JAIBUNISHA vs MEHARBAN

JAIBUNISHA vs MEHARBAN - Supreme Court Case 2022

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.76  OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 6329 OF 2020)
JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S) 
VERSUS
MEHARBAN & ANR.                        ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.77  OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 1337 OF 2021)
JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S) 
VERSUS
JUMMA & ORS.                        ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA J. 
These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the   informant   ­
appellant assailing the orders dated 7th October, 2020 and 17th
November,   2020   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Allahabad   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Bail   Application   Nos.
29759 of 2020 and 39886 of 2021 respectively whereby bail has
been granted to six persons accused in Sardhana P.S. Crime
Case No.955 of 2018. 
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2. It is the case of the appellant that she is the mother of the
deceased Yameen. She is stated to be an eyewitness to the attack
on   her   sons,   namely   Yameen   and   Mobin   and   her   husband,
Jamshed. The appellant herein is the person who lodged the
First Information Report being FIR No. 955/2018 for offences
under sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the ‘IPC’). In all
eleven accused were named in the FIR, being respondent no.1 in
Criminal Appeal No.76/2022, namely Meherban; respondent no.
1   to   5   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.77/2022,   namely   Jumma,
Hakmeen,   Yaseen,   Arshad   and   Firoz,   and   five   more   persons
namely, Bhoora, Shahid, Sullad, Yamin and Dev. 
3. That FIR No. 955/2018 dated 27th August, 2018 is stated
to have been filed by the appellant herein at around 21:05 hrs in
the night stating that at around 18:00 hrs of the same day the
accused,   armed   with   swords   and   knives   entered   appellant’s
house with a common intention to attack and kill Yameen and
Mobin, sons of the appellant and Jamshed, appellant’s husband.
That on entering the house, they started hurling abuses and
attacked the sons and husband of the appellant, attempting to
kill them. The neighbours of the appellant came to their rescue.
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However, as a result of such assault, Yameen died and Mobin
and   Jamshed   sustained   serious   injuries.   The   informantappellant   has   further   stated   that   there   was   a   pre­existing
dispute   between   the   deceased   and   Bhoora,   one   among   the
accused, which was settled by the residents of their locality.
However,   the   accused,   in   continuation   of   the   said   dispute
attacked the sons and the husband of the appellant and killed
one of her sons, namely, Yameen. 
4. Appellant’s son, Mobin was medically examined on the date
of the incident and the medical report records that that incised
wounds were found on his hand, which could be caused by a
sharp edged object. The injury report of Jamshed described three
injuries,   i.e.   an   incised   wound   on   the   scalp,   abrasion   and
contusion on the back and arm. 
5. After   conducting   an   investigation,   the   Police   filed   a
charge­sheet only against three accused, namely, Sullad, Bhoora
alias Shadab and Yamin. They were subsequently arrested by
the Police. The accused­respondents in the instant appeals are
the   eight   other   accused   named   in   the   FIR   but   were   not
charge­sheeted. 
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6. The appellant filed an application under section 319 of the
Code   of  Criminal  Procedure,   1973  (hereinafter  referred   to   as
“CrPC”   for   the   sake   of   brevity)   for   summoning   the   accusedrespondents herein who were not charge sheeted by the Police.
The   accused­respondents   were   summoned   by   the   Additional
Sessions Judge by order dated 21st September, 2019. 
7. On the date of commencement of trial before the Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, the accused Sullad, Bhoora
alias Shadab and Yamin were presented before the Court by the
Police.   However,   the   accused­respondents   summoned   under
section 319 of the CrPC, failed to appear before the trial court.
Therefore, the Additional District and Sessions Judge by order
dated 15th October, 2019 issued Non­Bailable Warrants against
the respondents herein. 
8. On the next date fixed for trial, the accused­respondents
against whom Non­Bailable Warrants were issued, again failed to
appear before the court and it was reported by the Police that the
said accused were absconding and were not found even at their
residences. The Additional District and Sessions Judge by order
dated 4th November, 2019 issued a proclamation under section
82 of the CrPC against the accused­respondents. 
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9. In the meantime, the accused­respondents summoned by
the Sessions Court preferred an application under section 482 of
the CrPC before the High Court, praying for an order to quash
the order dated 21st September, 2019 whereby the respondents
had been summoned to appear before the Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Meerut. By order dated 11th  November, 2019,
the High Court dismissed the said application and granted 30
days’ time to the accused to surrender before the Trial Court.
The accused­respondents assailed the said order by preferring a
Special Leave Petition, being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before
this   Court,   which   came   to   be   dismissed   by   order   dated   6th
December 2019. 
10. On 8th January, 2020, the next date on which the sessions
trial was presented, the accused­respondents once again failed
to   appear   notwithstanding   the   direction   by   this   Court   to
surrender.   Hence   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Meerut,   by
order   dated   8th  January,   2020,   directed   that   proceedings   for
attachment of property of the accused­respondents be initiated
under section 83 of the CrPC. 
11. The accused­respondents were arrested by the Police on 5th
February, 2020 and remained in judicial custody till they were
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enlarged on bail by the impugned orders of the High Court dated
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th October, 2020 and 17th November 2020. 
12. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application
before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut. The
same   came   to   be   rejected   by   order   dated   8th  July,   2020.
Similarly, the bail applications preferred by accused­respondents
Jumma, Hakmeen, Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz were also rejected
by a separate order dated 8th  July, 2020, having regard to the
seriousness of the offences alleged against the respondents. 
13. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application
before   the   High   Court   and   the   same   was   allowed   by   the
impugned order dated 7th October 2020 with a direction that the
accused be released on bail. Subsequently, the bail application
preferred   by   the   accused­respondents   Jumma,   Hakmeen,
Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz was also allowed by the High Court by
impugned order dated 17th  November 2020 by relying on the
order granting bail to co­accused Meherban. Being aggrieved, the
appellant has preferred these appeals before this Court. 
14. We have heard Sri. Ronak Karanpuria, learned counsel for
the   appellant,   Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for
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accused­   respondents   and   Sri.   R.K.   Raizada,   learned   Senior
Counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh and perused
the material on record. 
15. The Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
impugned orders of the High Court have been passed without
exercising jurisdiction in a judicious manner. In support of this
contention, it was submitted that the accused­respondents had
failed to appear before the Trial Court notwithstanding multiple
directions issued by the Trial Court, High Court and even this
Court to that effect. That they were under judicial custody for a
period less than nine months and had earlier absconded but
have now been granted bail by the High Court contrary to the
settled principles of law and the judgments of this Court. That by
directing that the accused be released on bail, the High Court
has invited the risk of them absconding again and that this
would prove to be prejudicial to the investigation and trial. 
It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the
possibility of the accused ­respondents tampering with evidence
and/or influencing witnesses while on bail, cannot be ruled out. 
16. Further it was urged that the High Court has not assigned
reasons for the grant of bail in the instant cases. That the High
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Court could not have granted bail to the accused having scant
regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences   alleged   against   them.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the High
Court in a very cryptic order de hors any reasoning has granted
bail to the accused­respondents. It was submitted on behalf of
the mother of the deceased, that the instant appeals may be
allowed by setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court.
In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant
has relied upon certain judgments of this Court which shall be
referred to later. 
17. Per   contra,  Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for
accused­   respondents   supported   the  impugned   orders   and
submitted   that   the   same  do   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity
warranting   interference   by   this   Court.   That   the   informantappellant has narrated an untrue version of events in order to
falsely   implicate   the   accused.   The   learned   counsel   for   the
respondents has stated that there was a scuffle between the
sons   and   the   husband   of   the   appellant,   and   the   accusedrespondents on the day of the alleged incident. That four of the
accused   have   also   been   seriously   injured   as   a   result   of   the
attack by appellant’s husband and sons. That an FIR in this
regard  had been  lodged  against the  appellant,  her sons and
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husband, in connection with which case the said persons have
been granted bail by the competent court. That no prima facie
case   has   been   made   out   against   the   accused   and   this   is
evidenced by the fact that they were not charge­sheeted. 
It   has   further   been   submitted   that   the   accusedrespondents have no criminal  antecedents and therefore, the
High   Court   acted   in   accordance   with   law   in   enlarging   the
accused­respondents on bail. 
It has also been contended that a court deciding a bail
application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits of the
case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial stage is bound
to prejudice fair trial. 
It   was   submitted   that   the   allegations   against   the
respondent­accused are false and hence the impugned orders of
the High Court do not call for any interference in these appeals. 
18. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Ronak Karanpuria,
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   the   impugned   orders
granting   bail   to   the   accused   respondents   are   bereft   of   any
reasoning and they are cryptic and bail has been granted in a
casual   manner,   we   extract   those   portions   of   the   impugned
orders dated 7th October, 2020 and 17th November, 2020 passed
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by the High Court which provide the “reasoning” of the Court for
granting bail, as under: 
    Impugned Order dated   7
th
   October, 2020
“Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the
merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the
nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of
punishment  in   case  of  conviction  and  the
nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable
apprehension of tampering of the witnesses
and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in
support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is
entitled to be released on bail in this case. 
Let the applicant Meharban involved in Case
Crime No. 955 of 2018 under sections 147,
148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506, 34 I.P.C.,
police station Sardhana, District Meerut be
released on bail on his furnishing a personal
bond of Rs. One lac with two sureties (out of
which one should be of his family member)
each in the like amount to the satisfaction of
the   court   concerned   with   the   following
conditions.
(i) The applicant shall file an undertaking
to the effect that he shall not seek any
adjournment   on   the   dates   fixed   for
evidence   when   the   witnesses   are
present in court. In case of default of
this condition, it shall be open for the
trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty
of bail and pass orders in accordance
with law.
(ii) The   applicant   shall   remain   present
before   the   trial   court   on   each   date
fixed, either personally or through his
counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence,
without sufficient cause, the trial court
may   proceed   against   him   under
Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code.
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(iii) In   case,   the   applicant   misuses   the
liberty of bail during trial and in order
to   secure   his   presence   proclamation
under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and
the applicant fails to appear before the
court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such
proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court
shall initiate proceedings against him,
in accordance with law, under Section
174­A of the Indian Penal Code.
(iv) The applicant shall remain present, in
person,   before  the  trial   court on  the
dates fixed for (i) opening of the case,
(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording
of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court
absence of the applicant is deliberate
or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it
shall be open for the trial court to treat
such default as abuse of liberty of bail
and proceed against him in accordance
with law.
It is further directed that the identity, status
and   residence   proof   of   the   sureties   be
verified by the authorities concerned before
they are accepted. In case of breach of any of
the above conditions, the trial court will be
liberty to cancel the bail.”
    Impugned Order dated 17th
   November, 2020
“Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the
merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the
nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of
punishment  in   case  of  conviction  and  the
nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable
apprehension of tampering of the witnesses
and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in
support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is
entitled to be released on bail in this case.
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Let   the   applicants­   Jumma,   Hakmeen,
Yaseen,   Arshad,   and   Firoz   involved   in
aforesaid case crime be released on bail on
his   furnishing   a   personal   bond   and   two
sureties   each   in   the   like   amount   to   the
satisfaction of the court concerned with the
following   conditions   which   are   being
imposed in the interest of justice:­
(i) The   applicants   shall   file   an
undertaking   to   the   effect   that   they
shall not seek any adjournment on the
dates   fixed   for   evidence   when   the
witnesses are present in court. In case
of default of this condition, it shall be
open for the trial court to treat it as
abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders
in accordance with law.
(ii) The   applicants   shall   remain   present
before   the   trial   court   on   each   date
fixed, either personally or through his
counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence,
without sufficient cause, the trial court
may   proceed   against   him   under
Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code.
(iii) In   case,   the   applicants   misuses   the
liberty of bail during trial and in order
to   secure   his   presence   proclamation
under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and
the   applicants   fails   to   appear   before
the   court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such
proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court
shall initiate proceedings against him,
in accordance with law, under Section
174­A of the Indian Penal Code.
(iv) The applicants shall remain present, in
person,   before  the  trial   court on  the
dates fixed for (i) opening of the case,
(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording
of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court
absence of the applicant is deliberate
or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it
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shall be open for the trial court to treat
such default as abuse of liberty of bail
and proceed against him in accordance
with law.
(v) The party shall file computer generated
copy  of  such   order  downloaded  from
the   official   website   of   High   Court   of
Allahabad.
(vi) The computer generated copy of such
order   shall   be   self   attested   by   the
counsel of the party concerned.
(vii) The concerned/Authority/Official shall
verify   the   authenticity   of   such
computerized   copy  of   the   order  from
the   official   website   of   High   Court   of
Allahabad   and   shall   make   a
declaration   of   such   verification   in
writing.
In   view   of   the   extraordinary   situation
prevailing in the State due to Covid­19, the
directions   of   this   Court   dated   6.4.2020
passed in Public Interest Litigation No. 564
of 2020 (In re vs. State of U.P.), shall also be
complied.
The order read thus:
Looking   to   impediments   in   arranging
sureties because of lockdown, while invoking
powers   under   Article   226   and   227   of   the
Constitution of India, we deem it appropriate
to   order   that   all   the   accused­applicants
whose bail application came to be allowed on
or after 15th March, 2020 but have not been
released due to non­availability of sureties as
a consequence to lockdown may be released
on executing personal bond as ordered by
the Court or to the satisfaction of the jail
authorities   where   such   accused   is
imprisoned, provided the accused­applicants
undertakes   to   furnish   required   sureties
within a period of one month from the date
of his/her actual release.”
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19. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the
judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to an
accused as under:
a) In  Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   &   Ors.   vs.   Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh ­­  (1978)  1
SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of
liberty   of   a   person   under   trial,   has   laid   down   the   key
factors   that   have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail,
which are extracted as under:
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may
be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8.   Another   relevant   factor   is   as   to   whether   the
course  of   justice   would   be  thwarted  by   him who
seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be
freed for the time being.
9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the
Court   considering   the   likelihood   of   the   applicant
interfering   with   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not
only   traditional   but   rational,   in   this   context,   to
enquire   into   the   antecedents   of   a   man   who   is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record
– particularly a record which suggests that he is
likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In
regard   to   habituals,   it   is   part   of   criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee  to  exploit   the  opportunity  to  inflict   further
about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore
not an exercise in irrelevance.”
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b) In Prahlad   Singh   Bhati   vs.   NCT   of   Delhi   &   ORS  –
(2001)   4   SCC   280  this   Court   highlighted   the   aspects
which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an
application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as
follows: 
“The   jurisdiction   to   grant   bail   has   to   be
exercised on the basis of well settled principles
having regard to the circumstances of each case
and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting
the   bail,   the   court   has   to   keep   in   mind   the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which   conviction   will   entail,   the   character,
behavior, means and standing of the accused,
circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the
presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
with, the larger interests of the public or State
and similar other considerations. It has also to
be   kept   in   mind   that   for   the   purposes   of
granting the bail the Legislature has used the
words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead
of "the evidence" which means the court dealing
with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to
whether   there   is   a   genuine   case   against   the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce prima facie evidence in support of the
charge.”
c) This Court  in  Ram   Govind   Upadhyay   vs.   Sudarshan
Singh – (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee, J.,
emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of
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bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. This Court
highlighted   that   bail   cannot   be   granted   as   a   matter   of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning. 
d)  In  Kalyan   Chandra   Sarkar   vs.   Rajesh   Ranjan   alias
Pappu Yadav & Anr. – (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court held
that although it is established that a court considering a
bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination
of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of
the case, the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail. 
e) In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chaterjee ­­ (2010)
14 SCC 496 this Court observed that where a High Court
has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer
from   the   vice   of   non­application   of   mind,   rendering   it
illegal.   This   Court   has   enumerated   the   circumstances
under which an order granting bail may be set aside. 
f) Another factor which should guide the courts’ decision in
deciding   a   bail   application   is   the   period   of   custody.
However, as noted in Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh
@ Lalla Bahu & Anr. – (2012) 9 SCC 446, the period of
17
custody has to be weighed simultaneously with the totality
of the circumstances and the criminal antecedents of the
accused, if any. Further, the circumstances which may
justify the grant of bail are to be considered in the larger
context of the societal concern involved in releasing an
accused,   in   juxtaposition   to   individual   liberty   of   the
accused seeking bail. 
g) In Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr. – (2016) 15 SCC
422, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court
on   the   considerations   to   be   placed   at   balance   while
deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J.
(as His Lordship then was) in paragraph18 as under: 
18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat
with profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation
of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of
supervening circumstances. The annulment of the
order passed by the High Court is sought as many
relevant   factors   have   not   been   taken   into
consideration   which   includes   the   criminal
antecedents   of   the   accused   and   that   makes   the
order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result
is the lancination of the impugned order.”
h) In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) – (2018) 12
SCC 129, this Court, while considering an appeal from an
order of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the
significant   considerations   of   which   a   court   must   be
18
mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so, this
Court has stated that while it is not possible to prescribe
an exhaustive list of considerations which are to guide a
court in deciding a bail application, the primary requisite of
an   order   granting   bail,   is   that   it   should   result   from
judicious exercise of the court’s discretion. 
i) Recently in Bhoopendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan &
Anr.  –   2021   SCC   Online   SC   1020,  this   Court   made
observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power
to   determine   whether   bail   has   been   granted   for   valid
reasons   as   distinguished   from   an   application   for
cancellation of bail. i.e. this Court  distinguished between
setting   aside   a   perverse   order   granting   bail   vis­a­vis
cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has
misconducted   himself   or   because   of   some   new   facts
requiring such cancellation. Quoting Mahipal vs. Rajesh
Kumar ­ (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court observed as under:
“16. The considerations that guide the power of
an appellate court in assessing the correctness of
an   order   granting   bail   stand   on   a   different
footing from an assessment of an application for
the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an
order   granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of
whether   there   was   an   improper   or   arbitrary
exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The
test   is   whether   the   order   granting   bail   is
perverse,   illegal   or   unjustified.   On   the   other
hand, an application for cancellation of bail is
generally examined on the anvil of the existence
19
of supervening circumstances or violations of the
conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has
been granted.” 
j) The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is  Brijmani  Devi  v.  Pappu  Kumar  and  Anr.  –
Criminal Appeal No. 1663/2021, wherein a three Judge
Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned
and casual order of the High Court granting bail to the
accused, observed as follows: 
“While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of
an individual is an invaluable right, at the same
time   while   considering   an   application   for   bail
Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of
the accusations against an accused and the facts
that   have   a   bearing   in   the   case,   particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous
or   vexatious   in   nature   but   are   supported   by
adequate material brought on record so as to
enable   a   Court   to   arrive   at   a  prima   facie
conclusion. While considering an application for
grant of bail a  prima facie  conclusion must be
supported by reasons and must  be arrived at
after having regard to the vital facts of the case
brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any,
and the nature of punishment that would follow
a   conviction   vis­à­vis   the   offence/s   alleged
against an accused.”
20.  On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision
arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi­judicial
20
authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court
in  Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited  &   Anr.   Vs.   Masood
Ahmed   Khan   &   Ors.  –   (2010)   9   SCC   496,  wherein   after
referring to a number of judgments this Court summarised at
paragraph 47 the law on the point. The relevant principles for
the purpose of this case are extracted as under: 
(a) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be
done it must also appear to be done as well.
(b) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any   possible   arbitrary   exercise   of   judicial   and   quasijudicial or even administrative power.
(c) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by
the   decision­maker   on   relevant   grounds   and   by
disregarding extraneous considerations.
(d) Reasons   have   virtually   become   as   indispensable   a
component   of   a   decision­making   process   as   observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi­judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to
rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned   decisions   based   on   relevant   facts.   This   is
virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision­making justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(f) Judicial or even quasi­judicial opinions these days can be
as   different   as   the   judges   and   authorities   who   deliver
them.   All   these   decisions   serve   one   common   purpose
which   is   to   demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is important
for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery
system.
21
(g) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(h) If   a   judge   or   a   quasi­judicial   authority   is   not   candid
enough about his/her decision­making process then it is
impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful
to   the   doctrine   of   precedent   or   to   principles   of
incrementalism.
(i) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber­stamp reasons”
is not to be equated with a valid decision­making process.
(j) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua
non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency
in   decision­making   not   only   makes   the   judges   and
decision­makers less prone to errors but also makes them
subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence
of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731­
37)
(k)  In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role
in   setting   up   precedents   for   the   future.   Therefore,   for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due
process”.
Though the aforesaid judgment was rendered in the context
of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order by the
National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission,   reliance
could be placed on the said judgment on the need to give reasons
while deciding a matter.
21. The Latin maxim “cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex”
meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of
22
any   particular   law   ceases,   so   does   the   law   itself”,   is   also
apposite.
22. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned
orders above. At the outset, we find that the extracted portions
are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the High
court while granting bail. As evident from the judgments of this
Court   referred   to   above,   a   court   deciding   a   bail   application
cannot   grant   bail   to   an   accused   without   having   regard   to
material   aspects   of   the   case   such   as   the   allegations   made
against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations
are   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   would   result   in   a
conviction;   reasonable   apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being
influenced   by   the   accused;   tampering   of   the   evidence;   the
frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of
the   accused;   and   a   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   in
support of the charge against the accused. 
While we are conscious of the fact that it is not necessary
for   a   Court   to   give   elaborate   reasons   while   granting   bail
particularly   when   the   case   is   at   the   initial   stage   and   the
allegations of the offences by the accused may not have been
crystalised as such, an order de hors any reasoning whatsoever
cannot result in grant of bail. If bail is granted in a casual
23
manner, the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail
the order before a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh
vs. State (Delhi Admn.) ­ 1978 CriLJ 129, when bail has been
granted to an accused, the State may, if new circumstances have
arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court
seeking cancellation of bail under section 439 (2) of the CrPC.
However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since the
grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order
granting bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal
or   has   been   arrived   at   by   ignoring   material   aspects   which
establish a prima­facie case against the accused. 
23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider
the facts of the present cases. The allegations against accusedrespondents as well as the contentions raised at the Bar have
been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of the same,
the following aspects of the case would emerge: 
a) The allegations against the accused­respondents are under
147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with section 34 of the
IPC,  with   regard  to  murder  of   the  deceased,   Yameen  and
attempt to murder Mobin and Jamshed. Thus the offences
alleged against the accused are of grave and heinous nature
24
inasmuch as there was death of appellant’s son and serious
injuries caused to her husband and another son.
b) That allegedly the accused­respondents attacked with deadly
weapons such as swords and knives. 
c) That there was allegedly a pre­existing enmity between the
deceased and Bhoora, one of the accused, which apparently
had been settled by the local residents. 
d) The accused­respondents were summoned by the Trial Court
by order dated 21st September, 2019. The accused preferred
an application under section 482 CrPC praying for an order
quashing the order dated 21st September, 2019. By an order
dated 11th November, 2019, the High Court dismissed the said
application   and   granted   30   days’   time   to   the   accused   to
surrender before the Trial Court. The accused­respondents
assailed the said order by preferring a Special Leave Petition,
being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before this Court, which
came to be dismissed by order dated 6th December 2019. 
e)   The   accused­respondents   resisted   arrest   for   a   period   of
approximately   three   and   a   half   months   as   they   were
absconding. The accused failed to surrender before the Trial
Court in gross violation of the directions of the Additional
District and Sessions Judge, the High Court and even this
25
Court. This  is a glaring  instance of gross violation  of  the
courts’ orders and rule of law. 
f) The accused­respondents had preferred applications before the
Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge   which   came   to   be
rejected by separate orders dated 8th July, 2020. 
g)   The   chances   of   the   accused   absconding   are   grave   having
regard to their previous conduct, if they are on bail. This
would delay commencement and conclusion of the trial and
consequently have an adverse impact on the cause of justice. 
h) The propensity of accused­respondents tampering with the
evidence and influencing the witnesses is an important factor
to be borne in mind in such cases. As a result, the accused
being beneficiaries of the same cannot be ruled out.  
i) The High Court in the impugned orders has failed to consider
the aforestated aspects of the case in the context of the grant
of bail and has granted bail to the accused by cryptic orders.  
24. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present cases
in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that these
cases are fit cases for grant of bail to the accused­respondents,
having regard to the seriousness of the allegations against them
as well as the aforesaid reasons. 
26
25. The High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid material
aspects   of   the   cases   and   has,   by  a  very   cryptic   and   casual
orders,   de   hors   any   coherent   reasoning,   granted   bail   to   the
accused­respondents. We find that the High Court was not right
in   allowing   the   applications   for   bail   filed   by   the   accusedrespondents. Hence the impugned orders dated 7th  May, 2020
and 17th November, 2020 are set aside. The appeals are allowed. 
26. The   accused­respondents   are   on   bail.   Their   bail   bonds
stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the
concerned jail authorities within a period of two weeks from
today. 
……………………………J. 
(M.R. SHAH) 
……………………….…..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
NEW DELHI; 
18TH JANUARY, 2022. 

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

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