Abdul Matin Mallick vs Subrata Bhattacharjee (Banerjee) Case

Abdul Matin Mallick vs Subrata Bhattacharjee (Banerjee) Case

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3499 OF 2022
Abdul Matin Mallick …Appellant(s)
Versus
Subrata Bhattacharjee (Banerjee) and Ors. …Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3500 OF 2022
Abdul Matin Mallick …Appellant(s)
Versus
Subrata Bhattacharjee (Banerjee) and Ors. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Calcutta in C.O. NO. 4266 of
2016 by which the High Court has dismissed the said writ petition
preferred by the appellant herein and has confirmed the order passed by
the first Appellate Court allowing the application submitted by the
1
respondents herein – pre-emptors, the original respondents –
revisionists before the High Court, the appellant herein - pre-emptee has
preferred the present appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5394 of 2022.
1.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Calcutta in C.O. NO. 1153 of
2016 by which the High Court has allowed the said writ petition preferred
by the respondents herein and has revived the execution case filed by
the respondents for implementing the pre-emption order and has further
directed that the executing court shall direct possession to be handed
over to the pre-emptors in respect of the property in question positively
within 31.08.2021, the appellant herein – pre-emptee has preferred the
present appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 4261 of 2022.
2. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under:-
2.1 That the disputed property in question, which was the subject
matter of application for pre-emption before the Appropriate Authority
under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to
as the “Act, 1955”) belonged to one Khudiram Bhattacharya, who died
on 17.04.2001 leaving behind him, surviving his widow Purnima
Bhattacharya who also died on 14.08.2001 and three sons namely
Subrata, Debabrata and Ratan (the pre-emptors herein) and two
daughters Kalyani and Alpana, the vendors of the pre-emptee (appellant
2
herein). On the death of Khudiram Bhattacharya and his widow, the
aforesaid three sons and two daughters inherited the property in
question each having undivided 1/5th share therein. The daughters of the
original owner - Khudiram Bhattacharya sold their undivided 2/5th share
in the property in question to the appellant herein - pre-emptee - Abdul
Matin Mallick vide registered sale deed dated 23.11.2011. The sale in
favour of the appellant by the daughters of the said Khudiram
Bhattacharya was sought to be pre-empted by the sons of said
Khudiram Bhattacharya on the ground that their sisters have transferred
their undivided share in the property in question to the appellant, a
stranger to the said property without serving statutory notice under SubSection (5) of Section 5 of the Act, 1955. The said application under
Section 8 of the Act, 1955 was registered as Misc. Pre-emption Case
No. 8 of 2012 before the learned Trial Court.
2.2 The learned Trial Court dismissed the said application for preemption as not maintainable mainly on the ground that since the vendors
of the pre-emptee had transferred their entire share in the suit property,
the application for pre-emption under Section 8 of the Act, 1955 is not
maintainable.
2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the pre-emption
application, pre-emptors preferred the appeal before the First Appellate
3
Court being Misc. Appeal No. 7 of 2014. The Appellate Court allowed
the said appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Trial
Court and consequently allowed the application for pre-emption holding
that even when a co-sharer of a plot of land transfers his entire share to
any person other than a raiyat in the said plot of land, the application for
pre-emption under Section 8 of the Act, 1955 would be maintainable.
2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the
First Appellate Court allowing the pre-emption application, the purchaser
– pre-emptee filed the present revision application before the High Court.
2.5 By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
dismissed the said revision application and has not interfered with the
judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court, however, has
granted the time to the pre-emptors to deposit the balance consideration
money together with further sum of 10% of that amount by further period
of 30 days.
2.6 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court, the purchaser – pre-emptee has
preferred the present appeals.
3. Shri Anand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the High Court has committed a grave error in dismissing the
revision application and not interfering with the order passed by the First
Appellate Court allowing the pre-emption application.
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3.1 It is vehemently submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant that as such there was a non-compliance of the
mandatory requirement of the deposit of the entire sale consideration
with a further sum of 10% of the sale consideration as required under
Section 8 of the Act. It is contended that it is an admitted position that at
the time of submitting the application for pre-emption, the pre-emptors
did not make any full deposit of the sale consideration with further 10%
of the sale consideration alongwith the application for pre-emption.
3.2 It is urged that before any application for pre-emption is considered
and further enquiry is conducted as required under Section 9 of the Act,
deposit of the entire sale consideration with 10% more of the sale
consideration is a condition precedent. That unless and until the said
condition is satisfied and/or fulfilled the pre-emption application shall not
be maintainable at all; that only thereafter the further enquiry as
contemplated under Section 9 of the Act, 1955 shall have to be
conducted. That in the present case, there is non-compliance of the
statutory mandatory requirement as per Section 8 of the Act, 1955.
Therefore, the pre-emption application was liable to be rejected.
3.3 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has heavily
relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Barasat Eye
Hospital and Ors. Vs. Kaustabh Mondal, (2019) 19 SCC 767 (paras
23 to 33).
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3.4 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decision, it is prayed to allow the present appeals.
4. Present appeals are opposed by Shri Mainak Bose, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents. It is
vehemently submitted that as such the learned Trial Court dismissed the
pre-emption application as not maintainable on the ground that since the
vendors of the pre-emptee have transferred their entire share in the suit
property, the application for pre-emption under Section 8 of the Act, 1955
would not be maintainable. It is submitted that however, in view of the
binding decision of the High Court in the case of Sk. Sajhan Ali & Ors.
Vs. Sk. Saber Ali & Anr. reported in 2016 (1) W.B.L.R (Cal) 133 by
which it has been held that even when the entire share of a co-sharer in
the plot of a land is transferred to any person other than a raiyat in the
said plot of land, the application for pre-emption under Section 8 of the
Act, 1955 would be maintainable. It is therefore submitted that the First
Appellate Court rightly set aside the order passed by the learned Trial
Court and allowed the pre-emption application, which is rightly not
interfered with by the High Court.
4.1 It is submitted that whether an application under Section 8 would
be maintainable when a co-sharer of a plot of land transfers his entire
share to any person other than a raiyat in the said plot of land, is
answered in the affirmative by the Larger Bench of the High Court in the
6
case of Naymul Haque and Ors. Vs. Allauddin Sk. and Ors. reported
in 2019(1)CLJ(CAL)488.
4.2 Now, so far as the submission /contention on behalf of the
appellant that as the pre-emptors did not deposit the entire sale
consideration with 10% higher than the sale consideration and therefore,
the pe-emption application was not maintainable is concerned, it is
vehemently submitted that as such the said contention was not raised
either before the Courts below and/or even before the High Court, and it
has been raised for the first time before this Court.
4.3 It is further submitted that alongwith the pre-emption application,
the pre-emptors did not deposit the entire sale consideration with 10%
additional sale consideration as the pre-emptors bonafide believed that
the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed was on a higher side.
It is submitted that thereafter the entire sale consideration with additional
10% has been deposited by the pre-emptors pursuant to the order
passed by the High Court. Therefore, even the condition mentioned in
Section 8 has now been complied with; therefore, the contention raised
now regarding non-deposit of the entire sale consideration with 10%
additional sale consideration shall no longer be available to the
appellant.
4.4 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present
appeals.
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5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at
length.
6. At this outset, it is required to be noted that pre-emptors submitted
the application before the learned Trial Court under Section 5 of the Act,
1955, in respect of the share sold by their sisters. Therefore, the
contesting respondents herein – the original pre-emptors sought to
exercise their right as pre-emptors under the provisions of the Act, 1955.
The right of the pre-emption has been elaborately dealt with and
considered by a Four Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Bishan
Singh Vs. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 838, wherein at paragraph 11,
it is observed and held as under: -
“11. … (1) The right of pre-emption is not a right to the
thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be
sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right. (2)
The pre-emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right
to follow the thing sold. (3) It is a right of substitution but
not of re-purchase i.e. the pre-emptor takes the entire
bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee.
(4) It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold
and not a share of the property sold. (5) Preference being
the essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior
right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his
place. (6) The right being a very weak right, it can be
defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee
allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being
substituted in his place.”
6.1 Thus, as observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid
judgment, the right of pre-emption is “a very weak right”. That being the
8
character of the right, any provision to enforce such a right must, thus,
be strictly construed. [Barasat Eye Hospital and Ors. (supra)]
6.2 The submission/contention on behalf of the pre-emptee that, as in
the present case, alongwith the pre-emption application, the pre-emptors
did not deposit the entire sale consideration with 10% additional sale
consideration, and therefore their pre-emption application was not
required to be further considered and no further enquiry as contemplated
under Section 9 of the Act, 1955 would be maintainable is concerned,
identical question came to be considered by this Court in the case of
Barasat Eye Hospital and Ors. (supra) wherein at paragraphs 23 to
33, it is observed and held as under: -
“23. The historical perspective of this right was set forth
by the Constitution Bench of this Court, as far back as in
1962, in Bhau Ram case [Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh,
AIR 1962 SC 1476]. The judgment in Bishan Singh
case [Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 838]
preceded the same, where different views, expressed in
respect of this law of pre-emption, have been set out, and
thereafter the position has been summarised. There is no
purpose in repeating the same, but, suffice to say that the
remedial action in respect of the right of pre-emption is a
secondary right, and that too in the context of the “right
being a very weak right”. It is in this context that it was
observed that such a right can be defeated by all
legitimate methods, such as a vendee allowing the
claimant of a superior or equal right to be substituted in its
place. This is not a right where equitable considerations
would gain ground. In fact, the effect of the right to preemption is that a private contract inter se the parties and
that too, in respect of land, is sought to be interfered with,
9
and substituted by a purchaser who fortuitously has land
in the vicinity to the land being sold. It is not a case of a
co-sharer, which would rest on a different ground.
24. The second aspect of importance is that given the
aforesaid position, even the time period for making the
deposit, under Section 8(1) of the said Act, has been held
to be sacrosanct, in view of the judgment of this Court
in Gopal Sardar case [Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar,
(2004) 4 SCC 252]. The very provision of Section 8(1) of
the said Act came up for consideration and, as held in that
case, if the time period itself cannot be extended and if
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply, while
interpreting Section 8 of the said Act, then the
requirement of deposit of the amount along with the
application, within the time stipulated is sacrosanct. The
amount to be deposited is not any amount, as that would
give a wide discretion to the pre-emptor, and any preemptor not able to pay the full amount, would always be
able to say that, in his belief, the consideration was much
lesser than what had been set out. If we read the
judgment in Gopal Sardar case [Gopal Sardar v. Karuna
Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252], in its true enunciation and
spirit, there is sanctity attached to both, the amount and
the time-frame. There cannot be sanctity to the timeframe, incapable of extension even by the Limitation Act,
and yet, there be no sanctity to the amount.
25. In the context of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of
Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961,
the recent view of this Court, in the context of the relevant
provision (now repealed [ Vide Section 2 of the Bihar
Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of
Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019.]), itself puts a
precondition for the exercise of the right of pre-emption,
by requiring the deposit of the full stated purchase money
and 10% of the purchase amount. In our view, it makes
no difference that the proviso in Section 16(3) of that Act
states that “… no such application shall be entertained
10
…”, in the context of filing of applications, without the
deposit of the full amount. We may say so because, if we
turn to Section 8(1) of the said Act, the right of preemption is activated “on deposit of the consideration
money together with the further sum of 10% of that
amount”. Thus, unless such a deposit is made, the right of
a pre-emptor is not even triggered off. The provisions of
Section 8 are explicit and clear in their terms.
26. Now turning to Section 9 of the said Act, from which,
apparently, some judgments of the Calcutta High Court
have sought to derive a conclusion that an inquiry into the
stated consideration is envisaged. However, the
commencement of sub-section (1) of Section 9 is with “on
the deposit mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 8
being made…” Thus, for anything further to happen under
Section 9 of the said Act, the deposit as envisaged under
Section 8 of the said Act has to be made. It is only then
that the remaining portion of Section 9 of the said Act
would come into play.
27. The question now is as to what would be the nature of
inquiry which has been envisaged to be carried out by the
Munsif. If Section 9, as it reads, is perused, then first, the
amount as mentioned in the sale transaction is to be
deposited, as per sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the said
Act. Once that amount is deposited, the next stage is for
the Munsif to give notice of the application to the
transferee. The transferee thereafter, when enters
appearance within the time specified, can prove the
consideration money paid for the transfer “and other
sums”. Such other sums, if any, are as “properly paid by
him in respect of the land including any sum paid for
annulling encumbrances created prior to the day of
transfer, and rent or revenue, cesses or taxes for any
period”. The inquiry, thus envisaged, is in respect of the
amount sought to be claimed over and above the stated
sale consideration in the document of sale because, in
that eventuality further sums would have to be called for,
11
from the pre-emptor. In that context, the additional
amount would have to be deposited. Even in the event
that a pre-emptor raises doubts regarding the
consideration amount, enquiry into the said aspect can be
done only upon payment of the full amount, along with the
application. In this aspect, the phrase “the remainder, if
any, being refunded to the applicant” would include to
mean the repayment of the initial deposit made along with
the application, if considered to be excess. To give any
other connotation to these sections would make both, the
latter part of Section 8 of the said Act and the inception
part of Section 9 of the said Act, otiose. We do not think
such an interpretation can be countenanced.
28. In our view, when the inquiry is being made by the
Munsif, whether in respect of the stated consideration, or
in respect of any additional amounts which may be
payable, the pre-requisite of deposit of the amount of the
stated consideration under Section 8(1) of the said Act
would be required to be fulfilled. The phraseology “the
remainder, if any, being refunded to the applicant” would
have to be understood in that context. The word
“remainder” is in reference to any amount which, on
inquiry about the stated consideration, may be found to
have been deposited in excess, but it cannot be left at the
own whim of the applicant to deposit any amount, which
is deemed proper, but the full amount has to be
deposited, and if found in excess on inquiry, be refunded
to the applicant.
29. We are, thus, firmly of the view that the pre-requisite
to even endeavour to exercise this weak right is the
deposit of the amount of sale consideration and the 10%
levy on that consideration, as otherwise, Section 8(1) of
the said Act will not be triggered off, apart from making
even the beginning of Section 9(1) of the said Act otiose.
30. We are not inclined to construe the aforesaid
provisions otherwise only on the ground that there are no
12
so-called “penal provisions” included. The provisions of
Sections 8 and 9 of the said Act must be read as they are.
In fact, it is a settled rule of construction that legislative
provisions should be read in their plain grammatical
connotation, and only in the case of conflicts between
different provisions would an endeavour have to be made
to read them in a manner that they co-exist and no part of
the rule is made superfluous. [British India General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Itbar Singh, AIR 1959 SC 1331] The
interpretation, as we have adopted, would show that
really speaking, no part of either Section 8, or Section 9 of
the said Act is made otiose. Even if an inquiry takes place
in the aspect of stated consideration, on a plea of some
fraud or likewise, and if such a finding is reached, the
amount can always be directed to be refunded, if
deposited in excess. However, it cannot be said that a
discretion can be left to the pre-emptor to deposit
whatever amount, in his opinion, is the appropriate
consideration, in order to exercise a right of pre-emption.
The full amount has to be deposited.
31. We may also note that, as a matter of fact, the preemptor in the present case i.e. the respondent has not
filed any material to substantiate even the plea on the
basis of which, even if an inquiry was held, could a
conclusion be reached that the stated consideration is not
the market value of the land.
32. We also believe that to give such a discretion to the
pre-emptor, without deposit of the full consideration,
would give rise to speculative litigation, where the preemptor, by depositing smaller amounts, can drag on the
issue of the vendee exercising rights in pursuance of the
valid sale deed executed. In the present case, there is a
sale deed executed and registered, setting out the
consideration.
33. We are of the view that the impugned order and the
view adopted would make a weak right into a “speculative
13
strong right”, something which has neither historically, nor
in judicial interpretation been envisaged.”
6.3 Therefore, deposit of the entire sale consideration with additional
10% of the sale consideration alongwith the pre-emption application is a
statutory and mandatory requirement and it is a pre-condition before any
further enquiry as contemplated under Section 9 of the Act is held. In
the present case, admittedly, the pre-emptors had not deposited the
entire sale consideration with additional 10% of the sale consideration
alongwith the pre-emption application. The aforesaid aspects have not
been considered either by the First Appellate Court or even by the High
Court in this case.
7. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the pre-emptors that
they bonafidely believed that the sale consideration mentioned in the
sale deed is in favour of the vendee, who is an outsider (outside the
family) was higher than the actual sale consideration and therefore, they
did not deposit the entire sale consideration with additional 10% of the
sale consideration alongwith the pre-emption application is concerned, it
is to be noted that the aforesaid cannot be a ground not to comply with
the condition of deposit as required under Section 8 of the Act, 1955. At
the most, such a dispute can be the subject matter of an enquiry
provided under Section 9 of the Act. As observed hereinabove, the
enquiry under Section 9 with respect to the sale consideration in the sale
14
deed would be only after the condition of deposit of entire sale
consideration with additional 10% as provided under Section 8 of the Act
has been complied with.
8. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the pre-emptors that
the contention of non-deposit of the entire sale consideration with
additional 10% of the sale consideration by the pre-emptors was not
raised before the Courts below and has been raised for the first time
before this Court, and therefore the same be not considered/permitted to
be raised now, is concerned, it is to be noted that the said contention
would go to the root of the matter on maintainability of the pre-emption
application as without complying with the statutory requirements as
mentioned under Section 8 of the Act, 1955, the same is not
maintainable. It is an admitted position that the pre-emptors had not
deposited the entire sale consideration with additional 10% of the sale
consideration along with the pre-emption application as required under
Section 8 of the Act in the instant case.
In view of the aforesaid admitted position, we have considered the
submission on behalf of the appellant on non-fulfillment of the condition
mentioned in Section 8 of the Act.
9. At this stage, it is required to be noted that even the High Court in
the impugned judgment and order has permitted the pre-emptors to
deposit the balance sale consideration. However, faced with the
15
decision of this Court in the case of Barasat Eye Hospital and Ors.
(supra) and in light of the observations made by us hereinabove that
alongwith the pre-emption application, the pre-emptors have to deposit
the entire sale consideration with additional 10% and only thereafter the
further enquiry can be conducted as per Section 9 of the Act, 1955 and
therefore, unless and until the same is complied with, the pre-emption
application would not be maintainable, the High Court is not justified in
permitting the pre-emptors to now deposit the balance sale consideration
with additional 10% while deciding the revision application. Such a
direction/permission/liberty would go against the intent of Section 8 of
the Act, 1955.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present
appeals succeed. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the
High Court and that of the First Appellate Court are hereby quashed and
set aside. Consequently, the pre-emption application submitted by the
original pre-emptors – respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein stands dismissed.
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 – original pre-emptors are permitted to withdraw
the amount, which they might have deposited either alongwith the preemption application and/or any subsequent deposit pursuant to the
orders passed by the High Court.
Present appeals are allowed accordingly. However, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Pending application(s), if any also stands disposed of.
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………………………………….J.
 [M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI; ………………………………….J.
May 05, 2022. [B.V. NAGARATHNA]
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