JAIBUNISHA vs MEHARBAN

JAIBUNISHA vs MEHARBAN - Supreme Court Case 2022

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.76  OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 6329 OF 2020)

JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S) 

VERSUS

MEHARBAN & ANR.                        ….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.77  OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 1337 OF 2021)

JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S) 

VERSUS

JUMMA & ORS.                        ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA J. 

These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the   informant   ­

appellant assailing the orders dated 7th October, 2020 and 17th

November,   2020   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at

Allahabad   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Bail   Application   Nos.

29759 of 2020 and 39886 of 2021 respectively whereby bail has

been granted to six persons accused in Sardhana P.S. Crime

Case No.955 of 2018. 

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2. It is the case of the appellant that she is the mother of the

deceased Yameen. She is stated to be an eyewitness to the attack

on   her   sons,   namely   Yameen   and   Mobin   and   her   husband,

Jamshed. The appellant herein is the person who lodged the

First Information Report being FIR No. 955/2018 for offences

under sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with

section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the ‘IPC’). In all

eleven accused were named in the FIR, being respondent no.1 in

Criminal Appeal No.76/2022, namely Meherban; respondent no.

1   to   5   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.77/2022,   namely   Jumma,

Hakmeen,   Yaseen,   Arshad   and   Firoz,   and   five   more   persons

namely, Bhoora, Shahid, Sullad, Yamin and Dev. 

3. That FIR No. 955/2018 dated 27th August, 2018 is stated

to have been filed by the appellant herein at around 21:05 hrs in

the night stating that at around 18:00 hrs of the same day the

accused,   armed   with   swords   and   knives   entered   appellant’s

house with a common intention to attack and kill Yameen and

Mobin, sons of the appellant and Jamshed, appellant’s husband.

That on entering the house, they started hurling abuses and

attacked the sons and husband of the appellant, attempting to

kill them. The neighbours of the appellant came to their rescue.

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However, as a result of such assault, Yameen died and Mobin

and   Jamshed   sustained   serious   injuries.   The   informantappellant   has   further   stated   that   there   was   a   pre­existing

dispute   between   the   deceased   and   Bhoora,   one   among   the

accused, which was settled by the residents of their locality.

However,   the   accused,   in   continuation   of   the   said   dispute

attacked the sons and the husband of the appellant and killed

one of her sons, namely, Yameen. 

4. Appellant’s son, Mobin was medically examined on the date

of the incident and the medical report records that that incised

wounds were found on his hand, which could be caused by a

sharp edged object. The injury report of Jamshed described three

injuries,   i.e.   an   incised   wound   on   the   scalp,   abrasion   and

contusion on the back and arm. 

5. After   conducting   an   investigation,   the   Police   filed   a

charge­sheet only against three accused, namely, Sullad, Bhoora

alias Shadab and Yamin. They were subsequently arrested by

the Police. The accused­respondents in the instant appeals are

the   eight   other   accused   named   in   the   FIR   but   were   not

charge­sheeted. 

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6. The appellant filed an application under section 319 of the

Code   of  Criminal  Procedure,   1973  (hereinafter  referred   to   as

“CrPC”   for   the   sake   of   brevity)   for   summoning   the   accusedrespondents herein who were not charge sheeted by the Police.

The   accused­respondents   were   summoned   by   the   Additional

Sessions Judge by order dated 21st September, 2019. 

7. On the date of commencement of trial before the Additional

District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, the accused Sullad, Bhoora

alias Shadab and Yamin were presented before the Court by the

Police.   However,   the   accused­respondents   summoned   under

section 319 of the CrPC, failed to appear before the trial court.

Therefore, the Additional District and Sessions Judge by order

dated 15th October, 2019 issued Non­Bailable Warrants against

the respondents herein. 

8. On the next date fixed for trial, the accused­respondents

against whom Non­Bailable Warrants were issued, again failed to

appear before the court and it was reported by the Police that the

said accused were absconding and were not found even at their

residences. The Additional District and Sessions Judge by order

dated 4th November, 2019 issued a proclamation under section

82 of the CrPC against the accused­respondents. 

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9. In the meantime, the accused­respondents summoned by

the Sessions Court preferred an application under section 482 of

the CrPC before the High Court, praying for an order to quash

the order dated 21st September, 2019 whereby the respondents

had been summoned to appear before the Additional District and

Sessions Judge, Meerut. By order dated 11th  November, 2019,

the High Court dismissed the said application and granted 30

days’ time to the accused to surrender before the Trial Court.

The accused­respondents assailed the said order by preferring a

Special Leave Petition, being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before

this   Court,   which   came   to   be   dismissed   by   order   dated   6th

December 2019. 

10. On 8th January, 2020, the next date on which the sessions

trial was presented, the accused­respondents once again failed

to   appear   notwithstanding   the   direction   by   this   Court   to

surrender.   Hence   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Meerut,   by

order   dated   8th  January,   2020,   directed   that   proceedings   for

attachment of property of the accused­respondents be initiated

under section 83 of the CrPC. 

11. The accused­respondents were arrested by the Police on 5th

February, 2020 and remained in judicial custody till they were

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enlarged on bail by the impugned orders of the High Court dated

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th October, 2020 and 17th November 2020. 

12. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application

before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut. The

same   came   to   be   rejected   by   order   dated   8th  July,   2020.

Similarly, the bail applications preferred by accused­respondents

Jumma, Hakmeen, Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz were also rejected

by a separate order dated 8th  July, 2020, having regard to the

seriousness of the offences alleged against the respondents. 

13. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application

before   the   High   Court   and   the   same   was   allowed   by   the

impugned order dated 7th October 2020 with a direction that the

accused be released on bail. Subsequently, the bail application

preferred   by   the   accused­respondents   Jumma,   Hakmeen,

Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz was also allowed by the High Court by

impugned order dated 17th  November 2020 by relying on the

order granting bail to co­accused Meherban. Being aggrieved, the

appellant has preferred these appeals before this Court. 

14. We have heard Sri. Ronak Karanpuria, learned counsel for

the   appellant,   Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for

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accused­   respondents   and   Sri.   R.K.   Raizada,   learned   Senior

Counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh and perused

the material on record. 

15. The Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the

impugned orders of the High Court have been passed without

exercising jurisdiction in a judicious manner. In support of this

contention, it was submitted that the accused­respondents had

failed to appear before the Trial Court notwithstanding multiple

directions issued by the Trial Court, High Court and even this

Court to that effect. That they were under judicial custody for a

period less than nine months and had earlier absconded but

have now been granted bail by the High Court contrary to the

settled principles of law and the judgments of this Court. That by

directing that the accused be released on bail, the High Court

has invited the risk of them absconding again and that this

would prove to be prejudicial to the investigation and trial. 

It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the

possibility of the accused ­respondents tampering with evidence

and/or influencing witnesses while on bail, cannot be ruled out. 

16. Further it was urged that the High Court has not assigned

reasons for the grant of bail in the instant cases. That the High

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Court could not have granted bail to the accused having scant

regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences   alleged   against   them.

According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the High

Court in a very cryptic order de hors any reasoning has granted

bail to the accused­respondents. It was submitted on behalf of

the mother of the deceased, that the instant appeals may be

allowed by setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court.

In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant

has relied upon certain judgments of this Court which shall be

referred to later. 

17. Per   contra,  Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for

accused­   respondents   supported   the  impugned   orders   and

submitted   that   the   same  do   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity

warranting   interference   by   this   Court.   That   the   informantappellant has narrated an untrue version of events in order to

falsely   implicate   the   accused.   The   learned   counsel   for   the

respondents has stated that there was a scuffle between the

sons   and   the   husband   of   the   appellant,   and   the   accusedrespondents on the day of the alleged incident. That four of the

accused   have   also   been   seriously   injured   as   a   result   of   the

attack by appellant’s husband and sons. That an FIR in this

regard  had been  lodged  against the  appellant,  her sons and

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husband, in connection with which case the said persons have

been granted bail by the competent court. That no prima facie

case   has   been   made   out   against   the   accused   and   this   is

evidenced by the fact that they were not charge­sheeted. 

It   has   further   been   submitted   that   the   accusedrespondents have no criminal  antecedents and therefore, the

High   Court   acted   in   accordance   with   law   in   enlarging   the

accused­respondents on bail. 

It has also been contended that a court deciding a bail

application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits of the

case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial stage is bound

to prejudice fair trial. 

It   was   submitted   that   the   allegations   against   the

respondent­accused are false and hence the impugned orders of

the High Court do not call for any interference in these appeals. 

18. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Ronak Karanpuria,

learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   the   impugned   orders

granting   bail   to   the   accused   respondents   are   bereft   of   any

reasoning and they are cryptic and bail has been granted in a

casual   manner,   we   extract   those   portions   of   the   impugned

orders dated 7th October, 2020 and 17th November, 2020 passed

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by the High Court which provide the “reasoning” of the Court for

granting bail, as under: 

    Impugned Order dated   7

th

   October, 2020

“Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the

merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the

nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of

punishment  in   case  of  conviction  and  the

nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable

apprehension of tampering of the witnesses

and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in

support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is

entitled to be released on bail in this case. 

Let the applicant Meharban involved in Case

Crime No. 955 of 2018 under sections 147,

148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506, 34 I.P.C.,

police station Sardhana, District Meerut be

released on bail on his furnishing a personal

bond of Rs. One lac with two sureties (out of

which one should be of his family member)

each in the like amount to the satisfaction of

the   court   concerned   with   the   following

conditions.

(i) The applicant shall file an undertaking

to the effect that he shall not seek any

adjournment   on   the   dates   fixed   for

evidence   when   the   witnesses   are

present in court. In case of default of

this condition, it shall be open for the

trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty

of bail and pass orders in accordance

with law.

(ii) The   applicant   shall   remain   present

before   the   trial   court   on   each   date

fixed, either personally or through his

counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence,

without sufficient cause, the trial court

may   proceed   against   him   under

Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal

Code.

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(iii) In   case,   the   applicant   misuses   the

liberty of bail during trial and in order

to   secure   his   presence   proclamation

under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and

the applicant fails to appear before the

court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such

proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court

shall initiate proceedings against him,

in accordance with law, under Section

174­A of the Indian Penal Code.

(iv) The applicant shall remain present, in

person,   before  the  trial   court on  the

dates fixed for (i) opening of the case,

(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording

of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court

absence of the applicant is deliberate

or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it

shall be open for the trial court to treat

such default as abuse of liberty of bail

and proceed against him in accordance

with law.

It is further directed that the identity, status

and   residence   proof   of   the   sureties   be

verified by the authorities concerned before

they are accepted. In case of breach of any of

the above conditions, the trial court will be

liberty to cancel the bail.”

    Impugned Order dated 17th

   November, 2020

“Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the

merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the

nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of

punishment  in   case  of  conviction  and  the

nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable

apprehension of tampering of the witnesses

and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in

support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is

entitled to be released on bail in this case.

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Let   the   applicants­   Jumma,   Hakmeen,

Yaseen,   Arshad,   and   Firoz   involved   in

aforesaid case crime be released on bail on

his   furnishing   a   personal   bond   and   two

sureties   each   in   the   like   amount   to   the

satisfaction of the court concerned with the

following   conditions   which   are   being

imposed in the interest of justice:­

(i) The   applicants   shall   file   an

undertaking   to   the   effect   that   they

shall not seek any adjournment on the

dates   fixed   for   evidence   when   the

witnesses are present in court. In case

of default of this condition, it shall be

open for the trial court to treat it as

abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders

in accordance with law.

(ii) The   applicants   shall   remain   present

before   the   trial   court   on   each   date

fixed, either personally or through his

counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence,

without sufficient cause, the trial court

may   proceed   against   him   under

Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal

Code.

(iii) In   case,   the   applicants   misuses   the

liberty of bail during trial and in order

to   secure   his   presence   proclamation

under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and

the   applicants   fails   to   appear   before

the   court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such

proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court

shall initiate proceedings against him,

in accordance with law, under Section

174­A of the Indian Penal Code.

(iv) The applicants shall remain present, in

person,   before  the  trial   court on  the

dates fixed for (i) opening of the case,

(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording

of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court

absence of the applicant is deliberate

or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it

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shall be open for the trial court to treat

such default as abuse of liberty of bail

and proceed against him in accordance

with law.

(v) The party shall file computer generated

copy  of  such   order  downloaded  from

the   official   website   of   High   Court   of

Allahabad.

(vi) The computer generated copy of such

order   shall   be   self   attested   by   the

counsel of the party concerned.

(vii) The concerned/Authority/Official shall

verify   the   authenticity   of   such

computerized   copy  of   the   order  from

the   official   website   of   High   Court   of

Allahabad   and   shall   make   a

declaration   of   such   verification   in

writing.

In   view   of   the   extraordinary   situation

prevailing in the State due to Covid­19, the

directions   of   this   Court   dated   6.4.2020

passed in Public Interest Litigation No. 564

of 2020 (In re vs. State of U.P.), shall also be

complied.

The order read thus:

Looking   to   impediments   in   arranging

sureties because of lockdown, while invoking

powers   under   Article   226   and   227   of   the

Constitution of India, we deem it appropriate

to   order   that   all   the   accused­applicants

whose bail application came to be allowed on

or after 15th March, 2020 but have not been

released due to non­availability of sureties as

a consequence to lockdown may be released

on executing personal bond as ordered by

the Court or to the satisfaction of the jail

authorities   where   such   accused   is

imprisoned, provided the accused­applicants

undertakes   to   furnish   required   sureties

within a period of one month from the date

of his/her actual release.”

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19. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the

judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to an

accused as under:

a) In  Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   &   Ors.   vs.   Public

Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh ­­  (1978)  1

SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content

of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of

liberty   of   a   person   under   trial,   has   laid   down   the   key

factors   that   have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail,

which are extracted as under:

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is

the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is

pertinent. The punishment to which the party may

be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also

bears upon the issue.

8.   Another   relevant   factor   is   as   to   whether   the

course  of   justice   would   be  thwarted  by   him who

seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be

freed for the time being.

9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the

Court   considering   the   likelihood   of   the   applicant

interfering   with   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   or

otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not

only   traditional   but   rational,   in   this   context,   to

enquire   into   the   antecedents   of   a   man   who   is

applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record

– particularly a record which suggests that he is

likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In

regard   to   habituals,   it   is   part   of   criminological

history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the

bailee  to  exploit   the  opportunity  to  inflict   further

about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore

not an exercise in irrelevance.”

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b) In Prahlad   Singh   Bhati   vs.   NCT   of   Delhi   &   ORS  –

(2001)   4   SCC   280  this   Court   highlighted   the   aspects

which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an

application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as

follows: 

“The   jurisdiction   to   grant   bail   has   to   be

exercised on the basis of well settled principles

having regard to the circumstances of each case

and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting

the   bail,   the   court   has   to   keep   in   mind   the

nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in

support thereof, the severity of the punishment

which   conviction   will   entail,   the   character,

behavior, means and standing of the accused,

circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the

accused, reasonable possibility of securing the

presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable

apprehension of the witnesses being tampered

with, the larger interests of the public or State

and similar other considerations. It has also to

be   kept   in   mind   that   for   the   purposes   of

granting the bail the Legislature has used the

words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead

of "the evidence" which means the court dealing

with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to

whether   there   is   a   genuine   case   against   the

accused and that the prosecution will be able to

produce prima facie evidence in support of the

charge.”

c) This Court  in  Ram   Govind   Upadhyay   vs.   Sudarshan

Singh – (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee, J.,

emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of

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bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. This Court

highlighted   that   bail   cannot   be   granted   as   a   matter   of

course, bereft of cogent reasoning. 

d)  In  Kalyan   Chandra   Sarkar   vs.   Rajesh   Ranjan   alias

Pappu Yadav & Anr. – (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court held

that although it is established that a court considering a

bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination

of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of

the case, the court is required to indicate the prima facie

reasons justifying the grant of bail. 

e) In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chaterjee ­­ (2010)

14 SCC 496 this Court observed that where a High Court

has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer

from   the   vice   of   non­application   of   mind,   rendering   it

illegal.   This   Court   has   enumerated   the   circumstances

under which an order granting bail may be set aside. 

f) Another factor which should guide the courts’ decision in

deciding   a   bail   application   is   the   period   of   custody.

However, as noted in Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh

@ Lalla Bahu & Anr. – (2012) 9 SCC 446, the period of

17

custody has to be weighed simultaneously with the totality

of the circumstances and the criminal antecedents of the

accused, if any. Further, the circumstances which may

justify the grant of bail are to be considered in the larger

context of the societal concern involved in releasing an

accused,   in   juxtaposition   to   individual   liberty   of   the

accused seeking bail. 

g) In Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr. – (2016) 15 SCC

422, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court

on   the   considerations   to   be   placed   at   balance   while

deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J.

(as His Lordship then was) in paragraph18 as under: 

18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat

with profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation

of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of

supervening circumstances. The annulment of the

order passed by the High Court is sought as many

relevant   factors   have   not   been   taken   into

consideration   which   includes   the   criminal

antecedents   of   the   accused   and   that   makes   the

order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result

is the lancination of the impugned order.”

h) In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) – (2018) 12

SCC 129, this Court, while considering an appeal from an

order of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the

significant   considerations   of   which   a   court   must   be

18

mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so, this

Court has stated that while it is not possible to prescribe

an exhaustive list of considerations which are to guide a

court in deciding a bail application, the primary requisite of

an   order   granting   bail,   is   that   it   should   result   from

judicious exercise of the court’s discretion. 

i) Recently in Bhoopendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan &

Anr.  –   2021   SCC   Online   SC   1020,  this   Court   made

observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power

to   determine   whether   bail   has   been   granted   for   valid

reasons   as   distinguished   from   an   application   for

cancellation of bail. i.e. this Court  distinguished between

setting   aside   a   perverse   order   granting   bail   vis­a­vis

cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has

misconducted   himself   or   because   of   some   new   facts

requiring such cancellation. Quoting Mahipal vs. Rajesh

Kumar ­ (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court observed as under:

“16. The considerations that guide the power of

an appellate court in assessing the correctness of

an   order   granting   bail   stand   on   a   different

footing from an assessment of an application for

the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an

order   granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of

whether   there   was   an   improper   or   arbitrary

exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The

test   is   whether   the   order   granting   bail   is

perverse,   illegal   or   unjustified.   On   the   other

hand, an application for cancellation of bail is

generally examined on the anvil of the existence

19

of supervening circumstances or violations of the

conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has

been granted.” 

j) The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of

application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise

of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the

accused is  Brijmani  Devi  v.  Pappu  Kumar  and  Anr.  –

Criminal Appeal No. 1663/2021, wherein a three Judge

Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned

and casual order of the High Court granting bail to the

accused, observed as follows: 

“While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of

an individual is an invaluable right, at the same

time   while   considering   an   application   for   bail

Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of

the accusations against an accused and the facts

that   have   a   bearing   in   the   case,   particularly,

when the accusations may not be false, frivolous

or   vexatious   in   nature   but   are   supported   by

adequate material brought on record so as to

enable   a   Court   to   arrive   at   a  prima   facie

conclusion. While considering an application for

grant of bail a  prima facie  conclusion must be

supported by reasons and must  be arrived at

after having regard to the vital facts of the case

brought on record. Due consideration must be

given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime,

the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any,

and the nature of punishment that would follow

a   conviction   vis­à­vis   the   offence/s   alleged

against an accused.”

20.  On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision

arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi­judicial

20

authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court

in  Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited  &   Anr.   Vs.   Masood

Ahmed   Khan   &   Ors.  –   (2010)   9   SCC   496,  wherein   after

referring to a number of judgments this Court summarised at

paragraph 47 the law on the point. The relevant principles for

the purpose of this case are extracted as under: 

(a) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the

wider principle of justice that justice must not only be

done it must also appear to be done as well.

(b) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on

any   possible   arbitrary   exercise   of   judicial   and   quasijudicial or even administrative power.

(c) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by

the   decision­maker   on   relevant   grounds   and   by

disregarding extraneous considerations.

(d) Reasons   have   virtually   become   as   indispensable   a

component   of   a   decision­making   process   as   observing

principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi­judicial and

even by administrative bodies.

(e) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to

rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of

reasoned   decisions   based   on   relevant   facts.   This   is

virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision­making justifying

the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(f) Judicial or even quasi­judicial opinions these days can be

as   different   as   the   judges   and   authorities   who   deliver

them.   All   these   decisions   serve   one   common   purpose

which   is   to   demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant

factors have been objectively considered. This is important

for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery

system.

21

(g) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial

accountability and transparency.

(h) If   a   judge   or   a   quasi­judicial   authority   is   not   candid

enough about his/her decision­making process then it is

impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful

to   the   doctrine   of   precedent   or   to   principles   of

incrementalism.

(i) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and

succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber­stamp reasons”

is not to be equated with a valid decision­making process.

(j) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua

non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency

in   decision­making   not   only   makes   the   judges   and

decision­makers less prone to errors but also makes them

subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence

of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731­

37)

(k)  In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role

in   setting   up   precedents   for   the   future.   Therefore,   for

development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the

decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due

process”.

Though the aforesaid judgment was rendered in the context

of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order by the

National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission,   reliance

could be placed on the said judgment on the need to give reasons

while deciding a matter.

21. The Latin maxim “cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex”

meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of

22

any   particular   law   ceases,   so   does   the   law   itself”,   is   also

apposite.

22. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned

orders above. At the outset, we find that the extracted portions

are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the High

court while granting bail. As evident from the judgments of this

Court   referred   to   above,   a   court   deciding   a   bail   application

cannot   grant   bail   to   an   accused   without   having   regard   to

material   aspects   of   the   case   such   as   the   allegations   made

against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations

are   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   would   result   in   a

conviction;   reasonable   apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being

influenced   by   the   accused;   tampering   of   the   evidence;   the

frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of

the   accused;   and   a   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   in

support of the charge against the accused. 

While we are conscious of the fact that it is not necessary

for   a   Court   to   give   elaborate   reasons   while   granting   bail

particularly   when   the   case   is   at   the   initial   stage   and   the

allegations of the offences by the accused may not have been

crystalised as such, an order de hors any reasoning whatsoever

cannot result in grant of bail. If bail is granted in a casual

23

manner, the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail

the order before a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh

vs. State (Delhi Admn.) ­ 1978 CriLJ 129, when bail has been

granted to an accused, the State may, if new circumstances have

arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court

seeking cancellation of bail under section 439 (2) of the CrPC.

However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since the

grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order

granting bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal

or   has   been   arrived   at   by   ignoring   material   aspects   which

establish a prima­facie case against the accused. 

23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider

the facts of the present cases. The allegations against accusedrespondents as well as the contentions raised at the Bar have

been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of the same,

the following aspects of the case would emerge: 

a) The allegations against the accused­respondents are under

147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with section 34 of the

IPC,  with   regard  to  murder  of   the  deceased,   Yameen  and

attempt to murder Mobin and Jamshed. Thus the offences

alleged against the accused are of grave and heinous nature

24

inasmuch as there was death of appellant’s son and serious

injuries caused to her husband and another son.

b) That allegedly the accused­respondents attacked with deadly

weapons such as swords and knives. 

c) That there was allegedly a pre­existing enmity between the

deceased and Bhoora, one of the accused, which apparently

had been settled by the local residents. 

d) The accused­respondents were summoned by the Trial Court

by order dated 21st September, 2019. The accused preferred

an application under section 482 CrPC praying for an order

quashing the order dated 21st September, 2019. By an order

dated 11th November, 2019, the High Court dismissed the said

application   and   granted   30   days’   time   to   the   accused   to

surrender before the Trial Court. The accused­respondents

assailed the said order by preferring a Special Leave Petition,

being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before this Court, which

came to be dismissed by order dated 6th December 2019. 

e)   The   accused­respondents   resisted   arrest   for   a   period   of

approximately   three   and   a   half   months   as   they   were

absconding. The accused failed to surrender before the Trial

Court in gross violation of the directions of the Additional

District and Sessions Judge, the High Court and even this

25

Court. This  is a glaring  instance of gross violation  of  the

courts’ orders and rule of law. 

f) The accused­respondents had preferred applications before the

Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge   which   came   to   be

rejected by separate orders dated 8th July, 2020. 

g)   The   chances   of   the   accused   absconding   are   grave   having

regard to their previous conduct, if they are on bail. This

would delay commencement and conclusion of the trial and

consequently have an adverse impact on the cause of justice. 

h) The propensity of accused­respondents tampering with the

evidence and influencing the witnesses is an important factor

to be borne in mind in such cases. As a result, the accused

being beneficiaries of the same cannot be ruled out.  

i) The High Court in the impugned orders has failed to consider

the aforestated aspects of the case in the context of the grant

of bail and has granted bail to the accused by cryptic orders.  

24. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present cases

in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that these

cases are fit cases for grant of bail to the accused­respondents,

having regard to the seriousness of the allegations against them

as well as the aforesaid reasons. 

26

25. The High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid material

aspects   of   the   cases   and   has,   by  a  very   cryptic   and   casual

orders,   de   hors   any   coherent   reasoning,   granted   bail   to   the

accused­respondents. We find that the High Court was not right

in   allowing   the   applications   for   bail   filed   by   the   accusedrespondents. Hence the impugned orders dated 7th  May, 2020

and 17th November, 2020 are set aside. The appeals are allowed. 

26. The   accused­respondents   are   on   bail.   Their   bail   bonds

stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the

concerned jail authorities within a period of two weeks from

today. 

……………………………J. 

(M.R. SHAH) 

……………………….…..J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

NEW DELHI; 

18TH JANUARY, 2022. 

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले