OFFICE OF THE ODISHA LOKAYUKTA VERSUS DR. PRADEEP KUMAR PANIGRAHI AND OTHERS
OFFICE OF THE ODISHA LOKAYUKTA VERSUS DR. PRADEEP KUMAR PANIGRAHI AND OTHERS
Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2023
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 62616262 of 2021)
OFFICE OF THE ODISHA
LOKAYUKTA ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
DR. PRADEEP KUMAR PANIGRAHI
AND OTHERS ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The instant appeals are directed against the judgment dated
3
rd February, 2021 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Orissa at Cuttack setting aside Order dated 11th December, 2020
passed by the Odisha Lokayukta initiating to conduct a preliminary
1
inquiry in exercise of power conferred under Section 20(1) of the
Odisha Lokayukta Act, 2014(hereinafter being referred to as the
“Act 2014”) on a complaint dated 9th December, 2020 received from
Mr.Ranjan Kumar Das, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance
Cell Unit, Bhubaneswar indicating the alleged corruption against
respondent no. 1 who is the elected Member of the Legislative
Assembly of Gopalpur Constituency directing the Directorate of
Vigilance, Cuttack to conduct a preliminary inquiry and submit a
report to the Lokayukta.
3. The review petition filed at the instance of the appellant on the
premise that Odisha Lokayukta was never heard and no
opportunity of hearing has been afforded before passing of the
impugned Order dated 3rd February, 2021 and it was in violation of
the principles of natural justice, came to be dismissed by passing a
nonspeaking Order dated 5th April, 2021.
4. Respondent no. 1 is an elected Member of the Legislative
Assembly. Mr. Ranjan Kumar Das, the then Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell Unit, Bhubaneswar, made a
complaint dated 9th December, 2020 indicating serious allegations
2
of alleged corruption against Member of the Odisha Legislative
Assembly of Gopalpur Constituency. Along with the complaint,
supporting documents were also annexed. The Odisha Lokayukta,
after taking into consideration the contents of the complaint and
the supporting documents annexed thereto, in exercise of power
conferred under Section 20(1) of the Act, 2014 directed the
Directorate of Vigilance, Odisha, Cuttack to conduct a preliminary
inquiry against respondent no. 1 and submit a report within two
months with a further direction that the Directorate of Vigilance
must ensure that during preliminary inquiry, the mandate of
Section 20(2) has to be complied with and further directed the
Office of Lokayukta to make available all the relevant record to the
Directorate of Vigilance for compliance.
5. Immediately on a reference made by the Odisha Lokayukta by
its Order dated 11th December, 2020 directing the Directorate of
Vigilance to conduct a preliminary inquiry against respondent no. 1
and calling upon the report, came to be challenged by respondent
no. 1 by filing writ petition before the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution. Although the Office of Lokayukta was
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impleaded as one of respondent before the High Court but as
informed to this Court, no notice was issued to them and on the
first date of hearing, without even affording opportunity of hearing
to the appellant to submit their written response, the Division
Bench of the High Court under Order dated 3rd February, 2021
proceeded on the premise that entrusting Directorate of Vigilance to
conduct preliminary inquiry is not in terms of the mandate of
Section 20(1) and set aside the Order dated 11th December, 2020
with a liberty to the Lokayukta to conduct preliminary inquiry, if so
advised, against respondent no. 1 by the inquiry wing of the
Lokayukta with a further liberty to proceed in conformity with the
requirements of Sections 20(2) and 20(3) after the preliminary
report being furnished by the inquiry wing of the Lokayukta.
6. A review filed by the Lokayukta against the Order impugned
dated 3rd February, 2021 came to be dismissed by a nonspeaking
order dated 5th April, 2021 which is a subject matter of challenge in
the appeals before us.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the order
impugned dated 3rd February, 2021 is in violation of the principles
4
of nature justice and the finding has been recorded without
affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and that apart,
it is not in conformity with the mandate of Section 20(1) of the Act
2014.
8. Learned counsel further submits that Section 20(1) provides
an option to the Lokayukta, who, on receipt of a complaint, if order
to hold a preliminary inquiry against any public servant, may
conduct either by its enquiry wing or by any agency to ascertain as
to whether there exists any prima facie case for proceeding in the
matter any further. If the relevant provisions of the Act are being
looked into, particularly Chapter VIII of the Act 2014, any agency as
referred to under Section 25 includes the State Vigilance and Crime
Branch for the purpose of conducting preliminary inquiry or
investigation, as the case may be, and that is further strengthened
by the procedure for conducting a preliminary inquiry or
investigation envisaged under Section 28 wherein it is open for the
Lokayukta to conduct preliminary inquiry or investigation through
the agency of the Government. In the given facts and
circumstances, the finding which has been recorded by the Division
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Bench of the High Court that entrusting to conduct preliminary
inquiry by the Directorate of Vigilance under Order dated 11th
December, 2020 is not in conformity with the Act 2014, needs to be
interfered with by this Court.
9. Learned counsel further submits that calling upon the inquiry
wing or any agency to conduct a preliminary inquiry is only for a
limited purpose to ascertain whether there exists prima facie case
to proceed in the matter. The Legislature was conscious of the fact
that if it may cause any prejudice to the incumbent against whom
the prima facie case has been registered and before any further
action is being taken or to make any recommendation to proceed
either to conduct investigation or initiate a departmental inquiry, it
is incumbent upon the Lokayukta to afford an opportunity of
hearing to the public servant as referred to under Sections 20(2)
and 20(3) of the Act, 2014. A complete inbuilt procedure has been
prescribed under Chapter VII for conducting preliminary inquiry
and investigation within the powers of the Lokayukta. Chapter VIII
prescribes not only the purpose of conducting preliminary inquiry
and investigation but also in reaching to a final conclusion even at
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the stage of registering of the chargesheet as referred to under
Section 20(8) of the Act, 2014.
10. Learned counsel further submits that no adverse or prejudicial
action was taken by the appellant in initiating to conduct a
preliminary inquiry under its Order dated 11th December 2020,
thus the interference made by the High Court, at this stage, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India was neither valid nor justified.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other
hand, submits that a complaint was made by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell, Bhubaneshwar dated 9th
December, 2020, who was the Officer of Directorate of Vigilance,
Cuttack, Odisha, Cuttack and direction was given to the Directorate
of Vigilance, Odisha to conduct a preliminary inquiry by Order
dated 11th December, 2020, the decision itself was in violation of
the principles of natural justice. Once the complaint was made by
the officer of the Directorate of Vigilance, at least entrusting the
preliminary inquiry to be conducted by another Officer of the
Directorate of Vigilance, may be senior in the ladder, was not legally
7
justified. The Officer of the Department has made a complaint on
9
th December, 2020 and other officer is called upon to conduct a
preliminary inquiry as stated that one cannot be a judge in its own
cause and that being the reason, the Division Bench of the High
Court has permitted the Lokayukta to conduct an inquiry by the
inquiry wing of the Lokayukta and administrative bias can’t be
ruled out of the Directorate of Vigilance who is to conduct a
preliminary inquiry.
12. Learned counsel further submits that since the respondents
were duly represented and the Advocate General of the State
appeared along with the State counsel, opportunity of hearing was
afforded to the appellant and plea of the principles of natural justice
as prayed for by the appellant being violated, in the facts and
circumstances, does not hold good. That apart, review petition
came to be rightly dismissed as the appellant failed to justify any
manifest error being committed by the Division Bench of the High
Court under its Order dated 3rd February, 2021 which may call for
our interference.
8
13. It may be noticed that while issuing notice by this Court on
23rd April, 2021, operation of the impugned order was stayed. In
furtherance of the stay granted by this Court, it is informed that the
appellant has proceeded further and after the preliminary inquiry
report being submitted to the Lokayukta by the Officer Shri P.K.
Naik on 28th May, 2021 and after affording opportunity of hearing to
the appellant, a detailed Order was passed by the Lokayukta under
Section 20(3)(a) dated 27th September, 2021 directing the
Directorate of Vigilance to carry out investigation. In furtherance
thereof, Directorate of Vigilance submitted a detailed report of
investigation to the Lokayukta on 7th June, 2022, however, no
further action has been initiated and awaiting orders of this Court
which is indicated in the order dated 24th June, 2022 placed on
record along with IA No. 89629 of 2022.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance perused the material available on record.
15. Before we proceed to examine the question raised in the
instant appeals, it may be apposite to first take a bird’s eye view of
the Scheme of the Act, 2014.
9
16. The Act, 2014 has been enacted by the legislature of the State
of Odisha having been assented to by the President on the 16th
January, 2015 with an object to provide for the establishment of the
body of Lokayukta for the State of Odisha to inquire into allegations
of corruption against public functionaries and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act is applicable to
the public servants of the State of Odisha serving in and outside the
State and the public servants under the control of Government of
Odisha.
17. A ‘complaint’ has been defined under Section 2(d), and the
term ‘preliminary inquiry’ and ‘public servant’ under Sections 2(l)
and 2(n) of the Act 2014 which are stated as follows:
“2. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
……
(d) “complaint” means a complaint, made in such form as may be prescribed,
alleging that a public servant has committed an offence punishable under the
Prevention of Corruption Act,1988;
……
(l) “preliminary inquiry” means an inquiry conducted under this Act;
……
(n) “public servant” means a person referred to in clauses (a) to (h) of subsection (1) of section 14 but does not include a public servant in respect of
whom the jurisdiction is exercisable by any court or other authority under the
Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Coast
Guard Act, 1978 or the procedure is applicable to such public servant under
those Acts;
10
…….”.
18. Chapter VII prescribes the procedure in respect of preliminary
inquiry and investigation, the relevant part of which is reproduced
as under:
“20. (1) The Lokayukta, on receipt of a complaint, if it decides to proceed further,
may order—
(a) preliminary inquiry against any public servant by its Inquiry
Wing or any agency to ascertain whether there exists a prima
facie case for proceeding in the matter; or
(b) investigation by any agency or authority empowered under any
law to investigate, where there exists a prima facie case:
Provided that any investigation under this clause shall be ordered only if in
the opinion of the Lokayukta there is substantial material relating to the
existence of a prima facie case or any earlier statutory investigation or enquiry
regarding the same complaint reveals that a prima facie case exists:
Provided further that before ordering an investigation under this clause, the
Lokayukta shall call for the explanation of the public servant and views of the
competent authority, so as to determine whether there exists a prima facie case
for investigation:
Provided also that a decision to order investigation under this clause shall
be taken by a bench constituted by the Chairperson under section 16.
(2) During the preliminary inquiry referred to in subsection (1), the Inquiry
Wing or any agency shall conduct a preliminary inquiry and on the basis of
material, information and documents collected, seek the comments on the
allegations made in the complaint from the public servant and competent
authority and after obtaining the comments of the concerned public servant and
competent authority, submit, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the
reference, a report to the Lokayukta.
(3) A bench consisting of not less than three Members of the Lokayukta shall
consider every report received under subsection (2) from the Inquiry Wing or
any agency and after giving an opportunity of being heard to the public servant,
decide as to whether there exists a prima facie case, and make
recommendations to proceed with one or more of the following actions, namely:
—
(a) investigation by any agency (including any special
investigation agency);
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(b) initiation of the departmental proceedings or any other
appropriate action against the concerned public servant by the
competent authority;
(c) closure of the proceedings against the public servant and take
action to proceed against the complainant under section 46.
(4) The promotion and other service benefits of a public servant mentioned in
clauses (e) to (h) of subsection (1) of section 14 shall not be affected until the
public servant is put under suspension on recommendation of the Lokayukta
under section 32 or charge sheet is filed after completion of investigation under
clause (a) of subsection (3) or a charge memo is issued against the said public
servant in a disciplinary proceeding initiated on the recommendation of the
Lokayukta under clause (b) of subsection (3).
(5) Every preliminary inquiry referred to in subsection (1) shall ordinarily be
completed within a period of ninety days and for reasons to be recorded in
writing, within a further period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the
complaint.
(6) In case the Lokayukta decides to proceed to investigate into the complaint, it
shall, by order in writing, direct any investigating agency (including any special
agency) to carry out the investigation as expeditiously as possible and complete
the investigation within a period of six months from the date of its order:
Provided that the Lokayukta, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, may
extend the said period by a further period not exceeding six months at a time
and for the maximum period of two years.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, any investigating agency (including any special agency) shall,
in respect of cases referred to it by the Lokayukta, submit the investigation
report to the Lokayukta.
(8) A bench consisting of not less than three Members of the Lokayukta shall
consider every report received by it under subsection (7) from any investigating
agency (including any special agency) and may, decide as to—
(a) filing of chargesheet or closure report before the Special Court
against the public servant;
(b) initiating the departmental proceedings or any other
appropriate action against the concerned public servant by the
competent authority.
(9) The Lokayukta may, after taking a decision under subsection (8) on the
filing of the charge sheet, direct its Prosecution Wing to initiate prosecution in a
Special Court in respect of cases investigated by any investigating agency
(including any special agency).
…..”
12
19. Section 20 provides an inbuilt mechanism laying down the
procedure to be followed in holding preliminary inquiry and
investigation which the Lokayukta, in the facts and circumstances,
on receipt of a complaint may decide either order for conducting
preliminary inquiry against the public servant by its inquiry wing or
any agency to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for
proceeding in the matter; or direct to hold an investigation by any
agency or authority empowered under any law to investigate, to
record its satisfaction whether there exists a prima facie case.
20. Subsections (2), (3) and (4) provide the procedure which has
to be followed by the inquiry wing or any agency which has been
asked to ascertain the fact as to whether there exists prima facie
case for proceeding in the matter. Such report is placed before a
Bench consisting of not less than three members of the Lokayukta
to consider the same under subsection (2) from the inquiry wing or
any agency and after affording an opportunity of being heard to the
public servant, may recommend to proceed with one or more of the
actions as provided under Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (3) to
hold departmental action against the public servant. Subsection
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(5) prescribes the time schedule of 90 days under which preliminary
inquiry has to be concluded. Subsection (6) provides the action to
be taken to carry out the investigation as expeditiously as possible
and complete the investigation within a period of six months.
Under subsection(7), notwithstanding anything contained in
Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the
investigating agency may submit the investigation report to the
Lokayukta. Subsections (8) and (9) provide the procedure to be
followed after investigating agency has submitted its report for
taking further action.
21. Chapter VIII provides the power of the Lokayukta. Under
Section 25, the power of superintendence and direction over the
investigating agency including the State Vigilance and Crime
Branch in respect of the matters in so far as they relate to the
investigation made by such agency has been entrusted to
Lokayukta.
22. Section 27 clarifies that for the purpose of any preliminary
inquiry, the inquiry wing of the Lokayukta holds powers of a civil
Court, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and any
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proceedings before the Lokayukta shall be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860.
23. Section 28 authorise the Lokayukta to conduct any
preliminary inquiry or investigation and utilize the services of any
officer or organization or investigation agency of the Government.
24. The Act, in fact, is a complete code putting in place the
procedure under which the Lokayukta under the Act, 2014 within
its territorial jurisdiction holds the authority to adopt a mechanism
in reference to public servants of the State of Odisha serving in and
outside the State and the public servants under the control of
Government of Odisha to inquire into allegations of corruption
against the public functionaries and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.
25. Mr. Ranjan Kumar Das, Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance Cell Unit, Bhubaneswar was not a person interested but
as an informant submitted a complaint against respondent no. 1
(MLA Gopalpur Constituency) to Odisha Lokayukta regarding
possession of disproportionate assets and intentionally enriching
15
himself illicitly adopting malpractices. On the said complaint
being received, the appellant directed the Directorate of Vigilance,
Cuttack to conduct a preliminary inquiry against respondent no.1
in exercise of his power under Section 20(1) of the Act, 2014 by an
order dated 11th December, 2020. Before any action could have
been taken by the Directorate of Vigilance in conducting a
preliminary inquiry, a writ petition was filed by respondent no.1
before the High Court and on the first motion stage, the High Court,
without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant, set
aside the order dated 11th December, 2020 passed by the appellant
for conducting a preliminary inquiry. The action of the Division
Bench of the High Court indeed was in violation of the principles of
natural justice.
26. The aim to the rule of natural justice is to secure justice or to
put it negatively, these rules can operate only in areas not covered
by any law validly made. The concept of natural justice, indeed,
has undergone a change with the passage of time, but still the timetested rules, namely, are (i) no one shall be a judge in his own case
(Nemo debet essse judex propria causa) and (ii) no decision shall be
16
given against a party without affording him a reasonable
opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem). At the same time,
action of the authority must be held in good faith without bias and
not arbitrary or unreasonable.
27. In the first instance, the Division Bench of the High Court has
committed a manifest error in passing of the order impugned dated
3
rd February, 2021 while setting aside the order of the appellant
dated 11th December, 2020 to conduct a preliminary inquiry against
respondent no.1 in exercise of powers under Section 20(1) of the
Act, 2014 which is in violation of the principles of natural justice.
28. Even on merits, the Division Bench has completely overlooked
Section 20(1) of the Act, 2014 that empowers the Lokayukta, on
receipt of a complaint, obviously after recording satisfaction, in its
discretion if intended to proceed and to hold any inquiry, can
conduct either a preliminary inquiry against a public servant by its
inquiry wing or any other agency to ascertain whether there exists a
prima facie case for proceeding in the matter or hold investigation
17
by any agency or authority empowered under any law to investigate
whether there exists a prima facie case.
29. So far as the term ‘any agency’ is concerned, it clearly
manifests from Section 25 of Chapter VIII which entrusts the power
of superintendence to the Lokayukta to exercise in such a manner
so as to require any agency, including the State Vigilance and
Crime Branch.
30. At the same time, under Section 28, for the purpose of
conducting any preliminary inquiry or investigation, it is open for
the Lokayukta to utilize the services of any officer or organization or
investigation agency of the Government and, in the circumstances,
if the appellant in its judicious discretion and on the facts and
circumstances of the case, conduct a preliminary inquiry through
an agency of the Government of which reference has been made
under Section 28 through the Directorate of Vigilance, Cuttack,
there appears no legal infirmity being committed by the appellant in
the decisionmaking process in conducting a preliminary inquiry
which, in our view, was within the scope and ambit of Section 20(1)
of the Act, 2014 and a manifest error was committed by the
18
Division Bench of the High Court while setting aside the order of the
appellant dated 11th December, 2020 to conduct an inquiry against
respondent no.1.
31. It is not a case of the respondents that respondent no.1 is not
a public servant or the Act, 2014 is not applicable to him or the
Lokayukta in its jurisdiction was not competent to conduct a
preliminary inquiry under Section 20(1) of the Act, 2014. In the
given facts and circumstances, the finding returned by the Division
Bench of the High Court under the judgment impugned, in our
view, is not legally sustainable.
32. During the course of submissions made by the parties, it was
informed that after the stay was granted by this Court of the
judgment impugned dated 3rd February, 2021, the appellant has
proceeded in conducting further inquiry and actions are being
taken after the Directorate of Vigilance has submitted a preliminary
inquiry report to the Lokayukta under Section 20(3)(a) to carry out
investigation and steps are taken by the Directorate of Vigilance in
summitting a report of investigation before the appellant on 7th
June, 2022.
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33. Although we may not appreciate the action of the appellant in
taking further steps when there was stay of the order impugned
passed by this Court, but at the same time, we granted an
opportunity to the respondents as well to justify if the action taken
by the appellant is not in conformity with the mandate of the Act,
2014, but from the written submissions placed before us, we do
not find any valid objection being raised by the respondents which
may call upon this Court to interfere in furtherance of the action
being taken by the appellant after the preliminary inquiry report
was submitted pursuant to order dated 11th December, 2020. Still
we leave it open to respondent no.1, if further action taken by the
appellant is not in conformity with law, he is at liberty to initiate
proceedings as admissible to him under the law.
34. So far as the objection raised by the respondents regarding the
action of conducting preliminary inquiry being bias for the reason
that the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Directorate of
Vigilance has submitted a complaint and the appellant directed the
Directorate of Vigilance to conduct a preliminary inquiry by an
order dated 11th December, 2020, which, in fact, was conducted by
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a senior officer of the Directorate of Vigliance i.e. Additional
Superintendent of Police Vigilance, Mr. P.K. Naik, who submitted a
report to the appellant on 28th May, 2021 is concerned, we are not
persuaded with the submission of there being any bias on the part
of the Directorate of Vigilance cell in conducting preliminary inquiry
for the reason that the Officer who submitted a complaint was
simply an informant and not the person interested, at the same
time, preliminary inquiry was conducted by a different Officer not
connected with author of the complaint, thus the plea of bias was
illfounded. In our view, the principles of bias, even remotely are
not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
35. The rule against bias is an essential component of modern
administrative law. The rule against bias ensures a fair procedure
by excluding decisionmakers who are tainted by bias. Under the
rule, actual bias is disqualifying even though it is prohibitively
difficult to establish. The basic principle underlying the timetested
rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appears to
be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several
decisions of this Court and for our consideration we take note of the
21
judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others vs. Union of
India and others1
, wherein in para 15 this Court held as under:
“15. It is unfortunate that Naqishbund was appointed as one of
the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the
Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the
most appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be
expected to know his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well
as their strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for
selection to the AllIndia Service is entitled to great weight. But
then under the circumstances it was improper to have included
Naqishbund as a member of the selection board. He was one of the
persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of
justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did
not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his
name was considered. But then the very fact that he was a
member of the selection board must have had its own impact on
the decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he
participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the
claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu was considered. He
was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates
in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the
deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between
his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to
believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not
whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a
person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is
reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been
biased. We agree with the learned Attorney General that a mere
suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable
likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take
into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of
human conduct. It was in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out
his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge.
Naturally he was also interested in safeguarding his position while
preparing the list of selected candidates.
(emphasis added)
1 1969 (2) SCC 262
22
36. The aforesaid view was further considered by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav and others vs. State
of Haryana and others2
as under:
“16. We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental
principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his
own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is
“in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the
justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting”.
The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact
decides partially, but whether there is a real livelihood of bias.
What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is
actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as
to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that
there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic
principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done
but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide
recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to
note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power
stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases
where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair
and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not
the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who
are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict
standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being
increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the
maintenance of the rule of law in a Welfare State where the
jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace
that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their
functions in a fair and just manner. This was the basis on which
the applicability of this rule was extended to the decisionmaking
process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers to
the Indian Forest Service in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2
SCC 262]. What happened in this case was that one Naqishbund,
the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir was
a member of the Selection Board which had been set up to select
officers to the Indian Forest Service from those serving in the
Forest Department of Jammu and Kashmir. Naqishbund who was
a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for
2 1985 (4) SCC 417
23
selection to the Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the
Selection Board at the time when his name was considered for
selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and participated in
the deliberations when the names of his rival officers were
considered for selection and took part in the deliberations of the
Selection Board while preparing the list of the selected candidates
in order of preference. This Court held that the presence of
Naqishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that there was
reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection.
Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court countered the argument
that Naqishbund did not take part in the deliberations of the
Selection Board when his name was considered, by saying :
“But then the very fact that he was a member of the
Selection Board must have had its own impact on the
decision of the Selection Board. Further admittedly he
participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board
when the claims of his rivals ... was considered. He
was also party to the preparation of the list of selected
candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his
participation in the deliberations of the Selection
Board there was a conflict between his interest and
duty.... The real question is not whether he was
biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a
person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there
is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to
have been biased.... There must be a reasonable
likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we
have to take into consideration human probabilities
and ordinary course of human conduct.”
This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias
but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be
shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood
of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account
of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal
friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable
likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relationship, the
question would always be as to how close is the degree of
relationship or in other words, is the nearness of relationship so
great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part
of the authority making the selection.”
(emphasis added)
24
37. In the instant case, the complaint was made by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police (Mr. Ranjan Kumar Das) of the Directorate
of Vigilance, who is, directly or indirectly, not concerned with the
complaint, he can be said to be an informant to the office of the
appellant and that apart, a preliminary inquiry was conducted
independently by a senior officer of the Directorate of Vigilance,
Additional Superintendent of Police, Mr. P.K. Naik, who submitted
his report of the preliminary inquiry on 28th May, 2021, the
question of bias in the instant facts and circumstances does not
arise at all and that apart, the Constitution Bench of this Court
recently in Mukesh Singh vs. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi)3
,
while examining the question as to whether in case investigation is
conducted by the police officer who himself is a complainant is the
trial stands vitiated and the accused is entitled to acquittal and
after examining the scheme of the Code, finally answered the
reference as under:
“13. From the above discussion and for the reasons stated above,
we conclude and answer the reference as under:
13.1. (I) That the observations of this Court in Bhagwan
Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(1976) 1 SCC 15] , Megha
3 2020 (10) SCC 120
25
Singh v. State of Haryana [(1996) 11 SCC 709]
and State v. Rajangam [(2010) 15 SCC 369] and the acquittal of
the accused by this Court on the ground that as the informant and
the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the
accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to
their own facts. It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions,
this Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each
and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a
bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be
disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.
13.2. (II) In a case where the informant himself is the investigator,
by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the
ground of bias or the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that
itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or
bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the
investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter
has to be decided on a casetocase basis. A contrary decision of
this Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab [(2018) 17 SCC 627] and
any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant
cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is
entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically
overruled.”
(emphasis added)
38. We are of the considered view that there was no element of
bias in conducting a preliminary inquiry in the instant case and the
objection raised by the respondents stands overruled.
39. The further objection raised by the respondents is in reference
to the locus standi of the appellant in filing appeal in this Court and
in support of his submission, counsel placed reliance on the
judgments of this Court in National Commission for Women vs.
26
State of Delhi and another4 and M.S. Kazi vs. Muslim
Education Society and others5
. In our considered view, the
submission is wholly bereft of merit for the reason that the action of
the appellant initiated pursuant to order dated 11th December, 2020
for conducting a preliminary inquiry in exercise of powers conferred
under Section 20(1) of the Act, 2014 was a subject matter of
challenge before the High Court at the instance of respondent no.1
and if that is being interfered with and the action of the appellant is
being set aside under the impugned judgment dated 3rd February,
2021, the appellant, indeed, was a person aggrieved and has a
locus standi to question the action interfered with by the Division
Bench of the High Court and the only remedy available with the
appellant is to question the order of the Division Bench of the High
Court by filing an special leave petition in this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution.
40. The judgment in National Commission for Women (supra)
on which the respondents have placed reliance was a case where in
criminal trial, in the first instance held by the trial Court, the
4 2010 (12) SCC 599
5 2016 (9) SCC 263
27
accused was convicted and on appeal being preferred by him, was
later acquitted by the competent Court of jurisdiction and obviously
appeal could be preferred against the order of acquittal either by the
prosecution i.e. the State Government or the victim, under Section
378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but either of the party
has not preferred any appeal and it was the National Commission
for Women who approached this Court by filing a special leave
petition under Article 136 of the Constitution and this Court still
has ventured to examine the appeal preferred by the Commission
on merits, but observed that the special leave to appeal at the
instance of the appellant – National Commission for Women, is not
maintainable and obviously at least the National Commission for
Women was not a person aggrieved and it has no locus to object the
order passed by the competent court of jurisdiction.
41. At the same time, the judgment of this Court in M.S. Kazi
(supra) was a case where the teacher was terminated by a minority
institution after conducting a disciplinary inquiry. As the matter
travelled to the High Court under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution and at this stage the Division Bench of the High Court
28
observed that since the Tribunal is not a party respondent who was
the Administrator before whom the dispute inter se between the
parties i.e. the teacher and the minority institution was examined,
the objection was sustainable, still that objection was turned down
by this Court as referred in para 9 and held that it is the person
aggrieved who has to pursue his or her remedy available under the
law and in the case on hand the person aggrieved invoked the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but the Tribunal was not a necessary
party to the proceedings for the reason that the lis was between
teacher and the minority institution and accordingly, this Court
held that the High Court has committed an error in dismissing the
letters patent appeal on the ground that it was not maintainable in
the absence of Tribunal being a party respondent.
42. Both the judgments relied upon are not even remotely
concerned with the facts and circumstances of the present case.
To say in other words, if the order of the appellant directing the
Directorate of Vigilance to conduct the preliminary inquiry in
exercise of power under Section 20(1) of the Act, 2014 dated 11th
December, 2020 has been set aside by the High Court, obviously,
29
the appellant is a person aggrieved and can certainly question the
legality/validity of the judgment of the High Court impugned by
invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
43. Consequently, the appeals succeed and are accordingly
allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated 3rd February, 2021
and the review order dated 5th April, 2021 are hereby set aside. No
costs.
44. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
……………………………J.
(BELA M. TRIVEDI)
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 23, 2023.
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