused remained

under judicial custody for a period of nearly one year and five

months   till   he   was   granted   bail   by   the   High   Court   vide

impugned order.

5.   A charge sheet was submitted by the police before the

Court of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur after

conducting an investigation in relation to the aforesaid FIR.

The Additional Metropolitan Magistrate by Order dated 12th

March, 2020 took cognizance of the offence and committed

the   case   to   the   District   and   Sessions   Court   for   trial   and

adjudication.

6.  The respondent­accused had earlier preferred applications

seeking   bail,   under   Section   437   of   the   Code   of   Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short, the “CrPC”) before the Court of

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Additional Metropolitan Magistrate No.9, Jaipur Metropolitan,

Jaipur, on two occasions. The same came to be rejected by

orders dated 23rd  January, 2020 and 6th  March, 2020. The

accused had also preferred a bail application under Section

439   of   the   CrPC   which   was   rejected   by   the   Additional

Sessions Judge No.5, Jaipur Metropolitan by order dated 12th

March,   2020   having   regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences

alleged   against   the   accused.   The   respondent­accused

preferred another bail application before the High Court and

by the impugned order dated 7th May, 2020, the High Court

has enlarged him on bail. Being aggrieved by the grant of bail

to   the   respondent­accused,   the   informant­appellant   has

preferred the instant appeal before this Court.

7. We have heard Sri. Basant R., learned Senior Counsel for

the   appellant   and   Sri.   Aditya   Kumar   Choudhary,   learned

Counsel   for   respondent­accused   and   have   perused   the

material on record.

8. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that

the   deceased   had   been   elected   in   2015   as   the   Deputy

Sarpanch   of   Mandha   Bhopawaspachar   village,   Jhotwara

Tehsil, Jaipur, Rajasthan. That he was elected to such post

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despite opposition from the accused and his family. That the

family of the accused exercised significant influence in the

village   and   were   trying   to   dissuade   the   deceased   from

contesting the election to the post of Sarpanch, to be held in

February   2020.   Owing   to   such   political   enmity,   the

respondent­accused   along   with   his   brothers   Arjun,

Satyanarayn and Okramal had gone to the appellant’s house

in   the   morning   on   8th  December,   2019   and   abused   the

deceased and later on the same day, the deceased was killed.

According to the appellant, the deceased was suffering from

54% permanent physical impairment of both his legs and had

therefore been overpowered by the respondent­accused who

had pinned him to the ground, sat on his chest and throttled

his neck, resulting in his death.

9.  Further it was urged that the High Court has not exercised

its discretion judiciously in granting bail to the respondentaccused.   That   the   High   Court   has   not   taken   into

consideration the gravity of the offence alleged and the grave

manner in which the offence was committed against a person

incapable of defending himself owing to physical impairment.

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10.   It   was   submitted   that   the   factum   of   previous   enmity

between the family of the accused and the deceased has not

been   taken   into   consideration   by   the   High   Court   in   the

context of the allegations against the accused with regard to

the grant of bail. That the possibility of respondent­accused, a

person exercising high political influence in Bhopawaspachar

village, absconding or threatening the witnesses or the family

of   the  deceased,   thereby  having  a  bearing  on   the  trial,  if

released on bail could not be ruled out. That the police were

initially   reluctant   to   even   register   an   FIR   against   the

respondent­accused. In fact, the accused was arrested by the

police on 10th December, 2019 only as a result of the protest

(dharna) carried out by the family members of the deceased

outside the police station. It was contended that the accused,

being a very influential person in the village, could influence

the course of trial by tampering with evidence and influencing

the witnesses. 

According   to   the   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the

appellant, the High Court has not assigned reasons for grant

of bail in the instant case wherein commission of a heinous

crime has been alleged against the accused, for which, the

accused, if convicted, could be sentenced to life imprisonment

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or even death penalty. That the High Court in a very cryptic

order,  de   hors  any   reasoning   has   granted   bail   to   the

respondent­accused. It was urged that the grant of bail to the

respondent­accused was contrary to the settled principles of

law and the judgments of this Court. It was submitted on

behalf of the appellant, who is the son of the deceased, that

this appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned

order. 

11. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel for

the   appellant   placed   reliance   on   certain   decisions   of   this

Court which shall be referred to later.

12.   Per   contra,   Sri.   Aditya   Kumar   Choudhary,   learned

counsel for respondent­accused submitted that the impugned

order   does   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity   warranting   any

interference by this Court. That the informant­appellant has

narrated   an   untrue   version   of   events   in   order   to   falsely

implicate the accused. Existence of past enmity between the

families   of   the   deceased   and   the   accused   has   been

categorically denied. It has been stated that the two families

maintained cordial relations, which fact is evidenced by the

findings in the charge sheet dated 7th February 2020, which

records   that   the   deceased   and   the   respondent­accused

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belonged to the same village and they used to play cards

together   at   the   Lalpura   bus   stand   every   day   since   their

retirement and there is no evidence which is suggestive of

enmity between them. That the sudden scuffle between the

deceased and the accused on 8th  December, 2019 was an

isolated   incident   and   was   not   in   connection   with   or   in

continuation of any pre­existing dispute between them. 

It was further submitted that there was a considerable

and unexplained delay by the informant­appellant in lodging

the FIR which is proof of the fact that the same was lodged as

an afterthought and therefore does not bring out the true

narration of facts. In support of his submission as to the false

nature   of   the   appellent’s   version   of   the   incident,   learned

counsel   for   the   respondent­accused   has   relied   on   the

statements of the eye­witnesses to the incident stating that

there was a sudden scuffle between the deceased and the

respondent­accused   on   the   date   of   the   incident   and   the

accused   throttled   the   neck   of   the   deceased.   After   being

separated, the deceased sat on a bench in the bus­stop but

later became unconscious and was immediately taken to the

hospital where he died. It has further been stated by an eye8

witness, namely, Mangalchand that the brothers of accused

were not present at the time of the incident. 

Learned counsel for the respondent­accused referred to

Niranjan Singh and Anr. vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote

and Ors, [1980] 2 SCC 559 to contend that a court deciding

a bail application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits

of the case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial stage

is bound to prejudice fair trial. 

Further, learned counsel for the respondent­accused

submitted   that   the   investigation   in   relation   to   FIR   No.

407/2019 is complete in all respects and charge sheet has

been   submitted.   Therefore,   there  arises   no  question   as   to

influencing any witness or tampering with the evidence. That

the accused has deep roots in society and will therefore not

attempt   to   abscond.   Also,   the   accused   has   no   criminal

antecedents and the incident in question occurred as a result

of a sudden scuffle and therefore, prima facie, offence under

section 300 of the IPC has not been made out against the

accused.   Hence,   the   impugned   order   granting   bail   to   the

respondent­accused   does   not   call   for   interference   by   this

Court.

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13. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Basant R., learned

Senior Counsel for the informant­appellant that the impugned

order granting bail to the respondent­accused is bereft of any

reasoning   and   that   such   order   is   casual   and   cryptic,   we

extract the portion of the impugned order dated 7th May, 2020

passed by the High Court which is the “reasoning” of the

Court for granting bail, as under: 

“I   have   considered   the   submissions   and

perused   the   challan   papers   and   the   postmortem   report,   but   without   expressing   any

opinion on the merits and demerits of the case,

I deem it appropriate to enlarge the accusedpetitioner on bail.

Therefore, this bail application is allowed and it

is directed that accused­petitioner namely, Ram

Narayan   Jat   S/o   Shri   Bhinva   Ram   shall   be

released on bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. in

connection   with   aforesaid   FIR,   provided   he

furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.

50,000/­ together with one surety in the like

amount   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   concerned

Magistrate   with   the   stipulation   that   he   shall

comply with all the conditions laid down under

Section 437 (3) Cr.P.C.”

14. Before  proceeding  further, it would be useful to refer to

the judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to

an accused as under:

a) In  Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   &   Ors.   vs.   Public

Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh ­­  (1978) 1

SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content

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of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of

liberty   of   a   person   under   trial,   has   laid   down   the   key

factors   that   have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail,

which are extracted as under:

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the

charge is the vital factor and the nature of the

evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to

which the party may be liable, if convicted or

conviction   is   confirmed,   also   bears   upon   the

issue.

8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the

course of justice would be thwarted by him who

seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to

be freed for the time being.

9.   Thus   the   legal   principles   and   practice

validate the Court considering the likelihood of

the applicant interfering with witnesses for the

prosecution or otherwise polluting the process

of justice. It is not only traditional but rational,

in this context, to enquire into the antecedents

of   a   man   who   is   applying   for   bail   to   find

whether he has a bad record – particularly a

record   which   suggests   that   he   is   likely   to

commit serious offences while on bail. In regard

to habituals, it is part of criminological history

that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the

bailee   to   exploit   the   opportunity   to   inflict

further   about   the   criminal   record   of   a

defendant,   is   therefore   not   an   exercise   in

irrelevance.”

b) In  Prahlad   Singh   Bhati   vs.   NCT   of   Delhi   &   ORS  –

(2001)   4   SCC   280  this   Court   highlighted   the   aspects

which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an

application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as

follows: 

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“The   jurisdiction   to   grant   bail   has   to   be

exercised on the basis of well settled principles

having regard to the circumstances of each case

and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting

the  bail,  the  court   has  to  keep  in  mind   the

nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in

support thereof, the severity of the punishment

which   conviction   will   entail,   the   character,

behavior, means and standing of the accused,

circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the

accused, reasonable possibility of securing the

presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable

apprehension of the witnesses being tampered

with, the larger interests of the public or State

and similar other considerations. It has also to

be   kept   in   mind   that   for   the   purposes   of

granting the bail the Legislature has used the

words   "reasonable   grounds   for   believing"

instead of "the evidence" which means the court

dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it

as to whether there is a genuine case against

the accused and that the prosecution will be

able to produce prima facie evidence in support

of the charge.”

c) This  Court  in  Ram   Govind   Upadhyay   vs.   Sudarshan

Singh – (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee, J.,

emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of

bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting

that bail cannot be granted as a matter of course, bereft of

cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: 

“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary

order — but, however, calls for exercise of such

a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a

matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any

cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to

record,   however,   that   the   grant   of   bail   is

dependent   upon   the   contextual   facts   of   the

matter being dealt with by the court and facts,

however,   do   always   vary   from   case   to   case.

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While placement of the accused in the society,

though  may  be  considered   but   that   by  itself

cannot   be   a   guiding   factor   in   the   matter   of

grant of bail and the same should and ought

always to be coupled with other circumstances

warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the

offence is one of the basic considerations for the

grant of bail — more heinous is the crime, the

greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,

though,   however,   dependent   on   the   factual

matrix of the matter.”

d) In  Kalyan   Chandra   Sarkar   vs.   Rajesh   Ranjan   alias

Pappu  Yadav  &  Anr.  –   (2004)  7  SCC  528, this Court

held   that   although   it   is   established   that   a   court

considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed

examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on

the merits of the case, the court is required to indicate the

prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 

e) In  Prasanta Kumar   Sarkar   vs.   Ashis   Chaterjee  ­­

(2010) 14 SCC 496 this Court observed that where a High

Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would

suffer from the vice of non­application of mind, rendering it

illegal.   This   Court   held   as   under   with   regard   to   the

circumstances under which an order granting bail may be

set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have

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guided the Court’s decision to grant bail have also been

detailed as under: 

“It is trite that this Court does not, normally,

interfere   with   an   order   passed   by   the   High

Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused.

However, it is equally incumbent upon the High

Court   to   exercise   its   discretion   judiciously,

cautiously and strictly in compliance with the

basic   principles   laid   down   in   a   plethora   of

decisions of this Court on the point. It is well

settled that,

among other circumstances, the factors to be

borne in mind while considering an application

for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie

or   reasonable   ground   to   believe   that   the

accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature

and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the

punishment   in   the   event   of   conviction;   (iv)

danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if

released   on   bail;   (v)   character,   behaviour,

means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii)

reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being

influenced;   and   (viii)   danger,   of   course,   of

justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

f) Another factor which should guide the courts’ decision in

deciding   a   bail   application   is   the   period   of   custody.

However,   as   noted   in  Ash   Mohammad   vs.   Shiv   Raj

Singh  @  Lalla  Bahu  &  Anr.  –  (2012)  9  SCC  446, the

period of custody has to be weighed simultaneously with

the   totality   of   the   circumstances   and   the   criminal

antecedents   of   the   acused,   if   any.   Further,   the

circumstances which may justify the grant of bail are to be

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considered in the larger context of the societal concern

involved   in   releasing   an   accused,   in   juxtaposition   to

individual liberty of the accused seeking bail. 

g) In Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr. – (2016) 15 SCC

422, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court

on   the   considerations   to   be   placed   at   balance   while

deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J.

(as His Lordship then was) in paragraphs 15 and 18 as

under: 

“15. This being the position of law, it is clear as

cloudless sky that the High Court has totally

ignored   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the

accused. What has weighed with the High Court

is   the   doctrine   of   parity.   A   history­sheeter

involved in the nature of crimes which we have

reproduced hereinabove, are not minor offences

so that he is not to be retained in custody, but

the   crimes   are   of   heinous   nature   and   such

crimes, by no stretch of imagination, can be

regarded   as   jejune.   Such   cases   do   create   a

thunder   and   lightening   having   the   effect

potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical

mind. The law expects the judiciary to be alert

while admitting these kind of accused persons

to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on

exercise of discretion judiciously and not in a

whimsical manner. 

x x x 

18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat

with   profit   that   it   is   not   an   appeal   for

cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not

sought because of supervening circumstances.

The annulment of the order passed by the High

Court is sought as many relevant factors have

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not   been   taken   into   consideration   which

includes   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the

accused and that makes the order a deviant

one.   Therefore,   the   inevitable   result   is   the

lancination of the impugned order.”

h) In Anil Kumar Yadav vs. State (NCT of Delhi) – (2018)

12 SCC 129, this Court, while considering an appeal from

an order of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the

significant   considerations   of   which   a   court   must   be

mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so,

this   Court   has   stated   that   while   it   is   not   possible   to

prescribe an exhaustive list of considerations which are to

guide a court in deciding a bail application, the primary

requisite of an order granting bail, is that it should result

from   judicious   exercise   of   the   court’s   discretion.   The

findings of this Court have been extracted as under: 

“17.   While   granting   bail,   the   relevant

considerations are: (i) nature of seriousness of

the offence; (ii) character of the evidence and

circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the

accused;   and   (iii)   likelihood   of   the   accused

fleeing   from   justice;   (iv)   the   impact   that   his

release may make on the prosecution witnesses,

its impact on the society; and (v) likelihood of

his   tampering.   No   doubt,   this   list   is   not

exhaustive.   There   are   no   hard­and­fast   rules

regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has

to be considered on its own merits. The matter

always calls for judicious exercise of discretion

by the Court.”

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i) In  Ramesh  Bhavan  Rathod  vs.  Vishanbhai  Hirabhai

Makwana Makwana (Koli) and Ors., (2021) 6 SCC 230

this   Court   after   referring   to   a   catena   of   judgments

emphasized   on   the   need   and   importance   of   assigning

reasons  for the grant of bail. This  Court categorically

observed that a court granting bail could not obviate its

duty to apply its judicial mind and indicate reasons as to

why bail has been granted or refused. The observations of

this Court have been extracted as under: 

“35. We disapprove of the  observations of  the

High   Court   in   a   succession   of   orders   in   the

present case recording that the Counsel for the

parties   "do   not   press   for   a   further   reasoned

order".   The   grant   of   bail   is   a   matter   which

implicates the liberty of the Accused, the interest

of   the   State   and   the   victims   of   crime   in   the

proper administration of criminal justice. It is a

well settled principle that in determining as to

whether bail should be granted, the High Court,

or for that matter, the Sessions Court deciding

an application Under Section 439 of the Code of

Criminal   Procedure   would   not   launch   upon   a

detailed evaluation of the facts on merits since a

criminal   trial   is   still   to   take   place.   These

observations while adjudicating upon bail would

also not be binding on the outcome of the trial.

But the Court granting bail cannot obviate its

duty   to   apply   a   judicial   mind   and   to   record

reasons, brief as they may be, for the purpose of

deciding   whether   or   not   to   grant   bail.   The

consent of parties cannot obviate the duty of the

High Court to indicate its reasons why it has

either  granted  or  refused  bail.  This  is  for  the

reason that the outcome of the application has a

significant bearing on the liberty of the Accused

on one hand as well as the public interest in the

due enforcement of criminal justice on the other.

The rights of the victims and their families are at

17

stake as well. These are not matters involving the

private rights of two individual parties, as in a

civil   proceeding.   The   proper   enforcement   of

criminal law is a matter of public interest. We

must,   therefore,   disapprove   of   the   manner   in

which   a   succession   of   orders   in   the   present

batch of cases has recorded that counsel for the

"respective   parties   do   not   press   for   further

reasoned order". If this is a euphemism for not

recording   adequate   reasons,   this   kind   of   a

formula   cannot   shield   the   order   from   judicial

scrutiny. 

36. Grant of bail Under Section 439 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure is a matter involving the

exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion

in granting or refusing bail­as in the case of any

other discretion which is vested in a court as a

judicial institution­is not unstructured. The duty

to   record   reasons   is   a   significant   safeguard

which   ensures   that   the   discretion   which   is

entrusted to the court is exercised in a judicious

manner. The recording of reasons in a judicial

order   ensures   that   the   thought   process

underlying the order is subject to scrutiny and

that it meets objective standards of reason and

justice.”

j) Recently in  Bhoopendra Singh vs. State  of Rajasthan

& Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 2021), this Court

made observations with respect to the exercise of appellate

power to determine whether bail has been granted for valid

reasons   as   distinguished   from   an   application   for

cancellation of bail. i.e. this Court distinguished between

setting   aside   a   perverse   order   granting   bail   vis­a­vis

cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has

misconducted   himself   or   because   of   some   new   facts

18

requiring such cancellation. Quoting Mahipal vs. Rajesh

Kumar ­   (2020)   2   SCC   118,  this   Court   observed   as

under:

“16. The considerations that guide the power of

an appellate court in assessing the correctness

of an order granting bail stand on a different

footing from an assessment of an application for

the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an

order   granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of

whether   there   was   an   improper   or   arbitrary

exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail.

The test is whether the order granting bail is

perverse,   illegal   or   unjustified.   On   the   other

hand, an application for cancellation of bail is

generally examined on the anvil of the existence

of supervening circumstances or violations of

the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail

has been granted.” 

k) Learned   counsel   for   the   accused­respondent   has   relied

upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in  Myakala

Dharmarajam   and   Ors.   vs.   The   State   of   Telangana

and Ors.  – (2020) 2 SCC 743 to contend that elaborate

reasons need not be assigned for the grant of bail. What is

of essence is that the record of the case ought to have

been perused by the court granting bail. The facts of the

said case are that a complaint was lodged against fifteen

persons for offences under Sections 148, 120B, 302 read

with Section 149 of  the Indian Penal  Code, 1860. The

accused therein moved an application seeking bail before

the Principal Sessions Judge, who, after perusal of the

19

case diary, statements of witnesses and other connected

records, released the accused on bail through an order

which did not elaborately discuss the material on record.

The High Court cancelled the bail bond on the ground that

the   Principal   Sessions   Judge   had   not   discussed   the

material on record in the order granting bail. In an appeal

preferred   by   the   accused   before   this   Court,   the   order

granting bail was restored and the following observations

were made as to the duty of the court to record reasons

and discuss the material on record before granting bail:

“10. Having perused the law laid down by this

Court on the scope of the power to be exercised

in   the   matter   of   cancellation   of   bails,   it   is

necessary to examine whether the order passed

by the Sessions Court granting bail is perverse

and suffers from infirmities which has resulted

in   the   miscarriage   of   justice.   No   doubt,   the

Sessions Court did not discuss the material on

record in detail, but there is an indication from

the orders by which bail was granted that the

entire material was perused before grant of bail.

It  is not  the case of either the complainantRespondent No. 2 or the State that irrelevant

considerations have been taken into account by

the Sessions Court while granting bail to the

Appellants. The order of the Sessions Court by

which the bail was granted to the Appellants

cannot be termed as perverse as the Sessions

Court   was   conscious   of   the   fact   that   the

investigation was completed and there was no

likelihood of the Appellant tampering with the

evidence.

11. The petition filed for cancellation of bail is

both on the grounds of illegality of the order

passed by the Sessions Court and the conduct

of the Appellants subsequent to their release

20

after bail was granted. The complaint filed by

one   Bojja   Ravinder   to   the   Commissioner   of

Police,   Karimnagar   is   placed   on   record   by

Respondent No. 2. It is stated in the complaint

that the Appellants were roaming freely in the

village   and   threatening   witnesses.   We   have

perused   the   complaint   and   found   that   the

allegations made therein are vague. There is no

mention  about   which   Accused   out   of  the   15

indulged in acts of holding out threats to the

witnesses or made an attempt to tamper with

the evidence.

12. After considering the submissions made on

behalf of the parties and examining the material

on record, we are of the opinion that the High

Court was not right in cancelling the bail of the

Appellants. The orders passed by the Sessions

Judge   granting   bail   cannot   be   termed   as

perverse.   The   complaint   alleging   that   the

Appellants were influencing witnesses is vague

and   is   without   any   details   regarding   the

involvement of the Appellants in threatening the

witnesses. Therefore, the Appeals are allowed

and   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   set

aside.”

However, we are of the view that the said decision is

not   applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   instant   case   for   the

following reasons:

Firstly, this Court in the aforecited decision restored

the order granting bail to the accused on the ground that

although no discussion was made by the Sessions Court as

to the material on record, in the order granting bail, it was

apparent in the order of the Sessions Court whereby bail

was granted, that the decision to grant bail was arrived at

after perusal of the entire material on record. While the

21

material   may  not  have   been   specifically  referred  to,   the

order granting bail was indicative of the fact that it had

been   arrived   at   after   thorough   consideration   thereof.

However, in the instant case, no such indication can be

observed in the impugned orders of the High Court which

would be suggestive of the fact that the material on record

was perused before deciding to grant bail.

Secondly,   the   case   referred   to   by   the   accused

concerned an  offence which was allegedly committed by

fifteen   persons.   The   complainant   therein   had   not

specifically assigned roles to each of such fifteen persons. It

was thus found that the allegations being vague, no prima

facie case could be made out, justifying the grant of bail to

the accused therein. However, in the instant case, only one

accused has been named by the appellant­informant and

the role attributed to him is specific. Therefore, the facts of

the case relied upon, being significantly different from the

one before us, we find that the judgment relied upon by the

learned counsel for the respondent­accused would be of no

assistance to his case.

l) The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of

application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise

22

of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the

accused   is   in   the   case   of  Brijmani   Devi   vs.   Pappu

Kumar   and   Anr.  –   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1663/2021

disposed   of   on   17th  December,   2021,   wherein   a   threeJudge   Bench   of   this   Court,   while   setting   aside   an

unreasoned and casual order of the High Court granting

bail to the accused, observed as follows: 

“While   we   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that

liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at

the same time while considering an application

for bail Courts cannot lose sight of the serious

nature of the accusations against an accused

and the facts that have a bearing in the case,

particularly, when the accusations may not be

false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are

supported   by   adequate   material   brought   on

record so as to enable a Court to arrive at a

prima   facie  conclusion.   While   considering   an

application   for   grant   of   bail   a  prima   facie

conclusion must be supported by reasons and

must be arrived at after having regard to the

vital facts of the case brought on record. Due

consideration must be given to facts suggestive

of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents

of   the   accused,   if   any,   and   the   nature   of

punishment that would follow a conviction visà­vis the offence/s alleged against an accused.”

15.  On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision

arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi­judicial

authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this

Court in  Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited  &   Anr.   vs.

Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. – (2010) 9 SCC 496, wherein

23

after   referring   to   a   number   of   judgments   this   Court

summarised   at   paragraph   47   the   law   on   the   point.   The

relevant principles for the purpose of this case are extracted

as under: 

“(a) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant

to   serve   the   wider   principle   of   justice   that

justice   must   not   only   be   done   it   must   also

appear to be done as well.

(b)  Recording   of   reasons   also   operates   as   a

valid   restraint   on   any   possible   arbitrary

exercise of judicial and quasi­judicial or even

administrative power.

(c)  Reasons reassure that discretion has been

exercised   by   the   decision­maker   on   relevant

grounds   and   by   disregarding   extraneous

considerations.

(d)   Reasons   have   virtually   become   as

indispensable   a   component   of   a   decisionmaking   process   as   observing   principles   of

natural  justice  by  judicial,  quasi­judicial and

even by administrative bodies.

(e)  The ongoing judicial trend in all countries

committed   to   rule   of   law   and   constitutional

governance is in favour of reasoned decisions

based on  relevant  facts.  This  is  virtually  the

lifeblood of judicial decision­making justifying

the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(f)  Judicial   or   even   quasi­judicial   opinions

these days can be as different as the judges and

authorities   who   deliver   them.   All   these

decisions serve one common purpose which is

to   demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant

factors have been objectively considered. This is

important for sustaining the litigants' faith in

the justice delivery system.

(g)  Insistence on reason is a requirement for

both judicial accountability and transparency.

24

(h)  If a judge or a quasi­judicial authority is not

candid enough about his/her decision­making

process then it is impossible to know whether

the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of

precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(i)  Reasons  in  support  of  decisions must  be

cogent,   clear   and   succinct.   A   pretence   of

reasons or “rubber­stamp reasons” is not to be

equated with a valid decision­making process.

(j)  It cannot be doubted that transparency is

the   sine   qua   non   of   restraint   on   abuse   of

judicial   powers.   Transparency   in   decisionmaking   not   only   makes   the   judges   and

decision­makers less prone to errors but also

makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See

David   Shapiro   in Defence   of   Judicial

Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731­

37)

(k)  In all common law jurisdictions judgments

play a vital role in setting up precedents for the

future.   Therefore,   for   development   of   law,

requirement of giving reasons for the decision is

of the essence and is virtually a part of “due

process”.

Though   the   aforesaid   judgment   was   rendered   in   the

context of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order

by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,

reliance could be placed on the said judgment on the need to

give reasons while deciding a matter.

16. The Latin maxim “cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex”

meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason

25

of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself”, is also

apposite. 

17. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned

order above.  At  the  outset,  we  observe  that  the  extracted

portions are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning”

of   the   High   court   while   granting   bail.   As   noted   from   the

aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a Court to give

elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the

case is at the initial stage and the allegations of the offences

by the accused would not have been crystalised as such.

There   cannot   be   elaborate   details   recorded   to   give   an

impression   that   the   case   is   one   that   would   result   in   a

conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an

order on an application for grant of bail. However, the Court

deciding   a   bail   application   cannot   completely   divorce   its

decision   from   material   aspects   of   the   case   such   as   the

allegations   made   against   the   accused;   severity   of   the

punishment if the allegations are proved beyond reasonable

doubt   and   would   result   in   a   conviction;   reasonable

apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being   influenced   by   the

accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of

the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and a

26

prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge

against the accused. 

18.  Ultimately, the Court considering an application for bail

has   to   exercise   discretion   in   a   judicious   manner   and   in

accordance with the settled principles of law having regard to

the crime alleged to be committed by the accused on the one

hand and ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other. 

19. Thus,  while  elaborate reasons may not be assigned for

grant of bail or an extensive discussion of the merits of the

case may not be undertaken by the court considering a bail

application,   an   order  de   hors  reasoning   or   bereft   of   the

relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In such a case

the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the

order before a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh

vs.  State  (Delhi  Admn.)  ­  1978  CriLJ  129,  when bail has

been   granted   to   an   accused,   the   State   may,   if   new

circumstances have arisen following the grant of such bail,

approach the High Court seeking cancellation of bail under

section 439 (2) of the CrPC. However, if no new circumstances

have cropped up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer

an appeal against the order granting bail, on the ground that

27

the  same   is  perverse  or illegal  or  has  been  arrived  at  by

ignoring material aspects which establish a prima­facie case

against the accused. 

20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider

the   facts   of   the   present   case.   The   allegations   against

respondent­accused as well as the contentions raised at the

Bar have been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of

the same, the following aspects of the case would emerge: 

a) The allegation against the respondent­accused is under

section 302 of the IPC with regard to the murder of the

deceased  Ram   Swaroop   Khokhar,   the   father   of   the

informant­appellant who was a disabled person. Thus, the

offence   alleged   against   the   respondent­accused   is   of   a

grave nature. 

b) The accusation against the accused is that he overpowered

the deceased who was suffering from impairment of both

his   legs,   pinned   him   to   the   ground,   sat   on   him   and

throttled his neck. As per the postmortem report, the cause

of death was ante­mortem strangulation.

c)   It is also the case of the appellant that the respondentaccused   is   a   person   exercising   significant   political

influence in the Bhopawaspachar village and that owing to

28

the same, the informant found it difficult to get an FIR

registered against him. That the accused was arrested only

following a protest outside a police station demanding his

arrest.  Thus, the possibility of the accused threatening or

otherwise influencing the witnesses, if on bail, cannot be

ruled out. 

d) That   the   respondent­accused   had   earlier   preferred

applications seeking bail, under section 437 of the CrPC

before the Court of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate,

Jaipur, on two occasions. The same came to be rejected by

orders dated 23rd January, 2020 and 6th March, 2020. The

accused had also preferred a bail application under section

439   of   the   CrPC   which   was   rejected   by   the   Additional

Sessions   Judge,   Jaipur   Metropolis   by   order   dated   12th

March, 2020 having regard to the gravity of the offences

alleged against the accused.

e) The High Court in the impugned order dated 7th May, 2020

has not considered the aforestated aspects of the case in

the context of the grant of bail.

21. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present case

in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that

this case is a fit case for grant of bail to the respondent29

accused, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations

against him. Strangely, the State of Rajasthan has not filed

any appeal against the impugned order. 

22. The High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid material

aspects of the case and has, by a very cryptic and casual

order,  de   hors  coherent   reasoning,   granted   bail   to   the

accused.   We   find   that   the   High   Court   was   not   right   in

allowing   the   application   for   bail   filed   by   the   respondentaccused. Hence the impugned order dated 7th  May, 2020 is

set aside. The appeal is allowed. 

23. The respondent accused is on bail. His bail bond stands

cancelled   and   he   is   directed   to   surrender   before   the

concerned jail authorities within a period of two weeks from

today. 

……………………………J 

M.R. SHAH 

……………………….…..J

B.V. NAGARATHNA

NEW DELHI;

11th JANUARY, 2022. 

30

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले