JAI BHAVANI SHIKSHAN PRASARAK MANDAL VS RAMESH

JAI BHAVANI SHIKSHAN PRASARAK MANDAL VS RAMESH

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPEME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7937 of 2011

JAI BHAVANI SHIKSHAN PRASARAK MANDAL      … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAMESH & ORS.     …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

V. Ramasubramanian, J.

1. The removal from service of respondent No.1 herein from the

post of Principal of the Institute of Pharmacy, having been set aside

by the School Tribunal, Aurangabad and the same having been

confirmed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of

the High Court, the Educational Society running the Institute of

Pharmacy has come up with the above appeal.

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2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the first

respondent and the learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra.

3. The appellant is an Educational Society registered under the

Bombay Public Trusts Act. It is running an institute of Pharmacy at

Gadhi Georai Dist., Beed. In the year 1991, the first respondent

herein was appointed as the Principal of the said Institute. In the

year 2004 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him on

certain   allegations   of   serious   nature.   The   Departmental   Inquiry

Committee held an inquiry in which the first respondent was given

all   opportunities   of   fair   hearing,   including   permission   to   be

represented by a lawyer. After the completion of the inquiry, the

Inquiry Committee submitted a report on 31.07.2004 holding 7 out

of 10 charges proved. Therefore, after issuing a show cause notice

enclosing a copy of the Inquiry Report, the Management passed an

order dated 19.08.2004 imposing upon the first respondent, the

penalty of removal from service.

4. The first respondent challenged the penalty before the School

Tribunal by way of an appeal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra

Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,

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1977   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   ‘Act’).   The   School   Tribunal

framed five issues as arising for consideration namely: (i) Whether

the Inquiry Committee constituted by the Management to conduct

further   inquiry   against   the   employee   was   proper,   legal   and

permissible   by   law?  (ii)  Whether   the   Management   did   not   pay

subsistence  allowance   and  whether  non­payment   of   subsistence

allowance   vitiated   the   inquiry?;  (iii)  Whether   the   inquiry   was

vitiated on account of the fact that the Management conducted the

inquiry   by   engaging   a   lawyer?;  (iv)  Whether   the   Management

conducted the inquiry by following Rule 37 of MEPS Rules, 1981?;

and  (v)  Whether   the   impugned   dismissal   order   was   legal   and

sustainable in law.   Out of these five issues, the Tribunal found

only the issue relating to the constitution and composition of the

Inquiry   Committee   to   be   not   in   accordance   with   the   Rules.

Therefore, the said appeal was allowed by the Tribunal by an order

dated 22.06.2006, primarily on the ground that the constitution of

the Inquiry Committee was not in accordance with Rule 36(2)(b) of

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the   Maharashtra   Employees   of   Private   Schools   (Conditions   of

Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the “MEPS Rules”).  

5. The appellant­Management filed a writ petition in WP No.5387

of 2006 on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,

Aurangabad Bench. A learned Judge of the High Court dismissed

the writ petition, affirming the view taken by the School Tribunal.  

6. The intra­court appeal filed by the appellant­Management was

dismissed   by   the   division   Bench,   by   placing   reliance   upon   the

decision   of   the   Full   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in  National

Education   Society,   Nagpur   and   another   vs.   Mahendra,   s/o

Baburao Jamkar and another1

.   Aggrieved by the said order the

Management is on appeal before us.

7. Since the entire dispute revolves around the constitution of

the Departmental Inquiry Committee with reference to Rule 36 of

the MEPS Rules, it is necessary first to look into Rule 36.

“36.   Inquiry   Committee.­ (1) If an employee is allegedly

found to be guilty on (any of the grounds specified in subrule (5)  of Rule 28) and the Management decides to hold an

inquiry, it shall do so through a properly constituted Inquiry

Committee. Such a committee shall conduct an inquiry only

in such cases where major penalties are to be inflicted. The

1 2007(3) Mh.L.J 707

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Chief Executive Officer authorised by the Management in

this behalf (and in the case of an inquiry against the Head

who is also the Chief Executive Officer, the President of the

Management)   shall   communicate   to   the   employee   or   the

head concerned by Registered Post  acknowledgement due

the allegations and demand from him a written explanation

within seven days from the date of receipt of the statement of

allegations. 

(2)  If the Chief Executive Officer or the President, as

the case may be, finds that the explanation submitted by the

employee   or   the   Head   referred   to   in   sub­rule   (1)   is   not

satisfactory, he shall place it before the Management within

fifteen days from the date of receipt of the explanation. The

Management shall in turn decide within fifteen days whether

an   inquiry   be   conducted   against   the   employee   and   if   it

decides   to   conduct   the   inquiry,   the   inquiry   shall   be

conducted   by   an   Inquiry   Committee   constituted   in   the

following manner, that is to say­

(a)  in the case of an employee­

(i) one member from amongst the members  of the

Management   to   be   nominated   by   the

Management,   or   by   the   President   of   the

Management   if   so   authorised   by   the

Management  whose   name   shall   be

communicated to Chief  Executive Officer within

15 days from the date of the  decision of  the

Management;

(ii) One   member   to   be   nominated   by   the  

employee from amongst the employees of any  

private school;

(iii) one   member   chosen   by   the   Chief   Executive  

Officer from the panel of teachers on  whom  

state/National Award has been conferred;

(b) in the case of the Head referred to in sub­rule (1)­

(i) one member who shall be the President of 

the  Management;

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(ii) one member to be nominated by the Head

from  amongst   the   employees   of   any

private school;

(iii) one member chosen by the President from

the  panel   of   Head   Masters   on   whom

State/National  Award   has   been

conferred.

(3) The Chief Executive Officer or, as the case may be, the

President   shall   communicate   the   names   of   members

nominated under sub­rule  (2)   by   Registered   Post

acknowledgement due to the employee or the Head referred

to in sub­ rule (1), as the case may be, directing him to

nominate a person on his behalf on the proposed Inquiry

Committee and to forward the name alongwith the written

consent of the person so nominated to the Chief Executive or

to the President, as the case may be, within fifteen days of

the receipt of the communication to that effect.

(4) If   the   employee   or   the   Head,   as   the   case   may   be,

communicates the name of the person nominated by him the

Inquiry  Committee  of  three members  shall  be  deemed  to

have been  constituted   on   the   date   of   receipt   of   such

communication   by   the   Chief   Executive   Officer   or   the

President, as the case may be. If the employee or such head

fails to communicate the name of his nominee within the

stipulated  period, the Inquiry Committee shall be deemed

to have been constituted on expiry of the stipulated period

consisting of only two members as provided in sub­rule (2).

(5) The   Convener   of   the   respective   Inquiry   Committee

shall be the nominee of the President, or as the case may be,

the   President   who   shall   initiate   action   pertaining   to   the

conduct of the Inquiry Committee and shall maintain all the

relevant record of the Inquiry.

(6) The meetings of the Inquiry Committee shall be held in

the   School   premises   during   normal   school   hours   or

immediately thereafter, if the  employee   agrees   and   even

during vacation.”

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8. Two expressions namely “Head” and “Chief Executive Officer”

used   in   sub­rule   (1)   of   Rule   36   provide   the   fulcrum   of   the

controversy on hand. The expression “Head” is not defined in the

Rules. However, the expression “Chief Executive Officer” is defined

in Rule 2(1)(c) as follows:­

“Chief   Executive   Officer”   means   the   Secretary,   Trustee,

Correspondent or a person by whatever name called who is

empowered   to   execute   the   decisions   taken   by   the

Management.”

9. The word “Head” is defined in Section 2(9) of the Maharashtra

Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,

1977 as follows:­

“Head of a school” or “Head” means the person, by whatever

name called in charge of the academic and administrative

duties   and   functions   of   a   school   conducted   by   any

Management   and   recognised   or   deemed   to   be   recognised

under   this   Act,   and   includes   a   principal,   vice   principal,

head­master,   head­mistress,   assistant   head­master,

assistant head­mistress or superintendent thereof”

10. Sub­rule (2) of Rule 36 provides for the composition of the

Inquiry   Committee   in   a   particular   manner   in   the   case   of   “an

employee”   and   it   provides   for   the   composition   of   the   Inquiry

Committee in a different manner in the case of “the Head”. In other

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words,   the   Inquiry   Committee   can   comprise   of  (i)  one   member

amongst   the   members   of   the   Management,   nominated   by   the

management or the President;  (ii)  one member nominated by the

employee   from   amongst   the   employees;   and  (iii)  one   member

chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the panel of teachers, if

the inquiry is against “an employee”. But if the inquiry is against

the   Head,   the   Inquiry   Committee   should   comprise   of:  (i)  the

President of the Management; (ii) one member to be nominated by

the Head from amongst the employees of any private schools; and

(iii)  one member chosen by the President from the panel of Head

Masters.

11. In the case on hand, there is and there can be no dispute

about the fact that the first respondent was the Head within the

meaning of the expression in terms of Section 2(9) of the Act, as he

was   the   Principal   of   the   Institute.   But   admittedly   the   first

respondent was not the Secretary, Trustee or Correspondent of the

Institute,   to   fall   within   the   definition   of   the   expression   “Chief

Executive Officer” under Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules.

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12. The   main   contention   of   the   first   respondent   which   was

accepted by the School Tribunal and the High Court was that by

virtue   of   Rule   36(2)(b)   of   the   Rules,   the   President   of   the

Management should have been one of the members of the Inquiry

Committee. There is no dispute about the fact that the President of

the appellant­Society was not a member of the Inquiry Committee.

But this fact provides only one part of the story.

13. The other part of the story is that the Departmental Inquiry

Committee   as   originally   constituted,   had   the   President   of   the

appellant­Society as a Member. But the case of the management is

that   by   a   letter   dated   13.06.2004,   the   President   requested   the

appellant­Society to relieve him due to ill health. Therefore, by a

letter dated 14.06.2004 one of the Vice­Presidents was requested to

be part of the Inquiry Committee. But the said Vice­ President also

recused   due   to   family   problems.   Therefore,   by   a   letter   dated

16.06.2004 another Vice­President was nominated to be part of the

Inquiry   Committee.   The   said   Vice­President   also   opted   out.

Therefore,   by   a   Resolution   dated   22.06.2004,   the   Management

decided   to   confer   all   the   powers   of   the   President   to   one   Shri

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Amarsingh   Shivaji   Rao   Pandit.   The   said   resolution   reads   as

follows:­

“Resolution no. 4:­ The President Mr. Shivajirao Ankushrao

Pandit   is   the   president   and   inviter   of   the   Departmental

Enquiry   Committee   for   inquiry   of   Mr.   Kalkotwar   R.   S.

(Suspended   Principal).   Therefore,   he   is   president   of   the

enquiry   committee   for   Departmental   enquiry   of   Mr.

Kalkotwar,   but   Mr.   Shivajirao   Ankushrao   Pandit   by   his

application due to ill health and as per advice of doctors

have intimation to take rest. His application and documents

annexed   thereto   have   been   considered   and   his   excuse

appears   reasonable.   Therefore,   all   the   powers   of   the

president of Jaibhawani Shikshan Prasarak regarding the

work   to   conduct   the   Enquiry   id   hereby   given   to   Mr.

Amarsingh Shivajirao Pandit. Therefore, it was unanimously

decided by all that, henceforth, Mr. Amarsingh Shivajirao

Pandit   will   see   the   work   as   president   and   inviter   of   the

departmental enquiry committee conducting inquiry of Mr.

Kalkotwar R.S.”

14. But the School Tribunal held that the aforesaid Resolution

dated   22.06.2004   surfaced   only   after   the   conclusion   of   the

arguments in the appeal and that, therefore, it could have been

prepared as an afterthought. The learned Single Judge of the High

Court refused to interfere with this finding of fact, on the ground

that   the   supervisory   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   was   limited

under Article 227 of the Constitution.

15. But the School Tribunal as well as the High Court omitted to

take note of the very pleadings of the first respondent in his appeal

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before the Tribunal. In paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Appeal

submitted by the first respondent before the School Tribunal, he

admitted  that  the  charge­sheet  was   signed  by  Shri   Shivaji   Rao

Pandit,   the   President   of   the   Society.   In   paragraph   9   of   the

Memorandum of Appeal, the respondent No.1 also admitted that by

a letter dated 26.06.2004 he was informed about the ill health of

the President of the Society and the appointment of Shri Amarsingh

Shivaji   Rao   Pandit   in   his   place.   Paragraphs   9   and   10   of   the

Memorandum of Appeal filed by the first respondent herein, before

the School Tribunal reads as follows:­

“The   appellant   states   that   when   the   inquiry   was   under

progress, the Administrative officer of the Respondent No. 1

Society,   vide   his   letter   dated   26.6.2004,   informed   the

appellant that since the President of the Society was ill, his

representative Shri. Amarsing Shivajirao Pandit, who is the

Member   of   the   Respondent   No.   1   Society,   shall   be   the

Convenor of the Inquiry Committee. A copy of this letter

dated 26.6.2004 issued by the Administrative officer of the

Respondent No.1 Society is annexed herewith and marked as

EXHIBIT “G”. 

The   appellant   further   states   that   vide   letter   dated

30.6.2004, the Administrative Officer of the Respondent No.

1 Society has issued a Corrigendum whereby it was informed

that Shri Amarsinh Pandit would act as the Convenor of the

Inquiry Committee and the President during the course of

the   Inquiry.   A   copy   of   the   said   Corrigendum   dated

30.6.2004,   issued   by   the   Administrative   Officer   of   the

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Respondent   No.   1   is   annexed   herewith   and   marked   as

EXHIBIT “H”.”

16. Unfortunately the School Tribunal as well as the High Court

failed to take note of the very pleadings of the first respondent with

regard to the circumstances in which the President of the Society

could not continue as part of the Inquiry Committee. Therefore, the

order of the School Tribunal was vitiated by perversity.

17. In any case, Rule 36(2)(a) begins with the words “in the case of

an employee”. Rule 36(2)(b) begins with the words “in the case of the

Head referred to in sub­rule (1)”.

18. The interpretation given by the School Tribunal and the High

Court to the aforesaid Rule would have been acceptable, if Rule

36(2)(b) had began only with the words “in the case of the Head”.

But it begins with the words “in the case of the Head referred to in

sub­rule (1)”.

19. Sub­rule (1) refers to the Head who is also the Chief Executive

Officer. Therefore, clause (b) of sub­rule (2) of Rule 36 should be

construed to apply only to a person who is the “Head” and who is

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also the “Chief Executive Officer”. Otherwise the words “referred in

sub­rule (1)” appearing in clause (b) would become redundant.

20. The Division Bench of the High Court relied upon the full

Bench decision of the High Court in National Education Society

(supra), to come to the conclusion that irrespective of whether the

Head of the Institute is also the Chief Executive Officer or not, Rule

36(2)(b) mandates the President to be a member of the Inquiry

Committee. A perusal of the Judgment of the Full Bench of the High

Court of Bombay in  National  Education  Society  (supra) shows

that   the   full   Bench   framed   two   questions   for   its  consideration.

Question No.2 framed by the Full Bench reads as follows:­

“Whether   the   President   of   the   management   has   to   be   a

member of the Enquiry Committee as specified in Rule 36(2)

(b)(i)   for   holding   disciplinary   enquiry   against   the   Head,

whether or not he is the Chief Executive Officer within the

meaning of Rule 2(c) of the Rules of 1981.”

21. The above question was taken up for consideration by the full

Bench in Paragraph 17 of its decision. In paragraphs 18 and 19, the

full Bench held as under:­

“18. Rule 36(1)(a) of the Rules provides for constitution of

Inquiry   Committee   in   respect   of   an   employee   while   Rule

36(2)(b) provides for constitution of Inquiry Committee for

the Head. We have already quoted the definition of “Head” in

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terms of Section 2(9) of the Act. If it is held that there is no

requirement for the President of the management to be a

member of the Inquiry Committee in case of the Head who is

not the Chief Executive Officer, providing separate Inquiry

Committee for the Head in Rule 36(2)(b) would be nugatory.

In case such an interpretation is accepted Head of the school

would be an employee for the purposes of Rule 36(2)(a) and

there was no need to have separate constitution of Inquiry

Committee in terms of Section 36(2)(b). It is well settled that

the   Legislature   does   not   use   any   word   unnecessarily.   It

would be appropriate to quote paragraph 9 of the judgment

of the Apex Court in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v.

State   of   Orissa   reported   in   MANU/SC/0077/1987   :

[1987]3SCR317.   In   para   9,   the   Apex   Court   observed   as

under:

…Just as Parliament  is not  expected to

use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also

not   expected   to   express   itself   unnecessarily.

Even   as   Parliament   does   not   use   any   word

without   meaning   something,   Parliament   does

not legislate where no legislation is called for.

Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for

the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to

make pointless legislation. Parliament does not

indulge in legislation merely to state what it is

unnecessary to state or to do what is already

validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to

legislate unnecessarily….

19. We, therefore, hold that in case of Head whether or not

he   is   empowered   to   act   as   Chief   Executive   Officer,   the

President   of   the   management   shall   be   a   member   of   the

Inquiry Committee as contemplated by Rule 36(2)(b)(i) of the

Rules of 1981.”

22. As could be seen from the portion of the Judgment extracted

above, the full Bench was unduly carried away by the fact that the

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Head of an Institution will become equated to an employee, if it was

held that the President of the Society need not be a member of the

Inquiry Committee. But what the Full Bench omitted to take note of

was   that   the   Chief   Executive   Officer   of   a   Society,   such   as   the

President, Secretary or Treasurer cannot be an employee of the

Institution run by the Society and that a Chief Executive Officer

such as the President or Secretary is liable to get elected and not

entitled   to   remuneration.   On   the   other   hand,   the   Head   of   the

Institution   is   essentially   an   employee   who   is   entitled   to

remuneration, seniority, promotion, continuance in service till the

age of superannuation etc., and who is subject to the disciplinary

control of the Management. In fact the President or Secretary of the

Society cannot be removed under the MEPS Rules. But the Head of

the   Institution   can   be   removed   only   in   terms   of   the   Rules.

Therefore, the interpretation given by the Full Bench of the High

Court of Bombay in  National  Education  Society  (supra), under

Rule 36(2)(b) may not be correct.

23. In any case, the High Court, in the impugned order, failed to

take the note of doctrine of necessity. Once it is admitted, (i) that

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the disciplinary proceedings commenced with an Inquiry Committee

of which the President was a member; and (ii) that subsequently he

was replaced by someone due to ill health, the doctrine of necessity

would come into play. Hence the impugned orders of the High Court

and the School Tribunal are liable to be reversed. Since the School

Tribunal   rejected   all   other   contentions   of   respondent   No.1,   but

upheld   only   the   contention   revolving   around   Rule   36(2)(b),   the

penalty of removal from service imposed upon the first respondent

is liable to be upheld. However, if by virtue of any interim order

passed by any forum, the respondent No.1 has been granted any

monetary benefit, the same shall not be recovered from him. The

appeal is accordingly allowed on the above terms and there shall be

no order as to costs.  

……………………………….J.

(HEMANT GUPTA)

………………………………..J.

(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)

New Delhi

March 29, 2022

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