Delhi Development Authority vs Rajan Sood
Delhi Development Authority vs Rajan Sood - Supreme Court Case
Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1927 OF 2022
Delhi Development Authority ..Appellant (S)
Versus
Rajan Sood & Ors. ..Respondent (S)
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1928 OF 2022
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 30.08.2016 passed by the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No.
1034/2015, by which the High Court has allowed the said
writ petition preferred by the private respondents herein –
original writ petitioners and has declared that the
acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act,
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1894) in respect of the subject lands are deemed to have
lapsed under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act, 2013), Delhi Development Authority
(DDA) and Government of NCT of Delhi have preferred the
present appeals.
2. Private respondent No.1 and 2 herein original writ
petitioners filed the writ petition before the High Court for
a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated
under the Act, 1894 in respect of the subject lands are
deemed to have lapsed under subsection (2) of section 24
of the Act, 2013. It was the case on behalf of the original
writ petitioners before the High Court that as the
possession of the land in question is with them and no
compensation has been paid, the land acquisition
proceedings are deemed to have lapsed. Heavy reliance
was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of
Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki and Ors, (2014) 3 SCC 183.
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2.1 The petition was opposed by the appellants herein and
others. It was the specific case on behalf of the DDA that
as such the compensation was tendered to one Shiv
Kumar S/o Devi Chand. Relying upon the decision of this
Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra),
the High Court, by the impugned judgment and order has
allowed the said writ petition and has declared that the
acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act, 1894 in
respect of the subject lands are deemed to have lapsed
under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.
2.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court, DDA and
Government of NCT of Delhi have preferred the present
appeals.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA has
vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances
of the case the High Court has materially erred in
declaring that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.
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3.1 It is submitted on behalf of the DDA that in the present
case as such the possession was already taken over by the
Authority on 23.09.1986 after following the due procedure
as required and even a punchnama was also drawn,
which was the requirement while taking over possession.
3.2 It is urged that even the compensation was tendered to
the recorded owner Shri Shiv Kumar through notice
under section 12(2) of the Act, 1894 but recorded owner
never came forward to accept the same. It is submitted
that therefore, the original writ petitioners cannot be
permitted to take the benefit under subsection (2) of
section 24 of the Act, 2013.
3.3 It is further submitted that even the amount of
compensation of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited by the DDA
with the Land and Building Department towards
compensation. Therefore, the original writ petitioners are
not entitled to the benefit of deemed lapse.
3.4 It is further contended by learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the DDA and the Government of NCT of Delhi
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that as such the original writ petitioners were not having
any locus to file the writ petition as their title to the
property is shrouded with fraud and investigation is
pending with the AntiCorruption Branch. It is submitted
that as the possession of the land in question was already
taken over as far as back on 23.09.1986 and even
compensation of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited with the
Land and Building Department, in view of the subsequent
decision in the case of Indore Development Authority
Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129, it cannot be
said the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.
3.5 It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that
while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High
Court has relied on the decision of this Court in the case
of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). That, the said
decision has been subsequently overruled by the
Constitution bench of this Court in the case of Indore
Development Authority (supra).
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3.6 In the alternative, it is submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respective appellants that
assuming, without admitting that the possession of the
land in question remain with the original writ petitioners,
in that case also, as there was an order of stay granted by
the High Court in the year 2011, in the writ petition filed
by the original writ petitioners and the High Court granted
the interim order of taking no coercive action/order qua
the land, therefore, in view of the decision of this Court in
the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), the
period under which the stay was operative is to be
excluded. Reliance is placed on para 366.8 of the decision
of this Court in the case of Indore Development
Authority (supra).
3.7 Making the above submission and relying upon the
aforesaid decision, it is prayed to allow the present
appeals.
4. Both these appeals are vehemently opposed by Ms. Pinky
Anand, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
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the original writ petitioners. Counter affidavits have been
filed on behalf of private respondent No.1 and 2 – original
writ petitioners opposing the present appeals.
4.1 It is vehemently submitted by Ms. Anand, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ
petitioners that as such there are specific findings
recorded by the High Court that the original writ
petitioners continue to be in physical possession and
therefore, as neither the actual possession of land in
question was taken over nor any compensation was paid
and/or even tendered to the original writ petitioners. It is
rightly held that acquisition proceedings have lapsed.
4.2 It is urged that in fact in the earlier order passed by the
High Court on 09.11.2011 in writ petition No.7714/2011,
the Division Bench directed the authority to consider
their application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 and to
decide it on merits. That as per section 48 of the Act,
1894 only in a case where possession of the land is not
taken over by the acquiring authority, then only, the
application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 would be
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maintainable. It is submitted therefore, when the Division
Bench directed the authority to consider the application
of the petitioners under section 48 of the Act, 1894 on
merits, it is to be presumed that only original writ
petitioners continue to remain possession. It is contended
that the authority might have taken exparte possession
on paper as alleged on 23.09.1986, however, the original
writ petitioners remained in possession actually. It is
further submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the original writ petitioners that there is also
a specific finding recorded by the High Court that the
authorities have failed to prove that any amount of
compensation was paid and/or tendered to the original
writ petitioners or even deposited with the treasury. It is
submitted that when the original writ petitioners remain
in possession and neither the compensation was
tendered nor it was paid, the twin conditions to declare
the acquisition proceedings as having lapsed under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 have been
satisfied. It is therefore submitted that the High Court
has not committed any error in declaring that the
8
acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject lands
are deemed to have lapsed under subsection (2) of
section 24 of the Act, 2013
5. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length.
6. By the impugned judgment and order the High Court has
held and declared that the land acquisition proceedings in
respect of the land in question are deemed to have lapsed
under subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. While
holding and declaring so the High Court has relied upon
decision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra). However, the said decision of this
Court has been subsequently overruled by the decision of
this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority
(supra). In paragraph 365 to 366, this Court in the case of
Indore Development Authority (supra) has observed and
held as under:
“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune
Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal
Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC
183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and
all other decisions in which Pune Municipal
9
Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274]
has been followed, are also overruled. The decision
in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji
Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC
353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be said to be
laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions
following the same are also overruled. In Indore
Development Authority v. Shailendra [Indore
Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412
: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the aspect with respect to
the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be
read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed for
consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot
prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present
judgment.
366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer
the questions as under:
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case
the award is not made as on 112014, the date of
commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of
proceedings. Compensation has to be determined
under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the
window period of five years excluding the period
covered by an interim order of the court, then
proceedings shall continue as provided under Section
24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has
not been repealed.
366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as “nor”
or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition
proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes
place where due to inaction of authorities for five years
or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. In other words, in case
possession has been taken, compensation has not
been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been
taken then there is no lapse.
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366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a
deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of
nondeposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2)
in case it has not been deposited with respect to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries
(landowners) as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation
under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the
said Act can be granted. Nondeposit of compensation
(in court) does not result in the lapse of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of nondeposit with
respect to the majority of holdings for five years or
more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid
to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the
compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the
1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that
acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to nonpayment or nondeposit of compensation in court. The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount
under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused
to accept compensation or who sought reference for
higher compensation, cannot claim that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is
to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of
Section 24(1)(b).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894
Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by
drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award
has been passed on taking possession under Section
16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,
as once possession has been taken there is no lapse
under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
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authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or
more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a
proceeding for land acquisition pending with the
authority concerned as on 112014. The period of
subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to
be excluded in the computation of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise
to new cause of action to question the legality of
concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24
applies to a proceeding pending on the date of
enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 112014. It does not
revive stale and timebarred claims and does not
reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to
question the legality of mode of taking possession to
reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of court to
invalidate acquisition.”
7. The High Court while passing the impugned judgment
and order has observed that the possession of the land in
question continued with the original writ petitioners and
that the compensation was neither paid nor even tendered
to the original writ petitioners. However, by holding that
the original writ petitioners have continued to remain in
possession, the High Court has relied upon the earlier
order dated 09.11.2011 passed in writ petition
No.7714/2011, by which the High Court directed the
authority to consider their application under section 48 of
the Act, 1894 on merits. However, it was the specific case
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on behalf of the authority before the learned Single Judge
that the possession of the land in question was already
taken over on 23.09.1986 and even the compensation
amount of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited with the land and
building department.
7.1 It is the case on behalf of the original writ petitioners that
a purported letter dated 23.09.1986 allegedly taking
symbolic possession was never disclosed by appellants in
the proceedings conducted before the High Court on two
separate occasions and the same has been filed for the
first time in the present proceedings. The aforesaid is not
correct. Even in the impugned order itself in paragraph 2,
the High Court has noted the submissions on behalf of
the appellants to the effect that the possession was taken
over on 23.09.1986. Therefore, it cannot be said such a
plea is taken for the first time before this Court. It is the
case on behalf of the original writ petitioners, relying
upon the earlier order passed by the High Court dated
09.11.2011 in writ petition No.7714/2011 that, the
original writ petitioners continue to be in possession and
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the actual possession has never been taken over.
However, it is required to be noted that even in the order
dated 09.11.2011, there was no specific finding given by
the High Court that the original writ petitioners are in
possession of the land in question. On the contrary, it is
observed that the authority to consider the application
under section 48 of the Act, 1894 on merits on the
assumption of the possession being with the original writ
petitioners. Therefore, while passing the order dated
09.11.2011 also, the High Court assumed the original
writ petitioners are in possession hence as such no
specific finding was given to the effect that the original
writ petitioners are in possession.
7.2 It is next contented on behalf of the original writ
petitioners that the alleged possession on 23.09.1986 is
illegal and it was a paper possession. However, it is
submitted on behalf of the appellants that possession of
land in question was taken over by drawing the
punchnama which can be said to be sufficient
compliance of the requirement while taking possession.
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The High Court has also doubted the compensation being
tendered as contended on behalf of the appellant.
7.3 Be that as it may. Assuming for the sake of argument
that the original writ petitioners are found to be in
possession and the compensation was not tendered, in
that case also as can be seen from the order passed by
the High Court on 09.11.2011 in writ petition
No.7714/2011, the authority was restrained from taking
any coercive action in respect of the land in question.
Therefore, in view of the subsequent decision of this
Court in the case of Indore Development Authority
(supra paragraph 366.8), the period, during which the
interim order is/was operative, has to be excluded in the
computation of five years’ period. In the present case
even, it is the contention on behalf of the original writ
petitioners that the order of no coercive action was
directed to be continued till the application under section
48 of the Act, 1894 was decided. It is the specific case on
behalf of the original writ petitioners before this Court
and even so stated in the written submissions that till
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date no decision is taken on the application under section
48 of the Act, 1894. Meaning thereby the direction/stay
granted by the High Court while passing the order dated
09.11.2011 in writ petition No.7714/2011 continued
when the Act, 2013 came into force.
7.4 In that view of the matter and considering the decision of
this Court in case of Indore Development Authority
(supra), it cannot be said that the land acquisition
proceedings are deemed to have lapsed under subsection
(2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.
8. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of
Indore Development Authority (supra), more
particularly, paragraph 366, it cannot be said that the
land acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and
on the aforesaid ground alone that at the time when the
Act, 2013 came into force there was a stay granted by the
High Court vide order dated 09.11.2011 in writ petition
No.7714/2011 restraining the authority taking any
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coercive action in respect of the land in question, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
declaring that the land acquisition proceedings are
deemed to have lapsed under subsection (2) of section
24 of the Act, 2013, is unsustainable.
10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition (C)
No.1043/2015 declaring that the land acquisition
proceedings under the Act, 1894 with respect to the land
in question are deemed to have lapsed under subsection
(2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is hereby quashed and
set aside. The present appeals are allowed to the
aforesaid extent, accordingly. There shall be no order as
to costs.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
March 29, 2022.
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