Gopi @ Goverdhannath (d) by LRs. & Ors Versus Sri Ballabh Vyas
Gopi @ Goverdhannath (d) by LRs. & Ors Versus Sri Ballabh Vyas
Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022
(@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 27679 of 2018)
Gopi @ Goverdhannath (d) by LRs. & Ors. …Appellants
Versus
Sri Ballabh Vyas …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In this appeal by Special Leave the appellants
assail the judgment and order dated 10.07.2018 in Civil
Revision Petition No. 2752 of 2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana
and the State of Andhra Pradesh. It arises out of R.C.
No. 262 of 2008 brought by the respondent herein under
Section 10(2)(i), 10(2)(vi) and 10(3)(a) of the Andhra
Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
Act, 1960 (for short “the Act”), for the eviction of
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appellant Nos. 2 & 3 herein and the other respondents
therein, who are all the successors-in-interest of the
original tenant Shri Balraj, being his wife and
children, from the petition schedule property. The
petition schedule property is a Mulgi (small shop),
admeasuring 29 square yards, abutting main road of
Mangalhat, Hyderabad. They were sought to be evicted
on three-fold grounds viz., non-payment/default in
payment of rent, [(S.10(2)(i)], tenant’s denial of the
title of the landlord not being bonafide [(S.10(2)(vi)]
and landlord’s right to be put in the possession of
property for his own business use [(S.10(3)(a)].
3. As per the order in R.C. No.262 of 2008 dated
07.11.2015, it was allowed and the respondents therein
were directed to vacate the petition schedule property
and to handover its vacant physical possession to the
petitioner therein (the respondent herein) within 3
months from the date of the order. The unsuccessful
respondents therein took up the matter before the
Appellate Authority, viz., Court of Chief Judge, City
Small Causes Court at Hyderabad, as Rent Appeal No.57
of 2016. The Appellate Authority considered the grounds
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of attack and found them meritless and consequently,
dismissed the appeal. It is aggrieved by the same that
the stated Civil Revision Petition was filed before the
High Court, which ultimately culminated in the impugned
judgment.
4. As a matter of fact, pending the proceedings before
the rent controller, the wife and two sons of Late
Balraj, who were also arrayed as respondents along with
the appellant Nos.2 and 3 herein, died. Later, during
the pendency of the present SLP the original petitioner
No.1, the other son of Late Balraj also died and
subsequently, his legal heirs were brought on record
as petitioner Nos. 1.1 and 1.2. The proforma
respondents viz., respondents 2 to 4 were deleted from
the array of parties, at the instance of the
appellants, as per order dated 11.10.2015 passed in
I.A. No. 147594 of 2018. Thus, the present proceedings
are being pressed into and pursued by the original
petitioner Nos. 2 & 3 and the other petitioner Nos.1.1
and 1.2, who are the legal heirs of original petitioner
No.1, in the present SLP. Hence, hereinafter, in this
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appeal they would be referred to as ‘the appellants’
and the petitioner in R.C. No.262 of 2008, who is the
respondent in this appeal, would be referred to as ‘the
respondent’, unless otherwise mentioned specifically.
5. Succinctly stated the case of the respondent (the
petitioner in RC No. 262 of 2008) is as follows: -
The petition schedule property is a small shop
(Mulgi) bearing Municipal D. No. 14-1-22 as described
hereinbefore. One Smt. Phool Kumari was its owner. She
was the original landlord and late Shri Bhandari Balraj
(the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants) was the
tenant, of the said shop. In the year 1985, the father
of the respondent by name Vasudev Vyas purchased the
petition schedule property from the aforesaid Smt.
Phool Kumari in the name of the respondent Ballabh
Vyas, then a minor aged 10 years, under Ex.P-3
registered sale deed dated 27.06.1985. The pre-existing
tenancy created between late Sh. Balraj and the said
original landlord was oral in nature and the rent
initially fixed was enhanced from time to time. On
27.06.1985 itself Ext. P-1 rental deed was executed
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between Late Sh. Balraj and the respondent, represented
by his natural father and guardian Vasudev Vyas, on a
monthly rent of Rs.300/-per month exclusive of
municipal property tax and electricity charges. It was
enhanced from time to time and finally fixed at Rs.
2,000/-. The original tenant Shri Balraj died on
15.05.1996 and thereafter the tenancy was being
continued by his wife and children and the original
respondent No.1 was paying rent initially. But, they
failed to pay rent from May, 2006 to April, 2008.
Prior to the filing of R.C. No.262 of 2008, the
respondent issued Ex.P-4 legal notice dated 30.05.2008
requesting the tenants to pay the arrears of rent and
to vacate and handover vacant possession of the
petition schedule property. It was also stated therein
that he is unemployed and requires the petition
schedule property for running his own business. On its
receipt, the respondents therein caused Ex. P-5 reply
disputing the very title of the petitioner therein
(respondent herein) over the petition schedule
property. It is thereafter R.C. No. 262 of 2008 was
filed.
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6. Obviously, the stated R.C. was defended on a number
of grounds by the respondents therein viz., appellant
Nos. 2 & 3 herein and the predecessors-in-interest of
the other appellants herein, inter alia, contending
that they are the owners of the petition schedule
property. As a matter of fact, they have not only
denied the title of the respondent over it but also
claimed its title contending that late Shri Balraj had
purchased the petition schedule property as per a sale
deed executed in the year 1985. The case put forth on
their behalf before the rent controller was that one
Phool Kumari was the original owner of the petition
schedule property (Mulgi) and she had leased it out to
Shri Balraj, he had been the tenant from 1960 to 1985
and then, Phool Kumari offered to sell it to him and
late Shri Balraj purchased the same for a valid
consideration in the year 1985.
7. The further contentions of the respondents in R.C.
No. 262 of 2008 viz., the appellant Nos. 2 & 3 herein
and the predecessors-in-interest of the other
appellants were as follows: -
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“That late Shri Balraj obtained Rs.15,000/-
from Vasudev Vyas, the father of the
respondent, as loan for paying sale
consideration to Phool Kumari, that the
father of the respondent put forth a
condition for payment of loan and
accordingly, on his insistence sale deed
was registered in the name of the
respondent as security, though late Shri
Balraj had subsequently repaid the loan
amount of Rs.15,000/- the father of the
respondent had failed to return the
petition schedule property to late Shri
Balraj, and that in the year 2003 the said
Mulgi was dismantled and it was renovated
and therefore, in view of Section 32 (b) of
the Act its provisions are inapplicable.
Raising all such contentions the Rent
Control Petition was sought to be
dismissed. However, as noticed
hereinbefore, the Rent Controller allowed
R.C.No.262 of 2008. The appeal preferred
before the Court of Chief Judge, City Small
Causes Court at Hyderabad as Rent Appeal
No.57/2016 was dismissed and the Revision
filed against the same, viz., Civil
Revision Petition No.2752 of 2018 was then,
dismissed by the High Court as per the
impugned judgment.”
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8. On 11.10.2018, this Court issued notice and ordered
that the status quo, as on that date be maintained. As
per the order dated 12.1.2022, it was ordered thus:
“Needless to mention that it will be open
to the respondent landlord to urge of
questions including the dis-entitlement of
the heirs to claim any tenancy interest in
the property in question.”
9. Heard Mr. Abhijit Basu, learned counsel for the
appellants and also Mr. K. Parameshwar, learned counsel
for the respondent. Virtually, the learned counsel for
the parties reiterated the contentions raised before
the Courts below with some additional points. We will
refer to the rival contentions, a little later after
looking into the real scope of consideration of the
instant appeal.
10. There can be no doubt with respect to the scope of
an appeal under Section 136 of the Constitution of
India by special leave against the concurrent findings.
In such matters, re-appreciation of evidence is not the
normal rule and the power thereunder would be sparingly
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exercised where the findings are absolutely perverse.
A finding can be said to be perverse if it is founded
on no evidence to support the same or totally against
the weight of evidence. So also, it can be said to be
perverse if material evidence was missed out for
consideration or a totally irrelevant and immaterial
aspect formed the foundation for such a finding.
11. A four-Judge Bench of this Court considered the
scope of appeal under Section 136 of the Constitution
by special leave, against the concurrent findings in
Kurapati Venkata Mallayyaand Anr. v. Thondepu Ramaswami
And Co. & Anr.1 In paragraph 9 herein it was held:
“9. The first point urged before us by Mr.
Ranganadham Chetty on behalf of the
appellant firm is that the High Court, as
well as the Subordinate Judge were in error
in holding that the bales in question had
been purchased by the appellant firm from
the respondent firm. This, however, is a
question of fact and since the two courts
below have found against the appellant firm
on this point this Court would not
ordinarily interfere with such a finding.
1
(AIR 1964 SC 818)
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Mr. Ranganadham Chetty, however, contended
on the authority of the decision in
Bibhabati Devi V. Kumar Ramendra Narayan
Roy that the practice of the court in
appeals by special leave is not a cast iron
one and that it would, therefore, be open
to this Court to depart from it in an
appropriate case. The aforesaid decision
was referred to by this Court in Srinivas
Ram Kumar V. Mahabir Prasad and it was
pointed out that when the courts below have
given concurrent findings on pure questions
of fact, this Court would not ordinarily
interfere with them and review the evidence
for the third time unless there are
exceptional circumstances justifying a
departure from the normal practice.”
12. We do not find any reason to make a further survey
of the authorities on the said point as the same is the
view which is being followed consistently.
13. Now, we will revert to the case on hand. A scanning
of the rival pleadings would reveal the common
contention of the parties. They would reveal that Smt.
Phool Kumari was the original owner of the petition
schedule property (Mulgi) and she had leased it out to
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late Shri Balraj, the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellants. It is also the admitted case of the
appellants that Smt. Phool Kumari was the landlord and
late Shri Balraj had been paying rent to her. The
diversion in pleadings occurs thereafter. According to
the respondent, his father Vasudev Vyas purchased the
petition schedule property from Smt. Phool Kumari as
per Ext.P3 registered sale deed dated 27.6.1985 in his
name when he was a minor aged 10 years and according
to the appellants Shri Balraj, their predecessor-ininterest purchased it from Smt. Phool Kumari for a
valid consideration of Rs.15,000/-, in the year 1985.
14. Evidently, the respondents in R.C. No. 262 of 2008
viz., appellants 2 and 3 and the predecessors-ininterest of the other appellants not only denied the
title of the respondent but also claimed the title over
the petition schedule property (Mulgi) contending that
the same was purchased from Smt. Phool Kumari by late
Shri Balraj, their predecessor-in-interest in the year
1985 for a valid consideration. Late Shri Balraj
obtained Rs. 15,000/- from the father of the petitioner
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therein (the respondent in this appeal) for effecting
payment to Smt. Phool Kumari and only on the demand of
the petitioner’s father, the sale deed in respect of
the petition schedule property was got registered by
Shri Balraj in the name of the petitioner therein
(respondent in this appeal) as a security.
15. Based on the rival pleadings the Rent Controller
framed the following points for consideration: -
1.Whether the respondents malafidely denying
the title of the petitioner?
2.Whether this Court lacks inherent
jurisdiction?
3.Whether there is jural relationship?
4.Whether the respondents are liable for
eviction from the petition schedule
property?
5.To what relief?
16. Obviously, all the points were decided in favour
of the petitioner therein (the respondent herein) and
accordingly, the R.C. No.262 of 2008 was allowed.
Consequently, the respondents therein were directed to
vacate the petition schedule property and handover its
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vacant physical possession to the petitioner therein
(the respondent herein) within three months from the
date of the order. It is this order which was confirmed
concurrently by the Appellate Authority and the High
Court.
17. We have carefully scanned the order of the Rent
Controller and the judgments of the Appellate Authority
as also the High Court. The question is what is the
perversity that invites interference with the
concurrent findings. Since notice and status quo
ordered by this Court as per order dated 11.10.2018 was
followed by the order dated 12.01.2022 we will consider
that question in detail.
18. We have already referred to the pleadings of the
parties taken up before the Rent Controller. When the
petitioner (the respondent herein), as landlord,
claimed eviction on the ground of tenants’ denial of
his title over the petition schedule property and to
establish such denial as not being bonafide produced
its registered sale deed, whether the appellants and
their predecessors—in-interest could justify the
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denial merely by asserting that Shri Balraj, their
predecessor-in-interest, had purchased it for a valid
consideration of Rs.15,000/- in the year 1985, without
producing any supporting material(s) admissible in
evidence? Certainly, the answer can only be in the
negative. This is because in respect of the sale of
an immovable property, worth value which makes the sale
deed compulsorily registrable, the genuineness of the
denial of title cannot be decided based on presumptions
and oral assertations ignoring a valid registered
document. In the aforesaid context, it is only
worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Bombay High
Court in Mohanlal Sohanlal v. Pannalal Jankidas2 and
also Sections 9 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 (hereinafter for short, ‘the TP Act’) and Section
17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. In paragraph
17 of the decision in Mohanlal Sohanlal2 it was held:
“In my opinion this is a case in which what was
said by Lord Simonds in delivering the judgment of
the Judicial Committee in 49 Bom. L.R. 244 applies
with equal force (P.245):
2 AIR 1948 Bom 133
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Upon this apparently simple question oral
evidence voluminous and bewildering has been
given and their Lordships find themselves in
agreement with Chagla J. who in the Appeal
Court said: 'In a case where oral testimony
is of such an unreliable and untrustworthy
character, the safest policy would be to let
the documents speak for themselves.' This
does not mean that, when the question whether
a transaction is a sale or a mortgage, form
is to be preferred to substance. It is an
inviolable rule that upon such a question the
Court must find the substance behind the
form. But where the oral evidence is
unreliable and contradictory the Court cannot
safely depart from the smitten evidence of
the document.”
19. Section 9 of the TP Act states that a transfer of
property can be made without writing in every case in
which a writing is not expressly required by law. But
then, as per Section 54 of the TP Act, sale of immovable
property of a value of Rupees one hundred and upwards
can be made only under a registered instrument.
Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 speaks
of documents of which registration is compulsory. As
per Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) thereof non-
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testamentary instruments which purport or operate to
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether
in present or future, any right, title or interest,
whether vested or contingent, of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable
property, shall be compulsorily registered. In the
decision in Lachhman Dass v. Ram Lal & Anr.3 it was
held that the real purpose of the said Section is to
secure that every person dealing with the property,
where such documents require registration, may rely
with confidence upon statements contained in the
register as a full and complete account of all
transactions by which title may be affected.
20. In this case the oral evidence adduced by the
respondent is to the effect that his father had
purchased the petition schedule property from Smt.
Phool Kumari under Ext. P3, registered sale deed dated
27.06.1985, in his name when he was aged 10 years. Per
contra, on behalf of the appellants what is pleaded and
argued is that the petition schedule property was
purchased by their predecessors-in-interest, Shri
3
(1989) 3 SCC 99
Page 17 of 31
Balraj from the very same vendor viz., Smt. Phool
Kumari in the year 1985, for a valid consideration of
Rs. 15,000/-. It is in this context that Ext. P3 would
act as a sure and clear pointer to where the truth
lies.
21. Evidently, the respondent herein (the petitioner
in R.C. No. 262 of 2008) brought on record Ext. P3, a
registered sale deed executed in his favour in respect
of the petition schedule property. While considering
the question of evidence produced on behalf of the
appellants herein in the said proceedings it is
relevant to refer to the following recital from the
order of the Rent Controller:
“On careful perusal of the entire record, this
Tribunal could not find any document to show the title
of the respondent over the petition schedule property.
As such this Court has to infer that without any valid
document, the respondents are denying the ownership of
the petitioner in spite of that petitioner exhibited
Ext.P3 in his favour.” Obviously in the above extracted
recital the reference ‘the respondents’ was with
respect to the appellants 2 and 3 and the predecessors-
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in-interest of the other appellants in this appeal and
the reference “the petitioner” was with reference to
the respondent herein.
22. What is the evidence adduced by the respondents in
R.C. No.262 of 2008 to deny the title of the petitioner
therein (the respondent)? Juxtaposed with Ext. P3 sale
deed, whether the oral assertation of appellants 2 and
3 and the predecessors-in-interest of appellants 1.1
and 1.2 would be sufficient to outweigh Ext. P3 in the
matter of consideration of their bonafides behind
denial of the title of the respondent? The indisputable
and undisputed fact is that except the oral assertation
of purchase of the petition schedule property by Shri
Balraj not even a scrap of paper to support the same
was produced on behalf of the appellants, either before
the Rent Controller or before the Appellate Authority.
In this context, it is relevant to refer to the oral
testimony of late Bhandari Goverdhan Nath, who was the
first respondent in R.C. No.262 of 2008 and the
original first petitioner in the SLP from which this
appeal arises. During his cross-examination as RW1 he
would depose that there was no registered sale deed in
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favour of his father as relating to the petition
schedule property. Taking note of the amount of
‘consideration’ of the alleged sale, it is evident that
transfer/conveyance of the said immovable property
could have been effected legally and lawfully only
through a registered deed of conveyance. Thus, the
indisputable position obtained in this case is that the
respondent herein/the petitioner therein, had adduced
documentary evidence of outright purchase of the
petition schedule property under Ext. P3 registered
sale deed. On the other hand, on behalf of the
respondents therein no admissible evidence to outweigh
the same to establish their bonafides in the denial of
title of the respondent herein, was adduced. It is a
fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the
appellants herein filed O.S.No.1210 of 2008 before the
Court of Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad and the said
fact and also the factum of its dismissal as per Ext.R3
was brought out in evidence by RW1 as well, while being
in his examination-in-chief. In fact, the petitioner
therein/respondent herein has brought on record the
judgment in O.S. No.1210 of 2008, which document was
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brought on the side of the appellants also as Ext.R3,
and the decree passed thereon as Exts.P7 and P8.
Obviously, RW1 then deposed that as against Ext.R3 an
appeal was preferred as A.S. No.123 of 2014 and it is
pending on the files of the Court of Additional Chief
Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. It is not
inappropriate to state at this juncture that now in the
written submission filed on behalf of the appellants
it is stated that the said appeal was also dismissed
subsequently and in the second Appeal filed against it
notice before admission was ordered. The institution
and dismissal of the said original suit brought out in
evidence was considered by the Rent Controller Court
only to answer the point as to whether the respondent
was malafidely denying the title of the respondent
herein/the petitioner therein. After such
consideration based on the oral and documentary
evidence before it, the Rent Controller came to the
conclusion that the respondents therein were denying
the title of the respondent herein malafidely.
23. All these aspects were given due consideration by
the Appellate Authority as also by the High Court while
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considering the case of the appellants herein in their
respective jurisdiction. It is to be noted that even
before this Court the appellants got no case that their
predecessor-in-interest Shri Balraj purchased the
petition schedule property from Smt. Phool Kumari as
per a registered sale deed. In the light of the
indisputable position thus obtained and in view of
Ext.P3, which is a registered sale deed executed in
favour of the respondent herein/the petitioner therein
by none other than Smt. Phool Kumari on 27.6.1985, the
denial of the title of the respondent herein over the
petition schedule property by the respondents in R.C.
No.262 of 2008 and now, by the appellants herein can
only be taken as one sans bonafide. In other words,
it is malafide.
Curiously, the respondents in R.C. No.262 of 2008
had also canvassed the position that ‘the Act’ is not
applicable by virtue of the provision under Section 32
(b) thereof, before the stated proceedings. It was so
raised contending that the petition schedule property
(Mulgi) was dismantled and in its place a new building
was constructed. A careful scanning of the judgment of
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the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Authority and the
High Court would reveal that the tenability of the said
contention was carefully considered and rejected.
24. It is to be noted that the Rent Controller observed
that no evidence to establish the factum of dismantling
of the petition schedule property was produced and
proved before it. That apart, the Appellate Authority
observed that no document revealing obtainment of
necessary permission for demolition and construction
of the petition schedule property was brought on
evidence on behalf of the appellants. Obviously, the
appellants took up a contention that the petition
schedule property being a very small shop does not
require any such permission. At the same time, the
fact is that they had not brought out any provision
under any law in support of the said contention.
Explanation 1 to Section 32 (b) of the Act would reveal
that in order to hold that a building was substantially
renovated not less than 75 per cent of the premises was
to be built new in accordance with the criteria
prescribed for determining the extent of renovation.
No evidence to establish such requirement is available
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on record. According to us, the hollowness of the said
contention would be revealed if a reference is made to
the definition of the term “building” given under
Section 2 of the Act, which is an inclusive definition.
Going by its definition it takes in its fold any house
or hut or part of a house or hut. For the purposes of
the Act when a hut or even part of a hut falls within
the definition of building, in the absence of any
provision under any law supporting the said contention
of the appellants that the petition schedule property
being a small shop will not attract the provisions of
the Act, is only to be rejected. In fact, it was
rightly rejected by the Courts below.
25. Obviously, upon perusing Ext. R3 (Ext. P7) judgment
the Appellate Authority has also found that on the side
of the appellants herein adverse possession was also
raised in O.S. No.1210 of 2008 to establish the claim
of title. Consequently, the Appellate Authority made
an observation that the claim of the title based on the
sale deed and a contention based on adverse possession
could not co-exist, evidently, for the purpose of
considering the question whether the denial of title
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of the respondent herein was made malafidely. In this
context it is worthy to refer to a three-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Narasamma & Ors. v. A.
Krishnappa (Dead) Thr. LRs.
4 In the said decision it
is held that independent claim of title and adverse
possession simultaneously in respect of the same
property on the same date would amount to taking
contradictory pleas. It is also held therein that when
a plea of adverse possession is projected it is
inherent in the nature of it that someone else is the
owner of the property and therefore the plea on the
title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent
and the latter can begin to operate only when the former
is renounced. When once it is found that a plea of
adverse possession in its inherent nature projects that
someone, other than who took up the said contention is
the owner of the property concerned; when it is
indisputable that the case of the appellants and their
predecessors-in-interest is that their predecessor-ininterest late Sh. Balraj had purchased the petition
schedule property as per a registered deed in the year
4
(2020) 15 SCC 218
Page 25 of 31
1985 and when it is proved before the rent controller
that the said property was purchased in the name of the
petitioner therein viz., the respondent herein, then
aged only 10 years, by his father as per Ext. P3
registered sale deed dated 27.06.1985 we cannot find
fault with the Appellate Authority in taking into
account the factum of raising the plea of adverse
possession by the appellants and/or their predecessorsin-interest in O.S. No. 1210 of 2008 for the limited
purpose of looking into the question of malafides in
the denial of title of the respondent herein over the
petition schedule property. Indeed, it was so noted
to support and sustain the finding of the rent
controller that the respondents in R.C. No.262 of 2008
were denying the title of the respondent without
bonafides.
26. A reference to Section 101 of the Indian Evidence
Act will not be inapposite in the context of the
aforesaid contentions. Though, on behalf of the
appellants herein a consistent case, raised to resist
the case of the respondent herein based on Ext. P3
registered sale deed, is that late Shri Balraj
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purchased the petition schedule property in the year
1985 for a valid consideration of Rs.15,000/-, no
documentary evidence was produced before the Rent
Control Court, before the Appellate Court or even
before the High Court. It is to be noted that no such
document is produced even before this Court. Thus, it
is obvious that despite asserting a specific fact that
Shri Balraj had purchased the property as per sale deed
in the year 1985 the appellants and their predecessors
had failed to prove the same, though, in the light of
Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden was upon
them. The burden of proof is of importance where by
reason of not discharging the burden which was put upon
him, a party must eventually fail. (See the decision
in C. Abdul Shukoor v. Arji Papa Rao5).
The long and short of all aforesaid discussions is
that the concurrent findings of the courts below on the
issue that the title of the respondent was malafidely
denied by the appellants is the rightful conclusion on
appreciation of the facts and evidence obtained in this
5 AIR 1963 SC 1150
Page 27 of 31
case and is not infected with perversity. It calls for
no interference.
27. In the light of the finding on the issue whether
the respondents in R.C. No.262 of 2008 were malafidely
denying the title of the petitioner therein over the
petition schedule property, Section 109 of the Transfer
of Property Act would assume relevance in regard to the
right of the petitioner in R.C. No.262 of 2008 to seek
eviction of the respondents therein, from the petition
schedule property. Admittedly, the predecessor-ininterest of the appellants viz., late Shri Balraj, was
the tenant in respect of the petition schedule property
under its original owner Smt. Phool Kumari. A bare
perusal of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act
would reveal that if a landlord transfers the property
leased out or any part of it, the transferee, in the
absence of any contract to the contrary, shall possess
all the rights of the landlord. Hence, the impact of
Ext.P3, in the absence of any contract to the contrary,
is that the respondent herein has stepped into the
shoes of Smt. Phool Kumari. In terms of Section 109 of
the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that
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attornment by the lessee is not necessary for the
transfer of the property leased out to him. Thus, the
inevitable consequence of transfer of a leased-out
property by the landlord in accordance with law to a
third party, in the absence of a contract to the
contrary, is that the third party concerned would not
only become its owner having title but also would step
into the shoes of the vendor as the landlord in relation
to the lease holder at the relevant point of time. In
such circumstances, the findings of the courts below
that there exists jural relationship of landlord and
tenant between the respondent and the appellants can
only be held as the correct and lawful conclusion in
the light of the evidence on record based on the legal
position.
28. Now, we will move on to consider the next question
as to whether the direction for eviction of the
appellants from the petition schedule property calls
for interference on the ground of perversity in
finding. The Rent Controller, the Appellate Authority
and the High Court considered the question whether the
requirement of the respondent to get vacant possession
Page 29 of 31
of the petition schedule property is bonafide and
acceptable as a ground for eviction. The pleadings and
the evidence of the respondent herein as PW-1 is to the
effect that he is unemployed and requires the petition
schedule property for establishing his own business to
eke out his livelihood. Though, the respondent herein
was cross-examined nothing could be elicited to
establish that his requirement for personal occupation
for the aforesaid purpose is not genuine and that it
is only a ruse for evicting the appellants. So also,
nothing could be elicited to establish that the
respondent possesses other vacant premises of his own
to establish his business. RW1, who was the original
first petitioner in the SLP from which this appeal
arises, while being examined-in-chief in R.C. No. 262
of 2008 would say that he did not file any document to
show that the petitioner therein viz., the respondent
herein got other non-residential building(s) or mulgies
in Feelkhana. Nothing was brought to our attention
that would establish non-consideration of any material
or consideration of irrelevant material, to arrive at
the finding that the requirement to get vacant
Page 30 of 31
possession of the petition schedule property of the
respondent is malafide. In short, on a careful
scanning of the concurrent findings on all issues, as
above, we find no reason to hold that such findings are
infected with perversity or manifest injustice. In the
said case, this appeal must fail. Accordingly, it is
dismissed. No order as to costs.
29. Though, the appellants, by virtue of their denial
of title of the respondent do not really deserve grant
of time to vacate the petition schedule property, we
are inclined to grant two months’ time from the date
of the judgment to the appellants to handover vacant
possession of the petition schedule property to the
respondent, in the interest of justice. To get the
benefit of the extended time thus granted, the
appellants shall file the usual undertaking before this
court within a period of two weeks that they would give
vacant possession of the petition schedule property
without any demur to the respondent and also that they
would pay Rs. 3000/- to as monthly rent during the
extended period of two months.
Page 31 of 31
30. The appeal stands dismissed subject to the above.
All pending applications are disposed of.
................,J.
(Indira Banerjee)
................,J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
NEW DELHI;
September 22, 2022
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