MUZAFFAR HUSAIN VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH CASE

MUZAFFAR HUSAIN VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH CASE / Judgment 2022 - 


Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले


REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3613 OF 2022
(Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 21948 of 2019)
MUZAFFAR HUSAIN …. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANR. .... RESPONDENT(S)

 J U D G M E N T
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The challenge in the instant appeal is to the Order dated 17.04.2019
passed by the High Court of judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow
Bench, Lucknow in Writ Petition being no. 496 of 2017 filed by
the appellant challenging the order of punishment issued by the
respondent-State pursuant to the decision of the Full Court of the
High Court taken on the report of the Enquiry Officer in respect of
the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant for the
alleged misconduct committed by him as a judicial officer.
2
2. Factual Matrix:
i. The appellant had joined the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services
in the year 1978 and sought voluntary retirement from the
said services in September 2003. Immediately after the
retirement, appellant joined as a Judicial Member, Central
Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai. On
19.07.2005, the appellant was informed vide the letter dated
19.07.2005 of the O.S.D (Enquiry), Allahabad High Court,
addressed to the Principal Registrar, CAT, New Delhi that
the High Court had initiated a departmental enquiry, being
no. 26 of 2005 against him. A copy of chargesheet was
enclosed therewith. There were twelve charges levelled
against the appellant in the said chargesheet. It was alleged
against the petition inter alia that the appellant, while posted
as the 11th Additional District Judge, Agra during the period
from 23.05.2001 to 19.05.2003, had decided a batch of
matters under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and had
awarded enhanced compensation which was multiple times
more than the investments made by the subsequent
purchasers of the acquired lands; that such subsequent
purchasers had no right to claim compensation for the
acquired lands; that the appellant had determined the
3
compensation in terms of square yards and not in terms of
bighas, and had awarded such compensation in flagrant
violation of the cardinal principles of law and equity and
against all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to
unduly favour such subsequent purchasers. It was therefore
alleged that the appellant had failed to maintain absolute
integrity and complete devotion to duty, and thereby had
committed a misconduct within the meaning of Rule-3 of
U.P. Govt. Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The charge no. 12
levelled against the appellant pertained to an undue favour
shown to the son of a Counsel named Shri KC Jain, by
exorbitantly enhancing the compensation in his favour.
ii. The appellant vide the letters dated 07.09.2005 and
19.09.2005 denied all the charges levelled against him. On
20.01.2006, the appellant received the written submissions
submitted on behalf of the department in the departmental
enquiry initiated against him and the appellant also
submitted his written submissions on 10.02.2006 in the said
enquiry.
iii. The Enquiry Officer vide his Enquiry report dated
05.04.2006 held charges no. 1 to 11 as “Proved” and charge
no. 12 as “Not Proved”. The Enquiry Officer submitted the
4
said report to the Chief Justice/Administrative
Committee/Full Court for further consideration on the
question of quantum of punishment. The appellant was
called upon and he filed his response on 14.06.2006 to the
said Enquiry report. The High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in its Full Court Meeting held that 02.09.2006
accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and resolved to
punish the appellant with curtailment of 90% of his
pensionary benefits with immediate effect. Pursuant to the
said recommendation made by the Full Court of the High
Court, the respondent-State passed an order dated
22.01.2007, sanctioning withholding of 90% from the
pension of the appellant in view of the provisions contained
in Article 351(A) of the Civil Services Regulations.
iv. The aggrieved appellant challenged the legality of the said
order dated 22.01.2007 by filing a writ before the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The
Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned order
dated 17.04.2019 found that the punishment order in
reference to the charge nos. 1 to 3 was not sustainable in the
eye of law as the respondents could not have framed the
charges for the incidences which have taken place 4 years
5
prior to the chargesheet. However, the High Court held that
there was no ground to interfere with the findings recorded
in reference to the charge nos. 4 to 11. The High Court
considering the overall circumstances reduced the
curtailment of pensionary benefits to the extent of 70% in
place of 90%. The present appeal is directed against the said
order passed by the High Court.
3. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kant for the appellant
raised following contentions:
i. The Enquiry against the appellant was initiated on the basis
of the directions issued by the High Court in Agra
Development Authority, Agra Vs. State of UP and Ors.
1
,
though there was no complaint pending against the
appellant.
ii. A mere perusal of the charges levelled against the appellant
in the chargesheet on the face of it revealed that the charges
did not make out even a prima facie case of misconduct and
that they were neither factually nor legally substantiable.
iii. The right to seek compensation is a property right and not
mere a right to sue, and the same could be legally transferred

1 2004 SCC Online All 269
6
from one person to another as held by the Supreme Court
and High Court in catena of decisions. In this regard, he has
relied upon Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh2
;
Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller of
Estate Duty3
, Food Corporation of India Vs. Kailash
Chand4
and Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors.
5
.
iv. The compensation was awarded by the appellant on the
market value of the land on the date of issuance of
notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
It had no relevance to the price offered or investments made
by the subsequent purchasers in respect of the acquired
lands. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep Kant relied upon UP Jal
Nigam, Lucknow Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow
& Ors.6
; Meera Sahni Vs. Lt. Governor Delhi7
etc.
v. Many cases, in which the enhanced compensation was
awarded by the appellant were upheld by the High Court,
and in some cases by the Supreme Court and therefore it
could not be said that the appellant was actuated by
extraneous consideration as alleged.

2
(1976) 1 SCC 570
3
(1980) 2 SCC 1
4 2014 (1) ADJ 379 (DB)
5 2018 SCC Online All 5936
6
(1996) 3 SCC 124
7
(2008) 9 SCC 177
7
vi. There was no specific charge against the appellant that he
had taken bribe or shown any undue favour to any person or
group of persons. Hence, merely because an enhanced
compensation was awarded, no inference of extraneous
consideration could be drawn. Mere suspicion was not
sufficient to prove that the appellant had acted because of
extraneous consideration. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep Kant
has relied upon the decisions in the case of Krishna Prasad
Verma (Dead) Thr Legal Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.
8
, in case
of Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh9
, and the
latest decision of Supreme Court in case of Abhay Jain Vs.
High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan & Anr.10
.
vii. The appellant being not held guilty of any grave misconduct
or having caused any loss, he could not have been awarded
punishment for ‘grave misconduct’.
4. Ms. Charu Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2
raised the following contentions:
(i) The High Court has full control over its judicial officers in
the matter of disciplinary proceedings. In the instant case,
after holding a regular disciplinary inquiry and after

8
(2019) 10 SCC 640
9
(2020) 11 SCC 760
10 (2022) SCC Online SC 319
8
following the due procedure of law, the Inquiry Officer had
submitted his report before the High Court. The same was
placed before the Full Court and collective consciousness of
the High Court was shaken, considering the manner in
which the appellant had misconducted himself while
working as a judicial officer.
(ii) The scope of judicial review is very limited. As per the
settled legal position, the Courts cannot sit in appeal over
the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and
substitute its own findings, unless any perversity or patent
illegality or irrationality in the process was found. The
judicial review is permissible not against the decision but
against the decision-making process only. In this regard, she
has relied upon the decision of this Court in Sarvepalli
Ramaiah (D) Tr. Lrs Vs District Collector Chittoor11
.
(iii) The appellant was given full and fair opportunity during the
enquiry proceedings conducted against him and the decision
was taken by the full Court of the High Court after
considering the entire material on record. The punishment
imposed was also proportionate to the guilt of the appellant.

11 (2019) 4 SCC 500
9
(iv) Taking the Court to the evidence recorded by the Enquiry
Officer, she submitted that the appellant had enhanced the
compensation manifolds in order to extend undue favour to
the subsequent purchasers, who had no right to receive the
compensation. She also submitted that the claimants who
were the subsequent purchasers, had made a very meagre
investments and purchased the right to receive
compensation and right to sue in place of the original
owners, which was totally prohibited under Section 6(e) of
the Transfer of Property Act read with the provisions
contained in the Land Acquisition Act.
(v) Lastly, she drew our attention to the observations made by
this Court in case of Union of India vs. K.K. Dhawan12 in
which it has been held that the judicial officer, if acts
negligently or recklessly or attempts to confer undue favour
on a person or takes a decision which is actuated by corrupt
motive, then he is not acting as a judge. Strict rules of
evidence do not apply to the departmental inquiry.
5. At the outset, it may be noted that maintenance of high standard of
conduct and character of the judicial officers has always been a

12 (1993) 2 SCC 56
10
matter of great concern for this court. In C. Ravichandran Iyer Vs.
Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors.13
, this court emphasizing the
need to maintain high standard of integrity, honesty and moral
vigour by the judges, observed: -
“Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society
is, therefore, entitled to except that a Judge must be a
man of high integrity, honesty and required to have
moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to
corrupt or venial influences. He is required to keep
most exacting standards of propriety in judicial
conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of
judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher
standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge.
Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial
officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical
standards expected of a higher judicial functionary,
as wholesome standard of conduct which would
generate public confidence, accord dignity to the
judicial office and enhance public image, not only of
the Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic
requirement that a Judge's official and personal
conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be
in tune with the highest standard of propriety and
probity. The standard of conduct is higher than
expected of a layman and also higher than expected
of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must
adhere to high standards of probity and propriety,
higher than those deemed acceptable for others.
Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter
from the fallen standard in the society.”

13 (1995) 5 SCC 457
11
6. In Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh14
, this court
reiterated that the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a
higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity.
“19. It has amply been reiterated by this Court that
the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a
higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity.
Very recently in Shrirang Yadavrao
Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra [Shrirang
Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (2019)
9 SCC 144 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] , a Division
Bench of this Court very succinctly collated these
principles and reiterated that: (SCC pp. 146-47,
paras 5-10)
‘5. The first and foremost quality required in a
Judge is integrity. The need of integrity in the
judiciary is much higher than in other institutions.
The judiciary is an institution whose foundations are
based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore,
necessary that judicial officers should possess the
sterling quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak
Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu,
(2005) 1 SCC 201] held as follows: (SCC p. 203)
‘Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline,
apart from others. It is high time the judiciary took
utmost care to see that the temple of justice does not
crack from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe in
the justice-delivery system resulting in the failure of
public confidence in the system. It must be
remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a larger
threat than the storm outside.’
6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exacting
standard, both inside and outside the court. This
Court in Daya Shankar v. High Court of
Allahabad [Daya Shankar v. High Court of
Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 132]
held thus: (SCC pp. 4-5, para 11)
‘11. … Judicial officers cannot have two
standards, one in the court and another outside the

14 (2020) 11 SCC 760
12
court. They must have only one standard of rectitude,
honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely
unworthy of the office they occupy.’
7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should
always remember that he is there to serve the public.
A Judge is judged not only by his quality of judgments
but also by the quality and purity of his
character. Impeccable integrity should be reflected
both in public and personal life of a Judge. One who
stands in judgments over others should be
incorruptible. That is the high standard which is
expected of Judges.
8. Judges must remember that they are not merely
employees but hold high public office. In R.C.
Chandel v. High Court of M.P. [R.C.
Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8 SCC 58 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 469] , this Court held that the
standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much
higher than that of an ordinary person. The following
observations of this Court are relevant: (SCC p. 70,
para 29)
‘29. Judicial service is not an ordinary
government service and the Judges are not employees
as such. Judges hold the public office; their function
is one of the essential functions of the State. In
discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges
represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is
an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of
impeccable integrity and unimpeachable
independence. He must be honest to the core with
high moral values. When a litigant enters the
courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before
whom his matter has come, would deliver justice
impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration.
The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much
higher than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that
since the standards in the society have fallen, the
Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be
expected to have high standards and ethical firmness
required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar's wife, must
be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial
system is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For
13
a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to survive,
justice system and the judicial process have to be
strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial
functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual
honesty.’
9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must
decide the case only on the basis of the facts on record
and the law applicable to the case. If a Judge decides
a case for any extraneous reasons then he is not
performing his duty in accordance with law.
10. In our view the word “gratification” does not only
mean monetary gratification. Gratification can be of
various types. It can be gratification of money,
gratification of power, gratification of lust etc., etc.”
7. It may further be noted that when a disciplinary action can be taken
against the officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, has
also been succinctly laid down by this court in case of Union of India
Vs. K.K. Dhawan (supra): -
“28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or
recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a
person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the
contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is
important to bear in mind that in the present case, we
are not concerned with the correctness or legality of
the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the
respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer.
The legality of the orders with reference to the nine
assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision
under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that
the Government is not precluded from taking the
disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules.
Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be
taken in the following cases:
14
(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would
reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or
devotion to duty;
(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness
or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a
government servant;
(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the
prescribed conditions which are essential for the
exercise of the statutory powers;
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however
small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long
ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is
great.”
8. It is trite to say that the power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional Court is not that of an appellate authority but is
confined only to the decision-making process. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities is permissible only if the
proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural
justice or in contravention of statutory regulations regulating such
proceedings or if the decision on the face of it is found to be arbitrary
or capricious. The Courts would and should not act as an appellate
Court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
should interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the
15
material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly
conducted, and the findings are based on evidence, the adequacy of
the evidence or reliability of evidence would not be a ground to
interfere with the findings recorded in the departmental enquiries.
9. In the High Court Of Judicature At Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil
And Anr.
15
, this Court held :-
“The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have
approached the case as though it was an appeal
against the order of the administrative/ disciplinary
authority of the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can be
permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles of natural
justice or in violation of statutory regulations
prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision
of the authority is vitiated by considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or
if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very
face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no
reasonable person could have arrived at such a
conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But
we cannot overlook that the departmental authority
(in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High
Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has
been properly conducted. The settled legal position is
that if there is some legal evidence on which the
findings can be based, then adequacy or even
reliability of that evidence is not a matter for
canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

15 (2000) 1 SCC 416
16
10. Again, in the State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya16
, it was observed in para 7 as under:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in
the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts
will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in
departmental enquiries, except where such findings
are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have
arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material
on record. Courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations.”
11. Reverting to the facts of the case, it may be noted that there was a
regular disciplinary proceedings conducted against the appellant after
serving him the chargesheet and giving him full opportunity of
hearing. Thereafter, pursuant to the enquiry report submitted by the
Enquiry Officer, Full Court of the High Court had resolved on
02.09.2006 to accept the said enquiry report and punish the appellant
with curtailment of 90% of pensionary benefit with immediate effect.

16 (2011) 4 SCC 584
17
The order of punishment passed by the respondent-State on the basis
of the said recommendation made by the full court of the High Court,
was challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High
Court. The High Court dropped the charge nos. 1 to 3 and upheld the
charge nos. 4 to 11 against the appellant, and reduced the punishment
to the curtailment of 70% in place of 90% of his pensionary benefits.
12. Pertinently, the appellant had not made any allegation with regard to
violation of principles of natural justice or contravention of any
statutory rules or regulations having occasioned during the course of
enquiry proceedings or in the decision-making process. Therefore, in
absence of any such allegations, the subjective satisfaction arrived at
by the High Court on the administrative side, and the impugned order
passed by the High Court on the judicial side did not warrant any
interference of this court. When the Enquiry proceedings have been
found to have been conducted in proper and legal manner, and when
the High Court on administrative side as well as on judicial side, has
accepted the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer qua the charge
nos. 4 to 11 levelled against the appellant as “proved”, holding him
guilty of having committed “misconduct”, this court was not expected
to sit as an appellate authority and revaluate the adequacy or
reliability of the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer.
Nonetheless, this court just for the sake of satisfying its conscience,
18
had permitted the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kant to argue
on the merits of the charges levelled against the appellant.
13. The bone of contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate Mr.
Kant was that the charges levelled against the appellant were not
sustainable factually or legally in as much as the appellant had
decided the land reference cases as per the law prevailing at the
relevant time. According to him as held in Union of India & Ors. Vs.
Iqbal Singh (supra), Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant
Controller of Estate Duty (supra), Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors
(supra), the right to seek compensation is a property right and the
same could be transferred. In the opinion of this court, the said
decisions have been rendered considering the facts of each case, and
have hardly any relevance to the facts of the cases decided by the
appellant under the Land Acquisition Act. In case of Union of India
& Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh (supra), this court was examining the right of
the claimant as a legatee under the will executed by a displaced person
under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Rules, 1955. In case of Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant
Controller of Estate Duty (supra), the question of legality and
validity of the notices issued by the Assistant Controller of Estate
Duty, Hyderabad in respect of the compensation received by the legal
heirs and representatives of the deceased owner of the acquired land
19
was under consideration. So far as the charges levelled against the
appellant were concerned, it was alleged that the appellant had
awarded enhanced compensation at an exorbitantly higher rate in
favour of the subsequent purchasers/investors, who had no right to
receive any compensation, more particularly when Section 6(e) of the
Transfer of Property Act specifically prohibited the transfer of mere
right to sue. The said cases were found to have been decided by the
appellant in flagrant violation of the cardinal principles of law and
equity, and against all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to
unduly favour such subsequent purchasers who had no legal right to
receive the compensation.
14. Much reliance was placed by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kant
for the appellant on the decision of this court in case of Krishna
Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar (supra), Sadhna Chaudhary Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of
Judicature of Rajasthan & Anr (supra) to buttress his submission
that mere suspicion cannot constitute misconduct, and that any
probability of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or
documentary material. He also submitted that the disciplinary
proceedings could not be initiated against the judicial officers merely
because the judgment or orders passed by them were wrong. We
completely agree with the submissions made by the learned Senior
20
Counsel for the appellant and with the ratio of judgments relied upon
by him. Nonetheless, in the instant case the appellant was found to
have conducted the proceedings in the manner which had reflected on
his reputation and integrity. There was enough evidence and material
to show that the appellant had misconducted himself while
discharging his duties as a judicial officer, and had passed the judicial
orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law, to unduly
favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who had no
right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated by
corrupt motive. Under the circumstances, the High Court was
perfectly justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 235 of the Constitution.
15. In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the guise of
passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and
misconduct. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need
not always be a monetary consideration. It is often said that “the
public servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how
a fish drank the water”. A judge must decide the case on the basis of
the facts on record and the law applicable to the case. If he decides a
case for extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in
accordance with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar’s wife,
must be above suspicion.
21
16. In that view of the matter, we find no merit in the present appeal and
the same is dismissed.

………………………………J.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD]
NEW DELHI ………………………………J.
06.05.2022 [BELA M. TRIVEDI]

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