State of Uttarakhand vs Sachendra Singh Rawat

 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 143 OF 2022
The State of Uttarakhand …Appellant
Versus
Sachendra Singh Rawat …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 11.12.2018 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at
Nainital in Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 2016, by which the High Court has
allowed the said appeal preferred by the respondent – accused and has
held that culpable homicide in the instant case is not murder and
consequently has converted the sentence from life imprisonment to ten
years rigorous imprisonment, the State of Uttarakhand has preferred the
present appeal.
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2. That the respondent herein – original accused was charged and
tried for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC for having
committed the murder of one Virendra Singh. As per the case of the
prosecution, on 26.11.2014, the entire village was celebrating Mehendi
Ceremony on the occasion of the wedding of one Anil. In the ceremony,
the entire village participated including the deceased Virendra Singh and
the accused Sachendra Singh Rawat. In the night, some altercations
took place between the deceased Virendra Singh and the accused
Sachendra Singh Rawat. But due to intervention of the villagers, the
matter did not proceed further. After the dinner, at about 12:00 in the
night, the accused attacked Virendra Singh by giving him blows by a
“Danda/Phakadiyat” – a rough piece of wood, which he was carrying.
The blow was on the head of the deceased. Virendra Singh ran towards
his house for safety. The accused ran after the deceased with
“Phakadiyat” in his hand. The deceased sustained multiple injuries on
the head. There was a skull fracture and a frontal wound on left side.
The complainant, who was the wife of the deceased tried to rescue her
husband, but failed. Meanwhile, several blows were given to her
husband. The mother-in-law of the complainant, Geeta Devi also came
to the rescue of the deceased. Due to grievous injuries, Virendra Singh
fell unconscious. The deceased was initially taken to Dr. Sharma, who
resided at Ghansali, which was only a few kilometers away, but
2
considering the condition of the injured, he was referred to Mahant
Indresh Hospital at Dehradun, where he was operated upon. After a few
days, i.e., on 5.12.2014, Virendra Singh passed away.
2.1 That, the wife of the deceased lodged an FIR against the accused
– respondent herein. Investigation was done by the police officer, in
charge of the police station. During the course of the investigation, the
investigating officer recorded the statements of the eye witnesses
including the complainant, i.e., the wife of the deceased. The
Investigating Officer also collected the medical evidence including post
mortem report etc. Thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the
Investigating Officer filed the charge sheet against the accused for the
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. As the case was exclusively
triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions
Court where the accused was put to trial. Accused pleaded not guilty and
he claimed to be tried by the trial Court for the offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC.
2.2 To bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution
examined in all 14 witnesses. Many of the witnesses were the eye
witnesses including the complainant, i.e., the wife of the deceased. The
prosecution also examined Dr. Pankaj Arora, PW11 who had operated
upon the deceased. After closure of the evidence on the prosecution
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side, a further statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was
recorded. Thereafter, on appreciation of evidence and believing the
evidence of eye witnesses, namely, Darshani Devi, the wife of the
deceased and others and considering the nature of the injuries sustained
by the deceased, the trial Court held that the culpable homicide was
murder and thereby convicted the accused for the offence punishable
under Section 302 IPC and imposed the sentence of life imprisonment.
2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the trial Court and sentencing him to undergo life
imprisonment, the accused preferred Criminal Appeal No. 110/2016
before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order, though the
High Court has believed the evidence of all the eye witnesses including
PW1 – the wife of the deceased, however, has held that culpable
homicide did not amount to murder, solely on the ground that it is not a
cold blooded murder; rather it is a sudden fight which ensued in the heat
of passion between the two; as a result of a sudden quarrel in the
marriage ceremony and that the weapon used was “Phakadiyat” which is
a rough piece of wood and therefore it cannot be said that there was any
intention on the part of the accused to kill and/or commit the murder of
the deceased and therefore the case would fall under the Fourth
exception to Section 300 IPC. After holding so and after altering the
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finding of murder to one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
the High Court has converted the sentence from life imprisonment to ten
years rigorous imprisonment.
2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court, the State has preferred the present
appeal.
3. Shri Virendra Rawat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
State has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of
the case, the High Court has committed a grave error in holding that the
murder of the deceased does not amount to culpable homicide.
3.1 It is submitted that the High Court has erred in observing and
holding that the case would fall within the Fourth exception of Section
300 IPC.
3.2 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State that merely because the weapon used was a
“Phakadiyat”, that by itself cannot make the culpable homicide as not
amounting to murder. It is submitted that the High Court has not properly
appreciated and considered the repetitive blows given on the vital part of
the body – head and the multiple injuries sustained by the deceased
leading to his death.
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3.3 It is further submitted that even the High Court has also not
properly appreciated that after the first incident of altercation between
the two at the place of marriage ceremony, due to the intervention of the
villagers, the matter did not proceed further. However, at about 12:00 in
the night, the accused attacked the deceased by a “Phakadiyat” which
he was carrying and when the deceased ran towards his house for
safety, the accused ran after him, reached his house and continued to
give several blows. It is therefore submitted that the High Court has
erred in observing and holding that the case would fall under Fourth
exception to Section 300 IPC as there was no premeditation and it was a
result of a sudden fight and due to a sudden quarrel in the mehendi
ceremony.
3.4 It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated the
fact that the main incident of having beaten the deceased was
subsequent to the first incident of altercation in the mehendi ceremony.
It is submitted that by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the
incident had occurred due to a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel in the mehendi ceremony.
3.5 It is further submitted that the High Court has not at all considered
the multiple grievous injuries sustained by the deceased on the head. It
is submitted that the accused used “Phakadiyat” with such a force that
6
there was a skull fracture and a frontal wound on left side and wounds
with 34 stitches on the left side of the skull extended from mid of the left
side of the skull along with coronal sutures of 16 cm. It is submitted that
therefore the case would certainly fall under Clauses Thirdly and
Fourthly to Section 300 IPC and therefore the trial Court rightly convicted
the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC.
3.6 In support of the above submissions, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in
the cases of Stalin vs. State, (2020) 9 SCC 524, in which this Court
considered the earlier decisions of this Court on the point in the cases of
Mahesh Balmiki vs. State of M.P., (2000) 1 SCC 319; Dhirajbhai
Gorakhbhai Nayak vs. State of Gujarat, (2003) 9 SCC 322; Pulicherla
Nagaraju vs. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444; Singapagu Anjaiah vs.
State of A.P., (2010) 9 SCC 799; State of Rajasthan vs. Kanhaiya Lal,
(2019) 5 SCC 639; Arun Raj v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 457;
Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 604;
State of Rajasthan vs. Leela Ram, (2019) 13 SCC 131; Bavisetti
Kameswara Rao vs. State of A.P., (2008) 15 SCC 725; and Virsa Singh
vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465.
3.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
decisions, it is prayed to set aside the impugned judgment and order
7
passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the conviction of
the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC and to restore the
judgment and order passed by the trial Court convicting the accused for
the offence under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to life
imprisonment.
4. Ms. Neha Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent – accused has tried to support the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court holding that in the instant case the
culpable homicide is not amounting to murder invoking Fourth exception
to Section 300 IPC.
4.1 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused that cogent reasons have been given by the High Court after
considering the surrounding circumstances and other considerations that
the culpable homicide is not amounting to murder and that the case
would fall under Fourth exception to Section 300 IPC.
4.2 It is submitted that as rightly observed by the High Court as the
weapon used by the accused was a “Phakadiyat” which is a rough piece
of wood, it cannot be said that there was any premeditation and/or any
intention on the part of the accused to kill and/or commit the murder of
the deceased.
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4.3 It is further submitted that the High Court has rightly observed and
held that the incident occurred in a sudden fight in the heat of passion on
a sudden quarrel in the mehendi ceremony and that the weapon used
was “Phakadiyat” which is used as a firewood primarily where food is
being cooked and where in the heat of passion the accused picked up
the “Phakadiyat” and used the same and therefore the case would fall
under Fourth exception to Section 300 IPC. It is therefore submitted that
the High Court has rightly altered the finding of murder to one of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder and has rightly converted the
sentence from life imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment.
4.4 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present
appeal.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at
length.
At the outset, it is required to be noted that the trial Court convicted
the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC for having killed one
Virendra Singh. It can be seen that the incident took place in two places.
The first incident of altercation between the accused and the deceased
was at the place of mehendi ceremony. At that time, due to the
intervention of the villagers, the matter did not proceed further. That
thereafter, the second incident took place at about 12:00 in the night,
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which can be said to be the actual incident which happened when the
accused attacked the deceased by “Phakadiyat” and gave several blows
to the deceased. The deceased ran towards his house and the accused
also followed him and continued to give blows on the head, thigh etc.
Therefore, the second incident cannot be said to be a result of sudden
fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The accused chased
the deceased at about 12:00 in the mid night and even after the
deceased reached his house, he was beaten by the accused in front of
his house which is witnessed by his wife, PW1. Therefore, as such, the
High Court has erred in observing and/or accepting the case on behalf of
the accused that the incident had taken place due to a sudden fight in
the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel in the mehendi ceremony.
The second incident had not taken place at all during the mehendi
ceremony. The second incident had taken place near the house of the
deceased and that too after the first incident was over, everybody went
to their houses and thereafter at 12:00 in the mid night the second
incident had taken place in which the accused gave several blows to the
deceased by “Phakadiyat” on the head, thigh etc. Therefore, the High
Court has erred in observing that the case would fall under Fourth
exception to Section 300 IPC.
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5.1 Even otherwise, the High Court has not properly appreciated
and/or considered the multiple injuries sustained by the deceased. As
per the medical evidence, the following injuries were found on the body
of the deceased:
“On external examination of the dead body following conditions
and injuries were found:
Average built, rigor mortis present at both upper limbs extended
upto the lower half of the thighs, eyes partially open, cornea
was dried xerosis, nostrils with blood clots.
(i) Stitched wounds with 34 stitches with left side of the skull
extended from mid of the left side of the skull along with
coronal sutures of 16 cm. Sutures were metallic.
(ii) Tracheotomy opening with secretion present in the
wound, inside the trachea along with lacerated wound
4cm in size with sharp and well defined margins.
(iii) Multiple contused wounds which were 1 to 2 cm in size
bluish black in colour at the left side of the shin of leg at
upper two-third region.
On internal examination of the dead body following conditions
and injuries were found:
(i) Skull fracture at the frontal wound on left side. Sharp
well defined parietal bone wound which was suggestive
of craniotomy with well defined margin.
(ii) Brain lacerated and clots present in the frontoparietal.
Lacerated brain wound extended up to the frontoparietal
and temporal.”
The main cause of death was injuries sustained by the deceased
on his head.
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5.2 From the aforesaid multiple injuries sustained by the
deceased, it can be seen that the accused used the “Phakadiyat” with
such a force that it resulted in skull fracture at the frontal wound on the
left side; stitched wounds with 34 stitches with left side of the skull
extended from mid of the left side of the skull along with coronal sutures
of 16 cm; brain lacerated and clots present in the frontoparietal and
lacerated brain wound extended up to the frontoparietal and temporal.
Thus, having caused the grievous injuries with such a force, how can the
accused get the benefit of fourth exception to Section 300 IPC. The case
would certainly fall under Clauses Thirdly and/or Fourthly to Section 300
IPC.
6. In light of the above factual scenario, few decisions of this Court on
the point whether culpable homicide would tantamount to murder or not,
are required to be referred to and considered.
a) In the case of Virsa Singh (supra), in paragraphs 16 & 17, it was
observed and held as under:
‘16. … The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a
serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury
that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality
of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent
that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the
injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference
is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or
intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question,
so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to
inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he
intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the
12
injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the
evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But
whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law.
Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is
a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the
question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question.
17. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the
seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality
of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a
superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the
sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder.
But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he
intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did
not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case
would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law
but one of fact; ….’”
(emphasis in original)
b) In Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak (supra), on applicability of
Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, it was observed and held in paragraph
11 as under:
“11. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a
sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic
provocation) not covered by the first exception, after which its place would
have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same
principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the
case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of
Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober
reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There
is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not
the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with
cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or
some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the
quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties
puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A “sudden fight” implies
mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is
then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such
cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the
Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is
no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes
place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that
one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own
conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then
mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the
share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can
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be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden
fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person
killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it
must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to
Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of
passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down
and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account
of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two
and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to
enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden
quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the
application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a
sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the
provision means “unfair advantage”.”
c) In the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju (supra), this Court had an
occasion to consider the case of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder and the intention to cause death. It was observed and held by
this Court that the intention to cause death can be gathered generally
from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other,
circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon
was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii)
whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of
force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course
of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the
incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was
a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation,
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and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the
heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken
undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi)
whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. In
paragraph 29, it was observed as under:
“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of
intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls
under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant
matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children,
utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to
altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like
revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases.
There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there
may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may
be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for
murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to
cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder
punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable
under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The
intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of
a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of
the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or
was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part
of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury;
(v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or
free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether
there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or
whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave
and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation;
(ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting
the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.
The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there
may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual
cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it
may.”
d) In the case of Singapagu Anjaiah (supra), in a similar set of facts
and circumstances, this Court concluded that the accused intended to
15
cause death of the deceased. In paragraph 16, it was observed as
under:
“16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the mind of the accused, his
intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body
chosen for the assault and the nature of the injuries caused. Here, the
appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence. He has further
chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing the injury which
had caused multiple fractures of skull. This clearly shows the force with
which the appellant had used the weapon. The cumulative effect of all
these factors irresistibly leads to one and the only conclusion that the
appellant intended to cause death of the deceased.”
e) In Kanhaiya Lal (supra), it was held by this Court in paras 7.4 and
7.5 as follows:
7.4. In Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar [Ashokkumar Magabhai Vankar v. State
of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 604, the death was caused by single blow on head of
the deceased with a wooden pestle. It was found that the accused used pestle
with such force that head of the deceased was broken into pieces. This Court
considered whether the case would fall under Section 302 or Exception 4 to
Section 300 IPC. It is held by this Court that the injury sustained by the deceased,
not only exhibits intention of the accused in causing death of victim, but also
knowledge of the accused in that regard. It is further observed by this Court that
such attack could be none other than for causing death of victim. It is observed
that any reasonable person, with any stretch of imagination can come to
conclusion that such injury on such a vital part of the body, with such a weapon,
would cause death.
7.5. A similar view is taken by this Court in the recent decision in Leela
Ram [State of Rajasthan v. Leela Ram, (2019) 13 SCC 131 and after considering
a catena of decisions of this Court on the issue on hand i.e. in case of a single
blow, whether a case falls under Section 302 or Section 304 Part I or Section 304
Part II, this Court reversed the judgment [Leela Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2008
SCC OnLine Raj 945] and convicted the accused for the offence under Section
302 IPC. In the same decision, this Court also considered Exception 4 of Section
300 IPC and observed in para 19 as under: (Leela Ram case [State of
Rajasthan v. Leela Ram, (2019) 13 SCC 131, SCC pp. 140-41)
‘19. … Under Exception 4, culpable homicide is not murder if the
stipulations contained in that provision are fulfilled. They are: (i) that the act
was committed without premeditation; (ii) that there was a sudden fight; (iii)
the act must be in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel; and (iv) the
offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner.’”
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7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions
to the facts of the case on hand and the fact that the accused gave
several blows/multiple blows on the vital part of the body – head which
resulted into grievous injuries and he used “Phakadiyat” with such a force
which resulted in Skull fracture and a frontal wound on left side and
wounds with 34 stitches on the left side of the skull extended from mid of
the left side of the skull along with coronal sutures of 16 cm, we are of
the opinion that the case would fall under Clauses thirdly and fourthly of
Section 300 IPC. Clauses thirdly and fourthly of Section 300 IPC read as
under:
“Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any
person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, or—
Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently
dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the
risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”
Therefore, as per Section 300 IPC, if the case falls within Clauses thirdly
and fourthly to Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide can be said to be
amounting to murder. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this
case, the High Court has committed a grave error in observing that
culpable homicide did not amount to murder, by applying exception
Fourth to Section 300 IPC. As observed hereinabove, exception Fourth
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to Section 300 IPC ought not to have been applied by the High Court at
all considering the fact that the main second incident had taken place
subsequently at 12:00 in the night, much after the first incident of
altercation was over in the mehendi ceremony. The impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on facts as
well as on law.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present
appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court altering finding of murder to one of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder and consequently converting the sentence from life
imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment is hereby quashed and
set aside. The respondent-accused is held guilty for the offence under
Section 302 IPC for having killed and/or committed the murder of the
deceased Virendra Singh and he is sentenced to undergo life
imprisonment. Accordingly, the judgment and order passed by the trial
Court convicting the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC and
sentencing him to life imprisonment is hereby restored.
……………………………………J.
[M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………………J.
FEBRUARY 04, 2022. [B.V. NAGARATHNA]
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