M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES VERSUS SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS

M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES VERSUS SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED)  THR. LRS. AND OTHERS

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8904­8907 OF 2010

M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES           ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED) 

THR. LRS. AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. These   appeals   challenge   the   judgment   dated   3rd

March 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High

Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at   Chandigarh   in   Regular

Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207 of 2005, thereby allowing

the appeals filed by the respondents­defendants challenging

the   concurrent   judgments   and   decrees   dated   3rd  January

2001 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division),

Faridabad (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”) in RBT

329/90/2000, and 8th February 2005 passed by the learned

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District   Judge,   Faridabad   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the

“Appellate Court”) in Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2001.  Vide the

impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge of the High

Court directed that, if the plaintiff desires to get the sale deed

executed pursuant to the agreement(s) to sell, he would do so

by   paying   the   present   prevalent   market   value   as   sale

consideration.   The appellant­plaintiff has also assailed the

order dated 10th  April 2008 passed by the learned Single

Judge   of   the   High   Court,   thereby   dismissing   the   review

applications being R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1206

of 2005 and R.A. No. 18­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1207 of

2005, filed by the appellant­plaintiff.

2. Facts in brief giving rise to the present appeals are

as under:

The   appellant­plaintiff   through   its   partner   Raj

Kumar, entered into an agreement to sell dated 29th October

1983 with the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4 with regard

to the suit property, which was situated in the revenue estate

of   Chak Salarpur, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad (U.P.), at

the rate of Rs. 2900/­ per Bigha.  Though the suit property

initially  was  in  the  State  of  U.P., vide  notification  of   the

2

Central Government dated 15th September 1983, it became a

part of the State of Haryana.  At the time of agreement to sell

dated 29th October 1983, earnest amount of Rs.50,000/­ was

paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants.

3. Due   to   a   dispute   between   the   State   of   U.P.   and

Haryana, the aforesaid sale deed could not be executed in

favour   of   the   appellant­plaintiff.     Therefore,   another

agreement to sell was executed between the parties on 23rd

August 1985.  At the time of execution of the said agreement,

an   additional   amount   of   Rs.1,00,000/­   was   paid   by   the

appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants.  It is not in

dispute that the total amount payable as per the terms of the

agreement   to   sell   dated   29th  October   1983   was   Rs.

1,65,000/­ out of which, an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was

duly received by the respondents­defendants on or before

23rd  August 1985.   As per the terms of the agreement(s) to

sell, the remaining sale price was to be paid before the SubRegistrar at the time of execution and registration of sale

deed.  It is not in dispute that the physical possession of the

suit property was also delivered to the appellant­plaintiff by

the respondents­defendants at the time of execution of the

3

agreement(s)   to   sell.     It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   the

appellant­plaintiff is thereafter in continuous possession of

the suit property.

4. As  per   the  terms   of  the   agreement(s)  to   sell,  the

respondents­defendants were required to obtain Income­Tax

Clearance (for short “ITC”) Certificate and to also get the

revenue   records   mutated   to   show   them   as   the   owners

inasmuch   as   the   Central   Government   was   shown   as   the

owner mistakenly.  The agreement to sell further stipulated

that, in case of default by the respondents­defendants, the

appellant­plaintiff was at liberty to get the sale deed executed

and registered.

5. After   coming   to   know   that   the   respondentsdefendants   were   trying   to   create   3rd  party   rights,   the

appellant­plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance with

further   prayer   for   permanent   injunction   as   against   the

respondents­defendants.   The said suit was resisted by the

respondents­defendants   by   filing   their   written   statement.

The learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 3rd

January 2001 decreed the suit.   In an appeal filed by the

respondents­defendants, the learned Appellate Court upheld

4

the findings of the trial court vide judgment and decree dated

8

th February 2005.

6. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondents­defendants

filed   second   appeals   before   the   High   Court.     Vide   the

impugned judgment, the High Court reversed the concurrent

findings recorded by the trial court and the Appellate Court

and   passed   the   judgment   as   aforesaid.     Being   aggrieved

thereby,   the   present   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the

appellant­plaintiff.

7. We have heard Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant­plaintiff and Shri S.R.

Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents­defendants.

8. Shri Malhotra submitted that the High Court has

grossly   erred   in   interfering   with   the   concurrent   findings

passed   by   the   trial   court   and   the   Appellate   Court.     He

submitted that, since no substantial question of law arose for

consideration before the High Court, the appeals deserve to

be allowed on this short ground alone.   He relies on the

judgment   of  this   Court  in   the   case   of  Kondiba   Dagadu

5

Kadam   v.   Savitribai   Sopan   Gujar   and   Others1

  in this

regard.

9. Shri   Malhotra   further   submitted   that,   even

assuming that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the

Punjab   Courts   Act,   1918   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the

“Punjab   Act”)   it   is   not   necessary   to   frame   a   substantial

question of law, the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge

of   the   High   Court   would   still   be   circumscribed   by   the

provisions   of   Section   41   of   the   Punjab   Act   and   any

interference in second appeal would only be warranted if the

case falls within the limited area as earmarked in Section 41

of the Punjab Act.

10. He   further   submitted   that  the   respondentsdefendants have not entered into the witness box  and as

such, the case of the appellant­plaintiff on the basis of the

agreement(s) to sell has gone unchallenged.   He therefore

submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed and the

impugned judgments are liable to be quashed and set aside.

11. Shri Singh, on the contrary, submitted that the High

Court has rightly allowed the second appeals.  He submitted

1 (1999) 3 SCC 722

6

that, as per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, the sale

deed was to be registered only after the ITC Certificate was

obtained and the property was mutated in the name of the

respondents­defendants. He submitted that the respondentsdefendants   had   filed   a   suit   for   getting   the   suit   property

mutated in their names on 4th June 1986 and the said suit

came   to   be   decreed   only   on   22nd  December   2006.     It   is

therefore   submitted   that   the   suit   filed   by   the   appellantplaintiff on 17th October 1989 was premature.  

12. Shri Singh submitted that in view of the Punjab Act,

no substantial question of law was required to be framed.  He

relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Kulwant

Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) By LRs.

and Others2

.  The learned Senior Counsel further relies on

the judgments of this Court in the cases of  Kirodi  (since

deceased)   Through   His   Legal   Representatives   v.   Ram

Parkash and Others3

 and Satyender and Others v. Saroj

and   Others4

in support of this proposition.   Shri Singh,

further relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of

2 (2001) 4 SCC 262

3 (2019) 11 SCC 317

4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1026

7

Nirmala   Anand   v.   Advent   Corporation   (P)   Ltd.   and

Others5

, submitted that there is no reason to interfere with

the   direction   of   the   trial   court   which   directs   that   if   the

plaintiff desires to get the specific performance, the same

shall   be   done   at   the   prevalent   market   rate.     He   further

submitted  that   the  suit  itself  was  not  tenable  in   view  of

Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.  

13. Section 41 of the Punjab Act reads thus:

“41. Second appeals — (1) An appeal shall lie

to the High Court from every decree passed in

appeal by any Court subordinate to the High

Court on any of the following grounds, namely:

(a)   the   decision   being   contrary   to

law   or   to   some   custom   or   usage

having the force of law: 

(b)   the   decision   having   failed   to

determine   some   material   issue   of

law or custom or usage having the

force of law: 

(c) a substantial error or defect in

the procedure provided by the Code

of Civil Procedure 1908 [V of 1908],

or   by   any   other   law   for   the   time

being in force which may possibly

have produced error or defect in the

decision   of   the   case   upon   the

merits; 

[Explanation — A question relating

to   the   existence   or   validity   of   a

custom or usage shall be deemed to

5 (2002) 5 SCC 481

8

be   a   question   of   law   within   the

meaning of his section:] 

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from

an appellate decree passed ex parte.”

14. This Court, in the case of Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi

Pal   Singh   and   Others6

, after   considering   the   scope   of

interference under the old Section 100 of the Civil Procedure

Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) and Section 41 of the Punjab

Act, has observed thus:

“15. A   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   judgments

would   show   that   the   jurisdiction   in   second

appeal is not to interfere with the findings of

fact on the ground that findings are erroneous,

however, gross or inexcusable the error may

seem   to   be.   The   findings   of   fact   will   also

include   the   findings   on   the   basis   of

documentary   evidence.   The   jurisdiction   to

interfere in the second appeal is only where

there is an error in law or procedure and not

merely an error on a question of fact.”

15. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that,

even when a court exercises jurisdiction under Section 41 of

the Punjab Act, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact in

second   appeal   on   the   ground   that   the   said   findings   are

erroneous,  howsoever  gross  or  inexcusable  the  error  may

6 (2019) 17 SCC 71

9

seem to be.  It has been held that the findings of fact would

also   include   the   findings   on   the   basis   of   documentary

evidence. The jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Punjab Act

would be available only when there is a substantial error or

defect in the procedure provided by the CPC or by any other

law for the time being in force.

16. A bench of three learned Judges of this Court, in a

recent   judgment   in   the   case   of  Satyender   and   Others

(supra), has observed thus:

“17. Be that as it may, though the requirement of

formulation of a substantial question of law was not

necessary,  yet  Section  41  of   the  Punjab  Courts

Act, requires that only such decisions are to be

considered in second appeal which are contrary

to   law  or  to   some  custom  or  usage  having  the

force   of   law   or   the   court   below  have   failed   to

determine some material issue of law or custom

or usage having the force of law. Therefore, what

is important is still a “question of law”. In other

words, second appeal is not a forum where court

has  to  re­examine  or  re­appreciate  questions  of

fact settled by the Trial Court and the Appellate

Court. The plaintiffs had claimed right over certain

agricultural land and their case was that they have

the right to be declared the owner of this property

and the possession be handed over to the them, for

the   reasons   that   on   this   particular   property

defendants and their predecessors­in­interest were

the tenants of the plaintiffs. Their case was that

defendant No. 2 was their tenant who had sub­let

the property in favour of his son, that is defendant

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No. 1 and therefore, the property should be reverted

back to the plaintiffs and they should be declared

the owner and should be given the possession of the

property as well. Both the Trial Court as well as the

First Appellate Court had held after evaluating the

evidence placed by the plaintiffs that the defendant

No. 2 and his brothers (who were not even made a

party   by   the   plaintiffs)   were   the   tenants   on   the

property and defendant No. 2 had not sub­let the

property in favour of his son that is defendant No. 1

and the revenue entries being made in this regard

in the year 1978 are wrong and without any basis

as there was no order of any revenue authority for

making such an entry. In short, the plaintiffs had

failed to prove their case as owner of the land in

dispute.   Hence   their   case   of   declaration   and

possession   was   dismissed.   The   Second   Appellate

Court however, quite erroneously, and without any

justification, gave an entirely new finding regarding

two Killa Nos. 21//3/2 and 7//13 on which the

plaintiffs   claimed   relief   of   declaration   and

possession, on the same grounds as raised by them

for the other Killa Nos. The pleadings also show that

the defendants had made a general denial of the

plaintiffs' claim for all the plots. Yet, the High Court

held that since the defendants had not made any

claim   for   plot   nos.   21//3/2   and   7//13   and

therefore   by   logic   a   decree   of   declaration   of

possession ought to have been given to the plaintiffs

for   these   plots!   This   reasoning   of   the   second

Appellate Court is erroneous for the simple reason

that the burden of proof was on the plaintiffs to

prove their case, which they had failed. They have

not been able to prove to the satisfaction of the Trial

Court as well as the First Appellate Court about

their claim of any kind over this property. Merely

because the defendant did not raise a counter claim

on this property it would not ipso facto mean that a

decree ought to have been granted in favour of the

plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have to prove their case on the

strength   of   their   evidence.   For   this   reason,   the

reasoning given by the Second Appellate Court for

11

decreeing   the   claim   of   the   plaintiff   for   plot   nos.

21//3/2 and 7//13 is incorrect and to that extent

is liable to be set aside.”

[emphasis supplied]

17. It would thus be clear that this Court has held that,

though   it   is   not   necessary   to   formulate   a   substantial

question   of  law,  the  jurisdiction  under  Section   41  of  the

Punjab   Act   would   permit   only   such   decisions   to   be

considered in second appeal which are contrary to law or to

some custom or usage having the force of law, or when the

courts below have failed to determine some material issue of

law or custom or usage having the force of law.  The Court

held that second appeal is not a forum where the court is to

re­examine or re­appreciate the question of fact settled by the

trial court or the Appellate Court.   It could thus clearly be

seen that though in view of Section 41 of the Punjab Act, it is

not necessary to frame a substantial question of law, the

jurisdiction of the High Court under second appeal cannot be

exercised for re­appreciation of evidence.  

18. A perusal of the plaint filed by the appellant­plaintiff

would   reveal   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   has   specifically

referred to the terms of the agreement(s) to sell.   He has

specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have

12

received   an   amount   of   Rs.1,50,000/­.   He   has   further

specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have

delivered the actual possession of the suit property to him.  It

is averred that after the respondents­defendants obtained the

requisite   ITC   Certificate   and   got   the   revenue   records

corrected,  they  were  required  to   serve  a   notice   upon   the

appellant­plaintiff informing him about the same having been

done.  After the receipt of such notice, the appellant­plaintiff

was required to make the balance payment and get the sale

deed executed.  The appellant­plaintiff was also given liberty

to use the suit property in any manner so as to plant trees,

raise construction, install tubewells etc.  It has been averred

in the plaint as under: 

“10.   That   all   the   defendants   have   been

admitting and acknowledging the plaintiff firm

to be in possession of the suit land and seeing

them   spending   huge   amount   over   it.   The

plaintiff   has   been   affecting   costly

improvements   over   the   suit   land   and   the

defendants have been seeing plaintiff spending

huge amount objected to it. They are estopped

from denying the fact by their acts, conduct,

omissions, laches and admissions. 

11. That the rates of the land in the dispute

have started rising and the defendants out of

sheer greed have threatened to take forcible

possession,   dispossess   the   plaintiff   and   to

interfere in the peaceful enjoyment of the suit

13

land by the plaintiff about a month ago. They

have also threatened to alienate the suit land

in favour of the third parties. They have also

refused   to   obtain   the   requisite   Income   Tax

Clearance certificate and to execute the sale

deed in favour of the plaintiff firm as agreed

upon   in   accordance   with   the   terms   of   the

agreement of sale dated 23.8.1985. 

12. That defendants No.1 to 4 were repeatedly

approached to execute the sale deed in favour

of the plaintiff in accordance with the terms of

the  agreement  of  sale  dated  23.8.1985. The

defendants   were   also   further   requested   to

desist from dispossessing the plaintiff, taking

forcible possession or otherwise interfering in

the peaceful enjoyment of the suit land by the

plaintiff.   However,   defendants   after

prevarication   for   some   time   have   finally

refused to accede to the reasonable, just and

legal request of the plaintiff about a week ago.

Hence this suit. 

13. That the plaintiff firm has all along been

ready and willing to perform its part of the

contract and is still ready and willing to do so.

It has all along got the requisite amount of

balance   sale   consideration   and   expense   etc.

with it. The defendants have thus committed

breaches of agreement of sale as per details

above with malafide intention. 

14. That cause of action arose about a month

ago and again about a week ago on the final

refusal of the defendants.”

19. It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   the   appellantplaintiff has specifically averred that due to the rising rate of

the suit property, the respondents­defendants, out of sheer

14

greed, had threatened to take forcible possession and also

threatened to alienate the suit property in favour of a 3rd

party.

20. In   the   written   statement,   the   respondentsdefendants   have   stated   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   had

obtained Power of Attorney from the respondents­defendants

and had undertaken to obtain the ITC Certificate.   It was

further stated by the respondents­defendants that they had

executed the Power of Attorney and one Mukhtar, an agent of

the appellant­plaintiff, was required to take all the requisite

steps to get the revenue records corrected.  It will be relevant

to refer to paragraph (11) of the written statement of the

respondents­defendants as under:

“11. In reply to Para No.11 it is denied that the

plaintiffs are in possession of the land in suit;

it is also denied that defendants Nos. l to 4

had to obtain the ITCC; it is also denied that

the   Plaintiff   had   the   financial   capability   to

purchase   the   land;  it   is   submitted   that

defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are in possession of

the   suit   land   as   owners   thereof   and   an

entitled to alienate the same if so desired.

It is also denied that the agreement to sell

dated 23.8.1985 is in force.”

[emphasis supplied]

15

21. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph would reveal

that   the   respondents­defendants   had   denied   that   the

appellant­plaintiff   was  in   possession   of  the   suit  property.

The respondents­defendants further asserted their right to

alienate the suit property, if they so desired.

22. The trial court, after perusal of the evidence, came to

a finding that the execution of the agreement(s) to sell was

admitted   by   the   respondents­defendants.     The   trial   court

further came to a specific finding of fact that the appellantplaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of

contract.   It found that, upon the respondents­defendants

complying   with   the   conditions   as   provided   in   the

agreement(s) to sell, they were required to issue a notice to

the appellant­plaintiff and after receipt of the said notice, the

sale consideration was required to be paid within 30 days

from receipt of the said notice.

23. In appeal, the learned Appellate Court affirmed the

findings of fact recorded by the trial court.  It held that the

execution   of   the   agreement   to   sell   (Ex.   PW1/3)   and   the

16

receipt of earnest money of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was not disputed.

It found that, as per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, it

was for the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4 to get the

revenue records corrected and they had also agreed to obtain

the ITC Certificate and to send a copy of the same to the

vendee.   The learned Appellate Court held that even oral

evidence to controvert these conditions incorporated in the

written statement cannot be led in view of Section 92 of the

Evidence   Act,   1872.     It   held   that   the   self­serving   oral

statement of Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7 was not sufficient to

controvert   the   terms   and   conditions   incorporated   in   the

agreement(s) to sell.  Insofar as the argument that the suit

for specific performance was filed without the correction of

revenue   records,   the   learned   Appellate   Court   found   that

since the respondents­defendants were intending to alienate

the suit property, the appellant­plaintiff was justified in filing

the suit.

24. The   learned   Appellate   Court   came   to   a   specific

finding that none of the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4,

who were signatories to the agreement, had entered into the

witness box.  Though Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7, who is the

17

husband of defendant No. 3, had appeared as a witness, the

Appellate Court found that he was not a good substitute for

defendants No. 1 to 4, who, being vendors, were the material

witnesses.     The   learned   Appellate   Court,   relying   on   the

judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Vidhyadhar   v.

Manikrao   and   Another7

,   held   that   on   account   of   nonexamination   of   any   of   the   vendors,   an   adverse   inference

could be drawn against them.

25. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the

impugned   judgment,   has   held   that   the   appellant­plaintiff

could seek specific performance of the contract only after the

revenue   record   was   corrected.     It   held   that   the   suit   for

correction   of   the   revenue   record   was   filed   by   the

respondents­defendants on 4th June 1986 and the same was

decreed on 22nd December 2006.  It therefore held that the

suit of the appellant­plaintiff which was filed on 17th October

1989 was not tenable.   The learned Single Judge therefore

allowed the appeals and held that, in view of the judgment of

this Court in the case of  Nirmala   Anand  (supra), if the

7 (1999) 3 SCC 573

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plaintiff desires to get the sale deed executed, he is required

to pay the present prevalent market rate of the suit property.

26. We find that the learned Single Judge of the High

Court has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of

fact recorded by the trial court as well as by the Appellate

Court.   The trial court as well as the Appellate Court had

specifically found on the basis of the evidence that, though

as per the terms and conditions of the agreement(s) to sell,

the sale deed was to be executed only after the respondentsdefendants obtained the ITC Certificate and got the revenue

records corrected, the appellant­plaintiff was compelled to file

the   suit   since   the   respondents­defendants   were   trying   to

alienate the suit property.

27. It is pertinent to note that the appellant­plaintiff has

specifically averred that, though the respondents­defendants

had neither obtained the ITC Certificate nor had the revenue

records corrected, they were threatening to dispossess him

and create 3rd  party rights over the suit property. In these

circumstances, the appellant­plaintiff was constrained to file

the   suit.   In   the   written   statement,   the   respondentsdefendants have specifically stated that they were entitled to

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create   3rd  party   rights.     In   this   factual   situation,   the

concurrent findings of the trial court and the Appellate Court

that   the   appellant­plaintiff   was   justified   in   filing   the   suit

could not have been faulted with.

28. The respondents­defendants cannot be permitted to

blow hot and cold at the same time.   On one hand, they

contended that the suit could not have been filed without

getting the ITC Certificate and correction of revenue records,

whereas on the other hand, they assert their right to alienate

the suit property.

29. Shri Singh has heavily relied on the judgment of this

Court in the case of Kulwant Kaur and Others (supra).  No

doubt that where it is found that the findings of the trial

court and the Appellate Court are vitiated on wrong test and

on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly,

there is an element of perversity, the High Court will be

within its jurisdiction to deal with the same.  However, this

can be permitted only in the event where such a fact is

brought   to   light   by   the   High   Court   explicitly   and   the

judgment   should   also   be   categorical   as   to   the   issue   of

perversity vis­à­vis the concept of justice.

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30. In   the   present   case,   apart   from   there   being   no

perversity in the concurrent findings of fact, there is not even

an observation in the judgment of the High Court to that

effect. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High

Court also does not discuss the issue of perversity vis­à­vis

the concept of justice.   As such, the said judgment, in our

view, is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

31. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondentsdefendants on the judgment of this Court in the case of

Nirmala   Anand  (supra) is concerned, the said judgment,

rather   than   supporting   the   case   of   the   respondentsdefendants, would support the case of the appellant­plaintiff.

In the said case, the suit filed by the appellant was partly

decreed, thereby only awarding damages.   The same was

upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court.  The defence

of the defendant therein was with regard to impossibility of

performance of the agreement entered into by the appellant

with the respondents No. 1 and 2.   In the said case, this

Court found that the respondents­defendants could not be

solely blamed for delay inasmuch as the completion of the

building was dependent upon certain acts that were to be

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done   by   the   Corporation   and   the   Government.     In   this

background, this Court directed an additional amount to be

paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants

to get the sale deed executed in her favour.

32. In the present case, it would be seen that out of an

agreed amount of Rs.1,65,000/­, the appellant­plaintiff has

already paid an amount of Rs.1,50,000/­ on or before 23rd

August 1985.  He was already put in possession at the time

of execution of the agreement(s) to sell.   The balance sale

consideration that was to be paid was only about 10% of the

total   agreed   amount.     Though   the   sale   deed   was   to   be

executed upon the respondents­defendants getting the ITC

Certificate and getting the revenue records corrected in the

year   1986,   in   view   of   their   greed   since   the   prices   were

escalating, the respondents­defendants had tried to create 3rd

party rights.  In these circumstances, the appellant­plaintiff

was required to file the suit.   The respondents­defendants

have also asserted in their written statement that they were

entitled to alienate the suit property.   Having accepted the

agreement(s) to sell and the receipt of an amount of Rs.

1,50,000/­ out of the total amount  of Rs.1,65,000/­, the

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respondents­defendants could not  have been  permitted to

take a contrary stand that on one hand, the suit could not be

filed before the ITC Certificate was obtained and the revenue

records were corrected, and on the other hand that they were

entitled to alienate the suit property.

33. We are of the considered view that the learned Single

Judge of the High Court has erred in interfering with the

concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the trial court and

the   Appellate   Court   upon   correct   appreciation   of

documentary as well as oral evidence.

34. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeals are allowed;

(ii) The judgment  3

rd  March 2008  passed by the High

Court in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207

of 2005 and order dated 10th  April 2008  passed by

the High Court in R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No.

1206 of 2005 and R.A. No. 18­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No.

1207 of 2005 are quashed and set aside; and

(iii) The judgments and decrees dated 3

rd January 2001

passed by the trial court in  RBT 329/90/2000 and

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dated  8

th  February   2005  passed   by   the   Appellate

Court in Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2001 are upheld. 

35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of

in the above terms. No order as to costs.

…..….......................J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

…….......................J.       

[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 13, 2022.

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