Dr. Abraham Patani of Mumbai & Anr. VERSUS The State of Maharashtra & Ors

Dr. Abraham Patani of Mumbai & Anr. VERSUS The State of Maharashtra & Ors

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5929 OF 2022

 [    ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.13754 OF 2022]

Dr. Abraham Patani of Mumbai & Anr. ..... Appellants

                                       

VERSUS

The State of Maharashtra & Ors. ..... Respondents

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J:

1. Leave Granted.

2. This appeal arises from the judgment dated 30.05.2022 passed

by the Bombay High Court dismissing the Appellants’ Writ Petition in

which they had sought to quash a series of resolutions passed by

Respondent   No.   2,   as   well   as   notifications   and   a   final   award   of

compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“LAA”) issued by

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Respondent Nos. 10 & 11, which cumulatively resulted in acquisition

of parts of the Appellants’ property for construction of a new road. 

A. FACTS

3. The genesis and course of the present dispute spans several

decades and includes one prior round of litigation before this Court.

The crux of the matter arises from the opposition by Appellants to the

construction of a road through their property by Respondent No. 2,

the Municipal Corporation of Mumbai. The property in question was

acquired by the Appellants in 1959, and a building known as the

“INGA Building” was constructed on it in 1965. 

4. The possibility of having a road through the Appellants’ land was

floated initially in a Development Plan (“DP”) of 1976. After this, the

road was realigned in 1984 in order to secure smooth passage through

Appellants’ land. Appellants raised objections in this regard in 1992

and the planned road was deleted from the DP via notification dated

12.11.1992 issued by Respondent No. 1. 

5. During this period, various complaints were allegedly received

from residents in surrounding areas regarding the need for a road in

order   to   connect   the   Mahakali   Caves   with   the   Central   Industrial

District. Respondent No. 1 issued a directive under Section 37(1) of

the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act”) on

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07.06.1993, acknowledging the need for a connecting road but stating

that it was “not feasible” to pursue construction of an 18.30 metre

road   through   the   Appellants’   land.   Thus,   Respondent   No.   2   was

instructed to analyse the legal and technical aspects of the project

before   submitting   a   proposal   for   setting   up   the   road   with   minor

modifications in the DP under Section 37 of the MRTP Act.

6. Meanwhile, Appellants completed construction of a bungalow on

their land in 1994. However, subsequent sanctions sought by the

Appellants   for   further   buildings   were   rejected   by   the   Municipal

Corporation on the ground that a proposal for creation of a link road

through the property was under consideration. 

7. Respondent   No.   2   eventually   passed   Resolution   No.   651   on

10.09.1996   that   renewed   the   proposal   to   have   the   link   road

constructed through Appellants’ land. Two further resolutions were

then   passed:   a)   Resolution   No.   39   dated   18.08.1998   by   the

Improvement Committee affirming the proposal for the link road; b)

Resolution No. 536 on 08.12.1998 by Respondent No. 2 under Sec.

126 of the MRTP Act and Secs. 90(1) & (3) of the Mumbai Municipal

Corporation Act (“MMC Act”) for the acquisition of land in order to

build the new road line. 

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8. The Office of the Chief Engineer (Development Plan) forwarded

an application to Respondent No. 1 on 05.02.1999 seeking to initiate

proceedings under the LAA. Appellants filed protestations before the

state authorities claiming that the dimensions and route for the link

road would touch the buildings that had been constructed by them.

Given these continuing disputes, Respondent No. 2 eventually passed

Resolution No. 1167 on 09.03.2001 which noted that there were three

other road lines that connected the Mahakali Caves with the Central

MIDC.   Consequently,   it   was   concluded   that   an   additional   road

through Appellants’ property was redundant. 

9. Private Respondents, Nos. 6­9, challenged this decision before

the HC in WP No. 1072 of 2001. While this was pending, Respondent

No. 2 proposed to reconsider Resolution No. 1167. Appellants filed a

Notice   of   Motion   in   the   already   pending   WP,   seeking   to   restrain

Respondent No. 2 from once again tabling the motion to have a link

road through their land. This Notice was dismissed by the High Court

on 18.10.2002 with liberty granted to Respondent No. 2 to reconsider

the decision made on 09.03.2001 but with a caveat that any fresh

resolution   passed   thereafter   would   only   be   given   effect   to   after

obtaining leave from the Court. 

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10. Respondent No. 2 proceeded to pass Resolution No. 1117 on

28.10.2002   which   withdrew   Resolution   No.   1167,   and   partially

modified the earlier resolution passed on 08.12.1998. The net result of

this was that the acquisition of Appellants’ land was sanctioned for

building an 18.30 metre new road line. Appellants moved Writ Petition

No. 3060 of 2002 challenging the renewal of the plan to construct the

link road  and seeking to  quash three Resolutions: a)  No. 651  on

10.09.1996; b) No. 536 on 08.12.1998; c) No. 1117 on 28.10.2002. 

11. Meanwhile, the High Court disposed of WP No. 1072 of 2001

with the observation that after the passage of Resolution No. 1117, the

WP in question had become infructuous and the validity and legality of

the Resolution would be decided by the High Court in the proceedings

initiated by Appellants. 

12. During pendency of the Appellants’ WP, and pursuant to the

application of 05.02.1999, the acquisition exercise under the LAA was

put in motion. Respondent No. 10 and 11 issued notifications under

Sections 4 and 6 of the LAA directing that Appellants’ land be acquired

in public interest. The award of compensation under Section 11 was

declared   on   26.11.2007.   Appellants   consequently   incorporated   a

challenge   to   the   notification   under   Sec.   6   and   the   award   of

compensation, into their prayer in the pending Writ Petition. 

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13. Appellants’ interim prayer for status quo vis­à­vis the property

was rejected by the High Court and, being aggrieved by this denial,

they instituted SLP (Civil) No. 22849 of 2008 in which the Supreme

Court ordered that status quo be maintained as on 22.09.2008. The

SLP remained pending for over a decade until it was disposed of vide

order dated 05.12.2019 with a request to the High Court to finally

decide the matter. The order of status quo was extended till the final

judgment by the High Court. 

14. Before the High Court, the Appellants assailed the entire land

acquisition process on broadly three grounds: a) The MRTP Act formed

a complete code for the purpose of town planning and development,

and hence, Respondent No. 2 could not resort to the provisions of the

MMC Act to circumvent a DP that is approved under the MRTP Act.

Instead, it was mandatory to seek permission from Respondent No. 1

for effectuating minor modifications in the DP under Section 37 of the

MRTP Act; b) In arguendo, the procedure under the MMC Act for land

acquisition had not been followed. Section 91 of the MMC Act required

Respondent   No.   3   to   initiate   the   process   of   acquiring   land   under

Section 296 for laying down a new road under Section 291. However,

in this case, the Office of the Chief Engineer had been the authority

which took the first step which was an incurable defect. Additionally,

no authorization had been granted by Respondent No. 1, as required

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under Section 91 of the MMC Act; c) Appellants had not been given

sufficient   opportunity   to   voice   their   grievances   in   respect   of

Respondent No. 2’s plan to build the link road through their land. 

15. The Appellants’ Writ Petition was eventually dismissed vide the

impugned judgment whereby the High Court declined to quash the

various resolutions passed by Respondent No. 2, and the notification

and award of compensation under the LAA. Thus, the High Court

affirmed the need to acquire Appellants’ land for construction of the

link road in public interest. 

16. The Division Bench held: ­

i) The acquisition of Appellants’ land and decision to lay a new

road through it was taken pursuant to Sections 91, 291(a)

and   296,   of   the   MMC   Act.   The   MMC   Act   conferred

Respondent No. 2 with the power to acquire land and build a

new road which required neither prior permission from the

State Govt., nor for the road itself to be reflected in the DP;

ii) The MMC Act and MRTP Act are distinct, and the powers

granted to Respondent No. 2 under the former would not be

impliedly repealed by the latter merely because it was a

subsequent statute. Rather, they would exist side­by­side

and supplement each other in the areas where there was an

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overlap of powers. Thus, Respondent No. 2 had the option of

either going through the MRTP Act or the MMC Act and it

had used its discretion to exercise the latter option;

iii) While it was true that the link road was not included in the

DP   after   its   deletion   in   1992,   this   did   not   prevent

Respondent   No.   2   from  acting  under  the   MMC  Act.   The

MRTP Act dealt with crafting of development plans at the

macro   level,   while   Respondent   No.   2   was   at   liberty   to

exercise its powers under the MMC Act to iron out minute

details and carry out work that would be in furtherance of

such a plan, such as the construction of a link road;

iv) Sec. 37 of the MRTP Act which laid out a rigorous process

for   making   minor   adjustments   to   a   DP   would   not   be

relevant, as Respondent No. 2 had acted under the MMC Act

and not the MRTP Act to facilitate the acquisition of land

and setting up of the road;

v) The requirements under Section 91 of the MMC Act had

been complied with. Even though the Office of the Chief

Engineer rather than Respondent No. 3 had forwarded the

letter   to   Respondent   No.   10   seeking   to   initiate   the   land

acquisition proceedings, this was only a minor defect that

would not invalidate the process; 

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vi) Respondent   No.   1   had   acceded   to   the   steps   taken   by

Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 to acquire the Appellants’ land by

initiating the land acquisition proceedings under the LAA

through Respondent Nos. 10 & 11, which showed that it was

in agreement with the need for obtaining the property for the

link road; 

vii) There was a clear and urgent need for building the road to

alleviate traffic congestion in the area caused by the lack of

a connector from the Mahakali Caves to the Central MIDC.

Thus,   public   interest   would   have   to   trump   the   private

interests of Appellants. 

It is in this context that Appellants have approached this Court for the

second time. 

B. SUBMISSIONS

17. Mr. Shyam Divan & Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsels for the

Appellants, have raised the following contentions while assailing the

impugned judgment: ­

i) The DP under the MRTP Act holds a position of primacy. It

is   not   possible   for   Respondent   No.   2   to   act   on   its   own

initiative in proposing construction of a road when the road

itself   is   not   reflected   in   the   DP.   Respondent   No.   1   had

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already made its opinion on the matter clear by deleting the

road   from   the   overall   DP   through   a   notification   on

12.11.1992, and had then suggested that Respondent No. 2

re­examine the issue in its Directive under Section 37 of the

MRTP Act, dated 07.06.1993;

ii) Section 31 of the MRTP Act provides the entire process by

which a DP is finalized and sanctioned. The overall scheme

under Section 31 envisages a consultative process with the

general   public   whereby   objections   and   suggestions   are

invited and considered. Respondent No. 2 has taken away

the right accorded under Section 31 to object to aspects of

the plan by circumventing it by way of a resolution under

the MMC Act; 

iii) The High Court’s ruling permits a subordinate authority, the

Municipal Corporation, to subvert the State Government’s

DP. This would cause violence to the mandate of the MRTP

Act; 

iv) Given the hierarchy established between the MRTP Act and

the MMC Act, Respondent No. 2’s usage of provisions of the

latter to do what cannot be done under the former, is merely

a colourable exercise of power;

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v) The MRTP Act is a complete code that provides for every

aspect of formulating, modifying, and finalizing a DP. Any

actions   taken   under   either  the   MCC  Act   or  the   LAA,   to

acquire land and use it for any purpose that is not expressly

sanctioned   in   the   DP,   are   illegal.   Reliance   is   placed   on

Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (“Girnar

Traders   2011”)1 and  Manohar   Joshi   v.   State   of

Maharashtra & Ors.2

vi) Permitting a Municipal Corporation to act outside of a DP

will create a chaotic situation and facilitate unbridled usage

of   the   powers   under   the   relevant   municipal   corporation

statute. Such discretion cannot be accorded to a municipal

corporation to act outside the contours of the relevant DP;

vii) Even under the MMC Act, the requirement of Respondent

No. 3 initiating the process under Section 91 has not been

fulfilled. The minimum safeguard provided under Section 91

is for the municipal commissioner himself/herself to at least

apply   his/her   mind   to   the   proposal   and   then   make   an

application to the State Govt. under Section 91. These are

not minor defects but basic protections under the MMC Act

1 (2011) 3 SCC 1.

2 (2012) 3 SCC 619.

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and must be construed strictly. The judgment in  Girnar

Traders   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   (“Girnar   Traders

2007”)3

 is cited in this regard;

viii) Notwithstanding the aforementioned defect, Section 91 of

the MMC Act requires the State Govt., upon receipt of an

application   for   the   acquisition   of   land,   to   authorize   the

initiation   of   proceedings   under   the   LAA.   No   such

authorization has been granted in this case and the DP does

not provide for the road in any case. 

ix) Resolution No. 1167 had explicitly noted that the proposed

road  seemed  to be for the  benefit of  private individuals,

Respondent Nos. 4­9, and was not for any discernible public

interest. 

18. Arguing in support of the impugned judgment, learned Counsel

Mr. Girish Godbole, appearing for Respondent Nos. 2 & 3, learned

Senior Counsel, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, appearing for Respondent Nos.

6­9, alongside learned Counsel Mr. S.C. Dharmadhikari, appearing for

Respondent Nos. 4 & 5, have placed the following submissions:

i) Sanction for construction of the link road was obtained via

three resolutions: i) No. 651 on 10.09.1996; ii) Resolution

3 (2007) 7 SCC 555.

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No. 39 by the Improvement Committee on 18.08.1998; iii)

Resolution No. 536 of 08.12.1998 which was a composite

resolution under Section 126 of the MRTP Act, and Section

90(1) & (3) of the MMC Act. Mr. Godbole clarifies that the

third resolution was, in effect, under Section 91 of the MMC

Act and the mention of Section 90 is merely a typographical

error;

ii) In terms of authorization required from Respondent No. 1

for carrying out the acquisition process, Sections 4 & 6 of

the   LAA   provide   that   the   State   Govt.   is   the   party   that

initiates   the   process   of   issuing   a   notification   and   then

declaring   that   a   parcel   of   land   is   needed   for   a   public

purpose. Hence, the steps taken subsequently under the

LAA demonstrate that the State Govt. was ad idem with the

municipal corporation on the need to procure Appellants’

land;

iii) Section 91 of the MMC has been complied with. The fact

that   the   Office   of   the   Chief   Engineer   forwarded   the

application   to   the   State   Govt.   is   inconsequential   as   the

action is a formality. The Commissioner was part of the

Ministerial   Committee   where   the   decision   regarding

Appellants’ land was taken and the application was only

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made   after   accruing   the   approval   of   the   committee,

including the Commissioner; 

iv) The MMC Act and MRTP Act operate in completely different

fields and co­exist simultaneously. If the State legislature

intended to erode the powers under the MMC Act, it would

have included provisions to that effect. 

v) Resort to Sections 91, 291(a) and 296 of the MMC Act as the

mode of acquisition was ideal for Appellants as they would

receive compensation via the statutory mechanism under

the LAA. Moreover, the plan for the road, as proposed by

Respondent   No.   2,   does   not   impact   the   buildings

constructed on the land. Hence, no substantial prejudice is

caused to Appellants;

vi) The   directive   dated   07.06.1993   cannot   be   classified   as

coming under Section 37 of the MRTP Act. The State Govt.

merely   suggested   that   Respondent   No.   2   reconsider   the

technical and legal aspects of the proposed link road after

which no further steps were taken. There was no express

modification directed to be made, and this was merely part

of the process of revisions and consideration of the DP.

vii) Appellants’ conduct and the manner in which they had the

buildings   on   the   land   constructed   in   defiance   of   an

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undertaking   that   was   given   to   the   state   authorities,

disentitles them to any relief on equitable grounds. Further,

their   repeated   representations   directly   to   the   State

authorities   and   attempts   to   manipulate   the   road

construction show mala fide intent;

viii) The link road is in public interest, and such a consideration

must override private interest.

19. Learned   senior   counsel,   Mr.   Divan,   countered   Respondents’

submissions in his rejoinder by raising the following points:

i) The Resolution of 08.12.1998 was under Section 90 of the

MMC Act which is for acquisition by consent. There was

neither consent for acquisition nor any separate resolution

under   Section   91   of   the   MMC   Act   that   was   passed   by

Respondents. Even if the submission by Mr. Godbole that

this was essentially a resolution under Section 91 is to be

accepted,   the   subsequent   Resolution   No.   1167   of

09.03.2001, and letter dated 14.03.2001 by Respondent No.

2, expressly noted there was no need for a road to be built

through   Appellants’   property.   Hence,   this   nullified   any

purported decision that may have been taken under Section

91 in the resolution dated 08.12.1998. 

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ii) The argument regarding disentitlement to relief on equitable

grounds is unfounded, since it is the municipal corporation

that has repeatedly changed its stance on the need for the

link road;

iii) The  affidavit  submitted  by  Vyaravali   Village  Development

Assn. before the High Court in the WP filed by Respondent

Nos. 6­9, shows that there was a clear application of mind to

the issue of constructing the link road. Resolution No. 1167

was the product of these deliberations. Thus, no claim of

manipulation   and   mala   fides   can   be   raised   against

Appellants.

iv) Having devoted our earnest attention to the submissions

advanced by both sides, and after perusing the record, we

now proceed to consider the issues that have been raised. 

C. ANALYSIS

C.1. Interplay between the MRTP Act and the MMC Act

20. The primary issue that emerges from the arguments raised by

the parties is with regard to the interaction between the MRTP Act and

the MMC Act. Specifically, the Appellants posit that the procedure

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under Section 37 of the MRTP Act for amendment of a DP is the sole

method by which construction that is not provided for within the DP

can subsequently be authorized. 

21. Section 37 of the MRTP Act (relevant part) sets out the following

process:

37. Modification of final Development plan

(1) Where a modification of any part of or any proposal

made   in,  a  final  Development  plan    *  *  *,  the  Planning

Authority   may,   or   when   so   directed   by   the   State

Government  [shall,  within  ninety  days  from  the  date  of

such  direction,  publish  a  notice]   in  the  Official  Gazette

[and   in  such  other  manner  as  may  be  determined  by  it]

inviting objections and suggestions from any person with

respect to  the proposed modification not later than one

month from the date of such notice ; and shall also serve

notice   on   all   persons   affected   by   the   proposed

modification   and   after   giving   a   hearing   to   any   such

persons,   submit   the   proposed   modification   (with

amendments,   if   any,)   [to   the   State   Government   for

sanction within one year from the date of publication of

notice   in   the   Official   Gazette.   If   such   modification

proposal   is   not   submitted  within   the   period   stipulated

above,  the  proposal  of  modification   shall  be  deemed   to

have lapsed: 

Provided   that,   such   lapsing   shall  not  bar   the  Planning

Authority from making a fresh proposal.] 

[(1A) If the Planning Authority fails to issue the notice as

directed by the State Government, the State Government

shall   issue   the  notice,  and   thereupon   the  provisions  of

sub­section (1) shall apply as they apply in relation to a

notice to be published by a Planning Authority.] 

[(1AA)(a)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   subsections (1),  (1A) and (2),  where the State Government is

satisfied   that   in   the   public   interest   it   is   necessary   to

carry out urgently a modification of any part of, or any

proposal  made   in,  a   final   Development   plan   of   such  a

nature   that   it   will   not   change   the   character   of   such

Development plan, the State Government may, on its own,

publish a notice in the Official Gazette, and in such other

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manner  as  may  be  determined  by   it,   inviting  objections

and   suggestions   from   any   person   with   respect   to   the

proposed modification not later than one month from the

date   of   such   notice   and   shall   also   serve   notice   on   all

persons  affected   by   the   proposed  modification  and   the

Planning Authority. 

(b) The State Government shall, after the specified period,

forward a copy of all such objections and suggestions to

the   Planning   Authority   for   its   say   to   the   Government

within   a   period   of   one  month   from   the   receipt   of   the

copies   of   such   objections   and   suggestions   from   the

Government. 

(c)   The  State  Government   shall,  after  giving   hearing   to

the   affected   persons   and   the   Planning   Authority   and

after making such inquiry as it may consider necessary

and   consulting   the   Director   of   Town   Planning,   by

notification in the Official Gazette, publish the approved

modifications   with   or   without   changes,   and   subject   to

such conditions as it may deem fit, or may decide not to

carry   out   such  modification.   On   the   publication   of   the

modification   in   the   Official   Gazette,   the   final

Development plan shall be deemed to have been modified

accordingly.]

22. As opposed to this, Respondents have attempted to make a case

that the power vested in the municipal corporation under Sections 91,

291(a), and 296 of the MMC Act, are unaffected by Section 37 of the

MRTP Act. The interpretation of the three provisions comprise the crux

of the present case and they are reproduced below (relevant part):

91.   Procedure   when   immoveable   property   cannot   be

acquired by agreement. 

(1) Whenever the Commissioner is unable to acquire any

immovable property  under  the  last  preceding  section by

agreement   [the   [State]   Government]   may,   in   their

discretion,   upon   the   application   of   the   Commissioner,

made with the approval of [the Improvements Committee]

[and   subject   to   the   other   provisions   of   this   Act]   order

proceedings to be taken for acquiring the same on behalf

of   the   corporation,   as   if   such   property   were   a   land

Page 18 of 61

needed  for  a  public  purpose  within  the  meaning  of   the

Land Acquisition Act, 1870.* 

(2)  The  amount  of  compensation  awarded  and  all  other

charges incurred in the acquisition of any such property

shall,   subject   to   all   other   provisions   of   this   Act,   be

forthwith  paid  by   the  Commissioner  and   thereupon   the

said property shall vest in the corporation.

     x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x

291. Power to make new public streets

The Commissioner, when authorised by the corporation in

this behalf may at any time— 

(a) lay out and make a new public street; 

(b) agree with any person for the making of a street for

public   use   through   the   land   of   such   person,   either

entirely  at  the  expense  of  such  person  or  partly  at  the

expense of such person and partly at the expense of the

corporation,   and   that   such   street   shall   become,   on

completion, a public street; 

[(c)   declare   any   street   made   under   an   improvement

scheme  duly  executed  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of

the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, or the City of

Bombay   Improvement  Trust  Transfer  Act,  1925,  to  be  a

public street.]

     x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x

296.   Power   to   acquire   premises   for   improvements   of

public street

(1)   The   Commissioner  may,   subject   to   the   provisions   of

section 90, 91 and 92—

(a) acquire any land required for the purpose of opening,

widening,   extending   or   otherwise   improving  any   public

street   or   of   making   any   new   public   street,   and   the

buildings, if any standing upon such land; 

(b) acquire in addition to the said land and the buildings,

if   any,   standing,   thereupon,   all   such   land   with   the

buildings,   if  any,   standing   thereupon,  as   it   shall   seem

expedient   for   the   corporation   to  acquire   outside  of   the

regular   line,   or   of   the   intended   regular   line,   of   such

street; 

(c) lease, sell or otherwise dispose of any land or building

purchased under clause (b). 

(2) Any conveyance of land or of a building under clause

(c)  may   comprise   such   conditions   as   the   Commissioner

Page 19 of 61

thinks fit, as to the removal of the existing building, the

description   of   new   building   to   be   erected,   the   period

within which such new building shall be completed and

other such matters.

23. Under the MCC Act, the power to make a new public street is

derived from Section 291. For the purpose of making a new street,

Section 296 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to acquire land,

subject to fulfilment of the conditions stipulated in Sections 90­92.

For our purposes, Section 91 is the consequential provision since

Appellants’ land could not, evidently, be acquired by agreement and

had to be procured under the terms of the procedure provided therein.

24. The entire scheme of land acquisition for the purpose of laying a

new road line is provided within the contours of Sections 91, 291(a)

and 296. There is undoubtedly a certain degree of overlap between

these provisions, and Section 37 of the MRTP Act as they deal with

procurement of land. However, the latter is relevant in the context of a

DP whereas the MCC Act regulates the manner in which the Mumbai

Municipal   Corporation   operates.   Moreover,   merely   because   both

statutes  are  concerned  with   land  acquisition,  may  not  necessarily

result in conflict between them. 

25. Learned   Senior   Counsels   for   the   Appellants   urged   that   the

interpretation of the provisions of the MRTP Act and MMC Act must be

such that actions under the latter could only be taken if sanction and

Page 20 of 61

approval for them had been obtained under the MRTP Act. While it is

true that the respective provisions in both Statutes deal with  the

method   for   procuring   land   in   public   interest,   there   is   nothing

contained   within   them   which   explicitly   or   impliedly   makes   them

subject to one another. A bare reading indicates that they operate in

distinctive fields which may not always be co­dependent. Appellants’

interpretation amounts to curtailing the power that Respondent No. 2

would   have   otherwise   been   able   to   exercise   under   the   MMC   Act,

outside the contours of the MRTP Act. 

26. It is well settled that provisions of one statute should not be

construed or interpreted in a manner that they render redundant the

provisions in another statute. The Court’s endeavour shall always be

to   harmoniously   construct   such   provisions   so   that   the   legislative

intent underlying both statutes can be fulfilled. 

27. In The Chief Inspector of Mines & Ors. v. Lala Karam Chand

Thapar  &  Ors.4

the Court had reconciled a seeming contradiction

between the Mines Act, 1923, and the General Clauses Act, through a

harmonious construction of the provisions in the two Acts:

“13. If the words of s. 31(4) are construed to mean that

the regulations became part of the Act to the extent that

when   the   Act   is   repealed,   the   regulations   also   stand

repealed,  a  conflict  at  once  arises  between  s.  31(4)  and

the   provisions   of   s.   24   of   the   General   Clauses   Act.   In

4 (1962) 1 SCR 9.

Page 21 of 61

other words, the Mines Act, 1923, while saying in s. 31(4)

that the repeal of the Act will result in the repeal of the

regulations, will be saying, in the provisions of s. 24 of

the   General   Clauses   Act   as   read   into   it,   that   on   the

repeal   of   the   Act,   when   the   Act   is   repealed   and   reenacted, the regulations will not stand repealed but will

continue   in   force   till   superseded   by   regulations   made

under the re­enacted Act. To solve this conflict the courts

must   apply   the   rule   of   harmonious   construction…   We

have to seek therefore some other means of harmonising

the  two  provisions.  The   reasonable  way  of  harmonising

that   obviously   suggests   itself   is   to   construe   s.  31(4)   to

mean that the regulations on publication shall have for

some purposes, say, for example, the purpose of deciding

the validity of the regulations, the same effect as if they

were part of the Act, but for the purpose of the continuity

of existence, they will not be considered part of the Act,

so that even though the Act is repealed, the regulations

will continue to exist, in accordance with the provisions

of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. This construction will

give reasonable effect to s. 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923

and   at   the   same   time   not   frustrate   the   very   salutary

object of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. One may pause

here to remember that regulations framed under an Act

are of the very greatest importance. Such regulations are

framed  for  the  successful  operation  of  the  Act.  Without

proper   regulations,   a   statute   will   often   be   worse   than

useless.  When  an   Act   is   repealed,   but   re­enacted,   it   is

almost   inevitable   that   there   will   be   some   time   lag

between   the   re­enacted   statute   coming   into   force,   and

regulations   being   framed   under   the   re­enacted   statute.

However efficient the rule making authority may be it is

impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into

force   of   the   re­enacted   statute   and   the   simultaneous

repeal   of   the   old   Act   and   the   making   of   regulations.

Often,   the   time   lag   would   be   considerable.   Is   it

conceivable   that   any   legislature,   in   providing   that

regulations made under its statute will have effect as if

enacted in the Act, could have intended by those words to

say that if ever the Act is repealed and re­enacted (as is

more   than   likely   to   happen   sooner   or   later),   the

regulations will have no existence for the purpose of the

re­enacted   statute,  and   thus   the   re­enacted  statute,   for

some   time   at   least,   will   be   in   many   respects,   a   dead

letter. The answer must be in the negative. Whatever the

purpose   be  which   induced   the  draftsmen   to  adopt   this

legislative form as regards the rules and regulations that

Page 22 of 61

they will have effect "as if enacted in the Act", it will be

strange indeed if the result of the language used, be that

by becoming part of the Act, they would stand repealed,

when  the  Act   is  repealed.  One  can  be  certain  that  that

could not have been the intention of the legislature. It is

satisfactory   that   the   words   used   do   not   produce   that

result.   For,   if   we   apply   the   rule   of   harmonious

construction, as has been pointed out above, s. 31(4) does

not   stand   in   the  way   of   the   operation   of   s.  24   of   the

General Clauses Act.”

28. The primacy of taking a harmonious construction was affirmed

in Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi5

 as well:

“8.   It   is   settled   that   for   interpreting   a   particular

provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning

of the words and phrases used in the statute has  to  be

gathered from the text, the nature of the subject matter

and   the   purpose   and   intention   of   the   statute.   It   is

cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort

should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding

the   conflict   and   adopting   a   harmonious   construction.

The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a

whole   and   one   provision   should   be   construed   with

reference   to   the   other   provision   to  make   the   provision

consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well

known principle of harmonious construction is that effect

should be given to all the provisions and a construction

that reduce one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not

harmonious construction.”

29. When the legislature knowingly allows two statutes to operate in

the same space, it is a reasonable presumption that the legislative

design would have been for both to remain operative without any

overriding effect, save and except when a contrary intent is explicitly

provided. In other words, the Court shall steer two statutes away from

5 (2001) 8 SCC 540.

Page 23 of 61

a direct collision with each other, even if their areas of operation are

broadly similar. 

30. Learned   Senior   Counsel,   Mr.   Shyam   Divan,   has   placed

substantial reliance on decisions of this Court in  Girnar   Traders

2011  and  Manohar  Joshi  to advance the Appellants’ argument. In

Girnar   Traders   2011  the issue under consideration was whether

Section 11A6

 of the LAA could be read into the MRTP Act’s scheme for

acquisition of land. Section 11A of the LAA provided a two­year time

period within which an award under Section 11 had to be made to

individuals claiming compensation under the Act. Failure to do so

would lead to the entire land acquisition process lapsing.

31. It is in this context that the Constitution Bench of this Court

held that the MRTP Act is a self­contained code. It elaborated that

mere reference to certain provisions of the LAA would not result in the

importation of the entire scheme of the said statute unto the MRTP

Act. The Court thus held:

6 11A. Period shall be which an award within made. –

The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years

from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that

period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: 

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the

commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award

shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. 

Explanation ­ In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the

period   during   which   any   action   or   proceeding   to   be   taken   in   pursuance   of   the   said

declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.]

Page 24 of 61

“84. The MRTP Act besides being a code in itself has one

pre­ dominant purpose, i.e., planned development. Other

matters   are   incidental   and,   therefore,   should   be

construed   to  achieve   that  pre­  dominant  object.  All   the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied

to the MRTP Act. The provisions of the MRTP Act have to

be   implemented   in   their   own   field.   As   far   as   the

provisions   relating   to   preparation,   approval   and

execution of the development plans are concerned, there

is   hardly   any   dependency   of   the State   Act on   the

provisions   of   the Land   Acquisition   Act.   It   may   be

necessary,   sometimes,   to   acquire   land  which   primarily

would   be   for   the   purpose   of   planned   development   as

contemplated under the MRTP Act. Some of the provisions

of the State Act have specifically referred to some of the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act but for the limited

purpose   of   acquiring   land. Thus,   the   purpose   of   such

reference   is,  obviously,   to   take  aid  of   the  provisions  of

    the     Central Act only for the purpose of acquiring a land

    in accordance with law stated therein rather than letting

any  provision  of  the     Central  Act hamper  or  obstruct  the

    principal   object   of   the State   Act,   i.e.   execution   of   the

planned development.”

(Emphasis Applied)

32. Unmistakably,   the   Constitution   Bench’s   objective   was

safeguarding against the transposition of conditions under the LAA

into the MRTP Act. Allowing this to happen would have made the task

of achieving the object and purpose of the MRTP Act more onerous.

The crucial factor that weighed with the Court in that instance was

that it could not allow the LAA to “hamper or obstruct” the MRTP Act’s

primary goals. 

33. A   similar   concern   was   deliberated   upon   by   this   Court   in

Manohar Joshi (Supra). The Court in that case was inter alia dealing

Page 25 of 61

with a conflict that arose between a DP and an earlier Town Planning

Scheme under Section 597

 of the MRTP Act. The DP reserved the area

in question for the construction of a primary school whereas the town

planning scheme had marked it as a residential zone. 

34. While noting the express provision under Section 398

 that a town

planning scheme would be subordinate to, and be suitably modified to

bring it in congruence with the DP, this Court held:

“84. As noted above, Section 39 specifically directs that

the Planning Authority shall vary the TP Scheme to the

extent   necessary   by   the   proposals   made   in   the   final

development plan, and Section 59(1)(a) gives the purpose

of   the   TP   scheme   viz.   that   it   is   for   implementing   the

proposals contained in the final development plan. Under

Section  31(6)  of  the  Act,  a  development  plan  which  has

came into operation is binding on the Planning Authority.

The   Planning   Authority   cannot   act   contrary   to   the   DP

plan   and   grant   development   permission   to   defeat   the

provision  of   the  DP  plan.  Besides,   it   cannot  be   ignored

that   a   duty   is   cast   on   every   Planning   Authority

specifically under Section 42 of the Act to take steps as

may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the plan

referred   to   in   Chapter   III   of   the   Act,   namely,   the

development plan.”

(Emphasis Applied)

7 59. Making of town planning schemes.

[(1)] Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force

— 

(a) a Planning Authority may for the purpose of implementing the proposals in the

final Development plan 4[or in respect of any land which is likely to be in the course of

development or which is already built upon], prepare one or more town planning schemes

for the area within its jurisdiction, or any part thereof ;…

8 39. Variation of town planning scheme by Development plan.

Where   a  final   Development  plan   contains  proposals   which  are   in  variation,   or

modification of those made in a town planning scheme which has been sanctioned by the

State Government before the commencement of this Act, the Planning Authority shall vary

such scheme suitably under section 92 to the extent necessary by the proposals made in

the final Development plan.

Page 26 of 61

35. Upon a close examination of these judgments, we fail to see how

they assist the Appellants’ case. In both instances, the concern was

regarding frustration of the DP by either importation of Section 11A of

the LAA into the scheme of the MRTP Act (Girnar Traders 2011), or

due  to  a  conflict  between  the  DP  and  the  town   planning  scheme

(Manohar   Joshi). Neither of these eventualities have arisen in the

present case. 

36. Even   apart   from   that,   the   principle   on   which   this   Court

proceeded   in   the   cases   cited   above   is   that   external   statutes   or

alternate schemes/plans under the MRTP Act or otherwise, should not

be allowed to frustrate the DP or the overall objective of planned

development under the MRTP Act. As the DP is the primary means of

achieving the purpose of the MRTP Act, any violence done to the

former would necessarily affect the latter. Conversely, if the former is

left essentially undisturbed then it cannot be said that the spirit and

scheme of the MRTP Act has not been honoured. 

37. The construction of the link road in the present case does not, in

any way, frustrate the DP or defeat the overall objective of the statute.

The   motivation   for   building   the   connector   is   to   alleviate   traffic

congestion in the area caused due to the need for commuters to take a

protracted detour around the boundaries of Appellants’ property. It is

Page 27 of 61

only in instances where a requirement of the DP is being abrogated

that a conflict arises and the observations in Girnar Traders 2011

(Supra) and Manohar Joshi (Supra) become relevant. 

38. Moreover, the decision in  Manohar   Joshi  (Supra)  contains a

crucial   distinguishing   factor   between   the   town   planning   scheme

sought to be effectuated in that case, and the proposed link road in

the present instance. Under Section 39 of the MRTP Act, the town

planning scheme is expressly made subordinate to the DP. No such

express provision has been placed in either the MRTP Act or the MMC

Act, to curtail the powers of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 under Sections 91,

291(a), and 296 of the MMC Act. 

39. In   fact,   the   MMC   Act   under   Section   61(m)9

  mandates   that

Respondent No. 2 take any lawful measures possible to provide for the

construction,   maintenance,   alteration,   and   improvement   of   public

streets. The wording of this provision is mandatory, in contrast to

Section 6310 of the MMC Act which grants discretion to the Municipal

9 61. Matters to be provided for by the corporation.

It shall be incumbent on the corporation to make adequate provision, by any means

or measures which it is lawfully competent to them to use or to take, for each of the

following matters, namely :—

…

(m) the construction, maintenance, alteration and improvement of public streets,

bridges, culverts, causeways and the like 1[and also other measures for ensuing the safe

and orderly passage of vehicular and pedestrian traffic on streets];…

10 63. Matters which may be provided for by the corporation at their discretion.

The corporation may, in their discretion, provide from time to time, either wholly or

partly, for all or any of the following matters, namely :—

…

Page 28 of 61

Corporation to make arrangements for the subjects listed thereunder,

if it so chooses. 

40. This Court should not, therefore, unduly erode the powers vested

in Respondent No. 2 to carry out its statutory duties under Section 61.

This is especially true in a case where the object and purpose of the

MRTP Act is left unaffected by the actions taken by the Municipal

Corporation. 

41. In this background, we find significant merit in learned Counsel,

Mr. Godbole’s argument, that the MRTP Act and the MMC Act exist in

separate spheres without any preconceived hierarchy. There may be

instances where there is overlap, such as when a DP is formulated for

a   municipal   area   where   the   municipal   corporation   also   exercises

jurisdiction. However, even in such a scenario the two statutes would

exist side­by­side and supplement each other. 

42. The exception to this, to borrow from Manohar Joshi (Supra),

would be where the actions taken by the municipal corporation or any

other external authority “defeat the provision of the DP plan”. In such

an eventuality the appropriate course of action would be to seek a

modification of the DP under the MRTP Act.

43. For these reasons, we reject the contention of the Appellants that

the only means by which the link road through their property could

Page 29 of 61

have been constructed was through an amendment to the DP under

Section 37 of the MRTP Act. Respondent No. 2 had the option to either

follow the procedure under the MRTP Act, or to invoke the parallel

process provided under Sections 91, 291(a) and 296 of the MMC Act.

Respondent No. 2’s recourse to the latter cannot be said to defeat any

provision of the DP or be contrary to the scheme of the MRTP Act. 

44. Having held as such, we also do not find merit in the argument

that   Respondent   No.   2’s   resort   to   the   MMC   Act   constitutes   a

colourable exercise of power. This Court in Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. v.

Must.  Mazirunnessa11  had characterized the colourable exercise of

powers as:

“9…The doctrine of colorable legislation really postulates

that legislation attempts to do indirectly what it cannot

do directly. In other words, though the letter of the law is

within   the   limits   of   the   powers   of   the   Legislature,   in

substance the law has transgressed those powers and by

doing   so   it   has   taken   the   precaution   of   concealing   its

real   purpose   under   the   cover   of   apparently   legitimate

and reasonable provisions…”

45. Once we have ascertained that the two legislations in question,

the MRTP Act and the MMC Act, exist in separate spheres with only

incidental overlap, the possibility of a colourable exercise of power by

Respondent No. 2 falls away. As elaborated above, there is no direct or

indirect bar on the exercise of powers under Sections 91, 291(a), and

296 of the MMC Act which are all in furtherance of Respondent No. 2’s

11 (1962) 1 SCR 724.

Page 30 of 61

responsibilities under Section 61. The only exception to this would be

in those cases where a provision of the DP itself is being abrogated. 

46. Mr. Divan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, had also

raised an issue regarding the lack of appropriate safeguards under the

MMC Act as compared to the MRTP Act. He urged that the existence of

the right to object by interested parties to amendments in a DP under

Section 37 of the MRTP Act was further backing for his contention

that the MRTP Act was a complete code and is meant to control the

entire field in regard to planned development. This, he argued, was in

contrast to Section 91 of the MMC Act which contains no such right of

objection prior to the municipal corporation passing a resolution. 

47. In our considered opinion, this does not advance Appellants’

case either. Merely because a right to object to a modification of a DP

exists under Section 37 of the MRTP Act does not automatically give it

an ascendant position in the hierarchy that Appellants seek to create

between the MRTP Act and the MMC Act. It is up to the legislature to

determine the amount of discretion that is accorded to the relevant

authorities under each statute. 

48. While   it   is   true   that   this   Court   has   previously   read   the

requirement of giving affected persons an opportunity to be heard into

statutes and provisions which did not provide for it, such a right was

Page 31 of 61

held even in those cases to not be absolute.12 However, we need not

even go so far. A closer reading of the MMC Act and the LAA shows

that there are adequate safeguards available and, in the facts of the

case,   Appellants   were   given   ample   opportunity   to   object   to   the

proposed expropriation of their land. 

49. When an application is made under Section 91 of the MMC Act,

it is not the case that a notice for acquisition is issued immediately.

The State Govt. must first satisfy itself that the land sought to be

acquired is indeed required for a public purpose. Respondent No. 1

must scrutinize the application submitted before it and come to the

conclusion that the property in question necessitates reservation in

public   interest   before   initiating   the   process   under   the   LAA   via

notification under Section 4. 

50. Thereafter,   a   mechanism   for   hearing   objections   is   provided

under the LAA. Section 5A of the LAA, as it was at the relevant time, is

reproduced below:

5A. Hearing of objections. – 

(1)   Any   person   interested   in   any   land   which   has   been

notified under section 4, subsection (1), as being needed

or   likely   to   be   needed   for   a   public   purpose   or   for   a

Company  may,  [within  thirty  days  from  the  date  of  the

publication of the notification], object to the acquisition

of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may

be. 

12 Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. (1985) 3 SCC 545; C.B.

Gautam v. Union of India & Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 78.

Page 32 of 61

(2) Every objection under sub­section (1) shall be made to

the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the

objector  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  [in  person  or  by

any   person   authorized   by   him   in   this   behalf]   or   by

pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and

after  making  such  further  inquiry,  if  any,  as  he  thinks

necessary,  [either  make  a   report   in   respect  of   the   land

which has been notified under section 4, sub­section (1),

or make different reports in respect of different parcels

of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing

his recommendations on the objections, together with the

record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of

that   Government].   The   decision   of   the   [appropriate

Government] on the objections shall be final. 

(3)   For   the   purpose   of   this   section,   a   person   shall   be

deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to

claim   an   interest   in   compensation   if   the   land   were

acquired under this Act.]

51. In light of this, the claim that adequate safeguards were not

available under the route provided in Section 91 of the MMC Act

cannot be countenanced. Not only does the State Govt. first evaluate

the application under Section 91, but Section 5A of the LAA also

permits the landowners themselves to air their grievances. 

52. Notice under Section 4(1)13 of the LAA was issued to Appellants

on   24.03.2005   by   the   Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer   (“SLAO”)

regarding the proposed acquisition of land for constructing the link

road   and   setting   a   deadline   of   15.04.2005   for   filing   objections.

13 4. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon. – 

(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] the land in any locality [is

needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or for a company], a notification to

that   effect   shall   be   published   in   the   Official   Gazette   [and   in   two   daily   newspapers

circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language], and the

Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at

convenient places in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the

giving of such public notice , being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of

the notification)].

Page 33 of 61

Appellants responded on 11.04.2005, opposing the acquisition  inter

alia  on the grounds that the matter was sub­judice before the High

Court in WP No. 3060 of 2002, and that the order dated 18.10.2002

passed in WP No. 1072 of 2001 had directed that actions would not be

taken pursuant to any subsequent resolution by Respondent No. 2

without leave being granted by the High Court. Their objections stated

that:

10. Our clients submit that for the reasons mentioned in

Writ   Petition   No.3060   of   2002   filed   by   our   clients,   the

proposed acquisition of land out of our clients' property

bearing CTS Nos.23, 24 and 26 of Mulgaon is not for any

public purpose and the same is not in accordance with

law.   No   portion   of   our   clients'   properties   bearing   CTS

Nos.23, 24 and 26 of Mulgaon is or is likely to be needed

for construction of any public road. Proposed acquisition is

at the instance of and for serving the private purpose of

Developers   of   properties   lying   to   East   of   our   clients'

properties and is malafide and in colourable exercise of

powers under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and Mumbai

Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. Construction of a private

road   through   the   property   of   our   clients   is   bound   to

destroy   our   clients'   property   and   cause   irreparable

damage to our clients' property, without serving any public

purpose.

     x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x

12. In the circumstances, our clients object to the proposed

acquisition   on   the   ground   that   the   same   is   in   willful

disobedience   and  breach  of   Order   dated   18th   October,

2002 passed by the Bombay High court in Writ Petition No.

l072   of   2001   and   amounts   to   interference   with   the

proceedings in Writ Petition No.3060 of 2002 filed by our

clients and pending before the Bombay High Court and

contempt of the Bombay High Court as also on the ground

that   the   same   is   not   under   authority   of   Appropriate

Government and the ground that the same is malafide and

in colourable exercise of powers and not in public interest,

but merely to favour and confer largesse on Developers of

Page 34 of 61

property lying to the East of the property of our clients, by

seeking to destroy the property of our clients and other

grounds.

53. It appears from the record that Appellants sent several letters to

this effect over the following months demanding that the acquisition

process cease on the aforementioned grounds stated in their letter of

11.04.2005.   Appellants   had   eventually   filed   a   contempt   petition

against Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 10, alleging violation of the order of

18.10.2002. This contempt petition was dismissed by the High Court

on 18.08.2006. 

54. Indeed, the award of compensation under Section 11 of the LAA14

passed   on   26.11.2007   recorded   at   several   instances   that   multiple

hearings   were   fixed   and   sufficient   opportunity   had   been   given   to

14 11. Enquiry and award by Collector. –

[(1)] On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been

adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objection (if any) which any

person   interested   has   stated   pursuant   to   a   notice   given   under   section   9   to   the

measurements made under section 8, and into the value of the land [at the date of the

publication of the notification under section 4, sub­section (1)], and into the respective

interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his

hand of­ 

(i) the true area of the land; 

(ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and 

(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or

believed to be interested in the land, or whom, or of whose claims, he has information,

whether or not they have respectively appeared before him : 

[Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub­section

without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the

appropriate Government may authorize in this behalf: 

Provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct

that the Collector may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as

the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf.

…

Page 35 of 61

interested parties to be heard. In terms of the inquiry under Section 5

of the LAA, the award noted:

After going through the objection raised by M/S Soloman

& Co. Adv. Mentioned above and legal advice dt. 10/5/05

revived from M.C.G.M.: the S.L.A.O. came to the conclusion

that he need not to wait till the decision of the Hon. High

Court, Mumbai in writ. Petition No.3060/02 filed by the

interested parties as asked for in the objection mentioned

above and S.L.A.O. decided to [proceed] with proceedings

under sec. 6 of L.A. Act. The detailed report in form 'D' as

required under sec. 5A of L.A. Act and draft notification

under sec. 6 of L.A. Act have been submitted to the Addl.

Commissioner Konkan Division through the Addl. Collector

M.S.D. on 16/6/05 for the approval and publication of

notification under sec. 6 in Govt Gazette and newspaper

etc.

55. The award then goes on to note that no documentation had been

submitted by any of the interested parties showing title/rights over the

land and no claims for compensation had been filed under the LAA

either:

E.  EVIDENCE   IN   SUPPORT  OF  CLAIM  BY   THE  LAND

OWNERS

Nobody from owners or interested persons has filled their

claims   of   compensation   nor   they   have   produced   any

documentary   evidence   of   ownership   of   land   under

acquisition.   Sufficient   times   were   given   them   by   fixing

hearing from time to time and heard them. Finally letters

dt. 12/5/06, 13/7/06 and 20/3/07 were issued to them

asking to file their claims of compensation and documents

of ownership. However, nobody came forward to file their

claims of compensation or claims of ownership.

Only one Shri Abraham Pattani through his advocate, filed

every time his objection for acquisition of said lands and

tried to stay acquisition proceedings.

Page 36 of 61

56. What emerges from this sequence of events is that Appellants

appear to have been given sufficient opportunity to be heard and for

their objections to be considered. However, the Appellants remained

preoccupied with attempting to halt the acquisition proceedings on the

ground that the matter was sub­judice before the High Court and,

thus,   no   further   steps   under   the   LAA   could   be   taken.   After

scrutinizing the legal situation, the SLAO dismissed their objections

and continued to perform the various steps under the LAA. There was

no stay granted during this time, and Appellants’ contempt petition

had been dismissed, as mentioned above. 

57. The Appellants seemingly did not submit any documentation in

support of their claim of title and neither did they seek quantification

of compensation they may have been entitled to under the LAA. As a

result, they cannot now claim that there was no opportunity given to

them to voice their concerns with regard to the acquisition process.

The decision by the Appellants to stick to their position in terms of the

notification and award being non­est due to the pendency of their WP

at the High Court cannot entitle them to now argue that they were

treated unfairly in the proceedings under the LAA. 

58. This   also   fortifies   our   earlier   observation   regarding   the   coexistence of the MMC Act alongside the MRTP Act. The contentions

Page 37 of 61

raised by the Appellants have failed to persuade us and we see no

reason to enact a hierarchy between the two Statutes. We affirm, once

again, the position articulated by Respondents that it was open to

Respondent No. 2 to act under the MMC Act to acquire Appellants’

land for the public purpose of building the link road.

C.2. Compliance with the procedure under the MMC Act

59. Having held that Respondent No. 2 was entitled to exercise its

powers under the MMC Act, it is now incumbent on us to examine

whether the procedure under the Statute was properly followed. We

refer to our earlier observations on the scheme of procurement under

the MMC Act from a combined reading of Sections 91, 291(a), and 296

contained therein. 

60. To begin with, it is necessary to recap the sequence of events

that led to the land acquisition proceedings. Learned Counsel for the

Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner, Mr. Godbole,

has highlighted the initial trio of resolutions, Nos. 651, 39 & 536, by

Respondent No. 2 that set the ball rolling in terms of land acquisition.

Resolution No. 536 was a composite resolution under Section 126 of

the MRTP Act and Section 90 of the MMC Act. According to him, this

was in effect a resolution under Section 91 as the reference to Section

90 was merely a typographical error due to Section 9015, acquisition

15 90. Acquisition of immovable property by agreement.

Page 38 of 61

via consent, being the first option under the MMC Act. When that

failed, the natural next step would be the second option under Section

91 of the MMC Act. 

61. Subsequently  the   Office   of   the   Chief   Engineer  had   made   an

application   to   Respondent   No.   1   on   05.02.1999   for  procuring   the

Appellants’   land.   The   link   road   proposal   was   then   shelved   via

Resolution No. 1167, before being revived once again by Resolution

No. 1117 dated 28.10.2002. 

62. Following   the   renewal   of   the   link   road   proposal,   the   land

acquisition proceedings were recommenced under Section 91 and the

necessary steps under the LAA were taken on the basis of the same

application of 05.02.1999 that had been submitted by the Office of the

Chief Engineer. This finally culminated in the passing of the award of

compensation under Section 11 of the LAA on 26.11.2007.

63. In this backdrop, learned Senior Counsels for the Appellants

have   argued   that   there   has   been   non­compliance   with   two

requirements under Section 91 of the MCC Act: a) The application for

acquisition of land was forwarded from the Office of the Chief Engineer

(Development   Plan)   and   not   the   Commissioner;   b)   There   was   no

(1) Wherever it is provided by this Act that the Commissioner may acquire or

whenever it is necessary or expedient for any purpose of this Act that the Commissioner

shall   acquire,   any   immovable   property,   such   property   may   be   acquired   by   the

Commissioner on behalf of the corporation by agreement 6[subject to the provisions of subsection (3)].

…

Page 39 of 61

authorization granted or order passed by Respondent No. 1 to proceed

with such an acquisition.

64. Adverting   to   the   first   submission,   we   acknowledge   the

unambiguous   language   of   Section   91   which   contemplates   an

application being submitted by the Commissioner, Respondent No. 3.

However, when dealing with such matters of procedure the old adage

of procedural laws being the handmaid of justice must be kept in

mind. As has been exhaustively and extensively reiterated by this

Court in the past, procedural rules must not be allowed to defeat the

basic purpose of a statute or hamper the pursuit of justice unless

violation of the procedure would itself amount to grave injustice. 

65. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr.16 this

Court in the context of procedural rules held:

“16…It   is   procedure,   something   designed   to   facilitate

justice  and  further   its  ends:  not  a  penal  enactment  for

punishment  and  penalties;  not  a  thing  designed  to  trip

people up. Too technical a construction of sections that

leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation

should   therefore   be   guarded   against   (provided   always

that   justice   is  done   to   both   sides)   lest   the   very  means

designed   for   the   furtherance   of   justice   be   used   to

frustrate it.”

(Emphasis Applied)

16 (1955) 2 SCR 1.

Page 40 of 61

66. Similarly,   in  Ghanshyam   Dass   v.   Dominion   of   India17 the

ethos behind “adjective law” was elaborated upon while dealing with

issuance of notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code:

“12. In the ultimate analysis, the question as to whether

a notice under Section 80 of the Code is valid or not is a

question  of  judicial  construction.  The Privy  Council  and

this  Court have applied the rule of strict  compliance in

dealing  with the question of  identity  of the person who

issues   the   notice  with   the   person  who   brings   the   suit.

This  Court  has  however adopted the rule  of  substantial

compliance   in  dealing  with   the   requirement   that   there

must   be   identity   between   the   cause   of   action   and   the

reliefs claimed in the notice as well as in the plaint. As

already stated, the Court has held that notice under this

section should be held to be sufficient if it substantially

fulfils its object of informing the parties concerned of the

nature  of   the   suit   to  be   filed.  On   this  principle,   it  has

been held that though the terms of the section have to be

strictly   complied   with,   that   does   not   mean   that   the

notice   should   be   scrutinized   in   a   pedantic   manner

divorced from common sense. The point to be considered

is  whether  the  notice  gives  sufficient   information  as  to

the  nature  of  the  claim  such  as  would  the   recipient  to

avert the litigation.”

(Emphasis Applied)

67. In the same vein,  Sugandhi   v.   P.   Rajkumar18 promoted an

approach that sought to achieve substantial justice when confronted

with breaches of procedural law, especially when the other party did

not suffer any significant prejudice. This Court opined:

“9. It   is   often   said   that  procedure   is   the   handmaid   of

justice.   Procedural   and   technical   hurdles   shall   not   be

allowed   to   come   in   the   way   of   the   court   while   doing

substantial   justice.   If  the  procedural   violation  does  not

seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party,  courts

17 (1984) 3 SCC 46.

18 (2020) 10 SCC 706.

Page 41 of 61

must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than

relying   upon   procedural   and   technical   violation. We

should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a

journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice

and   the   court   is   required   to   take  appropriate   steps   to

thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute.”

 (Emphasis Applied)

68. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of U.P. & Ors. v.

Babu Ram Upadhya19, while laying down the test for determining if

the legislature intended for a provision to be directory or mandatory in

nature, held as follows:

“29…For   ascertaining   the   real   intention   of   the

Legislature,   the   Court   may   consider,   inter   alia,   the

nature   and   the   design   of   the   statute,   and   the

consequences which would follow from construing it the

one   way   or   the   other,   the   impact   of   other   provisions

whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in

question   is  avoided,  the  circumstance, namely,  that  the

statute provides for a contingency of the non­compliance

with   the   provisions,   the   fact   that   the   non­compliance

with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty,

the  serious  or  trivial  consequences  that  flow  therefrom,

and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will

be defeated or furthered.”

(Emphasis Applied)

69. It is with these time tested principles in mind that we must now

analyse Appellants’ contentions and consider whether the requirement

of   the   Commissioner   making   the   application   under   Section   91   is

directory or mandatory in nature. While doing so, we avert to learned

Counsel  Mr.  Godbole’s  argument that the  Commissioner is,  at all

19 (1961) 2 SCR 679.

Page 42 of 61

times, involved in the decision making process and is an integral

member of the Ministerial Committee that signs off on initiating a land

acquisition process under the MMC Act. 

70. Thus, a common sense approach would lead to the conclusion

that rigid adherence to the notion that the Commissioner can be the

only official to actually send an application under Section 91 may not

be warranted in all scenarios. The construction of the provision that

has   been   suggested   by   the   Appellants   would   prevent   the   kind   of

“reasonable elasticity of interpretation” that was noted in  Sangram

Singh (Supra) to be vital when construing a statute. 

71. Further, we are unable to ascertain what prejudice has been

caused to the Appellants merely because it was the Office of the Chief

Engineer which officially forwarded the application to the prescribed

authority   under   Section   91.   The   consequence   in   both   scenarios,

whether   the   Commissioner   or   some   other   official   acts   under   the

provision, would be that land acquisition proceedings are commenced

under the LAA. None of the Appellants’ rights are abrogated by the

Chief   Engineer   making   the   application   under   Section   91.   This   is

further accentuated by the fact that, in any case, Respondent No. 3

was part of the decision­making process. 

Page 43 of 61

72. Appellants   have   placed   reliance   on  Girnar   Traders   2007

(Supra)  to contend that the requirement of Respondent No. 3 being

the specific official to make the application cannot be deviated from.

The Court in that instance was dealing with lapsing of a reservation of

land under the MRTP Act in terms of Section 127.20  The area in

question had been marked as part of a DP but no steps had been

taken to acquire it for a full decade thereafter. The Commissioner was

the   designated   authority   authorized   to   act   under   Section   126   to

initiate the steps for land acquisition. While analysing Sections 126 &

127 of the MRTP Act21, the majority opined:

20 127. Lapsing of reservations.

[(1) If any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any plan

under this Act is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final

Regional Plan, or final Development Plan comes into force 2[or if a declaration under subsection (2) or (4) of section 126 is not published in the Official Gazette within such period,

the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice, alongwith the documents

showing his title or interest in the said land, on the Planning Authority, the Development

Authority or, as the case may be, the Appropriate Authority to that effect; and if within

twelve months] from the date of the service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no

steps   as   aforesaid   are   commenced   for   its   acquisition,   the   reservation,   allotment   or

designation shall be deemed to have lapsed, and thereupon, the land shall be deemed to be

released from such reservation, allotment or designation and shall become available to the

owner for the purpose of development as otherwise, permissible in the case of adjacent land

under the relevant plan.

…

21 126. Acquisition of land required for public purposes specified in plans.

(1) Where after the publication of a draft Regional plan, a Development or any other

plan or town planning scheme, any land is required or reserved for any of the public

purposes   specified   in   any   plan   or   scheme   under   this   Act   at   any   time,   the   Planning

Authority, Development Authority, or as the case may be, 1[any Appropriate Authority may,

except as otherwise provided in section 113A] 2[acquire the land,— 

(a) by agreement by paying an amount agreed to, or 

(b) in lieu of any such amount, by granting the land­owner or the lessee, subject,

however,   to   the   lessee   paying   the   lessor   or   depositing   with   the   Planning   Authority,

Development Authority or Appropriate Authority, as the case may be, for payment to the

lessor, an amount equivalent to the value of the lessor’s interest to be determined by any of

the  said  Authorities  concerned  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  Land

Acquisition Act, 1894, Floor Space Index (FSI) or Transferable Development Rights (TDR)

against the area of land surrendered free of cost and free from all encumbrances, and also

further   additional   Floor   Space   Index   or   Transferable   Development   Rights   against   the

Page 44 of 61

“54.  When  we  conjointly   read  Sections  126  and  127  of

the MRTP Act, it is apparent that the legislative intent is

to   expeditiously   acquire   the   land   reserved   under   the

Town   Planning   Scheme   and,   therefore,   various   periods

have   been   prescribed   for   acquisition   of   the   owner's

property.   The   intent   and   purpose   of   the   provisions   of

Sections   126   and   127   has   been   well   explained   in

Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra). If

the acquisition is left for a time immemorial in the hands

of   the   concerned   authority   by   simply   making   an

application  to  the  State  Government  for  acquiring  such

land   under   the   LA   Act,   1894,   then   the   authority   will

simply   move   such   an   application   and   if   no   such

notification   is   issued   by   the   State   Government   for   one

year of the publication of the draft regional plan under

Section 126(2) read with Section 6 of the LA Act, wait for

the notification to be issued by the State Government by

exercising   suo   motu   power   under   Sub­section   (4)   of

Section 126; and till then no declaration could be made

under Section 127 as regards lapsing of reservation and

contemplated   declaration   of   land   being   released   and

available   for   the   land   owner   for   his   utilization   as

permitted   under   Section   127.   Section   127   permitted

inaction on the part of the acquisition authorities for a

period of 10 years for de­reservation of the land. Not only

that, it gives a further time for either to acquire the land

or   to   take   steps   for   acquisition   of   the   land   within   a

period of six months from the date of service of notice by

the   land   owner   for   de­reservation. The   steps   towards

commencement   of   the   acquisition   in   such   a   situation

would necessarily be the steps for acquisition and not a

step which may not result into acquisition and merely for

the purpose of seeking time so that Section 127 does not

come into operation. 

55. Providing the period of six months after the service of

notice clearly indicates the intention of the legislature of

an urgency where nothing has been done in regard to the

land reserved under the plan for a period of 10 years and

the owner is deprived of the utilization of his land as per

the  user  permissible  under   the  plan.  When  mandate   is

given   in   a   Section   requiring   compliance   within   a

particular   period,   the   strict   compliance   is   required

development or construction of the amenity on the surrendered land at his cost, as the

Final Development Control Regulations prepared in this behalf provide, or 

(c) by making an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,

…

Page 45 of 61

thereof as introduction of this Section is with legislative

intent   to   balance   the   power   of   the   State   of   'eminent

domain'…”

(Emphasis Applied)

73. It was in this context that the majority noted that the Executive

Engineer, who was not authorized to act as the appropriate authority

under Section 126, could not have taken on the mantle of making an

application for initiating proceedings under the LAA. What weighed

with the court was the legislative intent of Sections 126 and 127

which was to “balance the power of the State of ‘eminent domain’”. The

consequence of not acting in an expeditious manner under Sections

126 & 127 was the automatic de­reservation of land that was meant to

be part of the DP.

74. Thus, there are two important distinguishing factors between

Girnar   Traders   2007   (Supra)  and  our scenario.  The  first  is  the

mandate and purpose of Sections 126 & 127 which are meant to

ensure the DP is acted upon swiftly and efficiently. The prejudice

caused to a private citizen if his land is reserved for a public purpose

under the MRTP Act but then not acquired for years afterwards was

eloquently elaborated upon by the majority. The individual would be

deprived of the usage of his land due to the reservation, while not

receiving  compensation   for  it   under  the   LAA.   It  was   to   safeguard

against such an eventuality that strict adherence to Sections 126 &

Page 46 of 61

127   of   the   MRTP   Act   was   necessary.   This   rationale   cannot   be

transplanted to Section 91 of the MMC Act.

75. The second is the lack of any penal provision or consequence

attached to a failure to follow the exact procedure mentioned under

Section 91. As observed in Babu Ram Upadhya (Supra) the existence

of a penal mechanism attached to non­compliance is one of the means

by which the nature of a provision can be ascertained. Under the

MRTP Act the consequence of non­compliance with the designated

procedure under Section 126 is the eventual de­reservation of the land

in question under Section 127.

76. In this context, the Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation is also of

assistance. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General

Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. & Anr.22 referred to the need for

interpretation of a statute to be based on the context and purpose

behind it, in the following terms:

“33.   Interpretation   must   depend   on   the   text   and   the

context.  They  are   the  bases  of   interpretation.  One  may

well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives

the  colour.  Neither  can  be   ignored.  Both  are   important.

That   interpretation   is   best   which   makes   the   textual

interpretation   match   the   contextual.   A   statute   is   best

interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this

knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and

then   Section   by   section,   Clause   by   clause,   phrase   by

phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the

context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute22 (1987) 1 SCC 424.

Page 47 of 61

maker,   provided   by   such   context,   its   scheme,   the

sections,   clauses,   phrases   and   words  may   take   colour

and appear different than when the statute is looked at

without the glasses  provided by the context. With these

glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover

what   each   section,   each   clause,   each  phrase  and   each

word   is  meant   and   designed   to   say   as   to   fit   into   the

scheme   of   the   entire   Act.   No   part   of  a   statute  and  no

word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes

have to be construed so that every word has a place and

everything is in its place.”

77. Along   similar   lines,  S.   Gopal   Reddy   v.   State   of   A.P.23

expounded on the approach to be taken while interpreting statutes

and held:

“12. It is a well­known Rule of interpretation of statutes

that  the  text  and  the  context  of  the  entire  Act  must  be

looked   into   while   interpreting   any   of   the   expressions

used   in   a   statute.   The   courts  must   look   to   the   object

which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any

of   the   provisions   of   the   Act.   A   purposive  approach   for

interpreting   the   Act   is   necessary.   We   are   unable   to

persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only

the   property   or   valuable   security   given   at   the   time   of

marriage   which   would   bring   the   same   within   the

definition of 'dowry' punishable under the Act, as such an

interpretation   would   be   defeating   the   very   object   for

which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of

the   Act,   "demand   of   dowry"   as   a   consideration   for   a

proposed marriage would also come within the meaning

of the expression dowry under the Act.”

78. It   appears   to   us   that   Section   91   imposes   a   statutory

responsibility on Respondent No. 3, the Commissioner, to initiate the

land acquisition process. The object behind the expression “…upon

the application of the Commissioner, made with the approval of

23 (1996) 4 SCC 596.

Page 48 of 61

the…”   unequivocally   suggests   that   the   Commissioner   must   apply

his/her   mind   and   take   a   conscious   decision   in   favour   of   the

acquisition   proceedings   being   initiated   under   the   LAA.   Once   the

Commissioner   is   party   to   the   Ministerial   Committee   and   a

determination is made by the Committee that a new public street

must   be   laid   and   land   must   be   acquired   for   this   purpose   under

Section   91   of   the   MCC   Act   read   with   the   LAA,   it   is   no   longer

consequential which authority conveys this decision. The conclusion

that the land is required for the construction of the road cannot be

invalidated on this ground. 

79. To the extent that Respondent No. 3 is required to forward the

application under Section 91, we see no reason to consider this a

mandatory condition. Nevertheless, even for such directory provisions

substantial compliance is necessary. In Sharif­ud­din v. Abdul Gani

Lone24 the level of compliance with directory rules, as well as the

distinction between mandatory and directory requirements under a

statute, was detailed and laid down in the following terms:

“9. The   difference   between   a   mandatory   rule   and   a

directory   rule   is  that  while  the  former  must  be  strictly

observed,   in   the   case   of   the   latter,   substantial

compliance   may   be   sufficient   to   achieve   the   object

regarding   which   the   rule   is   enacted. Certain   broad

propositions which can be deduced from several decisions

of courts regarding the rules of construction that should

be followed in determining whether a provision of law is

24 (1980) 1 SCC 403.

Page 49 of 61

directory   or  mandatory  may   be   summarized   thus:   The

fact   that   the  statute  uses  the  word   'shall'  while   laying

down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it

is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out

the   true   character   of   the   legislation,   the   Court   has   to

ascertain   the   object   which   the   provision   of   law   in

question is to sub­serve and its design and the context in

which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated

by   non­compliance   with   it,   it   has   to   be   regarded   as

mandatory.”

(Emphasis Applied)

80. We   are   inclined   to   hold   and   affirm   that   there   has   been

substantial compliance with Section 91 to the extent that it achieves

the objective behind the provision. Learned Counsel, Mr. Godbole, has

already pointed out the practicalities of the decision making process in

Respondent No. 2. Undoubtedly, Respondent No. 3 would have been a

participant in the deliberations on whether to initiate the process

under Section 91 for procurement of land. The final application was

made   only   after   gaining   approval   from   him   and   the   rest   of   the

Committee. 

81. Appellants have urged that the need for Respondent No. 3 to

personally take the first step under Section 91 is part of the minimal

safeguards that exist under the MMC Act and must be adhered to. We

feel   that   the   purpose   behind   the   provision   of   ensuring   that   the

highest­ranking   officer   in   the   municipal   corporation   is   privy   and

amenable   to   the   acquisition   proceedings   is   achieved   by   his

Page 50 of 61

participation  and sign off on the action, regardless of whether he

personally sends the application. 

82. In this respect, the holding of a Division Bench of the Bombay

High   Court   in  Harakchand   Misirimal   Solanki   &   Ors.   v.   The

Collector  &   Ors.25 becomes relevant. The High Court was dealing

with the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, and

efforts made by the Pune Municipal Corporation to set up a “Forest

Garden”. One of the several alleged defects in the process which arose

for consideration before the High Court pertained to the fact that the

Assistant Commissioner, instead of the Commissioner, had made the

application for commencing proceedings under the LAA. It was urged

that the Commissioner was the designated authority under Section 78

of the Act.26 Rejecting this argument, the Division Bench observed:

“24.  We  do  not  find  any  substance   in  the  contention  of

the   petitioner   that   it   is   not   the   Assistant   Municipal

Commissioner but the Commissioner himself who should

have applied for initiation of proceedings under the said

Act…Therefore,   even   if   contention   of   the   petitioner   is

accepted that the actual application sent to the Collector

seeking   to   initiate   proceedings   under   the   said   Act   for

compulsory acquisition of the lands in issue was signed

25 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1067.

26 78. Procedure when immovable property cannot be acquired by agreement

(1) Whenever the Commissioner is unable under section 77 to acquire by agreement

any immovable property or any easement affecting any immovable property vested in the

Corporation or whenever any immovable property or any easement affecting any immovable

property vested in the Corporation is required for the purposes of this Act, the1 [State]

Government may in its discretion, upon the application of the Commissioner, made with the

approval of the Standing Committee and subject to the other provisions of this Act, order

proceedings to be taken for acquiring the same on behalf of the Corporation, as if such

property or easement were land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894[I of 1804].

Page 51 of 61

and   sent  by   the  Assistant  Municipal  Commissioner  and

not by the Commissioner of the said Corporation himself,

we do not find that this will constitute a gross illegality

in the initiation of the acquisition proceeding in issue. In

our   view,   once   the   proposal   is   shown   to   have   been

accepted   by   the   Commissioner,   processed   by   the

Commissioner  and  sent  to  the  Collector   in  terms  of  the

directions   of   the   Commissioner,   only   because   the   same

was formally signed not by the Commissioner himself but

by the Assistant Municipal Commissioner, in law, would

not   be   so   vital   to   warrant   vitiating   of   the   entire

acquisition proceeding. In our view, if it is demonstrated

that   substantial   compliance   is  done  with   the   statutory

requirement of Section 78 of the said Act, no fault can be

found with these acquisition proceedings, on this ground

as claimed by the petitioners.”

(Emphasis Applied)

83. The High Court, thus, rebutted this particular contention raised

by   the   Petitioners.   However,   the   Petitioners’   Writ   Petitions   were

allowed overall due to certain other discrepancies that were discovered

in   the   setting   up   of   the   Forest   Garden.   The   Pune   Municipal

Corporation filed an SLP against this judgment assailing the High

Court’s final conclusion which is unrelated to the specific issue we are

concerned with in the present case. Notwithstanding the fact that the

matter remains sub­judice on other facets of the case, we find some

prima facie merit in the reasoning by the Bombay High Court for

repelling the argument that only the Commissioner may submit the

application for reservation and acquisition of land under the LAA. 

84. As submitted by learned Counsel, Mr. Godbole, Respondent No.

3’s seal of approval was granted for the actions taken under Section

Page 52 of 61

91 of the MMC Act. We, therefore, hold that once the proposal has

been approved by the Commissioner, the lack of a formal signature

from him on the eventual  application is not a serious defect and

cannot annul the entire process that followed. 

85. Based on the discussion above, we are satisfied that Section 91

of the MMC Act has been substantially complied with in this case. We

now turn our attention to the second contention by the Appellants on

the issue of compliance with procedural requirements, which is the

purported absence of an order by the State Govt. for initiating land

acquisition proceedings under the LAA. 

86. To ascertain the veracity of the Appellants’ claim we may refer

once again to the final award of compensation passed on 26.11.2007.

Under   the   sub­heading   “Introduction”   under   the   main   heading

“Reasons   for   the   Award”,   it   is   noted   that   the   Office   of   the   Chief

Engineer   sent   the   application   to   the   Collector   05.02.1999   for

procuring   the   land   in   question.   Following   the   application,   it   was

recorded that:

“The  Addl.   collector   M.S.D.   along   with   his   letter   dt.

21/7/99 sent the said proposal to this office directing this

office to process acquisition proceeding.”

87. We are, therefore, unable to spot the infirmity in the actions of

Respondent authorities. The Additional Collector, acting on behalf of

Page 53 of 61

Respondent No. 1, forwarded the proposal from Respondent No. 2 to

the SLAO for further processing and commencement of the procedure

under the LAA. There is no indication in Section 91 of the MMC Act

that the order of the State Govt. to carry out the land acquisition is

supposed to be in a specific form. Keeping this in mind, we have no

hesitation   in   taking   a   pragmatic   and   practical   approach   to   this

requirement. It is enough that the relevant office in Respondent No. 1

accepted the application from Respondent No. 2 and conveyed it to the

authorities empowered to act under the LAA. The direction from the

Additional   Collector   for   the   SLAO   to   process   the   request   from

Respondent No. 2 would be sufficient compliance with Section 91 of

the MMC Act. 

88. In any case, Respondent Nos. 10 & 11, in performing the steps

under   the   LAA   to   procure   the   land,   acted   for   and   on   behalf   of

Respondent No. 1. Thus, it is incontrovertible that Respondent No. 1

was fully on board with the initiative to acquire Appellants’ land for

constructing the link road. The fact that all the steps under the LAA

were carried out is sufficient evidence that there has been adherence

to the spirit and scheme of Section 91 regarding Respondent No. 1

being involved and sanctioning the actions of Respondent Nos. 10 &

11. 

Page 54 of 61

89. In summation, we conclude that the objections by the Appellants

on the grounds of non­adherence to procedural requirements under

Section   91   of   the   MMC   Act   are   without   merit.   There   has   been

substantial compliance with the provision and the objective underlying

it has been honoured. 

C.3. Public Interest v. Private Interest

90. It is important for us to take stock of the nature of the present

dispute. The Appellants are private citizens who have valid title and

ownership over the land in question. Without doubt, their personal

and private rights are of great importance. In a democratic society

governed by the rule of law, the rights of an individual carry immense

importance and are the foundational blocks on which our legal, social,

and political milieu thrives. Under no circumstances should the rights

of individual citizens be trodden upon arbitrarily and any curtailment

of them must be scrutinized with utmost care.

91. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that in

several situations, the needs of the many must outweigh that of the

few. We say so not with any fervour nor as a mantra, but as a solemn

acknowledgment of the realities of modern life. The question of what

constitutes  “public  interest”   has  been   contemplated  upon  multiple

times and the history of this Court is full of musings by different

Page 55 of 61

benches on the exact contours of this phrase in the context of various

situations and statutes. 

92. In Manimegalai v. Special Tehsildar,

27 it was surmised that:

“14.  Similarly,  public  purpose   is  not  capable  of  precise

definition. Each case has to be considered in the light of

the purpose for which acquisition is sought  for. It is to

serve the general interest of the community as opposed to

the  particular interest  of  the  individual.  Public  purpose

broadly speaking would include the purpose in which the

general   interest   of   the   society   as   opposed   to   the

particular   interest   of   the   individual   is   directly   and

vitally  concerned.  Generally,  the  executive would  be  the

best   judge   to   determine   whether   or   not   the   impugned

purpose   is   a   public   purpose.   Yet   it   is   not   beyond   the

purview of judicial scrutiny. The interest of a Section of

the society may be public purpose when it is benefitted by

the acquisition. The acquisition in question must indicate

that it was towards the welfare of the people and not to

benefit a private individual or group of individuals joined

collectively. Therefore, acquisition for anything which is

not for a public purpose cannot be done compulsorily.”

93. In  B.P.   Sharma   v.   Union   of   India   &   Ors.28 the   nebulous

nature of phrases such as “public interest” or “in the interest of the

general public” was commented upon, with the Court stating:

“15. …The phrase "in the interest of the general public"

has come to be considered in several decisions and it has

been   held   that   it   would   comprise   within   its   ambit

interests   like   public   health   and   morals,   economic

stability,  stability  of  the  country,  equitable  distribution

of  essential  commodities  at  fair  prices  for  maintenance

of  purity  in public  life, prevention of  fraud and  similar

considerations…”

27 (2018) 13 SCC 491.

28 (2003) 7 SCC 309.

Page 56 of 61

94. This   point   was   emphasized   in  Bihar   Public   Service

Commission   v.   Saiyed   Hussain   Abbas   Rizwi   &   Anr.29 as   well,

which held that no strict definition for “public interest” existed:

“22. The expression "public interest" has to be understood

in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to

the relevant provisions of the Act. The expression "public

interest"  must  be   viewed   in   its   strict   sense  with  all   its

exceptions   so   as   to   justify   denial   of   a   statutory

exemption  in  terms  of  the  Act.   In   its  common  parlance,

the expression "public interest", like "public purpose", is

not capable of any precise definition. It does not have a

rigid  meaning,   is   elastic  and   takes   its   colour   from  the

statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time

and   state   of   society   and   its   needs.   It   also  means   the

general  welfare  of  the  public  that  warrants   recognition

and protection; something in which the public as a whole

has a stake.”

95. It is unnecessary to belabour the point. The proposition is simply

that   the   notion   of   public   interest   will   necessarily   reflect   the

specificities of the situation at hand. In the present case, the public

interest   which   has   been   emphasized   upon   by  Respondents   is   the

urgent   need   for   the   creation   of   a   connecting   road   through   the

Appellants’   property.   The   need   stems   from   the   traffic   congestion

caused on the route from the Mahakali Caves to the Central MIDC.

The   lack   of   a   direct   linkage   requires   detours   to   be   taken   that

significantly increase commuting time and cause inconvenience to the

general public.

29 (2012) 13 SCC 61.

Page 57 of 61

96. When   the   public   interest   is   so   clearly   articulated   and   is   an

urgent and pressing exigency, private interests must give way to the

extent required. This Court has acknowledged this before, such as in

Ramilila  Maidan  Incident  v. Home  Secretary,  Union of  India &

Ors.

30: 

“119.  The   right   to   freedom   in   a   democracy   has   to   be

exercised   in   terms   of   Article   19(1)(a)   subject   to   public

order. Public order and public tranquillity is a function

of the State which duty is discharged by the State in the

larger public  interest.  The  private right  is  to  be  waived

against public interest.  The action of the State and the

Police was in conformity with law. As a large number of

persons  were   to  assemble   on   the  morning   of  5th  June,

2011 and considering the other attendant circumstances

seen in light of the inputs received from the intelligence

agencies,   the   permission  was   revoked   and   the   persons

attending the camp at Ramlila Maidan were dispersed.”

(Emphasis Applied)

97. In K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka,

31

the origins of “Eminent Domain” were traced and the ethos behind

acquisition of land by the government for public good was discussed.

The Court elaborated on this in the following terms:

“134. Hugo Grotius is credited with the invention of the

term "eminent  domain" (jus or dominium eminens) which

implies   that   public   rights   always   overlap   with   private

rights to property, and in the case of public utility, public

rights   take   precedence.   Grotius   sets   two   conditions   on

the   exercise   of   the   power   of   eminent  domain:   the   first

requisite   is   public   advantage   and   then   compensation

from the public funds be made, if possible, to the one who

has   lost   his   right.   Application   of   the   above   principle

30 (2012) 5 SCC 1.

31 (2011) 9 SCC 1.

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varies from countries to countries. Germany, America and

Australian   Constitutions   bar   uncompensated   takings.

Canada's   constitution,   however,   does   not   contain   the

equivalent  of  the taking  clause,  and eminent  domain  is

solely a matter of statute law, the same is the situation

in   United   Kingdom   which   does   not   have   a   written

constitution   as   also   now   in   India   after   the   44th

Constitutional Amendment.”

(Emphasis Applied)

98. With these considerations in mind, we deem the present case to

be   an   appropriate   instance   where   public   interest   must   have

paramountcy over private interest. We emphasize once again before

parting that the rights of the individual must only be watered down

when the necessary circumstances demanding such a drastic measure

exist. 

99. Learned Counsel, Mr. Godbole, has candidly explained to us that

the plan for the road through the Appellants’ property is mapped in

such a way that  it  will  not disturb  the  buildings  that have been

constructed   on   it.   Learned   Senior   Counsel,   Mr.   Divan,   has   fairly

admitted that this is indeed the case. Given this, we consider that a

suitable middle ground has been arrived at which is practical and

optimally balances the competing interests between the parties. 

D. CONCLUSION

100. For the reasons detailed above, we find that Respondent No. 2

validly   exercised   its   powers   under   the   MMC   Act   to   direct   the

Page 59 of 61

acquisition of the Appellants’ land. The argument by the Appellants

that the MRTP Act maintains supremacy over the MMC Act is not the

correct position of law, in our opinion, and the two statutes exist sideby­side with some degree of overlap. The powers under the MMC Act

remain intact even in cases where they cover a subject that is also

provided for in the MRTP Act. 

101. The procedure contemplated under Section 91 of the MMC Act to

commence   proceedings   under   the   LAA   for   procuring   land   was

substantially complied with. The part of the provision relied upon by

the   Appellants   is   directory   in   nature   and   requires   substantial

compliance rather than strict compliance. The objections raised by the

Appellants regarding certain aspects of the process are unfounded as

no prejudice was caused to them, and the purported defects are not

nearly grave enough to cause an annulment of the entire process. 

102. In light of these findings, we do not consider it necessary to

comment   upon   the   submissions   by   learned   Senior   Counsel,   Mr.

Naphade,   regarding   the   bona   fides   of   the   Appellants   and   their

entitlement to relief on the grounds of equity. Considering the other

issues which have been answered in favour of the Respondents, this

point becomes moot. 

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103. In the final outcome, we dismiss the present appeal as being

devoid of merit. 

104. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of. 

………….……………..J.

(SURYA KANT)

………….……………..J.

(ABHAY S. OKA)

NEW DELHI:

SEPTEMBER 02, 2022

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