Morgan Securities And Credits Pvt. Ltd. Versus Videocon Industries Ltd

Morgan Securities And Credits Pvt. Ltd. Versus Videocon Industries Ltd


Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले


1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 5437 of 2022
Morgan Securities And Credits Pvt. Ltd. .... Appellant
Versus
Videocon Industries Ltd. ....Respondent


J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 This appeal arises from a judgment dated 26 February 2020 of the High
Court of Delhi by which the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 19961 against a judgment of the Single Judge dated 7 February
2019 has been dismissed. At the core, the issue is whether the arbitrator has the
discretion to grant post-award interest only on the principal sum due under
Section 31(7)(b) of the Act.
1
“The Act”
2
Facts
2 On 27 January 2003, the appellant and the respondent entered into an
agreement under which the respondent availed of bill discounting facilities from
the appellant. The appellant disbursed Rs. 5,00,32,656 pursuant to the
agreement. The dues remained unpaid. The appellant issued a notice to the
respondent on 10 January 2006 demanding the payment of the principal amount
of Rs. 5,00,32,656 as on 17 April 2003, which is the date of default, along with an
overdue interest. Since the respondent did not pay the amount as demanded, the
appellant issued a notice on 31 January 2006, invoking the arbitration clause of
the agreement.
3 The sole arbitrator rendered an arbitral award in favour of the appellant on
1 March 2013. The award was corrected on 29 April 2013 and decrees the claim
of the appellant in the amount of Rs. 5,00,32,656. Interest at the rate of (i) twenty
one percent per annum has been granted from the date of default to the date of
the demand notice; (ii) thirty six percent per annum with monthly rests from the
date of the demand notice to the date of award (“pre-award interest”); and (iii)
eighteen percent per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 5,00,32,656 from the
date of award to the date of payment (“post-award interest”). The relevant extract
of the award is set out below:
“ In view of the findings of the Tribunal above,
Respondent No. 2 is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,32,
656 (Rupees five crores thirty two thousand six hundred
and fifty six only) to the Claimant along with interest at
21% p.a till the date of demand notice. After the date of
the demand notice, i.e 10.01.2006, the Claimant is
entitled to receive interest at the rate 36% p.a with
monthly rests. Further, in terms of the aforesaid
decision in S.L Arora, the Claimant is entitled to
3
receive post- award interest at the rate of 18% p.a
only on the principal amount of Rs 5,00,32,656/”
 (emphasis
supplied)
4 The appellant challenged the arbitral award 2
in a petition under Section 34
before the Delhi High Court raising objections on the grant of post-award and preaward interest. The respondent also filed a petition3
. The appellant urged that
the post-award interest of eighteen percent per annum should be granted on the
total sum awarded, inclusive both of principal and pre-award interest. By a
judgment dated 7 February 2019, the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court
dismissed the petition filed by the appellant on the grant of post-award interest.
The Single Judge held that the Arbitrator had in his discretion restricted the postaward interest to the principal amount and that the court would not interfere with
the exercise of discretion:
The appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge was
dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by a
judgment dated 26 February 2020. The counsel for the
appellant before the High Court placed reliance on the
decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Hyder
Consulting (UK) Limited v. Governor, State of Orissa4
and contended that post-award interest ought to be
granted on the sum directed to be paid under the arbitral
award, which also includes the pre-award interest.
Counsel for the respondent contended that reliance ought
not to be placed on the judgment in Hyder Consulting
(supra) since the decision in State of Haryana v. SL
Arora5 was the applicable law when the petition under
Section 34 was instituted. The Division Bench of the High
Court observed that the judgment in Hyder Consulting
(supra) clarifies that when the arbitral award is silent on
post-award interest, it would be payable on the ‘sum’
awarded, which would include both the principal and the
pre-award interest. The Division Bench held that in this
2 OMP No. 972 of 2013
3 OMP 665 of 2013
4
(2015) 2 SCC 189
5
(2010) 3 SCC 690
4
case since the arbitral award is not silent on post-award
interest, the provisions of Section 31(7)(b) of the Act
would not be applicable.
Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court also
decided on the other objections of the appellant and the respondent.
5 Proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution were initiated for
challenging the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 26
February 2020. On 16 July 2021, this Court issued notice confined to the issue of
post-award interest. The order reads as follows:
“ 1 Issue notice confined to the post award interest.
We are not entertaining the Special Leave Petition as
regards the award of interest prior to the date of the
award.
2 The Arbitrator, in awarding interest at the rate of
18% post award on the principal sum, based the award
on the decision in State of Haryana v SL Arora. The
decision in S L Arora was overruled in Hyder
Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa.
3. In view of the above premises, we issue notice
confined to the above issue returnable in eight weeks.”
Submissions
6 Mr. Abhishek Puri, learned counsel appearing for the appellant made the
following submissions:
(i) In view of the provisions of Section 31(7) of the Act and the judgment of
this Court in Hyder Consulting (supra), if pre-award interest is
awarded on the principal sum, the aggregate of the principal and the
pre-award interest is the ‘sum’ on which post-award interest must be
granted;
(ii) According to the majority opinion in Hyder Consulting (supra), once
pre-award interest is granted on the principal sum under Section
31(7)(a) of the Act, the interest award loses its character as interest
5
and takes the color of the awarded ‘sum’ for the purposes of postaward interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act;
(iii) The arbitral award is silent on post-award interest on the component of
interest. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to the statutory rate of
interest on the aggregate of the principal and pre-award interest under
Section 31(7)(b) of the Act;
(iv) Even according to the decision in SL Arora (supra), the discretion of
the arbitral tribunal under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act was only with
respect to the rate of the post-award interest. In this case, the arbitrator
has awarded post-award interest only on the principal sum solely in
view of the judgment in SL Arora (supra);
(v) The arbitrator only has the discretion to determine the rate post-award
interest. The Arbitrator does not have the discretion to determine the
‘sum’ on which the post-award interest is to be granted; and
(vi) The contention that Section 31(7)(b) of the Act would be inapplicable in
cases where the arbitrator has awarded post-award interest by
exercising discretion is not borne out of the decisions in SL Arora
(supra) or Hyder Consulting (supra).
7 Mr Nakul Dewan, learned senior counsel for the respondent made the
following submissions:
(i) Section 31(7)(b) is qualified by the phrase “unless the award
otherwise directs”. Therefore, Section 31(7)(b) would only be
applicable where an arbitral award is silent on the component of
post-award interest;
6
(ii) Under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act, the arbitrator has the discretion to
(a) grant post-award interest; (b) determine the quantum over which
the post-award interest should be granted; and (c) determine the
rate at which the interest should be calculated; and
(iii) In Hyder Consulting (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court
overruled SL Arora (supra) to the extent that the latter decision held
that the arbitral tribunal does not have the power to award interest
over interest. However, in Hyder Consulting (supra), it was not
held that it is mandatory that the post-award interest ought to only
be granted on the aggregate of the principal and the pre-award
interest.
Analysis
8 Section 31 provides for the “form and content of arbitral award”. Subsection 7 of Section 31 deals with pre-award and post-award interest. Section
31(7)(a) provides for pre-award interest, that is for the period between the date
on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made.
Section 31(7)(b) provides for post-award interest, between the date of award to
the date of payment. Section 31(7) reads as follows:
(7) (a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and
in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money,
the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which
the award is made interest, at such rate as it deems
reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for
the whole or any part of the period between the date on
which the cause of action arose and the date on which
the award is made;
7
(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award
shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest
at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum from the
date of the award to the date of payment.
 (emphasis supplied)
9 In SL Arora (supra) this court had to interpret the expression ‘sum’ in
Section 31(7). This Court framed the following issue:
“(i) Whether Section 31(7) of the Act authorises and
enables Arbitral Tribunals to award interest on interest
from the date of award?”
Justice R V Raveendran writing for a two-Judge Bench held that Section 31(7)
does not enable the arbitral tribunal to provide interest on interest from the date
of the award. While arriving at this conclusion, the court observed that:
(i) Section 31(7) does not make any reference to the payment of
compound interest or interest on interest. The phrase “sum directed to
be paid by the award” refers to the award of “sums on substantive
claims”, that is, the principal amount. In the absence of a provision
enabling the grant of compound interest, such a power cannot be read
into the provisions either for the pre-award period or for the post-award
period;
(ii) A high rate of interest at eighteen percent is statutorily recognised in
Section 31(7)(b) for the post-award period to deter the award-debtor
from delaying the payment of monies as directed in the award;
(iii) Section 31(7)(a) confers the arbitrator with the discretion to determine
the rate of interest, the period for which the interest is to be paid, and
the quantum on which interest is to be awarded. However, the
discretionary power of the arbitrator is subject to the contract between
8
the parties. Section 31(7)(b) provides the arbitrator the discretion to
award interest for the post-award period. The discretion is not subject
to any contract. If the arbitrator does not exercise the discretion by
awarding post-award interest, then the mandated interest of eighteen
percent shall be awarded; and
(iv) If the award provides interest at a specified rate till the date of payment,
then Section 31(7)(b) of the Act will not be invoked. Section 31(7)(b) will
be invoked only if the award is silent on the post-award interest.
10 A two-judge bench of this Court6
referred the correctness of the decision in
SL Arora (supra) to a three-Judge Bench. In Hyder Consulting (supra), a threeJudge Bench overruled the decision in SL Arora (supra). Three separate
judgments were authored. In order to determine the ratio decidendi in Hyder
Consulting (supra), it is necessary that all three opinions are carefully analysed.
Justice SA Bobde, observed that the view in SL Arora (supra) that pre-award
interest should not be included in the ‘sum’ for calculating post-award interest is
erroneous:
“ 2. It is not possible to agree with the conclusion in S.L.
Arora case that Section 31(7) of the Act does not require
that interest which accrues till the date of the award be
included in the ‘sum’ from the date of award for
calculating the post-award interest. In my humble view,
this conclusion does not seem to be in consonance with
the clear language of Section 31(7) of the Act.”
Referring to Section 31(7)(a), Justice Bobde observed that (i) since Parliament
has not qualified the phrase ‘sum’ with the word ‘principal’, (as in Section 34 of
the Code of Civil Procedure 1908) the word ‘sum’ only takes the meaning of ‘a
6 Hyder Consulting Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2013) 2 SCC 719
9
particular amount of money’; (ii) the ‘sum’ would include both principal and
interest; and (iii) when interest is directed to be paid on the principal under
Section 31(7)(a), the aggregate amount after merging pre-award interest and
the principal would be the ‘sum’, where the two components of principal and
interest would have lost their identities. The relevant observations are extracted
below:
7. Thus, when used as a noun, as it seems to have been
used in this provision, the word “sum” simply means “an
amount of money”; whatever it may include — “principal”
and “interest” or one of the two. Once the meaning of the
word “sum” is clear, the same meaning must be ascribed
to the word in clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31
of the Act, where it provides that a sum directed to be
paid by an arbitral award “shall … carry interest …” from
the date of the award to the date of the payment i.e. postaward. In other words, what clause (b) of sub-section
(7) of Section 31 of the Act directs is that the “sum”,
which is directed to be paid by the award, whether
inclusive or exclusive of interest, shall carry interest
at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum for the
post-award period, unless otherwise ordered.
[…]
13. Thus, it is apparent that vide clause (a) of sub-section
(7) of Section 31 of the Act, Parliament intended that an
award for payment of money may be inclusive of interest,
and the “sum” of the principal amount plus interest may
be directed to be paid by the Arbitral Tribunal for the preaward period. Thereupon, the Arbitral Tribunal may
direct interest to be paid on such “sum” for the postaward period vide clause (b) of sub-section (7) of
Section 31 of the Act, at which stage the amount
would be the sum arrived at after the merging of
interest with the principal; the two components
having lost their separate identities.”
 (emphasis supplied)
10
11 Justice AM Sapre in his concurring opinion noted that while the grant of
pre-award interest is at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal; post-award interest
is mandated by the statute where the arbitrator only has the discretion to decide
the rate of interest. That is, if the arbitral tribunal has used its discretion to grant
post-award interest at a particular rate, then such rate as directed would prevail,
otherwise, the rate of interest mentioned in the statute would be applicable. The
relevant extract of the judgment reads as follows:
“26. […] Pre-award interest is at the discretion of the
Arbitral Tribunal, while the post-award interest on the
awarded sum is mandate of the statute—the only
difference being that of rate of interest to be awarded
by the Arbitral Tribunal. In other words, if the Arbitral
Tribunal has awarded post-award interest payable from
the date of award to the date of payment at a particular
rate in its discretion then it will prevail else the party will
be entitled to claim post-award interest on the awarded
sum at the statutory rate specified in clause (b) of Section
31(7) of the Act i.e. 18%. Thus, there is a clear distinction
in time period and the intended purpose of grant of
interest.”
 (emphasis supplied)
Justice Sapre agreed with Justice Bobde on the meaning of the expression ‘sum’
and held that once the interest is ‘included in the sum’, then the interest and the
principal component cannot be segregated :
“28. Therefore, for the purposes of an award, there is no
distinction between a “sum” with interest, and a “sum”
without interest. Once the interest is “included in the
sum” for which the award is made, the original sum
and the interest component cannot be segregated
and be seen independent of each other. The interest
component then loses its character of an “interest”
and takes the colour of “sum” for which the award is
made.
29. There may arise a situation where, the Arbitral
Tribunal may not award any amount towards principal
claim but award only “interest”. This award of interest
would itself then become the “sum” for which an award is
made under Section 31(7)(a) of the Act. Thus, in a pre-
11
award stage, the legislation seeks to make no
distinction between the sum awarded and the interest
component in it.
[…]
31. […] Interest under clause (b) is granted on the
“sum” directed to be paid by an arbitral award
wherein the “sum” is nothing more than what is
arrived at under clause (a)”
 (emphasis
supplied)
12 The view of Chief Justice HL Dattu in his dissenting opinion was that :
(i) The phrase ‘sum’ in Section 31(7)(a) refers to ‘money’ in common
parlance. Section 31(7)(a) states that interest may be awarded on
the ‘sum’, which would mean the interest awarded on the money for
which the arbitral award is made. Therefore, sum refers to the
‘principal’ amount awarded;
(ii) The phrase ‘sum’ as used in clause (b) is used in the same context
as in clause (a). Therefore, the phrase ‘sum’ in clause (b) also
means the ‘principal’ amount; and
(iii) The words ‘unless the award otherwise directs” in Section 31(7) (b)
would mean that if the arbitral tribunal directs post-award interest to
be paid, then Section 31(7)(b) would be inapplicable. The corollary
is that even if the award directs that no post-award interest is to be
granted, clause (b) cannot be invoked. The observations in the
dissent are extracted below:
“ 81. […] The said clause uses the phrase “unless the award
otherwise directs”, which would mean that in the event the
Arbitral Tribunal, in its award, makes a provision for interest
to be imposed in this second stage as envisaged by subsection (7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act, clause (b) would
12
become inapplicable. By the said award, the Arbitral Tribunal
has the power to impose an interest for the post-award
period which may be higher or lower than the rate as
prescribed under clause (b). Even if the award states that no
interest shall be imposed in the post-award period, clause
(b) cannot be invoked.
82. If the arbitral award is silent on the question of whether
there would be any post-award interest, only in that situation
could clause (b) be made applicable. In the said situation, it
would be mandatory as per law that the award could carry
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the
award to the date of payment. The term used in the given
clause is “shall”, therefore, if applicable, the imposition of
interest as per clause (b) would be mandatory.”
13 The contention of the respondent is that Section 31(7)(b) could be invoked
only when the arbitration award is silent on post-award interest. That is, if the
award does not make a specific provision for post-award interest, then in view of
Section 31(7)(b) of the Act, post-award interest of eighteen percent shall be paid
on the ‘sum’, for which purpose the ‘sum’ shall be the aggregate of the principal
and pre-award interest. The argument of Mr Nakul Dewan is that the arbitral
tribunal has the discretion to determine- a) whether post-award interest should be
granted; b) the ‘sum’ on which the post-award interest is to be granted; and c) the
rate of such interest.
14 The interpretation of Section 31(7)(b) has to focus on the meaning of two
phrases - first, the expression “sum”; and second, “unless the award otherwise
directs”. The phrase ‘sum’ has been interpreted in the opinion of Justice Bobde
and in the concurring opinion of Justice Sapre in Hyder Consulting (supra) to
mean the amount directed to be paid by an arbitral award as arrived in Section
31(7)(a), which would include the aggregate of the principal and the pre-award
interest. While Justice Sapre was of the view that the arbitrator only has the
discretion to determine the rate of post-award interest, Justice Bobde did not
13
expressly discuss the ambit of discretion of the arbitrator while granting postaward interest. In Justice Bobde’s opinion, there was no discussion on whether
the arbitrator had the discretion to order post-award interest on a part of the ‘sum’
that was arrived under Section 31(7)(a).
15 On the interpretation of the words ‘unless the award otherwise directs’,
Justice Sapre interpreted them to mean that post-award interest is a statutory
mandate and that the arbitrator only has the discretion to determine the rate of
interest to be awarded. Justice Bobde did not specifically interpret the phrase
‘unless the award otherwise directs’. The learned Judge made a passing
reference to the phrase in paragraph 7 of the judgment, where he observed that
“In other words, what clause (b) of sub-Section (7) of Section 31 of the Act directs
is that the “sum”, which is directed to be paid by the award, whether inclusive or
exclusive of interest, shall carry interest at the rate of eighteen per cent per
annum for the post-award period, unless otherwise ordered.” However, in
paragraph 13 of the judgment, the learned Judge observed, “Thereupon the
Arbitral Tribunal may direct interest to be paid on such ‘sum’ for the post-award
period vide clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the Act, at which stage
the amount would be the sum arrived at after the merging of interest with the
principal; the two components having lost their separate identities.”
16 The use of the words ‘may direct interest to be made’ in paragraph 13 of
Justice Bobde’s opinion could be interpreted to mean either that the arbitrator has
the discretion to decide not to grant post-award interest or as recognising the
discretion of the arbitrator on whether to grant interest on the aggregate of the
principal and the pre-award interest. Nothing in the observations extracted above
14
limit the discretion of the arbitrator in awarding post-award interest. This
conclusion is further fortified by the issue framed in Hyder Consultancy (supra),
where the Court was to determine if the conclusion in SL Arora (supra) is correct
to the extent that it holds that post-award interest cannot be granted on the
aggregate of principal and pre-award interest. In the concluding paragraph of
Justice Bobde’s opinion , it has been observed that SL Arora (supra) was
wrongly decided:
“ 24. In the result, I am of the view that SL Arora case is
wrongly decided in that it holds that a sum directed to be
paid by an Arbitral Tribunal and the reference to the
award on the substantive claim does not refer to interest
pendent lite awarded on the “sum directed to be paid
upon award” and that in the absence of any provision of
interest upon interest in the contract the Arbitral Tribunal
does not have the power to award interest upon interest,
or compound interest either for the pre-award period or
for the post0award period. Parliament has the undoubted
power to legislate on the subject and provide that the
Arbitral Tribunal may award interest on the sum directed
to be paid by the award, meaning a sum inclusive of
principal sum adjudged and the interest, and this has
been done by Parliament in plain language.”
17 The decision in Hyder Consulting (supra) was on the limited issue of
whether post-award interest could be granted on the aggregate of the principal
and the pre-award interest. As noted above, the opinion authored by Justice
Bobde was limited to this aspect of post-award interest. It was in the concurring
opinion of Justice Sapre that it was held that the arbitrator only has the discretion
to determine the rate of post-award interest. Therefore, the issue of whether the
arbitrator could award post-award interest on a part of the aggregate sum was
not conclusively decided the opinions forming a part of the majority in Hyder
Consulting (supra).
15
18 The issue before us is whether the phrase ‘unless the award otherwise
directs’ in Section 31(7)(b) of the Act only provides the arbitrator the discretion to
determine the rate of interest or both the rate of interest and the ‘sum’ it must be
paid against. At this juncture, it is crucial to note that both clauses (a) and (b) are
qualified. While, clause (a) is qualified by the arbitration agreement, clause (b) is
qualified by the arbitration award. However, the placement of the phrases is
crucial to their interpretation. The words, “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”
occurs at the beginning of clause (a) qualifying the entire provision. However, in
clause (b), the words, “unless the award otherwise directs” occurs after the words
‘a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall’ and before the words ‘carry
interest at the rate of eighteen per cent”. Thereby, those words only qualify the
rate of post-award interest.
19 Section 31(7)(a) confers a wide discretion upon the arbitrator in regard to
the grant of pre-award interest. The arbitrator has the discretion to determine the
rate of reasonable interest, the sum on which the interest is to be paid, that is
whether on the whole or any part of the principal amount, and the period for
which payment of interest is to be made - whether it should be for the whole or
any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and
the date of the award. When a discretion has been conferred on the arbitrator in
regard to the grant of pre-award interest, it would be against the grain of statutory
interpretation to presuppose that the legislative intent was to reduce the
discretionary power of the arbitrator for the grant of post-award interest under
clause (b). Clause (b) only contemplates a situation where the arbitration award
16
is silent on post-award interest, in which event the award-holder is entitled to a
post-award interest of eighteen percent.
20 The arbitrator has the discretion to grant post-award interest. Clause (b)
does not fetter the discretion of the arbitrator to grant post-award interest. It only
contemplates a situation in which the discretion is not exercised by the arbitrator.
Therefore, the observations Hyder Consulting (supra) on the meaning of ‘sum’
will not restrict the discretion of the arbitrator to grant post-award interest. There
is nothing in the provision which restricts the discretion of the arbitrator for the
grant of post-award interest which the arbitrator otherwise holds inherent to their
authority.
21 The purpose of granting post-award interest is to ensure that the awarddebtor does not delay the payment of the award. With the proliferation of
arbitration, issues involving both high and low financial implications are referred
to arbitration. The arbitrator takes note of various factors such as the financial
standing of the award-debtor and the circumstances of the parties in dispute
before awarding interest. The discretion of the arbitrator can only be restricted by
an express provision to that effect. Clause (a) subjects the exercise of discretion
by the arbitrator on the grant of pre-award interest to the arbitral award. However,
there is no provision in the Act which restricts the exercise of discretion to grant
post-award interest by the arbitrator. The arbitrator must exercise the discretion in
good faith, must take into account relevant and not irrelevant considerations, and
must act reasonably and rationally taking cognizance of the surrounding
circumstances.
17
22 In view of the discussion above, we summarise our findings below:
(i) The judgment of the two-Judge Bench in SL Arora (supra) was referred
to a three-Judge Bench in Hyder Consulting (supra) on the question of
whether post-award interest could be granted on the aggregate of the
principal and the pre-award interest arrived at under Section 31(7)(a) of
the Act;
(ii) Justice Bobde’s opinion in Hyder Consulting (supra) held that the
arbitrator may grant post-award interest on the aggregate of the
principal and the pre-award interest. The opinion did not discuss the
issue of whether the arbitrator could use their discretion to award postaward interest on a part of the ‘sum’ awarded under Section 31(7)(a);
(iii) The phrase ‘unless the award otherwise directs’ in Section 31(7)(b) only
qualifies the rate of interest;
(iv) According to Section 31(7)(b), if the arbitrator does not grant postaward interest, the award holder is entitled to post-award interest at
eighteen percent;
(v) Section 31(7)(b) does not fetter or restrict the discretion that the
arbitrator holds in granting post-award interest. The arbitrator has the
discretion to award post-award interest on a part of the sum;
(vi) The arbitrator must exercise the discretionary power to grant postaward interest reasonably and in good faith, taking into account all
relevant circumstances; and
(vii) By the arbitral award dated 29 April 2013, a post-award interest of
eighteen percent was awarded on the principal amount in view of the
18
judgment of this Court in SL Arora (supra). In view of the above
discussion, the arbitrator has the discretion to award post-award
interest on a part of the ‘sum’; the ‘sum’ as interpreted in Hyder
Consulting (supra). Thus, the award of the arbitrator granting post
award interest on the principal amount does not suffer from an error
apparent.
23 For the reasons indicated above, the appeal against the judgment of the
Delhi High Court dated 26 February 2020 is dismissed.
24 All pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

 ……....….....….......………………........J.
 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
 .........….....….......………………........J.
 [AS Bopanna]
New Delhi;
September 01, 2022

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