YAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC. VS SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE SOCIETY & ORS. ETC. CASE

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.41784197 OF 2022

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.10015

10034 of 2020]

YAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC. ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE

SOCIETY & ORS. ETC. ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.41984217 OF 2022

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.98919910

of 2020]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4218 OF 2022

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.14141 of

2020]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4219 OF 2022

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.300 of 2022]

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This batch of appeals challenge the judgment and order

dated 28th May, 2020, passed by the Allahabad High Court in

various writ petitions filed by the allottees of plots of land. The

writ petitions were filed challenging the demand of additional

amount made by the appellant hereinYamuna Expressway

Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as

“YEIDA”) in respect of plots of land leased out to the allottees;

the resolution of the Board of YEIDA dated 15th September,

2014, and the Government Order dated 29th August, 2014, vide

which the State Government had permitted YEIDA to recover

the additional amount from the allottees.

3. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. For the

sake of convenience, we will refer to the factual details as are

found in Writ Petition No.28968 of 2018, filed before the High

Court of Allahabad by M/s Shakuntla Education and Welfare

Society (the respondent No.1 herein).

4. A vast area of land was acquired by the State of Uttar

Pradesh in Gautam Budh Nagar district for public purposes.

The said area of land was acquired for the benefit of YEIDA.

After the land was acquired, YEIDA invited applications for the

allotment of plots of land in the area developed by it. In

response to the notice inviting applications for such allotment,

various allottees including the respondent No.1 herein applied

and were allotted plots admeasuring different sizes.

5. The respondent No.1 was informed by letter dated 14th

September, 2009, that a plot of 50 acres of land has been

reserved for it. Subsequently, a letter of allotment dated 10th

December, 2009 was issued to the respondent No.1, allotting

plot No.2 in Sector 7A, having an area of 50 acres, i.e.,

equivalent to 2,02,350 sq. meter. In the allotment letter, it was

stated that the premium of the land allotted was Rs.1,055/ per

sq. meter. It was also mentioned that the respondent No.1 had

deposited 10% of the premium amount and the balance 90% of

the premium amount was payable in monthly installments as

specified in the chart contained therein. The allotment letter

further stated that the lease deed shall be executed and the

possession of the land shall be handed over after completion of

the acquisition proceedings. It was stated that the land was

already in possession of YEIDA.

6. It was the contention of the respondent No.1 that on the

basis of the aforesaid allotment letter, a lease deed came to be

executed in favour of the respondent No.1 on 22nd January,

2010 for a period of 90 years after the respondent No.1 had

made substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of

the allotment and had deposited the necessary amount. The

lease deed provided that in addition to the amount payable by

the respondent No.1, as mentioned in the allotment letter, a

further amount, i.e., 2.5% of the total premium of the plot was

payable as annual lease rent.

7. It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that during

measurement, it was found that the plot allotted to it, had an

excess area of about 2 acres. The said excess land was also

leased out to it on the same terms and conditions. It was

further the case of the respondent No.1 that it was thereafter

given possession of the aforesaid land and on it, a University

known as Galgotias University was developed.

8. It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that

subsequently YEIDA came out with a policy and gave an option

to the respondent No.1 to deposit the entire premium amount

in lumpsum rather than in installments. This was subject to

certain rebate. It was stated that in accordance with the said

policy, a lumpsum amount was worked out by YEIDA and the

same was also paid by the respondent No.1. An undertaking

was also taken from the respondent No.1 on an affidavit on 7th

June, 2012, that in the event there was any clerical error or

miscalculation of the lumpsum amount, the respondent No.1

would make good the deficiency.

9. The State of Uttar Pradesh had also made largescale

acquisition of lands for the benefit of New Okhla Industrial

Development Authority (“NOIDA” for short) and Greater NOIDA.

A number of writ petitions came to be filed by farmers

challenging the said acquisition on various grounds before the

Allahabad High Court. The main ground of challenge was that

there was no urgency for acquiring the land and as such,

invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(hereinafter referred to as “the L.A. Act”) was not warranted. It

was contended that on account of invoking of Section 17 of the

L.A. Act, a valuable right available to the writ petitioners under

Section 5A of the L.A. Act was taken away. All the said writ

petitions came to be decided vide the judgment and order dated

21st October, 2011. In the leading case, i.e., Gajraj and others

vs. State of U.P. and others1

, the Full Bench of the Allahabad

High Court came to a finding that the urgency clause ought not

to have been invoked and the farmers were unlawfully denied

the benefit of Section 5A of the L.A. Act, wherein they could

1 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711

raise objections to the acquisition of the land. However, taking

into consideration the subsequent developments that the lands

had already been developed and third party rights had accrued,

the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of

Gajraj (supra) considered it appropriate not to disturb the

acquisition. In order to balance the equities, the Full Bench of

the Allahabad High Court directed payment of additional

compensation of 64.7% plus some other benefits to certain

class of farmers. It also directed certain other benefits to be

given to the farmers. The aforesaid additional compensation of

64.7% was worked out by the Court taking into consideration

the fact that in respect of one of the villages, i.e., Patwari,

NOIDA itself had entered into negotiations with the farmers and

had extended the benefit of additional compensation at the

aforesaid rate over and above the compensation awarded.

10. The aforesaid judgment and order of the Full Bench of the

Allahabad High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) came to be

confirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi vs. State

of Uttar Pradesh and others2

11. Since the farmers, whose lands were acquired for the

benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA, were being paid

additional compensation of 64.7%, there was unrest amongst

the farmers whose lands were acquired for YEIDA. It appears

that on account of agitation by the farmers, vast stretches of

lands could not be developed. As such, the Chief Executive

Officer (hereinafter referred to as “CEO”) of YEIDA addressed a

letter dated 10th April, 2013, to the State Government,

requesting to find a solution. The State Government, acting on

the said letter, instructed the Commissioner, Meerut Division,

Meerut, vide its letter of the same day, i.e., dated 10th April,

2013, to meet various groups of farmers and submit a report.

12. Accordingly, the Commissioner held a meeting with

various groups of farmers and the concerned District

Magistrates, and submitted a report to the State Government

2 (2015) 7 SCC 21

on 16th July, 2013, recommending constitution of a HighLevel

Committee.

13. The State Government vide Office Memo dated 3rd

September, 2013, constituted a HighLevel Committee under

the Chairmanship of Sri Rajendra Chaudhary, Minister of

Prison, State of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as “the

Chaudhary Committee”). The Chaudhary Committee also

consisted of the Divisional Commissioner of the concerned

Division and the Collector of concerned District. The

Chaudhary Committee submitted its recommendations to the

State Government, inter alia, recommending for the payment of

64.7% additional amount as “no litigation incentive” to the

farmers and for its reimbursement from the allottees in the

appropriate proportion.

14. The State Government accepted the recommendations of

the Chaudhary Committee and issued a Government Order

dated 29th August, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as “the said

G.O.”). The said G.O. provided that the farmers should be

offered 64.7% additional amount on the condition that they

withdraw their petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings

and undertake not to institute any litigation and create any

hindrance in the development work of YEIDA. It was clarified

in the said G.O. that the Government would not bear the

burden of the additional amount.

15. The said G.O. was placed before the Board of YEIDA in its

meeting, held on 15th September, 2014, and the same was

approved in the said meeting on the very same day, vide

Resolution dated 15th September, 2014.

16. In pursuance to the said G.O. and the Resolution dated

15th September, 2014 of the Board of YEIDA, additional demand

notices were issued to various allottees. In case of the

respondent No.1, an additional premium at the rate of Rs.600/

per sq. meter, for the land allotted and leased out, came to be

demanded, totaling to Rs.12,14,10,000/.

17. It was in this background that various writ petitions came

to be filed before the Allahabad High Court, including Writ

Petition No.28968 of 2018, filed by the respondent No.1.

18. By the impugned judgment and order dated 28th May,

2020, the Allahabad High Court allowed the said writ petitions

holding that:

(i) the decision in the case of Gajraj (supra), as approved

by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra), was

not a judgment in rem and could not have been applied

to proceedings for acquiring the land under different

notifications or for YEIDA;

(ii) the said G.O. and the Resolution of the Board of YEIDA

dated 15th September, 2014 were violative of the

provisions of the L.A. Act; and

(iii) the policy of the State Government was unfair,

unreasonable, arbitrary and in violation of the

provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

19. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals by way of

special leave have been filed on behalf of YEIDA, State of Uttar

Pradesh and farmers whose lands were acquired.

20. We have heard Shri C.A. Sundaram, Shri C.U. Singh and

Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of YEIDA, Shri Vinod Diwakar, learned Additional

Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar

Pradesh, Shri Rakesh U. Upadhyay and Dr. Surat Singh,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers whose lands

were acquired, Shri Nakul Dewan, Shri Sunil Gupta, Shri

Ravindra Srivastava and Shri Sanjiv Sen, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondentsoriginal

allottees of land.

21. The main contention of the appellants in the present

appeals is that the said G.O. was a policy decision of the State

Government, taken in public interest. It is submitted that the

said policy decision was taken after taking into consideration

the farmers’ agitation, the report of the Chaudhary Committee

and all other relevant factors. It is submitted that in order to

avoid acquisitions from being declared illegal, the Cabinet of

Ministers of the State Government had taken a considered

decision to adopt a formula, which was carved out by the

judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the

case of Gajraj (supra) and approved by this Court in the case of

Savitri Devi (supra).

22. It is also the contention on behalf of the appellants that

the policy of the State Government was in consonance with the

decision of this Court in the case of Centre for Public Interest

Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others3

wherein this Court has held that it is obligatory on the State to

ensure that people are adequately compensated for the transfer

of resource to the private domain. Relying on the judgment of

this Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union

of India and others4

, it is submitted that the policy of the

State Government was formulated by looking at the welfare of

3 (2012) 3 SCC 1

4 (2000) 10 SCC 664

the people at large rather than restricting the benefit to a small

section of the society. Relying on various judgments of this

Court, it is submitted that when the change in the policy of the

State is in public interest, it will override all private agreements

entered into by the State.

23. It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that, as

a matter of fact, on account of agitation of the farmers,

development could not take place in the concerned area. It is

submitted that various plot owners had approached the State

Government and its authorities for finding out a solution to

these problems, so that the development could proceed further.

It is submitted that the proceedings of the Chaudhary

Committee would itself reveal that all the stakeholders

including the representatives of allottees were heard by the

Chaudhary Committee. Not only that, but various allottees

had, in writing, agreed that they are willing to pay the

additional compensation so that the hindrance in the

development is removed. It is therefore submitted that it does

not lie in the mouth of the respondents to question the said

G.O. and oppose the payment of additional compensation.

24. Relying on various judgments of this Court, it is further

submitted on behalf of the appellants that the lease deed itself

permitted additions, alterations or modifications in the terms

and conditions of the lease. As such, even as per the lease

deed, the appellants were entitled to modify or alter the terms

and conditions of the lease. It is submitted that the word

“modify” has to be used in a broader sense and not in a

narrower sense.

25. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that

the High Court fell in great error in holding that no writ

petitions were pending. It is submitted that, as a matter of fact,

more than 600 writ petitions were pending when the policy

decision was taken by the State Government. It is submitted

that the policy decision was taken so as to save the acquisition,

which was otherwise liable to be quashed and set aside. It is

submitted that it is, in fact, the respondents, who are the

beneficiaries of the said measure and as such, having taken

benefit of the said measure, they cannot be permitted to refuse

to pay the additional compensation.

26. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the

allotees had an option, either to make additional payment or to

take refund with interest. Having opted not to seek refund with

interest, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to

refuse to pay the additional compensation.

27. It is also submitted on behalf of appellantYEIDA that it

had specifically submitted that stay orders passed by the High

Court were in force in most of the cases related to residential

plots, due to which the development work could not be

completed.

28. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers also

support the stand of YEIDA. It is submitted that the builders

had already recovered additional compensation from the

homebuyers. As such, the additional compensation was

already passed on by the builders to the homebuyers. It is

submitted that if the contention of the respondents is accepted,

it will amount to nothing else but allowing of unjust

enrichment.

29. It is further submitted that the respondents were not

entitled to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The writ petitions filed by them before

the Allahabad High Court were filed without impleading the

farmers who were necessary parties as respondents to the writ

petitions.

30. Elaborate arguments have been advanced on behalf of the

respondents. To summarize, they are as under:

(i) The respondents had not given any undertaking to pay

additional compensation, as stated;

(ii) The term “modification/addition” with regard to

payment was restricted only to any clerical or technical

error;

(iii) The High Court has rightly held that Gajraj (supra) and

Savitri Devi (supra) applied only to the peculiar facts

and circumstances of those cases. In the case of

Gajraj (supra), the High Court had done elaborate

exercise of categorizing the cases into three types. In

any case, it is submitted that the State itself was

aggrieved by the decision in Gajraj (supra), which has

been challenged by it before this Court;

(iv) In the present case, many of the acquisitions were by

private negotiations and as such, there is no question of

applicability of either Section 17 or Section 5A of the

L.A. Act;

(v) There were concluded contracts entered between the

allottees and YEIDA. As such, it was not open for

YEIDA to unilaterally change the terms and conditions

of the contract and enhance the lease premium;

(vi) The High Court has rightly held that the socalled

policy of the State Government was arbitrary, irrational

and therefore not sustainable in law;

(vii) On behalf of the respondent No.19Supertech Limited,

an additional submission was made that the

appropriate authority has already passed an order

admitting the petition filed under Section 7 of the

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;

(viii) On behalf of the individual plot owners, it is submitted

that the said plot owners, who belong to the middle

class section of the society cannot be burdened with the

additional amount.

(ix) The respondents also placed reliance on the judgment

of this Court in the case of ITC Limited vs. State of

Uttar Pradesh and others5

to support the proposition

that concluded contracts cannot be interfered with or

reopened.

5 (2011) 7 SCC 493

31. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties,

we have perused the material on record.

32. The main reasons that weighed with the High Court while

allowing the writ petitions are thus:

(i) That the lands which were acquired for YEIDA in the

present case were under different notification than the

notification which fell for consideration in the case of

Gajraj (supra);

(ii) That this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) has

categorically held that the directions given in the case

of Gajraj (supra) were issued by the High Court in the

peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and

therefore, the same could not have been applied to the

facts of the present case;

(iii) That some other petitions filed before the High Court

claiming the benefit on the basis of Gajraj (supra) were

ultimately rejected by the High Court;

(iv) That the State Government has to strictly act in

accordance with the law or statutory provisions. It

cannot act arbitrarily or in an unfair manner in breach

of specific provisions of law;

(v) That it is only for the Courts to grant equitable relief

and the Government is not entitled to pass order on

equitable ground of law.

33. We are called upon to examine the correctness of these

findings.

34. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Full Bench of

the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) is reproduced by

this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra). It will be

apposite to refer to following observations in the case of Savitri

Devi (supra):

“20. In a nutshell, relief was categorised in

three compartments. In the first instance,

those writ petitions which were filed belatedly

were dismissed. In the second category, three

villages, namely, Devala (Group 40), Village

Yusufpur Chak Sahberi (Group 38) and Village

Asdullapur (Group 42) the acquisition was set

aside. Land acquisition in respect of remaining

61 villages is concerned, the acquisition was

allowed to remain but the additional

compensation was increased to 64.7%with

further entitlement for allotment of

development abadi plot to the extent of 10%of

the acquired land of those landowners subject

to maximum of 2500 sq m.

21. We now reproduce the exact nature of

direction [2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] given by

the High Court, which reads as follows: (Gajraj

case [2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] , SCC

OnLine All)

“In view of the foregoing conclusions we

order as follows:

1. Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011,

Writ Petition No. 47545 of 2011 relating

to Village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522

of 2011 relating to Village Sadarpur, Writ

Petition No. 45196 of 2011, Writ Petition

No. 45208 of 2011, Writ Petition No.

45211 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45213 of

2011, Writ Petition No. 45216 of 2011,

Writ Petitions Nos. 4522324 of 2011,

Writ Petition No. 45226 of 2011, Writ

Petitions Nos. 4522930 of 2011, Writ

Petition No. 45235 of 2011, Writ Petition

No. 45238 of 2011, Writ Petition No.

45283 of 2011 relating to Village Khoda,

Writ Petition No. 46764 of 2011, Writ

Petition No. 46785 of 2011 relating to

Village Sultanpur, Writ Petition No.

46407 of 2011 relating to Village Chaura

Sadatpur and Writ Petition No. 46470 of

2011 relating to Village Alaverdipur

which have been filed with inordinate

delay and laches are dismissed.

2. (i) The writ petitions of Group

40 (Village Devla) being Writ Petition No.

31126 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 59131 of

2009, Writ Petition No. 22800 of 2010,

Writ Petition No. 37118 of 2011, Writ

Petition No. 42812 of 2009, Writ Petition

No. 50417 of 2009, Writ Petition No.

54424 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54652 of

2009, Writ Petition No. 55650 of 2009,

Writ Petition No. 57032 of 2009, Writ

Petition No. 58318 of 2009, Writ Petition

No. 22798 of 2010, Writ Petition No.

37784 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37787 of

2010, Writ Petitions Nos. 3112425 of

2011, Writ Petition No. 32234 of 2011,

Writ Petition No. 32987 of 2011, Writ

Petition No. 35648 of 2011, Writ Petition

No. 38059 of 2011, Writ Petition No.

41339 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47427 of

2011 and Writ Petition No. 47412 of 2011

are allowed and Notifications dated 265

2009 and 2262009 and all

consequential actions are quashed. The

petitioners shall be entitled for

restoration of their land subject to

deposit of compensation which they had

received under agreement/award before

the Authority/Collector.

(ii) Writ Petition No. 17725 of

2010 Omveer v. State of U.P. (Group 38)

relating to Village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi

is allowed. Notifications dated 1042006

and 692007 and all consequential

actions are quashed. The petitioners shall

be entitled for restoration of their land

subject to return of compensation

received by them under agreement/award

to the Collector.

(iii) Writ Petition No. 47486 of 2011

(Rajee v. State of U.P.) of Group 42

relating to Village Asdullapur is allowed.

Notifications dated 2712010 and 42

2010 as well as all subsequent

proceedings are quashed. The petitioners

shall be entitled to restoration of their

land.

3. All other writ petitions except as

mentioned above at (1) and (2) are

disposed of with the following directions:

(a) The petitioners shall be entitled

for payment of additional

compensation to the extent of same

ratio (i.e. 64.70%) as paid for Village

Patwari in addition to the

compensation received by them under

the 1997 Rules/award which payment

shall be ensured by the Authority at an

early date. It may be open for the

Authority to take a decision as to what

proportion of additional compensation

be asked to be paid by the allottees.

Those petitioners who have not yet

been paid compensation may be paid

the compensation as well as additional

compensation as ordered above. The

payment of additional compensation

shall be without any prejudice to rights

of landowners under Section 18 of the

Act, if any.

(b) All the petitioners shall be

entitled for allotment of

developed abadi plot to the extent of

10%of their acquired land subject to

maximum of 2500 sq m. We however,

leave it open to the Authority in cases

where allotment of abadi plot to the

extent of 6%or 8%has already been

made either to make allotment of the

balance of the area or may compensate

the landowners by payment of the

amount equivalent to balance area as

per average rate of allotment made of

developed residential plots.

4. The Authority may also take a

decision as to whether benefit of

additional compensation and allotment

of abadi plot to the extent of 10%be also

given to:

(a) those landholders whose earlier

writ petition challenging the

notifications has been dismissed

upholding the notifications; and

(b) those landholders who have not

come to the Court, relating to the

notifications which are the subject25

matter of challenge in the writ

petitions mentioned at Direction 3.

5. Greater Noida and its allottees are

directed not to carry on development and

not to implement the Master Plan 2021

till the observations and directions of the

National Capital Regional Planning Board

are incorporated in Master Plan 2021 to

the satisfaction of the National Capital

Regional Planning Board. We make it

clear that this direction shall not be

applicable in those cases where the

development is being carried on in

accordance with the earlier Master Plan

of Greater Noida duly approved by the

National Capital Regional Planning

Board.

6. We direct the Chief Secretary of the

State to appoint officers not below the

level of Principal Secretary (except the

officers of Industrial Development

Department who have dealt with the

relevant files) to conduct a thorough

inquiry regarding the acts of Greater

Noida (a) in proceeding to implement

Master Plan 2021 without approval of

NCRP Board, (b) decisions taken to

change the land use, (c) allotment made

to the builders, and (d) indiscriminate

proposals for acquisition of land, and

thereafter the State Government shall

take appropriate action in the matter.”

(emphasis in original)

22. We may point out at this stage that in

respect of all these three categories, the High

Court has provided its justification for granting

relief in the aforesaid nature. We shall be

referring to the same while discussing the

cases of the appellants belonging to one or the

other category.”

35. After considering various judgments, this Court in the

case of Savitri Devi (supra) observed thus:

“46. Thus, we have a scenario where, on

the one hand, invocation of urgency

provisions under Section 17 of the Act

and dispensing with the right to file

objection under Section 5A of the Act, is

found to be illegal. On the other hand, we

have a situation where because of delay

in challenging these acquisitions by the

landowners, developments have taken

place in these villages and in most of the

cases, thirdparty rights have been

created. Faced with this situation, the

High Court going by the spirit behind the

judgment of this Court in Bondu

Ramaswamy [(2010) 7 SCC 129 : (2010)

3 SCC (Civ) 1] came out with the solution

which is equitable to both sides. We are,

thus, of the view that the High Court

considered the ground realities of the

matter and arrived at a more practical

and workable solution by adequately

compensating the landowners in the form

of compensation as well as allotment of

developed abadi land at a higher rate i.e.

10%of the land acquired of each of the

landowners against the eligibility and to

(sic under) the policy to the extent of

5%and 6%of Noida and Greater Noida

land respectively.

36. It could thus be seen that this Court in the said case has

found that a peculiar situation arose, where on one hand

invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17 of the L.A.

Act and dispensing with the right to file objections under

Section 5A of the L.A. Act, were found to be illegal, while on the

other hand, the developments had already taken place in the

villages and in most of the cases, thirdparty rights were

created. Faced with this situation, the High Court came out

with the solution which was equitable to both sides. This

Court found that the High Court considered the ground

realities of the matter and arrived at a more practical and

workable solution by adequately compensating the landowners

in the form of compensation as well as allotment of

developed abadi land at a higher rate.

37. No doubt that this Court in paragraph 50 of the judgment

in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) makes it clear that the

directions of the High Court were given in the unique and

peculiar/specific background and therefore, it would not form

precedent for future cases.

38. It is to be noted that in the case of Greater Noida

Industrial Development Authority vs. Savitri Mohan (Dead)

Through Legal Representatives and others6

, this Court was

considering the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, wherein

it had quashed and set aside the Notification under Section 4(1)

and Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act as well as the Notification

under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act. A

specific question was framed by this Court in the said case in

paragraph 10, which reads thus:

“10. The only question for consideration

is whether the matter is covered by the

judgment of this Court in Savitri

Devi [Savitri Devi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7

SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 473] , as

claimed by the appellant in which case

6 (2016) 13 SCC 210

the respondents will be entitled to relief of

higher compensation and allotment of

land instead of quashing of acquisition

proceedings.”

39. Answering the aforesaid question, this Court in the said

case observed thus:

“13. A perusal of the above shows that

compensation had already been

disbursed to the extent of 76%.

Thereafter, for the entire land of Village

Chhapraula falling in Group 18, the relief

granted is payment of additional

compensation and allotment of land. As

already noted, the part of the order where

relief of quashing of notification has been

given is not of the category of the present

case. In these circumstances, we find

merit in the contention raised on behalf

of the appellant that the Division Bench

was in error in distinguishing the present

case from the judgment

in Gajraj [Gajraj v. State of U.P., (2011) 11

ADJ 1 : 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] .

14. As observed by this Court in Savitri

Devi [Savitri Devi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7

SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 473] , in

spite of the finding that invocation of

urgency clause was uncalled for, the

relief of setting aside the acquisition was

not granted having regard to the

development that had already been

undertaken on substantial part of the

land. However, to balance the equities

higher compensation and allotment of

land was ordered to meet the ends of

justice. [Savitri Devi v. State of U.P.,

(2015) 7 SCC 21, para 17]”

40. It could thus clearly be seen that though this Court in the

case of Savitri Devi (supra) observed that the judgment in the

case of Gajraj (supra) has to be construed particularly in the

unique and peculiar/specific background, in the case of

Savitri Mohan (Dead) (supra), this Court had followed the

principle laid down in the cases of Gajraj (supra) and Savitri

Devi (supra) and held that to balance the equities, it was

appropriate to issue directions for payment of higher

compensation and allotment of additional land. It was observed

that it was necessary to do so to meet the ends of justice.

41. At this juncture, we will have to consider the policy

decision of the State Government as formulated in the said

G.O. in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present

case.

42. After the decision of this Court in the cases of Gajraj

(supra) and Savitri Devi (supra), 64.7% additional

compensation and 10% of the land acquired of each of the land

owners, instead of 5% and 6% was made available to the

farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA as

well as Greater NOIDA. The lands acquired for the benefit of

YEIDA were also for the development of adjoining areas.

Feeling discriminated that they were being paid compensation

at much lesser rate as compared to the farmers whose lands

were acquired for NOIDA and Greater NOIDA, various farmers’

organizations started agitations. It is some of the allottees who

made representations to the CEO of YEIDA. One of such

representations was made by the respondent No.19Supertech

Private Limited to the CEO of YEIDA on 22nd November, 2013,

stating therein that on account of agitation by the Bhartiya

Kisan Union, they had to stop their work with effect from 20th

November, 2013. The said letter/representation stated that that

the main grievance of the officeholders of the Bhartiya Kisan

Union was that they want increased compensation and for

compensating the same, the Authority wants money from the

Builders. The said representation states that:

““the Authority is not resolving the

problems of the Farmers. The main issue

of farmers is that they want increased

compensation, and for compensating the

same, the Authority wants money from

the Builders. Builders are not ready to

pay this amount, due to which, we are

stopping the construction works of

Builders.” During the discussion, it was

said by the Company that “We are not

against the farmers or against their rights

and company gives it’s consent on this

fact that whatever the consent would be

made out between the Authority and

Government on the compensation

amount of farmers, that would be

accepted by the company.”

43. The said letter/representation categorically states that the

Company was not against the farmers or against their rights

and that it was willing to abide by whatever decision was

arrived at between the Authority and the Government on the

compensation amount of farmers.

44. Similar representations were made by Orris Greenbay Golf

Village on the same day, by Sunworld City Pvt. Ltd. on 26th

November, 2013, and by Gaursons Realtech Pvt. Ltd. on 4th

December, 2013.

45. It could thus be seen that on account of farmers’

resistance and their agitation, the development work of the

projects was stalled. When this was brought to the notice of

the State Government, the State Government nominated the

Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut vide order dated 10th

April, 2013, for looking into the issue. The Commissioner after

holding various meetings with the farmers’

organization/representatives submitted his report on 16th July,

2013, stating therein that the lands have been acquired by

YEIDA at large scale and taking into consideration the nature of

demands having wide implications, it was necessary that a

HighLevel Committee at the State Government level for

examining the demands of farmers be constituted. In this

background, the State Government vide order dated 3rd

September, 2013 constituted a Committee under the

Chairmanship of Shri Rajendra Chaudhary, Minister of Prison,

State of Uttar Pradesh. The Divisional Commissioner of the

concerned Division and the Collector of the concerned District

were also the members of the Chaudhary Committee. The

Chaudhary Committee was constituted for the purpose of

resolving the problems of the villagers/farmers and the

problems related to the industries. The Chaudhary Committee

considered the following issues:

“a. Demands raised by the Farmers/

Farmers' Organizations/

Representatives and

Memorandums/ Demand Letters

produced by them and the favour

put forth by them during the

personal hearing.

b. Favour put forth by the

Industrialists/ Builders/ Allottees

during personal hearing.

c. Favour and opinion of Yamuna

Expressway Authority.”

46. The Chaudhary Committee conducted its proceedings on

30th September, 2013 with the representatives of the farmers.

The said Committee thereafter held deliberations with the

representatives of the allottees on 29th October, 2013. It will be

apposite to refer to the relevant part of the discussion that took

place in the meeting held with the representatives of the

allottees on 29th October,2013, which reads thus:

“2. It was informed by the representative

of M/s. SDIL that due to the agitation

of local farmers on the issues of their

problems/demands, at present, we

are not available to carry out any

work on the spot, therefore, whatever

the decision will be taken by the

Committee/ Government for disposal

of the problems of farmers, we will

cooperate in the same.

3. It was informed by the representative

of M/s. Supertech Pvt. Ltd. that the

farmers are agitating in the entire

area and they are interrupting the

development work. It is necessary to

solve the problems of farmers. It was

also informed by him that he will

cooperate in the decision to be taken

by the Government/Committee for

disposal of the problems.

4. It was informed by the

representatives of M/s. Silverline and

other Units/Institutions that due to

interrupting their development works

as a result of the demands being

raised by the farmers of the area, the

project cost is getting escalated. Due

to solving the problems of farmers,

the investment will be increased in

the area and in disposal of the same,

they will provide their assistance.

5. Regarding the demand of giving 10%

abadi land in place of 7% abadi land

to be given to the ancestral farmers,

it was said by the representative of

M/s. J.P. Infratech Pvt. Ltd. namely

Sh. Sameer Gaur that earlier, they

have been paid value of 7% abadi

land and development charges, now,

if any other cost is imposed, then,

company is not in position to bear the

same.”

47. It could thus be seen that even the representatives of the

allottees were of the opinion that on account of the agitation of

the local farmers, the developers were not in a position to carry

out any work on the spot. It was also impressed upon that on

account of this, the cost of the project was getting escalated.

As such, it was urged to solve the problem.

48. The Chaudhary Committee also considered the

submissions made on behalf of the appellantYEIDA. It was

submitted on behalf of the appellantYEIDA that on account of

the judgment delivered in a similar case, i.e., in the case of

Gajraj (supra), the farmers, whose lands were acquired, were

also demanding the compensation on similar lines.

49. After considering the rival submissions, the Chaudhary

Committee gave its recommendation as under:

“Recommendation of Committee:

The opinion of Authority as well as the

demands of the Farmers' Organizations

were carefully considered by the

Committee. In the common order passed

in the different Writ Petitions filed by

Noida and Greater Noida Authorities, the

Hon'ble High Court by not finding the

proceedings conducted under Section 17 of

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be proper,

had directed that the Authority shall pay

64.7% additional compensation to the

farmers and return them 10% developed

land. Also in the Yamuna Expressway

Authority, around 700 Writ Petitions have

been filed by the farmers by challenging

the different notifications, wherein, stay

orders have been passed in the most of the

Petitions, the circumstances which were

existing in the acquisition made by Noida

and Greater Noida Authority, same

circumstances are also existed in the most

of the cases of acquisition of Yamuna

Expressway. The lands acquired by the

Authority, have been allotted to the

different allottees for different projects, due

to which, the third party rights have been

created in this acquired land and if order

is passed against the Authority in the

Petitioners filed against the Acquisition

Proceedings, then, many difficulties would

arise. Therefore, keeping in view the legal

expected legal complications, it is required

to do the out of court settlement with the

affected farmers. At the time of discussion,

it was assured by the farmers'

representatives that if the Government/

Authority agrees to give 64.7% additional

compensation, then, the farmers will

withdraw the Petitions filed in the Court.

Therefore, Committee recommends that:

I .(a) If, all the farmers/ Petitioners of a

village related to the land acquired/

purchased by the Yamuna

Expressway Authority, withdraw their

Petitions filed in the Hon'ble High

Court or in any other Court and if

they give written assurance for future

that they will not file any claim

against the Authority or it's allottees

in any Court and will not cause any

obstruction in the Development

Works, then, like the Greater Noida

Authority, the Authority may consider

to give amount equivalent to 64.7%

additional compensation in the form

of No Litigation Incentive/ Additional

Compensation, which may be

compensated proportionally from the

concerned allottees and same may

also be imposed proportionally in the

costing of allotment of land available

with the Authority.

These benefits shall be allowed also

to those farmers, whose' lands have

been purchased by the Authority vide

Sale Deed on mutual consent basis.

(b) The process of payment of additional

compensation, be completed

villagewise in accordance with the

Schemes/ Priorities of Authority after

obtaining physical possession of on

the spot and after withdrawal of all

the Writ petitions/ Cases of

concerned village after doing

settlement with the farmers. In view

of the financial condition of

Authority, if the payment of

additional compensation is not

possible in lumpsum, then, the

consideration could also be made

regarding payment in installments or

in the form of developed land.

2. Regarding allotment of 10%

developed land in place of 7%

developed land, the proceedings be

conducted according to the order of

Appeal/SLP filed by the

Noida/Greater Noida Authorities.

3. The proceedings of amendment

proposed by the Authority in Abadi

Rules, are at final stage of approval,

the proceedings be conducted as per

the decision of Government.

4. Regarding abolishing the distinction

between ancestral and nonancestral,

this decision has been taken in the

48th meeting dated 08.01.2014 of

Yamuna Expressway Authority

Board, that such land owners of the

lands acquired or to be

acquired/purchased by the

Authority, whose' names have

remained recorded in Six Yearly

land prior to the date of

establishment of Authority i.e.

24.04.2001, and the landowners are

residents of any village related to any

District lying within the notified area

of Yamuna Expressway Authority,

then, the benefit of 7% abadi land be

granted to him against his acquired

land. In the decision of Authority

Board, this facility has also been

allowed to the successors of eligible

land owners, who fulfill the aforesaid

conditions. The further proceedings

be conducted as per the decision of

Authority Board.

5. In view of the demands of farmers

organizations and local public of

District Mathura, after taking into

consideration the proposal submitted

by Concessionaire namely M/s. J.P.

Infratech Ltd., in the 48th meeting

dated 08.01.2014 of Yamuna

Expressway Authority Board, a

decision in principle has been taken

for construction of Exist & Entry

Ramps at BajnaNauhjheel Road at

Yamuna Expressway and by making

necessary amendments in DPR

accordingly, a letter has been sent to

the Concessionaire namely M/s. J,P.

Infratech for necessary action. The

further proceedings be conducted as

per the decision of Authority Board.

It is recommended by the Committee that

the aforementioned additional benefits be

granted to the landowners only in that

case when they will handover the physical

possession of land to the Authority and

withdraw Writ Petition/Case pending in

Hon'ble High Court or any other Court and

agreement for not causing any obstruction

in future in the development works of

allottees and for not filing any claim in any

Court against the acquisition of land in

future. Regarding the other demands, the

Committee will give it's recommendation

after further consideration.”

50. It could thus be seen that the recommendations of the

Chaudhary Committee were principally intended to resolve the

issue between the farmers and the allottees, and to find out a

workable solution to the problem. The Chaudhary Committee

recommended similar treatment to be given to the farmers

whose lands were acquired for YEIDA, as was given to the

farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA

and Greater NOIDA. The Chaudhary Committee found that the

same benefits as were given to the farmers whose lands were

acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA in view of

the judgment of the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra), as

affirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra)

should also be given to the farmers whose lands were acquired

for the benefit of YEIDA. However, this was made conditional.

Additional benefit was granted to the landowners on the

condition that they would handover the physical possession of

land to YEIDA and withdraw the writ petitions/cases filed by

them pending before the High Court.

51. The State Government vide the said G.O. gave effect to the

recommendations of the Chaudhary Committee. YEIDA too, in

its Board meeting dated 15th September, 2014, resolved to

implement the decision of the State Government. Accordingly,

demand notices came to be issued to the allottees.

52. It could thus be seen that the policy decision of the State

Government is preceded by various factors. Firstly, the

farmers’ agitation, after they were denied the benefits which

were granted to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the

benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA; the report of the

Commissioner, the appointment of the Chaudhary Committee,

the deliberations of the Chaudhary Committee with various

stakeholders, and thereafter the recommendations of the

Chaudhary Committee.

53. It will be relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in

the case of the Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of

India and another7

, wherein this Court has referred to various

earlier pronouncements and the treatise of Prof. S.A. de Smith

on “Judicial Review of Administrative Action”. The relevant

paragraphs of the said judgment read thus:

“12. It has been settled by this Court that

the doctrine of promissory estoppel is

applicable against the Government also

particularly where it is necessary to

prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The

doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into

aid to compel the Government or the

public authority “to carry out a

representation or promise which is

contrary to law or which was outside the

authority or power of the officer of the

Government or of the public authority to

make”. There is preponderance of judicial

opinion that to invoke the doctrine of

promissory estoppel clear, sound and

positive foundation must be laid in the

petition itself by the party invoking the

doctrine and that bald expressions,

without any supporting material, to the

effect that the doctrine is attracted

because the party invoking the doctrine

has altered its position relying on the

assurance of the Government would not be

sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In

our opinion, the doctrine of promissory

7 (1995) 1 SCC 274

estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract

and the courts are bound to consider all

aspects including the results sought to be

achieved and the public good at large,

because while considering the applicability

of the doctrine, the courts have to do

equity and the fundamental principles of

equity must for ever be present to the

mind of the court, while considering the

applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine

must yield when the equity so demands if

it can be shown having regard to the facts

and circumstances of the case that it

would be inequitable to hold the

Government or the public authority to its

promise, assurance or representation.

13. The ambit, scope and amplitude of the

doctrine of promissory estoppel has been

evolved in this country over the last

quarter of a century through successive

decisions of this Court starting with Union

of India v. IndoAfghan Agencies

Ltd. [(1968) 2 SCR 366 : AIR 1968 SC 718]

Reference in this connection may be made

with advantage to Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.

Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal

Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582 : (1970) 3 SCR

854] ; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.

Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(1979) 2 SCC 409 :

1979 SCC (Tax) 144 : (1979) 2 SCR

641] ; Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of

Haryana [(1981) 1 SCC 11 : (1980) 3 SCR

689] ; Union of India v. Godfrey Philips

India Ltd. [(1985) 4 SCC 369 : 1986 SCC

(Tax) 11] ; Indian Express Newspapers

(Bom) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1985) 1

SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] ; Pournami

Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1986 Supp SCC

728 : 1987 SCC (Tax) 134] ; Shri Bakul Oil

Industries v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC

31 : 1987 SCC (Tax) 74 : (1987) 1 SCR

185] ; Asstt. CCT v. Dharmendra Trading

Co. [(1988) 3 SCC 570 : 1988 SCC (Tax)

432] ; Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of

Punjab [(1992) 2 SCC 411] and Union of

India v. Hindustan Development

Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499 : JT (1993) 3 SC

15] In Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [(1985) 4

SCC 369 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 11] this Court

opined: (SCC p. 388, para 13)

“We may also point out that the

doctrine of promissory estoppel being an

equitable doctrine, it must yield when

the equity so requires; if it can be

shown by the Government or public

authority that having regard to the facts

as they have transpired, it would be

inequitable to hold the Government or

public authority to the promise or

representation made by it, the Court

would not raise an equity in favour of

the person to whom the promise or

representation is made and enforce the

promise or representation against the

Government or public authority. The

doctrine of promissory estoppel would

be displaced in such a case, because on

the facts, equity would not require that

the Government or public authority

should be held bound by the promise or

representation made by it.”

14. In Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram

Kumar [(1976) 3 SCC 540 : 1976 SCC (Tax)

360 : AIR 1976 SC 2237] four learned

Judges of this Court observed: (SCC p.

545, para 19)

“The fact that sales of country liquor

had been exempted from sales tax vide

Notification No. ST1149/X802 (33)51

dated 641959 could not operate as an

estoppel against the State Government

and preclude it from subjecting the

sales to tax if it felt impelled to do so in

the interest of the revenues of the State

which are required for execution of the

plans designed to meet the everincreasing pressing needs of the

developing society. It is now well settled

by a catena of decisions that there can

be no question of estoppel against the

Government in the exercise of its

legislative, sovereign or executive

powers.”

15. Prof. S.A. de Smith in his celebrated

treatise Judicial Review of Administrative

Action, 3rd Edn., at p. 279 sums up the

position thus:

“Contracts and covenants entered

into by the Crown are not to be

construed as being subject to implied

terms that would exclude the exercise

of general discretionary powers for

the public good. On the contrary they

are to be construed as incorporating

an implied term that such powers

remain exercisable. This is broadly

true of other public authorities also.

But the status and functions of the

Crown in this regard are of a higher

order. The Crown cannot be allowed

to tie its hands completely by prior

undertakings is as clear as the

proposition that the Courts cannot

allow the Crown to evade compliance

with ostensibly binding obligations

whenever it thinks fit. If a public

authority lawfully repudiates or

departs from the terms of a binding

contract in order to have been bound

in law by an ostensibly binding

contract because the undertakings

would improperly fetter its general

discretionary powers the other party

to the agreement has no right

whatsoever to damages or

compensation under the general law,

no matter how serious the damages

that party may have suffered.”

54. It has been held by this Court that the doctrine of

promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the

courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results

sought to be achieved and the public good at large. It has been

held that while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the

courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of

equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, while

considering the applicability of the doctrine. It has been held

that the doctrine being an equitable doctrine, it must yield

when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the

Government or Public Authority that having regard to the facts

and circumstances as they have transpired, it would be

inequitable to hold the Government or the Public Authority to

the promise, assurance or representation made by it. The

judgment of this Court in the case of Kasinka Trading (supra)

has been consistently followed.

55. If we apply the principle as laid down in the case of

Kasinka Trading (supra) to the facts of the present case, it

will be clear that the policy decision of the State Government

was not only in the larger public interest but also in the interest

of the respondents. The projects were stalled on account of the

farmers’ agitation. The farmers felt discriminated as they found

that the compensation paid to them was much lesser than the

one being paid to the equally circumstanced farmers in NOIDA

and Greater NOIDA. It was the allottees of the land who had

approached the State Government for redressal of the problem.

In these circumstances, the Government took cognizance of the

problem and appointed the Commissioner to look into the

issue. Since the Commissioner recommended appointment of a

HighLevel Committee, the Chaudhary Committee was

appointed. The Chaudhary Committee had threadbare

discussions with all the stakeholders. It also took into

consideration that on account of stay orders passed by the High

Court in various writ petitions, the development of the project

was stalled. On account of pendency of the writ petitions, there

was always a hanging sword over the entire acquisition of it

being declared unlawful. In this premise, in order to find out a

workable solution and that too, on the basis of the law laid

down by the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) as

affirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) and

followed by this Court in the case of Savitri Mohan (Dead)

(supra), recommendations were made by the Chaudhary

Committee. The Chaudhary Committee specifically

recommended that the additional compensation and other

incentives would be paid only if the landowners agree to

handover physical possession of the land to YEIDA and

withdraw all the litigations.

56. It could thus be seen that the recommendations, which

were accepted by the State Government and formulated in the

policy, were made taking into consideration the interests of all

the stakeholders. As held by this Court, it is not only the

interest of a small section of the allottees which should weigh

with the Government, but the Government should also give due

weightage to the interest of the large section of farmers, whose

lands were acquired.

57. We further find that the High Court fell in error in

observing that no writ petitions were filed challenging the

acquisition for YEIDA. The report of the Chaudhary Committee

itself would clarify that YEIDA had itself submitted that insofar

as the residential plots are concerned, there were stay orders

operating in majority of the writ petitions due to which the

development of the project work was stalled.

58. We are therefore of the considered view that the policy

decision of the State Government was in the larger public

interest. It was taken considering entire material collected by

the Chaudhary Committee after due deliberations with all the

stakeholders. The factors which were taken into consideration

by the State Government were relevant, rational and founded

on ground realities. In this view of the matter, the finding of

the High Court that the policy decision of the State Government

was arbitrary, irrational and unfair, is totally incorrect.

59. The law with regard to interference in the policy decision

of the State is by now very well crystalized. This Court in the

case of Essar Steel Limited vs Union of India and others8

had an occasion to consider the scope of interference in the

policy decision of the State. After referring to various decisions

of this Court, the Court observed thus:

“43. Before we can examine the validity of

the impugned policy decision dated 63

2007, it is crucial to understand the extent

of the power vested with this Court to

review policy decisions.

44. In DDA [DDA v. Allottee of SFS Flats,

(2008) 2 SCC 672 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 684]

on issue of judicial review of policy

decisions, the power of the Court is

examined and observed as under: (SCC pp.

69798, paras 6465)

“64. An executive order termed as a

policy decision is not beyond the pale of

judicial review. Whereas the superior

courts may not interfere with the nittygritty of the policy, or substitute one by

the other but it will not be correct to

contend that the court shall lay its

judicial hands off, when a plea is raised

that the impugned decision is a policy

8 (2016) 11 SCC 1

decision. Interference therewith on the

part of the superior court would not be

without jurisdiction as it is subject to

judicial review.

65. Broadly, a policy decision is

subject to judicial review on the

following grounds:

(a) if it is unconstitutional;

(b) if it is dehors the provisions of

the Act and the Regulations;

beyond its power of delegation;

(d) if the executive policy is

contrary to the statutory or a larger

policy.”

45. Thus, we will test the impugned policy

on the above grounds to determine

whether it warrants our interference under

Article 136 or not. Further, this Court

neither has the jurisdiction nor the

competence to judge the viability of such

policy decisions of the Government in

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of

India [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of

India, (2013) 7 SCC 1] , this Court has

further held as under: (SCC p. 17, para 41)

“41. … This Court sitting in the

jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment over

the commercial or business decision

taken by parties to the agreement, after

evaluating and assessing its monetary

and financial implications, unless the

decision is in clear violation of any

statutory provisions or perverse or

taken for extraneous considerations or

improper motives. States and its

instrumentalities can enter into various

contracts which may involve complex

economic factors. State or the State

undertaking being a party to a contract,

have to make various decisions which

they deem just and proper. There is

always an element of risk in such

decisions, ultimately it may turn out to

be a correct decision or a wrong

one. But if the decision is taken bona

fide and in public interest, the mere fact

that decision has ultimately proved to be

wrong, that itself is not a ground to hold

that the decision was mala fide or taken

with ulterior motives.”

(emphasis supplied)

46. In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu

Maiyam v. Union of India [Villianur

Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of

India, (2009) 7 SCC 561] , it was held as

under: (SCC p. 605, para 169)

“169. It is neither within the domain

of the courts nor the scope of judicial

review to embark upon an enquiry as to

whether a particular public policy is

wise or whether better public policy can

be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined

to strike down a policy at the behest of a

petitioner merely because it has been

urged that a different policy would have

been fairer or wiser or more scientific or

more logical. Wisdom and advisability of

economic policy are ordinarily not

amenable to judicial review. In matters

relating to economic issues the

Government has, while taking a

decision, right to “trial and error” as long

as both trial and error are bona fide and

within the limits of the authority. For

testing the correctness of a policy, the

appropriate forum is Parliament and not

the courts.”

(emphasis supplied)

47. A threeJudge Bench of this Court

in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of

India [Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union

of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664] cautioned

against courts sitting in appeal against

policy decisions. It was held as under:

(SCC p. 763, para 234)

“234. In respect of public projects

and policies which are initiated by the

Government the courts should not

become an approval authority. Normally

such decisions are taken by the

Government after due care and

consideration. In a democracy welfare of

the people at large, and not merely of a

small section of the society, has to be the

concern of a responsible Government. If

a considered policy decision has been

taken, which is not in conflict with any

law or is not mala fide, it will not be in

public interest to require the court to go

into and investigate those areas which

are the function of the executive. For any

project which is approved after due

deliberation the court should refrain

from being asked to review the decision

just because a petitioner in filing a PIL

alleges that such a decision should not

have been taken because an opposite

view against the undertaking of the

project, which view may have been

considered by the Government, is

possible. When two or more options or

views are possible and after considering

them the Government takes a policy

decision it is then not the function of

the court to go into the matter afresh

and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a

policy decision.”

(emphasis supplied)

48. A similar sentiment was echoed by a

Constitution Bench of this Court

in Peerless General Finance & Investment

Co. Ltd. v. RBI [Peerless General Finance &

Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI, (1992) 2 SCC

343] , wherein it was observed as under:

(SCC p. 375, para 31)

“31. … Courts are not to interfere

with economic policy which is the

function of experts. It is not the function

of the courts to sit in judgment over

matters of economic policy and it must

necessarily be left to the expert bodies.

In such matters even experts can

seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts

cannot be expected to decide them

without even the aid of experts.”

49. A perusal of the abovementioned

judgments of this Court would show that

this Court should exercise great caution

and restraint when confronted with

matters related to the policy regarding

commercial matters of the country.

Executive policies are usually enacted after

much deliberation by the Government.

Therefore, it would not be appropriate for

this Court to question the wisdom of the

same, unless it is demonstrated by the

aggrieved persons that the said policy has

been enacted in an arbitrary,

unreasonable or mala fide manner, or that

it offends the provisions of the

Constitution of India.”

60. It is trite law that an interference with the policy decision

would not be warranted unless it is found that the policy

decision is palpably arbitrary, mala fide, irrational or violative

of the statutory provisions. We are therefore of the considered

view that the High Court was also not right in interfering with

the policy decision of the State Government, which is in the

larger public interest.

61. It will also be apposite to refer to the following

observations of this Court in the case of APM Terminals B.V.

vs. Union of India and another9

“67. It has been the consistent view of this

Court that a change in policy by the

Government can have an overriding effect

over private treaties between the

Government and a private party, if the

same was in the general public interest

and provided such change in policy was

guided by reason. Several decisions have

been cited by the parties in this regard in

the context of preventing private

monopolisation of port activities to an

extent where such private player would

assume a dominant position which would

enable them to control not only the

berthing of ships but the tariff for use of

the port facilities.”

62. It could thus be seen that it is more than settled that a

change in policy by the Government can have an overriding

effect over private treaties between the Government and a

9 (2011) 6 SCC 756

private party, if the same was in the general public interest.

The additional requirement is that such change in policy is

required to be guided by reason.

63. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondents on the

judgment of this Court in the case of ITC Limited (supra) is

concerned, in our considered view, the said judgment would not

be of any assistance to the case of the respondents. This Court

in the said case in paragraph 107.1 has clearly observed that in

the case of conflict between public interest and personal

interest, public interest should prevail.

64. A number of judgments of this Court have been cited at

the Bar by the respondents in support of the proposition that in

view of concluded contracts, it was not permissible for the

appellants to unilaterally increase the premium by framing a

policy.

65. We have hereinabove elaborately discussed that when a

policy is changed by the State, which is in the general public

interest, such policy would prevail over the individual

rights/interests. In that view of the matter, we do not find it

necessary to refer to the said judgments. The policy of the

State Government as reflected in the said G.O. was not only in

the larger public interest but also in the interest of the

respondents.

66. We further find that the respondents have indulged into

the conduct of approbate and reprobate. They have changed

their stance as per their convenience. When their projects were

stalled on account of the farmers’ agitation, it is they who

approached the State Authorities for finding out a solution.

When the State Government responded to their representations

and came up with a policy which was equitable and in the

interest of both, the farmers and the allottees and when the

said policy paved the way for development, when called upon to

pay the additional compensation, the respondentsallottees

somersaulted and challenged the very same policy before the

High Court, which benefitted them. We have already

hereinabove made reference to the various communications

made by the allottees of the land for intervention of the State

Government.

67. Insofar as the individual plot owners are concerned, it will

be worthwhile to mention that the residential plot owners in

Sectors 18 and 20 of Yamuna Expressway city have formed an

association, viz., Yamuna Expressway ResidentialPlotOwners

Welfare Association (hereinafter referred to as “the YERWA”).

The communication addressed by the president of the YERWA

to the CEO of YEIDA would reveal that 98.5% of the

allottees/owners have voted in favour of paying the additional

premium demanded by the Authority. The only request made

by the YERWA is with regard to making a provision for paying

additional premium in installments.

68. It can thus be seen that even insofar as the individual

residential plot owners are concerned, more than 98% of the

plot owners do not have any objection to the payment of the

additional compensation.

69. With respect to the contention of the respondent No.19

Supertech with regard to initiation of CIRP, we are not

concerned with the said issue in the present proceedings. The

law will take its own course.

70. In conclusion, we are of the considered view that the

policy decision of the State Government as reflected in the said

G.O. dated 29th August, 2014 and the Resolution of the Board

of YEIDA dated 15th September, 2014 were in the larger public

interest, taking care of the concerns of the allottees as well as

the farmers. As already discussed hereinabove, had the said

decision not been taken, there was a hanging sword of the

acquisition being declared unlawful. The development of the

entire project was stalled on account of farmers’ agitation.

Before taking the policy decision, the State Government,

through the Chaudhary Committee, had done a wide range of

deliberations with all the stakeholders including the allottees,

farmers and YEIDA. The policy decision was taken after taking

into consideration all relevant factors and was guided by

reasons. In any case, it is a settled position of law that in case

of a conflict between public interest and personal interest,

public interest will outweigh the personal interest. The High

Court was therefore not justified in holding that the policy

decision of the State was unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary.

We are of the considered view that the High Court has erred in

allowing the writ petitions. The present appeals, therefore,

deserve to be allowed.

71. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeals are allowed;

(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 28th May,

2020, passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ

Petition No. 28968 of 2018 and companion matters is

quashed and set aside;

(iii) The writ petitions filed by the respondents covered by

the impugned judgment and order dated 28th May, 2020

passed by the Allahabad High Court are dismissed;

72. Applications for Intervention are allowed. Pending

applications, including the applications for directions, shall

stand disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order

as to costs.

…..….......................J.

[L. NAGESWARA RAO]

…….........................J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 19, 2022.

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Indian Constitution

YAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC. VS SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE SOCIETY & ORS. ETC. CASE

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