M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES VERSUS SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS

M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES VERSUS SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED)  THR. LRS. AND OTHERS

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले



REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8904­8907 OF 2010
M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES           ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED) 
THR. LRS. AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. These   appeals   challenge   the   judgment   dated   3rd
March 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at   Chandigarh   in   Regular
Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207 of 2005, thereby allowing
the appeals filed by the respondents­defendants challenging
the   concurrent   judgments   and   decrees   dated   3rd  January
2001 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Faridabad (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”) in RBT
329/90/2000, and 8th February 2005 passed by the learned
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District   Judge,   Faridabad   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“Appellate Court”) in Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2001.  Vide the
impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge of the High
Court directed that, if the plaintiff desires to get the sale deed
executed pursuant to the agreement(s) to sell, he would do so
by   paying   the   present   prevalent   market   value   as   sale
consideration.   The appellant­plaintiff has also assailed the
order dated 10th  April 2008 passed by the learned Single
Judge   of   the   High   Court,   thereby   dismissing   the   review
applications being R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1206
of 2005 and R.A. No. 18­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1207 of
2005, filed by the appellant­plaintiff.
2. Facts in brief giving rise to the present appeals are
as under:
The   appellant­plaintiff   through   its   partner   Raj
Kumar, entered into an agreement to sell dated 29th October
1983 with the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4 with regard
to the suit property, which was situated in the revenue estate
of   Chak Salarpur, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad (U.P.), at
the rate of Rs. 2900/­ per Bigha.  Though the suit property
initially  was  in  the  State  of  U.P., vide  notification  of   the
2
Central Government dated 15th September 1983, it became a
part of the State of Haryana.  At the time of agreement to sell
dated 29th October 1983, earnest amount of Rs.50,000/­ was
paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants.
3. Due   to   a   dispute   between   the   State   of   U.P.   and
Haryana, the aforesaid sale deed could not be executed in
favour   of   the   appellant­plaintiff.     Therefore,   another
agreement to sell was executed between the parties on 23rd
August 1985.  At the time of execution of the said agreement,
an   additional   amount   of   Rs.1,00,000/­   was   paid   by   the
appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants.  It is not in
dispute that the total amount payable as per the terms of the
agreement   to   sell   dated   29th  October   1983   was   Rs.
1,65,000/­ out of which, an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was
duly received by the respondents­defendants on or before
23rd  August 1985.   As per the terms of the agreement(s) to
sell, the remaining sale price was to be paid before the SubRegistrar at the time of execution and registration of sale
deed.  It is not in dispute that the physical possession of the
suit property was also delivered to the appellant­plaintiff by
the respondents­defendants at the time of execution of the
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agreement(s)   to   sell.     It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   the
appellant­plaintiff is thereafter in continuous possession of
the suit property.
4. As  per   the  terms   of  the   agreement(s)  to   sell,  the
respondents­defendants were required to obtain Income­Tax
Clearance (for short “ITC”) Certificate and to also get the
revenue   records   mutated   to   show   them   as   the   owners
inasmuch   as   the   Central   Government   was   shown   as   the
owner mistakenly.  The agreement to sell further stipulated
that, in case of default by the respondents­defendants, the
appellant­plaintiff was at liberty to get the sale deed executed
and registered.
5. After   coming   to   know   that   the   respondentsdefendants   were   trying   to   create   3rd  party   rights,   the
appellant­plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance with
further   prayer   for   permanent   injunction   as   against   the
respondents­defendants.   The said suit was resisted by the
respondents­defendants   by   filing   their   written   statement.
The learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 3rd
January 2001 decreed the suit.   In an appeal filed by the
respondents­defendants, the learned Appellate Court upheld
4
the findings of the trial court vide judgment and decree dated
8
th February 2005.
6. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondents­defendants
filed   second   appeals   before   the   High   Court.     Vide   the
impugned judgment, the High Court reversed the concurrent
findings recorded by the trial court and the Appellate Court
and   passed   the   judgment   as   aforesaid.     Being   aggrieved
thereby,   the   present   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the
appellant­plaintiff.
7. We have heard Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant­plaintiff and Shri S.R.
Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents­defendants.
8. Shri Malhotra submitted that the High Court has
grossly   erred   in   interfering   with   the   concurrent   findings
passed   by   the   trial   court   and   the   Appellate   Court.     He
submitted that, since no substantial question of law arose for
consideration before the High Court, the appeals deserve to
be allowed on this short ground alone.   He relies on the
judgment   of  this   Court  in   the   case   of  Kondiba   Dagadu
5
Kadam   v.   Savitribai   Sopan   Gujar   and   Others1
  in this
regard.
9. Shri   Malhotra   further   submitted   that,   even
assuming that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the
Punjab   Courts   Act,   1918   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“Punjab   Act”)   it   is   not   necessary   to   frame   a   substantial
question of law, the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge
of   the   High   Court   would   still   be   circumscribed   by   the
provisions   of   Section   41   of   the   Punjab   Act   and   any
interference in second appeal would only be warranted if the
case falls within the limited area as earmarked in Section 41
of the Punjab Act.
10. He   further   submitted   that  the   respondentsdefendants have not entered into the witness box  and as
such, the case of the appellant­plaintiff on the basis of the
agreement(s) to sell has gone unchallenged.   He therefore
submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed and the
impugned judgments are liable to be quashed and set aside.
11. Shri Singh, on the contrary, submitted that the High
Court has rightly allowed the second appeals.  He submitted
1 (1999) 3 SCC 722
6
that, as per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, the sale
deed was to be registered only after the ITC Certificate was
obtained and the property was mutated in the name of the
respondents­defendants. He submitted that the respondentsdefendants   had   filed   a   suit   for   getting   the   suit   property
mutated in their names on 4th June 1986 and the said suit
came   to   be   decreed   only   on   22nd  December   2006.     It   is
therefore   submitted   that   the   suit   filed   by   the   appellantplaintiff on 17th October 1989 was premature.  
12. Shri Singh submitted that in view of the Punjab Act,
no substantial question of law was required to be framed.  He
relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Kulwant
Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) By LRs.
and Others2
.  The learned Senior Counsel further relies on
the judgments of this Court in the cases of  Kirodi  (since
deceased)   Through   His   Legal   Representatives   v.   Ram
Parkash and Others3
 and Satyender and Others v. Saroj
and   Others4
in support of this proposition.   Shri Singh,
further relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of
2 (2001) 4 SCC 262
3 (2019) 11 SCC 317
4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1026
7
Nirmala   Anand   v.   Advent   Corporation   (P)   Ltd.   and
Others5
, submitted that there is no reason to interfere with
the   direction   of   the   trial   court   which   directs   that   if   the
plaintiff desires to get the specific performance, the same
shall   be   done   at   the   prevalent   market   rate.     He   further
submitted  that   the  suit  itself  was  not  tenable  in   view  of
Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.  
13. Section 41 of the Punjab Act reads thus:
“41. Second appeals — (1) An appeal shall lie
to the High Court from every decree passed in
appeal by any Court subordinate to the High
Court on any of the following grounds, namely:
(a)   the   decision   being   contrary   to
law   or   to   some   custom   or   usage
having the force of law: 
(b)   the   decision   having   failed   to
determine   some   material   issue   of
law or custom or usage having the
force of law: 
(c) a substantial error or defect in
the procedure provided by the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908 [V of 1908],
or   by   any   other   law   for   the   time
being in force which may possibly
have produced error or defect in the
decision   of   the   case   upon   the
merits; 
[Explanation — A question relating
to   the   existence   or   validity   of   a
custom or usage shall be deemed to
5 (2002) 5 SCC 481
8
be   a   question   of   law   within   the
meaning of his section:] 
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from
an appellate decree passed ex parte.”
14. This Court, in the case of Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi
Pal   Singh   and   Others6
, after   considering   the   scope   of
interference under the old Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) and Section 41 of the Punjab
Act, has observed thus:
“15. A   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   judgments
would   show   that   the   jurisdiction   in   second
appeal is not to interfere with the findings of
fact on the ground that findings are erroneous,
however, gross or inexcusable the error may
seem   to   be.   The   findings   of   fact   will   also
include   the   findings   on   the   basis   of
documentary   evidence.   The   jurisdiction   to
interfere in the second appeal is only where
there is an error in law or procedure and not
merely an error on a question of fact.”
15. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that,
even when a court exercises jurisdiction under Section 41 of
the Punjab Act, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact in
second   appeal   on   the   ground   that   the   said   findings   are
erroneous,  howsoever  gross  or  inexcusable  the  error  may
6 (2019) 17 SCC 71
9
seem to be.  It has been held that the findings of fact would
also   include   the   findings   on   the   basis   of   documentary
evidence. The jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Punjab Act
would be available only when there is a substantial error or
defect in the procedure provided by the CPC or by any other
law for the time being in force.
16. A bench of three learned Judges of this Court, in a
recent   judgment   in   the   case   of  Satyender   and   Others
(supra), has observed thus:
“17. Be that as it may, though the requirement of
formulation of a substantial question of law was not
necessary,  yet  Section  41  of   the  Punjab  Courts
Act, requires that only such decisions are to be
considered in second appeal which are contrary
to   law  or  to   some  custom  or  usage  having  the
force   of   law   or   the   court   below  have   failed   to
determine some material issue of law or custom
or usage having the force of law. Therefore, what
is important is still a “question of law”. In other
words, second appeal is not a forum where court
has  to  re­examine  or  re­appreciate  questions  of
fact settled by the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court. The plaintiffs had claimed right over certain
agricultural land and their case was that they have
the right to be declared the owner of this property
and the possession be handed over to the them, for
the   reasons   that   on   this   particular   property
defendants and their predecessors­in­interest were
the tenants of the plaintiffs. Their case was that
defendant No. 2 was their tenant who had sub­let
the property in favour of his son, that is defendant
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No. 1 and therefore, the property should be reverted
back to the plaintiffs and they should be declared
the owner and should be given the possession of the
property as well. Both the Trial Court as well as the
First Appellate Court had held after evaluating the
evidence placed by the plaintiffs that the defendant
No. 2 and his brothers (who were not even made a
party   by   the   plaintiffs)   were   the   tenants   on   the
property and defendant No. 2 had not sub­let the
property in favour of his son that is defendant No. 1
and the revenue entries being made in this regard
in the year 1978 are wrong and without any basis
as there was no order of any revenue authority for
making such an entry. In short, the plaintiffs had
failed to prove their case as owner of the land in
dispute.   Hence   their   case   of   declaration   and
possession   was   dismissed.   The   Second   Appellate
Court however, quite erroneously, and without any
justification, gave an entirely new finding regarding
two Killa Nos. 21//3/2 and 7//13 on which the
plaintiffs   claimed   relief   of   declaration   and
possession, on the same grounds as raised by them
for the other Killa Nos. The pleadings also show that
the defendants had made a general denial of the
plaintiffs' claim for all the plots. Yet, the High Court
held that since the defendants had not made any
claim   for   plot   nos.   21//3/2   and   7//13   and
therefore   by   logic   a   decree   of   declaration   of
possession ought to have been given to the plaintiffs
for   these   plots!   This   reasoning   of   the   second
Appellate Court is erroneous for the simple reason
that the burden of proof was on the plaintiffs to
prove their case, which they had failed. They have
not been able to prove to the satisfaction of the Trial
Court as well as the First Appellate Court about
their claim of any kind over this property. Merely
because the defendant did not raise a counter claim
on this property it would not ipso facto mean that a
decree ought to have been granted in favour of the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have to prove their case on the
strength   of   their   evidence.   For   this   reason,   the
reasoning given by the Second Appellate Court for
11
decreeing   the   claim   of   the   plaintiff   for   plot   nos.
21//3/2 and 7//13 is incorrect and to that extent
is liable to be set aside.”
[emphasis supplied]
17. It would thus be clear that this Court has held that,
though   it   is   not   necessary   to   formulate   a   substantial
question   of  law,  the  jurisdiction  under  Section   41  of  the
Punjab   Act   would   permit   only   such   decisions   to   be
considered in second appeal which are contrary to law or to
some custom or usage having the force of law, or when the
courts below have failed to determine some material issue of
law or custom or usage having the force of law.  The Court
held that second appeal is not a forum where the court is to
re­examine or re­appreciate the question of fact settled by the
trial court or the Appellate Court.   It could thus clearly be
seen that though in view of Section 41 of the Punjab Act, it is
not necessary to frame a substantial question of law, the
jurisdiction of the High Court under second appeal cannot be
exercised for re­appreciation of evidence.  
18. A perusal of the plaint filed by the appellant­plaintiff
would   reveal   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   has   specifically
referred to the terms of the agreement(s) to sell.   He has
specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have
12
received   an   amount   of   Rs.1,50,000/­.   He   has   further
specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have
delivered the actual possession of the suit property to him.  It
is averred that after the respondents­defendants obtained the
requisite   ITC   Certificate   and   got   the   revenue   records
corrected,  they  were  required  to   serve  a   notice   upon   the
appellant­plaintiff informing him about the same having been
done.  After the receipt of such notice, the appellant­plaintiff
was required to make the balance payment and get the sale
deed executed.  The appellant­plaintiff was also given liberty
to use the suit property in any manner so as to plant trees,
raise construction, install tubewells etc.  It has been averred
in the plaint as under: 
“10.   That   all   the   defendants   have   been
admitting and acknowledging the plaintiff firm
to be in possession of the suit land and seeing
them   spending   huge   amount   over   it.   The
plaintiff   has   been   affecting   costly
improvements   over   the   suit   land   and   the
defendants have been seeing plaintiff spending
huge amount objected to it. They are estopped
from denying the fact by their acts, conduct,
omissions, laches and admissions. 
11. That the rates of the land in the dispute
have started rising and the defendants out of
sheer greed have threatened to take forcible
possession,   dispossess   the   plaintiff   and   to
interfere in the peaceful enjoyment of the suit
13
land by the plaintiff about a month ago. They
have also threatened to alienate the suit land
in favour of the third parties. They have also
refused   to   obtain   the   requisite   Income   Tax
Clearance certificate and to execute the sale
deed in favour of the plaintiff firm as agreed
upon   in   accordance   with   the   terms   of   the
agreement of sale dated 23.8.1985. 
12. That defendants No.1 to 4 were repeatedly
approached to execute the sale deed in favour
of the plaintiff in accordance with the terms of
the  agreement  of  sale  dated  23.8.1985. The
defendants   were   also   further   requested   to
desist from dispossessing the plaintiff, taking
forcible possession or otherwise interfering in
the peaceful enjoyment of the suit land by the
plaintiff.   However,   defendants   after
prevarication   for   some   time   have   finally
refused to accede to the reasonable, just and
legal request of the plaintiff about a week ago.
Hence this suit. 
13. That the plaintiff firm has all along been
ready and willing to perform its part of the
contract and is still ready and willing to do so.
It has all along got the requisite amount of
balance   sale   consideration   and   expense   etc.
with it. The defendants have thus committed
breaches of agreement of sale as per details
above with malafide intention. 
14. That cause of action arose about a month
ago and again about a week ago on the final
refusal of the defendants.”
19. It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   the   appellantplaintiff has specifically averred that due to the rising rate of
the suit property, the respondents­defendants, out of sheer
14
greed, had threatened to take forcible possession and also
threatened to alienate the suit property in favour of a 3rd
party.
20. In   the   written   statement,   the   respondentsdefendants   have   stated   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   had
obtained Power of Attorney from the respondents­defendants
and had undertaken to obtain the ITC Certificate.   It was
further stated by the respondents­defendants that they had
executed the Power of Attorney and one Mukhtar, an agent of
the appellant­plaintiff, was required to take all the requisite
steps to get the revenue records corrected.  It will be relevant
to refer to paragraph (11) of the written statement of the
respondents­defendants as under:
“11. In reply to Para No.11 it is denied that the
plaintiffs are in possession of the land in suit;
it is also denied that defendants Nos. l to 4
had to obtain the ITCC; it is also denied that
the   Plaintiff   had   the   financial   capability   to
purchase   the   land;  it   is   submitted   that
defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are in possession of
the   suit   land   as   owners   thereof   and   an
entitled to alienate the same if so desired.
It is also denied that the agreement to sell
dated 23.8.1985 is in force.”
[emphasis supplied]
15
21. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph would reveal
that   the   respondents­defendants   had   denied   that   the
appellant­plaintiff   was  in   possession   of  the   suit  property.
The respondents­defendants further asserted their right to
alienate the suit property, if they so desired.
22. The trial court, after perusal of the evidence, came to
a finding that the execution of the agreement(s) to sell was
admitted   by   the   respondents­defendants.     The   trial   court
further came to a specific finding of fact that the appellantplaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of
contract.   It found that, upon the respondents­defendants
complying   with   the   conditions   as   provided   in   the
agreement(s) to sell, they were required to issue a notice to
the appellant­plaintiff and after receipt of the said notice, the
sale consideration was required to be paid within 30 days
from receipt of the said notice.
23. In appeal, the learned Appellate Court affirmed the
findings of fact recorded by the trial court.  It held that the
execution   of   the   agreement   to   sell   (Ex.   PW1/3)   and   the
16
receipt of earnest money of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was not disputed.
It found that, as per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, it
was for the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4 to get the
revenue records corrected and they had also agreed to obtain
the ITC Certificate and to send a copy of the same to the
vendee.   The learned Appellate Court held that even oral
evidence to controvert these conditions incorporated in the
written statement cannot be led in view of Section 92 of the
Evidence   Act,   1872.     It   held   that   the   self­serving   oral
statement of Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7 was not sufficient to
controvert   the   terms   and   conditions   incorporated   in   the
agreement(s) to sell.  Insofar as the argument that the suit
for specific performance was filed without the correction of
revenue   records,   the   learned   Appellate   Court   found   that
since the respondents­defendants were intending to alienate
the suit property, the appellant­plaintiff was justified in filing
the suit.
24. The   learned   Appellate   Court   came   to   a   specific
finding that none of the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4,
who were signatories to the agreement, had entered into the
witness box.  Though Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7, who is the
17
husband of defendant No. 3, had appeared as a witness, the
Appellate Court found that he was not a good substitute for
defendants No. 1 to 4, who, being vendors, were the material
witnesses.     The   learned   Appellate   Court,   relying   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Vidhyadhar   v.
Manikrao   and   Another7
,   held   that   on   account   of   nonexamination   of   any   of   the   vendors,   an   adverse   inference
could be drawn against them.
25. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the
impugned   judgment,   has   held   that   the   appellant­plaintiff
could seek specific performance of the contract only after the
revenue   record   was   corrected.     It   held   that   the   suit   for
correction   of   the   revenue   record   was   filed   by   the
respondents­defendants on 4th June 1986 and the same was
decreed on 22nd December 2006.  It therefore held that the
suit of the appellant­plaintiff which was filed on 17th October
1989 was not tenable.   The learned Single Judge therefore
allowed the appeals and held that, in view of the judgment of
this Court in the case of  Nirmala   Anand  (supra), if the
7 (1999) 3 SCC 573
18
plaintiff desires to get the sale deed executed, he is required
to pay the present prevalent market rate of the suit property.
26. We find that the learned Single Judge of the High
Court has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of
fact recorded by the trial court as well as by the Appellate
Court.   The trial court as well as the Appellate Court had
specifically found on the basis of the evidence that, though
as per the terms and conditions of the agreement(s) to sell,
the sale deed was to be executed only after the respondentsdefendants obtained the ITC Certificate and got the revenue
records corrected, the appellant­plaintiff was compelled to file
the   suit   since   the   respondents­defendants   were   trying   to
alienate the suit property.
27. It is pertinent to note that the appellant­plaintiff has
specifically averred that, though the respondents­defendants
had neither obtained the ITC Certificate nor had the revenue
records corrected, they were threatening to dispossess him
and create 3rd  party rights over the suit property. In these
circumstances, the appellant­plaintiff was constrained to file
the   suit.   In   the   written   statement,   the   respondentsdefendants have specifically stated that they were entitled to
19
create   3rd  party   rights.     In   this   factual   situation,   the
concurrent findings of the trial court and the Appellate Court
that   the   appellant­plaintiff   was   justified   in   filing   the   suit
could not have been faulted with.
28. The respondents­defendants cannot be permitted to
blow hot and cold at the same time.   On one hand, they
contended that the suit could not have been filed without
getting the ITC Certificate and correction of revenue records,
whereas on the other hand, they assert their right to alienate
the suit property.
29. Shri Singh has heavily relied on the judgment of this
Court in the case of Kulwant Kaur and Others (supra).  No
doubt that where it is found that the findings of the trial
court and the Appellate Court are vitiated on wrong test and
on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly,
there is an element of perversity, the High Court will be
within its jurisdiction to deal with the same.  However, this
can be permitted only in the event where such a fact is
brought   to   light   by   the   High   Court   explicitly   and   the
judgment   should   also   be   categorical   as   to   the   issue   of
perversity vis­à­vis the concept of justice.
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30. In   the   present   case,   apart   from   there   being   no
perversity in the concurrent findings of fact, there is not even
an observation in the judgment of the High Court to that
effect. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High
Court also does not discuss the issue of perversity vis­à­vis
the concept of justice.   As such, the said judgment, in our
view, is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
31. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondentsdefendants on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Nirmala   Anand  (supra) is concerned, the said judgment,
rather   than   supporting   the   case   of   the   respondentsdefendants, would support the case of the appellant­plaintiff.
In the said case, the suit filed by the appellant was partly
decreed, thereby only awarding damages.   The same was
upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court.  The defence
of the defendant therein was with regard to impossibility of
performance of the agreement entered into by the appellant
with the respondents No. 1 and 2.   In the said case, this
Court found that the respondents­defendants could not be
solely blamed for delay inasmuch as the completion of the
building was dependent upon certain acts that were to be
21
done   by   the   Corporation   and   the   Government.     In   this
background, this Court directed an additional amount to be
paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants
to get the sale deed executed in her favour.
32. In the present case, it would be seen that out of an
agreed amount of Rs.1,65,000/­, the appellant­plaintiff has
already paid an amount of Rs.1,50,000/­ on or before 23rd
August 1985.  He was already put in possession at the time
of execution of the agreement(s) to sell.   The balance sale
consideration that was to be paid was only about 10% of the
total   agreed   amount.     Though   the   sale   deed   was   to   be
executed upon the respondents­defendants getting the ITC
Certificate and getting the revenue records corrected in the
year   1986,   in   view   of   their   greed   since   the   prices   were
escalating, the respondents­defendants had tried to create 3rd
party rights.  In these circumstances, the appellant­plaintiff
was required to file the suit.   The respondents­defendants
have also asserted in their written statement that they were
entitled to alienate the suit property.   Having accepted the
agreement(s) to sell and the receipt of an amount of Rs.
1,50,000/­ out of the total amount  of Rs.1,65,000/­, the
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respondents­defendants could not  have been  permitted to
take a contrary stand that on one hand, the suit could not be
filed before the ITC Certificate was obtained and the revenue
records were corrected, and on the other hand that they were
entitled to alienate the suit property.
33. We are of the considered view that the learned Single
Judge of the High Court has erred in interfering with the
concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the trial court and
the   Appellate   Court   upon   correct   appreciation   of
documentary as well as oral evidence.
34. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeals are allowed;
(ii) The judgment  3
rd  March 2008  passed by the High
Court in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207
of 2005 and order dated 10th  April 2008  passed by
the High Court in R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No.
1206 of 2005 and R.A. No. 18­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No.
1207 of 2005 are quashed and set aside; and
(iii) The judgments and decrees dated 3
rd January 2001
passed by the trial court in  RBT 329/90/2000 and
23
dated  8
th  February   2005  passed   by   the   Appellate
Court in Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2001 are upheld. 
35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of
in the above terms. No order as to costs.
…..….......................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
…….......................J.       
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 13, 2022.
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