THIRU K. PALANISWAMY VERSUS M. SHANMUGAM & ORS.

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1392 OF 2023

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO. 11237 OF 2022)

THIRU K. PALANISWAMY ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1393 OF 2023

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO. 11579 OF 2022)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1394 OF 2023

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO. 11578 OF 2022)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1395 OF 2023

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO. 15753 OF 2022)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1396-1397 OF 2023

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NOS. 15705-15706 OF 2022)

JUDGMENT

DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals involving inter-related issues and same set of

contesting parties, have been considered together and are taken up for

disposal by this common judgment.

3. Before embarking upon the requisite details, a few preliminary

comments and brief outline shall be apposite.

3.1. The matters in issue essentially relate to the internal management

of a political party, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam1

, which is

registered with the Election Commission of India. This political party, said

to be having the primary cadre consisting of more than 1.5 crore members,

has its own byelaws, which have been amended from time to time. The two

upper levels of party structure include the Central Executive Committee2

and the General Council of the Central Organization3

. Though, in the

scheme of byelaws, the topmost position in the party was earlier assigned

to the General Secretary but, after the demise of the then General

Secretary on 05.12.2016, the party organisation went through a sea of

changes and ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator, was established by way of amendment of byelaws on

12.09.2017. However, the propositions for further amendments have met

with divergent views of different factions within the party and have led to

these litigations in as many as at least five civil suits. The prayers for

temporary injunction during the pendency of these civil suits have led to

different orders at different stages by the High Court of Judicature at

Madras on the Original side and on the Appellate side as also by this Court.

3.2. For introductory purposes, we may indicate that in the first three

civil suits, being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of 2022, various

applications seeking interim reliefs were dealt with by an order dated

22.06.2022 whereby, the learned Single Judge of the High Court declined

‘AIADMK’, for short; hereinafter also referred to as ‘the party’ or ‘the political party’.

2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Executive Committee’.

3 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the General Council’.

to grant any injunction against the meeting of the General Council

scheduled to be held on 23.06.2022. This order was challenged by one of

the plaintiffs in an intra-court appeal, OSA No. 160 of 2022; and therein, by

an order dated 23.06.2022, as passed after an early morning hearing, the

Division Bench of the High Court, though allowed the said scheduled

meeting of the General Council but, placed fetters on its scope by providing

that no decision shall be taken on any other matter except 23 items of draft

resolution. The said order dated 23.06.2022 came to be challenged in this

Court in the three appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.

11237 of 2022, 11578 of 2022 and 11579 of 2022 in this batch of matters.

By way of an interim order dated 06.07.2022, this Court stayed the

operation and effect of the said order dated 23.06.2022 and further to that,

the next proposed meeting of the General Council slated to be held on

11.07.2022 was also permitted but while leaving it open to the parties to

seek any other interim relief before the learned Single Judge dealing with

the civil suits. Before the aforesaid order dated 06.07.2022 by this Court,

two more civil suits, being CS Nos. 118 of 2022 and 119 of 2022, came to

be filed before the High Court against the said proposed meeting dated

11.07.2022. Therein again, a learned Single Judge of the High Court

conducted early morning hearing on 11.07.2022 and declined the interim

relief. The said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was, accordingly, held at the

scheduled time and various resolutions were adopted therein but, the said

order dated 11.07.2022 was subjected to challenge in this Court and, by

an order dated 27.09.2022, this Court remanded the matter for

reconsideration. Thereafter, the interim relief applications in the said newly

filed civil suits were decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court

on 17.08.2022 granting certain interim reliefs and providing, inter alia, that

status quo ante, as existing on 23.06.2022, shall be maintained and there

would be no Executive Council or General Council meeting without joint

consent of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. The said order dated

17.08.2022 was questioned in intra-court appeals, being OSA Nos. 227 of

2022, 231 of 2022 and 232 of 2022. These three appeals were allowed by

the Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 02.09.2022, which

is under challenge in the appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (C)

Nos. 15753 of 2022 and 15705-15706 of 2022.

4. The aforesaid outline would make it clear that though the issue

relating to the meetings of the General Council of the party-AIADMK has

gone into serious questions with different parties having different

propositions to make and different reliefs to seek but, the position obtaining

as at present is that the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 has taken place

and the said civil suits remain pending at different stages. The two principal

orders in challenge before us, i.e., the one dated 23.06.2022 and another

one dated 02.09.2022 essentially relate to the question of grant of

temporary injunction during the pendency of the respective civil suits. In

this regard too, it is to be noticed that insofar as the order dated 23.06.2022

is concerned, the operation and effect whereof was stayed by this Court on

06.07.2022, has practically lost its relevance because of the supervening

and subsequent events. The position where the contesting parties stand at

present is that on one hand, the plaintiff-appellants challenging the order

dated 02.09.2022 would submit that the said order is required to be set

aside and that of the learned Single Judge dated 17.08.2022 is required to

be restored, whereby interim relief was granted to them whereas, the

parties opposing would support the order dated 02.09.2022 as being just

and proper, requiring no interference.

5. We have drawn the foregoing outline essentially to indicate that

though there are multiple parties representing different positions before us

but the matters in essence relate to the question of grant of temporary

injunction in the civil suits concerning the affairs of the political party and

the disputes inter se the members and the factions within the party; and

then, the civil suits giving rise to the orders impugned remain pending and

ought to be tried in accordance with law. Thus, even when the learned

counsel for the contesting parties have made elaborate submissions on a

variety of factors and facets, we would confine this judgment and our

consideration to the question of grant of temporary injunction in the civil

suits; and to the extent adjudication is requisite by this Court in that regard.

Hence, we may not delve into the questions which are not germane to the

present adjudication.

6. With the foregoing preliminary comments, observations, and

outline, we may take note of the relevant factual aspects, in brief, as

follows:

6.1. A few of the basic facts which admit of no controversy are that the

party-AIADMK was founded in the year 1972 and is duly recognised and

registered with the Election Commission of India. The party, said to be

having primary cadre consisting of more than 1.5 crore members, is

governed by its own byelaws. As noticed, the upper levels of party structure

include the Executive Committee and the General Council. The byelaws of

the party have been amended from time to time, including the amendments

in the years 2011 and 2017. The propositions for further amendments are

at the root of controversy in the present matters. Before taking up the

questions in controversy, it may be noticed that in the scheme of the

byelaws as originally framed and continued for a long time, the topmost

position in the party was assigned to its General Secretary, who was to be

directly elected by the primary cadre. Earlier, Dr. J. Jayalalitha was holding

the said position of the General Secretary but, after her demise on

05.12.2016, the party drifted into a state of uncertainty as regards

leadership.

6.2. On 29.12.2016, in a General Council meeting convened after the

demise of Dr. J. Jayalalitha, Ms. V.K. Sasikala was nominated as the

interim General Secretary. However, on 14.02.2017, the said interim

General Secretary came to be incarcerated in view of a judgment of this

Court. Ultimately, on 28.08.2017, a notice was issued for a General Council

meeting on 12.09.2017. At that stage, one of the groups in the party had

staked its claim before the Election Commission of India as being in-charge

of the affairs of the party. All these features of intra-party dispute at that

stage are not of much implication in relation to the issues at hand. The

relevant aspect has been that in the meeting of the General Council held

on 12.09.2017, a unique system was put in place by amendment of the

byelaws. By way of this amendment, the said late Dr. J. Jayalalitha was

assigned the status of “Eternal General Secretary” of the party while

providing that the said post of General Secretary would as such be

abolished; and in place of the said post of General Secretary, two high level

posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were created.

6.3. At this juncture, it may also be noticed that the disputes in the civil

suits leading to the interim orders in question essentially relate to the two

persons who were respectively elected as Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator after such amendment of the byelaws; they being the appellant

of the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 15753 of 2022, Thiru. O.

Panneerselvam4

, who was elected as the Co-ordinator and the respondent

No. 1 of that appeal, Thiru. E.K. Palaniswamy5

, who was elected as the

Joint Co-ordinator.

6.4. In the amendment of the byelaws carried out on 12.09.2017, the

Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator were assigned the powers and role

that were previously entrusted to the General Secretary. Tersely put, it

established a system of joint leadership in the party whereby all decisions

were to be taken jointly by the said two office-holders of the party. As per

the amended byelaws, the tenure of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator

was fixed for a period of five years. From the date of the said decision dated

4 At several places and even during the course of submissions, Thiru. O. Panneerselvam has

been referred to with the initials ‘OPS’. For continuity, the same initials have been assigned in his

reference in this judgment.

5 At several places and even during the course of submissions, Thiru. E.K. Palaniswamy has been

referred to with the initials ‘EPS’. For continuity, the same initials have been assigned in his

reference in this judgment.

12.09.2017 and until the month of May 2021, this political party-AIADMK

remained in power, forming the government in the State of Tamil Nadu.

6.5. However, on 01.12.2021, the Executive Committee of the party

passed a special resolution for amending Rules 20-A(ii), 43 and 45 of the

byelaws. These amendments empowered the primary membership of the

party to directly elect the persons to the said post of Co-ordinator and Joint

Co-ordinator and it was also provided that even when the General Council

could amend the rules of the party constitution and even when the Coordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator could relax or make alterations in the

rules and regulations of the party, the provision for direct election of Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator only by primary members of the party

cannot be changed. The Executive Committee’s resolution dated

01.12.2021 also provided that the said amendments would come

immediately into effect but shall be approved by the General Council.

6.5.1. On 02.12.2021, the party election for the said posts of Co-ordinator

and Joint Co-ordinator was notified. On 06.12.2021, OPS and EPS jointly

contested for the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator; they were

elected unanimously and unopposed; the necessary certificates were

issued to both of them; and the election results were notified to the Election

Commission of India. It appears that further elections for the posts of office

bearers of the party at different levels of the organization were conducted

in terms of Rules 6 to 14 of the byelaws in different phases commencing

from 13.12.2021 and continuing until 28.04.2022, when the office bearers

of the Chief Committee of Kazhagam were appointed and then, on

29.04.2022, members of the Central Executive Committee were appointed

by OPS and EPS functioning jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

In the month of May, 2022, Form AA and Form BB were communicated by

the party in relation to the election of Tamil Nadu Legislative Council. These

forms were also signed by OPS and EPS, functioning jointly as Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

6.6. Until the processes aforesaid, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Coordinator appear to have continued to function in tandem and in the spirit

of joint leadership envisioned by the amended byelaws. Continuing as

such, they issued a joint notice convening the meeting of General Council

on 23.06.2022. This notice did not have any agenda or proposed

resolutions. However, with the issuance of this notice, a subtle simmering

appears to have started within the party for return to the system of single

leadership and this had been the trigger to the present litigation. It appears

that on 19.06.2022, OPS sent a letter to EPS asking for adjournment of the

General Council meeting scheduled to be held on 23.06.2022, which was

replied in the negative by EPS. There had been a petition filed in Madras

High Court for police protection at the meeting dated 23.06.2022. It is the

case of EPS that OPS received the final version of resolution to be placed

before the members of General Council by the Party Headquarters and he

conveyed the consent for the same. As noticed hereinbefore, the proposed

meeting dated 23.06.2022 led to the said three civil suits, being CS Nos.

102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of 2022. In CS No. 111 of 2022, the

plaintiff, Mr. M. Shanmugam sought the reliefs of prohibitory injunction

against the party as also against the General Council, the Executive

Committee, the Co-ordinator, and the Joint Co-ordinator, that they may not

convene the General Council meeting proposed to be held on 23.06.2022.

Two applications, OA Nos. 327 of 2022 and 328 of 2022, were also filed

seeking temporary injunction so as to restrain the defendants from placing

any agenda in the General Council meeting to be held on 23.06.2022.

Other OAs were also filed in the other civil suits but, for the sake of brevity,

we are not expanding on them because the subject-matter essentially

remains the same.

6.7. The aforesaid applications with the prayer for interim order and

direction were considered by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on

22.06.2022. The learned Single Judge declined to pass any interim order

or to issue any interim direction; and the General Council meeting slated

for 23.06.2022 was allowed to go on. The learned Single Judge observed,

inter alia, as under: -

“13. This Court, upon hearing the learned respective counsel and

on-going through the entire record, finds that all the parties have

reported no objection for conducting the General Council meeting

to be held on 23.06.2022, however, the learned counsel appearing

for the plaintiffs and 3rd defendant/Co-ordinator would strongly

oppose to passing of any resolutions on the floor of the Meeting

regarding amendment of the Rules and Regulations of the 1st

Defendant/Party, mainly, abolishing the posts of Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator as it would cause great prejudice to them. None

of the parties have made any prima facie case for grant of interim

orders. In fact, the plaintiffs have come forward with the applications

seeking interim directions based upon their apprehension that

resolutions may be passed in respect of amendment of the Rules

and Regulations of the 1st Defendant/Party. This Court, cannot

imagine what would be going to take place during the General

Council meeting held on 23.06.2022 and issued interim

orders/directions in advance. In fact, it is well settled that in matter

of internal issues of an association/Party, the Courts normally do

not interfere, leaving it open to the association/party and its

members to pass resolutions and frame a particular bye-law, rule or

regulation for better administration of the Party since any decision

comes forth among the Members of the General Council, it is well

within their collective wisdom and this Court cannot insist the

Members to act upon in a particular manner. It is for the General

Council and its members to decide and pass resolutions and this

Court cannot interfere with the process of conducting the General

Council meeting. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to pass any

interim orders/directions, except making it clear that the General

Council meeting which is scheduled to be held on 23.06.2022 shall

go on.

Issue Notice to the respondents returnable by 11.07.2022. Private

notice is also permitted.

List the matters on 11.07.2022.”

6.8. The aforesaid order dated 22.06.2022 was questioned by the

plaintiff of CS No. 111 of 2022 before the Division Bench of the High Court

in OSA No. 160 of 2022. Taking note of the case of the plaintiff-appellant

in the said intra-court appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court issued

directions in the manner that the General Council meeting slated on

23.06.2022 could go on but no decision would be taken on any item other

than 23 items mentioned in the draft resolution. While issuing notice, the

Division Bench observed and directed in its order dated 23.06.2022 as

under: -

“11. Since the draft resolution approved by the respondents 4 and

5 does not contain an item with regard to the amendment of the

Rule- 20A 1 to 13, 45 and 45 (sic), we are of the view that the

appellant has made out a prima facie case for the grant of an order

of interim injunction. In the event of not granting any interim order in

the above petition, the appellant and the 4th respondent would be

greatly prejudiced. Further, if an order of injunction is not granted,

the prayer sought for in the suit will become infructuous. We are

also of the view that the interim injunction sought for by the

petitioner to prohibit the respondents from conducting the General

Council Meeting cannot be granted. However, the General Council

can discuss and take decisions only with regard to 23 items

mentioned in the draft resolution, which has been approved by the

respondents 4 and 5. The respondents shall not take any decision

apart from the 23 items mentioned in the draft resolution. The

General Council are at liberty to discuss any other matter apart from

the 23 items mentioned in the draft resolution, however, no decision

shall be taken in the General Council meeting with regard to the

same.

12. In the result, we permit the respondents 4 and 5 to convene the

General Council meeting at 10.00 a.m. on 23.06.2022 and we also

permit the General Council to discuss and take any decision as per

the Rules and Bye-Laws with regard to 23 items mentioned in the

draft resolution and we make it clear that the respondents shall not

take any decision other than the 23 items mentioned in the draft

resolution. The members of the General Council are at liberty to

discuss any other matter, however, no decision should be taken in

the General Council with regard to the same.

Notice to the respondents 1 to 3 returnable by 19.07.2022.”

7. What transpired after the aforesaid order dated 23.06.2022 and in

the meeting of the General Council that followed, has given rise to several

disputed questions and issues. According to OPS and the persons standing

on his side, in the said meeting dated 23.06.2022, a resolution was

proposed to appoint Mr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussain as permanent

Presidium Chairman and he conferred upon himself such post of Chairman;

and thereafter, during the meeting, one of the members of the General

Council approached the stage and screamed out that all the 23 resolutions

that were to be voted upon, stood rejected. Then, around 2000 General

Council members went on to hand over a few documents in the form of

alleged affidavits/requisition signed by them to the Chairman of the meeting

and simultaneously made a requisition to convene the next meeting of

General Council on the date of his choice. It is alleged that the said Mr. A.

Tamizh Magan Hussain announced the next date of General Council

meeting as 11.07.2022 in breach of the byelaws of the party. It is the case

of OPS that resolution No. 1 as tabled in the said meeting was materially

different from the one which was approved by him in the email. On the other

hand, it is the case of EPS and the persons standing with him that in the

said meeting dated 23.06.2022, the requisition given by 2190 members

was read over and handed to the Presidium Chairman, who announced in

the same meeting, in the presence of OPS and all the members of General

Council, that the next General Council meeting based on the requisition, to

discuss and decide on the single leadership, would be held at the same

venue on 11.07.2022 at 9:15 a.m. A report of this meeting dated

23.06.2022 was sent to the Election Commission of India alongwith the

report of Presidium Chairman on 28.06.2022.

7.1. After the aforesaid meeting/proceedings dated 23.06.2022, a notice

dated 01.07.2022 came to be issued by “Party Headquarter’s Bearers” for

the General Council meeting to be held on 11.07.2022. OPS and the

persons standing with him have serious questions as regards the legality

and validity of the said notice dated 01.07.2022, essentially for two

reasons; one that the power to convene such meeting of General Council

was with Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator acting jointly and with none

other; and second, that this notice was sent only ten days before the

scheduled meeting even though the byelaws require minimum 15 days’

notice.

7.2. In the wake of the said notice dated 01.07.2022, the said Mr. M.

Shanmugam (plaintiff of CS No. 111 of 2022) moved applications before

the Division Bench of the High Court alleging breach of its order dated

23.06.2022. In regard to these applications, the Division Bench of the High

Court made it clear, in its order dated 04.07.2022, that the interim order

dated 23.06.2022 was pertaining only to the meeting scheduled to be held

on 23.06.2022 and the same could not be extended for an indefinite period.

The Division Bench also made it clear that they were not expressing any

opinion for the meeting scheduled to be held on 11.07.2022.

8. Thus, when in the order dated 04.07.2022, the High Court declined

to intervene in relation to the meeting dated 11.07.2022, on the next day

i.e., on 05.07.2022, two other civil suits came to be filed, one by OPS and

another by Mr. P. Vairamuthu. Before adverting to the prayers made in the

said civil suits as also the interim relief applications therein, for maintaining

continuity and sequence of events, we may take note of an order passed

by this Court on 06.07.2022.

8.1. While the aforesaid new civil suits and the interim relief applications

were to be taken up by the High Court, the three petitions seeking special

leave to appeal led by SLP(C) No. 11237 of 2022, filed in challenge to the

aforesaid order dated 23.06.2022 in OSA No. 160 of 2022, came up for

consideration before this Court on 06.07.2022. After taking note of the

submissions made and the events that had taken place as also the

scheduled meeting dated 11.07.2022, this Court, while issuing notice,

stayed the operation and effect of the impugned order dated 23.06.2022

and made it clear that the meeting slated for 11.07.2022 could proceed in

accordance with law while also leaving it open for the learned Single Judge

dealing with the said civil suits to examine the prayer for any other interim

relief and/or to pass any other order, as may be required in the facts and

circumstances of the case. The order dated 06.07.2022 as passed by this

Court reads as under: -

“Permission to file Special Leave Petitions in Dy. No. 19425 of

2022 and Dy. No. 19419 of 2022 is granted.

I.A. No. 89644 of 2022 stands rejected for applicant being not a

party to the civil suit(s) relating to these petitions.

Heard learned senior counsel for the petitioners and the learned

senior counsel appearing for the respective respondents in caveat.

The matters require consideration.

Issue notice, returnable in two weeks.

Mr. Pai Amit and Mr. Goutham Shivshankar accepts notice on

behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Notices, therefore, be issued to the unrepresented respondents,

returnable in two weeks.

Dasti service in addition to ordinary process is permitted.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the

subject-matter of the litigation as also the contents of the order

dated 22.06.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge on the

Original Side and the order dated 23.06.2022 as passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court dealing with the intra Court

appeals, it is considered appropriate and hence ordered and

observed as under: -

a. Operation and effect of the impugned order dated 23.06.2022

shall remain stayed.

It may be clarified that though the meeting dated 23.06.2022

(forming the subject-matter of the orders aforesaid), has already

been taken place but, in view of the further steps/proceedings taken

up or likely to be taken up pursuant to the impugned order and

pursuant to the observations/directions made therein, and looking

to the questions raised in these petitions, it appears necessary and

expedient that the operation of the impugned order should remain

stayed until further orders of this Court.

b. So far as the Meeting of the General Council of the respondent

No. 3, slated to be held on 11.07.2022 is concerned, the same may

proceed in accordance with law and in that relation, the other

aspects of any interim relief ought to be projected and presented

before the learned Single Judge dealing with civil suit(s) on the

Original Side.

c. We do not consider it necessary to pass any other order of

interim nature and all other aspects are to be examined at the

appropriate stage.

d. It is made clear that pendency of these petitions in this Court

shall not be of any impediment for the learned Single Judge dealing

with the civil suit(s) to examine the prayer for any other interim relief

and/or to pass any other necessary order, as may be required in the

facts and circumstances of the case.

The respondents may file counter affidavit within two weeks.

List these matters after two weeks.”

9. We may now revert to the subject-matter of, and the proceedings

in, the said two civil suits, being CS No. 118 of 2022 and CS No. 119 of

2022.

9.1. Thiru. O. Panneerselvam filed CS No. 118 of 2022 with OA No. 368

of 2022 for interim relief while questioning the convening of General

Council meeting on 11.07.2022. The main prayers in CS No. 118 of 2022

read as follows: -

“a) For a Declaration that convening the General Council Meeting

on 11.07.2022 or on any other date, without the joint authorization

of both Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator is illegal, and in

contravention to the bye laws of the 1st Defendant Party, more

particularly rule 20A(iv) and 20A(v) of the rules and regulations of

AIADMK Party.

b) For a Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants from

convening the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 or on any

other date without the express authorization of both the CoOrdinator and Joint Co-Ordinator.”

9.2. The prayer in OA No. 368 of 2022 filed with the said CS No. 118 of

2022 had been as follows: -

“Pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining the Respondents

from convening the alleged General Council meeting on 11.07.2022

or any other date without the express authorization of both the

coordinator and joint coordinator pending disposal of the suit and

pass such further or other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem

fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

9.3. CS No. 119 of 2022 was filed by Mr. P. Vairamuthu along with

application for injunctive relief (OA No. 370 of 2022). The main prayers in

CS No. 119 of 2022 are as follows: -

“a) For a Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants from

convening the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 or on any

other date without the express authorization of both the CoOrdinator and Joint Co-Ordinator.

b) For a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants or any

other office bearer of the party to convene the General Council

meeting on 11.07.2022 or any other dated without giving its

members, a 15 days’ notice in advance as contemplated in the rules

of the 1st Defendant party.”

9.4. In OA No. 370 of 2022, filed with the said CS No. 119 of 2022, the

prayer for interim relief had been in the following terms: -

“A. Pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining the

Respondents from convening the alleged General Council meeting

of the 1st Respondent party which is scheduled to be held on

11.07.2022 based on an unsigned notice dated 01.07.2022 issued

without giving 15 days notice in advance of the date of meeting and

in violation of the bye-laws of the party pending disposal of the suit

and pass such further or other orders as this Hon’ble Court may

deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

9.5. Further to the foregoing, it is also relevant to notice that on

07.07.2022, another interim relief application, being OA No. 379 of 2022,

was filed in CS No. 119 of 2022, seeking additional interim relief in the

following terms: -

“A. pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining the

Respondents from passing any resolution relating to the abolition of

the post of Co-Ordinator and Joint Coordinator as they were elected

by the primary members of the party for the term of 5 years as per

the by-law 20(A)ii, 20 A(iii) and consequentially direct the

Respondents from not implementing the resolutions/decisions

relating to item 3,4,5,6,7 mentioned in the notice dated 01.07.2022

in the alleged General Council meeting, which is to be held on

11.07.2022 pending disposal of the suit and pass such further or

other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the

interest of justice.”

10. The aforesaid interim relief applications filed in relation to the said

two subsequent suits were considered and decided by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court on 11.07.2022 at 09:00 a.m., a few minutes before

the scheduled time of the meeting of the General Council. Learned Single

Judge took note of the background aspects as also the orders passed by

this Court and proceeded to dismiss the applications.

10.1. Thereafter, the meeting of General Council was held on

11.07.2022, wherein certain resolutions were adopted which are the bone

of contention between the parties. A summary of the resolutions adopted

in the said meeting, being questioned by the plaintiffs of CS Nos. 118 of

2022 and 119 of 2022, could be usefully extracted from the written note

filed on their behalf (while omitting paper book page numbers) as follows:

“The General Council meeting was held immediately after the said

Order was delivered, and various illegal resolutions were passed at

the meeting for the conversion of the leadership structure of the

AIADMK from a system of joint leadership under the Coordinator

and Joint Coordinator to single leadership under the post of General

Secretary. Illegal resolutions were also passed at the meeting

expelling the OPS and other primary members from the primary

membership of the Party and removing OPS from the post of

Treasurer of the Party.

• Expulsion of OPS as primary member and relieving him from

position of Coordinator in the Party

• Expulsion of 3 other senior leaders including 2 MLAs

• Reverting to Single Leadership and amendments to

corresponding byelaws: Resolution 3

• Creation of post of Interim General Secretary: Resolution 4

• Election of EPS as Interim General Secretary: Resolution 5

• Notification of elections to post of General Secretary:

Resolution 6

• Summary of Amendments to Byelaws approved

o Amendments to Rule 2 of Byelaws imposing very

high threshold conditions introduced for a person to

contest for elections to General Secretary.

Previously, any member of the Party could contest for

the post.”

11. Even though the said meeting had taken place on 11.07.2022, the

plaintiffs of the aforesaid CS Nos. 118 of 2022 and 119 of 2022 questioned

the order dated 11.07.2022 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court,

declining to interfere with the meeting of the given date, in this Court by

way of SLP(C) Nos. 12784-12785 of 2022 and SLP(C) No. 12782 of 2022.

While considering the said petitions, this Court noticed that the High Court

did not adjudicate on the reliefs sought for, essentially with reference to the

order dated 06.07.2022 of this Court; and formed the view that the said

applications of interim reliefs ought to be reconsidered by the High Court,

particularly when in the order dated 06.07.2022, there had been no

restriction on powers of discretion of the High Court. The said petitions

were decided on 29.07.2022 and while remanding the matter, this Court

also provided that status quo as existing on the date shall be maintained

by the parties until hearing of the matter by the High Court but, while making

it clear that status quo order was not to be construed as any expression of

opinion by this Court on the merits of the case. The said order dated

29.07.2022 reads as under: -

“1. Exemption applications are allowed.

2. Heard learned Senior Advocates for the parties at considerable

length.

3. From the record, it appears that some of the parties to the

underlying dispute pending before the High Court of

Madras, filed Special Leave Petitions, being Special Leave

Petition (C) No. 11237 of 2022, Special Leave Petition (C)

No.11578 of 2022 and Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11579 of

2022, before this Court. These petitions were listed before this

Court on 06.07.2022, when this Court passed certain directions,

inter alia, relating to the meeting of the General Council of

respondent no. 1 to be conducted on 11.07.2022.

4. The petitioners presently before this Court filed civil suits

challenging, inter alia, holding of the meeting of the General Council

of respondent no. 1 dated 11.07.2022 and sought interim

reliefs in the pending suits. However, vide the impugned

order, rather than adjudicating on the interim reliefs, it appears

that the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras has not

adjudicated upon the reliefs sought. Rather, the learned Single

Judge held as follows:

“11. Having heard the learned counsel for parties, this

Court finds considerable force in the contentions put

forth by the learned Senior counsel for the

respondent/defendant. At the outset, it is pertinent to note

that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in unequivocal

terms, observed that the Meeting of the General Council

of the respondent No.3 slated to be held on 11.07.2022

is concerned, the same may proceed in accordance with

law. Therefore, having regard to the direction of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court cannot take a

contrary decision by interpreting the same as

technically projected by the learned Senior counsel

for the applicants, stating that if the applicants make out a

prima facie case that the General Council meeting is not in

accordance with law, this Court can very well interfere

and override the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court and pass orders injuncting the

respondents/defendants from convening the meeting.

This Court is unable to fortify the contention put forth

by the learned Senior counsel for the applicants rather

amazed, for more than one reason, firstly, in the order, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the learned

single Judge can decide the issue regarding the

convening of the General Council meeting on

11.07.2022 without bearing in mind the direction already

given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court; secondly, no other

interim relief has been sought for before this Court by the

applicants apart from not to convene the meeting, to

examine and pass necessary orders by this Court; thirdly,

since the order has been passed permitting the

respondents/defendants to convene the meeting, if at all,

the same is not proceeded in accordance with law as

projected by the learned Senior counsel for the applicants,

being custodian of the order, it is for the Hon'ble

Supreme Court to consider this aspect of the matter and

not by this Court; fourthly, all the grounds which were

vehemently raised before this Court on behalf of

the applicants regarding the subject meeting is not

going to be proceeded in accordance with law, were in fact,

very well available at the time of passing of the order by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court fails to understand

as to why the applicants have not brought the same

to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way

of review and seek modification of the order instead

calling upon this Court to sit over and interpret the order of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which, being inferior and

abiding by law of precedent, this Court is not

inclined to venture upon such course and pass

contrary orders.”

5. From the above, it is clear that the learned single judge has taken

the view that, by virtue of the earlier order dated 06.07.2022

passed by this Court, he is unable to properly adjudicate

the matters. However, a perusal of the order dated 06.07.2022

indicates no such restriction on the power or discretion of

the High Court.

6. Taking into consideration the above, we are of the considered

view that it would be appropriate to remand this issue to the High

Court for reconsideration, without being influenced by any of

the orders passed by this Court either in the present Special Leave

Petitions or in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11237 of 2022,

Special Leave Petition (C) No.11578 of 2022 and Special Leave

Petition (C) No. 11579 of 2022 respectively.

7. We request the High Court to dispose of the said

matters, pending adjudication before it, expeditiously and

preferably within a period of two weeks reckoned from the

date of communication of a copy of this order.

8. Till the High Court hears the matters, status-quo as it exists today

shall be maintained by the parties.

9. Before parting with these matters, we make it clear that we have

not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. It is further

clarified that the status-quo order being granted today, shall not be

construed as an expression of any opinion by this Court on the

merits of the case. The High Court shall deal with, and decide,

the matters on their own merits in accordance with law.

10. The Special Leave Petitions and all the pending applications are

disposed of on the above terms.”

12. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge of the High Court took up for

consideration the said interim relief applications in CS Nos. 118 of 2022

and 119 of 2022 and proceeded to decide the same by his order dated

17.08.2022. Therein, the learned Single Judge formulated the points for

determination in the following words: -

“(1) Whether the plaintiff have locus to maintain the suit?

(2) Whether the General Council Meeting dated 11.07.2022 was

convened by the person authorised to convene the Meeting?

(3) In whose favour the prima facie case and balance of

convenience lie?”

12.1. The learned Single Judge examined the facts of the case, byelaws

of the party as also a Division Bench decision of the High Court concerning

the same political party in S. Thirunavukkarasu and Anr. v. Selvi J.

Jayalalitha and Anr.: 1997 (III) CTC 229 and observed, inter alia, that if

anything was done contrary to the party constitution and was likely to cause

injury to the rights of the members, there was no bar to seek redressal from

the Civil Court. The learned Single Judge also observed that the principle

of indoor management would apply only in respect of deliberations in the

meeting convened in accordance with byelaws and if the process of

convening the meeting itself was faulty and contrary to law, there was no

bar under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to approach the

Civil Court. Thus, the first point for determination was answered in the

affirmative while holding that the plaintiffs had locus to maintain the suit as

framed.

12.2. After taking note of the rival submissions and after having surveyed

through the byelaws of the party, the learned Single Judge recorded his

conclusion on the second point for determination in the following terms: -

“75. To put it in a nutshell: -

(i). The General Council meeting dated 11/07/2022 was not

convened by person competent to convene the General Council

meeting.

(ii). The said meeting was not convened providing 15 days

advance notice.

(iii). The contention that the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator lapsed after 23.06.2022 is borne out of imagination. The

reason to claim these post fall vacant after 23/06/2022 is baseless.

Invented to suit the convenience and cover up the violation of the

Party Constitution.

(iv). Rule-20(A)(vii) of the Party Constitution is a provision which

deals with exigencies when the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator becomes vacant before the expiry of the nominated

Central Executive Committee office bearers tenure. This provision

will no way give right to the temporary Presidium Chairman to

convene the General Council Meeting.

(v). The Sub-Rule(viii) of Rule 20-A vest with the Co-ordinator

and the Joint Co-ordinator, the powers and responsibility to

convene the Executive Committee and General Council Meeting, to

implement policies and programmes of a Party and to conduct

Elections and bye-Elections for the party organ. In case, if they

refuse to convene the meeting, the General Council members

should resort to the 2nd limb of Rule 19(vii) of the Party Constitution.

If a valid request is made by 1/5th of the total members, the Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are bound to convene the meeting

within 30 days of the Notice. The date of the meeting should be

informed in writing, 15 days in advance. Thus, the General Council

Meeting dated 11.07.2022 not convened by person authorised, also

suffers short of 15 days notice in advance.”

12.3. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge dealt with the question of

prima facie case and balance of convenience and held as under: -

“76. The final submission made by the Learned Senior Counsel for

the respondents/defendants is that the balance of convenience is in

favour of the respondents, who commands the support of more than

95% of the General Council Members, who were elected by the

primary members. Which, in other words means that, more than

95% of the primary members are behind Thiru. Edappadi

K.Palaniswami, who has now been elected as temporary General

Secretary of the Party in the General Council meeting held on

11.07.2022. In that meeting, it is resolved to conduct the General

Secretary Election and Election Officer already nominated for the

said purpose. However, in view of the interim order of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, which has directed parties to maintain status quo,

the election process for the post of General Secretary not

proceeded any further. The balance of convenience is in favour of

the respondents/defendants, who want to run the party

democratically and face the primary members to be elected as the

Party General Secretary. If the prayer of the injunction acceded, it

will cause irreparable loss to the respondents.

77. This Court, while considering the prayer for injunction, bound to

apply the triple test, namely, prima facie case, balance of

convenience and irreparable injury. Undoubtedly, if injunction is not

granted, Thiru.Edappadi K.Palaniswami, who convened the

General Council meeting contrary to the written provisions of the

Party Constitution will be in a more convenient position, since after

the impugned meeting, the plaintiffs/applicants and few others are

removed from the Party Primary Membership. They cannot even

participate/contest in the proposed General Secretary Election.

78. The balance of convenience in the given contest must be tested

from the arm chair of the Primary Members who are the foundation

of the Party and not from the Leaders point of view. The plea made

by the respondents/defendants that the majority of the primary

members in the Party feel that dual leadership causes

inconvenience in the administration of the Party and they cry for

Single Leadership is not based on any quantifiable data.

Particularly, when the very same dual leadership were able to run

the Government as Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Minister for

nearly 4½ years successfully amist (sic) various speculation and

administering the Party as Joint Co-ordinator and Co-ordinator for

nearly 5 years. During this period they together decided the

electoral alliance, they jointly selected candidates for Elections held

at all levels and fought several elections. While so, how suddenly

between 20.06.2022 and 01.07.2022, the Party with more than 1 ½

crores of cadre strength decided for change the existing

dispensation through 2500 old General Council Members and

whether, the views of abext (sic) 2500 members really reflects the

view of 1½ crores primary members are questions need to be

examined and be tested. As per the party Constitution,

amendments can be made, but it should be by alone following due

process. It is for the members of the Party to decide about

Leadership and the Court cannot interfere in their decision, but if

there is patent violation of the process, there is no bar to seek

remedy through Court.

79. This Court has no doubt in its mind that notice dated 01.07.2022

calling for General Council meeting for on 11.07.2022 by a person

who is not authorised to call for meeting is void ab initio. If the

consequence of the void meeting allowed to sustain, it will cause

inconvenience to the Party cadres, who will be uncertain about their

Leadership. From the typed set of documents, this Court take notice

of the fact that due to the dispute between these two Leaders, in the

local body election held recently, the party men at the grass root

those who contested the election were not able to get the

recognised Election Symbol 'two leaves'. Since, they both failed to

make request to the Election Commission jointly for allocation of

reserved symbol to their Party candidates, the Election Commission

declined to allot reserved symbol. This is an irreparable injury as far

as the partymen are concerned.”

12.4. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge disposed of the

interim relief applications in the following terms: -

“80. For the above said reasons, the Original Application

Nos.368, 370 and 379 of 2022 are disposed of, with the following

directions:-

(i) There shall be an order of status quo ante as on

23.06.2022.

(ii) There shall be no Executive Council meeting or

General Council meeting without joint consent of the Coordinator Thiru.O.Panneerselvam and Joint Co-ordinator

Thiru.Edappadi K.Palaniswami.

(iii) There shall be no impediment for the Co-ordinator

and the Joint Co-ordinator on their own to convene the

General Council Meeting jointly to decide the affairs of the

party including amendment of the party constitution restoring

Single leadership.

(iv) If a proper representation from not less than 1/5th

members of the total members of the General Council is

received, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator shall

not refuse to convene the General Council meeting.

(v) The General Council meeting, on such requisition

shall be convened within 30 days from the date of receipt of

the requisition and it shall be held after 15 days advance

Notice given in writing.

(vi) In case, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator

are of the opinion that, for any reason further direction is

required for conducting the General Council meeting or need

assistance of Commissioner for conducting the meeting, it is

open for them to approach this Court and seek necessary

relief.

81. With the above directions, these Original Applications are

disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.”

13. The aforesaid order dated 17.08.2022 came to be questioned in

three intra-court appeals filed by EPS, being OSA Nos. 227 of 2022, 231

of 2022 and 232 of 2022. These three intra-court appeals have been

considered and allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by its

impugned order dated 02.09.2022. The relevant passages in this order

dated 02.09.2022 could be usefully reproduced as under: -

“28. So far as the contention with regard to the convening of the

General Council Meeting is concerned, the General Council

Meeting was convened by the appellant and the 1st respondent (in

O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) on 23.06.2022. The appellant and the 1st

respondent were also very much present in the General Council

Meeting on 23.06.2022. By order dated 23.06.2022 made in

C.M.P.No. 9962 of 2022 in O.S.A.No.160 of 2022, this Court

permitted the General Council to decide 23 Draft Resolutions and

also permitted the Members to discuss other matters, however,

restrained them from taking any final decision apart from 23 Draft

Resolutions. In the said meeting, 2190 members gave written

request to conduct General Council Meeting. Based on the said

letter, it was announced in the General Council Meeting itself that

the next General Council Meeting would be conducted on

11.07.2022. It is pertinent to note that the 1st respondent was very

much present at the time of such announcement. As per Rule 19(vii)

of the Bye-Law of the Party, the General Council Meeting should be

convened every year or as and when the Co-Ordinator and the Joint

Co-Ordinator consider it necessary by giving 15 days notice in

advance of the meeting. The quoram for the meeting shall be 1/5th

of the total number of Members of the General Council. If 1/5th of

the members of the General Council requests the Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator to convene the Special General Council Meeting,

they should do so within 30 days on receipt of such representation.

It would be appropriate to extract 19(vii) of the Bye-Law both in

Tamil and English version.

Rule 19(vii) reads as follows: -

Part vii: - The General Council Meeting shall be convened

once in a year or whenever it is considered necessary by

the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator by giving 15 days

notice in advance of the date of meeting.

The quoram for the meeting shall be one-fifth of the total number of

members of the General Council. If one-fifth of the members of the

General Council request the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to

convene the Special Meeting of the General Council, the Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator should do so within 30 days of the

receipt of such a requisition.

On a reading of Rule 19(vii), it could be seen that the first part deals

with the regular General Council Meeting which should be

convened once in a year and in respect of the General Council

Meeting convened at the instance of the Co-Ordinator and the Joint

Co-Ordinator. For conducting such meeting, the first part of Rule

19(vii) stipulates giving 15 days notice in advance of the date of

meeting. Rule 19(vii) does not provide for any written notice for

convening a meeting. The second part of Rule 19(vii) deals with the

quoram for the meeting, which shall be 1/5th of the total number of

members of the General Council. For convening the Special

General Council Meeting at the request of 1/5th of the Members of

the General Council, the same should be convened within 30 days

of the receipt of such a requisition by the Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator. The second part does not provide for giving any notice to

the members of the General Council. For a requisitioner’s meeting

of the General Council, Rule 19(vii) does not provide for any notice

unlike the regular General Council Meeting, which requires 15 days

of advance notice. The Tamil version of the Bye-Laws clearly

demarcates the difference between a regular General Council

Meeting and a Special General Council Meeting based on

requisition of members. The Tamil Version of the Bye-Law refers to

the regular meeting and states “Merpadi Kuttathirku 15 Natkkal Mun

Arivippu Kudukka Vendum”, while there is no such stipulation for

the Special Meeting called by the requisitioners. For both the

Meetings, the Bye-Laws does not contemplate written notice to be

issued. The notice mentioned in Rule 19(vii) is that of the meeting

and not a notice to each member. It is clear that the notice can be

by way of publication, affixing at notice board, announcement, etc.

In the case on hand, notice of Special General Council Meeting was

by announcement in the 23.06.2022 meeting. Therefore, the notice

given by announcement on 23.06.2022 was a due notice for

convening the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022.

When the notice for General Council Meeting on 12.09.2017 was

issued by the Headquarters office Bearers on 28.08.2017, the

announcement made at the floor of the General Council Meeting on

23.06.2022 for convening Special General Council Meeting on

11.07.2022 can be construed as a proper notice. The word “notice”,

denotes merely an intimation to the party concerned of a particular

fact. It cannot be limited to “notice in writing” and only to a letter. A

notice may take several forms. Even assuming that the notice

suffers from procedural irregularity, it is always open to the

members of the General Council to ratify, as long as there is a

substantive right/function underlying in the notice. This ratio has

been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment

reported in AIR 1962 SC 666 (cited supra).

29. Had the Framers of the Bye-Laws thought of giving 15 days

notice even for the convening of the Special General Council

Meeting at the request of 1/5th of the General Council members,

they would have incorporated giving 15 days notice at the end of

the second part of Rule 19(vii). The mentioning of giving 15 days

notice in the first part would establish the intention of the framers of

the Bye-Laws was to give notice to the members of the General

Council only in respect of the regular Annual General Council

Meeting and for the General Council Meeting convened at the

instance of the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator. Since the

Special General Council Meeting are being convened at the request

of the members of the General Council, there will not be any

necessity for giving another notice to the members again for

convening the Special General Council Meeting. If 15 days notice

is again given even for convening Special General Council Meeting

at the request of 1/5th of the members of the General Council, it

leads to a situation where the meeting can be convened only

between 16th and 30th day.

30. Admittedly, the Agenda for the meeting was issued on

01.07.2022. On 23.06.2022 itself a decision has been taken to

convene a meeting on 11.07.2022. The requisition for convening a

Special General Council Meeting signed by 2190 General Council

members was addressed to the Presidium Chairman, Co-Ordinator

and Joint Co-Ordinator and the same was given to the Presidium

Chairman. It cannot be disputed that for convening the General

Council Meeting on 23.06.2022 necessarily there should be a

Presidium Chairman. In the absence of Presidium Chairman, a

meeting cannot be convened. Therefore, 2190 members gave a

requisition for convening a Special General Council Meeting to the

Presidium Chairman for the reason that there was a rift between the

Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator. As already stated, the

announcement with regard to the next General Council Meeting on

11.07.2022 was made in the presence of the 1st respondent and

also in the presence of about 2500 members. It is not the case of

the 1st respondent that they did not know about the announcement

made in the floor of the General Council Meeting on 23.06.2022.

Though Rule 19(vii) says that the Co-Ordinator and the Joint CoOrdinator should convene the Special General Council Meeting

within 30 days from the date of receipt of the requisition by its 1/5th

General Council members, since the Co-Ordinator and the Joint CoOrdinator are at loggerheads, they were not in a position to convene

the Special General Council Meeting jointly. Since the Co-Ordinator

and the Joint Co-Ordinator are at loggerheads one cannot expect

them to jointly convene the Special General Council Meeting and if

the 2nd part of rule 19(vii) of the Bye-Law is strictly applied then it

would result in a deadlock situation. If either the Co-Ordinator or the

Joint Co-Ordinator is not co-operating for convening the General

Council Meeting, it would lead to a situation where no General

Council Meeting could be convened.

31. In the judgment reported in (1997) 3 CTC 229 (cited supra) the

expelled member from the AIADMK Party viz., Mr.

S.Thirunavukkarasu called for a General Council Meeting, parallel

meeting to the meeting called by the then General Secretary Selvi

J.Jayalalithaa. The General Secretary approached this Court

seeking for an order of interim injunction against the convening of

parallel meeting and the same was granted in her favour. Therefore,

the facts surrounding the said judgment is completely different to

the facts of the present case. In the case on hand, there was no

parallel meeting called for by any of the Members. The ratio laid

down by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court reported in (1997)

3 CTC 229 (cited supra) cannot be applied to the facts and

circumstances of the present case. It cannot be said as a general

rule that the requisitioners have no option but to go to Court if the

leaders do not call for a meeting. Such a statement would be

undemocratic and illegal. When the Interim General Secretary could

not act in the year 2017, the Office Bearers stepped in to convene

the meeting on 12.09.2018 (sic) based on a requisition received.

32. It is not in dispute that the General Secretary was given power

to convene the General Council Meeting. After the death of Selvi

J.Jayalalithaa, Mrs.V.K.Sasikala was appointed as the Interim

General Secretary and she could not perform as Interim General

Secretary in the year 2017 because of her incarceration in a criminal

case. Therefore, the Office Bearers convened the meeting on

12.09.2017 based on the requisition made by the Members. A

similar situation has arisen now, (i.e.) since the Co-Ordinator and

the Joint Co-Ordinator are in loggerheads, the calling for the

meeting by the Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022 at the floor of

the General Council Meeting cannot be termed as illegal.

33. Admittedly, there is a functional deadlock in the Party due to

the stand taken by the appellant and the 1st respondent (in

O.S.A.No.227 of 2022). Rules 5, 19(i) and 19(viii) are absolutely

clear that the General Council is the Supreme body of the Party. As

per the By-laws of the Party, the Executive Council has not been

given power either to amend the Rules or to take any important

decision. If such decision is taken, the same should be approved by

the General Council of the Party. Even if the Leaders take any

decision or action apart from what has been specifically provided to

them under the Rules and Regulations, they have to be ratified at

the General Council. The supremacy of the General Council is

because it is elected ultimately by the Primary Members in terms of

Rules 6 to 14 of the Bye-Laws.

34. As already stated, the General Council consists of 2665

members, who were elected through the Organizational Elections

under Rules 6 to 14 of the By-laws. The elected General Council

Members represent the Primary Members of the Party. It cannot be

disputed that the General Council is the Supreme Body in the party.

As per Rules 19(i) and 19(viii) of the Bye-Laws, the General Council

was given authority to decide on the policy matters. As per Rule 43

of the Bye-Laws, the General Council was given power to amend

the Bye-Laws. The General Council held on 11.07.2022 was a

requisitioners’ special meeting under Rule 19(vii) of the Bye-Laws.

As already stated, 2190 members have made the requisition for

convening a special General Council Meeting. The requisition given

at the General Council Meeting on 23.06.2022 was announced at

the floor of the meeting, informing the members that a General

Council Meeting would be convened on 11.07.2022. The requisition

made by 2190 members was followed by an agenda, which was

signed by 2432 members. The meeting was conducted on

11.07.2022 and a total of 2460 members were present in the

meeting. Thereafter, 2539 members, supporting the resolutions

passed in the General Council Meetings, filed affidavits before the

Election Commission of India.

35. The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator could not act on the

requisition since there was a dead lock in the decision making in the

Party. According to the appellant, the posts of Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator had lapsed on 23.06.2022 for want of ratification.

It is pertinent to note that the elections of the other members of the

General Council shall not lapse since their elections were not based

on any amended Bye-Law. The present situation, is identical to the

situation that was prevailing in 2017. When the Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator were not in a position to call for the meeting, the

members cannot be forced to approach the Court every time,

therefore, the power vested on the office-bearers under Rule 20 A

(vii) should be exercised for this purpose as exercised for the

meeting held on 12.09.2017.

36. For easy reference, the Bye-Laws of the Political Party is

annexed with this judgement.

37. The amendments to the Bye-Laws can happen only at the

General Council under Rule 43 of the Bye-Laws.

38. The General Council Meeting was convened on 11.07.2022

pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge in O.A.

Nos. 368, 370 and 379 of 2022 and thereafter, by order dated

06.07.2022 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 11237 of

2022 has observed as follows: -

“…….b. So far as the Meeting of the General Council of the

respondent No. 3, slated to be held on 11.07.2022 is

concerned, the same may proceed in accordance with law

and in that relation, the other aspects of any interim relief

ought to be projected and presented before the learned

Single Judge dealing with civil suit(s) on the Original

Side….”

39. The appellant-Co-Ordinator sent a letter dated 28.06.2022 to

the Election Commission of India stating that the posts of CoOrdinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator had lapsed for the reason that

the election in the Executive Council Meeting dated 01.12.2021 was

not ratified in the General Council Meeting held on 23.06.2022.

From the said letter, it is clear that the appellant-Joint Co-Ordinator

has given up his right to continue as Joint Co-Ordinator. Therefore,

there is no Joint-Co-Ordinator in the Party after the said letter. The

appellant cannot be compelled to continue as Joint Co-Ordinator

forever. When the appellant has given up his right to continue as

Joint-Co-Ordinator, the appellant and the 1st respondent in O.S.A.

No. 227 of 2022 cannot jointly conduct the General Council

Meeting. The common sense approach was followed on

12.09.2017, wherein the General Council Meeting was announced

at the instance of the Office Bearers Party Headquarters. The strict

compliance of Rule 19(vii) would lead to absurdity. In these

circumstances, the General Council Meeting called for by the

Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022 to convene the Special General

Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 is proper.

40. The requisition for the meeting was made by 2190 members

out of the 2665 members of the General Council. This amounts to

more than 80% of the General Council members. The requisition

was to be made by the members for deciding the issue of the Single

Leadership. The requisition was readout to all the members who

were present and with their approval, it was handed over to the

Chairman of the meeting on the stage in front of the requisitioners.

The requisition was followed with an Agenda being signed and

requested by 2432 General Council Members. Thereafter, the

meeting on 11.07.2022 was attended by 2460 members and 2539

members have filed affidavits before the Election Commission of

India affirming their support to the resolution passed at the General

Council Meeting on 11.07.2022.

41. The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the Original

Applications observed that since there is interpolation, it can only

be a manufactured document. It is pertinent to note that none of the

members, who signed the requisition or the agenda or attended the

meeting, have come before this Court, claiming that they did not do

so. That apart, the 1st respondent-plaintiffs has not made out any

assertion in the plaint that there was no requisition that was placed

at the meeting. Absolutely, there is no averment in the pleadings

that the requisition letter is a fabricated document or not genuine. In

the absence of any pleading or averment, the contention of the 1st

respondent (in O.S.A. No. 227 of 2022) that the requisition letter

given by 2190 members is not genuine cannot be accepted. When

none of the 2190 members, who have signed the requisition letter

to convene the Special General Council Meeting, disputed their

signature or contents of the document, a third party to the said letter

cannot question the same. The person who can dispute the

signature can only be that particular person and not a third party. In

the absence of any challenge made by the signatories to the

requisition letter, the said letter cannot be held as fabricated or not

genuine document. Even assuming that the Resolutions passed on

23.06.2022 and on 11.07.2022 are found to be illegal or against the

Bye-Laws of the Parties, it is always open to 1/5th members of the

General Council to convene a Special General Council Meeting and

reverse the resolution passed in those two meetings. In the case on

hand, no such meeting was called for at the instance of 1/5th of the

General Council members to reverse the decision. This would

establish that no irreparable injury has been caused to the 1st

respondent (in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022).

42. The members of the General Council are representing the

Primary Members of the Party and when the majority of the

members of the General Council have given requisition for

convening the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 and

also supported the Resolutions on 23.06.2022 and 11.07.2022, the

balance of convenience cannot be held in favour of the 1st

respondent. On the contrary, the balance of convenience can only

be in favour of the appellant.

43. With regard to the prima facie case is concerned, (2012) 6 SCC

792 (cited supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even where

prima facie case is in favour of the 1st respondent-plaintiff, the Court

will refuse temporary injunction if the injury suffered by the 1st

respondent on account of refusal of temporary injunction was not

irreparable. In the judgement reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719 (cited

supra) the Apex Court held that while granting or refusing to grant

interim injunction, the Court should exercise sound judicial

discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which

is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and

compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if

the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or

probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that

pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status

quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise

its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of

interim injunction pending the suit.

44. By giving a direction that there shall be no Executive Council

Meeting or General Council Meeting without joint consent of the CoOrdinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator, a situation has arisen where

the party, as a whole, will undergo irreparable hardship, since there

is no possibility of the appellant and the 1st respondent (in

O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) acting jointly to convene a meeting, much

less a General Council Meeting to discuss Single Leadership. The

direction only furthers the “functional deadlock” that was already in

existence in the Party.

45. As per Rule 20A(ix), the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator

are empowered to take such actions as he may deem fit on

important political events, policies and programmes of urgent nature

which cannot brook delay and await the meeting of either Executive

Committee or General Council of the Party. Such decisions and

actions have to be ratified by the General Council in its next

meeting. However, it is open to the Co-Ordinator and Joint Coordinator to obtain the views of the General Council Members on

such urgent matters by post when the Council is not in session.

Therefore, even if the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator take any

decision/action, the same is to be ratified at the General Council

Meeting.

46. When the applications have been filed challenging the Special

General Council Meeting held on 11.07.2022 and when the learned

Single Judge, by order dated 11.07.2022 permitted the convening

of the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022, which was

challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Apex Court, by

order dated 29.07.2022, while remanding the matter back to the

learned Single Judge for fresh consideration, directed the parties to

maintain status quo as on the date of 29.07.2022. It is pertinent to

note that the Apex Court has not directed the parties to maintain

status quo as on 11.07.2022 or on 23.06.2022. Therefore, it is clear

that the Resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and 11.07.2022 were

not disturbed till the pronouncement of the order by the learned

Single Judge in O.A. Nos. 368, 370 and 379 of 2022 on 17.08.2022.

47. When the Presidium Chairman had announced the date of next

Special General Council Meeting based on the requisition made by

2190 members of the General Council on 23.06.2022 the 1st

respondent-plaintiff should have challenged the decision taken on

23.06.2022 to convene a Special General Council Meeting on

11.07.2022. In the case on hand, the 1st respondent has filed the

suit challenging only the Special General Council Meeting held on

11.07.2022. When the 1st respondent did not challenge the

Resolutions passed in the General Council Meeting held on

23.06.2022, an order of status quo ante as on 23.06.2022 cannot

be granted.

48. So far as the direction to the appellant and the 1st respondent

(in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) to conduct the Executive Council Meeting

or General Council Meeting jointly is not workable, as the appellant

and the 1st respondent have not been able to act together and there

has been a deadlock, which has resulted in the impossibility to

perform the functions, which is the very premise based on which the

General Council of the Party was held on 12.09.2017, wherein the

posts of Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator were created and

the appellant and the 1st respondent came to be elected to the said

posts.

49. Since the appellant-Joint Co-Ordinator, by his letter dated

28.06.2022 to the Election Commission of India, has stated that his

post along with the post of Co-Ordinator had lapsed, as already

stated, he cannot be compelled to continue in the said post. That

apart, the 1st respondent (in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) alone cannot

take any decision independently. In these circumstances, we are

not giving any finding with regard to the stand taken by the appellant

that the posts of Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator had lapsed

for want of ratification on 23.06.2022. The said issue can be decided

in the pending suit.

50. The ratio laid down in the Judgments relied upon by the learned

Senior Counsels appearing for the appellant squarely applies to the

facts and circumstances of the present case. The ratio laid down by

the Gauhati High Court in an unreported judgement made in CRP

No.22(AP) of 2015 [cited supra] applies to the case of the 1st

respondent.

51. Though there is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1990 Supp

(1) SCC 727 (cited supra) relied upon by the learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, since the facts and

circumstances of the present case differs, the said ratio is not

applicable to the present case.

52. For the reasons stated above, the order passed by the learned

Single Judge in the Original Application in O.A. No. 368 of 2022 in

C.S. No.118 of 2022 and the Original Applications in O.A. Nos. 370

and 379 of 2022 in C.S.No. 119 of 2022 are set aside.

Consequently, the Original Applications in O.A.Nos.368, 370 and

379 of 2022 are dismissed. The above Original Side Appeals are

allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous

Petitions are closed.”

14. The aforesaid order dated 02.09.2022 has been challenged in the

appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 15753 of 2022 by the plaintiff OPS and

in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 15705-15706 of 2022 by the said

other plaintiff P. Vairamuthu. These two petitions were entertained by this

Court on 30.09.2022 and on that date, the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of EPS stated at the Bar that until hearing of these matters, there

shall not be any election of the General Secretary. This Court recorded the

statement so made and directed the respondents accordingly. The order

dated 30.09.2022 reads as under:

“Issue notice.

The respective learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of the

respective respondents, therefore, the respondents need not be

served now. Notice be made returnable on 21.11.2022.

To be notified with SLP (C) No. 11237 of 2022.

In the meantime, all the parties are directed to complete the

pleadings.

Shri C. Aryama Sundaram, learned Senior Advocate appearing

on behalf of respondent No. 1 has stated at the Bar that till the

present matters are heard, there shall not be any election of the

General Secretary held. We record the statement and direct the

respondents accordingly.”

15. In the above backdrop, the appeals preferred in challenge to the

said order dated 02.09.2022 as also the previous order dated 23.06.2022,

as passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, have been taken up by

this Court for analogous hearing. However, it may be usefully reiterated

that so far as the order dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, it has practically

lost its relevance because of the subsequent events of holding of meeting

dated 11.07.2022 and passing of other orders by the High Court and by

this Court. The principal part of the matter, therefore, relates to the legality

and validity of the order dated 02.09.2022. In this position and as agreed

to by the learned counsel for the parties, we have heard the respective

submissions principally in relation to the order dated 02.09.2022. Though

as indicated hereinbefore, a wide variety of contentions have been urged

by the learned counsel for the parties but, having regard to the fact that the

appeals herein essentially relate to the matter of grant of temporary

injunction, only the relevant submissions in that regard need to be dealt

with in this judgment.

16. We have heard the detailed and elaborate submissions of the

learned senior counsel Mr. Ranjit Kumar and Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar

appearing for the respective appellants on one hand and those of the

learned senior counsel Mr. C. Aryama Sundaram, Mr. C. S. Vaidyanathan,

Mr. Mukul Rohtagi and Mr. Atul Chitale appearing for the respective

contesting respondents.

16.1. Before proceeding further, it may be indicated that while the

detailed arguments were concluded on 11.01.2023 and judgment was

reserved, the matters were taken up again on board in view of mention

made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 of SLP (C) Nos. 15705-15706 of

2022 and thereafter, this Court passed an order on 03.02.2023 for the

limited purpose of making arrangements for the party, in relation to the

upcoming bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency.

Therein, we provided for choosing of the candidate of the party by the

General Council and it was also provided that expulsion of the appellant

OPS and other persons would not operate for that limited purpose of

decision-making by the General Council; and that the choice of the

candidate shall be conveyed to the Election Commission of India by the

Presidium Chairman. The said order was passed in the peculiar

circumstances and looking to the requirements of urgency as also in the

larger interest of democracy but, while making it clear that such

arrangement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the parties and

without conferring any additional right in any of the parties.6

6 The said order dated 03.02.2023 reads as under:

“In continuity with and as per the permission granted in the order dated

30.01.2023, we have heard learned counsel for the parties for the limited purpose

in relation to the bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency.

We have taken note of the respective stand of the contesting parties as also

the Election Commission of India in these matters.

As the judgment remains reserved, we do not wish to elaborate on any of the

contentious issues involved in the matters. However, having taken note of the

fact that bye-election for 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency has already

been announced where the last date for filing nominations is 07.02.2023, in our

view, a workable solution/interim arrangement appears to be in the interest of the

political party concerned as also in the larger interest of democracy with

participation of the party’s candidate in the forthcoming bye-election.

Hence, after taking note of the submissions and counter-submissions of the

learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties as also the propositions of

the learned counsel appearing for the Election Commission of India, we deem it

appropriate to make the interim arrangement only in relation to the forthcoming

bye-election and only for the purpose of participation of a candidate of the party

concerned.

17. The relevant contentions urged on behalf of the appellants in

challenge to the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 could be summarised

as follows:

17.1. Learned senior counsel for the appellants have submitted that the

Division Bench of the High Court could not have interfered with the order

dated 17.08.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court

without recording a finding to the effect that the order as passed was

In regard to the above, without prejudice to the rights of any of the parties and

without conferring any additional right in any of the parties, it is considered

appropriate and hence provided thus :

(1) The proposal as regards choosing the candidate of the party shall be placed

for consideration and for final decision by the General Council of the party.

(2) As regards the decision-making process of the General Council for choosing

the candidate and looking to the time constrains, it is also provided that this

process may be taken up by placing the necessary resolution for consideration

by way of circulation.

(3) In this process of decision-making by the General Council for arriving at the

name of a candidate to be put up by the party in the forthcoming bye-election of

98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency, the persons who had allegedly been

expelled from the party [namely S/Shri O. Panneerselvam (appellant), R.

Vaithilingam, J.C.D. Prabakar and P.H. Manoj Pandian] and whose expulsion is

also a matter of contentions, it is provided that such expulsion shall not operate

so far as the present purpose is concerned, i.e., for the purpose of decision by

the General Council to choose the candidate for the forthcoming bye-election of

98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency. In other words, the aforesaid four

persons shall be entitled to put forward their votes in the circulation process for

this limited purpose of selection of the candidate of the party for the said byeelection.

(4) The ultimate decision of the General Council, as regards choice of the

candidate shall be conveyed to the Election Commission of India by the

Presidium Chairperson, Dr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussain; and such communication

of the decision of General Council shall be accepted by the Election Commission

of India as being the authorization on behalf of the party for the limited purpose

of putting up its candidate in the forthcoming bye-election and the returning officer

shall take necessary steps accordingly.

We again make it clear that the judgment in the main matters remains

reserved and this interim arrangement shall otherwise not be of conferring any

additional right in any of the parties nor of taking away any of the rights of the

parties. The interim arrangement in terms of this order shall remain confined to

the process of bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency and not

beyond.

Copy of this order be provided to all the parties as also to the Election

Commission of India.

Having regard to the overall circumstances and the nature of order passed

hereinabove, we do not find any necessity of impleadment as such of the Election

Commission of India in these proceedings nor any other order appears requisite.

Therefore, both the applications (for impleadment and directions) stand disposed

of.

Judgment remains reserved.”

arbitrary, capricious, perverse or contrary to the settled principles of law

regulating grant of injunctions. Highlighting the contours of an Appellate

Court’s jurisdiction in such appeals, they have placed reliance on the

decision of this Court in Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.:

1990 Supp SCC 727 to submit that the Appellate Court could interfere with

the exercise of discretion by the Court of first instance only when the

discretion is shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or

perversely or where the Court has ignored the settled principles of law

regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. No such case

having been made out in the appeals before the Division Bench of the High

Court, interference with and reversal of the well-considered order of the

learned Single Judge deserves to be disapproved.

17.2. It has been strenuously argued that the very convening of the

meeting of General Council, to be held on 11.07.2022, had been illegal and

non est; the said meeting remains unauthorised; and no resolution taken

therein could be said to be permissible in law for two main reasons.

First that, from a reading of the Rules 19(vii) and 20-A(viii), it is but

clear that the authority to convene the General Council meeting is vested

only with the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator, acting jointly.

Therefore, the Presidium Chairman neither had the power to make any

announcement on 23.06.2022 about convening of the General Council

meeting on 11.07.2022 nor he could have convened any such meeting.

Further, the written notice dated 01.07.2022, not signed by OPS and sent

to the General Council members by an unspecified body (Head Quarters’

Office Bearers) to call for the meeting on 11.07.2022, is void for having

been issued by the persons without having authority to do so under the

byelaws of the party. It has also been submitted that in regard to such

questions arising in the past, the High Court has held in the case of S.

Thirunavukkarasu (supra), that the scheme of byelaws does not envisage

the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting; and if the

General Secretary does not act on the requisition with sufficient dispatch,

the only option in such a scenario is to approach the Court. On the same

principles and analogy, if at all the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator

would fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of

the Court but a meeting cannot be convened by the persons not authorised

to do so.

Secondly, the notice dated 01.07.2022 did not comply with the

requirement of 15 days period as stipulated under Rule 19(vii) of the

byelaws of the party; and there is a long-standing practice of AIADMK party

to issue written invitations to the members of the General Council for the

meetings. It is further submitted that the announcement made by the

Presidium Chairman at the meeting was lacking in material particulars such

as venue, etc. which is contrary to settled principles of law as laid out in the

authoritative book “Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings”7

17.3. Learned counsel for the appellants have further contended that the

balance of convenience in the present matters has been in favour of grant

of injunction as prayed for. It is submitted that the so-called will of a

7 Edited by Madeleine Cordes, John Pugh-Smith, 13th ed., Thomson Reuters at p. 41.

purported majority in the General Council does not reflect the will of the

entire primary membership of the party; and no data has been submitted

by the respondents to suggest that the primary members of the party want

to revert to the regime of single leadership. It is further submitted that the

issue of balance of convenience is to be considered in light of the nature of

prima facie case set up by the plaintiffs in the suit; and not de hors such

issue, as has been done by the Division Bench of the High Court in the

order impugned. Reliance has been placed on one passage in the decision

of this Court in State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. and Ors.: (2000) 9

SCC 572 and on another decision of this Court in Surya Nath Singh and

Ors. v. Khedu Singh (Dead) by LRS and Ors.: 1994 Supp (3) SCC 561

to submit that balance of convenience while granting interim injunction is

to be seen from the standpoint of the ‘justice of the situation’.

17.4. It has also been argued that if the interim injunction is not granted

as prayed for, irreparable injury would be caused to the appellant OPS and

the persons on his side or similarly situated, who have been purportedly

expelled as primary members of the party as a consequence of the

resolutions passed in the General Council meeting held on 11.07.2022.

This expulsion coupled with other substantial changes made in the

leadership structure of the party would, in effect, exclude OPS from

participating in the affairs of the party and by the time of final adjudication

of the suit, the changes made to the composition of the party would be

irreversible in the absence of protective interim order.

17.5. Furthermore, on the issue of grant of interim injunction as a

discretionary measure, balance of convenience and prima facie case, the

learned counsel for the appellants have relied upon the decisions of this

Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West

Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors.: (1985) 1 SCC 260, Dalpat Kumar

and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors.: (1992) 1 SCC 719 and American

Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors.: (1993) 2 SCC 199.

18. The contra contentions urged on behalf of the respondents in

support of the said order dated 02.09.2022 could also be usefully

summarised as follows:

18.1. Learned senior counsel for the respondents have submitted that

the decision as to acceptance or rejection of an interim injunction is a

matter of discretion, which does not require interference under Article 136

of the Constitution of India. It has also been argued that the reliefs claimed

in the applications in question had been against holding of the General

Council meeting dated 11.07.2022, which has already been concluded and

hence, the reliefs have practically become infructuous. The decisions of

this Court in Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of

Greater Mumbai and Ors.: (2006) 5 SCC 282 and Skyline Education

Institute (India) Private Limited v. S.L. Vaswani and Anr.: (2010) 2 SCC

142 have been relied upon to submit that in the matter of grant or refusal

of injunction, interference by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India could only be considered when the discretion

exercised by the High Court is vitiated by an error apparent or perversity or

manifest injustice. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 02.09.2022

does not suffer from any such infirmity and hence, calls for no interference.

18.2. It has further been argued that the General Council is the supreme

authority in the party as is evident from Rules 5, 5(vii), 19(i), 19(viii) and 43.

The General Council, therefore, has unfettered powers to amend, add or

delete the byelaws; including the powers that are not specifically placed in

the byelaws; and it is for this supremacy that as a condition of membership

into the party, one has to abide by the decision of the General Council.

Relying on the decision of this Court in K. Rajendran and Ors. v. State of

Tamil Nadu and Ors.: (1982) 2 SCC 273 it has been submitted that the

General Council has the power even to create, abolish and replace the

post.

18.3. It has been contended, particularly with reference to Rule 19(vii) of

the byelaws, that the notice sent on 01.07.2022 would qualify to be a proper

notice for, the byelaws only speak about notice of the meeting and not

notice to the members; the byelaws do not require service of written notice

for convening of meeting; the dictionary meaning of the word ‘notice’ is

intimation and does not necessarily mean notice in writing; and 15 days’

notice is to be given only for the regular meeting of the General Council

and not for the special meeting. Further, it has been submitted that in the

Tamil version of byelaws, the expression ‘aforesaid’ in the first part of Rule

19(vii) has been clearly used to denote that 15 days’ notice is required to

be given for the regular meeting and not for the special or requisitioned

meeting. It has also been submitted that the formality of notice cannot

vitiate the action when parties had intimation of the event, as announced

by Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022. These contentions have been

supported by relying on a decision of this Court in Nilkantha Sidramappa

Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti and Ors.: AIR 1962 SC

666.

18.4. As to the functional deadlock, due to the divergent and discordant

views of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator leading to non-functioning

of party, the learned counsel for the respondents have relied on the

decision in the case of B.N. Viswanathan and Anr. v. Tiffin’s Barytes,

Asbestos and Paints Ltd.: (1953) 66 LW 124, wherein it was held that the

General Body of shareholders had the power to carry out the functions of

the board, when it was impossible for the board to perform its functions. It

has been submitted that if there is a vacuum and something is done within

the framework, such an action is valid unless it is impermissible within the

framework. It has also been submitted that having regard to the position

obtaining in the present case, the said decision in S. Thirunavukkarasu

(supra) is of no application because therein an expelled member of

AIADMK attempted to convene a General Council meeting, parallel to the

meeting called by the then General Secretary whereas, in the present case

no parallel meeting of General Council has been convened by anyone.

18.5. It has further been submitted, relying on the decision of this Court

in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum and Ors.: (1964)

1 SCR 1, that in the matters pertaining to internal affairs or management of

an association, the Court would ordinarily be slow in interfering; and the

impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court, standing in

conformity with these principles, calls for no interference.

19. In rejoinder submissions, learned senior counsel for the appellants

have submitted that until 23.06.2022, there was not even a whisper of

reverting to the system of single leadership amongst the party members;

the functions of the party were being carried out smoothly; and even during

the Panchayat elections, by both the Co-ordinator and the Joint Coordinator jointly. Hence, the argument of “functional deadlock” is

disingenuous and incorrect.

19.1. It has been further submitted that the General Council is not

superior to the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the party as pursuant

to the amendments made to the byelaws on 01.12.2021, the Co-ordinator

and Joint Co-ordinator are to be elected directly through vote by an

electorate consisting of entire primary membership of the party. Further,

Rule 45 of the byelaws authorizes them to relax or make alterations to any

of the rules and regulations of the party. Therefore, the logic that a party

organ is supreme because its members are ultimately elected by the

primary membership of the party applies even more to the posts of Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

19.2. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that if it be

assumed that the posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed

because of non-ratification of the amendments of 01.12.2021 by the

General Council, the elections of other office-bearers held after the

amendments of 01.12.2021 would also stand annulled and in any case,

even according to Rule 20-A(vii) of the byelaws, the other office-bearers as

mentioned therein do not have the power to convene the General Council

meeting.

20. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and

have examined the record of the case with reference to the law applicable.

20.1. Before proceeding further, a few comments on the width and limits of

the consideration in these appeals appear necessary. Having regard to the

subject-matter of the civil suits leading to the order dated 17.08.2022 by the

learned Single Judge and the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 by the

Division Bench of the High Court and the totality of circumstances, it may at

once be observed in relation to the submissions made by either of the parties

concerning the contents of the resolution taken in the questioned meeting on

11.07.2022, that no challenge thereto as such has been laid in the suits as

filed or by way of any amendment of pleadings; and entering into any aspect

relating to the substance, contents and merits of the decisions said to have

been taken in the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 would be practically

traversing even beyond the scope of the subject civil suits. In other words,

the real question to be determined in these appeals against the order dated

02.09.2022 would only be as regards the prayer for temporary injunction

against convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022. Within this framework

and boundaries, we may examine the rival contentions to determine the

question as to whether the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 calls for any

interference.

21. While dealing with the relevant contentions, we may usefully take

note of a few decisions cited in these appeals so as to define the

parameters and contours of the discussion forthcoming.

21.1. The case of S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) has been referred to by

the learned counsel for the appellants in order to submit that therein, a

Division Bench of the High Court extensively interpreted the scheme of the

byelaws of the party-AIADMK and held that the scheme of byelaws does

not envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting;

and if the General Secretary (now replaced by the Co-ordinator and the

Joint Co-ordinator jointly) fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to

seek intervention of the Court but a meeting cannot be convened by the

persons not authorised to do so. The relevant paragraphs of the said

decision read as under: -

“69. As per rule 20(v) of the party, the General Secretary of the party

is competent to convene the general council meeting. Rule 19(viii)

does not authorise anyone else to convene the special general

council meeting of the party. On facts, the learned single judge

having held that the letter of requisition was not posted, has also

held that even otherwise the plaintiff had convened the meeting of

the general council as per Rule 19(viii). We have no good reason to

differ from the finding recorded by the learned single judge that the

letter of requisition was not given to the plaintiff. Once we take the

view that the letter of requisition was not given to the plaintiff, the

defendant had no authority to convene the meeting of the general

council. Even otherwise Rule 19(viii) has not made any provision for

convening the meeting of the general council by the requisitioning

members in case the plaintiff as the general secretary failed to

convene the meeting.

70. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the defendant and

the learned counsel for the impleading applicants relied on the order

of the learned single Judge of this Court in Karuppasamy Pandian

& 6 others v. All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and

two others, (Application No.119 of 1988 disposed of on 20.1.1988

is C.S.No.28 of 1988). In our view it is not an authority for the

proposition that in case the General Secretary fails to convene the

meeting under Rule 19(viii), the requisitioning members can

convene a meeting. In the said order the Court refused to convene

a meeting by appointment of a Commissioner. But an observation

was made that if the General Secretary refused to convene a

meeting, it is always open to any member of the party's general

council to convene a meeting and take any decision after they

establish their majority. In our view the order governs the facts of

that case in the given circumstances. Even otherwise we do not

agree that the requisitioning members may convene a meeting in

case the general secretary fails to convene a meeting in terms of

Rule 19(viii).

71. Rule 20 (v) specifically states that the general secretary of the

party shall have the powers and responsibilities to convene the

executive and general council meeting. Rule 19(viii) also obliges the

General Secretary to convene special meeting of the general

council on requisition within 30 days of the receipt of such

requisition. Rule 19(viii) has made a specific provision to preside

over the general council meeting, that in the absence of Chairman,

one of the members of the general council elected by the body shall

preside over the meeting. Again Rule 23(ii) states that in the

absence of the chairman, one of the members present will preside

over and conduct the meeting of the central executive committee

and general council. In the very party rules, when provisions are

made for presiding over meetings in the absence of chairman, a

similar provision could have been made in case of Rule 19(viii) in

the matter of convening a meeting.

72. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the defendant is

that Rule 19(viii) may be harmoniously construed so as to serve the

purpose of the rule; if the general secretary does not convene the

meeting, the requisitioning members cannot be made helpless, and

in the normal course, having given the requisition, they were entitled

to have a meeting, and if not convened by the general secretary

within the given time, they could themselves convene such a

meeting. He also added that even if the general secretary convenes

a meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of the requisition

fixing the date of the meeting after several years, it will create an

anomalous situation. In that regard the learned counsel submitted

that convening a meeting must be taken as holding a meeting. As

already noticed above, general council meeting has to be called

atleast once in six months. In case the general secretary convenes

a meeting within the time given but scheduling to hold the meeting

after few years, in such a situation it can always be challenged as

unreasonable and stating that the very object of the rule is defeated

or on such other grounds available. It is equally open to the

members of the party to amend the rule if so desired so as to make

a specific provision in this regard.

73. Rule 19(vii) says that meeting of the general council shall be

held once in six months by giving 15 days notice in advance of the

date of the meeting. But in Rule 19(viii) of the same rules, it is stated

that if a requisition is made the general secretary has to convene

special meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of such

requisition. Even when the rules were framed a clear difference and

distinction between holding a meeting and convening a meeting

was kept in view. The learned single Judge in paragraphs 38 to 41

of the order under appeal, referring to various decisions, has taken

the view that convening a meeting is to call for a meeting. We agree

with the same. As already noticed above, even otherwise the

plaintiff herself had convened the meeting. The defendant having

been expelled on 19.5.1997 from the primary membership of the

party, prima facie, he had no locus standi to convene the meeting

of the general council.

74. Nothing prevented even the requisitioning members

participating in the meeting convened by the plaintiff to ventilate

their grievances, even though such a meeting was not called on

requisition, as according to the plaintiff there was no requisition to

call for such a meeting. Under the circumstances when the

requisition was not at all received by the plaintiff to convene a

general council meeting, the defendant has been expelled from the

primary membership of the party on 19.5.1997 itself and who had

no locus-standi to convene a meeting, and the general secretary

alone was competent to convene a meeting, prima-facie, we have

no hesitation to agree with the finding of the learned single Judge

that the action of the defendant in convening of the meeting of the

general council which was held on 3.6.1997 was unauthorised and

against the rules of the party.”

21.2. In Wander Ltd. (supra), a decision strongly relied upon by the

learned counsel for the appellants, this Court explained the principle that

ordinarily, the Appellate Court would not be interfering with the exercise of

discretion by the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion

except in the cases where discretion was shown to have been exercised

arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or against the settled principles of law.

This Court observed and held as under: -

“9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a

stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff

and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and

remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence.

The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of

administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both

temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory

injunction, it is stated

“...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his

rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in

damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were

resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection

must be weighed against the corresponding need of the

defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his

having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for

which he could not be adequately compensated. The court

must weigh one need against another and determine where

the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.”

The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the

rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The court

also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers

his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts

into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant

has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been

doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different

from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to

commence his enterprise, are attracted.

***** ***** *****

14. ….. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with

the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute

its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to

have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or

where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating

grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against

exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate

court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion

different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached

by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate

court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise

of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had

considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a

contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial

court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate

court would have taken a different view may not justify interference

with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these

principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private

Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (1960) 3 SCR 713: (SCR 721)

“... These principles are well established, but as has been

observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton &

Co. v. Jhanaton: 1942 AC 130 ‘...the law as to the reversal by

a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the

exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty

that arises is due only to the application of well settled

principles in an individual case’.”

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”

21.3. The case of State of Karnataka (supra) essentially related to a suit

involving inter-State water disputes and in the referred passage, it was

indicated that even when balance of convenience or inconvenience is

another requirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the

matter of grant of injunction; and the relief would depend on facts and

circumstances of each case with justice of the situation being the guiding

factor, in the following terms: -

“168. ….Generally speaking, however, be it noted that the issue of

grant of injunction is to be looked at from the point of view as to

whether on refusal of the injunction, the plaintiff would suffer

irreparable loss of injury keeping in view the strength of the parties'

case. Balance of convenience or inconvenience is also another

requirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the

matter of grant of injunction and the relief being always flexible

depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The

justice of the situation ought to be the guiding factor …..”

21.4. In Surya Nath Singh (supra), this Court held that though the grant

of injunction was a matter of discretion, the same must be on settled

principles of law to advance the cause of justice; and it is subject to

correction by the Appellate Court. This Court said: -

“2. …..Though the grant of injunction is discretionary, the same

must be exercised on settled principles of law to advance the cause

of justice. It is subject to correction by the appellate court….”

21.5. In the case of Dunlop India Ltd. (supra), though expositing in

relation to the matters of public revenue, this Court explained the

requirements of due consideration of the questions relating to balance of

convenience and irreparable injury in the following terms: -

“5. We repeat and deprecate the practice of granting interim order

which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no

better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out,

without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the

public interest and a host of other relevant considerations.

…..…..There are, of course, cases which demand that interim

orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross

violations of the law and injustices are perpetrated or are about to

be perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene and

give appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim relief

may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake

a citizen's faith in the impartiality of public administration, a court

may well be justified in granting interim relief against public

authority. But since the law presumes that public authorities function

properly and bona fide with due regard to the public interest, a court

must be circumspect in granting interim orders of far-reaching

dimensions or orders causing administrative, burdensome

inconvenience or orders preventing collection of public revenue for

no better reason than that the parties have come to the court

alleging prejudice, inconvenience or harm and that a prima facie

case has been shown. There can be and there are no hard and fast

rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection are called for.

There are several other vital considerations apart from the

existence of a prima facie case. There is the question of balance of

convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is

the question of the public interest. There are many such factors

worthy of consideration….”

21.6. In the case of Dalpat Kumar (supra), this Court explained the

principles for exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief

of injunction in the following terms: -

“4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be

granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise,

that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise

cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in

the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to

restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying

and preventing … or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise

causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in

the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until

further orders…... Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is

required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the

nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible

injury. In other words, the court, on exercise of the power of granting

ad interim injunction, is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in

the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of

injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to

the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to

be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court,

there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the

plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to

protect the party from the species of injury. In other words,

irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right

would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship

or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from

withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to

arise from granting it.

5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by

affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour

which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima

facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right

is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case

is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be

established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a

substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation

and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie

case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further

has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in

“irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no

other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction

and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended

injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean

that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but

means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that

cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third

condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour

of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant

injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the

amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused

to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that

which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is

granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of

likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit,

the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction

would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial

discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction

pending the suit.”

21.7. In the case of American Express Bank Ltd. (supra), on the

discretion of the Court in grant of declaration and injunction, this Court

observed and held in the referred paragraph as under: -

“22. Undoubtedly declaration of the rights or status is one of

discretion of the court under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963. Equally the grant or refusal of the relief of declaration and

injunction under the provision of that Act is discretionary. The

plaintiff cannot claim the relief as of right. It has to be granted

according to sound principles of law and ex debito justitiae. The

court cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or vehicle

of oppression. While exercising its discretionary power, the court

must keep in its mind the well-settled principles of justice and fair

play and the discretion would be exercised keeping in view the ends

of justice since justice is the hallmark and it cannot be administered

in vacuum. Grant of declaration and injunction relating to

commercial transactions tend to aid dishonesty and perfidy.

Conversely, refusal to grant relief generally encourages candour in

business behaviour, facilitates free flow of capital, prompt

compliance with covenants, sustained growth of commerce and

above all inculcates respect for the efficacy of judicial adjudication.

Before granting or refusing to grant relief of declaration or injunction

or both the court must weigh pros and cons in each case, consider

the facts and circumstances in their proper perspective and

exercise discretion with circumspection to further the ends of

justice. From the backdrop fact-situation we have no hesitation to

hold that the relief of declaration granted is unjust and illegal. It

tended to impede free flow of capital, thwarted the growth of

mercantile business and deflected the course of justice.”

21.8. In the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer (supra), this Court reiterated

that the matter of grant or refusal of injunction was that of discretion and

not ordinarily calling for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution

unless the discretion had been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or

perversely or where the impugned order had been passed while ignoring

the settled principles of law. In the said case, this Court held that the

Appellate Court was justified in interfering with the matter and vacating the

injunction of the Trial Court while observing as under: -

“29. This Court also observed that this Court in exercise of

jurisdiction under Article 136, would not ordinarily interfere with the

exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of temporary injunction

by the High Court and the trial court and substitute its own discretion

therefor, except where the discretion has been shown to have been

exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the order

of the Court under scrutiny ignores settled principles of law.

30. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary

injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the

plaintiff : (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded,

necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a

temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the

plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for

protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the

defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the

plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused

to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition,

temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant

such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free

from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands.

***** ***** *****

32. Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely

in the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court will interfere.

Exercise of discretion by granting a temporary injunction when there

is “no material”, or refusing to grant a temporary injunction by

ignoring the relevant documents produced, are instances of action

which are termed as arbitrary, capricious or perverse. When we

refer to acting on “no material” (similar to “no evidence”), we refer

not only to cases where there is total dearth of material, but also to

cases where there is no relevant material or where the material,

taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the

exercise of discretion. In this case, there was “no material” to make

out a prima facie case and therefore, the High Court in its appellate

jurisdiction, was justified in interfering in the matter and vacating the

temporary injunction granted by the trial court.

33. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court

in the seven appeals. We accordingly dismiss these SLPs as having

no merit. The petitioners are granted 15 days time to make

alternative arrangements. Parties to bear their respective costs.”

21.9. In Skyline Education Institute (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this

Court again explained that in the matter of injunction, interference under

Article 136 of the Constitution would not ordinarily be made while observing

as under: -

“19. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. Before

pronouncing upon the tenability or otherwise of the appellant's

prayer for restraining the respondents from using the word “Skyline”

for the Institute of Engineering and Technology established by

them, we consider it necessary to observe that as the suit filed by

the appellant is pending trial and issues raised by the parties are

yet to be decided, the High Court rightly considered and decided the

appellant's prayer for temporary injunction only on the basis of the

undisputed facts and the material placed before the learned Single

Judge and unless this Court comes to the conclusion that the

discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to entertain the

appellant's prayer for temporary injunction is vitiated by an error

apparent or perversity and manifest injustice has been done to it,

there will be no warrant for exercise of power under Article 136 of

the Constitution.

***** ***** *****

22. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that once the court of

first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief

of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based

upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court

and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath

to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter

it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the

issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable

injury and equity.”

21.10. In the case of Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti (supra), this

Court held that formality of notice cannot invalidate the action when the

parties had intimation of the event; and that the term notice does not

necessarily mean communication in writing. This Court observed and held,

inter alia, as under: -

“8. Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act

10 of 1940) requires the arbitrators or umpire to give notice in writing

to the parties of the making and signing of the award. Sub-section

(2) of that section requires the Court, after the filing of the award, to

give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. The difference in

the provisions of the two sub-sections with respect to the giving of

notice is significant and indicates clearly that the notice which the

court is to give to the parties of the filing of the award need not be a

notice in writing. The notice can be given orally. No question of the

service of the notice in the formal way of delivering the notice or

tendering it to the party can arise in the case of a notice given orally.

The communication of the information that an award has been filed

is sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section, (2) of

Section 14 with respect to the giving of the notice to the parties

concerned about the filing of the award. “Notice” does not

necessarily mean “communication in writing”. “Notice”, according to

the Oxford Concise Dictionary, means “intimation, intelligence,

warning” and has this meaning in expressions like “give notice, have

notice” and it also means “formal intimation of something, or

instructions to do something” and has such a meaning in

expressions like “notice to quit, till further notice”. We are of opinion

that the expression “give notice” in sub-section (2) of Section 14,

simply means giving intimation of the filing of the award, which

certainly was given to the parties through their pleaders on 21-2-

1948. Notice to the pleader is notice to the party, in view of Rule 5

of Order 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides that any

process served on the pleader of any party shall be presumed to be

duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader

represents and, unless the court otherwise directs, shall be as

effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served

on the party in person.

***** ***** *****

10. We see no ground to construe the expression “date of service

of notice” in column 3 of Article 158 of the Limitation Act to mean

only a notice in writing served in a formal manner. When the

legislature used the word “notice” it must be presumed to have

borne in mind that it means not only a formal intimation but also an

informal one. Similarly, it must be deemed to have in mind the fact

that service of a notice would include constructive or informal notice.

If its intention were to exclude the latter sense of the words “notice”

and “service” it would have said so explicitly. It has not done so

here. Moreover, to construe the expression as meaning only a

written notice served formally on the party to be affected, will leave

the door open to that party, eventhough with full knowledge of the

filing of the award he has taken part in the subsequent proceedings,

to challenge the decree based upon the award at any time upon the

ground that for want of a proper notice his right to object to the filing

of the award had not even accrued. Such a result would stultify the

whole object which underlies the process of arbitration — the

speedy decision of a dispute by a tribunal chosen by the parties.”

21.11. In the case of T.P. Daver (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court

held that in the matters relating to internal management of an association,

the Courts generally do not interfere while observing as under: -

“8. The following principles may be gathered from the above

discussion. (1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to abide by

the rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall

be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules. (2) The lodge

is bound to act strictly according to the rules whether a particular

rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each case,

having regard to the well settled rules of construction in that regard.

(3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited; it cannot

obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of such a body; it

can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body acts without

jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the

principles of natural justice as explained in the decisions cited

supra.”

22. Apart from the above, we may also take note of the principles in

relation to the matters concerning grant of interim relief, which have been

stated and re-emphasised by this Court in the case of Union of India and

Ors. v. M/s. Raj Grow Impex LLP and Ors.: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 429 as

follows: -

“194. In addition to the general principles for exercise of discretion,

as discussed hereinbefore, a few features specific to the matters of

interim relief need special mention. It is rather elementary that in the

matters of grant of interim relief, satisfaction of the Court only about

existence of prima facie case in favour of the suitor is not enough.

The other elements i.e., balance of convenience and likelihood of

irreparable injury, are not of empty formality and carry their own

relevance; and while exercising its discretion in the matter of interim

relief and adopting a particular course, the Court needs to weigh the

risk of injustice, if ultimately the decision of main matter runs counter

to the course being adopted at the time of granting or refusing the

interim relief. We may usefully refer to the relevant principle stated

in the decision of Chancery Division in Films Rover International

Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd. : (1986) 3 All ER 772 as under:—

“….The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory

injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there

is by definition a risk that the court may make the “wrong”

decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party

who fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if

there was a trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an

injunction to a party who succeeds (or would succeed) at

trial. A fundamental principle is therefore that the court

should take whichever course appears to carry the

lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been

“wrong” in the sense I have described. The guidelines for

the grant of both kinds of interlocutory injunctions are

derived from this principle.”

(emphasis in bold supplied)

195. While referring to various expositions in the said decision, this

Court, in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab

Warden : (1990) 2 SCC 117 observed as under:—

“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are

thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo

of the last non-contested status which preceded the

pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief

may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that

have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was

wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the

granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or

would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause

great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against

whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it

to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally

cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have

evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these

guidelines are:

(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall

be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is

normally required for a prohibitory injunction.

(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury

which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one

seeking such relief.

17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal

of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest

in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised

in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case.

Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor

complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional

circumstances needing action, applying them as

prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions

would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.”

(emphasis in bold supplied)

196. In keeping with the principles aforesaid, one of the simple

questions to be adverted to at the threshold stage in the present

cases was, as to whether the importers (writ petitioners) were likely

to suffer irreparable injury in case the interim relief was denied and

they were to ultimately succeed in the writ petitions. A direct answer

to this question would have made it clear that their injury, if at all,

would have been of some amount of loss of profit, which could

always be measured in monetary terms and, usually, cannot be

regarded as an irreparable one. Another simple but pertinent

question would have been concerning the element of balance of

convenience; and a simple answer to the same would have further

shown that the inconvenience which the importers were going to

suffer because of the notifications in question was far lesser than

the inconvenience which the appellants were going to suffer (with

ultimate impact on national interest) in case operation of the

notifications was stayed and thereby, the markets of India were

allowed to be flooded with excessive quantity of the said imported

peas/pulses.”

23. A few of the referred provisions in the byelaws of the party, as

existing before the questioned meeting dated 11.07.2022 and even before

the amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be usefully extracted as under: -

“RULE - 5: MEMBERSHIP

*** *** ***

vii) Members shall have no right to resort to Court proceedings

regarding Party matters. If any member of the party resorts to

any Court proceedings against the Party Co-Ordinator's and

joint co-ordinator's decision he/she shall cease to be a primary

member of the party.

The decision of the General Council shall be final with regard to

party matters and only those who abide by this condition are

eligible to admission for Membership.

All those who have become Members of the KAZHAGAM are

bound by the decision of the General Council.

*** *** ***

RULE-18: FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

i) The responsibility and functions of the above mentioned Office

bearers of the Party units at different levels will be as follows:

ii) CHAIRMAN:

He will preside over and conduct the General Body and the

Executive Committee Meetings. In his absence, the meeting

shall be presided over and conducted by one of the members.

iii) SECRETARY:

The Secretary of the Party unit will be responsible for the

administration and execute the decisions of the respective

Executive Committee. In case of emergency, where the

Secretary is not in a position to convene the Executive

Committee Meeting, he should get the decisions taken by him

ratified within fifteen days by the Executive Committee. He

should submit any file required by the Audit Committee for

scrutiny.

*** *** ***

vi) Should a contingency of absence or void of Office Bearers in a

Party unit arise, the person elected by the Executive Committee

members will exercise the functions on adhoc basis till regular

Office bearers of the set-up are elected within one month.

RULE-19: GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE CENTRAL

ORGANISATION

i) The General Council of the AIADMK shall consist of the

Chairman, Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Deputy Coordinators, Treasurer, Headquarters Secretaries of the Party,

the members of the Central Executive Committee, the members

of the General Council elected from the Districts and other

States, the Members of the Audit Committee, Property

Protection Committee, and the Parliamentary Board. The

General Council shall be the Supreme body of the Party with all

powers of the Kazhagam.

ii) The Secretaries of Union Kazhagams, the Secretaries of the

Municipal Town Kazhagams and Township Kazhagams, the

District Secretaries, the Chairman, Assistant Secretary and

Treasurer of the District Kazhagam etc. in Tamil Nadu as well

as the Secretaries of State Kazhagams and the Chairman,

Assistant Secretary, Treasurer of the State Kazhagams of other

States shall be the members of the General Council by virtue of

their offices.

iii) The General Council members shall be elected from each

District Kazhagam in such numbers equivalent to the total

number of Assembly Constituencies in the respective district. In

respect of other, State including Pondicherry, the number of the

General Council members will be determined by the Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator with reference to the total

number of members registered in the respective State

Kazhagams.

iv) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party jointly can

nominate not exceeding 100 Members to the General Council

of the Central Organisation from among the members of the

Party.

v) The General Council of the Central Organisation (Headquarters)

shall meet and elect the Chairman of the Central Organisation.

vi) The meeting of the General Council of the Central Organisation

shall be presided over by the Chairman. In his absence, one of

the members of the General Council may be temporarily

nominated to preside over the meeting of the General Council.

vii) The General Council Meeting shall be convened once in a year

or whenever it is considered necessary by the Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator by giving 15 days notice in advance of the

date of meeting.

The quorum for the meeting shall be one-fifth of the total

number of members of the General Council. If one-fifth of the

members of the General Council request the Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator to convene the Special Meeting of the

General Council, the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator

should do so within 30 days of the receipt of such a requisition.

viii) The General Council will be the supreme authority to frame

policies and programmes of the Party and for their

implementation. The decision of the General Council is final and

binding on all the members of the Party.

ix) A General Council will have five years tenure. However, the

tenure shall get extended till the new General Council Meeting

is convened.

RULE-20: GENERAL SECRETARY

As per wishes of the members of the party and the party cadre,

PURATCHI THALAIVI Dr.J.JAYALALITHA shall be the eternal

General Secretary of the party and no person shall be elected/

appointed/nominated to that post. The Post of General Secretary

stands abolished.

RULE 20-A: CO-ORDINATOR AND JOINT CO-ORDINATOR

i) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be primary

members of the party for a continuous period of five years.

ii) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be elected by the

members of the General Council.

iii) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator elected as per sub rule

(ii) shall hold the post for a period of 5 years.

iv)The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall discharge/perform

their duties, obligations and functions and shall exercise their

powers as per the Rules and regulations jointly.

v) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party will be

responsible for the entire administration of the Party.

vi) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will constitute the

Executive Committee of the Central Organisation consisting of

the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Chairman, Treasurer,

Headquarters Secretaries, District Secretaries and the

nominated members.

vii) The members of the Central Executive Committee, Treasurer

and the Headquarters Secretaries nominated by the CoOrdinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold the office during the

tenure of the office of the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

If for any reason the post of the Co-Ordinator and Joint

Co-ordinator becomes vacant before the expiry of the tenure

the office bearers who were nominated by the previous CoOrdinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold office and continue to

function till the new The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator

are elected and assume office.

viii) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party shall have

the powers and responsibilities to convene the Executive and

the General Council Meetings, to implement policies and

programmes of the Party as decided by the General and

Executive Councils, to conduct elections and bye elections for

Party Organisations, to examine the accounts of all the Party

units through the Audit Committee, to manage by self and

through the Treasurer the income and expenditure of the Party

organizations at all levels, to manage the Party Office, movable

and immovable properties of the Party, to represent the Party in

the legal proceedings that may arise in respect of Party

properties and to take necessary legal steps on behalf of the

Party to protect them.

The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will preside over

the Party conferences take all kinds of disciplinary proceedings

in accordance with the Party rules against the Party units and

its office bearers who violate the Party rules, regulations or act

against the Party interest, party discipline, policies and

programmes, including immediate suspension of any Party unit

or office bearer. The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall

be the supreme authority to take a final decision on the

disciplinary proceedings recommended by the Party units and

shall have over all powers to take all steps to promote and

preserve the Party policies and programmes and to develop

and protect the Party organizations.

ix) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empowered to take

such actions as he may deem fit on important political events,

policies and programmes of urgent nature which cannot brook

delay/and await the meeting of either Executive Committee or

General Council of the Party. Such decisions and actions have

to be ratified by the General Council in its next meeting.

However, it is open to the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator

to obtain the views of the General Council Members on such

urgent matters by post when the Council is not in session.

x) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empowered to

deposit the funds of the AIADMK in any of the legally constituted

Banks or Financial Institutions either in Current Accounts or

Fixed Deposits; to withdraw such funds and to operate the

accounts on behalf of the Party. The Co-Ordinator and Joint Coordinator are also empowered to obtain loans for the Party

purposes from the above mentioned institutions on the security

of the assets of the Party and to do all that is necessary in this

regard for and on behalf of the Party.

xi) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested with powers

to authorize the Treasure of the Party to operate on his behalf

the Bank Accounts namely to deposit or to withdraw funds, and

also in respect of duties mentioned in sub-rule (x) of this Rule.

xii) The Authorisation Forms addressed to the Election Officers for

the allotment of the Two Leaves Symbol to the candidates

contesting on behalf of the AIADMK shall be signed only by the

Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

xiii) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested with the

right to nominate Joint Secretaries or Deputy Secretaries, in

case of need to Branch units, Union, Town, Township and

District Units and other state units, besides elected

functionaries. Moreover, the Co-Ordinator and Joint Coordinator are also vested with the Powers to nominate women

in the posts, to compensate and give due representation to

women if in any of the party units at any level, women do not

elected represent one third of the posts.

*** *** ***

Rule-23: CHAIRMAN

i) The Members of the General Council will elect the Chairman of

the Central Organisation of the Party.

ii) The Chairman will preside over and conduct the proceedings of

the Central Executive Committee and the General Council

Meetings. In the absence of the Chairman, one of the Members

present will temporarily preside over and conduct the meetings.

*** *** ***

RULE-25: CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

*** *** ***

ii) Unless it could not be convened for valid reasons, the Central

Executive Committee shall meet once in six months. If found

necessary, the AIADMK Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator an

convene the meeting at any time.

iii) Fourteen days notice should be given for ordinary meetings and

seven days notice for urgent meetings of the Central Executive

Committee.

*** *** ***

RULE-42: TENURE

If the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator feels that there are

genuine reasons according to changing situations, the Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator is vested with the power to

exempt from the above mentioned Rules and Regulations.

RULE-43: AMENDMENTS

The General Council will have powers to frame, amend or

delete any of the Rules of the Party Constitution.

*** *** ***

RULE-45: Authorisation to Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are fully authorized to

relax or make alterations to any of the aforesaid Rules and

Regulations of the Party.”

23.1. Some of these provisions were amended by the Executive

Committee on 01.12.2021. These provisions, as existing before and after

the said amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be noticed in comparative

terms as follows: -

Byelaws before 01.12.2021

amendment

Byelaws after 01.12.2021

amendment

Rule 20(A) - Coordinator

and Joint Coordinator

Sub-rule (ii)

Rule 20(A) - Coordinator and

Joint Coordinator

Sub-rule (ii)

The Co-ordinator and Joint

Co-ordinator shall be elected

by the members of the

General Council.

The Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator shall be elected by the

Primary Members of the Party.

Further, both the Co-ordinator

and Joint Co-ordinator shall be

jointly elected by the Primary

Members of the Party by way of

a Single Vote.

Rule 43 - Amendments

The General Council will

have powers to frame,

amend or delete any of the

Rules of the Party

Constitution.

Rule 43 - Amendments

The General Council will have

powers to frame, amend or

delete any of the Rules of the

Party Constitution. But the Rule

that the Coordinator and Joint

Coordinator should be elected

only by all the Primary members

of the Party cannot be changed

or amended since it forms the

basic structure of the Party.

Rule 45 - Authorisation to

Coordinator and Joint

Coordinator

The Co-ordinator and Joint

Co-ordinator are fully

authorized to relax or make

alterations to any of the

aforesaid Rules and

Regulations of the Party.

Rule 45 - Authorisation to

Coordinator and Joint

Coordinator

The Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator are fully authorized to

relax or make alterations to any

of the aforesaid Rules and

Regulations of the Party. But the

rule that the Coordinator and

Joint Coordinator should be

elected only by all the Primary

members of the Party cannot be

relaxed or altered since it forms

the basic structure of the Party.

24. A quick recapitulation of the past events shall be apposite. Though,

in the scheme of byelaws, the topmost position in the party was earlier

assigned to the General Secretary but, after the demise of the then General

Secretary on 05.12.2016, the party organisation went through various

changes and ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator, was established by way of amendment of the byelaws

on 12.09.2017. The principal contesting parties - OPS and EPS - were

jointly, and unanimously, elected to the said positions of Co-ordinator and

Joint Co-ordinator respectively and acted jointly for a long time, until before

convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022. However, when the

proposition for further amendments of the byelaws – essentially to revert to

the system of single leadership at the apex level – was likely to come up in

the meeting of the General Council dated 23.06.2022, it led to the litigation.

Initially, in the first three civil suits, being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022

and 111 of 2022, the prayers for interim injunction against holding of the

meeting dated 23.06.2022 were declined by a learned Single Judge of the

High Court by an order dated 22.06.2022 with reference to the settled

principles of law that in matter of internal issues of an association/party, the

Courts normally do not interfere while leaving it open to the

association/party and its members to pass the necessary resolutions and

to frame a particular byelaw, rule or regulation for better administration of

the party; and that it were a matter well within their collective wisdom and

the Court cannot insist upon the members to act in a particular manner for,

it was for the General Council and its members to decide and pass

resolutions and the Court cannot interfere with the process of conducting

the General Council meeting. This order was challenged in an intra-court

appeal, OSA No. 160 of 2022 wherein, by an order dated 23.06.2022, the

Division Bench of the High Court, though allowed the said scheduled

meeting of the General Council to go on but, placed fetters by providing

that no decision shall be taken on any other matter except 23 items of draft

resolution. It is the case of the respondents that in the said meeting, the

proposed agenda items could not be taken up and hence, the proposal for

continuance of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed. The appellant

would submit various reasons for which the said meeting dated 23.06.2022

was nothing but faux pas and in any case, the Presidium Chairman of that

meeting had no authority to convene another meeting of the General

Council. On 06.07.2022, while examining the challenge to the said order

dated 23.06.2022 as passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, this

Court took note of the events that had taken place as also the fact that next

meeting of the General Council was scheduled to be held on 11.07.2022

and hence, while issuing notice, stayed the operation and effect of the

impugned order dated 23.06.2022 and made it clear that the meeting slated

for 11.07.2022 could proceed in accordance with law while also leaving it

open for the learned Single Judge dealing with the civil suits to examine

the prayer for any other interim relief and/or to pass any other order, as

may be required on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Then,

the prayers made in the freshly instituted civil suits, being CS Nos. 118 of

2022 and 119 of 2022, for preventing the meeting dated 11.07.2022 were

declined by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 11.07.2022, in the

order passed just before the scheduled time of the meeting. The said

meeting dated 11.07.2022 was, accordingly, held at the scheduled time

and various resolutions were adopted therein but, the said order dated

11.07.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge was found to have been

passed on wrong notion about the purport of the order of this Court dated

06.07.2022 and hence, by an order dated 27.09.2022, this Court remanded

the matter for reconsideration. Thereafter, the interim relief applications in

the said newly filed civil suits were decided by a learned Single Judge of

the High Court on 17.08.2022 granting certain interim reliefs and providing,

inter alia, that status quo ante as existing on 23.06.2022 shall be

maintained and there would be no Executive Council or General Council

meeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.

The said order dated 17.08.2022 was, however, set aside by the Division

Bench of the High Court by its impugned order dated 02.09.2022. The

question is as to whether the order so passed by the Division Bench of the

High Court calls for interference by this Court.

25. It is apparent from a close look at the order dated 17.08.2022 that

grant of temporary injunction in these matters by the learned Single Judge

was premised essentially on three factors: first and the foremost being that

as per the byelaws of the party, the General Council meeting could have

been convened only by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator and they

having not done so, the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was wholly

unauthorised. Additionally, the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was not

convened by providing 15 days’ advance notice, as required by Rule 19(vii)

of the byelaws. Secondly, the learned Single Judge was of the view that by

not granting injunction, EPS, who convened the General Council meeting

contrary to the provisions of the byelaws, would be in a more convenient

position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPS and few others from

the party membership and they could not have even participated in the

proposed General Secretary elections. According to the learned Single

Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injury in the given context

were required to be visualised with reference to the viewpoints of the

primary members of the party. Thirdly, the learned Single Judge was of the

view that when OPS and EPS had successfully functioned jointly as Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, how the party, with more than 1.5 crore

cadre strength, suddenly decided to change the existing dispensation. The

ultimate injunction issued by the learned Single Judge had been that of

restoring status quo ante as on 23.06.2022 and further to that, it was

ordained that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator have to function

jointly, meetings have to be called with their joint consent and on being

properly requisitioned, they would not refuse to convene the General

Council meeting, and that they could approach the Court for necessary

directions for conducting the General Council meeting.

26. On the other hand, while dealing with the intra-court appeals

against the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, the Division

Bench of the High Court, in the first place, took note of the events that

transpired on 23.06.2022 in the General Council meeting and noted the

fact that the requisition was given by 2190 members and also the fact that

the plaintiff OPS was very much present in the said meeting dated

23.06.2022 wherein, it was announced that the next meeting would be

conducted on 11.07.2022. The Division Bench of the High Court, after

examining the record and particularly Rule 19(vii) in its Tamil and English

versions, took note of its frame whereby the requirement of 15 days’ notice

appears to be referable to the regular meeting of the General Council to be

convened once in a year or whenever considered necessary but not in

relation to the meeting requisitioned by 1/5th members of the General

Council where the only requirement is for the Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator to convene the meeting within 30 days of receipt of the requisition.

The High Court observed that it had not been the case of the plaintiff OPS

that they were not knowing about announcement made on the floor of the

General Council meeting on 23.06.2022. The Division Bench also referred

to an undeniable fact situation that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator

were at loggerheads and any strict application of Rule 19(vii) was likely to

result in a deadlock. The Division Bench further referred to the past event

when the interim General Secretary could not perform the functions

because of her incarceration in a criminal case and, therefore, the office

bearers convened the meeting on 12.09.2017 based on the requisition

made by the members. The Division Bench also took note of the apex

position assigned to the General Council in the byelaws to take all the

decisions. Yet further, the Division Bench took note of the stance of the

Joint Co-ordinator – EPS – who had sent a communication to the Election

Commission of India stating that the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Coordinator had lapsed for the reason that the election in the Executive

Committee meeting dated 01.12.2021 was not ratified in the General

Council meeting held on 23.06.2022. The Division Bench observed that

when the Joint Co-ordinator had given up his position to continue as such,

there was no Joint Co-ordinator in the party.

26.1. As regards the views of the learned Single Judge doubting the

requisition as a manufactured document, the Division Bench pointed out

that none of the members who signed the requisition or attended the

meeting came forward with any such claim. That apart, the plaintiffs did not

make any assertion in the plaint that there was no requisition placed in the

meeting nor there was any averment that the requisition letter was a

fabricated document. The Division Bench went on to observe that even if

the resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and on 11.07.2022 were found to be

illegal or against the byelaws, it was always open to 1/5th members of the

General Council to convene a special meeting and reverse the resolutions

passed in these two meetings but no such requisition was given by 1/5

th of

the General Council members and this factor operated against the claim of

irreparable injury.

26.2. The Division Bench also referred to the principles governing the

grant or refusal of temporary injunction and pointed out that the directions

given by the learned Single Judge for convening the meeting only with the

joint consent of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a

situation where the party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardship

because there was no possibility of the appellant and the respondent No.

1 – OPS and EPS – acting jointly to convene the meeting. The Division

Bench pointed out that the directions of the learned Single Judge would

only further the “functional deadlock” already existing in the party.

26.3. We are not elaborating on all other comments and observations

made by the Division Bench of the High Court in the relevant passages

quoted in extenso hereinbefore. Suffice it to observe for the present

purpose that the Division Bench of the High Court, while passing the order

dated 02.09.2022, has amply and clearly pointed out as to how the order

of temporary injunction as passed by the learned Single Judge was against

the sound judicial principles and the discretion exercised by the learned

Single Judge was suffering from arbitrariness as also perversity.

27. In our view, the logic and reasoning of the Division Bench of the

High Court stand in accord with law as also the facts of the present case.

28. The main plank of submissions on the part of the appellants in

challenge to the order dated 02.09.2022 has been that convening of the

meeting dated 11.07.2022 suffered from illegalities inasmuch as the

meeting was not convened by an authorised person and that 15 days’

notice was not given. The same had been the reasoning adopted by the

learned Single Judge while finding a prima facie case in favour of the

plaintiffs. The said reasoning and similar arguments remain fallacious and

cannot be accepted.

28.1. The facts of the case make it abundantly clear that so far as

convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, the same had

never been in doubt or in any dispute. The said meeting was indeed

convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator jointly. They had

been working in tandem until that stage. However, they seem to have fallen

apart immediately thereafter, particularly when a proposition for

amendment of the byelaws and reverting to the system of single leadership

was in the offing. In any case, the meeting dated 23.06.2022 was duly

convened and the efforts to prevent the same did not meet with success in

the Court. Even if the slated business was not transacted in the meeting

dated 23.06.2022, all that had happened in that meeting could not have

been ignored. It remains undeniable that the plaintiff OPS and the persons

standing with him were also very much present in the said meeting. The

General Council is said to be consisting of 2665 members. If 2190

members out of these 2665 gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for convening

the General Council meeting and the Presidium Chairman announced the

date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in the given set of facts

and circumstances, such announcement, at least at the present stage,

cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant. At that point of time, when Coordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were shown to be not functioning jointly

(for whatsoever reason), a functional deadlock came into existence for the

party and a workable solution was required to be found. In the given

scenario, the actions and steps taken by the requisitioning members as

also by the Presidium Chairman cannot be declared as unwarranted or

illegal at this stage. That being the position, convening of meeting dated

11.07.2022 could not have been taken as an act unauthorised. The learned

Single Judge while passing the order dated 17.08.2022 seems to have

fallen in serious error and said order was clearly suffering from perversity

when convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was taken as an act

unauthorised. The Division Bench of the High Court, in our view, has rightly

looked at the substance of the matter and realities of the situation.

28.2. The other alleged infirmity about want of clear 15 days’ notice has

also been rightly dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the

impugned order dated 02.09.2022. In our view, in such an internal matter

of the party, approach of the Court and that too, while considering the

prayer for interim relief, cannot be of finding technical faults and flaws

detached from the substance of the matter. Even as regards technicalities,

the Division Bench appears to have rightly analysed the frame of the said

Rule 19(vii), where the requirement of 15 days’ notice is referable to the

regular meeting and not as such to a requisitioned or special meeting.

29. The considerations of the learned Single Judge as regards the

question of prima facie case had been suffering from basic flaws, as

noticed above; and interference by the Division Bench was but warranted

looking to the subject-matter of the litigation and its implications. This apart,

and even if it be assumed that the plaintiffs were able to project some

arguable case before the Court and some elements of prima facie case, in

our view, the approach of the learned Single Judge while examining the

questions of balance of convenience and irreparable injury had been from

an altogether wrong angle. As noticed, the learned Single Judge took the

view that by not granting injunction, EPS would be in a more convenient

position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPS and few others from

the party membership and they could not have even participated in the

proposed General Secretary elections. According to the learned Single

Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, in the given context,

were required to be visualised from the vantage point of the primary

members. Such observations and considerations of the learned Single

Judge, in our view, do not stand in conformity with sound judicial principles.

The questions of balance of convenience and irreparable injury in relation

to the applications under consideration could not have been examined with

reference to the consequences or fallout of the meeting dated 11.07.2022.

Moreover, the authority of the General Council to deal with the relevant

matters could not have been brushed aside with reference to the strength

of the primary membership of the party. It is but clear that the learned Single

Judge has not kept in view the relevant tests as expounded in the decisions

above-referred. In the present case concerning the internal management

of the political party, and looking to the nature of claim made by the

plaintiffs, the balance of convenience had not been in favour of granting

any interim injunction on the applications under consideration.

30. Having examined the matter in its totality, we are constrained to

observe that the learned Single Judge in the present matter did not

examine the questions relating to balance of convenience and irreparable

injury in the correct perspective and particularly failed to weigh the

competing possibilities and risk of injustice if ultimately the decision of main

matter would run counter to the course being adopted and suggested in the

order granting temporary injunction in the manner and form it was being

granted. It gets perforce reiterated that if the order as passed by the learned

Single Judge was to remain in force until decision of the suits, it would have

been drastically detrimental to the interest of political party in question,

which is a recognised political party with the Election Commission of India.

In the matters of the present nature, the simple and precise view, as stated

by the learned Single Judge at the initial stage on 22.06.2022 while

declining the prayer for interim relief, had been on the correct statement of

law that ordinarily the Court would not interfere in the internal issues of an

association/party and would leave it open to the association/party and its

members to take a particular decision for better administration; and that

had been the correct approach towards the facts of the case. In the present

case, when General Council is shown to be the apex body of the party,

taking any exception to the meeting of the General Council could have

neither been countenanced nor interfered with by way of temporary

injunction. In the given set of facts and circumstances, the hyper-technical

suggestions as sought to be made about the want of valid notice with

reference to date, time and place of meeting i.e., with reference to Chapter

5 from Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings (supra) do not

further the cause of the appellants, particularly when it is noticed that the

date, time and place of the meeting in question were duly declared in the

meeting dated 23.06.2022.

31. The submission on behalf of the appellants based on the decision

in S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) that the scheme of byelaws does not

envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting; and

if the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly fail to convene the

meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court has its own

shortcomings. As rightly noticed by the Division Bench in the order

impugned, in the said case, an expelled member of the party called for a

General Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then General

Secretary. In the given fact situation, the Court granted interim injunction in

favour of the General Secretary against convening of the parallel meeting.

In the present matter, no parallel meeting of General Council has been

called for or requisitioned by any of the Members. The Division Bench of

the High Court has rightly observed that as a general rule, it cannot be laid

down that the requisitionists have no option but only to go to the Court if

the meeting is not convened. It has also been pointed out that in the past,

when the interim General Secretary could not act in the year 2017, the

Office Bearers stepped in and convened the meeting based on a requisition

received. The present situation too, where the position as occupied earlier

by the General Secretary was assigned to the Co-ordinator and the Joint

Co-ordinator in their jointness and it remains beyond a shadow of doubt

that Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator do not stand in jointness and

cannot act jointly, is akin to the situation when the apex position holder was

not in a position to act. Obviously, a workable solution was to be found; and

when the solution as found and applied, does not otherwise appear

offending the spirit of byelaws as also the norms of functioning of an

association or a party, it cannot be said that declaration of the Presidium

Chairman for the meeting of the General Council on 11.07.2022 and the

follow-up notice by the Office Bearers at Party Headquarters had been

wholly unauthorised.

32. Apart from the foregoing, the other considerations in the impugned

order dated 17.08.2022 which had prevailed with the learned Single Judge

make it clear that the learned Single Judge has proceeded contrary to the

sound and applicable judicial principles. It remains undeniable that law

does not envisage performance of any impossibility nor any mandate could

be issued by the Court for performance of a practical impossibility. The

learned Single Judge expressed the view that when OPS and EPS had

successfully functioned jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator how

the party, with more than 1.5 crore cadre strength, suddenly decided to

change the existing dispensation. With respect, in our view, such a

question was not even germane to the points for determination arising

before the Court. As to how any compact, be it an association or be it a

political party, would manage its affairs and what alterations its governing

body would consider appropriate in its rules, regulations or byelaws, are all

the matters squarely within the domain of that compact and its governing

body. In any case, in the applications before the Court, the only relevant

question was about the validity of convening the meeting dated

11.07.2022. The learned Single Judge appears to have traversed through

such wide areas that ultimately the decision came to be based on entirely

irrelevant considerations.

33. It is also noteworthy that the ultimate injunction issued by the

learned Single Judge had been that of restoring status quo ante as on

23.06.2022 and further to that, the learned Single Judge directed that the

Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator would have to function jointly;

meetings have to be called with their joint consent; and on being properly

requisitioned, they would not refuse to convene the General Council

meeting and that they could approach the Court for necessary directions

for conducting the General Council meeting. Apart from the fact that the

injunction as issued by the learned Single Judge had been far away and

beyond the scope of applications before him, the said injunction could have

only perpetuated the functional deadlock in the party. The order passed by

the learned Single Judge could not have been countenanced from any

angle and thus, the Division Bench, in our view, has rightly interfered with

the same.

34. In the passing, we may also observe that while filing the suit and

seeking interim relief, the plaintiff OPS and even the other plaintiff, have

arrayed the parties to the litigation in the manner that the political partyAIADMK, as also its General Council and its Central Executive Committee

are said to be represented by “Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator” in

terms of assertions of these plaintiffs that the party and its

governing/executing bodies are only to be represented by the Co-ordinator

and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly. This effort on the part of the plaintiffs

carries its own shortcomings when it remains undeniable that they i.e., OPS

and EPS, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator respectively, do not

stand in jointness or even togetherness so as to work cohesively as a unit.

The effort on the part of the plaintiffs does not stand in conformity with the

existing realities.

35. Before closing on these matters, we need to make it clear again that

though several submissions have been made on behalf of the appellants

assailing the validity and correctness of the resolutions said to have been

adopted in the meeting dated 11.07.2022 and in counter to that, the

respondents have attempted to justify the said decisions/resolutions but we

have chosen not to deal with any of those contentions. This is for the

specific reason that the decisions taken in the meeting dated 11.07.2022

do not form the subject-matter of the applications for temporary injunction,

which were restored for reconsideration by this Court and were ultimately

decided by the learned Single Judge by the order dated 17.08.2022 and

then the intra-court appeals against that order of the learned Single Judge

were allowed by the Division Bench on 02.09.2022. In the interest of justice,

we leave all the related aspects concerning the said resolutions open to be

agitated, but strictly in accordance with law; and all the objections and

rebuttals of the contesting parties are also kept open.

35.1. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the scope of

these appeals, we have not found it necessary to deal with any of the

impleadment applications moved in these matters and we would leave it

open for all such applicants also to take recourse to appropriate remedy in

accordance with law, in case of any legal grievance existing with a right to

seek relief in the appropriate forum.

36. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the appeals arising out

of SLP(C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and 15705-15706 of 2022 are required to

be dismissed while affirming the impugned order dated 02.09.2022.

37. So far as the other appeals are concerned, therein, the aforesaid

order dated 23.06.2022 is in challenge. The operation and effect of the said

order was stayed by this Court on 06.07.2022. As noticed, the said order

dated 23.06.2022 has even otherwise lost its relevance. However, in order

to put the records straight, we deem it appropriate to make the stay order

dated 06.07.2022 absolute so as to dispose of the appeals filed in

challenge to the said order dated 23.06.2022.

38. Before concluding, we also make it clear that none of the

observations in this judgment shall have any bearing on the merit

consideration of the pending civil suits relating to these appeals; and the

said suits shall be proceeded with on their own merits and in accordance

with law.

39. Accordingly, and in view of the above:

1. The appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and

15705-15706 of 2022 are dismissed and the order dated

02.09.2022, as passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in

OSA Nos. 227 of 2022, 231 of 2022 and 232 of 2022 stands

affirmed.

2. The appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 11237 of 2022, 11579

of 2022 and 11578 of 2022 stand disposed of while making the

interim order dated 06.07.2022 absolute.

3. The parties are left to bear their own costs of these appeals.

4. All the pending applications also stand disposed of.

……....……………………. J.

(DINESH MAHESHWARI)

……....……………………. J.

(HRISHIKESH ROY)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 23, 2023.

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THIRU K. PALANISWAMY VERSUS M. SHANMUGAM & ORS.

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