SHYAM SEL AND POWER LIMITED vs SHYAM STEEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED

SHYAM SEL AND POWER LIMITED vs SHYAM STEEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1984 OF 2022

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 4080 of 2022]

SHYAM SEL AND POWER LIMITED 

AND ANOTHER             ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SHYAM STEEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED    ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order passed by

the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta dated 24th

December 2019, arising out of the order passed by the learned

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Single Judge of the High Court dated 2nd April 2019, by which

the learned Single Judge had granted time to the appellantsdefendants to file affidavit­in­opposition and directed to post

the matter after three weeks.   By the said order, the learned

Single   Judge   also   directed   the   appellants­defendants   to

maintain weekly accounts of sale of the products covered by

Class 6, which are sold under the mark ‘SHYAM’.

3. The facts in the present case are not much in dispute.

The respondent­plaintiff had filed a suit against the appellantsdefendants for infringement of trade mark and passing off.  It is

the   case   of   the   respondent­plaintiff   that   it   has   trade   mark

registration in respect of the word ‘SHYAM’ and diverse label

marks wherein the word ‘SHYAM’ features prominently.  Both

the   respondent­plaintiff   and   the   appellants­defendants

manufacture and sell, inter alia, Thermo­Mechanically treated

bars (hereinafter referred to as “TMT bars”).  It is the case of the

respondent­plaintiff that in the year 2015, it came to know that

the   appellants­defendants   were   using   the   mark   ‘SHYAM’   in

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their products.  The respondent­plaintiff therefore, through its

advocate,   objected   to   such   use.     It   is   the   case   of   the

respondent­plaintiff that the appellants­defendants agreed to

phase out the products that they had manufactured with the

mark ‘SHYAM’ and not to use the said mark ‘SHYAM’ on their

products in future.

4. It is further the case of the respondent­plaintiff that the

appellants­defendants had applied for registration of the mark

‘SHYAM INFRA’.  The respondent­plaintiff had filed its objection

to it.  It is further its case that since the appellants­defendants

did not file their counter­statement, the application lapsed and

was treated as abandoned. 

5. It   is   further   the   case   of   the   respondent­plaintiff   that

towards the end of 2018, the appellants­defendants started to

use the word ‘SHYAM METALICS’ on the packaging of their

TMT   bars.     According   to   respondent­plaintiff,   though   the

appellants­defendants   had   used   the   word   ‘SHYAM’   on   their

invoices and  stationeries, they had  not  used the said word

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‘SHYAM’   on   their   wrappers   in   which   their   TMT   bars   were

packed.  According to the respondent­plaintiff, this was done by

the appellants­defendants only to take advantage of the growing

and expanding business of the respondent­plaintiff and with an

intention   that   the   products   manufactured   and   sold   by   the

appellants­defendants   could   be   passed   off   as   those   of   the

respondent­plaintiff.   In   this   background,   the   respondentplaintiff filed a civil suit being CS No. 63 of 2019 before the

learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, claiming

infringement of their registered trade mark ‘SHYAM’ and its

variants and also for passing off by the appellants­defendants.

6. Along with the suit, an application being GA No.857 of

2019 in CS No. 63 of 2019 for temporary injunction under

Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) came to be filed.   The said

application basically claimed an order of injunction restraining

the   appellants­defendants   from   infringing   the   respondentplaintiff’s   trade   mark   ‘SHYAM’   and   its   variants   and   in

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particular,   trade   mark   registration   No.   987596.     The   said

ssapplication sought an injunction restraining the appellantsdefendants   from,   in   any   manner,   passing   off   and   enabling

others to pass off the respondent­plaintiff’s products by use of

trade marks comprising the word ‘SHYAM’ or any other trade

mark similar thereto.  

7. The said suit and the application for temporary injunction

came to be filed in the month of March, 2019.  The application

came up for consideration for grant of ad­interim injunction

before the learned Single Judge on 2nd April 2019.  The learned

Single Judge made a prima facie observation that he was of the

view that ‘SHYAM’ being a part of the business name of the

appellants­defendants,   no   injunction   should   be   passed   to

restrain the appellants­defendants from using the said word

‘SHYAM’ on their packaging.  The learned Single Judge deemed

it appropriate to grant time to the appellants­defendants to file

affidavit­in­opposition, which was directed to be filed within two

weeks from the date of the said order.  It was also clarified that

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no   prayer   for   extension   of   time   shall   be   entertained.     The

learned Single Judge directed the matter to be listed after three

weeks.   Vide the said order, the learned  Single Judge also

directed the appellants­defendants to maintain weekly accounts

of sale of the products covered by Class 6, which are sold under

the mark ‘SHYAM’.  The learned Single Judge also clarified that

the observation made by him in the said order was prima facie

for the purpose of passing an order at the ad­interim stage and

the   same   would   not   have   any   relevance   at   the   time   of

considering and deciding the said application after exchange of

affidavits.

8. Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single

Judge,   the   respondent­plaintiff   filed   an   appeal   before   the

Division Bench of the High Court.  The Division Bench of the

High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 24th

December 2019 though, has observed that “the order of the

learned Single Judge dated 2nd April 2019 is modified”, but in

effect,   has   allowed   the   appeal   and   granted   an   injunction

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restraining   the   appellants­defendants   from,   in   any   way,

manufacturing, selling or advertising their goods with the mark

‘SHYAM’ or with a label or device containing the mark ‘SHYAM’

till   the   disposal   of   the   suit.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the

present appeal.

9. This Court, while issuing notice on 16th  June 2020, had

stayed the impugned judgment and order.   The respondentplaintiff had therefore filed an application for vacating stay.

However, this Court found it appropriate to decide the main

appeal itself on merits.  As such, we have heard learned Senior

Counsel for the parties at length.

10. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellants­defendants submitted that the appeal

filed by the respondent­plaintiff before the Division Bench of

the High Court was not tenable. Relying on the judgment of this

Court in the case of  Shah   Babulal   Khimji   v.   Jayaben   D.

Kania and Another1

, learned Senior Counsel submitted that

1 (1981) 4 SCC 8

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the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 2nd  April

2019 could not be construed to be a ‘judgment’ within the

meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court

(hereinafter referred to as “Letters Patent”) and as such, the

appeal itself was not maintainable.   He submitted that vide

judgment and order impugned before the Division Bench of the

High Court, the learned Single Judge had only granted time to

file the reply and had neither granted nor refused an interim

injunction.     Shri   Rohatgi   submitted   that   the   order   of   the

learned   Single   Judge   is   neither   a   final   judgment   nor   a

preliminary   judgment   nor   an   intermediary/interlocutory

judgment. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the order

passed by the learned Single Judge would not fall in any of the

categories   carved   out   by   this   Court   in   para   (120)   of   its

judgment in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji (supra).

11. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that in any case, the view

taken by the learned Single Judge could not be construed to be

either   impossible   or   perverse,   warranting   interference.     The

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learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in

the case of Wander Ltd. and Another v. Antox India P. Ltd2

.

Shri Rohatgi further submitted that the Division Bench of the

High Court has in fact usurped the jurisdiction of the learned

Single Judge to decide an application under Order XXXIX Rules

1 and 2 CPC.  Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case

of  Monsanto   Technology   LLC   Through   the   authorized

representative Ms Natalia Voruz and Others v. Nuziveedu

Seeds Limited Through Director and Others3

, he submitted

that it was impermissible for the Division Bench  of the High

Court to do so.

12. Shri   Neeraj   Kishan   Kaul,   learned   Senior   Counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent­plaintiff submitted that

the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly interfered with

the order passed by the learned Single Judge.   He submitted

that it is a settled principle of law that an order of injunction

would be issued wherever an infringement of a registered trade

2 1990 Supp SCC 727

3 (2019) 3 SCC 381

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mark is established.  He relies on the recent judgment of this

Court in the case of  Renaissance Hotel Holdings  Inc. v. B.

Vijaya Sai and Others4

13. Insofar as the objection of the appellants­defendants with

regard   to   maintainability   of   the   appeal   before   the   Division

Bench of the High Court is concerned, Shri Kaul would submit

that the view taken by this Court in the case of Shah Babulal

Khimji  (supra)   would   rather   support   the   case   of   the

respondent­plaintiff than that of the appellants­defendants.  He

submitted   that   since   a   vital   and   valuable   right   of   the

respondent­plaintiff was infringed by non­grant of ad­interim

order by the learned Single Judge, the appeal was very much

tenable.     He   submitted   that   it   is   not   in   dispute   that   the

respondent­plaintiff is the registered owner of the trade mark

‘SHYAM’.  As such, once the infringement thereof was brought

to the notice of the learned Single Judge, the learned Single

Judge ought to have granted ad­interim relief restraining the

4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 61 [Civil Appeal No.404 of 2022 dated 19.01.2022]

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appellants­defendants   from   using   the   said   trade   mark   and

passing off their goods as that of the respondent­plaintiff.  He

therefore submitted that no interference is warranted in the

present appeal.

14. Though both  the parties have addressed this Court at

length on merits of the matter and have also taken us through

voluminous documents, we do not find it necessary to go into

those issues.  The present appeal arises out of an order passed

by   the   Division   Bench   of   the  High   Court   in   an   intra­court

appeal   challenging   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single

Judge vide which the learned Single Judge had granted time to

the   appellants­defendants   to   file   affidavit­in­opposition   and

postponed the hearing of the application seeking injunction.

15. We are of the considered view that any observation on

merits by this Court would prejudice the rights of either of the

parties and therefore, we are restricting ourselves to consider

the question with regard to tenability of the appeal against the

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order of the learned Single Judge and the correctness of the

approach of the Division Bench of the High Court.

16. An intra­court appeal lies to the Division Bench of the

High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.  Clause 15 of

the Letters Patent enables a party to appeal to the Division

Bench of the High Court against an order of the Single Judge.

A three­Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Shah Babulal

Khimji  (supra) had an occasion to consider the question as to

what would be meant by the term ‘judgment’ used in Clause 15

of the Letters Patent.  In the said case, the plaintiff had filed a

suit on the original side of the Bombay High Court for specific

performance of a contract and prayed for an interim relief by

appointing a receiver of the suit­property and injuncting the

defendant   from   disposing   of   the   suit­property   during   the

pendency of the suit. The Single Judge of the High Court after

hearing   the   notice   of   motion   had   dismissed   the   said

application. The plaintiff therefore filed an appeal before the

Division Bench of the High Court.  The Division Bench of the

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High Court held that the order of the Single Judge refusing to

appoint a receiver and to grant an injunction could not be

construed to be a ‘judgment’ as contemplated by Clause 15 of

the Letters Patent.   Being aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff had

approached this Court.  Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, speaking

for himself and Justice Varadarajan, observed thus:

109. Clause 15 makes no attempt to define what a

judgment is. As letters patent is a special law which

carves out its own sphere, it would not be possible

for   us   to   project   the   definition   of   the   word

“judgment” appearing in Section 2(9) of the Code of

1908,   which   defines   “judgment”   into   the   letters

patent:

“‘Judgment’  means   the   statement   given

by the Judge of the grounds of a decree

or order.”

110. In Mt. Shahzadi Begam, v. Alak Nath [AIR 1935

All 620 : 1935 ALJ 681 : 157 IC 347] , Sulaiman,

C.J.,   very   rightly   pointed   out   that   as   the   letters

patent were drafted long before even the Code of

1882 was passed, the word “judgment” used in the

letters patent cannot be relatable to or confined to

the   definition   of   “judgment”   as   contained   in   the

Code of Civil Procedure which came into existence

long   after   the   letters   patent   were   given.   In   this

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connection, the Chief Justice observed [29 Cal LJ

225] as follows:

“It has been held in numerous cases that

as   the   letters   patent   were   drafted   long

before even the earlier Code of 1882 was

passed, the word ‘judgment’ used therein

does not mean the judgment as defined

in the existing Code of Civil Procedure. At

the same time the word ‘judgment’ does

not   include   every   possible   order,   final,

preliminary or interlocutory passed by a

Judge of the High Court.”

111. We find ourselves in complete agreement with

the observations made by the Allahabad High Court

on this aspect of the matter.

112. The definition of the word “judgment” in subsection (9) of Section 2 of the Code of 1908 is linked

with the definition of “decree” which is defined in

sub­section (2) of Section 2 thus:

“ ‘Decree’ means the formal expression of

an adjudication which, so far as regards

the   Court   expressing   it,   conclusively

determines the rights of the parties with

regard   to   all   or   any   of   the   matters   in

controversy in the suit and may be either

preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to

include the rejection of a plaint and the

determination   of   any   question   within

Section 47 or Section 144, but shall not

include—

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(a)   any   adjudication   from   which   an

appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or

(b) any order of dismissal for default.

Explanation.—A   decree   is   preliminary

when   further   proceedings   have   to   be

taken before the suit can be completely

disposed   of.   It   is   final   when   such

adjudication   completely   disposes   of   the

suit.   It   may   be   partly   preliminary   and

partly final.”

113. Thus,  under  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  a

judgment consists of the reasons and grounds for a

decree passed by a court. As a judgment constitutes

the reasons for the decree it follows as a matter of

course   that   the   judgment   must   be   a   formal

adjudication   which   conclusively   determines   the

rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the

matters in controversy.  The concept of a judgment

as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to

be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by

sub­section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically

imported into the definition of the word “judgment”

as used in clause 15 of the letters patent because

the letters patent has advisedly not used the terms

“order”   or   “decree”   anywhere.   The   intention,

therefore, of the givers of the letters patent was that

the word “judgment” should receive a much wider

and   more   liberal   interpretation   than   the   word

“judgment” used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At

the same time, it cannot be said that any order

passed   by   a   trial   Judge   would   amount   to   a

judgment;   otherwise   there   will   be   no  end  to   the

number of orders which would be appealable under

the   letters  patent.  It  seems to   us  that  the   word

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“judgment” has undoubtedly a concept of finality in

a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words,

a judgment can be of three kinds:

(1) A final judgment.— A judgment which

decides   all   the   questions   or   issues   in

controversy so far as the trial Judge is

concerned and leaves nothing else to be

decided. This would mean that by virtue

of   the   judgment,   the   suit   or   action

brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or

decreed in part or in full. Such an order

passed   by   the   trial   Judge   indisputably

and unquestionably is a judgment within

the   meaning   of   the   letters   patent   and

even   amounts   to   a   decree   so   that   an

appeal would lie from such a judgment to

a Division Bench.

(2) A preliminary judgment.—This kind of

a   judgment   may   take   two   forms—(a)

where   the   trial   Judge   by   an   order

dismisses the suit without going into the

merits   of   the   suit   but   only   on   a

preliminary   objection   raised   by   the

defendant or the party opposing on the

ground that the suit is not maintainable.

Here also, as the suit is finally decided

one way or the other, the order passed by

the   trial   Judge   would   be   a   judgment

finally deciding the cause so far as the

Trial   Judge   is   concerned   and   therefore

appealable   to   the   larger   Bench.   (b)

Another   shape   which   a   preliminary

judgment may take is that where the trial

Judge passes an order after hearing the

preliminary   objections   raised   by   the

defendant   relating   to   maintainability   of

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the   suit,   e.g.,   bar   of   jurisdiction, res

judicata,   a   manifest   defect   in   the   suit,

absence of notice under Section 80 and

the like, and these objections are decided

by the trial Judge against the defendant,

the suit is not terminated but continues

and has to be tried on merits but the

order   of   the   trial   Judge   rejecting   the

objections   doubtless   adversely   affects   a

valuable right of the defendant who, if his

objections are valid, is entitled to get the

suit   dismissed   on   preliminary   grounds.

Thus, such an order even though it keeps

the   suit   alive,   undoubtedly   decides   an

important aspect of the trial which affects

a vital right of the defendant and must,

therefore, be construed to be a judgment

so as to be appealable to a larger Bench.

(3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment.

— Most of the interlocutory orders which

contain the quality of finality are clearly

specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43

Rule 1 and have already been held by us

to be judgments within the meaning of

the   letters   patent   and,   therefore,

appealable.   There   may   also   be

interlocutory   orders   which   are   not

covered by Order 43 Rule 1 but which

also   possess   the   characteristics   and

trappings of finality in that, the orders

may adversely affect a valuable right of

the party or decide an important aspect

of   the   trial   in   an   ancillary   proceeding.

Before such an order can be a judgment

the adverse effect on the party concerned

must   be   direct   and   immediate   rather

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than   indirect   or   remote.   For   instance,

where   the   trial   Judge   in   a   suit   under

Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure

refuses the defendant leave to defend the

suit,   the   order   directly   affects   the

defendant   because   he   loses   a   valuable

right to defend the suit and his remedy is

confined   only   to   contest   the   plaintiff's

case on his own evidence without being

given a chance to rebut that evidence. As

such an order vitally affects a valuable

right of the defendant it will undoubtedly

be   treated   as   a   judgment   within   the

meaning of the letters patent so as to be

appealable to a larger Bench. Take the

converse case in a similar suit where the

trial Judge allows the defendant to defend

the   suit   in   which   case   although   the

plaintiff   is   adversely   affected   but   the

damage or prejudice caused to him is not

direct   or   immediate   but   of   a   minimal

nature and rather too remote because the

plaintiff  still possesses  his full  right  to

show   that   the   defence   is   false   and

succeed in the suit. Thus, such an order

passed   by   the   trial   Judge   would   not

amount   to   a   judgment   within   the

meaning of clause 15 of the letters patent

but will be purely an interlocutory order.

Similarly, suppose the trial Judge passes

an order setting aside an ex parte decree

against   the   defendant,   which   is   not

appealable under any of the clauses of

Order   43   Rule   1   though   an   order

rejecting an application to set aside the

decree passed ex parte falls within Order

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43 Rule 1 clause (d) and is appealable,

the   serious   question   that   arises   is

whether or not the order first mentioned

is   a   judgment   within   the   meaning   of

letters patent. The fact, however, remains

that the order setting aside the ex parte

decree   puts   the   defendant   to   a   great

advantage and works serious injustice to

the plaintiff because as a consequence of

the order, the plaintiff has now to contest

the suit and is deprived of the fruits of

the decree passed in his favour. In these

circumstances,   therefore,   the   order

passed by the trial Judge setting aside

the   ex   parte   decree   vitally   affects   the

valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence

amounts   to   an   interlocutory   judgment

and is therefore, appealable to a larger

Bench.”

114. In the course of the trial, the trial Judge may

pass   a   number   of   orders   whereby   some   of   the

various   steps   to   be   taken   by   the   parties   in

prosecution of the suit may be of a routine nature

while other orders may cause some inconvenience

to one party or the other, e.g., an order refusing an

adjournment,   an   order   refusing   to   summon   an

additional witness or documents, an order refusing

to condone delay in filing documents, after the first

date   of   hearing   an   order   of   costs   to   one   of   the

parties   for   its   default   or   an   order   exercising

discretion in respect of a procedural matter against

one   party   or   the   other.   Such   orders   are   purely

interlocutory   and   cannot   constitute   judgments

because it will always be open to the aggrieved party

to make a grievance of the order passed against the

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party   concerned   in   the   appeal   against   the   final

judgment passed by the trial Judge.

115. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order

cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those

orders would be judgments which decide matters of

moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the

parties   and   which   work   serious   injustice   to   the

party   concerned.   Similarly,   orders   passed   by   the

trial   Judge   deciding   question   of   admissibility   or

relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as

judgments because the grievance on this score can

be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against

the final judgment.

116. We   might   give   another   instance   of   an

interlocutory order which amounts to an exercise of

discretion and which may yet amount to a judgment

within the meaning of the letters patent. Suppose

the  trial Judge allows the plaintiff to  amend  his

plaint or include a cause of action or a relief as a

result of which a vested right of limitation accrued

to   the   defendant   is   taken   away   and   rendered

nugatory. It is manifest that in such cases, although

the   order   passed   by   the   trial   Judge   is   purely

discretionary   and   interlocutory,   it   causes   gross

injustice   to   the   defendant   who   is   deprived   of   a

valuable right of defence to the suit. Such an order,

therefore, though interlocutory in nature contains

the   attributes   and   characteristics   of   finality   and

must be treated as a judgment within the meaning

of the letters patent. This is what was held by this

Court in Shanti Kumar case [(1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR

1974 SC 1719 : (1975) 1 SCR 550] , as discussed

above.

20

117. Let us take another instance of a similar order

which may not amount to a judgment. Suppose, the

trial Judge allows the plaintiff to amend the plaint

by adding a particular relief or taking an additional

ground which may be inconsistent with the pleas

taken by him but is not barred by limitation and

does not work serious injustice to the defendant

who would have ample opportunity to disprove the

amended plea taken by plaintiff at the trial. In such

cases, the order of the trial Judge would only be a

simple interlocutory order without containing any

quality   of   finality   and   would   therefore   not   be   a

judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the

letters patent.

118. The   various   instances   given   by   us   would

constitute   sufficient   guidelines   to   determine

whether or not an order passed by the trial Judge is

a judgment within the meaning of the letters patent.

We   must   however   hasten   to   add   that   instances

given by us are illustrative and not exhaustive. We

have already referred to the various tests laid down

by the Calcutta, Rangoon and Madras High Courts.

So far as the Rangoon High Court is concerned we

have already pointed out that the strict test that an

order   passed   by   the   trial   Judge   would   be   a

judgment only if it amounts to a decree under the

Code of Civil Procedure, is legally erroneous and

opposed to the very tenor and spirit of the language

of the letters patent. We, therefore, do not approve

of the test laid down by the Rangoon High Court

and that decision therefore has to be confined only

to  the facts of that  particular case because that

being   a   case   of   transfer,   it   is   manifest   that   no

21

question of any finality was involved in the order of

transfer. We  would like to  adopt and approve of

generally the tests laid down by Sir White, C.J.,

in Tuljaram Row case [ILR 35 Mad 1] (which seems

to have been followed by most of the High Courts)

minus   the   broader   and   the   wider   attributes

adumbrated by Sir White, C.J., or more explicitly by

Krishnaswamy  Ayyar,  J.   as  has   been   referred  to

above.

119. Apart from the tests laid down by Sir White,

C.J., the following considerations must prevail with

the court:

“(1) That the trial Judge being a senior

court   with   vast   experience   of   various

branches of law occupying a very high

status   should   be   trusted   to   pass

discretionary or interlocutory orders with

due regard to the well settled principles of

civil   justice.   Thus,   any   discretion

exercised or routine orders passed by the

trial Judge in the course of the suit which

may   cause   some   inconvenience   or,   to

some extent, prejudice to one party or the

other cannot be treated as a judgment

otherwise   the   appellate   court   (Division

Bench) will be flooded with appeals from

all   kinds   of   orders   passed   by   the   trial

Judge.   The   courts   must   give   sufficient

allowance to the trial Judge and raise a

presumption that any discretionary order

which he passes must be presumed to be

correct   unless   it   is ex   facie legally

erroneous   or   causes   grave   and

substantial injustice.

22

(2) That the interlocutory order in order

to be a judgment must contain the traits

and trappings of finality either when the

order   decides   the   questions   in

controversy in an ancillary proceeding or

in   the   suit   itself   or   in   a   part   of   the

proceedings.

(3) The tests laid down by Sir White, C.J.

as also by Sir Couch, C.J. as modified by

later decisions of the Calcutta High Court

itself which have been dealt with by us

elaborately should be borne in mind.”

120. Thus, these are some of the principles which

might guide a Division Bench in deciding whether

an order passed by the trial Judge amounts to a

judgment within the meaning of the letters patent.

We might, however, at the risk of repetition give

illustrations of interlocutory orders which may be

treated as judgments:

(1) An order granting leave to amend the

plaint   by   introducing   a   new   cause   of

action which completely alters the nature

of the suit and takes away a vested right

of limitation or any other valuable right

accrued to the defendant.

(2) An order rejecting the plaint.

(3) An order refusing leave to defend the

suit in an action under Order 37, of the

Code of Civil Procedure.

23

(4) An order rescinding leave of the trial

Judge granted by him under clause 12 of

the letters patent.

(5)   An   order   deciding   a   preliminary

objection   to   the   maintainability   of   the

suit on the ground of limitation, absence

of notice under Section 80, bar against

competency   of   the   suit   against   the

defendant even though the suit is kept

alive.

(6) An order rejecting an application for a

judgment on admission under Order 12

Rule 6.

(7)  An  order  refusing   to  add   necessary

parties in a suit under Section 92 of the

Code of Civil Procedure.

(8)   An   order   varying   or   amending   a

decree.

(9)   An   order   refusing   leave   to   sue   in

forma pauperis.

(10) An order granting review.

(11) An order allowing withdrawal of the

suit with liberty to file a fresh one.

(12) An order holding that the defendants

are not agriculturists within the meaning

of the special law.

(13) An order staying or refusing to stay a

suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

(14) An order granting or refusing to stay

execution of the decree.

(15) An order deciding payment of court

fees against the plaintiff.”

24

121. Here, it may be noted that whereas an order

deciding the nature of the court fees to be paid by

the plaintiff would be a judgment but this order

affects only the plaintiff or the Government and not

the   defendant.   Thus,   only   the   plaintiff   or   the

Government as the case may be will have the right

to file an appeal in the Division Bench and not the

defendant because the question of payment of court

fees is a matter between the Government and the

plaintiff   and   the   defendant   has   no   locus   in   this

regard.

122. We have by way of sample laid down various

illustrative examples of an order which may amount

to judgment but it is not possible to give such an

exhaustive list as may cover all possible cases. Law

with   its   dynamism,   pragmatism   and   vastness   is

such a large ocean that it is well­nigh impossible for

us   to   envisage   or   provide   for   every   possible

contingency or situation so as to evolve a device or

frame an exhaustive formula or strategy to confine

and   incarcerate   the   same   in   a   strait­jacket.   We,

however,   hope   and   trust   that   by   and   large   the

controversy   raging   for   about   a   century   on   the

connotation of the term “judgment” would have now

been settled and a few cases which may have been

left out, would undoubtedly be decided by the court

concerned in the light of the tests, observations and

principles enunciated by us.

123. In the instant case, as the order of the trial

Judge was one refusing appointment of a receiver

and   grant   of   an   ad­interim   injunction,   it   is

undoubtedly a judgment within the meaning of the

letters patent both because in view of our judgment.

25

Order 43 Rule 1 applies to internal appeals in the

High Court and apart from it such an order even on

merits contains the  quality of finality and would

therefore   be   a   judgment   within   the   meaning   of

clause 15 of the letters patent. The consistent view

taken by the Bombay High Court in the various

cases noted above or other cases which may not

have   been   noticed   by   us   regarding   the   strict

interpretation of clause 15 of the letters patent are

hereby  overruled  and  the   Bombay  High  Court  is

directed to decide the question in future in the light

of our decision.

124. We, therefore, hold that the order passed by

the trial Judge in the instant case being a judgment

within   the   meaning   of   clause   15   of   the   letters

patent, the appeal before the Division Bench was

maintainable and the Division Bench of the High

Court was in error in dismissing the appeal without

deciding it on merits. We have already directed the

High Court to decide the appeal on merits by our

formal order dated April 22, 1981.”

17. It could thus be seen that though this Court has held that

the term ‘judgment’ used in Letters Patent could not be given a

narrower meaning as is given to the term ‘judgment’ used in

CPC and that it should receive a much wider and more liberal

interpretation, however, at the same time, each and every order

passed   by   the   trial   judge   could   not   be   construed   to   be   a

26

‘judgment’ inasmuch as there will be no end to the number of

orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent.  It

has been held that the word ‘judgment’ has undoubtedly a

concept of finality in a broader and not in a narrower sense.  It

has been held that where an order vitally affects a valuable

right of the defendants, it will undoubtedly be treated as a

‘judgment’ within the meaning of Letters Patent so as to be

appealable to a larger Bench.

18. It has been held that most of the interlocutory orders

which contain the  quality of finality are clearly specified in

clauses (a) to (w) of Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC and would be

‘judgments’   within   the   meaning   of   the   letters   patent   and,

therefore,   appealable.   However,   there   may   be   interlocutory

orders which are not covered by Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC but

which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality

inasmuch as such orders may adversely affect a valuable right

of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an

ancillary proceeding. It has further been held that however, for

27

such an order to be a ‘judgment’, an adverse effect on the party

concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or

remote.  Various illustrations of interlocutory orders have been

given by this Court in para (120), which could be held to be

appealable.     This   Court   held   that   though   any   discretion

exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the

course of the suit may cause some inconvenience or, to some

extent, prejudice to one party or the other, they cannot be

treated   as   a   ‘judgment’   unless   they   contain   the   traits   and

trappings of finality.   This Court has expressed in para (122)

that   though   it   had,   by   way   of   sample,   laid   down   various

illustrative   examples   of   an   order   which   may   amount   to   a

judgment, it would not be possible to give such an exhaustive

list as may cover all possible areas. This Court, in the facts of

the said case, held that an order of the Single Judge refusing

appointment of a receiver and grant of an ad­interim injunction

was undoubtedly a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Letters

Patent, both because Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC applies to internal

28

appeals in the High Court and that such an order even on

merits contains the quality of finality and would therefore be a

‘judgment’   within   the   meaning   of   Clause   15   of   the   Letters

Patent.

19. Justice A.N. Sen, while holding that the order in question

was   appealable   under  Section  104(1)   read   with  Order   XLIII

CPC, did not find it necessary to go into the question as to

whether such an order would be appealable under Clause 15 of

the Letters Patent.  It will be apposite to refer to the following

observations of the learned Judge:

“151.  ……In   my   opinion,   an   exhaustive   or   a

comprehensive   definition   of   ‘judgment’   as

contemplated   in   Clause   15   of   the   Letters   Patent

cannot   be   properly   given   and   it   will   be   wise   to

remember that in the Letters Patent itself, there is

no definition of the word ‘judgment’.  The expression

has necessarily to be construed and interpreted in

each particular case.  It is, however, safe to say that

if any order has the effect of finally determining any

controversy forming the subject­matter of the suit

itself or any part thereof or the same affects the

question of court’s jurisdiction or the question of

limitation, such an order will normally constitute

‘judgment’ within the meaning of Clause 15 of the

Letters Patent…….”

29

20. Justice Sen reiterated that it was safe to say that if any

order   has   the   effect   of   finally   determining   any   controversy

forming the subject­matter of the suit itself or any part thereof

or the same affects the question of court’s jurisdiction or the

question of limitation, such an order will normally constitute

‘judgment’ within the meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent.

He however observed that the expression has necessarily to be

construed and interpreted in each particular case.

21. It could thus be seen that both the judgments of Justice

S. Murtaza Fazal Ali as well as Justice A.N. Sen have a common

thread   that,   as   to   whether   an   order   impugned   would   be   a

‘judgment’  within the  scope of  Clause  15  of Letters Patent,

would   depend   on   facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case.

However, for such an order to be construed as a ‘judgment’, it

must have the traits and trappings of finality.  To come within

the ambit of ‘judgment’, such an order must affect vital and

valuable rights of the parties, which works serious injustice to

30

the party concerned.  Each and every order passed by the Court

during   the   course   of   the   trial,   though   may   cause   some

inconvenience to one of the parties or, to some extent, some

prejudice   to   one   of   the   parties,   cannot   be   treated   as   a

‘judgment’.  If such is permitted, the floodgate of appeals would

be open against the order of Single Judge.

22. In the light of this observation, we will have to consider as

to whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated

2

nd April 2019, could be construed as a ‘judgment’ within the

meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent.

23. What the learned Single Judge has done by the said order,

was to grant two weeks’ time to the  appellants­defendants  to

file affidavit­in­opposition and postpone the issue of grant of

ad­interim   injunction   by   three   weeks.     No   doubt,   that   the

learned Single Judge has at one place observed that prima

facie, he was of the view that ‘SHYAM’ being  a part of the

business   name   of   the   appellants­defendants,   no   injunction

should be passed to restrain the appellants­defendants from

31

using the said word ‘SHYAM’ on their packaging, but in the

same order, he has clarified that all the observations he has

made in the said order were prima facie for the purpose of

passing an order at the ad­interim stage and the same would

have no relevance at the time of considering and deciding the

said application after exchange of affidavits.  

24. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   order   in   fact   was

postponement of the question as to whether the respondentplaintiff was entitled to grant of an ad­interim injunction or not,

and that too, by merely three weeks.  The order was only giving

an   opportunity   to   the   appellants­defendants   to   file   their

affidavit­in­opposition within a period of two weeks.  The order

clarified   that   no   prayer   for   extension   of   time   shall   be

entertained.  The learned Single Judge therefore postponed the

issue   with   regard   to   consideration   of   the   prayer   of   the

respondent­plaintiff   for   grant   of   ad­interim   injunction   by   a

period of mere three weeks and that too only in order to afford

an   opportunity   to   the   appellants­defendants   to   file   their

32

affidavit­in­opposition. While doing the same, the respondentplaintiff’s   interest   was   also   protected,   inasmuch   as   the

appellants­defendants   were   directed   to   maintain   weekly

accounts of sale of their products covered by Class 6, which

were sold under the mark ‘SHYAM’. 

25. It is thus clear that there was no adjudication with regard

to the rights of the respondent­plaintiff to get an ad­interim

injunction   during   the   pendency   of   the   suit.     Though   by

postponement of the issue with regard to grant of ad­interim

injunction, the order might have caused some inconvenience

and   may   be,   to   some   extent,   prejudice   to   the   respondentplaintiff;   the   same   could   not   be   treated   as   a   ‘judgment’

inasmuch as there was no conclusive finding as to whether the

respondent­plaintiff   was   entitled   for   grant   of   ad­interim

injunction or not. As such, the order passed by the learned

Single Judge did not contain the traits and trappings of finality.

If it is held otherwise, this will open a floodgate of appeals for

parties who may even challenge the order of adjournment or

33

grant of time to the other side to file affidavit­in­reply.  We are

therefore of the considered view that the order dated 2nd April

2019   cannot   be   construed   to   be   a   ‘judgment’   within   the

meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent and as such, the appeal

to the Division Bench of the High Court was not tenable.  

26. We clarify that as held in Shah Babulal Khimji  (supra),

we   are   holding   so,   taking   into   consideration   the   facts   and

circumstances as they appear in the present matter.

27. With this, we could have very well allowed the present

appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and order of

the Division Bench of the High Court.  However, since we find

that the approach of the Division Bench of the High Court was

totally contrary to the various well­settled principles of law, we

are required to consider the correctness of various findings and

observations of the Division Bench of the High Court in the

impugned judgment and order.

28. The learned Single Judge passed an order on 2nd  April

2019.  It appears that the appeal to the Division Bench of the

34

High Court was filed immediately thereafter in the month of

April, though the exact date of filing of appeal is not known.

The judgment and order impugned herein was passed after a

gap of about 8­9 months from the date of the order passed by

the learned Single Judge.   The perusal of the judgment and

order impugned herein would clearly reveal that the counsel for

the appellants­defendants had specifically submitted that the

appeal   was   against   an   ad­interim   order   and   therefore,   the

appellate court should not interfere by substituting its views

but   should   instead   direct   a   speedy   hearing   of   the   interim

application of the respondent­plaintiff. The Division Bench of

the High Court after recording the said submission, observed

thus: 

“Before entering into a discussion with regard to the

merits of this case I say that all the facts and papers

which were necessary for deciding the prima facie

case of the parties were before us.  On these facts

and evidence we were in a position to assess their

respective   prima   facie   case   and   the   balance   of

convenience.

In those circumstances we propose to dispose of the

interlocutory   application   ourselves   instead   of

35

entering a prima facie finding and relegating it to

the court below for its disposal.   That would be

unnecessary prolongation of the litigation and utter

wastage of time.”

29. It is difficult to appreciate the anxiety on the part of the

Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   to   itself   dispose   of   the

interlocutory application instead of relegating it to the court

below for its disposal.   When the Division Bench of the High

Court itself took 8­9 months to decide the appeal, it is difficult

to understand as to what the learned Judges of the Division

Bench of the High Court meant by “unnecessary prolongation of

the litigation and utter wastage of time”.  If the learned Judges

of   the   Division   Bench   were   so   much   concerned   with   the

prolongation of litigation, they could have very well requested

the learned Single Judge to decide the injunction application

within a stipulated period.  Instead of waiting for a period of 8­9

months, this could have been done by them at the very first

instance when the appeal was listed.  The hierarchy of the trial

court and  the appellate  court  exists  so  that the  trial court

36

exercises its discretion upon the settled principles of law.  An

appellate court, after the findings of the trial court are recorded,

has an advantage of appreciating the view taken by the trial

judge   and   examining   the   correctness   or   otherwise   thereof

within the limited area available.   If the appellate court itself

decides the matters required to be decided by the trial court,

there would be no necessity to have the hierarchy of courts. As

observed by this Court in Monsanto Technology LLC  (supra),

the appellate court cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the Single

Judge to decide as to whether the tests of prima facie case,

balance of convenience and irreparable injury are made out in

the case or not.

30. Though   there   are   various   observations   made   by   the

Division Bench of the High Court, which in our view, are totally

unwarranted,   we   refrain   ourselves   to   refer   to   them   as   any

comment thereon would unnecessarily prejudice the rights of

either   of   the   parties.     We   will   only   limit   ourselves   to   the

37

minimum possible observations of the Division Bench of the

High Court.  

31. Though the Division Bench of the High Court, referring to

the judgment of this Court in the case of Wander Ltd. (supra),

observes that the appellate court will not substitute its opinion

with that of the trial court in an interim application unless

there is a perversity in the order, it fails to discuss as to how

the   view   taken   by   the   trial   judge   was   either   perverse   or

impossible.  At one place, the Division Bench of the High Court

observes that: 

“Now,   the   question   is   whether   the   learned   single

judge exercised his discretion correctly and whether

this   court   should   interfere   with   that   exercise   of

discretion.” 

and in the same breath observes that: 

“Therefore, we have considered the case on the basis

of  the  petition   as  well  as   the   additional  evidence

before us.   In our opinion, this court is not called

upon   only   to   evaluate   whether   the   exercise   of

discretion   by   the   learned   trial   court   was   right   or

wrong.”  

38

Then immediately thereafter, the Division Bench of the High

Court observes that:

“This court is duty bound to pass a suitable interim

order, pending trial of the suit.”

32. We ask a question to ourselves that, in an appeal against

the order of a Single Judge, if the Division Bench of the High

Court is not required to evaluate the question as to whether the

discretion exercised by the trial court was right or wrong, what

else is it required to do.  We are unable to trace the source of

the duty of the appellate court which makes it bound to pass a

suitable interim order pending the trial of the suit.  

33. The Division Bench of the High Court further observes

that for doing so, it has to put itself in a position as if it was

moved to pass an interim order in the suit.   At the cost of

repetition,   we  reiterate   that   if  the   approach   of   the   Division

Bench of the High Court is to be upheld, then there would be

no necessity to have the trial courts at all.   Thereafter, the

Division Bench of the High Court observes that the case was

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different from Wander Ltd. (supra).  The Division Bench of the

High Court stops at that.  It does not even take the trouble to

observe as to how the scope of the appeal before it was different

from   the   scope   as   defined   by   this   Court   in  Wander   Ltd.

(supra).   In a line thereafter, the Division Bench of the High

Court observes that prima facie case on facts theoretically is in

favour of the appellant therein (plaintiff) and thereafter, passes

various directions including the injunction.  Though, in fact, it

allows the appeal in entirety by allowing an application under

Order  XXXIX  Rules  1  and  2  CPC  pendente   lite  the  suit,  it

graciously   observes   in   the   ultimate   para   that   it   was   only

modifying the order dated 2nd April 2019 passed by the learned

Single Judge.

34. The learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High

Court have taken pains to make a mention of the judgment of

this Court in the case of Wander Ltd. (supra).  This judgment

has   been   guiding   the   appellate   courts   in   the   country   for

decades while exercising their appellate jurisdiction considering

40

the correctness of the discretion and jurisdiction exercised by

the trial courts for grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.

In the said case, the learned Single Judge had refused an order

of   temporary   injunction   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   who   was

claiming to be a registered proprietor of the registered trade

mark.  The Division Bench of the High Court had reversed the

order passed by the learned Single Judge and granted interim

injunction. Reversing the order of the Division Bench of the

High Court and maintaining the order of the learned Single

Judge, this Court observed thus:

“14. The   appeals   before   the   Division   Bench   were

against   the   exercise   of   discretion   by   the   Single

Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not

interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court

of first instance and substitute its own discretion

except where the discretion has been shown to have

been   exercised   arbitrarily,   or   capriciously   or

perversely   or   where   the   court   had   ignored   the

settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal

of   interlocutory   injunctions.   An   appeal   against

exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on

principle.   Appellate   court   will   not   reassess   the

material and seek to reach a conclusion different

from the one reached by the court below if the one

reached by that court was reasonably possible on

the material. The appellate court would normally

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not be justified in interfering with the exercise of

discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if

it had considered the matter at the trial stage it

would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the

discretion   has   been   exercised   by   the   trial   court

reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that

the   appellate  court   would   have  taken   a  different

view   may   not   justify   interference   with   the   trial

court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these

principles   Gajendragadkar,   J.   in Printers   (Mysore)

Private  Ltd. v. Pothan  Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 :

AIR 1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)

“... These principles are well established,

but   as   has  been   observed   by   Viscount

Simon   in Charles   Osenton   &

Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law

as to the reversal by a court of appeal of

an order made by a judge below in the

exercise   of   his   discretion   is   well

established, and any difficulty that arises

is   due   only   to   the   application   of   well

settled principles in an individual case’.”

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to

this principle.”

35. Though the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the

High Court have on more than one occasion referred to the

judgment of this Court in Wander Ltd.  (supra), they have not

even, for namesake, observed as to how the discretion exercised

by   the   learned   Single   Judge   was   exercised   arbitrarily,

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capriciously or perversely.  In our view, having waited for 8­9

months after the learned Single Judge had passed the order, all

that ought to have been done by the learned Judges of the

Division Bench of the High Court was to request the learned

Single Judge to decide the application for ad­interim injunction,

which in fact, the learned Single Judge had scheduled to do

after three weeks from 2nd April 2019.  In our view, it was not

even necessary for the Division Bench of the High Court to have

waited till 24th December 2019 and taken the pains of deciding

the application at first instance.  It could have very well, in the

month of April, 2019 itself, done the exercise of requesting the

learned Single Judge to decide the application as scheduled.  

36. In any event, though the Division Bench of the High Court

observes that for deciding the question with regard to grant of

interim injunction, it has to put itself in a position as if it was

moved to pass an interim order in the suit, it even fails to take

into consideration the principles which a court is required to

take into consideration while deciding such an application. It is

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a settled principle of law that while considering the question of

grant of interim injunction, the courts are required to consider

the three tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and

irreparable   injury.   Besides   a   stray   observation   that   the

respondent­plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, there is

no discussion as to how a prima facie case was made out by the

respondent­plaintiff.     In   any   case,   insofar   as   the   tests   of

balance of convenience and irreparable injury are concerned,

there   is   not   even   a   mention   with   regard   to   these   in   the

impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the

High Court. In our view, the approach of the Division Bench of

the High Court was totally unwarranted and uncalled for.  We

refrain ourselves from using any stronger words.  

37. We find that it is high time that this Court should take

note   of   frivolous   appeals   being   filed   against   unappealable

orders wasting precious judicial time. As it is, the courts in

India   are   already   over­burdened   with   huge   pendency.   Such

unwarranted proceedings at the behest of the parties who can

44

afford   to   bear   the   expenses   of   such   litigations,   must   be

discouraged. We therefore find that the present appeal deserves

to be allowed with token costs.  The respondent­plaintiff shall

pay a token cost of Rs.5 lakhs to the  Supreme Court Middle

Income Group Legal Aid Society (MIG).

38. In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned

judgment and order dated 24th December 2019 is quashed and

set aside.  The learned Single Judge is requested to decide the

application filed by the respondent­plaintiff under Order XXXIX

Rules 1 and 2 CPC as expeditiously as possible and in any

case,   within   a   period   of   six   weeks   from   the   date   of   this

judgment.  Till further orders are passed by the learned Single

Judge, the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 2nd

April 2019 would continue to operate.

39. We clarify that we have not touched upon the merits of the

matter   and   none   of   the   observations   either   by   the   learned

Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court or by us,

would in any manner weigh with the learned Single Judge while

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deciding the application for injunction filed by the respondentplaintiff. 

40. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in

the above terms.

….……..….......................J.

                                                       [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

  ………….........................J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 14, 2022.

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Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले