Bombay Chemical Industries vs Deputy Labour Commissioner

Bombay Chemical Industries vs Deputy Labour Commissioner - Supreme Court Case

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.813 OF 2022

M/s Bombay Chemical Industries       ..Appellant (S)

VERSUS

Deputy Labour Commissioner & Anr.                  ..Respondent (S)

J U D G M E N T 

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

judgment and order dated 14.11.2018 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No.33482

of 2018, by which the High Court has dismissed the said

writ petition preferred by the appellant herein and has

confirmed   the   order   passed   by   the   Presiding   Officer,

Labour Court IV, U.P., Kanpur Nagar, under Section 33(C)

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(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   the   original   writ

petitioner has preferred the present appeal. 

2. That respondent No.2 herein moved an application before

the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial

Disputes Act in Misc. Case No.26 of 2012 demanding the

difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012. The

said   application   was   contested by   the   appellant   herein

denying any relationship of employee­employer. It was the

categorical stand of the appellant that respondent No.2

herein was never engaged by it. Before the Labour Court

respondent No.2 herein relied upon the documents exhibit

W­1 to W­6 in support of his case that he had worked in

the   establishment   as   a   salesman.   That   by   order   dated

28.11.2017  the   learned   Presiding  Officer,  Labour   Court

allowed the said application and  directed the  appellant

herein to pay the difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to

31.03.2012 as claimed in the application.

2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order

passed   by   the   learned   Presiding   Officer,   Labour   Court

under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the

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appellant herein preferred a writ petition before the High

Court.   By   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   the   High

Court has dismissed the said writ petition which has given

rise to the present appeal. 

3. Shri Vishal Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant has vehemently submitted that in the facts

and circumstances of the case the High Court has erred in

dismissing   the   writ   petition   and   confirming   the   order

passed by the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act.

3.1 It is submitted by Shri Yadav appearing on behalf of the

appellant that the High Court ought to have appreciated

that when there was a serious issue raised with respect to

the employer­employee relationship between the appellant

and respondent No.2 and that it was seriously disputed

that   respondent   No.2   was   at   any   point   of   time   in

employment as a salesman, the Labour Court ought not to

have   entertained/allowed   the   application   under   Section

33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the same could

have been decided in the reference under Section 10 of the

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Industrial Disputes Act. It is therefore submitted that the

order passed by the Labour Court is completely without

jurisdiction.  Therefore, the High Court ought to have set

aside the same. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this

Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs.

Ganesh Razak and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 235 and Union of

India   and   another   Vs.   Kankuben   (Dead)   By   Lrs.   and

Others,  (2006) 9 SCC 292, in support of his submissions

that   in   a   proceeding   under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the

Industrial   Disputes   Act,   the   Labour   Court   cannot

adjudicate the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the

claim and it can only interpret the award or settlement on

which the claim is based. 

3.2 Making the above submissions and relying on the above

decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.      

    

4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Dr. Vinod

Kumar Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent(s). 

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4.1 It is submitted that in the present case respondent No.2

placed on record voluminous record namely exhibit W­1 to

W­6   to   show   that   respondent   No.2   was   working   as   a

salesman   with   the   appellant.   It   is   submitted   that   the

appellant came out with a false case to get out of the

obligation difference in salary to be paid as claimed in the

application.   It   is   therefore   submitted   that   when   on

appreciation   of   evidence   and   considering   the   material

available on record the Labour Court held that respondent

No.2 was employed as a salesman and thereafter directed

the appellant to pay the difference of wages it cannot be

said that the Labour Court exceeded in its jurisdiction. 

4.2 It   is   submitted   that   when   on   the   face   of   the   record

available   it   was   found   by   the   Labour   Court   that

respondent No.2 was in employment of the appellant as a

salesman, and in the claim before the Labour Court there

was found a difference in the salary/pay for the period

from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012, the Labour Court has not

committed any error. The High Court has rightly dismissed

the writ petition.

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5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respective parties at length. 

6. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent

No.2 herein filed an application before the Labour Court

under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,

demanding   difference   of   wages   from   01.04.2006   to

31.03.2012. It was thus the case on behalf of respondent

No.2   that   he   was   working   with   the   appellant   as   a

salesman. However, the appellant had taken a categorical

stand   that   respondent   No.2   was   never   engaged   by   the

appellant.  It   was   specifically   the   case   on   behalf   of   the

appellant that respondent No.2 had never worked in the

establishment   in  the  post   of  salesman.  Therefore,   once

there   was   a   serious   dispute   that   respondent   No.2   had

worked as an employee of the appellant and there was a

very   serious   dispute   raised   by   the   appellant   that

respondent No.2 was not in employment as a salesman as

claimed by respondent No.2, thereafter, it was not open for

the   Labour   Court   to   entertain   disputed   questions   and

adjudicate   upon   the   employer­employee   relationship

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between the appellant and respondent No.2. As per the

settled proposition of law, in an application under Section

33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court

has   no   jurisdiction   and   cannot   adjudicate   dispute   of

entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen.  It can

only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim

is based. As held by this Court in the case of  Ganesh

Razak   and   Anr.  (supra), the labour court’s jurisdiction

under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like

that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of

law   without   prior   adjudication   or   recognition   of   the

disputed   claim   of   the   workmen,   proceedings   for

computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of

wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable

under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and Anr.

(1995) 1 SCC 235).

In the case of  Kankuben (supra), it is observed and

held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from

his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of

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being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled

to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit

can approach Labour Court under Section 33­C (2) of the

ID Act.  It is further observed that the benefit sought to be

enforced under Section 33­C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily

a pre­existing benefit or one flowing from a pre­existing

right.     The   difference between   a   pre­existing   right   or

benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is

considered just and fair on the other hand is vital.   The

former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising

powers under Section 33­C (2) of the ID Act while the latter

does not.

7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when there was

no   prior   adjudication   on   the   issue  whether   respondent

No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed

by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute

raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a

salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent

No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was

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the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents

are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought

not to have proceeded further with the application under

Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour

Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate

appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his

right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. Therefore, the

order   passed   by   the   Labour   Court   was   beyond   the

jurisdiction   conferred   under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the

Industrial   Disputes   Act.   The   High   Court   has   not

appreciated   the   aforesaid   facts   and   has   confirmed   the

same  without  adverting  to   the  scope  and   ambit  of  the

jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of

the Industrial Disputes Act.  

8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above the

present   appeal   succeeds.   The   impugned   judgment   and

order passed by the High Court as well as that of the order

passed by the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act in Misc. Case No.26 of 2012 are

hereby   quashed   and   set   aside.   Respondent   No.2   is

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relegated to avail any other remedy which may be available

under   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   including   that   of

reference to adjudicate his right as an employee of the

appellant   as   claimed   by   him.   As   and   when   such

proceedings   are   initiated  the  same  to   be  considered   in

accordance with law and on its own merits and without in

anyway   being   influenced   by   the   present   order,   as   this

Court has not expressed anything in favour of either of the

parties on the aspect of employer­employee relationship

between the appellant and respondent No.2. The present

appeal is allowed with the above observations and to the

aforesaid extent. No costs.   

…………………………………J.

                  (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J.

 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

New Delhi, 

February, 04 2022.

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