FAROOQI BEGUM (D) BY LRS. VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

FAROOQI BEGUM (D)  BY LRS. VERSUS THE STATE OF  UTTAR PRADESH - Supreme Court Case 2022

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1534 of 2009

FAROOQI BEGUM (D) 

BY LRS.      APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF 

UTTAR PRADESH      RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Vikram Nath, J.

Appellant   has   assailed   the   correctness   of

Judgment and Order dated 21.07.2006 passed

by the Single Judge, Allahabad High Court in

Second Appeal No. 813 of 1975 between Farooqi

Begum vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, whereby the

Second Appeal was dismissed giving rise to the

present appeal.

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FACTS

2. The  State   of   U.P.   through   Collector,

Rampur,   instituted   a   suit   for   declaration,

possession   and   damages   before   the   Court   of

District Judge, Rampur, registered as Original

Suit No.1 of 1964, State of U.P. vs. Smt. Farooqi

Begum with respect to land in suit measuring

20 bighas 10 biswa (pukhta) situated in Village

Thotar, Tehsil Sadar, District Rampur, that it

was   a   government   grove   (known   as   ‘Bagh

Hazoor Pasand’) and presently belonging to the

U.P. State Garden Department, Rampur.

3. According to the plaint averments, the said

grove was rent free grant of the defendant long

before   the   merger   of   Rampur   State   and   like

other  Muafis; it was granted by His Highness

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Nawab Hamid Ali Khan to his different wives

and was liable to resumption at the pleasure of

the ruler of erstwhile Rampur State; after the

death of Nawab Hamid Ali Khan in 1930, his

successor Nawab Raza Ali Khan resumed all the

Muafis of all the widows of his father including

that   of   the   defendant;   the   possession   of   the

same was taken over by the State Authorities

soon after the resumption; the same was given

effect to in the revenue papers and the grove

concerned came to be recorded in the name of

the State (Shamil Khalasa); the defendant and

her Karpoons through collusion of the revenue

officers managed to get her name continued in

the Patwari’s record even though her possession

had been removed; the grove in question along

with   similarly   resumed   grove   came   into   the

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hands of the State of U.P. at the time of merger;

ever since the State has been selling its Bahar;

the defendant on the basis of continuance of her

name, though illegally, continued to interfere in

the   possession   of   the   State   even   in   1959

claiming the grove in question in her ownership;

the   State   of   U.P.   took   legal   steps   to   get   the

revenue   records   corrected   by   expunging   the

name of the defendant and for incorporating the

name   of   the   State   but   the   revenue   court

declined such request of the State as such the

necessity to file the suit arose.

4. Smt. Farooqi  Begum,  the  sole  defendant,

filed the written statement denying the plaint

allegations except that the proceedings before

the revenue courts culminated in her favour; it

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was further alleged that the defendant had been

in   continuous   possession   since   1924;   the

property   in   suit   was   the   holding   of   the

defendant   on   the   commencement   of   U.P.

Zamindari   Abolition   and   Land   Reforms   Act,

1952 and as such on the commencement of the

Act,   the   defendant   became   the   ‘Bhumidhar’

thereof;   that   in   proceedings   for   ejectment

against   one   Laddan   Khan   initiated   by   the

defendant,   the   State   being   a   party   had

acquiesced to the defendant’s title as such the

suit was barred by estoppel; further that the

Bagh   Hazoor   Pasand  was   in   possession   of

defendant   and   was   her   own   property   and

adjoining grove measuring 13 bighas 2 biswas

was the grove of the plaintiff State and was in

its possession; both these groves are separated

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by a Nala (a drain); the plaintiff had filed a suit

on a wrong advice that the grove in question

was resumed; other formal pleas of defence were

also taken in the written statement.

5. The Trial Court proceeded to frame issues

on   the   basis   of   pleadings   and   allowed   the

parties   to   lead   their   evidence.   The   defendant

filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 of

the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   19081

  for

amendment   in   the   written   statement   on

01.11.1965.   The   Trial   Court   vide   judgment

dated 13.11.1966 decreed the suit and at the

same time rejected the amendment application

on the ground that it had been filed at a very

belated   stage   after   the   arguments   had   been

heard.   Against   the   said   judgment   dated

1 In short “CPC”

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13.11.1966, the defendant preferred an appeal

which was originally filed before the High Court

and registered as First Appeal No.61 of 1967

but later on transferred to the Court of District

Judge,   Rampur,   after   the   U.P.   Civil   Laws

Amendment Act, 1970.

6. In the Court of District Judge, Rampur, it

was registered as Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1970,

Smt.   Farooqi   Begum   vs.   State   of   U.P.   The

District   Judge,   Rampur,   vide   judgment   and

order dated 08.09.1971 allowed the amendment

dated 01.11.1965, set aside the judgment of the

Trial Court dated 13.11.1966 and remanded the

matter to the Trial Court for a fresh decision

after   necessary   reframing   of   issues   and

opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence.

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7. After remand, the Trial Court in addition to

the already framed ten issues, further framed

four more issues and allowed the parties to lead

evidence.   The   Trial   court   vide   judgment   and

order dated 01.05.1973 again decreed the suit.

8. The   First   Appeal   filed   by   the   defendant

registered as Civil Appeal No.73 was dismissed

by IInd Additional District Judge, Rampur, vide

judgment dated 06.03.1975. Aggrieved by the

same,   the   defendant   preferred   the   Second

Appeal   before   the   High   Court   registered   as

Second Appeal No. 813 of 1975. The learned

single Judge of the Allahabad High Court vide

judgment   and   order   dated   21.07.2006

dismissed the Second Appeal which has given

rise to the filing of the present appeal.

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9. We have heard Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan,

learned senior counsel for the appellants and

Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal, learned counsel for the

State. We have been taken through the material

on record by the learned counsel for the parties.

Arguments of the appellant:

10. The   following   submissions   have   been

advanced on behalf of the appellant stating that

the   courts   below   committed   the   following

serious errors of law.

i. The burden of proof was wrongly shifted

on the defendant­appellant.

ii. Inadmissible evidence was relied upon to

record finding in favour of the plaintiffrespondent.

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iii. Secondary   evidence   was   relied   upon

without   the   Record­keeper   being

examined to prove the same.

iv. Even the secondary evidence relied upon

smelt of manipulation and interpolation,

which was illegally ignored.

v. Documents were prepared in the name of

the   defendant­appellant,   which   were

specifically   denied,   but   the   same   was

illegally relied upon.

vi. The   core   issue   as   to   whether   an

unconditional gift by a husband in favour

of his wife during the subsistence of the

marriage was irrevocable, has not been

looked into, thereby resulting into grave

error of justice.

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vii. The   plaintiff­respondent   had   completely

failed to prove their case as there was no

evidence to support their claim but still

the suit was decreed.

viii. Relevant   and   admissible   evidence   was

illegally ignored.

ix. The pleadings of the plaintiff­respondent

were vague and not specific, nor was duly

established by evidence despite the same,

the suit was decreed.

x. The defendant­appellant was throughout

in possession and, as such, had perfected

her right, title and interest on the coming

of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land

Reforms Act, 1951, which aspect has not

been considered.

11. On   all   the   above   submissions,   learned

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counsel for the appellants has referred in detail

to the evidence and the relevant material, which

we will refer to at a later stage.

12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

plaintiff­respondent   made   the   following

submissions:

i. All the three courts below have recorded

concurrent findings of fact and, as such,

do not call for any interference.

ii. Once   the   plaintiff   and   defendant   both

have equal opportunity to lead evidence,

the argument regarding shifting of burden

of proof would lose its significance.

iii. The plaintiff­respondent had led cogent,

reliable   and   admissible   evidence   to

establish his case.

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iv. The   courts   below   have   taken   into

consideration   all   the   material   placed

before it and after due appreciation of the

same,   in   accordance   with   law,   the

findings have been recorded.

v. All the three courts have dealt with all the

specific issues framed and have recorded

their findings after due consideration of

the material placed by both the sides.

ANALYSIS:

13. The suit of the respondent instituted for the

relief   of   declaration,   possession   and   mesne

profits   was   based   on  the  averments   that   the

grant given by Nawab Hamid Ali Khan in 1924

in favour of the appellant, had been resumed by

his successor, Nawab Raza Ali Khan in the year

1930,   thereafter,   the   respondent   had   entered

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into   possession,   the   records   were   corrected,

however,   the   appellant   on   account   of   some

omission in the maintenance of the records, reentered into possession sometimes in 1959 and,

therefore, they were compelled to file a suit. It is

also   stated   that   the   respondent   made   an

attempt to get the records corrected through the

revenue   court   by   way   of   an   application   for

correction of revenue records, but the same was

rejected by the Deputy Collector in 1953.

14. On   the   above   pleadings,   the   first   thing

required to be proved by the plaintiff­respondent

was   that   there   was   resumption   of   the   grant

given in favour of the appellant. For the said

purpose, neither any such order resuming the

earlier   grant   was   filed,   nor   any   order   of   the

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revenue court was filed to show that the said

resumption of grant had been incorporated in

the revenue records. The defense taken was that

all the records had been destroyed in a fire in

1947.   The   only   evidence   led   by   the   plaintiffrespondent was filing of a true copy of Muafiat

Register   and   the   statement   of   PW­2   (Roop

Kishore), who was said to be working as a Clerk

in the Revenue Department.

15. We have examined the statement of PW­2.

According to learned counsel for the appellant,

two basic objections were taken for not relying

upon the Muafiat Register.  Firstly, it had torn

binding   and   had   loose   pages.   Secondly,   the

entire register was written in blue­black ink and

it   is   only   the   entry   relating   to   the   land   in

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question regarding resumption was written in

black ink. These two aspects casted a doubt on

the veracity of the entries in the register and in

particular the entry relating to the resumption.

The document was, thus, a document not free

from suspicion and as such, no reliance could

be placed upon it.

16. Apart   from   the   above,   no   other   evidence

was led by the plaintiff­respondent to prove the

resumption. PW­2 in his cross­examination, had

no explanation for the loose pages, the index i.e.

the first page and the last page being missing

with no detail of the number of pages in the said

register. Further, there was no explanation for

the difference in the ink and that too only on the

page by which, the entry relating to resumption

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with respect to the land in dispute was made.

The courts below relied upon the entries in the

Muafiat Register only for the reason that it was

a document produced by the State and the State

would   have   no   reason   to   make   any   kind   of

interpolation.   There was no other supporting

document   with   regard   to   presumption   of   the

land in question.

17. Referring   to   the   above   documents   and

statements,   counsel   for   the   appellants

submitted that grave injustice has been done to

the   appellant  by  the  courts   below  in   holding

that there was a resumption, in the absence of

any credible, reliable evidence to that effect.

18. Prima   facie,   we   find   substance   in

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submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the

appellants   that   apparently   there   was   no

evidence to prove the resumption of the grant.

19. Insofar  as   the   issue   of   possession   is

concerned,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant

submitted that it was the specific case of the

defendant­appellants that they had continued in

possession right from 1924 i.e. the time when

the grant was given. It is also submitted that

throughout   in   the   revenue   records,   the

possession   of   the   defendant­appellant   is

recorded. It was also submitted that 20 bighas

and odd piece of land given under the grant was

separated by a Nala(drain) with a separate piece

of land measuring 13 bighas and odd, which

was in the possession of State Department of

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Government   Garden   and   it   was   this   smaller

piece of land, which was being let out by the

State   of   U.P.,   Garden   Department   by   selling

usufruct thereof. 

20. It was next submitted that Deputy Collector

in   the   proceedings   for   correction   of   records

initiated by the plaintiff­respondent, had made a

spot inspection not once but a couple of times.

In its order dated 03.01.1961, while rejecting

the   application   of   the   State   for   deleting   the

name of the defendant­appellant and recording

the   name   of   the   plaintiff­respondent,   had

categorically   recorded   that   the   defendantappellant was in occupation and in possession

of the land in question. 

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21. It may be noted that the finding recorded

by a Class­I Officer of the State could not be

easily ignored. It is true that correction of record

proceedings is summary in nature, but when

the   inspection   was   carried   out,   such   finding

recorded   in   the   order   regarding   possession

ought not to have been ignored.

22. It is thus apparent that plaintiff­respondent

led   no   evidence   to   establish   that   it   was

throughout in possession since 1930 after the

resumption. The courts below have proceeded

on assumptions and presumptions to hold in

favour of the State on the question of possession

and to decree the suit.

23. On the other hand, we find that that the

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defendant­appellants   had   filed   not   only

documentary evidence to prove their continuous

possession but also oral evidence, which has

been ignored. 

24. It was further submitted on behalf of the

appellants   that   courts   below   have   placed

reliance upon a letter of the defendant­appellant

dated 19.07.1954 to draw presumption that the

defendant­appellant   was   not   in   possession   in

1954   and   it   is   for   this   reason   that   she   had

applied   for   seeking   to   be   put   back   into

possession. The contents of the said letter have

been perused.   According to it, there is some

land   of   Government   and   after   merger   the

Government Garden Department, Rampur has

taken possession over her grove and the request

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made   was   to   direct   the   Government   Garden

Department, Rampur to remove their possession

from   her   garden   so   that   she   may   have   full

possession of her share. This clearly means that

there was issue of some part of the land granted

to the defendant­appellants being in possession

of the Garden Department, Rampur.

25. This letter has been heavily relied upon by

the   courts   below   to   record   the   finding   of

possession in favour of the plaintiff­respondent.

The signatures on the said letter were denied by

the   defendant­appellant,   but   the   same   was

sought to be proved through a nephew of stepsister instead of getting the same verified by a

hand­writing expert.

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26. P.W.­3, Shakir Ali Khan, who claims to be a

Clerk posted as Clerk in the Garden Department

Office,   in   his   examination­in­chief   has   stated

that   he   recognizes   the   signature   of   the

defendant­appellant   as   his   wife   is   the   stepdaughter   of   the   sister   of   the   defendantappellant.   However,   in   his   cross­examination,

he states that:

i. he does not know the name of the sister

of   Farooqui   Begum,   the   defendantappellant,  whose   step­daughter was  his

wife; he even does not know the name of

her father; he had never exchanged any

letter   with   the   defendant­appellant;   he

had not seen defendant­appellant reading

and writing; he does not have any direct

relationship   with   the   defendant.     The

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credibility   of   the   statement   of   PW­3   to

prove the signature of the defendant also

appears to be far­fetched and doubtful.

We may also note here that even if the

said   letter  contain  the   signature   of   the

defendant, it’s content cannot be read to

mean that the defendant was expecting

complete   loss   of   possession   over   her

entire piece of land but it was only with

respect   to   part   of   the   land   where   the

Government   Garden   Department   had

apparently   encroached   upon   while

demarcating.

27. Learned counsel for the plaintiff­respondent

has sought to justify the findings recorded by

the courts below referring to the various parts of

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the judgments and also taking us through the

evidence on record.

28. Learned   Counsel   for   the   defendantappellant has vehemently argued that the gift by

a muslim husband to his wife during marriage

will   be   irrevocable.     She   has   placed   reliance

upon a few judgements in support of the said

submission.   We are not inclined to enter into

that question as prima facie, we are of the view

that the matter requires reconsideration by the

High Court and such an issue could be raised at

that stage.

29. We have given our anxious consideration to

the arguments advanced and are of the view

that the High Court fell in error in not taking

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into   consideration   the   relevant   material   and

instead relying upon inadmissible evidence or

evidence which had no bearing to the findings.

Even the burden had been wrongly placed on

the   defendant­appellant.   Further,   the   High

Court  ought to  have carefully  scrutinized the

evidence available on record and only thereafter

arrived at a conclusion.

30. In view of the above, the appeal deserves to

be allowed. It is, accordingly, allowed.

31. The judgment of the High Court impugned

in the appeal is set aside. The matter is remitted

back to the High Court.

32. The   Second   Appeal   be   restored   to   its

original number and may be heard and disposed

of afresh in the light of the observations made

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above.

33. Learned counsel for the parties would be at

liberty to raise all the points before the High

Court.   They   undertake   to   extend   all   cooperation in the hearing of the appeal before the

High Court.  We also request the High Court to

decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible.

…..……..........................J.

[S. ABDUL NAZEER]

………….........................J.

[VIKRAM NATH]

NEW DELHI

JULY 12, 2022. 

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