State Bank of India & Anr. vs K.S. Vishwanath Case

State Bank of India & Anr. vs K.S. Vishwanath  Case

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3490 OF 2022

State Bank of India & Anr.               ...Appellants

Versus

K.S. Vishwanath        ...Respondent

J U D G M E N T 

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

judgment and order dated 16.03.2021 passed by the High

Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No.4220 of

2011 by which the High Court has dismissed the said Writ

Appeal No.4220 of 2011 preferred by the appellant – employer

– SBI and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by

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the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of dismissal

passed by the Disciplinary Authority and directing the Bank

to pay to the delinquent officer consequential benefits without

back wages, the appellant ­ SBI – employer has preferred the

present appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as

under:

That the respondent herein ­ the delinquent officer was

working as a Deputy Manager (Cash) at SSI Peenya II Stage

Branch   of   the   SBI   Bank   at   Bangalore   from   14.03.1996

onwards.  That there was a requirement of Rs.10 lakhs which

was required to be collected from Peenya Industrial Estate

Branch of the Bank.   That on the basis of one forged letter

dated 06.08.1996, the delinquent officer withdrew Rs.10 lakhs

fraudulently.   The delinquent officer produced a false letter

dated   06.08.1996   at   Peenya   Industrial   Estate   Branch   and

withdrew   the   aforesaid   amount   of   Rs.10   lakhs   which

remained unaccounted at the SSI Branch.   The letter dated

06.08.1996 was purported to have been signed by one A.R.

Balasubramanian, the AGM of the SSI Branch.  He denied his

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signature found on the letter dated 06.08.1996.  Subsequently

on tallying the account it was found that Rs.10 lakhs was

withdrawn from Peenya Industrial Estate Branch which was

to be deposited at SSI Branch had not been accounted for and

the said amount had not been deposited with the SSI Branch.

Thereafter the local Head Officer submitted a complaint to the

CBI on 10.11.1998, based on which the FIR was registered.

The   aforesaid   FIR   was   registered   after   the   preliminary

investigation was held on 18.09.1998.  It was found that the

fraud has been committed by the insider, who was well aware

of   the   procedure   for   cash   remittance   as   well   as   with   the

signature   of   the   Branch   Manager   of   SSI   Branch.     The

respondent – delinquent officer was placed under suspension.

Thereafter a departmental enquiry was initiated against the

delinquent officer and he was charged with the charge­sheet

as under:

“(i)  On 6th August, 1996, you got prepared a

set   of   fraudulent   cash   remittance

documented and by producing the same at

Peenya Industrial Estate Branch, Bangalore

made the officials threat believe them to be

genuine and part with Rs.10 Lacs as cash

remittance to SSI Peenya II stage Branch and

you failed to account for the same in the

books of SSI Peenya II Stage Branch.

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(ii)  You have made substantial investments

in   Kisan   Vikas   Patra   and   Special   Term

Deposits with SBI Staff Co­operative Credit

Society,   Bangalore   during   the   period

23.09.1998 to 08.06.1988 and you failed to

make proper disclosures of the same in the

Assets & Liabilities Statements submitted by

you.

Your act stated at (i) above has resulted in

the Bank incurring an undue loss of Rs.10

Lacs.”

2.1 Before   the   Enquiry   Officer,   41   documents   and   9

witnesses were produced by the management to prove the

charges.     After   considering   the   statements/depositions   of

management   witnesses   PW1   to   PW7   the   Enquiry   Officer

submitted   his   report   holding   charge   no.1   as   proved   and

charge   no.2   as   partly   proved.     The   Appointing   Authority

agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and imposed

the   penalty   of   dismissal   from   services   which   came   to   be

confirmed by the Appellate Authority.

2.2 Thereafter the respondent – delinquent officer filed a writ

petition before the learned Single Judge of the High Court.  By

the   time   the   writ   petition   came   to   be   disposed   of,   the

respondent   –   delinquent   officer   attained   the   age   of

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superannuation.   By judgment and order dated 22.03.2011

the learned Single Judge set aside the order of punishment

and directed the Bank to give all the consequential benefits to

the   original   writ   petitioners   except   back   wages   as   in   the

meantime he attained the age of superannuation. 

2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and

order passed by the learned Single Judge setting aside the

order of punishment imposed by the appointing authority, the

Bank filed the present Writ Appeal No.4220 of 2011 before the

Division Bench of the High Court.   The delinquent officer also

filed Writ Appeal No.4599 of 2011 against the denial of back

wages.  Both the writ appeals came to be heard, decided and

disposed of by a common impugned judgment and order.  By

the   common   impugned   judgment   and   order   the   Division

Bench of the High Court has dismissed both the appeals, one

preferred   by   the   appellant   –   management   and   another

preferred by the delinquent officer.

2.4 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High

Court in dismissing the Writ Appeal No.4220 of 2011 and

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confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned

Single Judge setting aside the punishment imposed by the

appointing authority, the Bank – employer has preferred the

present appeal.

3. Shri Sanjay Kapoor, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the Bank has vehemently submitted that in the facts and

circumstances of the case, both, the learned Single Judge as

well as the Division Bench have materially erred in interfering

with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer which were

on appreciation of evidence on record, both documentary as

well as oral.

3.1 It is submitted that during the enquiry the Management

examined   in   all   9   witnesses   and   produced   on   record   41

documents   to   prove   the   charges.     That   the   management

witnesses were primarily employees of the Bank who were also

cross­examined during the course of enquiry.  It is submitted

that in the present case PW2 and PW3, the Cash Officer and

the Accountant confirmed the practice adopted by the Branch

seeking remittance, as also the fact that the respondent on

the relevant date had come with one more person whom he

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introduced as the Cashier of the Branch.  By examining the

aforesaid   witnesses,   the   management   has   established   and

proved that voucher and remittance/cash was given to the

respondent inside the vault.

3.1.1  It is submitted that by examining the witness namely,

the Branch Manager ­ PW4, the management has proved that

the Branch Manager whose alleged signature was found on

the alleged letter was in fact not of his and that he confirmed

that   the   letter   allegedly   bearing   his   signature   seeking

remittance of Rs.10 lakhs was not signed by him at all.  He

explained   the   normal   practice   during   the   course   of   his

evidence.

3.1.2  It is submitted that PW5 and PW6 confirmed that it was

the   respondent   –   delinquent   officer   who   had   come   to   the

Branch with another person with cash remittance and he was

a witness to the said incident.

3.1.3  It is further submitted by Shri Kapoor, learned counsel

appearing for the Branch Manager that even the management

has been successful in establishing and proving that it was

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respondent   –   delinquent   officer   who   got   prepared   the

fraudulent   letter.     Further,   PW7   ­   proprietor   of   the   photo

stating shop confirmed that it was the respondent who had

come for typing the fraudulent letter and she got typed the

same in her shop.  It is submitted that she also identified the

respondent in the enquiry.

3.2 It is contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the   appellant   –   Bank   that   despite   the   aforesaid   clinching

evidence placed on record the High Court has erred in holding

that the bank has not been able to prove the complicity of the

respondent   in   the   alleged   offence.     It   is   urged   that   while

setting   aside   the   order   of   punishment   the   learned   Single

Judge   acted   beyond   the   scope   and   ambit   of   the   writ

jurisdiction and the power of the judicial review conferred on a

constitutional court.

3.3 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of

State of  Karnataka vs. N.  Ganga Raj  reported in  (2020)  3

SCC  423, it is submitted by Shri Kapoor, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant – Bank that in the said

decision   this   Court   observed   and   held   that   the   power   of

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Judicial Review conferred on a constitutional court is not that

of an appellate authority but is confined only to the decisionmaking process.  It is submitted that as held, under Articles

226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not

reappreciate the evidence, interfering with the conclusions in

the enquiry, go into the adequacy or reliability of the evidence

or correct the error of fact however grave it may be.

3.4 It is contended that the High Court has committed a

grave error in interfering with the findings recorded by the

Enquiry Officer and setting aside the order of punishment

imposed by the appointing authority.

4. While   opposing   the   present   appeal   learned   counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent – delinquent officer has

made the following submissions:

(i) That the respondent herein had an unblemished

record from his joining as a clerk till the date of

alleged incident in his career of long 28 years

and had even got two promotions;

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(ii) That   the   entire   amount   of   Rs.10   lakhs   was

allegedly paid to one Shri M.N. Kiran and not to

the respondent – delinquent officer;

(iii) Initially   the   Local   Head   Officer   of   the   Branch

directed   one   Shri   M.R.   Srinath,   AGM   to

investigate the matter.  Shri Srinath investigated

the   matter   and   found   that   there   was   no

involvement of any officer from the SSI Peenya II

Branch and completely absolved the delinquent

officer.  It is submitted that it was observed that

the style of the letter requesting the remittance

resembles   the   usual   style   adopted   by   the

delinquent officer.  That it is observed that that

none of the documents at the SSI Peenya Branch

was tampered with which is indicative of noninvolvement of staff of the SSI Peenya Branch;

(iv) That in the criminal proceedings investigated by

the   CBI,   the   delinquent   officer   has   been

acquitted by the competent criminal court.  That

the   learned   Single   Judge   specifically   observed

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and held that the enquiry was vitiated due to the

violation of principles of natural justice;

(v) The enquiry officer held the respondent guilty on

mere surmises and conjectures.  

(vi) The   enquiry   officer   erred   in   relying   on   the

deposition   of   PW7,   who   claimed   to   be   the

manager of the photocopying shop;

(vii) That   the   manager   failed   to   prove   that

document/letter dated 06.08.1996 was prepared

by the respondent ­ delinquent officer. 

(viii) Therefore, once the preparation of document was

itself doubtful from the evidence of PW7 there is

no question of forging the signatures on the said

documents by the respondent;

(ix) That therefore, the entire allegation is made on

falsehood   which   has   not   been   proved   by   any

evidence.

4.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of

Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Others, AIR 1978

SC   1277,   it   is   submitted   that   as   held   by   this   Court   the

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domestic tribunals are quasi­judicial in character.  Therefore,

the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is

that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis

of some evidence i.e. cogent material which with some degree

of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect

of charges against him.

4.2 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of

Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4

SCC 635, it is submitted that a quasi­judicial tribunal which

records findings based on no legal evidence, then the findings

are either ipse­dixit or based on conjectures and surmises.

The   enquiry   suffers   from   the   additional   infirmity   of   nonapplication of mind and stands vitiated.

4.3 On   judicial   review,   it   is   submitted   that   if   there   is

procedural   violation   and   violation   of   principles   of   natural

justice,   the   courts   are   justified   to   set   aside   such

administrative action and in many a case may possibly direct

a denovo enquiry.  It is submitted that however, in the present

case   the   delinquent   officer   has   attained   the   age   of

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superannuation,   he   cannot   be   burdened   with   the   fresh

enquiry   and   the   courts   have   to   set   aside   the   said

administrative action itself.  It is submitted that therefore as

such the respondent was required to be reinstated with full

back wages.  That instead the High Court has denied the back

wages to the respondent – delinquent officer.  Therefore, the

impugned judgment and orders passed by the High Court are

not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of

powers   conferred   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   of

India.

Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss

the present appeal.

5. In rejoinder learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant – Bank has pointed out that in view of the judgment

and order passed by the learned Single Judge confirmed by

the Division Bench, the respondent – delinquent officer would

get Rs.25.61 lakhs towards terminal benefits and arrears of

pension etc. and thereafter Rs.20,502/­ per month towards

pension,   which   would   amount   to   granting   premium   to

dishonesty. 

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6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.

7. At   the   outset,  it   is  required  to  be  noted  that   in  the

departmental enquiry against the delinquent officer by the

disciplinary authority it was alleged that he got prepared a set

of fraudulent cash remittance document and by producing the

same at Peenya Industrial Estate Branch, Bangalore made the

officials believe them to be genuine and part with Rs.10 Lacs

as cash remittance to SSI Peenya II Stage Branch and after

receiving the same cash he failed to account for the same in

the   books   of   SSI   Peenya   II   Stage   Branch.     To   prove   the

aforesaid   charge   the   management   as   such   examined   9

witnesses and produced 41 documents.  The aforesaid charge

has   been   held   to   be   proved   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   on

appreciation of the entire evidence on record including the

deposition of the management witnesses examined as PW1 to

PW7.   On considering the enquiry report and the findings

recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   it   appears   that   the

management   has   been   able   to   establish   and   prove   the

complicity of the delinquent officer and has been successful in

proving that;

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(i) The delinquent officer prepared the fraudulent

letter dated 06.08.1996 (by examining PW7) who

at the letter requesting for remittance resembles

the style/writing of the delinquent officer (PW1);

(ii) It was the respondent – delinquent officer who

had   come   with   one   more   person   whom   he

introduced as a new cashier and the delinquent

officer   submitted   the   voucher   and   that   the

remittance/cash   was   given   to   him   inside   the

vault (by examining PW2 and PW3);

(iii) The Branch Manager confirmed that the letter

allegedly   bearing   his   signature   seeking

remittance of Rs.10 lakhs was not signed by him

(PW4);

(iv) And   that   it   was   the   respondent   –   delinquent

officer   who   went   to   the   Branch   with   another

person for cash remittance and that the cash

remittance   was   paid   to   the   respondent   –

delinquent officer.  

The aforesaid findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer

were   on   the   appreciation   of   evidence   on   record,   both

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documentary as well as oral.   Despite the above, the High

Court has observed and held that the management had failed

to prove the complicity of the delinquent officer in the alleged

offence. 

7.1 From the aforesaid, it can be seen that the management

has been able to prove the complete chain of events which led

to   the   conclusion   that   it   was   the   delinquent   officer   who

prepared the false letter dated 06.08.1996; he went to the

Branch for withdrawing the cash along with the fraudulent

letter; that it was he who took the cash/remittance of Rs.10

lakhs and thereafter the said amount was not deposited with

the SSI Peenya II Stage Branch.

Then,   what   else   was   required   to   be   established   and

proved by the Management  to prove the complicity of the

delinquent officer?

7.2 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the

High Court it appears that the High Court has dealt with and

considered the writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution   of   India   challenging   the   decision   of   the

Bank/Management dismissing the delinquent officer as if the

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High   Court   was   exercising   the   powers   of   the   Appellate

Authority.     The   High   Court   in   exercise   of   powers   under

Articles   226/227   of   the   Constitution   of   India   has

reappreciated the evidence on record which otherwise is not

permissible as held by this Court in a catena of decisions.

7.3 Recently in the case of  Nand  Kishore  Prasad   (Supra)

after   considering   other   decisions   of   this   Court   on   judicial

review and the power of the High Court in a departmental

enquiry and interference with the findings recorded in the

departmental enquiry, it is observed and held that the High

Court   is  not   a   court   of   appeal   over   the   decision   of   the

authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public

servant. It is further observed and held that the High Court is

concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an

authority   competent   in   that   behalf,   and   according   to   the

procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of

natural justice are not violated. It is further observed that if

there is some evidence, that the authority entrusted with the

duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence

may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent

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officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High

Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India to review/reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at an

independent finding on the evidence.  In paragraphs 9 to 14,

this Court had considered other decisions on the power of the

High Court on judicial review on the decisions taken by the

Disciplinary Authority as under:

“9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of

A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] , a

three­Judge Bench of this Court has held that the

High   Court   is   not   a   court   of   appeal   over   the

decision of the authorities holding a departmental

enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to

determine   whether   the   enquiry   is   held   by   an

authority competent in that behalf, and according

to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and

whether   the   rules   of   natural   justice   are   not

violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726­

27, para 7)

“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a

proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a

court of appeal over the decision of the authorities

holding a departmental enquiry against a public

servant : it is concerned to determine whether the

enquiry is held by an authority competent in that

behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed

in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural

justice   are   not   violated.   Where   there   is   some

evidence, which the authority entrusted with the

duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which

evidence may reasonably support the conclusion

that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it

is not the function of the High Court in a petition

for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence

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and to arrive at an independent finding on the

evidence.”

10. In B.C.   Chaturvedi v. Union   of   India [B.C.

Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :

1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , again a three­Judge Bench

of this Court has held that power of judicial review

is not an appeal from a decision but a review of

the manner in which the decision is made. Power

of   judicial   review   is   meant   to   ensure   that   the

individual   receives   fair   treatment   and   not   to

ensure  that the conclusion which the  authority

reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the

court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial

review does not act as an appellate authority to

reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own

independent findings on the evidence. It was held

as under : (SCC pp. 759­60, paras 12­13)

“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a

decision but a review of the manner in which the

decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant

to   ensure   that   the   individual   receives   fair

treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion

which the authority reaches is necessarily correct

in   the   eye   of   the   court.   When   an   inquiry   is

conducted on charges of misconduct by a public

servant,   the   Court/Tribunal   is   concerned   to

determine   whether   the   inquiry   was   held   by   a

competent   officer   or   whether   rules   of   natural

justice are complied with. Whether the findings or

conclusions   are   based   on   some   evidence,   the

authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry

has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a

finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must

be based on some evidence. Neither the technical

rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or

evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary

proceeding.   When   the   authority   accepts   that

evidence   and   conclusion   receives   support

therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to

hold that the delinquent officer is  guilty of the

charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial

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review   does   not   act   as   appellate   authority   to

reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own

independent   findings   on   the   evidence.   The

Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority

held the proceedings against the delinquent officer

in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural

justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing

the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or

finding   reached   by   the   disciplinary   authority   is

based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding

be such as no reasonable person would have ever

reached,   the   Court/Tribunal   may   interfere   with

the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief

so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each

case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge

of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate

authority has co­extensive power to reappreciate

the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a

disciplinary   inquiry,   the   strict   proof   of   legal

evidence  and  findings  on  that evidence  are  not

relevant.   Adequacy   of   evidence   or   reliability   of

evidence   cannot   be   permitted   to   be   canvassed

before   the   Court/Tribunal.   In Union   of

India v. H.C.   Goel [Union   of   India v. H.C.   Goel,

(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court

held   at   p.   728   that   if   the   conclusion,   upon

consideration   of   the   evidence   reached   by   the

disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from

patent error on the face of the record or based on

no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be

issued.”

11. In High   Court   of   Bombay v. Shashikant   S.

Patil [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil,

(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] , this

Court held that interference with the decision of

departmental   authorities   is   permitted   if   such

authority had held proceedings in violation of the

principles   of   natural   justice   or   in   violation   of

statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such

enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article

20

226 of the Constitution. It was held as under :

(SCC p. 423, para 16)

“16.   The   Division   Bench   [Shashikant   S.

Patil v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine

Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court

seems to have approached the case as though it

was   an   appeal   against   the   order   of   the

administrative/disciplinary authority of the High

Court.   Interference   with   the   decision   of

departmental authorities can be permitted, while

exercising   jurisdiction   under   Article   226   of   the

Constitution   if   such   authority   had   held

proceedings in violation of the principles of natural

justice   or   in   violation   of   statutory   regulations

prescribing  the   mode  of  such  enquiry  or  if  the

decision   of   the   authority   is   vitiated   by

considerations   extraneous   to   the   evidence   and

merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by

the   authority,   on   the   very   face   of   it,   is   wholly

arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person

could   have   arrived   at   such   a   conclusion,   or

grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot

overlook that the departmental authority (in this

case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court)

is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has

been properly conducted. The settled legal position

is that if there is some legal evidence on which the

findings   can   be   based,   then   adequacy   or   even

reliability   of   that   evidence   is   not   a   matter   for

canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition

filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi

Chand   Nalwaya [State   Bank   of   Bikaner   &

Jaipur v. Nemi   Chand   Nalwaya,   (2011)   4   SCC

584 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721] , this Court held

that the courts will not act as an appellate court

and   reassess   the   evidence   led   in   the   domestic

enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another

view is possible on the material on record. If the

enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the

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findings are based on evidence, the question of

adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of

the evidence will not be ground for interfering with

the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court

held as under : (SCC pp. 587­88, paras 7 & 10)

“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not

act   as   an   appellate   court   and   reassess   the

evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere

on the ground that another view is possible on the

material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly

and properly held and the findings are based on

evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence

or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be

grounds   for   interfering   with   the   findings   in

departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not

interfere   with   findings   of   fact   recorded   in

departmental   enquiries,   except   where   such

findings are based on no evidence or where they

are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity

is   to   see   whether   a   tribunal   acting   reasonably

could have arrived at such conclusion or finding,

on the material on record. The courts will however

interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters,

if   principles   of   natural   justice   or   statutory

regulations have been violated or if the order is

found   to   be   arbitrary,   capricious,   mala   fide   or

based   on   extraneous   considerations.   (Vide B.C.

Chaturvedi v. Union   of   India [B.C.

Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :

1996   SCC   (L&S)   80]   , Union   of   India v. G.

Ganayutham [Union   of   India v. G.   Ganayutham,

(1997)   7   SCC   463   :   1997   SCC   (L&S)   1806]

and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana [Bank

of  India v. Degala  Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC

762   :   1999   SCC   (L&S)   1036]   , High   Court   of

Bombay v. Shashikant   S.   Patil [High   Court   of

22

Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 :

2000 SCC (L&S) 144] .)

***

10.   The   fact   that   the   criminal   court

subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving

him   the   benefit   of   doubt,   will   not   in   any   way

render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid

nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or

consequential punishment. The standard of proof

required   in   criminal   proceedings   being   different

from   the   standard   of   proof   required   in

departmental   enquiries,   the   same   charges   and

evidence may lead to different results in the two

proceedings,   that   is,   finding   of   guilt   in

departmental   proceedings   and   an   acquittal   by

giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings.

This   is   more   so   when   the   departmental

proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in

point   of   time,   when   compared   to   the   criminal

proceedings. The  findings by the criminal court

will   have   no   effect   on   previously   concluded

domestic   enquiry.   An   employee   who   allows   the

findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the

disciplinary   authority   to   attain   finality   by   nonchallenge, cannot after several years, challenge the

decision   on   the   ground   that   subsequently,   the

criminal court has acquitted him.”

13. In another judgment reported as Union of

India v. P.   Gunasekaran [Union   of   India v. P.

Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC

(L&S)   554]   ,   this   Court   held   that   while

reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act

as   an   appellate   authority   in   the   disciplinary

proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to

when  the  High  Court shall  not interfere  in  the

disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)

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“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution

of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry,

in   case   the   same   has   been   conducted   in

accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on

which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it

may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment

unless it shocks its conscience.”

14. On the other hand the learned counsel for

the respondent relies upon the judgment reported

as Allahabad   Bank v. Krishna   Narayan

Tewari [Allahabad   Bank v. Krishna   Narayan

Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S)

335]   ,   wherein   this   Court   held   that   if   the

disciplinary authority records a finding that is not

supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding

which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court

could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary

proceedings.   We   do   not   find   that   even   on

touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High

Court could interfere with the findings recorded by

the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no

evidence   or   that   the   findings   are   perverse.   The

finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct

has been interfered with only on the ground that

there   are   discrepancies   in   the   evidence   of   the

Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will

not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry

officer has appreciated the evidence and returned

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a   finding   that   the   respondent   is   guilty   of

misconduct.”

That   thereafter   this   Court   has   observed   and   held   in

paragraph 7, 8 and 15 as under:

“7. The   disciplinary   authority   has   taken   into

consideration   the   evidence   led   before   the   IO   to

return a finding that the charges levelled against

the respondent stand proved.

8. We find that the interference in the order of

punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the

High Court suffers from patent error. The power of

judicial review is confined to the decision­making

process. The power of judicial review conferred on

the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not

that of an appellate authority.

xxx  xxx xxx

15. The   disciplinary   authority   agreed   with   the

findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an

order of punishment. An appeal before the State

Government   was   also   dismissed.   Once   the

evidence has been accepted by the departmental

authority, in exercise of power of judicial review,

the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere

with   the   findings   of   facts   recorded   by

reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the

appellate authority. We may notice that the said

judgment   has   not   noticed   the   larger   Bench

judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S.

Sree   Rama   Rao,   AIR   1963   SC   1723]   and B.C.

Chaturvedi [B.C.   Chaturvedi v. Union   of   India,

(1995)   6   SCC   749   :   1996   SCC   (L&S)   80]   as

mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by

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the   Tribunal   and   the   High   Court   suffer   from

patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in

law.”

8. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the

opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in

interfering with the order passed by the disciplinary authority

dismissing the respondent – delinquent officer from service.

The High Court has erred in reappreciating the entire evidence

on record and thereafter interfering with the findings of fact

recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   and   accepted   by   the

disciplinary   authority.   By   interfering   with   the   findings

recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   which   as   such   were   on

appreciation of evidence on record, the order passed by the

High Court suffers from patent illegality.   From the findings

recorded   by   the   Enquiry   Officer   recorded   hereinabove,   it

cannot be said that there was no evidence at all which may

reasonably support the conclusion that the Delinquent officer

is guilty of the charge.

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9. Now   so   far   as   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the

respondent – delinquent officer that as he has been acquitted

in a criminal court and therefore, he cannot be held guilty in a

disciplinary   proceeding   is   concerned,   the   aforesaid   has   no

substance.     From   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the

criminal court it appears that he has been given the benefit of

doubt.  Even otherwise the standard of proof which is required

in a criminal case and that of the disciplinary proceedings is

different.     The   fact   that   the   criminal   court  acquitted   the

respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any

way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor

affect   the   validity   of   the   finding   of   guilt   or   consequential

punishment.  As held by this Court in a catena of decisions

the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being

different from the standard of proof required in departmental

enquiries,   the   same   charges   and   evidence   may   lead   to

different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt

in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit

of doubt in the criminal proceedings

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10. Now the next question which is posed for consideration

is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the

appointing   authority   was   justified   in   dismissing   the

delinquent officer from service is concerned looking to the

seriousness of the charge proved of misappropriating the sum

of Rs.10 lakhs and not depositing the same with the Bank, it

cannot be said that the order of dismissal can be said to be

disproportionate to the charge and misconduct held to be

proved.   At this stage even the modus operandi adopted by

the delinquent officer also deserves the consideration.  As per

the evidence on record, he went along with the false and

fabricated   document   dated  06.08.1996   along   with   another

person and he introduced that person as a new cashier and

he   ensured   that   the   voucher   was   not   signed   by   him   but

singed by the other person who was introduced by him as a

new cashier.  Therefore, he saw to it that there is no evidence

on record that he actually received the money.   This shows

the   criminal   mind/conduct   on   the   part   of   the   delinquent

officer.  Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case

it cannot be said that the disciplinary authority/competent

28

authority/management   had   committed   any   error   in

dismissing the respondent – delinquent officer from service. 

11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,

the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division

Bench   of   the   High   Court   dismissing   the   appeal   and   not

interfering with the judgment and order passed by the learned

Single Judge which interfered with the order of punishment

imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   dismissing   the

respondent – delinquent officer from service and the judgment

and order passed by the learned Single Judge are hereby

quashed and set aside.

The  order passed by  the Management  dismissing the

respondent   –   delinquent   officer   on   proved   charge   and

misconduct is hereby restored.

Present Appeal is accordingly Allowed.  In the facts and

circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 

…………………………………J.

            (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J.

                                                 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

New Delhi, 

May 20, 2022.

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