YASHODA (ALIAS SODHAN) VERSUS SUKHWINDER SINGH AND OTHERS

YASHODA (ALIAS SODHAN)  VERSUS SUKHWINDER SINGH AND OTHERS

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8247 OF 2009

YASHODA (ALIAS SODHAN)           ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SUKHWINDER SINGH AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. The   appeal   challenges   the   judgment   dated   28th

January 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge of the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular

Second Appeal No. 3205 of 2007 (O&M), thereby dismissing

the appeal filed by the present appellant.

2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are as

under:

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As   per   Kartar   Singh,   the   original   plaintiff   (since

deceased), the grandfather of respondent Nos.1 and 2, he

had entered into an agreement to sell the agricultural lands

on 10th January 1993.  As per the said agreement, the sale

deed was to be executed before 15th March 1994. According

to the plaintiff, a family settlement also took place between

him and the appellant­defendant in the month of November

1993. It is to be noted that the plaintiff initially filed a suit for

declaration against the appellant­defendant being Civil Suit

No. 141 of 1994 on 10th February 1994.  The said suit was

filed on the basis of the said family settlement that took place

in   the   month   of   November   1993.     On   the   basis   of   the

application filed by the plaintiff, the said suit was dismissed

as withdrawn on 7th May 1994.

3. The plaintiff filed the present suit on 2nd June 1994

being Suit No. 536 of 1994 seeking specific performance on

the basis of alleged agreement to sell dated 10th  January

1993.   The appellant­defendant resisted the suit by filing

written   statement   on   29th  October   1994.     In   the   written

statement, the appellant­defendant categorically denied the

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existence and/or the execution of any agreement to sell.  It

was specifically contended by the appellant­defendant that

the second suit was not maintainable in view of withdrawal

of the first suit. The plaintiff filed his Replication on 14th

November 1994 contending that the first suit for declaration

was   filed   only   to   avoid   payment   of   stamp   duty   and

registration charges.

4. The learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division),

Sunam   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “trial   court”)   vide

judgment and decree dated 6th  August 1997 dismissed the

suit for specific performance. Being aggrieved thereby, the

respondents,   i.e.,   the   legal   representatives   of   the   plaintiff

filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge,

Sangrur (hereinafter referred to as the “Appellate Court”).

The Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 26th

July 2007 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the

plaintiff for specific performance of agreement to sell dated

10th  January 1993. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellantdefendant preferred an appeal before the High Court.   The

High   Court   vide   impugned   judgment   dated   28th  January

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2009 dismissed the appeal.  Hence, the appellant­defendant

has approached this Court.

5. We have heard Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant­defendant and

Shri   Narender   Hooda,   learned   Senior   Counsel   and   Shri

Gagan Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents­plaintiffs.

6. Shri Luthra, learned Senior Counsel submitted that

the trial court, finding that the plaintiff had suppressed the

fact with regard to filing of the earlier suit and further that

the plaintiff had resiled from the stand taken by him in the

earlier litigation and taken a contrary stand, had dismissed

the suit.  He submitted that however, the learned Appellate

Court   erroneously   accepted   the   stand   of   the   plaintiff   in

Replication that the earlier suit was filed only in order to save

the stamp duty and registration charges and allowed the

appeal.  

7. Shri   Luthra   submitted   that   the   perusal   of   the

evidence of the plaintiff would show that he had not stated

anything   regarding   the   earlier   suit   in   his   evidence.     He

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submitted that, the learned Appellate Court has failed to take

into   consideration   that   all   the   witnesses   were   closely

associated with the plaintiff and therefore, their evidence was

not trustworthy.   He further submitted that the appellantdefendant had specifically put up a case that she was a

parda­nasheen lady and that the plaintiff was her cousin and

she   had   blind   faith   on   him.     He   submitted   that,   taking

disadvantage of such a blind faith, the plaintiff had taken her

thumb impression on some paper and used it to create an

agreement to sell.  He further submitted that, as a matter of

fact,   an   application   for   partition   was   also   filed   by   the

appellant­defendant   on   4th  July   1994.     He   therefore

submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the suit

deserves to be dismissed.

8. Shri   Luthra   relied   on   various   judgments   of   this

Court in support of the submission that, since the act of the

respondents­plaintiffs   of   suppression   of   material   facts

amounted to fraud, he was not entitled to a discretionary

relief.

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9. Shri Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondents­plaintiffs submitted that all the three courts

have concurrently found that the execution of the agreement

to sell dated 10th  January 1993 was duly established.   He

submitted that the trial court as well as the Appellate Court

and   the   High   Court   have   also   found   that   the   appellantdefendant has failed to establish the fact that the agreement

to sell is a result of fraud or misrepresentation.   Having

decided these issues in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs,

the trial court had erred in non­suiting the respondentsplaintiffs on a technical ground.  Shri Gupta, relying on the

judgment of this Court in the case of  Arunima Baruah  v.

Union   of   India   and   Others1

, submitted that, unless the

suppression of filing of an earlier suit is a material fact, such

non­disclosure would not be fatal to the case of the plaintiff.

Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Harjas

Rai   Makhija   (Dead)   Through   Legal   Representatives   v.

Pushparani Jain and Another2

, he submitted that a mere

concealment   or   non­disclosure   of   relevant   facts   without

1 (2007) 6 SCC 120

2 (2017) 2 SCC 797

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intent to deceive or a bald allegation of fraud without proof

and intent to deceive, would not render a decree obtained by

a party as fraudulent.   Shri Gupta submitted that in the

present case, the trial court itself has found that the plaintiff

had   failed   to   establish   fraud   and   as   such,   the   Appellate

Court has rightly allowed the appeal.  He also relies on the

judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Svenska

Handelsbanken   v.   M/s   Indian   Charge   Chrome   and

Others3

.  Shri Gupta further relies on the judgment of this

Court in the case of Union of India v. M/s Chaturbhai M.

Patel and Co.4

in support of his submission that fraud has

to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

10. Shri Gupta further submitted that the earlier suit for

declaration   was   filed   on   the   claim   that   the   respondentsplaintiffs were owner in possession of the suit property on

the basis of settlement deed, whereas the second suit was

filed on the basis of agreement to sell dated 10th  January

1993.  He submitted that there is nothing on record to show

3 (1994) 1 SCC 502

4 (1976) 1 SCC 747

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that the respondents­plaintiffs had any intention to defraud

the appellant­defendant.

11. Shri Hooda, learned Senior Counsel submitted that

after the Replication was allowed by the trial court, it became

a part of the plaint. As such, the respondents­plaintiffs had

sufficiently   proved   as   to   the   circumstances   in   which   the

earlier suit was filed.  He therefore submitted that the trial

court   had   erred   in   non­suiting   the   plaintiff   on   a   trivial

ground. Shri Hooda further submitted that after holding that

the respondents­plaintiffs had proved the agreement to sell,

that the appellant­defendant had failed to prove that any

fraud was played on her and that the issue under Order II

Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’)

was   also   in   favour   of   the   respondents­plaintiffs,   the   trial

court had grossly erred in dismissing the suit.  He submitted

that   the   said   error   has   been   rightly   corrected   by   the

Appellate Court.

12. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had filed a suit

for declaration being Civil Suit No. 141 of 1994.   It will be

relevant to refer to some of the averments in the said plaint:

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1. “That previously the defendant was owner to the

extent   of   1/3rd  share   in   land   measuring   205

Kanal   4   Marla   mustatil   &   killa   numbers   as

detailed   in   the   heading   of   the   plaint.   Copy   of

Jamabandi is attached herewith. 

2. That previously the defendant was also owner to

the extent of 1/6 share in land measuring 139

Kanal   2   Marla   and   land   gair   mumkin   plot

measuring   9   Kanal   2   Marla   mustatil   &   kiolla

numbers as detailed in the heading of the plaint.

Copy of Jamabandi is attached herewith. 

3. ………

4. That   about   three   months   ago   and   a   family

settlement took place between the plaintiff and

defendant and the land in dispute fallen into the

share   of   the   plaintiff   and   the   defendant   had

delivered the possession of the suit property to

the plaintiff after visiting the spot. In this now the

plaintiff   is   continuous   in   possession   over

disputed   property   as   owner   since   last   three

month. The defendant has remained no concern. 

5. That the defendant was requested to admit the

claim   of   the   plaintiff   and   to   get   corrected   the

name of the plaintiff in revenue record as owner

but the defendant after dilly­dallying the matter

had refused yesterday to do so from which cause

of   action   accrued   to   the   plaintiff   against   the

defendant.”

13. The   said   suit   for   declaration   was   filed   on   10th

February   1994.     It   is   to   be   noted   that   according   to   the

respondents­plaintiffs,   the   alleged   agreement   to   sell   was

executed on 10th January 1993.  As such it is prior in point

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of time to the date of filing of the suit for declaration i.e. 10th

February 1994.   There is no mention with regard to the

alleged agreement to sell in the said plaint.

14. The plaintiff filed an application on 7th May 1994 for

withdrawal of the said suit for declaration.  Vide order of the

same date, the trial court, after recording the statement of

the plaintiff that he did not want to proceed with the case,

dismissed the same as withdrawn. 

15. Within a period of one month, the plaintiff filed the

present suit for specific performance.   It will be relevant to

refer to some of the averments in the plaint:

“2. That the defendant agreed to sell the above said

suit land to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.

6,50,000/­   and   the   defendant   executed   an

agreement on dated 10.1.1994 at Patran in favour

of the plaintiff and received a sum of Rs. 50,000/­

from the plaintiff as earnest money and remaining

amount   was   to   be   paid   by   the   plaintiff   to   the

defendant at the time of sale deed before the SubRegistrar.   The   agreement   was   read   over   to   the

defendant   who   after   admitting   the   same   to   be

correct put her thumb impressions in the presence

of Lal Singh Lamberdar, Amolak Singh s/o Jagroop

Singh   and   Bhagwant   Singh   S/o   Krishan   Singh

resident of Shadihari and witnesses also attested

the said agreement in the presence of defendant.

The plaintiff put his thumb impression in token of

correctness of the above said agreement.

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……….

15. That there is no litigation pending or decided

between the parties with regard to the agreement in

question.”

16. It could thus clearly be seen that, the present suit

bases   its   claim  only   on   the   agreement  to   sell   dated   10th

January 1993.  Leave aside there being any reference to the

earlier   suit,   the   plaintiff   baldly   stated   that   there   was   no

litigation pending or decided between the parties with regard

to the agreement in question.  No doubt that it is sought to

be   argued   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondentsplaintiffs that the statement in paragraph (15) of the plaint is

only   with   regard   to   the   litigation   with   respect   to   the

agreement in question.  It is stated that the said paragraph

does   not   mention   litigation   with   regard   to   the   land   in

question and as such, there is no suppression of material

fact.

17. After the suit for specific performance was filed, the

written statement was filed by the appellant­defendant on

29th October 1994.  In the written statement, the appellantdefendant has stated thus:

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“3. That the plaintiff file the said suit no.141 dt.

10.2.1994 in the Court of P.C.S. Sub Judge First

Class Sunam on 10.2.1994 which was dismiss on

7.5.1994,   but   the   plaintiff   ending   between   the

parties, on this ground only the suit of the plaintiff

is liable to be dismissed. In case any agreement

executed earlier between the parties, the plaintiff

must mention about this in the suit, hence on this

alone ground the suit is liable to be dismissed. 

4) That the plaintiff on 10.2.1994 in regard to the

land  filed Suit for  pre­emption Right  against the

defendant   in   which   the   plaintiff   shown   himself

owner in possession of the land in question, the

said suit was consigned to record on 7.5.1994. In

the   said   suit   the   defendant   did   not   mention

anything in regard to the agreement DT 10.1.1994.

5) That the plaintiff did not come before the Hon'ble

Court   in   clean   hand   and   he   has   concealed   the

matter before the Hon'ble Court, hence the suit is

liable to be dismissed. 

6) That the plaintiff and Defendant are having close

relations with each other. The plaintiff is uncle's son

of Defendant. Defendant has no brother, hence he

treated plaintiff as her real brother and believe upon

him. Defendant is aged lady her eye sight is very

week and villager lady, she has no legal knowledge.

The plaintiff getting the wrongful gain of her believe

with the intention to grab her share has taken the

thumb   impression   on   the   writing   by   committing

cheating and fraudulent means.”

18. After   the   appellant­defendant   took   objection   with

regard to the earlier suit being withdrawn, the plaintiff came

with the Replication application wherein, for the first time, he

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came up with a story that the earlier suit was filed only to

save   the   stamp   duty   and   registration   fee   and   since   the

appellant­defendant became dishonest later on, the plaintiff

withdrew the suit.  It is thus clear that the Replication was

filed as an after­thought only to cure the lacuna as pointed

out in the written statement.   The trial court found that a

person cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions

in the court of law to play fast and loose and to blow hot and

cold.  The trial court, relying on the judgment of the Punjab

and Haryana High Court in the case of  Jaspal   Singh   v.

Sardul   Singh5

, held that a party cannot be permitted to

approbate and reprobate and resile from that position.  The

trial court has also found that the explanation submitted by

the plaintiff with regard to the circumstances under which

the earlier suit was filed, speaks volumes of the dishonest

intention of the plaintiff.  The trial court also found that the

plaintiff has made an attempt to defraud the State of its

revenue.  The trial court found that the past litigation has a

direct bearing on the merits of the present controversy.   It

observed that the plaintiff was duty bound to plead the same

5 1994 (3) Recent Revenue Reports 106 (Punjab and Haryana)

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in the plaint.  The trial court found that under Order VII Rule

1 (j) of the CPC (as applicable in Punjab), the statement with

regard to earlier litigation has to be made in the plaint.  It

will be relevant to refer to the said provision:

“ORDER VII

PLAINT

1. Particulars to be contained in plaint.

………….

(j)  a statement to the effect that no suit between

the same parties, or between the parties under

whom they or any of them claim, litigating on the

same grounds has been previously instituted or

finally   decided   by   a   Court   of   competent

jurisdiction or limited jurisdiction, and if so, with

what results.” 

19. The trial court therefore, relying on the judgment of

this Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead)

By   LRs.   v.   Jagannath   (Dead)   By   LRs.   and   Others6

,

dismissed the suit, though it had answered the other issues

in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs.

20. This well­reasoned judgment of the trial court came

to   be   reversed   by   the   Appellate   Court.     Accepting   the

6 (1994) 1 SCC 1

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explanation of the respondents­plaintiffs in Replication that

the earlier suit was filed in order to save the registration fee

and the stamp duty, the Appellate Court held that the nondisclosure of the plaintiff about earlier litigation in the plaint

but clarifying it later in  the Replication, was not  such a

crucial point on the basis of which he could be non­suited in

toto.

21. Though the suit was dismissed by the trial court and

decreed by the Appellate  Court, the High Court observed

thus:

“The learned trial Court came to the conclusion

that the agreement to sell and the default on the

part   of   the   appellant   has   been   established   and

therefore directed the agreement to be enforced by

way of execution of the sale deed. 

In appeal, the findings of the learned trial Court

were affirmed.”

22. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   there   is   total   nonapplication of mind by the High Court.  The High Court did

not even care to refer to the grounds raised in the appeal

with   regard   to   the   effect   of   non­disclosure   of   filing   and

withdrawal of the earlier suit.  The High Court dismissed the

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suit on the basis that it arises out of the concurrent findings

of fact and no question of law is involved.

23. What would be the effect of suppression of earlier

proceedings has been considered by this Court in the case of

S.P.   Chengalvaraya   Naidu  (supra).   The Court observed

thus:

“5. The   High   Court,   in  our  view,   fell  into   patent

error. The short question before the High Court was

whether in the facts and circumstances of this case,

Jagannath   obtained   the   preliminary   decree   by

playing   fraud   on   the   court.   The   High   Court,

however,   went   haywire   and   made   observations

which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the

High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon

the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and

prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality

of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such

an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in

the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law

are meant for imparting justice between the parties.

One who comes to the court, must come with clean

hands. We are constrained to say that more often

than   not,   process   of   the   court   is   being   abused.

Property­grabbers,   tax­evaders,   bank­loan­dodgers

and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of

life   find   the   court­process   a   convenient   lever   to

retain   the   illegal   gains   indefinitely.   We   have   no

hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based

on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He

can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the

litigation.

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6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of

doubt   that   Jagannath   obtained   the   preliminary

decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an

act   of   deliberate   deception   with   the   design   of

securing something by taking unfair advantage of

another.   It   is   a   deception   in   order   to   gain   by

another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an

advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with

Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the

court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had,

on his own volition, executed the registered release

deed   (Ex.   B­15)   in   favour   of   Chunilal   Sowcar

regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the

appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his

master   Chunilal   Sowcar.   Without   disclosing   all

these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the

property on the ground that he had purchased the

property on his own behalf and not on behalf of

Chunilal   Sowcar.   Non­production   and   even   nonmentioning   of   the   release   deed   at   the   trial   is

tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do

not agree with the observations of the High Court

that   the   appellants­defendants   could   have   easily

produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B­15

and   non­suited   the   plaintiff.   A   litigant,   who

approaches the court, is bound to produce all the

documents executed by him which are relevant to

the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in

order to gain advantage on the other side then he

would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well

as on the opposite party.”

24. Again   in   the   case   of  A.V.   Papayya   Sastry   and

Others  v.  Govt.  of  A.P.  and  Others7

, this Court observed

thus:

7 (2007) 4 SCC 221

17

“21. Now, it is well­settled principle of law that if

any   judgment   or   order   is   obtained   by   fraud,   it

cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law.

Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke

proclaimed:

“Fraud   avoids   all   judicial   acts,

ecclesiastical or temporal.”

22. It   is   thus   settled   proposition   of   law   that   a

judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud

on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and

non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment,

decree or order—by the first court or by the final

court—has to be treated as nullity by every court,

superior   or   inferior.   It   can   be  challenged   in  any

court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even

in collateral proceedings.

23. In   the   leading   case   of Lazarus   Estates

Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB

702   :   (1956)   2   WLR   502   (CA)]   Lord   Denning

observed : (All ER p. 345 C)

“No judgment of a court, no order of a

Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has

been obtained by fraud.”

24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases,

13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud,

de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would

be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it

might be impeachable from without. In other words,

though it is not permissible to show that the court

was   “mistaken”,   it   might   be   shown   that   it   was

“misled”. There is an essential distinction between

mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the

distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment

cannot be brought on the ground that it has been

decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the

decision   was   one   which   should   not   have   been

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rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was

imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.

25. It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell

together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud

and  deceit ought to benefit  none  (fraus   et   dolus

nemini patrocinari debent).

26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate

deception with the design of securing some unfair or

undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of

another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another.

Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they

are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic

collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether

in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of

litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an

absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of

oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.”

25. As   observed,   there   is   an   essential   distinction

between mistake and trickery.   In the present case, it is

sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents­plaintiffs

that the averment in paragraph (15) of the plaint was with

regard to a lis on the basis of the agreement.  It is submitted

that the earlier suit was not based on the agreement and as

such, there was no suppression.  We find the argument to be

unsustainable.  We are of the view that such a statement was

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made   as   a   trickery   so   as   to   obtain   the   judgment   by

misleading the court.  

26. In the case of H.N. Jagannath and Others v. State

of Karnataka and Others8

, the land owners filed civil suits

one after other in respect of acquired lands.  The said suits

were withdrawn without liberty to approach the court again.

Simultaneously,   land   owners   also   filed   writ   petitions

challenging the acquisition on different grounds.  The same

were dismissed.   Thereafter, the land owners submitted an

application to the State Government for denotification of the

land.   Since it was not considered, one more writ petition

came   to   be   filed   in   which   a   direction   was   issued   for

consideration of the representation.  The said representation

was rejected in the year 1992.  The land owners filed another

writ petition questioning the rejection of its representation.

The same was also dismissed.   Thereafter, six more writ

petitions   were   filed   again   questioning   the   validity   of

acquisition proceedings and yet again, they were dismissed.

In an intra­court appeal, the Division Bench relegated the

parties   to   the   civil   court   to   work   out   their   remedies.

8 (2018) 11 SCC 104

20

Criticizing the approach of the Division Bench, this Court

observed thus:

“14. It is not in dispute that the property in question

along with other properties was acquired by the BDA in

accordance   with   law   by   issuing   notifications   under

Sections 17(1) and 19(1) of the BDA Act as far back as

in the year 1977 and in the year 1979. BDA has formed

and   allotted   the   sites.   Most   of   the   allottees   have

constructed   houses   and   are   residing   peacefully.

However, Respondent 4 still contends that possession

has   remained   with   it   and   therefore   the   acquisition

needs   to   be   set   aside   and   that   the   land   should   be

denotified. As detailed supra, Respondent 4 has already

approached the civil court thrice and High Court on six

occasions.   Whenever   the   suits   are   withdrawn,

Respondent 4 has not sought any liberty to approach

the civil court once again. Thus, it was not open for

Respondent 4 to approach the civil court repeatedly for

the very same reliefs. Consistently, the civil court on

three   occasions   has   negatived   the   contention   of   the

appellant.

15. Even   when   Respondent   4   approached   the   High

Court of Karnataka by filing the writ petitions and writ

appeals, it has failed. Futile attempts have been made

by   Respondent   4   only   to   see   that   the   allottees   are

harassed and to keep the litigation pending. After the

final   notification,   an   award   was   passed   and

compensation was deposited. Possession was taken and

the same was evidenced by the panchnama prepared as

far   back   as   on   23­9­1986.   The   notification   under

Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on

20­1­1987 disclosing the factum of taking possession of

the land in question. Attempt made by Respondent 4 for

getting the disputed land denotified has also failed as

far back as on 15­1­1993, when the State Government

had rejected the representation of Respondent 4 seeking

21

denotification. The writ petition filed by Respondent 4

challenging   such   order   of   dismissal   of   the

representation was also dismissed. Despite the same,

Respondent   4   is   pursuing   the   matter   by   filing   writ

petition after writ petition. It is a clear case of abuse of

process of law as well as the court.

16. We do not find any reason to interfere in the finding

of   fact   rendered   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   that

possession was taken by BDA on 23­9­1986. There is

nothing to be adjudicated further in respect of the title

or possession of the property. The title as well as the

possession   of   the   property   has   vested   with   BDA   for

about more than 30 years prior to this day and sites

were formed and allotted to various persons including

the appellant herein. In the light of such voluminous

records and having regard to the fact that Respondent 4

has   been   repeatedly   making   futile   attempts   by

approaching   the   courts   of   law   by   raising   frivolous

contentions,   the   Division   Bench   ought   not   to   have

granted liberty to Respondent 4 to approach the civil

court once again for the very same relief, for which it

has failed earlier. In view of this, the learned counsel for

the appellant is justified in contending that the Division

Bench   has   completely   erred   in   reviving   the   dispute

which had long been given a legal quietus after a series

of litigations. The judgment of the Division Bench, if

allowed to stand, will unsettle the settled state of affairs

involving   hundreds   of   allottees   of   sites   who   have

constructed the houses and are residing therein. The

impugned judgment of the Division Bench virtually sets

at naught a number of judgments rendered by the civil

court as well as the High Court in the very matter (and

was given without any reason much less a valid reason).

17. ……..

18. ……..

19. Having regard to the discussion made supra, in our

considered   opinion,   it   is   a   clear   case   of   contempt

22

committed by Respondent 4 by repeatedly approaching

the courts of law for almost the same relief which was

negatived by the courts for three decades. However, we

decline to initiate contempt proceedings and to impose

heavy costs, under the peculiar facts and circumstance

of this case.”

27. We find that the Appellate Court has grossly erred in

reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court which

had dismissed the suit taking into consideration the conduct

of the respondents­plaintiffs.  

28. Insofar as the reliance placed by Shri Gupta on the

judgment  of  this   Court  in   the  case  of  Arunima   Baruah

(supra) is concerned, the Court observed thus:

“12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to

refuse   to   exercise   its   discretionary   jurisdiction

suppression must be of material fact. What would

be   a   material   fact,   suppression   whereof   would

disentitle   the   appellant   to   obtain   a   discretionary

relief,   would   depend   upon   the   facts   and

circumstances   of   each   case.   Material   fact   would

mean material for the purpose of determination of

the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that

whether the same was material for grant or denial of

the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for

determination  of  the  lis  between  the  parties,  the

court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary

jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking

the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be

allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands.

But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands

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become   clean,   whether   the   relief   would   still   be

denied is the question.”

29. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that

what would be a ‘material fact’ would depend upon the facts

and circumstances of each case. It has also been held that

‘material   fact’   would   mean   material   for   the   purpose   of

determination of the lis. It has also been held that a person

invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be

allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands.   In the

present case, filing of the earlier suit and withdrawal thereof

without   liberty   to   file   another   suit   was   a   material   fact.

Undisputedly,   the   respondents­plaintiffs   had   failed   to

approach the court with clean hands.  As such, we find that

the said judgment would be of no assistance to the case of

the respondents­plaintiffs. 

30. Insofar as the judgment in the case of  Harjas Rai

Makhija (supra) is concerned, in the facts of the said case,

the Court held that though the appellant Makhija had an

opportunity to prove the allegation of fraud when he filed an

application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC, he missed

24

that opportunity right up to this Court.   He took a second

shot at alleging fraud and filed another suit.   However, he

failed in the trial court as well as the High Court as he could

not produce any evidence to prove that fraud was committed

by the respondent when she obtained the decree dated 4th

October 1999.   As such, the said judgment would not be

applicable to the facts of the present case.

31. Insofar   as   the   judgment   in   the   case   of  M/s

Chaturbhai M. Patel and Co.  (supra) is concerned, it was

the case of defendant that some amount of fraud had been

played on the defendant by the collusion of the plaintiff with

his father.   This Court, concurring with the findings of the

High Court, found that the circumstances relied on by the

appellant were not at all conclusive to prove the case of

fraud.     The   present   case   is   a   case   of   suppression   of   a

material fact with regard to filing and withdrawal of earlier

proceedings.     As   such,   the   said   judgment   would   not   be

applicable to the facts of the present case.

32. Similarly,   the   facts   in   the   case   of  Svenska

Handelsbanken  (supra) were also totally different and as

25

such, reliance on the said judgment is also of no assistance

to the case of the respondents­plaintiffs in the present case.

33. In that view of the matter, we find that the Appellate

Court   has   grossly   erred   in   reversing   the   well­reasoned

judgment and decree of the trial court.  As already observed

hereinabove,   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   passed

without application of mind.  The High Court has gone on a

premise that the trial court had decreed the suit and the

Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal.  This is factually

erroneous.

34. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeal is allowed;

(ii) The   judgment   and   decree   dated  26th  July   2007

passed by the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 191

of 2006 and the judgment passed by the High Court

dated 28th January 2009 in R.S.A. No. 3205 of 2007

(O&M) are quashed and set aside; and

(iii) The   judgment   and   decree   dated   6th  August   1997

passed by the trial court in Suit No. 536 of 1994

26

thereby   dismissing   the   suit   of   the   respondentsplaintiffs is upheld. 

35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of

in the above terms. No order as to costs.

…..….......................J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

 …….......................J.       

[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 12, 2022.

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