Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Versus Bharat Singh Jhala (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr.

Rajasthan State Road Transport  Corporation Versus Bharat Singh Jhala (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu  Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr. 

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

1

REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6942 of 2022

Rajasthan State Road Transport 

Corporation     … Appellant

Versus

Bharat Singh Jhala (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu 

Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr.                  … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

judgment and order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur

passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.645 of 2020 by

which the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the

said appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Single

Judge   dismissing   the   writ   petition   filed   by   the   appellant

2

confirming the order passed by the Labour Court setting aside

the   order  of  termination  passed against   the  workman,  the

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation has preferred the

present appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are

as under:

2.1 The workman was serving on the post of Conductor.  A

departmental enquiry was initiated against him alleging not

issuing the tickets to 10 passengers though he collected the

amount of tickets.   In the department inquiry he was found

guilty for the misconduct alleged.  The employer – Rajasthan

State Road Transport Corporation terminated his services vide

Order dated 31.07.2001.

2.2 An application for approval of punishment order under

Section   33(2)(b)   of   Industrial   Dispute   Act,   1947   (hereafter

referred   to   as   “the   I.D.   Act”)   was   submitted   before   the

Industrial  Tribunal   on   31.07.2001.  The   Industrial   Tribunal

3

held the enquiry bad.   However, the Industrial Tribunal vide

Order dated 12.12.2012 allowed the appellant – Corporation to

prove the charges before the Tribunal.  Both the parties led the

evidence   before   the   Tribunal   on   the   charges   alleged.   The

appellants led, both, oral as well as documentary evidences.

That   on   appreciation   of   entire   evidence   on   record   and

considering   the   submissions   made   on   behalf   of   both   the

parties, the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 21.07.2015

allowed the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act

and granted the approval of the order of termination.   That

thereafter and after a period of approximately 19 years from

the date of passing the order of termination, the workman

again raised the Industrial Dispute challenging the order of

termination   of   2001.     By   Judgment   and   Award   dated

19.11.2019   the   Labour   Court,   Jaipur   allowed   the   said

reference and set aside the order of termination.   As in the

meantime the workman died and the dispute was raised after

a   period   of   19   years,   the   Labour   Court   passed   an   order

awarding 50% back wages from the date of termination till his

4

death i.e. 10.12.2018.   The Judgment and Award passed by

the Labour Court was challenged before the learned Single

Judge of the High Court.  The learned Single Judge dismissed

the writ petition.   Against the award passed by the learned

Single   Judge   dismissing   the   writ   petition   the   appellant

preferred the appeal before the Division Bench.  By impugned

judgment and order the High Court has dismissed the said

appeal which has given rise to the present appeal.

3. Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellant   has   vehemently

submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the

Hon’ble   High   Court   has   committed   a   serious   error   in

dismissing   the   writ   appeal/writ   petition   confirming   the

judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Court.

3.1 It is submitted that once in an application under Section

33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act   and   pursuant   to   the   earlier   order

passed by the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant was permitted

to lead the evidence and prove the charge/misconduct and

thereafter when the order of termination was approved by the

5

Industrial   Tribunal,   thereafter   it   was   not   open   for   the

workman to again raise the Industrial Dispute that too after a

period of 19 years.  It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court

has materially erred in confirming the judgment and award

passed by  the  learned Labour Court  quashing  and  setting

aside the order of termination which as such was approved by

the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015.

3.2 Making   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   allow   the

present appeal.

4. Present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   H.D.

Thanvi,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the

respondents. 

4.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of

John   D’Souza   vs.   Karnataka   State   Road   Transport

Corporation,  (2019) 14 Scale 57, it is vehemently submitted

that   as   observed   and   held   by   this   Hon’ble   Court   the

proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 10 of the I.D.

6

Act are distinct and different.  It is submitted that as observed

and held by this Hon’ble Court in the aforesaid decision the

proceedings   under   Section   33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act   are

summary in nature and findings recorded while deciding the

application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act shall not affect

the substantive right in a reference under Section 10 of the

I.D. Act.

4.2 It is submitted that therefore, the Labour Court did not

commit any error in considering the validity of the order of

termination   and   thereafter   quashing   and   setting   aside   the

same and ordering 50% back wages.

4.3 It   is   submitted   that   considering   the   fact   that   the

workman has died and his heir ­ widow is awarded 50% back

wages only, the same may not be interfered by this Court in

exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India.

7

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective

parties at length.

5.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the workman

was subjected to departmental enquiry and the charge against

the   deceased   workman   was   not   issuing   the   tickets   to   10

passengers though he collected the fare.  On conclusion of the

departmental   enquiry   his   services   were   terminated.     The

termination was the subject matter of the approval application

before the Industrial Tribunal in an application under Section

33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act.     In   the   said   proceedings   the

management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the

charge/misconduct   before   the   Tribunal.     In   the   said

application the parties led the evidence, both, oral as well as

documentary.     Thereafter   on   appreciation   of   evidence   on

record,   the   Industrial   Tribunal   by   order   dated   21.07.2015

approved   the   order   of   termination.     That   thereafter   the

workman raised the Industrial Dispute challenging the order

of termination which as such was proved by the Industrial

8

Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015.  Therefore, once the order

of termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal and

the management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove

the   misconduct   before   the   Court   and   thereafter   on

appreciation   of   evidence   the   order   of   termination   was

approved, thereafter the fresh reference under Section 10 of

the   I.D.   Act   challenging   the   order   of   termination   was   not

permissible.   It is required to be noted that the order dated

21.07.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal which as such is

a   higher   forum   than   the   Labour   Court   had   attained   the

finality.  Though the aforesaid fact was pointed out before the

High Court, the High Court has not at all considered and/or

appreciated the same and has confirmed the judgment and

award passed by the Labour Court for setting aside the order

of termination which as such was approved by the Industrial

Tribunal.

5.2 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of

this Court in the case of John D’Souza (supra) by the learned

9

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent is concerned,

on facts the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of

the case on hand.   In the present case by specific order the

Industrial   Tribunal   permitted   the   management   to   lead   the

evidence and prove the misconduct before the Court which as

such was permissible.  That thereafter the Industrial Tribunal

approved   the   order   of   termination.   Once   the   order   of

termination   was   approved   by   the   Industrial   Tribunal   on

appreciation of evidence led before it, thereafter the findings

recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were binding between the

parties.     No   contrary   view   could   have   been   taken   by   the

Labour   Court   contrary   to   the   findings   recorded   by   the

Industrial Tribunal.

6. In view of the above, the judgment and award passed by

the   Labour   Court   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   is

unsustainable.  The High Court has committed a very serious

error in dismissing the writ petition/writ appeal confirming the

10

judgment and award passed by the Labour Court setting aside

the order of termination.

7. In view of the above and for the reason stated above the

present appeal succeeds.  The impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court confirming the judgment and award

passed   by   the   Labour   Court   setting   aside   the   order   of

termination   and   the   judgment   and   award   passed   by   the

Labour Court setting aside the order of termination are hereby

quashed and set aside.

The Present Appeal is Allowed to the aforesaid extent.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there

shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………………J.

            (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J.

New Delhi,     (KRISHNA MURARI)

September 30, 2022.