The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Bangalore vs The State of Karnataka

The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Bangalore vs The State of Karnataka - Supreme Court Case - Judgment 2022

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 13451346 OF 2022

The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee ..Appellant (S)

Bangalore

Versus

The State of Karnataka & Ors. ..Respondent (S)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 13471374 OF 2022

J U D G M E N T

M. R. Shah, J.

1. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of

appeals and as such are between the same parties, all

these appeals are decided and disposed of together by this

common judgment and order.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order in respective writ appeals preferred by

the appellant herein – the Agricultural Produce Marketing

Committee, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the

“APMC”), by which the Division Bench of the High Court

has dismissed the said writ appeals and confirmed the

common judgment and order passed by the learned Single

Judge passed in respective writ petitions preferred by the

private respondents herein – original land owners and

declared that the acquisitions of the lands in question has

lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter

referred to as “the Act, 2013”), the APMC, Bangalore has

preferred the present appeals.

3. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are

as under:

3.1 That the lands in question were acquired in three parts.

The first acquisition was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas

of land owned by respondent No.4 – Jamanlal Bajaj Seva

Trust (for short “Trust”). Second acquisition was in respect

of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned by very respondent

No.4 – Trust and the third acquisition was in respect of 3

acres 34 guntas of land (which is not the subject matter of

appeals before this Court).

3.2 The relevant facts in respect of first and second

acquisitions are as under:

In respect of 172 acres 22 guntas (First Acquisition)

3.2.1 That a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the

Act, 1894”) on 03.09.1994 in respect of 172 acres 22

guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 herein – Trust in

Srigandadakaval Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru

for establishing a mega market by the appellant – APMC,

Bangalore.

3.2.2 One Rajajinagar House Building Cooperative Society

challenged the notification issued under Section 4(1),

before the High Court of Karnataka by way of Writ Petition

No.28988/1994. It was the case on behalf of the said

society that the land should be acquired for them and not

for APMC. The said writ petition came to be dismissed by

the High Court vide order dated 23.12.1995.

3.3.3 Thereafter a notification/declaration under Section 6 of the

Act, 1894 was issued on 10.10.1996 and published on

13.10.1996. A draft award was prepared in respect of 172

acres 22 guntas of land on 12.08.1998.

3.3.4 On the instructions given by the Land Acquisition Officer,

the appellant – APMC deposited Rs.9,14,14,873/ on

19.08.1998 towards approximate cost of the acquisition.

3.3.5 It appears that the aforesaid Rajajinagar House Building

Cooperative Society filed another writ petition being W.P.

No.6880/1997 before the High Court, before the

acquisition of 172.50 acres of land at Srigandadakaval

Village could be completed. The High Court granted an exparte order of stay of acquisition proceedings vide interim

order dated 16.09.1998. Thereafter respondent no.4 –

original land owner filed Writ Petition No.3884/1998

before the High Court, challenging the acquisition

proceedings. Vide interim order dated 08.02.1999, the

High Court ordered stay of dispossession.

In respect of 104 acres 5 guntas (Second Acquisition)

3.4 That a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section

17(4) of the Act, 1894, dispensing with the requirement of

hearing was issued on 13.04.1999 in respect of 104 acres

5 guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 – Trust in

Herohalli Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bangalore North

Taluk, for establishing a mega market by the appellant –

APMC. A final notification under Section 6(1) read with

Section 17(1) to 17(4) was issued in respect of 100 acres

11 guntas out of 104 acres 5 guntas which had been

notified under Section 4(1) on 13.04.1999, leaving an area

of 3 acres 34 guntas out of acquisition. An enquiry under

Section 5A was dispensed with.

3.4.1 That one Vishwaneedam Trust filed Writ Petition

No.708/2000 before the High Court challenging the said

acquisition. The High Court granted stay of dispossession

in respect of 35 acres out of the 100 acres 5 guntas

situated in Herohalli Village.

3.4.2 Respondent No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed Writ

Petition No.37140/2000 challenging the notifications

dated 13.04.1999 and 26.10.1999 in respect of the lands

at Herohalli Village.

3.4.3 According to the appellant, possession was taken and

handed over to the APMC by the Land Acquisition Officer

vide an Official Memorandum of Possession dated

06.10.2000 in respect of 65 acres 19 guntas of the lands at

Herohalli Village.

3.4.4 That an award was made by the State Land Acquisition

Officer (SLAO) on 22.05.2002, referring to a Government

order dated 26.03.2002, in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas

covered by Section 6 notification dated 26.10.1999. The

award provided for payment of compensation to

respondent No.4 – Trust after excluding 34 acres 14

guntas of acquired land treating the same as Phut Kharab

belonging to the Government and further excluding 35

acres in respect of the writ petition filed Vishwaneedam

trust in which an order of stay of dispossession had been

passed by the High Court. The said compensation was

accepted by respondent No.4 under protest. Respondent

No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed a Land Acquisition

Case No.1/2003 seeking enhancement of compensation

which seems to be pending.

3.5 Thus, Writ Petition No.3884/1998 filed by respondent No.4

– original land owner was in respect of 172 acres 22

guntas of land. Writ Petition Nos.3714037146/2000 was

in respect of 100 acres of land and Writ Petition

No.708/2000 was filed by Vishwaneedam Trust in respect

of second acquisition (part).

3.6 A common statement of objections was filed by the

appellant – APMC to all the writ petitions.

3.7 That the APMC filed IA No.01/2007 in W.P.

No.37140/2000, to permit APMC to hand over 9 acres of

land out of 65 acres 11 guntas to the Bangalore

Development Authority (BDA) and 4 acres to the Bangalore

Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB). That vide

order dated 21.03.2007, the learned Single Judge allowed

the said IA No.01/2007 and granted permission to the

APMC as prayed.

3.8 At this stage, it is required to be noted that in respect to

the lands in question and other lands owned by

respondent No.4 – Trust, proceedings were pending before

the Land Reforms Tribunal, Bangalore N. Taluk. At this

stage, it is required to be noted that it was the specific case

on behalf of the State and the APMC that unless the

proceedings under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (KLR

Act) are disposed of, the compensation is not required to

be deposited as, if ultimately it is held that the land

acquired is excess vacant land under the provisions of KLR

Act, in that case, the said land would vest with the State

Government and therefore, no compensation would be

payable. Therefore, since the Government was not

proceeding with making of awards or offering

compensation on the ground that proceedings were

pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal, by the same

order dated 21.03.2007 the learned Single Judge directed

the Tribunal to dispose of application No.LRF 2099/7475

under Section 66 of the KLR Act, within three months.

3.9 The order passed by the learned Single Judge dated

21.03.2007 granting permission to the APMC to hand over

9 acres of land to BDA and 4 acres of land to BWSSB was

challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court by

way of Writ Appeal No.1011/2007. The Division Bench of

the High Court stayed the order of the learned Single

Judge. The said appeal along with some companion

appeals came to be disposed of by the Division Bench vide

order dated 28.06.2012, directing learned Single Judge to

decide all the connected writ petitions finally and

continued the interim stay granted by the Division Bench

until the final disposal of all the petitions.

3.10 Thereafter APMC filed IA No.03/2008 seeking permission

to build a wall around 65 acres of land, which came to be

allowed vide order dated 12.02.2009. It is reported that

thereafter APMC has completed the fencing work.

Proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal

3.11 That the Land Reforms Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as

“the Tribunal”) passed an order dated 12.01.2010 in the

proceedings under the KLR Act holding that 213 acres 20

guntas of respondent No.4 – Trust’s land was excess land

under the said Act.

3.11.1 The order passed by the Tribunal was challenged before

the High Court in Writ Petition No.4311/2010. The High

Court vide order dated 24.03.2014 remitted the

proceedings to the Tribunal with directions for a fresh

consideration.

3.11.2 On remand the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated

22.09.2015 and declared that 265 acres 24 guntas of

land held by respondent No.4 – Trust was excess land.

That the order passed by the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015

was challenged before the High Court and the High Court

vide order dated 02.05.2017 set aside the order passed

by the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015 and once again

remitted the matter to the Tribunal.

3.11.3 That the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated 28.11.2017

and declared that 354 acres 10 guntas was excess land.

The order passed by the Tribunal dated 28.11.2017 was

again the subject matter before the High Court by way of

Writ Petition No.55344/2017. By judgment and order

dated 30.06.2021, the learned Single Judge has quashed

and set aside the Tribunal’s order dated 28.11.2017. It is

reported that against the judgment and order passed by

the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated

30.06.2021 passed in Writ Petition No.55344/2017, the

State has preferred a writ appeal being W.A. No.1089/21,

which is reported to be pending before the Division Bench

of the High Court.

3.12 That all the aforesaid writ petitions being W.P.

No.3884/1998 (in respect of 172 acres of land), W.P. Nos.

3714037146/2000 (in respect of 100 acres of land) and

others writ petitions being W.P. No.708/2000 and 19579

19585/2001, were clubbed together. During the pendency

of the aforesaid writ petitions the Act, 2013 came into

force. Therefore, the writ petitioners submitted an

application dated 24.02.2014 seeking to invoke the benefit

of the Act, 2013 and urged that the benefit of provisions of

the said Act would be available to it.

3.13 That the learned Single Judge framed the following points

for consideration:

a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should

be deferred pending adjudication and

determination by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore

North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwise

under the provisions of the Karnataka Land

Reforms Act, 1961 of the very lands which are

the subject matter herein.

b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands

in question having said to have been given to

APMC can be said to be valid and in accordance

with law.

c. Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA

Act in the acquisition of a portion of the lands

for the same purpose was justified.

d. Whether the acquiring authority could keeping

abeyance the mandate to pay or deposit the

compensation amount pending disposal of the

proceedings before the Land Tribunal in respect

of the lands.

e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed

by virtue of the 2013 Act.

3.14 That though some observations were made on the

proceedings under the Act, 1894, thereafter, without

further finally deciding any other point framed for

consideration, as reproduced hereinabove, the learned

Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions by holding that

respective acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of

the Act, 2013.

3.15 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common

judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge

dated 24.06.2014 holding that respective acquisitions have

lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the APMC

preferred writ appeals before the High Court. By the

impugned common judgment and order, the Division

Bench of the High Court has dismissed the said appeals

confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned

Single Judge declaring that the acquisition have lapsed

under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.

3.16 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

common judgment and order passed by the Division Bench

of the High Court in respective Writ Appeal No.1732/2014

and others along with accompanied appeals, the APMC,

Bangalore, has preferred the present appeals.

4 Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf

of the appellant – APMC has vehemently contended that in

the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court

has erred in holding that the acquisitions in respect of the

lands in question have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the

Act, 2013.

4.1 It is further contended that in respect of acquisition of 172

acres land no award was declared in view of the stay

granted by the High Court in various proceedings. It is

submitted that therefore subsection (2) of Section 24 of

the Act, 2013 shall not be applicable. It is submitted that

therefore the High Court has erred in declaring that the

acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section

24 of the Act, 2013.

4.2 It is further submitted that so far as the acquisition in

respect of 100 acres of land situated at Herohalli Village is

concerned, the award in respect of 65 acres of land was

declared and the possession was also taken over. Further,

the amount of compensation was deposited and the

respondent – original land owner withdrew Rs.2.37 crores,

therefore it cannot be said that the acquisition has lapsed

under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013.

4.3 It is urged that the High Court has not properly

appreciated the fact that in respect of acquisition of 172

acres and in respect of remaining 35 acres out of the 100

acres of land, the awards could not be declared in view of

the stay orders granted by the High Court in various

proceedings. Therefore, for the purpose of Section 24(1)(a)

of the Act, 2013, being made applicable, the period during

which the stay orders were in operation have to be

excluded.

4.4 Now so far as the observations made by the High Court

that the appellant was not ready to deposit the amount of

compensation, it is submitted that the High Court ought to

have appreciated that as such there was a very valid

reason and/or justification for the APMC not to deposit the

entire amount of compensation. It is submitted that with

respect to the very land in question the proceedings under

the KLR Act were pending before the Land Reforms

Tribunal and the Tribunal had to take a call and/or

decision that the respondentTrust is holding any excess

vacant land or not and therefore, it was thought fit to wait

till the outcome of the proceedings under the Land

Reforms Act. It is submitted that the aforesaid reason

cannot be ascribed against the appellant on the ground

that the appellant was not ready to deposit/pay the

compensation.

4.5 It is further submitted that even the High Court has

materially erred in holding that possession in respect of 65

acres of land was illegal which was taken by invoking

urgency clause and not complying with the deposit of 80%

of compensation as required under Section 17 of the Act,

1894.

4.6 It is further submitted that as such in the impugned

judgment and order the High Court has not at all quashed

and set aside the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the

Act, 1894 in respect of 172 acres and 100 acres of lands,

respectively. It is submitted that after some discussion on

the proceedings under the Act, 1894, the High Court has

straightway considered the applicability of the Act, 2013

and has held that the acquisitions in respect of both the

lands have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section 24 of

the Act, 2013.

4.7 Relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of this

Court reported in the case of Indore Development

Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129, it is

submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed

by the High Court holding that the acquisitions have

lapsed under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act,

2013, is not sustainable.

4.8 A number of submissions are sought to be made by Shri V.

Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the

appellant – APMC on repeal of the Act, 1894 in view of the

enactment of the Act, 2013 and the effect of the Act, 2013

on the acquisitions under the Act, 1894. However, for the

reasons stated hereinbelow and as the High Court has not

at all considered any of the submissions/issues on the

validity of the notifications issued under Section 4 and 6

and the High Court having considered and dealt with the

applicability of subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act,

2013 and having held that the acquisitions have lapsed

under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, we

propose to remand the matter to the High Court to decide

the other issues raised afresh, in accordance with law and

on merits. Therefore, we have not dealt with any of the

submissions made by Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate

and even Shri C.U. Singh, learned Senior Advocate

appearing on behalf of the respondent – Trust on merits on

other issues. Hence, we have restricted the consideration

of the present appeals to the impugned judgment and

order passed by the High Court declaring that the

acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section

24 of the Act, 2013.

5 Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the State has supported the appellant – APMC.

He has stated that the Writ Appeal No.1089/21

challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned

Single Judge quashing and setting aside the order passed

by the Tribunal, is pending before the Division Bench of

the High Court. Therefore, it is prayed that if this

honourable Court proposes, to remand the matter to the

learned Single Judge, in that case, the aforesaid appeal be

directed to be heard first by the Division Bench of the High

Court.

6 All these appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri C.U.

Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the

respondent – Trust – original land owner. It is submitted

that in the present case respondent – Trust is undertaking

various activities and running the ashram in furtherance

of the object of the Trust. It is submitted that respondent –

Trust is not an ordinary individual land owner. That the

Trust was established in the year 1960. It is submitted

that the lands in question was purchased in the year 1960

and the same is being used to carry out Gandhian

activities and in furtherance of the object of the Trust.

6.1 It is submitted that in the present case the High Court has

rightly observed that the State Government/APMC have no

intention of paying any compensation for the acquisition of

the subject lands and accordingly, chose to abandon the

acquisition of the lands or to allow the same deliberately to

lapse.

6.2 Shri Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of

respondent – Trust has also made elaborate submissions

on the legality and validity of the notifications under

section 4 and 6 of Act, 1894 in respect of the acquisitions

of 172 acres and 100 acres lands, respectively. However,

by the impugned judgment and order the High Court has

not declared and set aside the notifications under Section

4 and 6 of the Act, 1894 and has held and declared that

the acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of

Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and the High Court has not at

all decided the other issues which were placed before it.

We propose not to deal with any of the submissions on

other issues on which there is no decision by the High

Court and we confine the present appeals to the decision

of the High Court declaring and holding that the

acquisitions have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section

24 of the Act, 2013 and for the other issues we propose to

remand the matter to the High Court.

6.3 Now so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by

the High Court holding and declaring that the acquisitions

have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act,

2013, Shri Singh learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of respondent – Trust has fairly conceded that in

view of the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of

Indore Development Authority (supra), the view taken by

the High Court that the acquisitions have lapsed under

subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 is

unsustainable. However, he has submitted that the

learned Single Judge and even the learned Division Bench

of the High Court were right in holding so, considering the

law prevailing at that time when the learned Single Judge

decided the matters. It is submitted that the learned Single

Judge followed the law prevailing at the relevant time and

the learned Single Judge decided the matters accordingly.

It is submitted that therefore no fault can be found with

the view taken by the learned Single Judge.

7 We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respective parties at length.

8 At the outset it is required to be noted that the proceedings

before the learned Single Judge of the High Court by way

of writ petition No. 3884 of 1998 was with respect to 172

acres 22 guntas of land acquired. In the writ petition No.

3884 of 1998, the original land owners prayed for the

following reliefs:

(i) Declare that the entire acquisition proceedings

commencing with the issue of a preliminary

notification gazette on 3.9.1994 marked as AnnexureA in the writ petition have lapsed on account of the

award not having been made within a period of two

years in terms of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition

Act.

(ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or

direction to quash AnnexureA, the preliminary

notification LAQ (2) SR/32/9495 DATED 2.9.1994

PUBLISHE DIN TH Karnataka Gazette dated 3.9.1994

and Annexure the final notification No. RDD 21 LAQ

96 dated 10.10.1996 published in the Karnataka

Gazette dated 31. l 0.1996.

By way of amendment the original writ petitioners – original

land owners also prayed to declare that the acquisition

proceedings are deemed to have lapsed in view of the

provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013.

8.1 Writ petition Nos. 3714037146 of 2000 filed by the original

writ petitioners – original land owners was with respect to

100 acres of acquired land. In the said writ petitions original

writ petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:

(i) Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other writ or order,

quashing the impugned notification at AnnexureB

dated 13.04.1999 gazetted on 17.04.1999 in LAC(2) SR

2/992000 issued by the second respondent and also

the notification at AnnexureC dated 26.10.1999

gazetted on 18.11.1999 in No. Kam.E.68.AQ899

issued by the first respondent.

(ii) In the alternative direct the respondents to pay

compensation to the petitioner in terms of the

proceedings of the meeting dated 29.04.1999 Vide

AnnexureD

By way of amendment the original writ petitioners also

prayed to declare the acquisition proceedings having been

lapsed under the provisions of the Act, 2013.

8.2 That the learned Single Judge framed the following common

points for consideration:

a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should

be deferred pending adjudication and

determination by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore

North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwise

under the provisions of the Karnataka Land

Reforms Act, 1961 of the very lands which are

the subject matter herein.

b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands

in question having said to have been given to

APMC can be said to be valid and in accordance

with law.

c. Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA

Act in the acquisition of a portion of the lands

for the same purpose was justified.

d. Whether the acquiring authority could keeping

abeyance the mandate to pay or deposit the

compensation amount pending disposal of the

proceedings before the Land Tribunal in respect

of the lands.

e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed

by virtue of the 2013 Act.

Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds were

raised before the High Court on the legality and validity of

the acquisition proceedings, the learned Single Judge

decided only one issue, namely, whether the acquisition

proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act.

Whereas a number of issues/grounds were raised and as

such the original reliefs sought (acquisition proceedings

under Act 1894) were the main reliefs which were required

to be dealt with and considered, unfortunately, the learned

Single Judge did not give findings on the other

issues/grounds and on the reliefs sought and as observed

hereinabove, disposed of the writ petitions considering

only one relief/ground, namely, whether the acquisition

proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. When a

number of submissions were made on the other

issues/grounds, we are of the opinion that the High Court

ought to have considered the other issues and ought to

have given the findings on other issues also. Because of

not deciding the other issues and deciding the matter only

on one issue and thereafter when the decision on such one

issue, is held to be bad in law for the reasons stated

hereinbelow, this Court has no other alternative but to

remand the matters to the learned Single Judge for

deciding the Writ Petitions afresh on all other issues.

8.3 By way of analogy we observe that while considering Order

14 Rule 2 (as amended w.e.f. 01.02.1977), this Court in

the case of Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. Ivory Properties &

Ors, (2020) 6 SCC 557, has observed and held that after

the amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977, though Order 14 Rule

2(2) enables the court to decide the issue of law as a

preliminary issue in case the same relates to (i) jurisdiction

of court or (ii) a bar to suit created by any law for the time

being in force, a departure has been made in amended

provision whereby now it mandates the court to pronounce

judgment on all issues notwithstanding that a case may be

disposed of on a preliminary issue. It is further observed

that intendment behind this departure is to avoid remand

in an appealable case for deciding other issues.

8.4 Therefore, the courts should adjudicate on all the issues

and give its findings on all the issues and not to

pronounce the judgment only on one of the issues. As

such it is the duty cast upon the courts to adjudicate on

all the issues and pronounce the judgment on all the

issues rather than adopting a shortcut approach and

pronouncing the judgment on only one issue. By such a

practice, it would increase the burden on the appellate

court and in many cases if the decision on the issue

decided is found to be erroneous and on other issues there

is no adjudication and no findings recorded by the court,

the appellate court will have no option but to remand the

matter for its fresh decision. Therefore, to avoid such an

eventuality, the courts have to adjudicate on all the issues

raised in a case and render findings and the judgment on

all the issues involved.

9 Now, so far as the impugned common judgment and order

passed by the High Court declaring that the acquisition

proceedings have lapsed under subsection (2) of Section

24 of the Act, 2013, is concerned, the same is

unsustainable in view of the decision of the Constitution

bench of this Court in the case of Indore Development

Authority (supra). This Court has concluded in paragraph

365 and 366 as under:

“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune

Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal

Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC

183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and

all other decisions in which Pune Municipal

Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal

Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274]

has been followed, are also overruled. The decision

in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji

Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC

353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be said to be

laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions

following the same are also overruled. In Indore

Development Authority v. Shailendra [Indore

Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412

: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the aspect with respect to

the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be

read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed for

consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot

prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present

judgment.

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer

the questions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case

the award is not made as on 112014, the date of

commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of

proceedings. Compensation has to be determined

under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within the

window period of five years excluding the period

covered by an interim order of the court, then

proceedings shall continue as provided under Section

24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has

not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between

possession and compensation has to be read as “nor”

or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition

proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes

place where due to inaction of authorities for five years

or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the

possession of land has not been taken nor

compensation has been paid. In other words, in case

possession has been taken, compensation has not

been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if

compensation has been paid, possession has not been

taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a

deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of

nondeposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2)

in case it has not been deposited with respect to

majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries

(landowners) as on the date of notification for land

acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be

entitled to compensation in accordance with the

provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation

under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the

said Act can be granted. Nondeposit of compensation

(in court) does not result in the lapse of land

acquisition proceedings. In case of nondeposit with

respect to the majority of holdings for five years or

more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid

to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for

land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the

compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the

1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that

acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to nonpayment or nondeposit of compensation in court. The

obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount

under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused

to accept compensation or who sought reference for

higher compensation, cannot claim that the

acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section

24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is

to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of

Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894

Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by

drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award

has been passed on taking possession under Section

16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no

divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,

as once possession has been taken there is no lapse

under Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a

deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case

authorities have failed due to their inaction to take

possession and pay compensation for five years or

more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a

proceeding for land acquisition pending with the

authority concerned as on 112014. The period of

subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to

be excluded in the computation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise

to new cause of action to question the legality of

concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24

applies to a proceeding pending on the date of

enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 112014. It does not

revive stale and timebarred claims and does not

reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to

question the legality of mode of taking possession to

reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of

compensation in the treasury instead of court to

invalidate acquisition.”

We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that

all judgments rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal

Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [(2014)

3 SCC 183] are overruled in view of the interpretation

made to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, in Indore

Development Authority (supra). There has been a trend

of land owners filing fresh cases seeking lapse of

acquisition on the basis of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013,

although such land owners may have earlier

unsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the

acquisition notifications. Such land owners may have had

the benefit of interim orders of stay of further proceedings

in the acquisition process or dispossession resulting in a

delay in the making of the award and payment/deposit of

the compensation and consequently in taking over

possession of the acquired land. There being a delay in the

passing of the award owing to interim orders granted by

the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits may

have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners

cannot now take advantage of the same so as to contend

that no award has been made and consequently there has

been no payment or deposit of the compensation and that

possession of the acquired land continues with them. The

land owners having had the benefit of interim orders

granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them

against the acquisition cannot take benefit under Section

24(2) of the Act, 2013. The High Court or the civil courts

which may have granted interim orders in favour of the

land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspect before

applying Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the

land owners.

10 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of

Indore Development Authority (supra) to the facts of the

case on hand, the view taken by the High Court while

declaring the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under

subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is

unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by

this Court in the case Indore Development Authority

(supra). Even the same is also not disputed by Shri C. U.

Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the

original writ petitioners – original land owners. Therefore,

the common judgment and order passed by the High Court

allowing the writ petitions and declaring that the

acquisition proceedings with respect to the lands in

question have lapsed under subsection (2) of section 24 of

the Act, 2013 cannot stand and the same deserve to be

quashed and set aside.

11 As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issues

were raised on the legality of the acquisition proceedings

under the Act, 1894 and though other points for

consideration were raised/framed by the High Court

reproduced hereinabove, since none of the issues are

adjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other

alternative but to remand the matter to the learned Single

Judge for deciding the writ petitions afresh and to

adjudicate on all the other issues, other than the lapse of

acquisitions under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act,

2013. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the High

Court ought to have adjudicated on all the issues raised

and ought not to have decided and disposed of the writ

petitions, adjudicating only on one issue which has been

found to be erroneous. The Division Bench has also not

applied its mind to this aspect of the matter and has

simply dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant herein.

12 In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated

above, all these appeals are allowed. The impugned

common judgment and order passed by the Division Bench

of the High Court as well as the common judgment and

order passed by the High Court in writ petition(s) No.

3884/1998 and Nos. 3714037146/2000 are hereby

quashed and set aside. The matters are remitted back to

the learned Single Judge to decide and dispose of the

aforesaid writ petitions afresh and in accordance with law

and on their own merits. The learned Single Judge to

adjudicate all other issues which were framed reproduced

hereinabove and pronounce the judgment on all the points

framed for consideration. The aforesaid exercise shall be

completed within a period of twelve months from the date

of receipt of the present order.

It is made clear that we have not expressed anything

on the merits of these cases, in favour of either of the

parties on other issues and it is ultimately for the learned

Single Judge to deal with and consider the same in

accordance with law and on their own merits. It is also

made clear that on remand the learned Single Judge to

adjudicate and pronounce the judgment on all other issues

except the issue with respect to the lapse of the acquisition

proceedings by virtue of the Act, 2013. All the appeals are

allowed accordingly.

We also observe and direct that Writ Appeal No.1089 of

2021 be heard first and to be decided and disposed of on

or before 31.12.2022. There shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………………J.

(M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

New Delhi,

March 22, 2022.

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- March 04, 2020

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