NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs RAVINDRA KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS.

NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs RAVINDRA KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 382 OF 2012
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAVINDRA KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR.
LRS.

.....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed by the original defendant against
the judgment and decree passed by the High Court on 25.02.2010
upholding the findings of the first Appellate Court dated 19.12.1999
whereby the decree of the Trial Court was affirmed.
2. The plaintiff-respondent was allotted a residential plot No. D-49, Sector30, Noida1
 as a member of the Defence Services Cooperative Housing
Society on 06.10.1981. The possession of the plot was handed over to
him on 24.08.1991.
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Sector 30 Plot’
1
3. However, prior to the allotment of the said plot, plot No. 84, Sector15A, Noida2
 was allotted to Smt. Amila Singhvi, wife of the plaintiff on
10.03.1981. As per the pleaded case of the plaintiff, there was an
uncertainty on account of litigation between the Society of which he
was a member with the appellant authority. Therefore, the plot at
Sector 15A was applied for, which was allotted to the plaintiff’s wife on
10.3.1981. It was pleaded that since the plaintiff was interested in
Sector 30 plot as member of the Society, therefore, the wife of the
plaintiff transferred the Sector 15A plot in favor of one Mrs. Kanta Modi
after obtaining permission from the appellant. Later, a transfer deed
was executed on 25.10.1990.
4. The plaintiff was served with a notice on 12.06.1996 that the Sector 30
plot had been obtained by him by submitting a false affidavit as Sector
15A plot was already allotted to his wife. The grievance of the plaintiff
was that since the Sector 15A plot has been sold after obtaining
permission from the appellant, therefore, the Sector 30 plot was the
only plot in possession of the plaintiff. With the said claim, the suit for
declaration was filed restraining the defendant from re-allocating the
Sector 30 plot and from dispossessing the plaintiff from the same. After
considering the reply, the plot was cancelled on 18.10.1996.
5. In the written statement filed by the appellant, it was asserted that
there was no litigation in respect of the Sector 15A plot and that the
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Sector 15A Plot’
2
plaintiff was aware of the allotment of the Sector 15A plot when Sector
30 plot was allotted. However, the plaintiff intentionally concealed such
factum of allotment and filed a false affidavit for the Sector 30 plot. It
was also pleaded that the plaintiff was aware of the terms and
conditions of allotment that the plaintiff and his wife cannot retain both
the plots separately. The Sector 15A plot was sold only to conceal the
fact of obtaining double allotment. It was further contended that Sector
15A plot was allotted on 10.03.1981 and the wife of the plaintiff sworn
an affidavit on 04.03.1983 that the allotee, her spouse and dependent
children have not been allotted residential plot/house/flat in Noida,
Delhi or New Delhi. The plaintiff was allotted Sector 30 plot on
06.10.1981. The plaintiff had also filed an affidavit along with his letter
dated 1.12.1988 that he, his spouse and dependent children did not
own in full or part any residential plot/house/flat in Noida, Delhi and
New Delhi. The affidavit filed by the plaintiff reads thus:
“AFFIDAVIT
I, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi S/o Late Shri K.M. Singhvi R/o of E227, East of Kailash, New Delhi-110065, aged about 39 years do
hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as under:-
1. That I have attained the age of majority on 26.01.1968.
2. That I am a bonafide and registered member of the
Defence Services Cooperative Housing Society (Regd.) in
my own name and right on May 1, 1976.
3. That I have deposited Rs.125/- as membership fee of the
above cooperative housing society on 18.07.1975.
4. That I, my spouse and dependent children do not own in
3
full or in part on lease hold or free hold basis any
residential plot or house in NOIDA and have not been
allotted any plot, or house on hire purchase basis in
NOIDA complex.”
6. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit inter alia on the ground that
the lease executed in favour of the plaintiff cannot be determined
merely by passing the subject order in terms of Section 111 (g) of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1887 as no notice for determination of lease
under the said section has been issued. Therefore, all rights in the
lease would survive. The first Appellate Court and the High Court
affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court. The High Court
further held that plaintiff and his wife had no ulterior motive to
perpetrate fraud on the appellants. It was noted that there was no
willful or dishonest intention on the part of the plaintiff and his wife.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant herein argued that the entire basis of
the decree passed by the Courts was erroneous and wholly untenable
in law. Lease was not cancelled for the reason that there was any
violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. The allotment was
cancelled as false affidavits were filed by the allotees of both the plots
which knocks down the very allotment since it was obtained by
concealing material facts. The appellant had a policy that a family
would not get more than one plot so as to provide housing to large
number of citizens.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the letter of
4
allotment of plot to the plaintiff dated 6.10.1981 along with the terms
and conditions for the sale of developed leasehold rights of residential
plots to the members of the Cooperative Housing Building Societies in
New Okhla Industrial Development Area (NOIDA). It was contended
that such terms and conditions were applicable to all the Cooperative
Housing Building Societies. The relevant conditions read thus:
“1. ELIGIBILITY:
 Any person who is competent to contract. A person himself
owning or in the case of his/her spouse or dependent children
owning a plot or house within municipal corporations of Delhi or
New Delhi or Noida Complex will not be eligible for allotment of a
plot in NOIDA.
2. NOTE MORE THAN ONE PLOT:
 An eligible person will be allotted not more than one residential
plot in the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority. Area
separately eligible for allotment of plot and for this purpose they
shall be treated as a single eligible person.
xxx xxx xxx
15. LEASE DEED AND OTHER CONDTIONS OF LEASE
xxx xxx xxx
(I) If the allotment of lease of the plot is obtained by any
misrepresentation misstatement or fraud or if there is any
breach of the conditions of the lease, the allotment or as the
case may be, the lease may be cancelled and the possession of
the plot and the building thereon may be taken over by the
Authority and the lessee will not be entitled to any
compensation.”
9. Thus, it was averred that the allotment was cancelled for the reason
5
that the wife of the plaintiff was allotted a plot earlier in point of time
but still, the plaintiff filed an affidavit not disclosing the allotment of
such plot to his spouse. Thus, it was a violation of the terms and
conditions of the allotment.
10. On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the
plaintiff argued that the terms and conditions of the sale of developed
leasehold rights have not been produced on record. The plaintiff
became the member of the Cooperative Housing Society in the year
1976 but the disputes were pending for a long time. Therefore, the plot
at Sector 15A was sought, which was allotted to his wife.
Subsequently, after the settlement of the dispute, such plot was
allotted to the Society and as a member of the Society, he has been
allotted a residential plot.
11. It has been admitted by the plaintiff-respondent that on account of
dispute regarding the allotment, no construction has been raised over
the said plot.
12. It was further submitted that in terms of Section 14 of the Uttar
Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976, the Chief Executive Officer
can resume the site or building in case of non-payment of
consideration or any installment or breach of any condition of such
transfer or breach of any rule or regulation made. The judgment of this
Court reported as ITC Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
3
3 (2011) 7 SCC 493
6
has been relied upon to submit that in case a lessee commits default in
paying either the premium or lease amount or commits breach of any
term of the lease, the Chief Executive Officer alone can resume the
plot. The Authority to resume implies and includes the Authority to
unilaterally cancel the lease as well.
13. It was also argued that the finding of fact recorded by the trial court
and affirmed by the First Appellate Court was not interfered with by the
High Court in the second appeal as no substantial question of law
arose for consideration. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied
upon judgments of this Court reported as Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v.
U.T., Chandigarh & Ors.
4 and Managing Director, Haryana State
Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. v. Hari Om
Enterprises & Anr.
5
 to contend that determination of lease has to be
the last resort.
14. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and find that the
plaintiff had invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court even though he
had filed a false affidavit that his spouse or dependent children have
not been allotted any plot.
15. It is an admitted fact that the wife of the plaintiff was allotted Sector
15A plot on 10.3.1981. The wife sworn an affidavit on 4.3.1983 that
neither she nor her spouse owned any other plot in Noida. It was on
6.10.1981 that the plaintiff was informed about allotment of residential
4 (2004) 2 SCC 130
5 (2009) 16 SCC 208
7
plot measuring 450 sq. yards in Sector 30. The allotment was said to
be subject to terms and conditions as enclosed. The relevant extract
from such terms and conditions have been reproduced above. Such
terms clearly show that a person himself owning, or in case of his
spouse or dependent children owning a plot within the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi or New Delhi or Noida complex, will not be eligible
for allotment of a plot in Noida. The affidavit of the wife of the plaintiff
was false as the plot measuring 450 sq. yards stood allotted to the
plaintiff on 6.10.1981. Therefore, on the date the wife of the plaintiff
had sworn the affidavit, the Sector 30 plot was already allotted to the
plaintiff. The argument that plot might have been allotted but the
possession was not with the wife of the plaintiff is incorrect. The
affidavit was to the effect that she has not been allotted any plot either
in her name or in the name of her husband. The affidavit was not that
the plot has been allotted but possession has not been delivered.
16. On the other hand, the plaintiff had sworn an affidavit, sent to the
appellant with his letter dated 1.12.1988 that he, his spouse and
dependent children do not own in full or in part on leasehold or
freehold basis any residential plot. Even this affidavit is in respect of
allotment of a plot not in respect of delivery of possession. It may be
stated that when in 1988, the plaintiff had sworn the affidavit, the
lease deed dated 31.1.1983 already stood executed in respect of
Sector 15A plot. Since the lease was executed, the wife of the plaintiff
8
applied for permission to transfer which was granted and transfer deed
was executed on 25.10.1990. The permission was granted by the
appellant without having knowledge of the fact that the husband of the
allottee has already been allotted a separate plot. Once an affidavit
has been filed which is on the face of it false to the knowledge of the
executants, no benefit can be claimed on the ground that delivery of
possession was given.
17. In M. Veerabhadra Rao Vs. Tek Chand
6
, this Court was considering
an affidavit attested by an Advocate in terms of Section 3(2) of the
Oaths Act, 1969. The conduct of appellant to attest an affidavit without
oath and the attestation on the representation of the respondent that it
bears his signatures, came up for consideration. In these
circumstances, this Court held as under:
“17. The expression 'affidavit' has been commonly understood to
mean a sworn statement in writing made especially under oath or
on affirmation before an authorised Magistrate or officer. Affidavit
has been defined in sub-clause (3) of Section 3 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 to include 'affirmation and declaration in the
case of person by law allowed to affirm or declare instead of
swearing.' The essential ingredients of an affidavit are that the
statements or declarations are made by the deponent relevant to
the subject matter and in order to add sanctity to it, he swears or
affirms the truth of the statements made in the presence of a
person who in law is authorised either to administer oath or to
accept the affirmation……”
18. Therefore, affidavits filed were not mere sheet of paper but a solemn
statement made before a person authorized to administer oath or to
6 1984(Supp) SCC 571
9
accept affirmation. The plaintiff had breached such solemn statement
made on oath.
19. The terms and conditions of allotment conveyed to the plaintiff on
1.12.1988 have a specific clause that if allotment is obtained by any
misrepresentation or misstatement or fraud, the lease may be
cancelled and the possession of the plot and the building thereon may
be taken by the Authority. Therefore, cancellation of allotment of plot
obtained after filing false affidavit is a legitimate ground of cancellation
of lease. Fraud vitiates all actions as laid down by this Court in S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by
LRs. & Ors.
7
 wherein it was held as under:
“5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short
question before the High Court was whether in the facts and
circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary
decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however,
went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse.
We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty
cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and
prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation”
cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it
becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants.
The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the
parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean
hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not,
process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, taxevaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons
from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to
retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say
that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to
approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any
stage of the litigation.”
7 (1994) 1 SCC 1
10
20. The argument that the lease was required to be determined by the
Chief Executive Officer is not tenable. The determination of lease by
the Chief Executive Officer would arise if in case there was any
violation of the terms of lease. If the condition precedent for grant of
lease itself was fraudulent, the cancellation of lease was not required
to be preceeded by permission of the Chief Executive Officer. Still
further, the Chief Executive Officer has granted permission on
13.9.1998, though the cancellation order was passed on 18.10.1996.
Thus, it is a case of irregularity at best which stands removed with the
permission of the Chief Executive Officer. The argument that if the
statute prescribes a power to do a certain thing in a certain way, such
thing must be done in that way and other modes of performance are
necessarily forbidden is not applicable in the present case. Firstly, for
the reason that admittedly, false affidavits were filed by the plaintiff as
well as by his wife. The filing of a false affidavit disentitles the plaintiff
for any equitable relief. Secondly, any irregularity in the process of
cancellation stands cured with Chief Executive Officer granting
permission on 13.9.1998.
21. The judgment in ITC Limited as relied upon by the respondent is on
altogether different facts. In that case, the allotment made in favour of
ITC Limited was subject matter of challenge in Public Interest Litigation
in writ petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court. The issue was in
respect of cancellation of lease on account of violation of the terms,
11
not based upon fraud in obtaining the lease.
22. The judgments of this Court in Teri Oat Estates and Hari Om
Enterprises are also on different facts wherein the Doctrine of
Proportionality was applied.
23. The fact is that the second plot allotted to the plaintiff had been
allotted against the express terms of allotment. Therefore, there is
neither equity nor any law in favor of the plaintiff. A person who
misleads the Authority in obtaining allotment of a plot is not entitled to
any relief.
24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the
courts below are set aside and the suit is thus dismissed.
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
.............................................J.
(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 15, 2022.
12

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