AMARENDRA KUMAR PANDEY VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

AMARENDRA KUMAR PANDEY VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11473­11474 OF 2018

AMARENDRA KUMAR PANDEY  ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

J. B. PARDIWALA, J.

1. These   appeals,   by   special   leave,   are   directed   against   the

judgment and order passed by a Division Bench of the Guwahati High

Court dated 21.12.2017 in the Writ Appeal No. 354 of 2017 by which

the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India & Ors.

thereby setting aside the judgment and order passed by a learned

Single Judge of the High Court dated 19.01.2015 in the Writ Petition

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(C) 2783 of 2004 filed by the appellant herein.

2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under:

(i) The   appellant   herein   (original   writ   petitioner)   had   joined   the

Assam Rifles as a Rifleman in the year 1993. While he was in service,

he came to be discharged vide order dated 31.01.2004 passed by Lt.

Col Offg Comdt.

(ii) The order of discharge referred to above reads thus:

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT 24 ASSAM RIFLES, 

C/O 99 APO

ORDER

2401637/AKP/2004 DATED 31.01.2004

1. WHEREAS it is considered that the conduct of No

2401637W   Rfn/GD   Amrandra   Kumar   Pandey   of

which has led him getting four Red Ink entries is

such as to render his further retention in the public

Service undesirable being a incorrigible offender and

having shown no improvement during his service.

2. AND WHEREAS No. 2401637W Rfn/GD Amrandra

Kumar   Pandey   was   afforded   opportunity   to   show

cause against the proposed action vide 24 AR letter

No. 11014/A36­2003/635 dt. 02 Sep., 2003.

3. AND WHEREAS No 2401637W Rfn/GD Amrandra

Kumar Pandey submitted his replies vide letter No.

Nil dated 01. Oct.2003. the same was considered in

terms of ROI 4/99 and was found unsatisfactory by

the competent authority.

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4. NOW   WHEREFORE,   In   exercise   of   the   powers

conferred on me under AR Act 1941 Sec 4(a) read

with Para 24, Chapter VIII of AR Manual and Para 6

of ROI 4/99, the undersigned hereby discharge the

said   No.2401637W   Rfn/GD   Amrandra   Kumar

Pandey   from   the   Assam   Rifles   being   incorrigible

offender   soldier   with   effect   from   31   Jan.,   2004

(Afternoon) No.2401637W Rfn/GD Amrandra Kumar

Pandey  is   entitled   to   get  pension   and   gratuity   as

admissible under rule.

s/d

(Santosh Joseph)

Lt. Col Offg Comdt

3. Thus, the aforesaid order of discharge was passed on the basis of

the four Red­Ink entries received by him during his period of service.

The four Red­Ink entries were on the following grounds:

Entry 1 (1996) For staying back to take care of his

ailing   mother   –  ‘without   sufficient

cause   over   staying   leave   granted’.

Sentenced   to   14   days   of   rigorous

imprisonment   with   deduction   in

salary.

Entry 2 (1998) For being on the way out to make a

phone call, but stopped before he

could leave the compound – “visited

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out of bound areas as specified in

unit BRO Part I Ser No 202 dated 30

Aug 96 without permission from his

superior  officers”.  Sentenced to 28

days   of   rigorous   custody   and   14

days of Military Custody.

Entry 3 (1999) For losing his luggage while coming

back from home – “lost his identity

card   bearing   machine   No.   078550

by   neglect   the   property   of   the

Government   issued   to   him   for   his

use”.  Sentenced   to   28   days   of

rigorous imprisonment and 14 days

of detention in AR custody.

Entry 4 (2004)  For   playing   cards   all   alone   by

himself   –  ‘to   obey   unit   standing

orders and was found Gambling in

unit line’.  Sentenced to 28 days of

rigorous imprisonment and 14 days

of fine.

4. The appellant herein challenged the order of discharge before the

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Guwahati High Court by filing the Writ Petition (C) No. 2738 of 2002. It

appears from the materials on record that a learned Single Judge of

the   Guwahati   High   Court   decided   the   Writ   Petition   filed   by   the

appellant   herein   along   with   two   other   identical   petitions   of   two

similarly situated riflemen and by a common judgment and order dated

19.01.2015 allowed the same. The impugned order of discharge came

to be set aside. The learned Single Judge remitted the matter to the

authorities concerned for a fresh decision in the light of a Division

Bench decision of the Guwahati High Court.

5. The learned Single Judge while allowing the Writ Petition filed by

the appellant herein held as under:

“The issue regarding discharge from Assam Rifles on

securing   four   Red   Ink   entries   was   gone   into   by   a

Division   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Balwant   Singh   Vs.

Union of India & Ors., reported in 2011 (5) GLT 640.

That was a case where a Rifleman was discharged

from the Assam Rifles on getting four Red Ink entries.

Out   of   the   four   Red   Ink   entries,   three   related   to

intoxication   and   one   related   to   overstay   of   leave

period. The Division Bench examined the provisions of

Clause­5   of   the   Record   Branch   Instruction   (ROI)

No.1/2004.   Clause­5   of   ROI   provides   that   under

Chapter­VIII,   Rule   24   of   the   Assam   Rifles   Manual

power is conferred on the Commandant of an Assam

Rifles   battalion   to   discharge   any   member   of   the

Assam Rifles below the rank of Naib Subedar in case

he receives four or more Red Ink entries. The Division

Bench held that the use of the expression “four or

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more Red Ink entries” and also the use of the word

“may” in Clause­5 indicates that discretion is vested

in the disciplinary authority to decide as to whether

the person who is found to have received the Red Ink

entries ought to be discharged from service or not. It

was held that merely because a man receives four

Red Ink entries, discharge is not automatic. Discretion

is   given   to   the   Commanding   Officer   to   consider

discharge.   The   severity   and   the   nature   of   the

misconduct will have to be weighed before recourse is

taken to exercise power conferred by Clause­5 of the

ROI.

It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is

vested in an authority to exercise a particular power,

the   same   is   required   to   be   exercised   with   due

diligence,   and   in   reasonable   and   rational   manner.

Since order of discharge and the procedure preceding

such   discharge   is   of   a   summary   nature,   it   is

necessary that the order of discharge is a speaking

order and must indicate how and in what manner the

authority   exercised   the   discretionary   power.   The

Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions has

reiterated   time   and   again   the   necessity   and

importance   of   giving   reasons   by   the   authority   in

support of its decision. It has been held that the face

of an order passed by a quasi­judicial authority or

even   by   an   administrative   authority   affecting   the

rights of parties must speak. The affected party must

know how his case or defence was considered before

passing   the   prejudicial   order.   Coming   back   to   the

three impugned orders, it is evident that none of the

orders disclose how the responses of the petitioners

were considered and why discharge was necessary.

As   held   by   the   Division   Bench   just   because   the

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petitioners incurred four Red Ink entries, it does not

ipso facto mean that they are to be discharged from

the   Assam   Rifles.   As   pointed   out   by   the   Division

Bench,   the   authority   vested   with   the   power   to

discharge   must   examine   the   response   of   the

concerned person and weigh the same vis­à­vis the

severity of the misconduct which led to incurring of the

Red Ink entries in the service rolls. Such examination

is not discernible from the impugned orders.

Having regard to the above, this Court is of the view

that   the   impugned   orders   of   discharge   cannot   be

sustained. Accordingly, the orders of discharge of the

petitioners   are   set   aside   and   quashed.   Matter   is

remanded back to the respondents for a fresh decision

in the light of the Division Bench judgment in Balwant

Singh   (Supra)   and   the   discussions   made   above.

Respondents may consider imposition of any lesser

punishment on the petitioners balancing the interest of

the   organization   and   also   that   of   the   petitioners

subject   to   assessment   of   physical   fitness   of   the

petitioners.

Writ   petitions   are   allowed   to   the   above   extent.   No

costs.”

6. The  Union  of  India  being dissatisfied  with  the  judgment and

order passed by the learned Single Judge referred to above challenged

the same by filing the writ appeal before the Division Bench of the

Guwahati High Court. The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal filed

by the Union of India and thereby set aside the order passed by the

learned   Single   Judge   referred   to   above.   The   Appeal   Court   while

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allowing the writ appeal filed by the Union of India essentially took the

view that neither the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 under which the decision

to discharge was taken nor the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 requires the

authority to record any reasons or the satisfaction in the order of

discharge itself. The Appeal Court took the view having regard to the

provision of Clause 5 of the ROI 1/2004 that the Commandant has the

discretion to discharge a person who has four or more Red Ink entries.

All that is required is to serve a notice on the individual affording an

opportunity to explain. The provision of Clause 5 does not require the

Commandant  to   record   the  reasons   of  satisfaction  in   the  order  of

discharge.

7. Being dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Appeal

Court of the High Court, the appellant herein (original writ petitioner)

is here before this Court with the present appeal.

SUBMISSIONS :

8. The   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant   vehemently

submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in passing

the impugned order. He would submit that there was no good reason

for the Appeal Court to disturb the order passed by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court.

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9. The learned Counsel has broadly classified his submissions as

under:

(a) Discharge is not mandatory even after four Red entries.

(b) There is a difference between cases of major misconducts and

minor misconducts.

(c) In the order of discharge no reasons have been assigned.

(d) The plea of malafide raised against the authority has not been

considered.

10. The   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant   invited   the

attention of this Court to the Record Office Instruction No. 4 of 1999

which provides for the procedure for discharge/retirement from service

of Assam Rifles personnel. The same reads thus:

RECORD OFFICE INSTRUCTION NO.4/99

PROCEDURE FOR DISCHARGE/RETIREMENT FROM 

SERVICE ASSAM RIFLES PERSONNEL

1. A comprehensive instruction, containing all existing 

orders on the subject has been compiled in the form of

this ROI for guidance and strict compliance by all 

concerned.

***** ***** *****

***** ***** *****

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***** ***** *****

6. Discharge/Disposal of Undesirable/Inefficient 

Personnel

Chapter VIII, Rules 24 of the Assam Rifles Manual

invests powers to the Commandant of Assam Rifles

Battalions to ‘dismiss’ or ‘remove’ any member of the

Assam Rifles below the rank of Nb/Sub. This power

may be invoked by a Commandant in case where a

person   has   got   four   red   ink   entries.   As   far   as

practicable, however, discharge under this provision

should be avoided as personnel sent on discharge on

this account are not eligible for pension. In case it is

necessary to send an individual on discharge under

this provision, a notice will be served on the individual

to give opportunity to explain his case. Complete case

will be forwarded to Range HQ alongwith the notice

and   reply   received   from   the   individual,   for   the

approval of the DIGAR. The documents will be sent to

this   Directorate   Records   (Doc)/UPAO   (And   the

individual to Depot Coy (No.1 Constr Coy))……

11. The learned Counsel also invited the attention of this Court to

the Assam Rifles Manual. The relevant clause of the Assam Rifles

Manual reads thus:

ASSAM RIFLES MANUAL

“24. A Commandant may dismiss any member of the 

Assam Rifles below the rank of Jemadar. 

The word “dismissal” should be restricted to the case

of an officer removed with disgrace. In other cases

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“removal” is the proper word to be used. A “dimissed”

officer may not be re­employed.

Dismissal   is   the   last   resource,   and   should   not

ordinarily   be   ordered   until   all   other   means   of

punishment   have   been   tried   and   failed.   For

incorrigible   offenders;   confirmed   bad   characters,

confirmed   drunkards,   for   offences   involving   moral

disgrace, fraud and dishonesty, continued and willful

disobedience   or   neglect,   it   is   generally   the   only

appropriate punishment”

12. The principal argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the

appellant   is   that   the   discharge   from   service   is   not   automatic   or

mandatory   after   four   Red   entries.   Four   Red   entries   are   only   a

minimum   requirement   and   cannot   be   the   sole   ground   to   order

discharge. It is argued that the Rule itself states that the power “may

be invoked” and that “as far as practicable, however, discharge under

this provision should be avoided as the Personnel sent on discharge on

this account are not eligible for pension”. The submission is that the

provision can be pressed into service only when “continued and willful

disobedience or neglect” comes on record.

13. The   learned   Counsel   with   a   view   to   fortify   his   aforesaid

submission placed strong reliance on the decisions of this Court in the

case of  Virendra   Kumar   Dubey   v.   Chief   of   Army   Staff  &   Ors.,

(2016) 2 SCC 627, and Vijay Shankar Mishra v. Union of India and

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Ors., (2017) 1 SCC 795, respectively.

14. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned Counsel

prays that there being merit in his appeal the same be allowed and the

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court may be set

aside   including   the   order   of   discharge   and   the   appellant   may   be

ordered to be reinstated in service with all Full Back Wages and all

other statutory benefits.

15. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed by

the   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   respondents.   The   learned

Counsel would submit that no error not to speak of any error of law

could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the

impugned judgment and order. She would submit that the High Court

was absolutely justified in taking the view that it was not necessary for

the   authority   concerned   to   assign   any   reasons   for   the   purpose   of

passing an order of discharge. The four Red Ink entries were sufficient

for   the   authority   to   arrive   at   the   subjective   satisfaction   that   the

appellant   herein   was   not   fit   to   be   retained   in   service   and   more

particularly being a Rifleman with the Assam Rifle. 

16. It is argued that before passing the order of discharge, notice to

show cause was issued to the appellant herein and an opportunity of

hearing was given to him.

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17. The learned Counsel submitted that all that the appellant did

was to tender an apology for his mistakes. No other ground was raised

in his reply to the show cause notice except that he hails from a poor

family and his parents and children are dependent on him. Having

regard to the reply the authority concerned rightly formed an opinion

that the appellant was a habitual offender. She invited the attention of

this Court to Para 6 of the impugned judgment of the High Court

wherein the High Court has noted that the appellant failed to offer any

explanation in the reply to the show cause notice except the family

circumstances.

18. The learned Counsel further submitted that the decision of this

Court in the case of Union of India v. Balwant Singh, (2015) 14 SCC

389, has not been referred to in the case of Virendra Kumar Dubey

(supra).

19. In the last the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of

this Court in the case of  Satgur  Singh   v.  UOI  &  Ors.  reported in

(2019)9 SCC 205, more particularly, the observations made in Para 6

and 7 respectively. Para 6 & 7 respectively are as under: 

“6. We   do   not   find   any   merit   in   the   present

appeal.   Para  5(a)   of   the   circular  dated   28­12­1988

deals with an enquiry which is not a court of inquiry

into the allegations against an army personnel. Such

enquiry   is   not   like   departmental   enquiry   but

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semblance of the fair decision­making process keeping

in view the reply filed. The court of inquiry stands

specifically excluded. What kind of enquiry is required

to   be   conducted   would   depend   upon   facts   of   each

case. The enquiry is not a regular enquiry as Para 5(a)

of   the   Army   Instructions   suggests   that   it   is   a

preliminary enquiry. The test of preliminary enquiry

will be satisfied if an explanation of a personnel is

submitted   and   upon   consideration,   and   order   is

passed thereon. In the present case, the appellant has

not offered any explanation in the reply filed except

giving vague family circumstance. Thus, he has been

given   adequate   opportunity   to   put   his   defence.

Therefore, the parameters laid down in Para 5(a) of

the   Army   Instructions   dated   28­12­1988   stand

satisfied….

7. In   reply   to   the   show­cause   notice,   the

appellant   has   not   given   any   explanation   of   his

absence from duty on seven occasions. He has been

punished on each occasion for rigorous imprisonment

ranging from 2 days to 28 days. A member of the

Armed Forces cannot take his duty lightly and abstain

from duty at his will. Since the absence of duty was

on   several   different   occasions   for   which   he   was

imposed punishment of imprisonment, therefore, the

order of discharge cannot be said to be unjustified.

The   Commanding   Officer   has   recorded   that   the

appellant   is   a   habitual   offender.   Such   fact   is

supported by absence of the appellant from duty on

seven occasions.”

20. In such circumstances referred to above the learned Counsel

appearing for the respondents pray that there being no merit in this

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appeal, the same may be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

21. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

having gone through the materials on record, the only question that

falls for our consideration is whether the Division Bench of the High

Court committed any error in passing the impugned order?

22. We must first look into the decision of this Court rendered in the

case of Virendra Kumar Dubey (supra). In the said case, the appellant

Virendra Kumar Dubey was enrolled as an operator in the corps of

Artillery of Indian Army on 27.09.1980. Having served in that capacity

for nearly twelve years, he received a show cause notice pointing out

that he had been awarded four Red Ink entries for various offences set

out   in   the   notice   and   that  Virendra  Kumar   Dubey  had   become   a

habitual offender, thereby setting a bad example of indiscipline in the

army. Virendra Kumar Dubey ultimately came to be discharged from

service by an order dated 14.12.1992. He preferred a departmental

appeal, which failed. He, thereafter, went to the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh at Jabalpur, however, the High Court declined to entertain the

petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. He, thereafter,

preferred an appeal before the Appeal Court and the writ appeal was

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ultimately ordered  to be transferred  to  the  Armed  Forces  Tribunal

Regional   Bench,   Lucknow.   The   Tribunal   ultimately   dismissed   the

transferred petition which gave rise to the appeal before this Court.

23. This Court in Virendra Kumar Dubey (supra) held as under:

 “19. It is common ground that a red ink entry may be

earned by an individual for overstaying leave for one

week or for six months. In either case the entry is a

red ink entry and would qualify for consideration in

the matter of discharge. If two persons who suffer

such entries are treated similarly notwithstanding the

gravity   of   the   offence   being   different,   it   would   be

unfair and unjust for unequals cannot be treated as

equals. More importantly, a person who has suffered

four such entries on a graver misconduct may escape

discharge which another individual who has earned

such   entries   for   relatively   lesser   offences   may   be

asked to go home prematurely. The unfairness in any

such   situation   makes   it   necessary   to   bring   in

safeguards to prevent miscarriage of justice. That is

precisely what the procedural safeguards purport to

do in the present case.”

Taking the aforesaid view, this Court ultimately passed the following

order:

“21. In the result this appeal succeeds and is hereby

allowed. The order of discharge passed against the

appellant is hereby set aside. Since the appellant has

already crossed the age of superannuation, interest of

justice will be sufficiently served if we direct that the

appellant shall be treated to have been in service till

the   time   he   would   have   completed   the   qualifying

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service  for grant of  pension. No back wages  shall,

however,   be   admissible.   Benefit   of   continuity   of

service for all other purpose shall be granted to the

appellant   including   pension.   Monetary   benefits

payable   to   the   appellant   shall   be   released

expeditiously but not later than four months from the

date of this order. No Costs.”

24. In  Vijay   Shankar   Mishra  (supra), the appellant therein was

enrolled in the Army Medical Corps on 23.06.1984. On 03.10.1997, a

notice to show cause was issued to him to explain why he should not

be discharged from service under Rule 13(3) Table (III)(v) of the Army

Rules, 1954 on the ground that his conduct and service had not been

found satisfactory. He ultimately came to be discharged from service.

By that time, he had rendered service of thirteen years and eight

months. The minimum qualifying service for earning pension under

Rule 132 of the Pension Regulations for the Army ,1961 is fifteen

years. He filed a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court

which   was   dismissed   on   21.11.2006.   In   appeal,   a   Division   Bench

directed reconsideration of the case of the appellant. Pursuant to the

order of the High Court, an order was issued rejecting his claim for

pension on the ground that he had not put in fifteen years of service

and had been discharged for the reason that he was unlikely to become

an efficient soldier. He again filed a writ petition before the Madhya

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Pradesh   High   Court   which   was   transferred   to   the   Armed   Forces

Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the matter. Thereafter, Mishra came

before this Court. The very same argument was canvassed before this

Court on behalf of Vijay Shankar Mishra that the mere fact that he had

been punished while in service on nine occasions inclusive of six Red

entries was no ground to exercise the power under the relevant rule for

the   purpose   of   discharge.   The   Court   relied   upon  Vijay   Shankar

Mishra (supra) and ultimately held as under:

“9. In the present case, it is evident that there was no

application   of   mind   by   the   authorities   to   the

circumstances   which   have   to   be   taken   into

consideration while exercising the power under Rule

13. The mere fact that the appellant had crossed the

threshold of four red entries could not be a ground to

discharge   him   without   considering   other   relevant

circumstances including: (i) the nature of the violation

which   led   to   the   award   of   the   red   ink   entries;   (ii)

whether the appellant had been exposed to duty in

hard stations and to difficult living conditions; (iii) long

years of service, just short of completing the qualifying

period for pension. Even after the Madhya Pradesh

High Court specifically directed consideration of his

case bearing in mind the provisions of the circular, the

relevant factors were not borne in mind. The order

that   was   passed   on   26­2­2007   failed   to   consider

relevant   and   germane   circumstances   and   does   not

indicate a due application of mind to the requirements

of the letter of Army Headquarters dated 28­12­1988

and the Circular dated 10­01­1989.

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10. For these reasons, we are of the view that the

Armed Forces Tribunal was in error in rejecting the

application. The orders of the Tribunal dated 23­9­

2010 Vijay Shankar Mishra V. Union of India, 2010

SCC OnLine AFT 1127 and 15­9­2011 are set aside.

Since the appellant would have attained the age of

superannuation, the ends of justice would be met if he

is treated to have been in service till the time he would

have   completed   the   qualifying   service   for   grant   of

pension. No back wages shall however be admissible.

The   benefit   of   continuity   of   service   for   all   other

purposes shall be granted to the appellant including

pension.   The   monetary   benefits   payable   to   the

appellant shall be released within a period of four

months from the date of this order.”

25. In   both   the   aforesaid   decisions,   this   Court   took   into

consideration the fact that there was no application of mind by the

authority to the relevant aspects which were taken into consideration

while exercising the power under Rule 13 of the Rules. In both the

aforesaid cases, this Court took the view that the mere fact that the

Personnel had crossed the threshold of few Red Ink entries could not

have been made a ground to discharge them without considering other

relevant circumstances, more particularly, the nature of the violation

which led to the award of the Red Ink entries. The crux of the ratio of

the decision of this Court in the case on  Veerendra  Kumar  Dubey

(supra) is that the only safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power by

the authority would be to ensure that there is an enquiry, howsoever,

19

summary and a finding about the defence set up by the individual

besides   consideration   of   the   factors   made   relevant   under   the

procedure.

26. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the

respondents on the decision of this Court in the case Satgur Singh

(supra) is of no avail. It was a case in which the appellant failed to

furnish any explanation of his absence from duty on seven occasions.

On facts, this Court took the view that as the absence from duty was

on several different occasions for which he was imposed punishment of

imprisonment, the order of discharge could not be said to unjustified.

27. We may elaborate the aforesaid a little further. 

28. Where an Act or the statutory rules framed thereunder left an

action dependent upon the opinion of the authority concerned, by

some such expression as ‘is satisfied’ or ‘is of the opinion’ or ‘if it has

reason to believe’ or ‘if it considered necessary’, the opinion of the

authority is conclusive, (a) if the procedure prescribed by the Act or

rules   for   formation   of   the   opinion   was   duly   followed,   (b)     if   the

authority acted bona fide, (c) if the authority itself formed the opinion

and   did   not   borrow   the   opinion   of   somebody   else   and   (d)   if   the

authority did not proceed on a fundamental misconception of the law

and the matter in regard to which the opinion had to be formed.

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29. The action based on the subjective opinion or satisfaction, in our

opinion, can judicially be reviewed first to find out the existence of the

facts or circumstances on the basis of which the authority is alleged to

have formed the opinion. It is true that ordinarily the court should not

inquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts found except in a

case where it is alleged that the facts which have been found existing

were not supported by any evidence at all or that the finding in regard

to circumstances or material is so perverse that no reasonable man

would say that the facts and circumstances exist. The courts will not

readily defer to the conclusiveness of the authority’s opinion as to the

existence   of   matter   of   law   or   fact   upon   which   the   validity   of   the

exercise of the power is predicated.

30. The   doctrine   of   reasonableness   thus   may   be   invoked.   Where

there are no reasonable grounds for the formation of the authority’s

opinion, judicial review in such a case is permissible. [See Director of

Public Prosecutions v. Head, (1959) AC 83 (Lord Denning).

31.  When we say that where the circumstances or material or state

of affairs does not at all exist to form an opinion and the action based

on such opinion can be quashed by the courts, we mean that in effect

there is no evidence whatsoever to form or support the opinion. The

distinction between insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence and no

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evidence must of course be borne in mind. A finding based on no

evidence as opposed to a finding which is merely against the weight of

the evidence is an abuse of the power which courts naturally are loath

to tolerate. Whether or not there is evidence to support a particular

decision has always been considered as a question of law. [See Reg. v.

Governor of Brixton Prison, Armah, Ex Parte, (1966) 3 WLR 828 at

p. 841].

32. It is in such a case that it is said that the authority would be

deemed to have not applied its mind or it did not honestly form its

opinion. The same conclusion is drawn when opinion is based on

irrelevant matter. [See  Rasbihari  v.  State  of  Orissa,  AIR 1969 SC

1081].

33. In the case of  Rohtas   Industries   Ltd.   v.   S.D.   Agarwal  and

another,  AIR   1969   SC   707,   it   was   held   that   the   existence   of

circumstances is a condition precedent to form an opinion by the

Government.   The   same   view   was   earlier   expressed   in   the   case   of

Barium Chemicals Ltd. and another v. Company Law Board and

others, AIR 1967 SC 295.

34. Secondly,   the   court   can   inquire   whether   the   facts   and

circumstances so found to exist have a reasonable nexus with the

22

purpose for which the power is to be exercised. In other words, if an

inference from facts does not logically accord with and flow from them,

the Courts can interfere treating them as an error of law. [See Bean v.

Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries,  (1944) 2 All ER 279 at p. 284].

Thus,   this   Court   can   see   whether   on   the   basis   of   the   facts   and

circumstances found, any reasonable man can say that an opinion as

is   formed   can   be   formed   by   a   reasonable   man.   That   would   be   a

question   of   law   to   be   determined   by   the   Court.   [See  Farmer   v.

Cotton’s Trustees, 1915 AC 922]. Their Lordships observed:

“………..   in   my   humble   judgment   where   all   the

material facts are fully found, and the only question is

whether the facts are such as to bring the case within

the provisions properly construed of some statutory

enactment, the question is one of law only.”

[See also Muthu Gounder v. Government of Madras,  (1969) 82 Mad

LW 1].

35. Thirdly, this Court can interfere if the constitutional or statutory

term essential for the exercise of the power has either been misapplied

or misinterpreted. The Courts have always equated the jurisdictional

review with the review for error of law and have shown their readiness

to quash an order if the meaning of the constitutional or statutory

term has been misconstrued or misapplied. [See  Iveagh (Earl  of)  v.

23

Minister of Housing and Local Govt., (1962) 2 QB 147; Iveagh (Earl

of) v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. (1964) 1 AB 395].

36. Fourthly, it is permissible to interfere in a case where the power

is exercised for improper purpose. If a power granted for one purpose

is exercised for a different purpose, then it will be deemed that the

power has not been validly exercised. If the power in this case is found

to   have   not   been   exercised   genuinely   for   the   purpose   of   taking

immediate action but has been used only to avoid embarrassment or

wreck personal vengeance, then the power will be deemed to have been

exercised improperly. [See  Natesa   Asari   v.   State   of   Madras,  AIR

1954 Mad 481].

37. Fifthly, the grounds which are relevant for the purpose for which

the power can be exercised have not been considered or grounds which

are not relevant and yet are considered and an order is based on such

grounds, then the order can be attacked as invalid and illegal. In this

connection, reference may be made to  Ram  Manohar   v.   State   of

Bihar,  AIR 1966 SC 740;  Dwarka  Das  v.  State  of  J.  and  K.,  AIR

1957 SC 164 at p. 168 and Motilall v. State of Bihar,  AIR 1968 SC

1509.   On   the   same   principle,   the   administrative   action   will   be

invalidated if it can be established that the authority was satisfied on

the wrong question: [See (1967) 1 AC 13].

24

38. At this stage, it may be apposite to refer to the Assam Rifles

Regulation, 2016. We are conscious of the fact that these regulations

do not apply to the case on hand as the order of discharge is of 2004.

However,   we   deem   fit   to   reproduce   the   relevant   regulations,   more

particularly, 107(c) and 108 respectively, as these regulations seem to

have been enacted and brought into force having regard to the ratio of

the decision of this Court in the case of  Veerendra  Kumar  Dubey

(supra). Regulation 107(c) reads thus:

“107. Removal   of   undesirable,   incorrigible   and

inefficient   Subordinate   Officers,   Under   Officers   and

other enrolled persons. 

(a) …………

(b) …………

(c) The procedure for dismissal/discharge of unsuitable

subordinate officer/under officer/enrolled person will be

as under:­ 

(i) As provided under Rules 24 and 25 of Assam

Rifles Rules, the person concerned, subject to the

exception mentioned therein, shall be served with a

Show Cause Notice against the contemplated action. 

(ii) Preliminary   enquiry.   Before   recommending

discharge or dismissal of an individual the authority

concerned will ensure that an impartial enquiry (not

necessarily a Court of Inquiry) has been made into

the   allegations   against   him   and   that   he   has   had

adequate opportunity of hearing. 

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(iii) Rule 24 of the Assam Rifles confers powers on

the   Commandants   of   the   Assam   Rifles   Units/

establishment   to   discharge   any   subordinate

officer/under   officer/enrolled   persons   of   Assam

Rifles.   However,   the   power   of   discharge   by   the

Commandant shall be exercised with prior approval

of   immediate   superior   officer   not   below   Sector

Commander   in   case   of   Under   Officers   and   other

enrolled person and that of Inspector General Assam

Rifles in case of Subordinate Officers. 

(iv) After compliance of the provisions enumerated

above, a show cause notice will be served on the

individual affording him an opportunity to explain his

case.   Thereafter,   the   complete   case   file   will   be

forwarded   to   next   superior   authority/Sector

Headquarters   for   approval   of   the   superior

authority/Sector Commander.

(v) The   authority   competent   to   sanction   the

dismissal/discharge   of   the   individual   will   before

passing orders re­consider the case in the light of the

individual reply to the show cause notice. A person

who   has   been   served   a   show   cause   notice   for

proposed dismissal may be ordered to be discharged

if it is considered that discharge would meet the end

of   justice.   If   the   competent   authority   accepts   the

reply of the individual to the show cause notice as

entirely satisfactorily, he will pass orders accordingly.

108.  Discharge   on   ground   of   red   ink   entries.  A

Subordinate   Officer,   Under   Officer   or   other   enrolled

person who has incurred four or more red ink entries may

be recommended for discharge from the service on the

ground   of   unsuitability,   subject   to   the   following

conditions:­ 

(a) After an individual has earned three red ink

entries, he shall be warned in writing that his service

will   be   liable   to   be   terminated   by   the   competent

authority if he earns one more red ink entry. Such a

warning   letter   shall   be   issued   to   him   by   the

26

concerned Sector Commander through Commandant

of the individual. 

(b) Each case of individuals having earned four or

more red ink entries shall be examined on its own

merit depending upon the nature and gravity of the

offences   and   the   aggravating   circumstances   under

which   these   were   committed.   The   authority

competent   to   sanction   discharge   under   this   para

shall record reasons for ordering the discharge, or

otherwise. 

(c) A   person   who   has   put   in   eighteen   years   of

qualifying   service   for   pension   may   be   allowed   to

complete the required qualifying service for grant of

pension before he is recommended for discharge on

ground of four or more red ink entries, unless there

are   compelling   reasons   to   sanction   his   discharge

before   completion   of   the   qualifying   service   for

pension, which must be specified in the discharge

order. 

(d) Before   taking  the  final   decision  to   order  the

discharge, the person concerned shall be informed

through a show cause notice that his retention in the

service is considered undesirable for having incurred

four   or  more   red   ink   entries,   thereby   also   calling

upon him to show cause as to why he should not be

discharged   from   the   service   for   being   considered

unsuitable for the service in the Assam Rifles. The

individual shall be given minimum fifteen days, after

receipt of Show Cause Notice, to submit his reply.

(e) After receipt of the individual’s reply, if any, the

case shall be put up to the authority competent to

sanction the discharge alongwith recommendations

of the Commandant of the unit concerned. Before

passing the discharge order, the authority competent

to sanction the discharge under this para may seek

the advise of the Law Officer concerned. 

(f) An order of discharge under this para shall be

27

passed   by   an   officer   not   less   than   a   Sector

Commander in the case of Under Officer or other

enrolled   persons   and   an   officer   not   less   than

Inspector General Assam Rifles/Additional Director

General   Assam   Rifles   in   case   of   Subordinate

Officers.”

39. Having regard to the nature of the misconduct alleged against the

appellant we are of the view that the ends of justice would be met if we

set aside the order of discharge and treat the appellant herein to have

been in service till the time, he could be said to have completed the

qualifying service for grant of pension. We are inclined to pass such an

order with a view to do substantial justice as there is nothing on record

to indicate that the nature of the misconduct leading to the award of

four Red Ink entries was so unacceptable that the competent authority

had no option but to direct his discharge to prevent indiscipline in the

force.

40. The order of discharge passed against the appellant herein is

hereby set aside. The appellant shall be treated to have been in service

till the time he would have completed the qualifying service for grant of

pension.   We   are   informed   that   only   six   months   were   left   for   the

qualifying service to be completed before the appellant came to be

discharged. No back wages shall, however, be admissible. The benefit

of continuity of service for all other purpose shall be granted to the

28

appellant  including  pension.  The   monetary  benefits   payable   to   the

appellant   shall   be   released   expeditiously   but   not   later   than   four

months from the date of this order.

41. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No order as to

costs.  

42.  Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

………………………………………..J.

     (SURYA KANT)

………………………………………..J.

                              (J.B. PARDIWALA)

NEW DELHI

JULY 14, 2022

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