MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) VS RAJENDRA ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD)

MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) VS RAJENDRA ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD)

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5894 OF 2019

MUNNI DEVI ALIAS

NATHI DEVI (DEAD) …APPELLANT(S)

THR LRS. & ORS.

VERSUS

RAJENDRA ALIAS

LALLU LAL (DEAD) …RESPONDENT(S)

THR LRS. & ORS.

 J U D G M E N T

BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.

1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated

20.07.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at

Jaipur in S.B. Civil First Appeal No.120 of 1989, filed by the Appellants

under Section 96 read with Order 41 of CPC, whereby the High Court

while allowing the said First Appeal has set aside the judgment and decree

dated 05.08.1989 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge,

Class-1, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Civil Suit

2

No.56/73, and has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff Daulalji, the

predecessor of the present appellants, against the defendant no. 1 Bhonri

Devi, the predecessor of the present respondent Nos.1 to 3 and others.

2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the matter, it would be

beneficial to reproduce the genealogical table/pedigree of the families of

the parties.

Gopalji

Ram Ratanji Abhadydutt Ji Bij Ballabji

(Died issueless)

Jagannathji Rampratapji Shrinarainji

 (Died issueless)

Sri Bakshji

@ Gilji Harinarayanji Ganeshnarayanji

(Died issueless Died 1938

on 11.11.53)

 Daulalji Dhannalaji (son)

Exp.10.11.83 Died 1936

Plaintiff

(Claims to be Wife-Bhonri Devi

adopted by Sri Bakshji on (Defendant died on 17.04.1979)

11.06.1916)

3. The original plaintiff Daulalji filed the suit being No.56 of 1973 seeking

possession of the suit property alongwith the mesne profits, against the

original defendant - Smt. Bhonri Devi, widow of Late Shri Dhannalalji and

against the other defendant Nos. 2 to 12, who were the tenants in the suit

property. The suit property is the house property bearing No.1875, Chokdi

Topkhana Desh, Jaipur which was an ancestral property in the hands of

Harinarayanji and his brother Ganeshnarayanji. As per the case of the

3

plaintiff – Daulalji, he was adopted by Sri Bakshji, who was the greatgrandson of their common ancestor Gopalji on 11.06.1916. The husband

of the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi, i.e., Dhannalalji predeceased his father

Ganeshnarayanji in 1936. Ganeshnarayanji expired in 1938 and his brother

Harinarayanji died issueless on 11.11.1953. As per the further case of the

plaintiff Daulalji, Harinarayanji had executed a Will on 30.07.1949 in his

favour, and upon his death, on 11.11.1953, he had become the owner of the

suit property alongwith other properties of Harinarayanji by virtue of the

said Will. Upon the death of Harinarayanji, the defendant No.1 – Bhonri

Devi started harassing the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff left the suit

property on 25.12.1953, and since then the defendant No.1 was in

possession of the suit property. The defendant Nos.2 to 12 were the tenants

in the part of suit property. The plaintiff Daulalji claimed that after the

death of Harinarayanji, he being the only male member in the family as

well as the legatee under the Will of Harinarayanji, had become the sole

owner of the suit property and, therefore, was entitled to recover the

possession of the suit property from the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi, who

had no legal right or interest in the suit property.

4. The suit was resisted by the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi by filing the

written statement, denying the averments and allegations made in the

plaint. She also denied any Will having been executed by Harinarayanji in

favour of the plaintiff Daulalji and further contended that Harinarayanji,

4

with a view to take her care, after the demise of her husband and father-inlaw, had started residing with her in the suit property, however, the plaintiff

never resided in the suit property. It was further contended that the

defendant Nos.2 to 12 were giving rent to her, she being the wife of

Dhannalalji and daughter-in-law of Ganeshnarayanji, and thus, was in

possession of the suit property as an owner and was maintaining herself

from the income derived from the suit property. It was also contended that

the limited right vested in her favour in the suit property, had enlarged into

full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,

1956, which came into force on 17.06.1956. She, therefore, contended that

the suit at the instance of the plaintiff was not maintainable and was liable

to be dismissed. The defendant Nos.2 to 8 and 10 to 12 had also filed their

respective written statements contending, inter alia, that the defendant

No.1 Bhonri Devi was the owner of the suit property, and they were her

tenants and were paying rent to her only.

5. It may be noted that the original plaintiff Daulalji expired on 10.11.1983

and original defendant No. 1 Bhonri Devi expired on 17.04.1979, pending

the suit. Thereafter, the suit was prosecuted by Munnidevi, daughter of

original plaintiff – Daulalji and the legal representatives i.e. the nephews

and niece of defendant No. 1 Bhonri Devi, who were substituted in her

place pending the suit. The suit was decreed by the trial Court on

05.08.1989, against which the First Appeal being No. 120/1989 was

5

preferred by the legal representatives of the defendant no. 1 Bhonri Devi.

Pending the appeal, Munnidevi, daughter of original plaintiff Daulalji also

expired, and her legal representatives were substituted in her place. The

said First Appeal having been allowed by the High Court vide the

impugned order dated 20th July, 2017, the present appeal has been filed by

the heirs and legal representatives of the said Munnidevi (hereinafter

referred to as “the appellants”) against the respondent nos. 1 to 4

(contesting respondents) and respondent nos. 5 & 6 (Proforma

respondents).

Submissions:

6. The learned Advocate Mr. Puneet Jain appearing for the appellants

assailing the impugned judgement passed by the High Court made

multiple submissions as follows:

(i) The High Court had committed an error in holding that

after the death of Shri Ganeshnarayanji in 1938, a limited

right in the suit property was created in favour of Bhonri

Devi and that the said Bhonri Devi had a right of

maintenance even under the old Shastric Law, which had

fructified into a full right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956. According to Mr. Jain, the Hindu

Woman Right to Property Act, 1937 had no application to

the facts of the present case, as the suit property was

6

located in the erstwhile State of Jaipur, where the said Act

was not applicable. In the State of Jaipur, the Hindu

Woman Right to Property Act, 1947 which came into force

on 24.09.1947, was applicable, however, Shri Dhannalal

having expired in 1936 and Ganeshnarayanji having

expired in 1938 i.e., before the commencement of the Act

of 1947, no limited right under the Act of 1947 was created

in favour of the said Bhonri Devi. Even under Section 3(2)

of 1937 Act, right in the joint family property was created

only in favour of the widow of the deceased and not in

favour of a daughter-in-law of a pre-deceased son. In this

regard, he has placed reliance on the decision of this Court

in case of Ram Vishal (Dead) & Ors. by Lrs. Vs. Jagan

Nath & Anr1

.

(ii) Mere possession of property or a right to maintenance

under the old Shastric Law did not give any right to the

defendant no. 1 Bhonri Devi under Section 14(1) of the

said Act of 1956. In this regard, Mr. Jain took the Court to

the pleadings of the parties and submitted that there was no

specific plea raised by defendant no. 1 in this regard and it

1

(2004) 9 SCC 302

7

was only by way of alternative contention raised in the

written statement, the defendant no.1 had sought to

ascertain the plea of her having become full owner under

Section 14(1) of the said Act of 1956.

(iii) There was no limited ownership created in favour of the

defendant no.1 Bhonri Devi specifically in the suit

property and that no presumption of limited ownership as

sought to be asserted by her could be raised. The

presumption must necessarily flow from some statutory or

customary law of inheritance or by instrument or a decree

or a device as contemplated in the Explanation II of

Section 14(1) of the Act.

(iv) The possession of suit property was never given to the

defendant no. 1- Bhonri Devi in the nature of right to

possess in lieu of her right of maintenance creating limited

ownership in the suit property. Mere possession without

any vestige of right in property would not attract Section

14(1). The existence of a pre-existing “limited ownership”

is a sine qua non for the application of Section 14(1),

inasmuch as it is only the limited ownership which would

fructify and blossom into a full ownership under the said

8

provision. Where no such “limited ownership” is shown to

have existed, Section 14(1) has no application.

(v) Right to maintenance is not a “Right in a specific property”

but it is a “Right against the properties of the joint family

generally.”

(vi) Mere right to maintenance without acquisition of title also

would not be sufficient to attract Section 14. Placing

reliance on the decision in case of Dindayal & Anr. vs.

Rajaram2

, he submitted that before any property could be

said to be possessed by a Hindu Woman, as provided in

Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, it has to be established

that the woman had a right to the possession of the property

in question and that she must have been in possession of

such property either actually or constructively.

(vii) A Hindu Female having a right to maintenance would not

ipso facto create any charge on the property. A right to

maintenance may amount to a legal charge if such charge

is created either by an agreement between the parties or by

a decree. In this regard, Mr. Jain has relied upon the

provisions of Section 27 of the Hindu Adoption and

2

(1970) 1 SCC 786

9

Maintenance Act, 1956 and the decision in case of Sadhu

Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike3

.

(viii)In the alternative, Mr. Jain submitted that the defendant

no.1- Bhonri Devi’s claims based on her right to

maintenance could be raised only qua the share of Shri

Ganeshnarayanji in the suit property which was to the

extent of 1/4th of the suit property, and the remaining 3/4th

share in the property belonged to the legitimate right of

Daulalji and his heirs, as a consequence of the adoption of

Daulalji and the Will dated 30.07.1949 executed by

Harinarayanji in his favour. He also submitted that the

probate in respect of the said Will was granted to the

plaintiff Daulalji and that the claim of rival Will set up by

the defendant no. 1 Bhonri Devi was negated by the

Probate Court.

(ix) Lastly, he submitted that the suit property being an

ancestral property of the appellants, it should have been

kept within their family and the present respondents who

are the nephews and niece of the deceased Bhonri Devi,

could not claim any right in the suit property.

3

(2006) 8 SCC 75

10

7. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pallav Shishodia appearing for the

contesting respondents, supporting the findings recorded by the High

Court in the impugned order, made following submissions:

(i) The exclusive possession of widow of HUF property itself

would create a presumption that such property was

earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of

maintenance, more particularly when the surviving coparcener did not earmark any alternative property for

recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. In this

regard, Mr. Shishodia has invited the attention of the Court

to the ratio laid down by this Court in case of Shrimati

Rani Bai vs. Shri Yadunandan Ram & Anr4 and the

judgments of Rajasthan High Court in case of Mst.

Gaumati Vs. Shankar Lal5 and Mool Kanwar Vs. Jeewa

Lal6

.

(ii) The exclusive possession of defendant Bhonri Devi, after

the death of Harinarayanji was never questioned by the

plaintiff Daulalji. The suit property was only about 1/4th of

the total HUF properties held by Harinarayanji and

Ganeshnarayanji, yielding nominal rentals just enough for

4 1969 (1) SCC 604

5 AIR 1974 Raj.147

6 AIR 1982 Raj.267

11

her sustenance, as compared to much bigger house at

Purani Basti, two shops at Chandpole and other properties

taken away by the original plaintiff-Daulalji.

(iii) As regards the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Act of

1956, he submitted that the pre-existing right of

maintenance in favour of a widow would have remained

only a lofty right throughout her life without any

vindication, and would have remained fettered at the

mercy of surviving co-parceners, if the case of the plaintiff

was accepted that the said Bhonri Devi enjoyed the suit

property only by way of grace and concession of the

plaintiff-Daulalji. Otherwise, the very purpose of Section

14(1) of the Act, which was enacted to confer absolute

ownership on the Hindu widow in settled possession of

HUF property in lieu of her pre-existing right of

maintenance, would be frustrated. Mr. Shishodia drew the

attention of the Court to the various observations made and

findings recorded by this Court in case of V.Tulasamma

and Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs7

. According to

him, once the pre-existing right was recognized, the

7

(1977) 3 SCC 99

12

consequences of Section 14(1) cannot be denied to a Hindu

widow.

(iv) The expression “possession” contained in Section 14(1) is

required to be given the widest possible meaning to include

actual as well as constructive possession, like attornment

of tenants in the present case. Likewise, the expression

“acquire” is also required to be given a widest possible

meaning to include acquisition by possession, especially

when such possession of widow already satisfied her preexisting right of maintenance. To elaborate his submission,

Mr. Shishodia has placed reliance on the decision of this

Court in case of Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Thakorbhai

Chelabhai and Others8

.

(v) Till the death of Harinarayanji in 1953, he held HUF

properties as karta and the last surviving co-parcener in the

direct line. However, all the rights, title and interest of

Harinarayanji and his successor were subject to the preexisting right of maintenance in favour of Bhonri Devi and,

therefore, even Harinarayanji could not have bequeathed

more than whatever right, title or interest he had in the

8

(1979) 3 SCC 300

13

HUF properties, by executing the Will, in view of Section

30 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The plaintiff

Daulalji, therefore, had also got the suit property as a

legatee or co-parcener subject to the limited estate of

Bhonri Devi, whose pre-existing right of maintenance

from the suit property, made her absolute owner after

Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956 came into force.

Analysis:

8. Though number of issues were raised by the parties during the course of

trial before the Trial Court and during the course of the appeal before the

High Court, the learned Counsel Mr. Puneet Jain for the appellants has not

disputed before this court that Bhonri Devi had a right of maintenance from

the estate of her husband’s joint family. He also has not disputed that

Bhonri Devi was residing in the suit house since the time Harinarayanji was

alive i.e., prior to 11.11.1953, and that after the death of Harinarayanji,

Bhonri Devi continued to live in the said house and was collecting the rent

from the tenants who were occupying part of the suit premises. However,

Mr. Puneet Jain has seriously disputed Bhonri Devi’s right to maintenance

from the suit property alone. He has disputed her claim of acquiring the suit

property in lieu of her maintenance for being a full owner, as contemplated

in Section 14(1) of the Act. According to him, vestige of interest against

14

the property could not be said to be the same as the vestige in the property.

In absence of creation of any charge or execution of a document

recognising her right of maintenance in the suit property, it could not be

said that she had pre-existing or limited ownership in the suit property.

9. Similarly, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shishodia for the concerned

respondents has also not pressed into service the contentions raised by

Bhonri Devi in the suit with regard to the plaintiff Daulalji being a stranger

to the joint family of her husband, and with regard to his adoption by Sri

Bakshji. He has also not pressed into service the issue with regard to the

Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Daulalji. However, Mr.

Shishodia urged that all rights, title or interest of Harinarayanji were subject

to the pre-existing right of maintenance of Bhonri Devi, and he could not

have bequeathed by way of Will to Daulalji, more than whatever right or

interest he had in the suit property. Admittedly, Bhonri Devi was in

possession of the suit property and was collecting the rent from the tenants

occupying part of suit property. Therefore, according to Mr. Shishodia, her

settled possession of suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right of

maintenance, entitled her to become full owner of the suit property in view

of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.

10. The main issue therefore, whether Bhonri Devi, the predecessor of the

present respondents had become an absolute owner on coming into force

15

the Act of 1956, revolves around the interpretation of Section 14 thereof. It

reads as under:

“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.

—

(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether

acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall

be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both

movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu

by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of

maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any

person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her

marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by

prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any

such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the

commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any

property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other

instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under

an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument

or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in

such property.”

11. From the plain reading of Section 14(1) along with the Explanation thereto,

it emerges that in order to become a full owner and not a limited owner, of

a property by virtue of Section 14(1), a female Hindu, before or after the

commencement of Act of 1956, must be in possession of the property, and

it must have been acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition,

or in lieu of maintenance, or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any

person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage or by her

own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other

manner whatsoever, or any such property must have been held by her as

stridhana immediately before the commencement of the Act.

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12. In the instant case, we are concerned with the claim of Bhonri Devi of

having become the full owner in respect of the suit property on the ground

that she was in settled legal possession of the suit property before and after

the commencement of the Act, in lieu of her pre-existing right of

maintenance, and such limited ownership right had fructified into full

ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). The High Court while discussing

about the right of a Hindu widow to the property, has observed that the

Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 was in force in the year 1937

when Ganeshnarayanji, father-in-law of Bhonri Devi expired in 1938, and

that even prior to the said Act of 1937, the right of Hindu widow was

recognised as per the old shastric customs prevalent in the area. In our

opinion, the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 conferred right

on Hindu widow to the property of her husband, who died after the

commencement of the said Act of 1937 and not prior thereto. Bhonri Devi’s

husband Dhannalalji having expired in 1936, the said Act of 1937 would

not be applicable to facts of the case. However, prior to the said Act of

1937, the right to maintenance of Hindu widow was recognised in Shastric

law. This court in case of V.Tulasamma and other vs. Sesha Reddy(Dead)

(supra) has elaborately considered the pre-existing right to maintenance of

a Hindu woman while considering the provisions of Section 14 of the said

Act of 1956. Justice fazal Ali, as he then was, after quoting the authorities

17

on the subject and elucidating the nature and extent of right of a Hindu wife

to maintenance, summarised the position in para 62 as under: -

“62. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions

which we have reached after an exhaustive consideration of

the authorities mentioned above on the question of law

involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of Sections

14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be

stated thus:

“(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty

formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of

grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property

which flows from the spiritual relationship between the

husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure

Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by the

earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such

a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against

property and the husband has a personal obligation to

maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the

female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a

charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said

right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even

without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a preexisting right so that any transfer declaring or recognising

such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses

or confirms the pre-existing rights.

(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been

couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally

construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object

of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought

to be achieved by this long-needed legislation.

(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso

and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation

of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be

construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main

provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a

way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main

provision.

(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments,

decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new

titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no

application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to

confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In

18

such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally

permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.

Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises

a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or

partition or share to which the female is entitled, the subsection has absolutely no application and the female's limited

interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one

by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any,

under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a

property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of

maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken

out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by

Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of

the transferee.

(5) The use of express terms like ‘property acquired by a

female Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, ‘or

arrears of maintenance’, etc. in the Explanation to Section

14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these

categories which have been expressly excepted from the

operation of sub-section (2).

(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the Legislature in

Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include

the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in

actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a

widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree

before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but

had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the

property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force

of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the

property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the

widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right

or title, because the section does not contemplate the

possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.

(7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section 14(2) are

wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and

they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind

of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”

19

13. Following the said observations made in the case of V.Tulasamma

(supra), this court in Raghubar Singh & Ors vs Gulab Singh & Ors9 held

as under:

“22. The judgment in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] has

held the field till date. (See also with advantage: Ram

Kali v. Choudhri Ajit Shankar [(1997) 9 SCC 613]

and Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda

Verrappa [(1997) 10 SCC 673].)

23. Thus, we find that there is enough authority for the

proposition that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female is

a pre-existing right, which existed in the Hindu law long before

the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 came into force and is not a

creation of those statutes, which only recognised that position.

In the words of Fazal Ali, J. in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC

99] : (SCC p. 135, para 62)

“(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an

empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a

matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against

property which flows from the spiritual relationship between

the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by

pure Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even

by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to

Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a

right against property and the husband has a personal

obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has

property, the female has the legal right to be maintained

therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a

female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At

any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is

doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or

recognising such a right does not confer any new title but

merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.”

24. Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a

Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship

between the husband and the wife and that right in the case of

a widow is “a pre-existing right”, which existed under

the Shastric Hindu law long before the passing of the 1937 or

the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely recognised the position as

was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a

“statutory” backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of

the property of her husband, she has a right to be maintained

9

(1998) 6 SCC 314

20

out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession of that

property in lieu of her right to maintenance.

25. Explaining the meaning of the expression “possessed” as

used by the legislature in Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act

in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] this Court held: (SCC

p. 136, para 62)

“(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the legislature in

Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include

the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in

actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a

widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree

before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but

had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the

property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force

of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the

property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the

widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right

or title, because the section does not contemplate the

possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.”

26. It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow's

limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute

right notwithstanding any restriction placed under the

document or the instrument. So far as sub-section (2) of

Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees,

awards, gifts, etc., which create an independent or a new title

in favour of the female for the first time. It has no application

to cases where the instrument/document either declares or

recognises or confirms her share in the property or her “preexisting right to maintenance” out of that property. As held

in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] sub-section (2) of

Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its

own, without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) of

the Act.”

14. In view of the above, there remains no shadow of doubt that a Hindu

woman’s right to maintenance was not and is not an empty formality or an

illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity. It is a

tangible right against the property, which flows from the spiritual

relationship between the husband and the wife. The said right was

recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law, which existed even

21

before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely gave

statutory backing recognising the position as was existing under the

Shastric Hindu Law. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property

of her husband or of the husband’s HUF, she has a right to be maintained

out of the said property. She is entitled to retain the possession of that

property in lieu of her right to maintenance. Section 14(1) and the

Explanation thereto envisages liberal construction in favour of the females,

with the object of advancing and promoting the socio-economic ends

sought to be achieved by the said legislation. As explained in

V.Tulasamma (supra) case, the words “possessed by” used in Section 14(1)

are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a

property, even though the Hindu woman is not in actual or physical

possession of the same. Of course, it is equally well settled that the

possession of the widow, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or

title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank

trespasser without any right or title.

15. The undisputed facts in the instant case are that Dhannalalji, the husband

of Bhonri Devi expired in 1936, Ganeshnarayanji, the father-in-law of

Bhonri Devi expired in 1938 and Harinarayanji, the brother of

Ganeshnarayanji died on 11.11.1953. Daulalji was adopted by Sri Bakshji

in the year 1916. Harinarayanji, Ganeshnarayanji and Sri Bakshji had

22

common ancestor Gopalji. It is also not disputed that the suit property was

an ancestral property in the hands of Harinarayanji and Ganeshnarayanji. It

is also not disputed that Bhonri Devi was staying in the suit property before

the death of Harinarayanji, and after his death she was in possession and in

charge of the said property, and was maintaining herself by collecting rent

from the tenants who were occupying part of the suit property.

16. Now it appears from the documents on record that the rent notes (Exhibit

A-2 to A-11) executed during the period 1955 to 1965 in respect of the part

of the suit property, were executed in the name of Bhonri Devi. The

concerned defendants in the suit had also filed their written statements,

stating that they were paying rent to Bhonri Devi only. It further appears

from the document (Exhibit A-13) that Daulalji had raised an objection

against Bhonri Devi paying the house tax in respect of the suit property and

that the Municipal Commissioner, Jaipur vide order dated 28.03.1957 had

observed that Bhonri Devi was paying the tax in the past also. An appeal

against the said order was preferred by Daulalji before the Administrator

of Municipal Council, Jaipur however the same was also rejected vide the

order dated 28.01.1959. It was observed therein that “In this case there is a

dispute regarding ownership. Municipal Commissioner who is the

reversing authority in his judgment dated 28.03.1957 held that Bhonri Devi

who was paying tax to the municipality in the past, should pay the tax and

23

for question of title the concerned party should seek remedy in the Civil

Courts.”

17. From the said documents it clearly emerges that Bhonri Devi was paying

the house tax prior to 1956 and was collecting the rent from the tenants

prior to and after 1956. Pertinently from the document Exhibit-54, it

emerges that in 1940 Bhonri Devi, when she was staying with her in-laws,

had no source of maintenance, and therefore she was granted Rs. 2.50 per

month by way of maintenance, by the Punya Department of the

Government. She claiming to be a PARDANASHEEN lady had authorised

Daulalji to collect the said amount of maintenance. The said document

clearly shows that Bhonri Devi was residing in the suit house since 1940.

Be that as it may, it was well established that Bhonri devi was in possession

of the suit house before and after the death of Harinarayanji in 1953 and

had continued to remain in possession thereafter and was collecting rent

from the tenants who were in occupation of part of the suit premises since

1955, till the date of filing of the suit in 1965 by the plaintiff Daulalji.

18. The afore-stated facts and circumstances clearly established that Bhonri

devi had long settled possession of the suit property, which she had

acquired in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, prior to the

commencement of the Act of 1956, which entitled her to become a full

owner of the suit property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act. Her

exclusive possession of suit property after the death of Harinarayanji in

24

1953 i.e., prior to coming into force of the said Act in 1956, was not only

not disputed but was admitted by the plaintiff Daulalji in the plaint itself.

Her pre-existing right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her

husband was also well established. The submission of Mr. Jain for the

appellants that mere right to maintenance would not ipso facto create any

charge on the property and that for creating legal charge recognising right

of Hindu women to maintenance required execution of a document, device

or agreement, cannot be countenanced. Her pre-existing right to

maintenance, coupled with her settled legal possession of the property,

would be sufficient to create a presumption that she had a vestige of right

or claim in the property, though no document was executed or specific

charge was created in her favour recognizing her right to maintenance in

the property.

19.It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of

Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property. What was stated in the

Will was that whatever movable and immovable property, which belonged

to Harinarayanji would be devolved upon Daulalji. It was only in the

Probate proceedings filed by Daulalji in respect of the said Will, he had

shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is true that the objections raised

by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour of Daulalji were not

accepted by the Probate Court, and the alleged Will executed by

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Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi was also not proved by her in the

said proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to

maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in view of her

exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior to and after the

commencement of the Act of 1956, the only conclusion which could be

drawn, would be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property in lieu of

her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had held the suit property

as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the

said Act of 1956.

20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a tangible right

against the property which flows from the spiritual relationship between

the husband and the wife. Such right was recognized and enjoined under

the Shastric Hindu Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946

Acts. Where a Hindu widow is found to be in exclusive settled legal

possession of the HUF property, that itself would create a presumption that

such property was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of

maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener did not

earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-existing right of

maintenance. The word “possessed by” and “acquired” used in Section

14(1) are of the widest amplitude and include the state of owning a

property. It is by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu

26

widow’s limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right,

when such property is possessed by her whether acquired before or after

the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.

21. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court had

rightly held that Bhonri Devi had pre-existing right to maintenance in the

suit property that had ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1)

of the Act of 1956.

22. The present appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.

………………………. J.

[AJAY RASTOGI]

 …..................................J.

 [BELA M. TRIVEDI]

NEW DELHI;

18.05.2022