SURENDRAN VS STATE OF KERALA

SURENDRAN VS STATE OF KERALA

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1080 of 2019

SURENDRAN                             … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA            … RESPONDENT

J UDGM EN T

    N.V.    RAMANA    , CJI

1. The instant appeal, by way of special leave, is directed against

judgment dated 12.09.2018 passed by the High Court of Kerala in

Criminal Revision Petition No. 1801 of 2006, whereby the High

Court partly allowed the Revision Petition filed by the appellanthusband (accused no. 5). By way of the impugned judgment, the

High Court has set aside the concurrent findings of conviction of

the courts below and acquitted the appellant under Section 304B of

the Indian Penal Code [for short ‘the IPC’] while confirming his

conviction under Section 498A of the IPC. The High Court has

further modified the sentence imposed on the appellant to rigorous

imprisonment for one year. 

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REPORTABLE

2. The conspectus of the facts necessary for the disposal of the

appeal   are   as   follows:   the   appellant   married   the   deceased   on

09.04.1995.   After   the   marriage,   the   deceased   resided   with   the

appellant and his family members at their matrimonial home. It is

alleged that the appellant, along with his family members, started

harassing the deceased soon after the marriage and was demanding

additional   dowry.   Allegedly,   the   deceased   attempted   suicide   by

consuming Benzyl Hexa Chloride powder on 11.02.1996 due to the

mental harassment by the accused persons. Fortunately, she was

able   to   recover   after   treatment   at   the   Government   Hospital,

Palakkad.   Subsequent   to   this   incident,   mediation   between   the

parties   took   place   and   a   settlement   was   reached   between   the

parties whereby the deceased continued to reside at the house of

the accused. Despite the above agreement, it is alleged that the

harassment   continued   and   the   deceased   committed   suicide   by

hanging on 21.10.1996, at her own home.

3. The prosecution charged the appellant, his parents and his

two brothers under Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC. Pending

trial, the  appellant’s  father passed  away.  The Trial Court, after

examining all the witnesses and perusing the documents produced

by the  prosecution  and defence, convicted the accused persons

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under Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC.  Vide  judgment dated

12.05.2006, the Appellate Court acquitted the appellant’s brothers

of both the offences. However, the conviction and sentence against

the appellant and his mother was confirmed. 

4. Aggrieved, the appellant and his mother filed the Criminal

Revision   Petition   before   the   High   Court   of   Kerala.   As   already

mentioned above,  vide  the  impugned judgment, the High Court

partly allowed the revision petition and acquitted the appellant and

his mother under Section 304B of the IPC  while confirming their

conviction under Section 498A of the IPC. The High Court, however,

reduced   the   sentence   imposed   on   the   appellant   to   rigorous

imprisonment for one year, and, that of his mother to rigorous

imprisonment for one month. The appellant’s mother has not filed

any appeal before this Court. 

5. The   main   thrust   of   the   submissions   made   by   the   learned

counsel for the appellant are two­fold. First, that the suicide note

and other statements made by the deceased cannot be relied upon

by the Court for convicting him under Section 498A of the IPC as

they do not fall within the scope of Section 32(1) of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘the Evidence Act’).  Second, that the

evidence of PW­3 (mother of the deceased) is contradictory and

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cannot be relied upon to convict the appellant. On the strength of

the above two arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant

attempts to persuade this Court that there is no credible evidence

to   convict   the   appellant   under   Section   498A   of   the   IPC,   and

therefore, he should be acquitted of the same. 

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondentState submits that there are three concurrent finding of facts by the

Courts below which do not merit any interference by this Court in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India. Learned counsel for the State also submits that there is

sufficient evidence on record to make out a clear case for convicting

the appellant under Section 498A of the IPC. 

7. Heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   and   the

respondent­State at length. 

8. Before we proceed, it is expedient to advert to the submissions

of the learned counsel for the appellant particularly that in the

present case, the appellant was acquitted under Section 304B of

the IPC by the High Court in revision and therefore, the statements

of the deceased could not have been relied upon by the High Court

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to sustain his conviction under Section 498A of the IPC as it would

not fall within the ambit of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. 

9. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to certain provisions

of   Section   32   of   the   Evidence   Act.     Section   32   relates   to   the

admissibility of statements made by a person who cannot be called

as witness. The Section itself specifies the circumstances under

which such statements become relevant. In the present case, we are

concerned with one such circumstance, that is, when the person

who   made   the   statement   is   dead.   The   learned   counsel   for   the

appellant   has   focused   predominantly   on   Section   32(1)   of   the

Evidence Act in an attempt to exclude the evidence of the deceased

by suggesting that it does not fall within the scope of the abovesaid

sub­section and therefore, is inadmissible. The relevant portion of

Section 32 of the Evidence Act is extracted below: 

32. Cases in which statement of relevant

fact  by  person  who  is  dead  or  cannot  be

found, etc., is relevant. – 

Statements,   written   or   verbal,   or   relevant

facts, made by a person who is dead, or who

cannot   be   found,   or   who   has   become

incapable   of   giving   evidence,   or   whose

attendance cannot be procured, without an

amount of delay or expense which under the

circumstances   of   the   case   appears   to   the

Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant

facts in the following cases:

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(1)  When   it   relates   to   cause   of   death.  ­

When the statement is made by a person as

to the cause of his death, or as to any of the

circumstances   of   the   transaction   which

resulted in his death, in cases in which the

cause  of   that  person's  death   comes   into

question.

Such   statements   are   relevant   whether   the

person who made them was or was not, at

the   time   when   they   were   made,   under

expectation of death, and whatever may be

the nature of the proceeding in which the

cause of his death comes into question.

xxx xxx     xxx

10. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the

“dying declaration” section, although the phrase itself does not find

mention under the Evidence Act. The Courts have had occasion to

consider the scope and ambit of Section 32, particularly Section

32(1) of the Evidence Act on various occasions.

11. To rely on Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, one of the main

conditions laid out in the sub­section is that the issue must arise

“in   cases   in   which   the   cause   of   that   person's   death   comes   into

question”. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant

is that, in the present case, with the acquittal of the appellant by

the High Court under Section 304B of the IPC, and the absence of

any appeal challenging the same, the present case pertains to only

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Section 498A of the IPC. Therefore, the present case does not fall

within   the   scope   of   the  aforementioned   sub­section   as   it   is   no

longer a case in which the cause of the deceased’s death comes into

question. As such,  Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act cannot be

relied upon by the Court to admit the statements of the deceased to

convict him under Section 498A of the IPC. 

12. Learned counsel for the appellant has primarily relied upon

the judgment of this Court in  Gananath   Pattnaik   v.   State   of

Orissa,   (2002)  2  SCC  619,  wherein the Court had observed as

under: 

“10. Another circumstance of cruelty is with

respect to taking away of the child from the

deceased. To arrive at such a conclusion, the

trial court has referred to the statement of

PW 5, who is the sister of the deceased. In

her deposition recorded in the court on 4­5­

1990 PW 5 had stated:

      “Whenever I had gone to my sister, all

the times she was complaining that she is

not well treated by her husband and inlaws for non­fulfilment of balance dowry

amount of a scooter and a two­in­one.”

and added:

      “On 3­6­1987 for the last time I had

been to the house of the deceased i.e. to

her separate residence. Sworna, Snigdha,

Sima Apa, Baby Apa accompanied me to

her house on that day. At that time the

deceased complained before us as usual

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and added to that she said that she is

being   assaulted   by   the   accused

nowadays. She further complained before

us that the accused is taking away the

child from her, and that her mother­inlaw   has   come   and   some   conspiracy   is

going   against   her   (the   deceased).   She

further   told   that  ‘mate   au   banchei

debenahin’.”

Such   a   statement   appears   to   have   been

taken on record with the aid of Section 32

of the Indian Evidence Act at a time when

the   appellant   was   being   tried   for   the

    offence   under   Section   304­B   and   such

statement was admissible under clause (1)

of   the   said   section   as   it   related   to   the

cause   of   death   of   the   deceased   and   the

circumstances   of   the   transaction   which

resulted in her death. Such a statement is

not admissible in evidence for the offence

punishable   under   Section   498­A   of   the

Penal Code, 1860  and has to be termed as

being only a hearsay evidence. Section 32 is

an exception to the hearsay rule and deals

with   the   statements   or   declarations   by   a

person, since dead, relating to the cause of

his   or   her   death   or   the   circumstances

leading to such death. If a statement which

otherwise is covered by the hearsay rule does

not fall within the exceptions of Section 32 of

the Evidence Act, the same cannot be relied

upon for finding the guilt of the accused.”

(Emphasis supplied)

13. Although not cited by the learned counsel, the proposition put

forth by him appears to be supported by three other judgments of

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this   Court   in  Inderpal   v.   State   of   MP,   (2001)   10   SCC   736,

Bhairon Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 80

and Kantilal Martaji Pandor v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 8 SCC

781. All of these judgments also appear to follow the same line of

reasoning as followed by this Court in  Gananath  Pattnaik  case

(supra),  i.e., that once the Court has acquitted an accused of the

charge relating to the death of an individual, the evidence of the

deceased   would   not   be   admissible   to   prove   the   charge   under

Section 498A of the IPC simpliciter as then the case would no longer

relate to the death of the deceased.

14. It may bear mentioning that the phrase “cases in which the

cause of that person's death comes into question”  is broader than

merely referring only to cases where there is a charge of murder,

suicide, or dowry death. There have been instances where Courts

have used Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act to admit statements in

a case where the charge is of a different nature or even in a civil

action. This is abundantly clear from the second part of Section

32(1) of the Evidence Act which specifies that such statements are

relevant “whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the

cause of his death comes into question”. Illustration (a) to Section 32

of the Evidence Act refers to a statement made by a deceased in a

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rape case which may be admitted under the section, which was the

position in India even prior to the enactment of the Evidence Act, as

held by the Court in the case of Queen v. Bissorunjun Mookerjee,

(1866) 6 W.R. Cr. 75. 

15. In Lalji  Dusadh  v.  King­Emperor,  AIR  1928  Pat  162,  the

Patna High Court upheld the admissibility of statements made by

the deceased in a case concerning charges under Sections 302, 392

and 397 of the IPC. In that case, the deceased victim was robbed

and killed as a part of the same transaction. The submission of the

learned counsel for the accused in that case, inter alia, was that the

dying declaration  of the  deceased could  not be admitted under

Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act with respect to the charges under

Section 392 and 397 of the IPC. Negativing this contention, the

High Court observed as follows:

“A further legal point is taken with regard to

the dying declarations.

It is contended that so far as the charges for

the offences under sections 392 and 397 are

concerned   the   dying   declarations   are   not

admissible under section 32(1) of the Indian

Evidence Act inasmuch as the cause of the

deceased's death does not come in question

in the trial of those charges. It is contended

that on this point the Indian law is the same

as   the   English   law   and   that   a   dying

declaration as to the cause of the death is

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only   admissible   when   the   causing   of   the

death is the subject of the charge. I cannot

agree with this view. The words of section

32 are  very  wide and  it  is  not necessary

that   the   charge   should   be   one   of

homicide. The evidence as to the cause of

death   was   relevant   to   the   charge   of

robbery   and   consequently   the   cause   of

death   that   is   to   say   the   assault

committed   by   the   appellant   came   in

question   in   the   trial.  Before   the   Indian

Evidence   Act   was   enacted   it   was   held   in

Queen  v.  Bissorunjun   Mookerjee  [(1866)   6

W.R. (Cr.) 75.] that there was no necessity in

India for following the very narrow rule of

English   law   and   that   a   dying   declaration

could be used as evidence in a charge of

rape. One of the illustrations to section 32 of

the   present   Indian   Evidence   Act   expressly

provides for such evidence where the charge

is not culpable homicide but rape.”

(Emphasis supplied)

16. Further, in a proceeding with multiple charges, where one

directly relates to the death of a declarant and the other does not,

the Court has admitted the evidence of the declarant even if the

prosecution   failed   to   prove   the   charge   relating   to   death.   For

instance, in  Parmanand  Ganga  Prasad  v.  Emperor,  AIR  1940

Nag 340, the High Court of Nagpur held as follows: 

“7.  …The prosecution story as narrated by

us shows that throughout the enquiry the

cause of death of Munde was material. That

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being so, the  mere   fact   that   a   charge   of

murder failed and was not brought home

to   the   accused   would   not   make   the

statement   inadmissible   for   the   purposes

of  other  offences  which  were   committed

in the course of the same transaction and

with which the accused were charged.

8.  We  may  also   observe  that  in   all   cases

regarding admissibility of a particular piece

of   evidence   the   material   time   when   the

admissibility  has  got   to   be   decided  is  the

time when the Court received the evidence

and   not   the   eventual   result.   In   this   case

when   the   statements   were   filed   by   the

prosecution and proved in the case it could

under no circumstances be argued that the

cause of death of the deceased was not in

question. The cause of death of Munde was

in question as there was also a charge under

S.   302,   and   this   charge   was   joined   with

other   charges   in   the   case   under   Section

239(d)   as   forming   part   of   the   same

transaction.   So,   at   the   stage   at   which

these   statements   were   put   up   by   the

prosecution   before   the   Court   as

admissible,   it   could   not   be   argued   that

they were not admissible and a document

once   admitted   in   evidence   remains

admissible   for   all   purposes   in   the   case.

The   subsequent   result   of   the   case,   viz.,

failure of the charge of murder should not

make   any   difference   whatsoever   to   the

admissibility   of   the   document.  Just   as

their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR

1938 PC 130 [Babulal v. Emperor, (1938) 25

AIR PC 130 : 174 IC 1 : 65 IA 158 : 32 SLR

476 : 39 Cr LJ 452 : ILR (1938) 2 Cal 295

(PC).] stated that the relevant point of time in

the proceedings at which the condition as to

sameness of transaction must be fulfilled is

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the time of accusation and not that of the

eventual   result   we   think   we   would   be

justified in stating the same with respect to

the admissibility of a document…”

(Emphasis supplied)

17. From the above pronouncements, and the wordings of Section

32(1) of the Evidence Act, it appears that the test for admissibility

under the said section is not that the evidence to be admitted

should directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the

individual, or that the charge relating to death could not be proved.

Rather, the test appears to be that the cause of death must come

into   question   in   that   case,   regardless   of   the   nature   of   the

proceeding, and that the purpose for which such evidence is being

sought to be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the

transaction’ relating to the death.  

18. The phrase ‘circumstances of the transaction’, as occurring in

the   section,   has   been   interpreted   by   the   Privy   Council   in   the

judgment that is considered the locus classicus on admissibility of

evidence   under   Section   32(1)   of   the   Evidence   Act, Pakala

Narayana   Swami   v.   King­Emperor,  AIR   1939   PC   47.  In that

case, the Privy Council was dealing with a case of murder wherein

one of the main pieces of evidence against the accused was the

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statement made by the deceased to his wife. The defence argued

that such evidence had to be excluded due to the hearsay rule.

However, the said evidence was admitted under Section 32(1) of the

Evidence Act and the accused was convicted. In appeal, one of the

questions the Privy Council had to answer related to whether the

deceased’s statement was properly admitted or not. In that context,

the Privy Council observed as under: 

“A variety of questions has been mooted in

the   Indian   courts   as   to   the   effect   of   this

section.   It   has   been   suggested   that   the

statement   must   be   made   after   the

transaction has taken place, that the person

making it must be at any rate near death,

that   the   “circumstances”   can   only   include

the acts done when and where the death was

caused. Their Lordships are of opinion that

the natural meaning of the words used does

not   convey   any   of   these   limitations.   The

statement may be made before the cause of

death has arisen, or before the deceased has

any reason to anticipate being killed.  The

circumstances  must  be  circumstances  of

the   transaction   :   general   expressions

indicating fear or suspicion whether of a

particular individual or otherwise and not

directly   releated   to   the   occasion   of   the

death   will   not   be   admissible.   But

statements made by the deceased that he

was proceeding to the spot where he was

in fact killed, or as to  his  reasons  for so

proceeding, or that he was going to meet

a  particular  person,  or  that  he  had  been

invited by such person to meet him would

each   of   them   be   circumstances   of   the

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transaction,  and would be so whether the

person was unknown, or was not the person

accused. Such a statement might indeed be

exculpatory   of   the   person   accused.

“Circumstances   of   the   transaction”   is   a

phrase   no   doubt   that   conveys   some

limitations.   It   is   not   as   broad   as   the

analogous   use   in   “circumstantial

evidence”  which   includes  evidence  of  all

relevant   facts.   It   is   on   the   other   hand

narrower   than   “res   gestae.”

Circumstances   must   have   some

proximate   relation   to   the   actual

occurrence : though, as for instance in a

case of prolonged poisoning, they may be

related to dates at a considerable distance

from the date of the actual fatal dose.

It will be observed that “the circumstances”

are of the transaction which resulted in the

death of the declarant. It is not necessary

that there should be a known transaction

other than that the death of the declarant

has ultimately been caused, for the condition

of the admissibility of the evidence is that

“the cause of [the declarant's] death comes

into question.” In the present case the cause

of the deceased's death comes into question.

The transaction is one in which the deceased

was murdered on March 21 or 22 : and his

body   was   found   in   a   trunk   proved   to   be

bought   on   behalf   of   the   accused.   The

statement made by the deceased on March

20 or 21 that he was setting out to the place

where   the   accused   lived,   and   to   meet   a

person, the wife of the accused, who lived in

the accused's house, appears clearly to be a

statement as to some of the circumstances of

the transaction which resulted in his death.

The statement was rightly admitted.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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19. This principle of law has been upheld by this Court on various

occasions.   In  Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   v.   State   of

Maharashtra, (1984)   4   SCC   116,  this   Court   summarized   the

principles of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to

“circumstances of the transaction”: 

“21.  Thus, from a review of the authorities

mentioned above and the clear language of

Section   32(1)   of   the   Evidence   Act,   the

following propositions emerge:

(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of

hearsay and makes admissible the statement

of a person who dies, whether the death is a

homicide   or   a   suicide,   provided   the

statement relates to the cause of death, or

exhibits circumstances leading to the death.

In   this   respect,   as   indicated   above,   the

Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar

conditions   of   our   society   and   the   diverse

nature   and   character   of   our   people,   has

thought it necessary to widen the sphere of

Section 32 to avoid injustice.

(2)   The   test   of   proximity   cannot   be   too

literally   construed   and   practically

reduced   to   a   cut­and­dried   formula   of

universal application so as to be confined

in  a  straitjacket.  Distance  of  time  would

depend or vary with the circumstances of

each case. For instance, where death is a

logical culmination of a continuous drama

long in process and is, as it were, a finale

of the story, the statement regarding each

step   directly   connected  with   the   end   of

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the   drama   would   be   admissible   because

the   entire   statement   would   have   to   be

read   as   an   organic   whole   and   not   torn

from  the  context.  Sometimes  statements

relevant   to   or   furnishing   an   immediate

motive may also be admissible as being a

part   of   the   transaction   of   death.   It   is

manifest  that  all  these  statements  come

to   light   only   after   the   death   of   the

deceased   who   speaks   from   death.   For

instance,   where   the   death   takes   place

within a very  short time of the marriage

or the distance of time is not spread over

more than 3­4 months the statement may

be admissible under Section 32.

(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section

32 is yet another exception to the rule that

in criminal law the evidence of a person who

was   not   being   subjected   to   or   given   an

opportunity of being cross­examined by the

accused,   would   be   valueless   because   the

place of cross­examination is taken by the

solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple

reason that a person on the verge of death is

not likely to make a false statement unless

there   is   strong  evidence   to   show   that   the

statement was secured either by prompting

or tutoring.

(4) It may be important to note that Section

32   does   not   speak   of   homicide   alone   but

includes   suicide   also,   hence   all   the

circumstances   which   may   be   relevant   to

prove a case of homicide would be equally

relevant to prove a case of suicide.

(5)  Where   the  main   evidence   consists  of

statements   and   letters   written   by   the

deceased   which   are   directly   connected

with   or   related   to   her   death   and   which

reveal a tell­tale story, the said statement

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would clearly fall within the four corners

of  Section  32  and,  therefore,  admissible.

The distance of time alone in such cases

would   not   make   the   statement

irrelevant.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. A reading of the above pronouncements makes it clear that, in

some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to

cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge under Section

498A of the IPC under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There are,

however, certain necessary pre­conditions that must be met before

the evidence is admitted. 

21. The first condition is that her cause of death must come into

question in the matter. This would include, for instance, matters

where along with the charge under Section 498A of the IPC, the

prosecution has also charged the accused under Sections 302, 306

or 304B of the IPC. It must be noted however that as long as the

cause of her death has come into question, whether the charge

relating to death is proved or not is immaterial with respect to

admissibility.

22. The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show

that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to

Section 498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the

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transaction of the death. How far back the evidence can be, and

how connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased

would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case.  No specific straitjacket formula or rule can be given with

respect to this. 

23. To the above extent therefore, the judgments of this Court in

Gananath   Pattnaik  (supra),  Inderpal  (supra),  Bhairon   Singh

(supra) and Kantilal Martaji Pandor  (supra), wherein it has been

held that the evidence of the deceased cannot be admitted under

Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act to prove the charge under Section

498A of the IPC only because the accused stands acquitted of the

charge relating to the death of the deceased, may not be correct.

These judgments stand overruled to that limited extent.

24. Coming to the present case, we are of the opinion that it is not

necessary for this Court to undertake the exercise to determine

whether   the   statement   of   the   deceased   can   be   admitted   under

Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. As the learned counsel for the

State rightly points out, this appeal can be decided even without

considering this aspect, as the other evidence on record clearly

proves the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 

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25. The fact that the deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear

from   the   evidence   of   PW­3   (mother   of   the   deceased).   She   had

specifically stated in her chief­examination that within few days of

their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her

parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given, he

would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl. As a result of

such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide for the

first time by consuming poison. While she was being treated in the

hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to which

appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no further

demands for dowry would be made. This agreement was exhibited

before   the   Trial   Court   as   Ext   P­3.   Although   the   High   Court

indicated that the said settlement was not admissible in evidence,

the fact of its existence has been deposed by PW­9, who is an

independent witness, as well as by PW­3. Further, it was stated by

PW­3 in her chief­examination that even after the settlement, the

appellant had continued to ill­treat the deceased. The deceased, due

to the ill­treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide

by hanging herself with a saree. 

26. The learned counsel for the appellant, despite his best efforts,

could   not   persuade   this   Court   that   the   evidence   of   PW­3   was

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unreliable. There are three concurrent findings of the Courts below

upholding the reliability of the evidence of PW­3. The submission of

the learned counsel for the appellant that the evidence of PW­3 is

unreliable because she is the mother of the deceased, cannot be

countenanced. It is a settled principle of law that the evidence

tendered by the related or interested witness cannot be discarded

on that ground alone. However, as a rule of prudence, the Court

may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested witness

more carefully. This Court in Ilangovan v. State of T.N.,  (2020)

10 SCC 533 has held as follows:

“7.  With respect to the first submission of

the counsel for the appellant, regarding the

testimonies   of   related   witnesses,   it   is

settled law that the testimony of a related

or an interested witness can be taken into

consideration, with the additional burden

on   the   Court   in   such   cases   to   carefully

scrutinise such evidence (see Sudhakar v.

State,   (2018)   5   SCC   435).  As   such,   the

mere   submission   of   the   counsel   for   the

appellant,   that   the   testimonies   of   the

witnesses in the case should be disregarded

because they were related, without bringing

to the attention of the Court any reason to

disbelieve   the   same,   cannot   be

countenanced.”

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27. In view  of  the above, we see no reason to interfere with the

impugned judgment passed by the High Court in confirming the

conviction  of  the appellant under Section  498A of the  IPC and

sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. 

28. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The appellant is on bail.

His bail bonds stand cancelled and he is directed to surrender

within   a   period   of   one   week   from   today   before   the   concerned

authorities to serve out the remaining period of sentence.

...........................CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)

      

 ...........................J.

(A.S. BOPANNA)

...........................J.

(HIMA KOHLI)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 13, 2022.

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