JOGI RAM vs SURESH KUMAR

JOGI RAM vs SURESH KUMAR - Supreme Court Case 2022

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1543-1544 OF 2019

JOGI RAM … Appellant

Versus

SURESH KUMAR & ORS. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

Background:

1. The consequences of a testamentary disposition by a Will dated

15.4.1968 by one Tulsi Ram, who passed away on 17.11.1969 is still

pending resolution before us after half a century.

2. The Will aforesaid bequeathed the testator’s estate to his son, the

appellant herein, and his second wife Ram Devi (the first wife being

deceased whose progeny is the appellant). Land measuring 175 kanals

and 9 marla, a residential house and a Bara is Village Jundla, Haryana

was bequeathed half and half to the appellant and Ram Devi. However,

the nature of bequeath was different for the two. The appellant was

1

given absolute ownership rights to the extent of his share of land and

property whereas Ram Devi was given a limited ownership for her

enjoyment during her lifetime with respect to her share of the land with a

specific provision that she could not alienate, transfer or create third

party rights over the same. Thereafter the property was to vest absolutely

in the appellant after her lifetime.

3. It appears that the properties were enjoyed as per the Will after the

demise of Tulsi Ram in 1969 for quite a few years till the first round of

litigation began – Bimla Devi, daughter of Ram Devi instituted a suit in

the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Karnal for declaration against her

mother, Ram Devi, claiming that she had become owner in possession of

half share of the land willed to Ram Devi by Tulsi Ram, which resulted

in a decree being passed on 15.1.1986. It may be stated at this stage

itself that by very nature the suit was collusive. On the decree being

passed Bimla Devi executed a lease deed in favour of one Amar Singh on

17.6.1986 in respect of land falling within Ram Devi’s limited share.

This prompted the appellant to file a Civil Suit No.94/1993 for

declaration and permanent injunction before the Senior Sub Judge,

Karnal impleading Ram Devi, Bimla Devi and Amar Singh. The

2

gravamen of the suit was that Ram Devi having only a limited life

interest the decree of declaration by Bimla Devi had been obtained

through collusion and the lease deed was a bogus document which would

not have any effect upon the rights of the appellant to inherit the property

after the demise of Ram Devi. The suit was, however, contested only by

Ram Devi with the other two defendants being proceeded ex parte. The

suit resulted in a judgment and decree dated 27.9.1995 to the effect that

the appellant having proved the Will executed by Tulsi Ram, the case

clearly fell under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) which was in the nature of an

exception as it precluded the benefits of Section 14(1) of the said Act to

accrue with respect of a property inter alia inherited under a Will with a

restricted right in such a property. Thus, it was concluded that the limited

estate of Ram Devi could not be expanded to an absolute estate and the

decree of the Civil Court dated 15.1.1986 and the lease deed dated

17.6.1986 were consequently set aside.

4. It may be noted that even though the suit was pending in the

interregnum period Ram Devi executed two sale deeds dated 29.4.1993

qua land measuring 38 kanals 14 marlas in favour of one Dharam Singh

3

and 11 kanals 3 marlas in favour of Kanta Devi. Another sale deed was

subsequently executed on 8/9.6.1998 in favour of Baldeva for land

measuring 40 kanals 8 marlas. All these were part of the suit land. The

latter was during the pendency of the appeal by Ram Devi before the

Additional District Judge, Karnal which appeal was also finally

dismissed vide judgment dated 15.4.1999. Insofar as the appeal qua

Baldeva was concerned, that was also dismissed due to inability of Ram

Devi to serve notice on Baldeva despite sufficient opportunity. In the

third round of the same litigation Ram Devi’s second appeal under

Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (hereinafter referred to as the

‘PC Act’) also met the same fate vide judgment dated 23.10.2001 in RSA

No.1700/1999. The whole matter ought to have received a quietus

thereafter as the Special Leave Petition was also dismissed vide order

dated 29.4.2002. It may be noticed that in the interregnum period Ram

Devi also passed away on 26.8.1999. This is as far as the story of the

first round of litigation.

5. The second round of litigation began when the appellant instituted

a Civil Suit No.256/157 of 2008 before the Civil Judge, SD, Karnal for

declaration and injunction challenging the sale deeds executed by Ram

4

Devi. This suit was also decreed vide judgment and decree dated

13.8.2009 in favour of the appellant.

6. Once again the gravamen of the decision of the learned Civil Judge

was the earlier judgment and decree dated 27.9.1995 opining that Ram

Devi had only a limited ownership right and could not have alienated the

suit property. There being no change in law, the previous decree in

favour of the appellant was held binding among the parties and their

successors-in-interest. The sale deeds executed, thus, found to be

unsustainable being against the decree of the lower court. Once again,

opinion was the same as to the construction of Sections14(1) and 14(2) of

the said Act as any contrary interpretation would tantamount to

proscribing the right of a Hindu to execute a Will as envisaged under

Section 30 of the said Act. The court granted a decree of possession to

the appellant being the rightful owner of the same. The court also noted

that the title of the purchasers could not be better titled than Ram Devi

possessed as they had acquired their rights from her and could not even

be considered bona fide purchasers for value in view of the history of the

litigation.

7. Kanta Devi, legal heirs of Baldev and Dharam Singh then

5

preferred an appeal against the said judgment dated 13.8.2009, which

was dismissed vide judgment dated 7.10.2010 in Civil Appeal

No.56/2009. That gave rise to the second appeal before the High Court,

being RSA No.210/2011.

8. The respondents pleaded before the High Court by relying upon

the judgment of this Court in V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy

(Dead) by LRs.1

 to contend that Ram Devi’s right over the suit property

granted under the Will had crystallised into an absolute ownership right

making her competent to transfer the same. The subsequent judgment of

this Court in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna &

Ors.2

 was also referred to in support of the said proposition. The decree

in the first round of litigation was contended not to operate as res

judicata in the second suit as the judgment in the earlier suit was contrary

to the law prevailing at the time of their consideration (Shakuntla Devi

v. Kamla & Ors.3

 which referred to Mathura Prasad Bajoo & Ors. v.

Dossibai N.B. Jeejebhoy4

). Without prejudice to the same the

respondents also claimed to be bona fide purchasers for value and, thus,

were protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

1

(1977) 3 SCC 99

2

(2016) 2 SCC 56

3

(2005) 5 SCC 390

4

(1970) 1 SCC 613

6

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘TP Act’).

9. On the other hand the appellant contended that the doctrine of res

judicata would apply in view of the earlier adjudication as the matter of

Ram Devi having a limited estate has been upheld right till the Supreme

Court. The appellant had also taken possession of the suit property and

execution of the judgments was under challenge before the High Court.

10. The fate of the respondents after the amendment turned favourable

as they succeeded before the High Court in terms of the impugned

judgment dated 22.2.2018. The discussion in the impugned judgment

revolves around three aspects:

(a) Whether the first round of litigation operate as res judicata for

the appeal.

(b)Whether Ram Devi’s limited right over the suit property

conferred through the Will had crystallised into an absolute

right under Section 14(1) of the said Act.

(c) Whether the High Court was mandated to frame a substantial

question of law in deciding the second appeal.

11. On the first aspect the High Court found that the factual scenario

and legal principles enunciated in Shakuntla Devi5

 case would be

5

(supra)

7

squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In the factual

scenario of that case, one Uttamdasi was the successor of the suit

property and had alienated the same through a sale deed and gift deed.

The daughter of Uttamdasi, Takami, successfully challenged the

alienation and the decree became final. Uttamdasi thereafter executed a

Will with respect to the same suit property. Tikami instituted a suit for

possession on the basis of a previous declaratory decree wherein she had

been held to have ownership right of the property. This Court opined that

the case would constitute as a principle of res judicata. The first

declaratory decree in favour of Tikami was granted on the basis of a

limited right held by Uttamdasi in the suit property. By the time the

second decree was tried, the Supreme Court in V. Tulasamma & Ors.6

case had declared the law under Section 14 of the said Act to the extent

that the beneficiary under a Will such as Uttamdasi with limited rights

would become the absolute owner of the same. Since the law had been

altered since the first declaratory decree, the same would not operate as

res judicata in a decree for possession. The judgment in V. Tulasamma

& Ors.7

 case was not retrospective but a declaratory decree simpliciter

6

(supra)

7

(supra)

8

would not attain finality if it is used in a future decree of possession and

it would be open for a defendant in a future suit for possession to

establish that the earlier declaratory decree was not lawful. Thus, the

respondents were held entitled to challenge the appellant’s possession of

the suit property.

12. On the second aspect the High Court has taken a view that V.

Tulasamma & Ors.8

 case had sufficiently resolved any uncertainty under

Sections 14(1) & 14(2) of the said Act. A Hindu female has a right to

maintenance on a property if a charge was created for her maintenance,

the right would become legally enforceable irrespective, even without a

charge, the claim for maintenance was a pre-existing right so that any

transfer declaring such right would not confer a new title but merely

confirm pre-existing rights and Section 14(2) of the said Act cannot be

interpreted in a manner that would dilute Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the

said Act. Only in a scenario where the instrument created a new title in

favour of the wife for the first time, would Section 14(2) would come

into play and not where there was a pre-existing right. Ram Devi was

held to have been conferred with a limited right which would translate

into an absolute right over the suit property as it was only a confirmation

8

(supra)

9

of the pre-existing right over the property.

13. On the last aspect it was held that in view of the decision of this

Court in Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs & Ors. v. Chandrika &

Ors.9

, the High Court was not required to frame a substantial question of

law while deciding the plea as Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Code’) would have

no applicability to the PC Act.

14. On the appellant approaching this Court notice was issued in the

SLP on 4.7.2018 with the direction to maintain status quo as on the date

as the appellant had already taken over possession in the execution of the

decree. Leave was granted on 4.2.2019 and the interim order made

absolute.

15. In the conspectus of the aforesaid, the matter was heard by us.

The Arguments:

16. In order to appreciate the provisions of the said Act, it may be

appropriate to reproduce Section 14 of the said Act as under:

“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute

property.—

(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether

9 AIR 2016 SC 1213

10

acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be

held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both

movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu

by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of

maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any

person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her

marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by

prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any

such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the

commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any

property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other

instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under

an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or

the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such

property.”

17. There is no doubt that Section 14 of the said Act is the part of the

said Act to give rights of a property to a Hindu female and was a

progressive step. Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the said Act makes it

clear that it applies to properties acquired before or after the

commencement of the said Act. Any property so possessed was to be

held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The

Explanation to sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the said Act defines the

meaning of “property” in this sub-section to include both movable and

immovable property acquired by the female Hindu by inheritance or

11

devise or a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance,

or by gift from any person, or by her skill or exertion, or by purchase or

by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever, including stridhana.

The Explanation is quite expansive.

18. Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act is in the nature of a

proviso. It begins with a ‘non-obstante clause’. Thus, it says that

“nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property

acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a

decree or order of a civil court....” etc. where a restricted estate in such

property is prescribed. In our view the objective of sub-Section (2)

above is quite clear as enunciated repeatedly by this Court in various

judicial pronouncements, i.e., there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a

property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his

wife but of course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance

that would mature in an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the said

Act.

19. Before considering the submissions it would be appropriate to turn

to the Will itself. The Will while conferring a limited estate on Ram

Devi, Tulsi Ram had clearly stated that she will earn income from the

12

property for her livelihood. The income, thus, generated from the

property is what has been given for maintenance and not the property

itself. The next clarification is that after the lifetime of Ram Devi, the

appellant will get the ownership of the remaining half portion also. It is

specified that in case Ram Devi pre-deceases Tulsi Ram, then all the

properties would go absolutely to the appellant and that the other

children will have no interest in the property. We may note that Tulsi

Ram had six children. One son and four daughters are from the first wife

and Bimla Devi was the daughter from the second wife. At the stage

when the Will was executed one of the daughters was unmarried and the

Will also provided that in case for performing the marriage Ram Devi

needs money she will have the right to mortgage the property and earn

money from the same and will further have the right to gain income even

prior to the marriage.

20. We have set forth the terms and conditions of the Will to

understand the intent of the testator. The testator is, at least, clear in

terms that the income derived from the property is what is given to the

second wife as maintenance while insofar as the properties are

concerned, they are divided half and half with the appellant having an

13

absolute share and the wife having a limited estate which after her

lifetime was to convert into an absolute estate of the appellant.

21. Now turning to the submissions of the learned counsel for the

parties.

22. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the life estate was

not given to Ram Devi in lieu of recognition of any pre-existing right of

Ram Devi or in lieu of maintenance and, thus, Section 14(2) of the said

Act would apply and not Section 14(1) of the said Act. The plea of res

judicata was again reiterated. It was urged that the High Court

proceeded on an erroneous premise as if the law had changed from the

first round of litigation while the fact was that the law was the same at

both stages of time. The distinction which was sought to be made was

that Shakuntla Devi10 case was wrongly relied upon as the Will in that

case was dated 1.10.1935 and it was, thus, a pre-1956 Will and, thus, that

judgment was not precedent for factual scenario in question. The suit

property was a self-acquired property of Tulsi Ram and, thus, he was

competent to execute the Will.

23. We may note that learned counsel for the appellant did seek to

contend that since possession of the property was taken over by the

10 (supra)

14

appellant and Ram Devi was not in possession thereof, she cannot claim

the benefit of Section 14(1) of the said Act (Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara

Sahib Narike & Ors.11 and Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors. v.

Gaddam Ramireddy & Ors.12). We may, however, note that in our

perspective that is not a material consideration as the possession is stated

to have been taken over in pursuance of the decree of the trial court.

24. On behalf of the respondents it was, once again, emphasised that

the factual scenario was similar to Shakuntla Devi13 case and the rights

of a female Hindu post the said Act have been crystallised and enunciated

in V. Tulasamma & Ors.14 case since she was an absolute owner she was

entitled to sell the land and the respondents were bona fide buyers who

were protected by Section 41 of the TP Act. Further no substantial

question of law was required to be framed in view of the Constitution

Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (dead) through

LRs & Ors.15 case.

Our view:

25. We have extracted the relevant portions of the enactment, the

11 (2006) 8 SCC 75

12 (2010) 9 SCC 602

13 (supra)

14 (supra)

15 (supra)

15

document in question being the Will and have already opined on the

interpretation of the Will. The submissions of the learned counsel for the

parties have, thus, to be appreciated in the conspectus of the same.

26. We do believe that there are only two real aspects to be examined

in the present case as the issue of even framing a question of law stands

settled. The two aspects, in our view are as under:

i. In the given factual scenario did Ram Devi become the absolute

owner of the property in view of Section 14(1) of the said Act

or in view of the Will the Explanation under Section 14(2)

would apply.

ii. What is the effect of the first round of litigation which came up

to this Court between the appellant and Ram Devi, the two

beneficiaries of the Will.

27. We are of the view that both these questions have to be answered

in favour of the appellant and for that reason the impugned judgment is

unsustainable.

28. We would first like to turn to the seminal judgment in V.

Tulasamma & Ors.16 case. In para 20 the propositions emerging in

16 (supra)

16

respect of incidents and characteristics of a Hindu woman’s right to

maintenance have been crystallised as under:

“20. Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of

the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu Law on

the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to

the incidents and characteristics of a Hindu woman's right to

maintenance:

(1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal

obligation so far as the husband is' concerned, and it is his

duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the

husband has property then the right of the widow to

maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property

and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it

the legal obligation to maintain the widow;

(2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to

property but it is undoubtedly pre-existing right in property,

i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by

the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance

on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a

decree from the civil court;

(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and

is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold

and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to

maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for

her maintenance;

(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a preexisting right which existed in the Hindu Law long before

the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is,

therefore, a pre-existing right;

(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and

temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by

17

virtue of which the wife becomes a sort (I.L.R. 27 Mad. 45.

(2) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 452) of co-owner in the property of her

husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate

nature; and

(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the

property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the

possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who

succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a

position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.”

29. In the light of the aforesaid passage, Sections 14(1) & 14(2) of the

said Act were entered by the Court. The word “possessed” was held to

be used in a wide sense not requiring a Hindu woman to be an actual or

physical possession of the property and it would suffice if she has a right

in the property. The discussion in para 33 thereafter opines that the

intention of the Parliament was to confine sub-section (2) of Section 14

of the said Act only to two transactions, viz., a gift and a will, which

clearly would not include property received by a Hindu female in lieu of

maintenance or at a partition. The intention of the Parliament in adding

the other categories to sub-section (2) was merely to ensure that any

transaction under which a Hindu female gets a new or independent title

under any of the modes mentioned in Section 14(2) of the said Act. The

conclusions were thereafter set forth in para 62 of the judgment as under:

18

“62. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions

which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of

the authorities mentioned above; on the question of law

involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of s. 14(1) and

(2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated thus:

(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty

formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of

grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property

which flows from the spiritual relationship between the

husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by

pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed

even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya

to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is

a right against property and the husband has a personal

obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has

property, the female has the legal right to be maintained

therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a

female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At

any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is

doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring

or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but

merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.

(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been

couched in the widest possible terms. And must be liberally

construed in favour of the females so as to advance the

object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic

ends, sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.

(3) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and

has a field of its own without interfering with the operation

of s. 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed

in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision

or the protection granted by s. 14(1) or in a way so as to

become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

19

(4) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 applies to instruments, decrees,

awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in

favour of the females for the first time and has no

application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to

confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In

such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally

permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.

Where, however, an instrument merely declares or

recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to

maintenance or partition or share to which the female is

entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and

the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged

into an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and the restrictions

placed, if any, under the document would have to be

ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a

female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the

instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub- s. (2) and would

be governed by s. 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on

the powers of the transferee.

(5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a

female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or

arrears of maintenance" etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1)

clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories

which have been expressly excepted from the operation of

sub-s.

(2).

(6) The words "possessed by" used by the Legislature in s.

14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the

state of owning a property even though the owner is not in

actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where a

widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary

decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been

passed but had not been given actual possession under a

final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed

by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get absolute

interest. in the property. It is equally well settled that the

20

possession of the widow, however, must be under some

vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not

contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without

any right or title.

(7) That the words "restricted estate" used in s. 4(2) are

wider than limited interest as indicated in s.14(1) and they

include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of

limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”

30. In our view the relevant aspect of the aforesaid conclusion is para

4 which opines where sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act would

apply and this does inter alia applies to a Will which may create

independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is

not a recognition of a pre-existing right. In such cases of a restricted

estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) of

the said Act will not operate in that sphere.

31. We may add here that the objective of Section 14(1) is to create an

absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such

limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then. The objective

cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable

to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects

including maintenance are taken care of. If we were to hold so it would

imply that if the wife is disinherited under the Will it would be

21

sustainable but if a limited estate is given it would mature into an

absolute interest irrespective of the intent of the testator. That cannot be

the objective, in our view.

32. The testator in the present case, Tulsi Ram, had taken all care for

the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue

generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to

give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son

inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime. We are, thus, of the view

that it would be the provisions of Section 14(2) of the said Act which

would come into play in such a scenario and Ram Devi only had a life

interest in her favour. The natural sequittur is that the respondents cannot

inherit a better title than what the vendor had and, thus, the view taken by

the trial court and the first appellate court is the correct view and the sale

deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained.

33. On consideration of the second aspect, we must begin by stating

that the sequence of litigations can hardly be said to classify the

respondents as bona fide purchasers. The first endeavour was by the

daughter of Ram Devi by seeking what is undoubtedly a collusive decree

when she had no interest in the property. She then sought to create lease

22

interest in the property. Both these aspects were held against Ram Devi

and her daughter right till the Supreme Court in the first round of

litigation clearly opining that Ram Devi had only a limited estate in the

property. Despite having lost right till the Supreme Court, the sale deeds

were intervening factors even during the pendency of the litigation which

went against the vendor Ram Devi.

34. We may also notice that the reliance on Shakuntla Devi17 case by

the High Court is misplaced as the factual scenario cannot be said to be

identical. In fact the most crucial aspect was that the Will in question

was dated 1.10.1935, a pre-1956 Will which is the distinguishing factor.

The same factual scenario prevailed in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy18 case.

We must also notice that the High Court wrongly proceeded on the basis

that the first round of litigation would not create any binding precedents

because there was change in law after the first round of litigation. There

is, in fact, no change in law as all the judgments were much prior in time.

We have already stated that the rights of the respondents are derived only

from Ram Devi and once the judgment is binding on Ram Devi it cannot

be said that she can create rights contrary to the judgment in favour of

17 (supra)

18 (supra)

23

third parties and that too was done during the pendency of the litigation.

We believe from the facts on record that the transactions in question are

not only not bona fide but dubious in character to somehow deny the

appellant rights conferred under the Will respondents being third parties.

The repeated endeavour of Ram Devi and her daughter did not succeed

earlier and cannot be permitted to succeed qua the purchasers from Ram

Devi.

Conclusion:

35. The result of the aforesaid is that the appeals are allowed and the

impugned judgment of the learned single Judge of the High Court is set

aside and the decree of the trial court dated 13.8.2009 as affirmed by the

appellate court dated 7.10.2010 is reaffirmed. The parties are left to bear

their own costs.

...……………………………J.

[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]

...……………………………J.

[M.M. Sundresh]

New Delhi.

February 01, 2022.

24

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले