GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. VERSUS THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7759-7760 OF 2014

GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7761 OF 2014

SRI UDASIN MUTT .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1. The challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014 is to an order

dated 7.3.2013 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ

Petition No. 31893 of 2011 whereby the appellant herein i.e., Gulf

Oil Corporation Limited1

was ordered to be evicted under the

1 For short, the ‘Lessee’

provisions of The Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious

Institutions and Endowments Act, 19872

. The lessee claimed

leasehold rights on the land admeasuring 540 acres and 30 guntas

situated at village Kukatpally, Hyderabad.

2. Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014 has been preferred by Sri Udasin

Mutt3

, the lessor of the said land, arising out of Writ Petition No.

8005 of 2012. The said writ petition was decided along with the writ

petition filed by the lessee. The Mutt has claimed mesne profits in

terms of Section 83(6) of the 1987 Act. However, the writ petition

was disposed of with a direction to consider the request of the

lessee under Rule 15 of the Telangana Charitable and Hindu

Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable Properties and

other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases and Licenses

Rules, 20034

, published vide Government Order Memo No. 866

dated 8.8.2003.

3. The dry soil land measuring more than 540 acres and 30 guntas was

granted as inam land by the Nizam of Hyderabad to the Mutt

somewhere in the year 1873. The Mutt entered into an agreement

of lease with M/s Indian Detonators, predecessor of the lessee, on

23.07.1964 in respect of 143 acres of inam lands, bearing survey

no. 1010/8 to 1010/10. The lessee, claiming to be the successor-ininterest of M/s Indian Detonators, relies on the permission said to be

granted by the Government to enter into lease of the inam land on

2 For short, the ‘1987 Act’

3 For short the ‘Lessor’ or ‘Mutt’

4 For short, the ‘2003 Rules’

24.02.1964.

4. The lessor thereafter entered into an agreement with M/s Indian

Detonators on 14.9.1966 to take on lease 257 acres and 19 guntas

of the inam land. The supplementary lease deed dated 21.03.1969

was also executed for an area of 2 acres and 32 guntas of land.

5. The Commissioner, Endowments Department communicated to the

Secretary to Government, Revenue (Endowments) Department on

29.4.1975 to sanction proposed long lease of 99 years of 137 Acres

19 guntas of the land. It was also communicated that since the

lease was exceeding 6 years, therefore, sanction of the Government

is necessary under Section 70 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and

Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 19665

. Section 70 of

the 1966 Act reads thus:

“70. Lease, sale, etc., of inams to be void in certain cases:-

(1) Any lease for a term exceeding six years and any gift,

sale, exchange or mortgage of an inam land granted

for the support or maintenance of a charitable or

religious institution or endowment or for the

performance of a religious or public charity or service,

shall be null and void unless any such transaction, not

being a gift, is effected with the prior sanction of the

Government.

(2) Such prior sanction may be accorded by the

Government where they consider that the transaction

is-

(i) necessary or beneficial to the institution or

endowment;

(ii) consistent with the objects of the institution or

endowment and;

(iii) the consideration thereof is reasonable and

proper.

5 For short, the ‘1966 Act’

(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any

inam land in the Andhra Area of the State.”

6. It was on 10.05.1976, the Government of Andhra Pradesh accorded

sanction for lease of land measuring 137 acres and 19 guntas to

M/s. Indian Detonators Limited. Subsequently, on 20.04.1978, the

lessor entered into another lease deed with M/s Indian Detonators

Limited for a period of 99 years for land measuring 137 acres 19

guntas.

7. A perusal of the lease deed dated 23.07.1964 in respect of 143

acres and the lease deed dated 14.09.1966 in respect of 257 acres

and 19 guntas of land specifically mention that the lease are of

inam land. A summary of the various lease deeds executed by the

lessor are produced hereinunder:

Sl.

No.

Lessor Lessees Document No.

& Date

Sy. No. Extent

1 Mahant

Baba Seva

Das

M/s Indian

Detonator

s Limited

366

23.7.1964

1010/8 to

1010/10

1010/11 (p)

1010/12 to

1010/15

1024, 1026

143-00

2 -do- -do- 889

14.09.1966

1010/1 to

1010/7

1026, 1024,

1029, 1030,

1038, 1039,

1010, 1041

257-19

3 Udasin Mutt

Mahant

Baba Gynan

Das Ji

M/s Indian

Detonators

Limited

Supplementary

lease deed

21.3.1969

1010/11 2-32

4 Mahant

Baba Dynan

Das Chela

of Mahant

Puran Das

M/s I.D.L.

Chemical

Ltd

1817/75

28.9.19

1028, 1036,

1037, 1042,

1066, 1067,

1068, 1069 and

1070

137-19

Total 540.30

8. The 1987 Act came into force on 21.04.1987, repealing the 1966

Act. Section 82 of the 1987 Act has a non-obstante clause so as to

override and cancel any lease of agricultural land other than lease

to a landless poor person. Section 82 of the 1987 Act reads thus:

“82. Lease of Agricultural Lands:-

(1) Any lease of agricultural land belonging to or given or

endowed for the purpose of any institution or

endowment subsisting on the date of commencement

of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything in any other

law for the time being in force, held by a person who is

not a landless poor person stands cancelled.

(2) xxx xxx xxx

(3) The authority to sanction the lease or licence in

respect of any property or any right or interest thereon

belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of

any charitable or religious institution or endowment,

the manner in which and the period for which such

lease or licence shall be such as may be prescribed.

(4) Every lease or licence of any immovable property,

other than the Agricultural land belonging to, or given

or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or

religious institution or endowment subsisting on the

date of the commencement of this Act, shall continue

to be in force subject to the rules as may be prescribed

under sub-section (3).

(5) 6

[The provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area)

Tenancy Act, 1956 (Act XVIII of 1956) and the Andhra

Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural

Lands Act, 1950 (Act XXI of 1950) shall not apply to

any lease of land belonging to or given or endowed for

the purpose of any charitable or religious institutions or

endowment as defined in this Act.]”

9. The Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Bill (Bill No. XVIII of 1954) was

published in Hyderabad Gazette Extraordinary No.86 on 10.04.1954.

6 Added by Act No. 27 of 2002, w.e.f. 26-8-2002.

One of the objects for the enactment of such legislation was the

abolition of all inams, other than village service inams and inams

held by religious and charitable institutions. In pursuance of such

Bill, the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 19557

came to be

enacted. Such Act received the assent of the President on

16.07.1955 and was published in the Hyderabad Gazette

Extraordinary No. 90 of 20.07.1955. The enactment is now known as

the Telangana Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. Initially, the Inams

Abolition Act was not applicable to inams held by or for the benefit

of charitable and religious institutions [Section 1(2)(i)]. The said

provision was however deleted by Andhra Pradesh (Amendment)

Act, 1985 (Act No. 29 of 1985) with effect from 26.12.1985. The

Inams Abolition Act was then subsequently amended vide Andhra

Pradesh (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 19 of 1994), whereby a

proviso was inserted to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act with

retrospective effect from 26.12.1985, the date when Section 1(2)(i)

was deleted. The inserted clause and other relevant provisions of

the said Inams Abolition Act read thus:

“[1(2) It extends to the whole of the Hyderabad State and

shall be applicable to all inams except –

(i) inams held by or for the benefit of charitable and

religious institutions;

(ii) inams held for rendering village service useful to

the Government or to the village community

including sethsendhi, neeradi and balutha inams.]

xx xx xx

7 Inams Abolition Act

8 omitted by A.P. (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Act No. 29 of 1985) w.e.f. 26.12.1985

3. Abolition and vesting of inams and the consequences

thereof-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary

contained in any usage, settlement, contract, grant,

sanad, order or other instrument, Act, regulation, rules

or order having the force of law and notwithstanding any

judgment, decree or order of a Civil, Revenue or Atiyat

Court, and with effect from the date of vesting, all inams

shall be deemed to have been abolished and shall vest

in the State.

(2) Save as expressely provided by or under the

provisions of this Act and with effect from the date of

vesting, the following consequences shall ensue

namely:-

xxx xxx xxx

revenue;

(d) all rents and land revenue including cesses and

royalties, accruing in respect of such inam lands, on or

after the date of vesting, shall be payable to the State

and not to the Inamdar, and any payment made in

contravention of this clause shall not be valid;

4((1) xxx xxx xxx

[Provided that where inams are held by or for the benefit of

charitable and religious institutions no person shall be

entitled to be registered as an occupant under sections 5, 6,

7 and 8 and the institution alone shall be entitled to be

registered as an occupant of all inam lands other than those

specified in clauses (a) and (c) above without restriction of

extent to four and half times the family holding and without

the condition of personal cultivation:

Provided further that where any person other than the

concerned charitable or religious institution has been

registered as an occupant under sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 after

the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)

Abolition of Inams (Amendment) Act, 1985 such registration

shall and shall be deemed always to have been null and void

and no effect shall be given to such registration]”

9 inserted by A.P. (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 19 of 1994) with retrospective effect from 26.12.1985.

xxx xxx xxx

9. Vesting of certain buildings and inam lands used for nonagricultural purposes.-

(1) Every private building, situated within an inam shall, with

effect from the date of vesting, vest in the person who

owned it immediately before that date.

(2) Where an inam land has been converted for any purpose

unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall

be entitled to keep the land provided that such conversion

was not void or illegal under any law in force.

(3) The vesting of private buildings or lands under subsection (1) or (2) shall be subject to the payment of nonagricultural assessment that may be imposed by

Government from time to time.”

10. Section 82 of the 1987 Act statutorily cancelled the lease deeds if

endowed for the purpose of any institution. Section 75 of the 1987

Act declares that any lease and any gifts, sale, exchange or

mortgage of an inam land, granted for the support or maintenance

of charitable or religious institution, or endowment or for the

performance of a religious or public charity or service shall be null

and void, unless such transaction, not being a gift, is affected with

prior sanction of the Government. A perusal of the facts would show

that prior approval was only in respect of 137 acres 19 guntas of

land on the basis of which registered lease deed was executed on

20.04.1978. However, lease deed dated 23.07.1964 in respect of

143 acres, lease deed dated 14.09.1966 in respect of 257 acres 19

guntas and supplementary lease deed dated 21.3.1969 in respect of

2 Acres 32 guntas were not preceded with any prior sanction.

Though there is a note of the Second Secretary of the Government

that lease for 99 years would not amount to transfer of property,

but such note is on the file of the Government and had not been

communicated to any of the interested parties.

11. It is submitted that the lessee faced no issues till November 2006

when the previous Mahant Baba Sagardas was unceremoniously

removed. It was on 24.08.2007, a notice on behalf of Sri Arun Das ji,

Mahant of the Mutt, for delivery of vacant possession, was served

treating lessee as an encroacher. It was later on 24.12.2007, the

Mutt wrote to the Assistant Commissioner (Endowments) for

eviction of the lessee, inter alia on the ground that a graveyard on a

land measuring 20 acres has come up and thus there is a violation

of the terms of the lease. The Assistant Commissioner called for an

inspection report from the office of the Inspector, Endowments

Department. A report was submitted on 29.01.2008, communicating

to the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department that the

three lease deeds are without prior Government approval. Only the

lease deed dated 20.04.1978 was with prior approval. It was

communicated that the 4 lease deeds have totally become null and

void as per the 1966 Act, 1987 Act and the Rules framed under the

Government Order No.866 dated 08.08.2003.

12. The proceedings leading to the present appeals were initiated when

a show cause notice dated 20.12.2008 was issued by Deputy

Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad. The

proceedings initiated in pursuance of show cause notice to the

lessee was assigned an Original Application No.21/2008 before the

Deputy Commissioner, Endowments Department, later renumbered

as OA No. 579 of 2010 after the constitution of the Endowments

Tribunal. The lessee was asked to remove the encroachment upon

the land belonging to the Mutt.

13. It has been argued that the Endowments Tribunal passed a patently

perverse order of eviction on the ground that the leased land was

agricultural in nature and therefore, the lease deed was void as per

Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The writ petition against the order

passed by the Endowments Tribunal remained unsuccessful. It is the

said order passed in the writ petition which is the subject matter of

challenge in the present appeals.

14. The argument of Mr. Harish Salve, appearing for the lessee, is that it

was neither asserted by the Mutt, nor any issue was framed

regarding treating the land as agricultural land. Therefore, in the

absence of any evidence of the land being an agriculture land, the

finding recorded by the Endowments Tribunal and affirmed by the

High Court suffers from patent illegality as without any plea or

evidence, a finding has been returned to declare the lease deed

executed in favor of the appellant as cancelled on the ground that

the lease was of an agricultural land.

15. Mr. Salve referred to an order passed by the Joint Collector in an

appeal under Section 24 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)

Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, wherein a finding was returned that

the land in question was converted into for non-agricultural use

before 1973. The order under challenge in appeal was an order

passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 27.11.2004.

16. It is argued that the order of the Joint Collector is final and act as an

estoppel to the effect that the leased inam lands are nonagricultural in nature and the factum of the Endowments Tribunal

having delved into the same by giving a perverse finding is

impermissible. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court

reported as Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board,

Peermade and Anr.

that if an issue has been finally determined,

parties cannot dispute such finding.

17. The issue as to whether the land is agricultural land was raised for

the first time in the written arguments submitted by the Mutt before

the Endowments Tribunal relying upon a report of the Assistant

Commissioner (Endowments). It is submitted that the argument

raised by the Mutt was dealt with in the written arguments raised by

the lessee specifically contending that a new plea was raised for the

first time in the written arguments that the land was agricultural

land. Reliance is placed upon judgment of this Court reported as

Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr.

wherein it was held

that once a particular plea is not raised and the defendants had no

opportunity to resist or oppose such a relief, it would lead to

miscarriage of justice. Reliance was also placed upon a judgment of

10 (1999) 5 SCC 590

11 (2008) 17 SCC 491

this Court reported as Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. v.

Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors.

18. It is argued that the distinction between agricultural and nonagricultural land is evident from the reading of Section 3 of the

Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Assessments Act, 1963, which

provides for assessment of non-agricultural land. The A.P

Agricultural Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act,

2006 repealed the 1963 Act by keeping the distinction between the

agricultural and non-agricultural land. Reference was made to

Section 28 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue

Act, 1317 Fasli that the land in Section 1(b) includes all kinds of

benefits pertaining to land and that land revenue is paid for nonagricultural land as well. It has been argued that Section 82 would

be applicable only if lease of land is used for agricultural purpose

alone. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of this Court

reported as Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Officer in Charge

(Court of Wards)

, Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim (SMT) v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujrat

and ITC Limited v. Blue

Coast Hotels Limited

dealing with the agricultural land in the

taxation laws such as wealth tax and income tax. It is further

contended that the lease deeds executed for a period of 99 years

could not be terminated in violation of the terms of a notice period

of 5 years, as well as on a non-existing ground of termination of

12 (1987) 2 SCC 555

13 (1976) 3 SCC 864

14 (1993) Supp 4 SCC 707

15 (2018) 15 SCC 99

lease. It is also argued that the report of the Assistant Collector,

Endowments is on inquiry and not evidence before the Tribunal

which can be made basis of terminating the lease in favor of the

lessee.

19. It is contended that the notice for termination of lease was issued

on 11.10.2007 on the ground that Mutt had entered into lease

agreements with IDL and IDL Chemicals Limited and not with the

appellant; the appellant abandoned most of the land, thereby

allowing encroachers to occupy the land and that the land of Mutt is

being converted into burial grounds.

20. It was averred that eviction proceedings can only be in consonance

with the terms of the eviction notice which allows no room for

vagueness and ambiguity. In the notice, no issue qua the nature of

the leased inam lands was raised but was surreptitiously supplanted

by the Mutt in its written arguments. The same is erroneously

considered and decided by the Tribunal and upheld by the High

Court. It is only Section 75 of the 1987 Act that would be applicable

which contemplates prior permission of the Government in the case

of inam lands.

21. It is argued that evidence can be led in support of the plea raised.

Since there is no plea raised by the Mutt that the land is agricultural

land, therefore, no amount of evidence in absence of plea can be

considered by the Court. Reliance is placed upon Union of India v.

Ibrahim Uddin & Anr.

, and Biraji alias Brijraji & Anr. v. Surya

Pratap & Ors.

22. The appellants further argued that any finding of a court of law in

the absence of evidence cannot be sustained. Such finding based

on a document which is not placed on record is violation of

principles of natural justice, fair play and fairness. Reliance is placed

upon Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra

It is argued that since the report of the Inspector dated 29.1.2008

was not placed on record, therefore, the lessee was not given a

chance to rebut the assertion that the land is an agricultural land.

23. It has been further argued that the impugned order of the High

Court is perverse and that the judgment of the High Court in

Siddartha Academy of General and Technical Education v.

Deputy Commissioner of Endowments

19 has been wrongly

relied upon. In fact, in the said judgment, the land was agricultural

land. This Court in SLP (Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 has

permitted Siddartha Academy to withdraw the SLP after the

Government passed the necessary orders, i.e., granting permission

to continue with the lease. It was contended that Section 82 does

not annul governmental permissions granted prior to the

commencement of the Act. Therefore, the same could not be

deemed to be cancelled in terms of the provisions of Section 82(1)

16 (2012) 8 SCC 148

17 (2020) 10 SCC 729

18 (2009) 11 SCC 141

19 2010 SCC Online AP 461

of the 1987 Act. It is stated that the lease deeds dated 23.7.1964

and 20.4.1978 make it abundantly clear that the said lease deeds

were entered into by the appellant and Mutt with prior permission of

the Government. It is further argued that the lease deeds were for

the purpose of construction and running a factory, therefore, the

land cannot be said to be an agricultural land.

24. Mr. Salve further relied upon the communication dated 17.11.1994

from Hyderabad Urban Development Authority to contend that the

land falls within the Zonal Development Plan for Kukatpally Zone

approved on 25.04.1986 and is earmarked as an industrial area as

per the said Plan. Thus, it was argued that Endowments Tribunal

wrongly held the land to be agricultural despite the reason that no

issue was framed. The finding is based on the basis of an

observation in the order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition

No. 24440 of 2010 filed by the lessee. It is also argued that the

judgment of the High Court in Siddartha Academy that the land is

agricultural and lease stands terminated is legally untenable. The

said order was affirmed in appeal on 1.3.201320, holding that the

use of the land for non-agriculture purpose is immaterial for the

purpose of Section 82 of the 1987 Act.

25. It has been argued that Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,

1976 was passed in the year 1976 w.e.f. 17.2.1976 and that the

lands at Kukatpally became urban lands. Therefore, the urban lands

are the lands situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration

20 Writ Appeal Nos. 488, 489 and 490 of 2011

and referred to as such in the master plan and where there is no

master plan, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration

and situated in any area included within the local limits of a

municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area committee,

a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small-town

committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat. Therefore, with the

enactment of the aforesaid Act, the agricultural land changed to

non-agricultural urban land.

26. It is contended that the term of payment of land revenue are

standard boiler plate clauses and no land revenue has ever been

paid by the lessee for the leased inam lands.

27. The arguments raised by the lessee has been controverted by the

Mutt that nature of land was agriculture and by operation of Section

82 of the 1987 Act, the lease stands statutorily cancelled. It is

argued that the nature of land is important to be considered and not

the purpose to which the land is to put to use by the lessee. It is

further pointed out that validity of Section 82 has been upheld by

this Court in a judgment reported as State of A.P. v. Nallamilli

Rami Reddy & Ors.

21, wherein it was held that the object of

Section 82 of the 1987 Act is to protect the interests of the religious

institutions and to safeguard such institutions from the “grip of rich

and powerful persons”.

28. It is also pointed out that the 1987 Act was preceded by a report

made by a Commission headed by Justice C. Kondaiah, former Chief

Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para 1.18.1 of the report

21 (2001) 7 SCC 708

reads thus:

“It is stated that all concerned who are interested in the

charitable or religious institutions have stated that the temple

authorities are facing innumerable difficulties in the

management of the landed properties of the institutions, the

income is very meagre, not worth-mentioning, and in some

cases it is nil, although the institution owns large extent of

lands. Reasons thereof is the provisions of the Tenancy Act,

attitude of the persons in possession and enjoyment for

several years, the lands belonging to these institutions are

mostly in the hands of the rich and powerful sections against

whom the concerned authorities are experiencing difficulties

to dispossess them from the lands. The trustees or archakas

are in enjoyment of the lands kept Benami in the names of

their relations, etc. The authorities also are in the collusion

with them. The rents paid by the tenants are nominal fixed

decades back. The Estimates Committee also expressed the

same opinion.”

29. It is averred that the Endowments Tribunal and the High Court have

concluded that the lease stands statutorily terminated in terms of

Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act. The Khasra Pahanis are prepared only

in respect of agricultural land under Rule 8 of Andhra Pradesh

(Telangana Area) of Land Census Rules, 1954. Such Rules have been

framed under Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and

Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. The Khasra Pahanis show the land as

dry agricultural land and as cultivable and uncultivable. The nature

of the land is described as “sand soil”, “irrigability”, “trees” and

“kharif”. The Khasra Pahanis for the year 1954-55 and 2003-04

show that the land is dry agricultural land and also shows as

cultivable and uncultivable land. The land is described as “sand

soil”, “irrigability”, “trees”, “kharif”, which shows that reference is

made to agricultural lands apart from the fact that the lands were

inam lands. It is further pointed out that land revenue of Rs.714-27

was demanded from the lessee on 04-08-1980 by the Mutt in terms

of the lease deeds dated 23.07.1964, 14.09.1966, supplementary

lease deed dated 21.03.1969 and lease deed dated 20.04.1978.

30. The Mutt also relied upon notifications dated 25.04.1963 and

27.05.1975 published under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 intending to acquire the land for the purpose of Andhra

Pradesh Housing Board. The land therein is described as a dry land.

It is further pointed out that the acquisition has not been concluded

but the notification has been referred to for pointing out the nature

of the land. The order dated 30.11.1976 passed by the A.P. Land

Reforms Tribunal under Section 8(1) of the A.P. Land Reforms

(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 shows that the land was

considered to be within the ambit of the statute dealing with the

ceiling of the agricultural land, though the land was exempt from

the surplus area proceedings under Section 23 of the aforesaid Act.

31. The lease deeds further contemplate payment of land revenue at

the enhanced rate for use of land for non-agricultural purpose. The

use of land for non-agricultural purposes leads to enhance land

revenue. It is contended that the Assistant Commissioner has

submitted a report on 16.12.2008 wherein the land in question was

found to be agricultural and was the basis to proceed under the

1987 Act.

32. It is also argued that the Competent Authority, the then Deputy

Commissioner could initiate suo moto proceedings under Section

82(1) of the 1987 Act. It is also argued that no application was

submitted by the lessee to convert the land to non-agricultural use

under Rule 70 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land

Revenue Rules, 1951. It is also argued that the argument of the

lessee before the Endowments Tribunal was that the leased land in

question, though registered as agricultural land, but has been used

for non-agricultural purposes. The Tribunal thus held that even if

land is being used for non-agricultural purposes, it is still an

agricultural land. The relevant extract from the order reads thus:

“6). (ii). (b). (i). (a). ……….On the other hand, the contest of

the Respondents is that the lease lands in question are

though registered as agricultural lands, from purpose of lease

and in use by the lessees for than agricultural as observed in

Ex.83 order point-2 at pages 8 and 9, it is only a nonagricultural immovable property lease to govern by Sec.82(4)

of the Act, that there is no finding by the High Court to hold

the lands in question as agricultural in the writ petition

24440/2010 order dated 20.1.2011 and in the absence of

which an observation even between the parties inter se is not

Res-Judicata or obiter or estoppel from disputing now the

nature of the lease lands….

6). (ii). (b). (i). (d). In fact, the petition schedule lands of the

nd Applicant Math is recorded as per the Ex.A17 pahanies

and A18 G.Os as Inam and Agricultural lands. Since the

petition schedule lands are in use after Ex.A1-4 lease deeds

by Respondents for non-agricultural (commercial/industrial)

purposes as observed in Ex.83 order point-2 for consideration

at pages 8 and 9, whether it changes the nature of the land

from agricultural to non-agricultural……..Thus, the subject

matter of the leases covered by Ex.A1-4 are the agricultural

lands though in other than agricultural purposes in use by

any of the Respondents and the leases stand terminated by

statutory operation of law from the above as per Sec.82(1

and 2) of the Act from the time the Act, 30/87 came in to

force for none of the Respondents are within the meaning of

landless poor agriculturists.”

33. It is contended that Section 160 of the 1987 Act gives it an overriding effect and that the provisions of 1987 Act shall apply

notwithstanding any compromise agreement, scheme, judgment,

decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. Thus, by

necessary implication, the leases would be governed by the statute.

34. It is argued that the lessees were fully aware of the issue before the

Tribunal that it is a statutory cancellation of lease of agricultural

land. The Mahant of the Mutt was confronted with the document

Ex.R-3, subsequently named Ex.B-3, which was an order passed by

the Joint Collector in appellate proceedings on the issue of grant of

occupancy rights wherein the finding was returned that the use of

land was for non-agricultural purposes. In the evidence affidavit, no

document was produced showing that the nature of the land was

non-agricultural. In Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 filed by the

lessee challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the High Court

dealt with the arguments raised by the Mutt, respondent No. 5 in

the said proceedings, that the lease is of agricultural land. The

argument recorded is as under:

“9. …..The counsel would place reliance on Section 82 and

contend that in any event the lease stood cancelled by virtue

of sub-section (1) thereof, which provides that a lease of

agricultural land held by other than a landless poor person on

the date of commencement of the Act shall notwithstanding

any other law for the time being in force stands cancelled……

10. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in reply

would submit that the previous W.P. No.9681 of 2008 was not

concerned with the issue relating to formation of opinion and

if it is accepted that the subject land is agricultural land, then

the Rules issued in G.O.Ms. No.866 upon which earlier refer20

ence was placed have no application to the subject

lands……..”

35. Still further, the High Court had called for the record of the Tribunal

in the abovesaid writ petition (WP No. 24440 of 2010). It quoted

from the reports dated 29.1.2008 of the Inspector and dated

24.1.2008 of the Assistant Director and recorded as under:

“The lands and in question are agriculture lands. As per

Section 82(1) any lease of the Agriculture land belong into

any institution are held by a person who is not a landless

poor person stands cancelled. This Section is upheld by the

Honourable Supreme Court.”

Further I submit that during the scrutiny of the proposals

submitted u/s 83 the Amended Act 33/2007 has come into

force and the powers vested in the Deputy Commissioner U/s

83 of the Act 30/87 are conferred to the Endowments Tribunal.

Since it has not been constituted, the proposals have not

been submitted to the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments

Department, Hyderabad for initiating Action U/s 83.”

36. The order passed by the High Court on 20.1.2011 has attained

finality. The fact that the land is agricultural land was recorded in

the order passed, therefore, the lessee cannot plead ignorance of

the fact that the land in question was not an agricultural land.

37. It is averred that in the written submissions submitted before the

Tribunal, the stand of the lessee is not that it was not aware of the

report of the Assistant Commissioner or that no issue was framed

on the land being agricultural in nature, therefore, not covered

under Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act. The specific issue framed by

the Tribunal was whether the leases are not in subsistence by virtue

of Section 82 of the 1987 Act. It is further contended that the

parties have gone to trial fully aware of the real issues involved,

then even assuming that the issue was not framed, it is not open to

the parties to challenge the procedure. Reliance is placed upon

Swamy Atmananda & Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam &

Ors.

, Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao

Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors.

38. It is argued that the Tribunal has rightly held that the letter dated

24.2.1964 (Ex.B-40) or the order dated 10.5.1976 (Ex.A-16) does

not amount to valid sanction as there is no application of mind to

show how it is necessary or beneficial for the Mutt. The letter dated

24.2.1964 (Ex.B-40) is not addressed to either of the parties and

that in terms of Rule 331 of the Hyderabad Endowment Rules, lease

for 99 years could not be granted. Moreover, it is stated that the

order of the Joint Collector under the Inams Abolition Act dated

25.7.2007 is erroneously relied upon by the lessee. The finding that

the land was being used for non-agricultural purpose is an incidental

finding in the context of a different legislation and therefore cannot

be applied to interpret Section 82 of the 1987 Act. It is also

contended that the Inams Abolition Act has no application to the

land in question in view of Section 1(2)(i) of the said Act till

26.12.1985, and thereafter by virtue of proviso to Section 4(1) of

the said Act which exempts the charitable and religious institutions

from the operation of the Inams Abolition Act.

22 (2005) 10 SCC 51

23 AIR 1963 SC 884

24 AIR 1956 SC 593

39. It is also argued that the lessee has not made any application for

use of the land for non-agricultural purpose without prior permission

under Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Rules, 1951

and that no document has been produced to prove the nature of the

land as non-agricultural.

40. The argument of the State is that the term ‘agricultural land’ as

mentioned in Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act has nothing to do with

the purpose of which the leased lands were being used. Therefore,

whether the lands were being used for agricultural purpose or not is

irrelevant for the application of Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act. The

object and purpose of the 1987 Act is to safeguard the interests of

the charitable and religious institutions and to revert and resume

the agricultural lands of the religious institutions to them for their

own benefit and well-being. Therefore, the legislature has sought to

statutorily cancel all leases of ‘agricultural land’ belonging to

charitable and religious institutions. Reliance was placed upon

judgment of the High Court in Siddartha Academy. It is also

argued that Section 82(4) of the 1987 Act deals with lease of any

immovable property other than agricultural land belonging to or

given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or religious

institution subsisting on the date of commencement of the 1987 Act

and states that the same shall continue to be in force subject to the

rules as may be prescribed under sub-section (3). Rule 15 of the

2003 Rules is to the following effect:

“15. Any lease or license granted, continued or allowed to be

continued otherwise than in accordance with rules shall be

null and void:

Provided that, any lease or license subsisting by the

date of notification of these rules of any immovable property

or right may be continued according to such terms and

conditions and also on the rent payable thereto, till the expiry

of the period of the lease or license as may be decided upon

by the Additional Commissioner on a proposal received from

the Executive Officer or Chairman or the Person-inManagement as the case may be.”

41. It is thus sought to be contended that in respect of agricultural land,

the lease stands cancelled whereas in respect of land other than

agricultural land, the property can be used only in terms of Rule 15

of the 2003 Rules.

42. The order of Joint Collector dated 25.8.2007 was argued to not

operate as estoppel as the issues are different. The issues before

the Joint Collector were in respect of nature of lands as inam lands

and if the said lands were used as agricultural lands on the crucial

date. The issue was not whether the lands are agricultural lands on

the appointed date that is 1.11.1973.

43. It is therefore contended that the lessee had sufficient knowledge,

awareness and opportunity to deal with and make representations

in respect of the issue relating to leased lands being ‘agricultural

lands’ and hence, the leases stand statutorily cancelled. The report

of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowment referred to by the

High Court in Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 is relied upon. Even in

the written arguments, the issue was raised that the lands in

question are agricultural lands. In fact, the lessee has referred to

evidence with respect to agricultural lands without ever attempting

to lead evidence on this issue. It is also argued that the

Endowments Tribunal has framed an issue as to whether the lease

deeds are in subsistence owing to the provisions of Section 82 of

the 1987 Act.

44. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The

question required to be examined is whether in terms of Section 82

of the 1987 Act, lease of agricultural land stands statutorily

cancelled. It is not required to be examined at this stage as to

whether the lessee is the present lessee on account of change of

the name of original lessee M/s Indian Detonators Limited or IDL

Chemicals Limited. To determine the primary question, the following

aspects need to be examined:

(a) What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007 passed by the

Joint Collector under the Inams Abolition Act?

(b) Whether the land in question is agricultural land to which the

Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and

Endowments Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease in favor of

the lessee stands cancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the

Act?

land in question was agricultural land in the proceedings

before the Endowments Tribunal?

(a) What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007 passed by the Joint

Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act?

45. The Inams Abolition Act abolished all inams (grants) by the Nizam.

The Act contemplates adjudication of matters in relation to grant of

occupancy rights and certificates in respect of inam lands covered

by the Act and vested with the Government, inquiry into the nature

and history of such lands, determination of compensation payable

to the Inamdar and apportionment thereto. Sections 4 to 8 of the

Inams Abolition Act came into force on 1.11.1973 i.e., the date of

grant of occupancy rights under the Inams Act. It appears that the

Mutt entered into an agreement with one Kalyani Narsing Rao. He

filed an application for grant of occupancy rights. Such application

was allowed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner on

27.11.2004. The Revenue Divisional Officer was considering an

application for issuance of occupancy rights certificate to the

general power of attorney holder of the Mutt. The application was

allowed and it was concluded as under:

“In view of the aforesaid findings the case has been

examined with reference to the Act and Rules in force. It is

revealed that as per the material on record, the lands in

question are inam lands and the applicants are owners. In

view of the aforesaid the application seeking the issuance of

Occupancy Rights Certificate is allowed as prayer for.

In view of the above and also as per the Judgment of

Honourable High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in WP No. 9497 of

2003, dated 29-7-2004, the land in question, falls under

section 9(2) of the AP (T.A) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955.

Therefore, the applicants are declared as owners of the land

in question under section 9(2) of the AP (T.A) Abolition of

Inams Act, 1955.”

46. In an appeal under Section 24 of the Inams Abolition Act, a finding

was returned that the land in question was converted into for nonagricultural use before 1973. The issue no. 2 therein was to the

effect whether the land in question was under agriculture as on the

crucial date. The finding on the said issue is that it was being used

for non-agricultural purposes. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted

to abolish the inams and to confer occupancy rights to the tiller.

Since the land was an inam land given to the charitable and

religious institutions, it was found to be exempt from the operation

of the Inams Abolition Act. The Joint Collector held that the land is

an inam land and in terms of proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act, the

inam was held by or for the benefit of charitable and religious

institutions, therefore, no person shall be entitled to be registered

as an occupant and the institution alone shall be entitled to be

registered as the occupant. It is the said order of the Revenue

Divisional Officer which was set aside by the Joint Collector. It was

held as under:

“The property was given by Nizam for the Mutt but not to

Sagar Das. It is clear that Mutt only can sell the property after

taking prior permission from the Endowment Department but

not the Mahanth in his individual capacity. Baba Sagar Das is

not an institution and he is only a Mahanth appointed by

Endowment Department. The Revenue Divisional Officer has

considered irrevocable G.P.A. and the decree obtained by

Kalayani Narsinga Rao and concluded that Sagar Das is

entitled to 60% and K. Narsinga Rao is entitled for 40% share

in the properties of Mutt and further held that the G.P.A.

holder can maintain the case before him under Rule 5 of the

Rules under A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of Inam Rules, 1955 declared

the applicants K. Narsinga Rao and Baba Sagar Das as

owners of the properties belonged to Mutt. The order of the

Revenue Divisional Officer is based on assumption and

presumption and the orders speaks that there are no

documents marked and no evidence was adduced on either

side.

The Commissioner of Endowment Department vide its

Proceedings No.F1/47775/2004-I dated 25-11-2006 has

removed the said Sagar Das from the post of Mahant of

Udasin Mutt Hussaini Alam, Hyderabad and framed charges

for alienating the properties including execution of the G.P.A.

dated 1-9-1981 in favour of K. Narsinga Rao and misleading

the Revenue Divisional Officer and acted adverse to the

interest of the institution.

xxx xxx

Therefore in respect of Inams claimed by charitable and

religious institutions, no individual in entitled to maintain a

claim and religious institution alone is entitled to have locus

standi. Therefore, the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer,

declaring the GPA holder of Mahanth as owner of the land U/s

9(2) of the Act, to say the least, is mischievous, perverse and

totally illegal.

In view of the above facts, the Revenue Divisional Officer has

no jurisdiction to exercise powers U/s 9 of A.P. (T.A.) Abolition

of Inams Act, 1955 and declare a person as owner of inam

lands, much less a person who has no locus standi at all.

Further inam lands in question are being claimed by a

religious institution and will be covered by appropriate

provisions of the Act. The impugned Proceedings of Revenue

Divisional Officer, Chevella in Case No.L/76/2000 dated 27-

11-2004 wherein the respondent No.1 is declared as owner of

the land in question U/s 9(2) of the A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of

Inams Act, 1955 is perverse, without jurisdiction, abinitio

void, and hereby declared as a nullity.

The land in question being inam lands vest with the State

upon abolition of Inams as per the Section 3 of the Act.

Further as the lands were converted to non-agricultural use

as on the crucial date and continue to remain so as on date,

proceedings need to be initiated before competent court, and

not revenue authorities, under the appropriate provisions of

the Act. As the lands are claimed by religious institution a

claim under inam abolition Act can be maintained only in the

name of the institution and not by individuals.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of.”

47. The scope of inquiry under the said Act was restricted to grant of

occupancy rights which was negated for multiple reasons including

the fact that the land was not under agriculture on the crucial date.

Since the Inams Abolition Act is a special Act in respect of abolition

of inams and conferment of occupancy rights, it is an order not by a

Tribunal having a plenary jurisdiction. The Tribunal under the Inams

Abolition Act had limited jurisdiction to decide the questions arising

under the Inams Abolition Act. Therefore, the findings recorded in

such proceedings neither act as estoppel, nor res judicata for any

other proceedings.

48. In Hope Plantations Ltd., it was held that estoppel works in the

same proceedings, and also in subsequent suits between the same

parties in which the same issue arises. Reliance has been placed

upon the following part of the order, which reads thus:

“26. …….These two aspects are “cause of action estoppel”

and “issue estoppel”. These two terms are of common law

origin. Again, once an issue has been finally determined,

parties cannot subsequently in the same suit advance

arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing

that the issue was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is

to approach the higher forum if available. The determination

of the issue between the parties gives rise to, as noted

above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent

proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been

determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between the

same parties in which the same issue arises…..”

49. The proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act were initiated by a

Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rights on the basis of

an agreement to sell. The Mutt was represented by a Power of

Attorney holder who was claiming independent rights, therefore, the

previous proceedings were not between the same parties as the

Mutt was not a party in its own rights but through an attorney who

was claiming independent right in himself. Therefore, the findings

recorded therein are not relevant or binding in respect of

proceedings under another statute, enacted for different objective

to protect the inam land given to the charitable and religious

institutions.

50. The Inams Abolition Act is not applicable to the Mutt for the reason

that the Act itself is not applicable to charitable and the religious

institutions in terms of Section 1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and

thereafter in terms of first proviso to Section 4(1) of the Inams

Abolition Act. Thus, any finding recorded by the Joint Collector is

only for the purposes of negating the claim of Power of Attorney

holder claiming occupancy rights. It has been categorically held by

the Joint Collector that the Act is not applicable to the Mutt.

(b) Whether the land in question is agricultural land to which the

Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and

Endowments Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease in favor of the

lessee stands cancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the Act?

51. The primary argument of the learned counsel for the lessees is that

there was no pleading that the land in question was agricultural

land, therefore, the lessees were not made aware of the fact that

the lease stands statutorily cancelled. The said argument is not

tenable for the reason that the Inspector in his report dated

29.1.2008 and 16.12.2008 reported that the lands in question are

agricultural lands and that lease of such lands stands cancelled. It

was also mentioned that the validity of Section 82 has been upheld

by this Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddi wherein this Court held as

under:

“12. It is plain that religious institutions fall into a separate

class and lands held by them have a special character in

respect of which tenancies had been created and these

tenancies are sought to be put to an end to for resumption of

lands for better management thereof. It is clear that the

tenants under the religious institutions form a special class by

themselves and such classification is made, so far as tenants

are concerned, to achieve the object of protecting the

interests of the religious institutions. Therefore, we do not

think, any of the principles which result in hostile

discrimination would be applicable to the present case.”

52. The lessee had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010

challenging the continuation of proceedings before the Endowments

Tribunal. In the counter affidavit dated 7.12.2010 filed on behalf of

the Mutt, it was stated that the leases have become null and void

under Section 82 of the 1987 Act.

“2. …It is our case that the leases have been null and void

under section 82 of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu

Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987 …”

53. The writ petition was dismissed on 20.1.2011. The High Court also

noticed the argument of the Mutt that in terms of Section 82, the

leases stood cancelled.

“The counsel would place reliance on Section 82 and contend

that in any event the lease stood cancelled by virtue of subsection (1) thereof, which provides that a lease of agricultural

land held by other than a landless poor person on the date of

commencement of the Act shall notwithstanding any other

law for the time being in force stands cancelled.”

54. The High Court had called for the record of the fourth respondent

i.e., the Assistant Commissioner (Endowment) wherein, the

following statement was made:

“The lands and in question are agricultural lands. As per

Section 82(1) any lease of the agriculture land belong into

any institution are held by a person who is not a landless

poor person stands cancelled. This Section is upheld by the

Honourable Supreme Court.”

55. The argument that the land is agricultural land was raised by the

Mutt and also recorded in the report of the Inspector. Thus, it is

noted that lessees were well aware of the nature of the land as

agricultural land. Such order of the High Court has attained finality.

The following point for consideration was culled down by the

Endowments Tribunal:

“(1) Whether the leases for 99 years covered respectively, by

Ex.A1-3 in favour of R1 and by Ex.A4 in favour of R2,

executed by the 2nd Applicant Math for the entire petition

schedule property are not in subsistence by virtue of the

provisions of the Endowments Act 30/87 (Sec.82 r/w. the rules

made there under vide GOMS. Nos. 866 & 379 of 2003 with

amendments to it in GOMS No. 160 of 2010)?”

56. The Mutt has based its arguments on the premise that the land in

question is agricultural land. The precise argument raised by the

lessee in the written arguments submitted before the Endowments

Tribunal is as under:

“14. The contention of the Applicant No. 2 Mutt is that the

land covered by Ex.P1 to P4 are agricultural lands. It is

submitted that the said contention is incorrect since the lands

were taken by the Respondents for non-agricultural purpose

and for industrial use. The Applicant No. 2 Mutt is aware of

this fact. In page 2 of the legal notice dated 24.08.2007

(Ex.P11) issued by the Counsel for the Applicant No. 2 Mutt to

Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. (R3), it was stated that the lease

agreements were permitted to be entered between my client

Sri Udasin Mutt, Hussaini Alam, Hyderabad and M/s. Indian

Detonators Limited/IDL Chemicals Limited. The above said

companies were entitled to use the lands totally admeasuring

an extent of Acs 539-38 guntas in terms of the lease

agreement which was more the less to be used as safety,

testing zone etc., as amended by the Government under the

provisions of the Explosives Act and Rules. The Pahanies for

the year 2003-2004 filed by the Applicant No. 2 Mutt vide

Ex.P17 (A-D) say that the lands covered by Ex.P1 to P4 are

“dry” lands. There is no mention in these documents to

suggest that the said lands are “dry agricultural lands”. The

Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 filed by the Applicant No.

2 Mutt vide Ex.P20 say that the said lands are “Isuka Nela”,

which means sandy soil. It is common knowledge that on

“sandy soil”, it is not possible to do agriculture. Except these

two documents, the Applicant No. 2 Mutt has not filed any

other document(s) to establish that the lands covered by

Ex.P1 to P4 are agricultural lands. On the other hand, the

Respondents have filed Ex.R33 which is a letter written by Dy.

Commissioner of Endowments to the Commissioner of

Endowments. In the said letter, it was stated that “…the

proposed land is neither cultivable nor useful for even grazing

purpose, as it is covered by rocks…”. Apart from Ex.R33, the

order dated 25.08.2007 of the Joint Collector, R.R. District has

stated that “…the land in question is used for non-agricultural

purpose…It is, therefore, submitted that the lands covered by

Ex.P1 to P4 are non-agricultural lands right from the

commencement of the lease and therefore, the contention of

the Applicant No. 2 that the lands are agricultural lands is

devoid of merit.”

57. A perusal of the written arguments, as reproduced above, shows

that the lessees have submitted that the land is being used for nonagricultural purposes. The entire argument is based upon use of the

land for non-agricultural purposes. The nature of land is distinct

from the use of the land. Since the land is agricultural land, its use

for non-agricultural purposes would not alter the nature of the land

as an agricultural land. Section 82 of the 1987 Act mentions “any

lease of agricultural land….”, therefore, the lease has to be of

agricultural land irrespective of the use to which the lessee may put

such agricultural land to. The language of the statute refers to

nature of the land and not the use thereof. Therefore, even in terms

of the written arguments raised by the lessee before the Tribunal,

the use of land for non-agricultural purposes would be irrelevant for

statutory cancellation of the lease of agricultural lands under

Section 82 of the 1987 Act.

58. The distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land

sought to be drawn from the reading of Section 3 of the Andhra

Pradesh Non-Agricultural Assessments Act, 1963 repealed by the

A.P Agricultural Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act,

2006, is not tenable. The distinction between the categories of land

leads to consequence of higher assessment in the case of nonagricultural land. The lessee has not led any evidence that they are

paying levy as per the rates fixed under this statute as that of nonagricultural land.

59. A learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a

judgment reported as A.P. Punjabi Sabha, Hyderabad v. Joint

Collector, Hyderabad

while considering the provisions of Inams

Abolition Act held that for the purpose of this Act, if the land is put

to non-agricultural purposes, it is not covered by the Act in

question. The Collector would assume jurisdiction to decide the

claims under Section 10 only if the lands were put to agricultural

use. It was held as under:

“19. The term ‘agricultural or non-agricultural purposes’ is not

defined under the Act. However, for the purpose of Section 9,

it is sufficient if the land is put to non-agricultural purposes.

The reason or justification is outside the scope of enquiry

under the provisions of the Act. The Collector will assume

jurisdiction to decide the claims under Section 10 only, if the

25 2004 SCC OnLine AP 689

lands were put to agricultural use. Though in Form I, the

relevant date is mentioned as 20.7.1955, in view of

subsequent legislative changes and judicial pronouncements,

the crucial date now stands as 1.11.1973. In Sections 4 and 5,

the expression ‘cultivates personally’ is used, whereas in

Sections 6, 7 and 8, the expression ‘under his personal

cultivation’ is employed. They constitute the jurisdictional

facts, for exercise of power under Section 10. An inamdar,

Kazim-e-kadim or tenant may have an excellent ground or

justification, for not undertaking activities of cultivation in the

inam lands. But once such land is found to be not under

cultivation, the Collector ceases to have power to deal with

the same under Section 10. Further, the contesting

respondents clearly stated that the land is put to nonagricultural purposes.”

60. On the other hand, in respect of the 1987 Act, the Division Bench of

the High Court in Siddhartha Academy held that use of land for

non-agricultural purpose is immaterial for the purpose of statutory

cancellation of lease deed, as provided under Section 82(1) of the

said Act. It was held as under:

“A reading of the above provision would show that the

essential object and purpose of the provision is with regard to

regulating the leases of agricultural lands and all such leases

except those held by landless poor persons stand cancelled.

Explanation I also defines the expression ‘landless poor

person’. For applying Section 82, the test therefore is whether

the lease is that of agricultural lands. On the facts of the

present case, it cannot be disputed that the lease in favour of

the appellant is that of agricultural land. The mere fact that

the appellant/lessee has put the said land for non-agricultural

use therefore does not make any difference as the purpose for

which the leased property is used is immaterial for the

purpose of Section 82 of the Act. The leases therefore

statutorily stand cancelled with regard to all agricultural lands

and are only saved to the extent of leases in favour of

landless poor persons. The learned Single Judge therefore has

rightly held against the writ petitioner and the orders of

eviction passed against them by applying Section 82(1) of the

Act requires no interference.”

61. The SLP (Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 stood withdrawn on

27.2.2017. Thus, the order passed by the Division Bench had

attained finality.

in question was agricultural land in the proceedings between the

parties before the Endowments Tribunal?

62. The judgments in Bachhaj Nahar and Ram Sarup Gupta are not

applicable to the facts of the present case wherein, it has been held

that it is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if

any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally

settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its

pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be

pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object

and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know

the case it has to meet.

63. The judgments relied upon by Shri Salve such as Ibrahim Uddin,

and Biraji alias Brijraji are not helpful to the arguments raised. In

fact, the lessees were aware of the controversy in respect of nature

of land and its statutory cancellation, therefore, the lack of

pleadings or the evidence loses its significance. The 1987 Act is a

Code in itself providing for constitution of the Endowments Tribunal,

appeal, revision and review. The strict rule of procedure

contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of

pleadings and evidence cannot be extended to the Tribunal

constituted for specific purpose. Since the lessees were aware of the

fact that the Mutt claims the land to be agricultural land and

statutory cancellation of the lease was being averred for the reason

that the leased land was agricultural, therefore, the lessees cannot

complain of any violation of principles of natural justice or strict

rules of pleading as is required under the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908.

64. In fact, this Court in Nedunuri Kameswaramma held that since

parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the

evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation of

those of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an

issue was fatal to the case. It was held as under:

“5. No doubt, no issue was framed, and the one, which was

framed, could have been more elaborate; but since the

parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the

evidence not only in support of their contentions but in

refutation of those of the other side, it cannot be said that the

absence of an issue was fatal to the case, or that there was

that mistrial which vitiates proceedings. We are, therefore, of

opinion that the suit could not be dismissed on this narrow

ground, and also that there is no need for a remit, as the

evidence which has been led in the case is sufficient to reach

the right conclusion. Neither party claimed before us that it

had any further evidence to offer.”

65. In Swamy Atmananda, it was held that if the parties went to the

trial knowing fully well the real issues involved and adduced

evidence in such a case, without establishing prejudice, it would not

be open to a party to raise the question of non-framing of a

particular issue.

66. Therefore, the parties were aware of the controversy about the

nature of the land. Thus, the lessee cannot be permitted to turn

around to dispute the nature of land leased to them.

67. We find merit in the argument raised by the lessees that the lease

executed prior to the commencement of 1987 Act would not be

annulled for the reason that there was no prior approval. The leases

were granted prior to the commencement of the 1987 Act but even

under the 1966 Act, Section 70 prohibited lease of the inam land if

its term exceeded six years. The lease of land measuring 143 acres

vide lease deed dated 23.7.1964; 257 acres 19 guntas vide lease

deed dated 14.9.1966 and 2 acres 32 guntas vide lease deed dated

21.3.1969 were not preceded with any prior approval of the

competent authority. Reliance is placed upon the note dated

24.2.1964 but such note is part of the decision-making process as

no approval was communicated to either the lessee or the lessor or

to any person. In fact, the said communication is a note of Second

Secretary to Government Home (Endowments-III) Department that

lease for a term of 99 years cannot be construed as a transfer of

ownership of the endowed lands by outright sale and is prohibited

under Rule 331 of Hyderabad State Endowment Rules and

Regulations. It is not a communication addressed either to the

lessee or to the lessor or to any other person or institution. The

regulation 331 prohibits the possession over and transfer of the

nuzli lands (tax bearing lands) from generation to generation in

future. The Regulation 331 is as follows:

“331. In the light of experience regarding the possession

over and transfer of the nuzli lands (tax bearing lands)

from generation to generation in future endowed lands

will not be let out on nuzul so that endowments may be

safeguarded.”

68. The note dated 24.02.1964 relied upon to argue that it leads to

approval of lease is not a decision which can be said to be effective

and binding in view of the judgements of this Court. Recently, this

Court in Nareshbhai Bhagubhai v. Union of India

, held as

under:

“27. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachhittar

Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395] a Constitution

Bench held that merely writing something on the file does

not amount to an order. For a file noting to amount to a

decision of the Government, it must be communicated to

the person so affected, before that person can be bound

by that order. Until the order is communicated to the

person affected by it, it cannot be regarded as anything

more than being provisional in character.

28. Similarly, in Shanti Sports Club v. Union of

India [Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC

705 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 707] this Court held that notings

recorded in the official files, by the officers of the

Government at different levels, and even the Ministers, do

not become a decision of the Government, unless the

same are sanctified and acted upon, by issuing an order in

the name of the President or Governor, as the case may

be, and are communicated to the affected persons.

29. In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA [Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 180] , this Court held

that: (SCC pp. 185-86, paras 14 & 16)

“14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no more

than an opinion by an officer for internal use and

consideration of the other officials of the department and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to add that internal notings

are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the

file culminate into an executable order, affecting

the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the

26 (2019) 15 SCC 1

final decision-making authority in the department,

gets his approval and the final order is [Ed.: The

word between two asterisks has been emphasised

in original as well.] communicated [Ed.: The word

between two asterisks has been emphasised in

original as well.] to the person concerned.

***

16. To the like effect are the observations of this

Court in Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra [Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of

Maharashtra, (2003) 5 SCC 413] , wherein it was

said that a right created under an order of a statutory authority must be communicated to the person concerned so as to confer an enforceable

right.”

69. The only approval of land measuring 173 acres and 19 guntas is

dated 10.5.1976. Though there is a reference to the communication

of the Commissioner Endowment dated 29.4.1975 in respect of

three previous lease deeds, but there is no communication to the

Mutt either of the letter dated 10.5.1976 or of 29.4.1975. Section

82 does not make any exception of the lease granted with approval.

The approval is mentioned only in Section 75 of the 1987 Act. Even

if such approval is treated to have been granted in respect of the

entire land, the lease granted with approval is relevant only for the

purposes of Section 75 of the 1987 Act and not for the purposes of

Section 82 of the said Act.

70. Similarly, the argument that the land now falls within the urban

agglomeration in view of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling

and Regulation) Act, 1976 is again not tenable. Firstly, the said Act

stands repealed on 22.3.1999. Still further, the mere fact that the

land has come within the municipal limits would not make the land

as non-agricultural land. It only means that the land within the

municipal limits can be utilized or the buildings be constructed in

terms of the provisions of the Municipal Laws applicable thereto.

71. Similarly, the argument that the land in question falls with the Zonal

Development Plan for Kukatpally as per the communication of the

Hyderabad Urban Development Authority is again not tenable. The

Zonal Development Plan is future planning of the development of

the area. Thus, in future, the land can be used only according to

Zonal Development Plan but that does not mean that the

agricultural nature of the land has ceased to exist. Therefore, the

said communication is also not tenable.

72. In Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014, there is a direction to consider the

request of the lessee. However, Rule 15 of the Telangana Charitable

and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable

Properties and other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases

and Licenses Rules, 2003 will have no application to the agricultural

land in view of the fact that Section 82(3) and (4) is applicable only

to the land and property which is not agricultural. Since the land

has been found to be agricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not

be applicable to the land in question. Thus, the direction to consider

the request of the lessee to consider the grant of lease under Rule

15 is untenable.

73. Consequently, Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014 are dismissed

whereas Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014 is allowed, setting aside the

direction to consider the request of the lessee under Rule 15 of the

Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and

Endowments Immovable Properties and other Rights (Other than

Agricultural Land) Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003.

.............................................J.

(HEMANT GUPTA)

.............................................J.

(VIKRAM NATH)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 13, 2022.

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