RAJESWARI CHANDRASEKAR GANESH VERSUS THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 402 OF 2021

RAJESWARI CHANDRASEKAR GANESH …PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

1. This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of

India involves a contest over the custody of children born out of

the wedlock between the petitioner-mother and the respondent

no.2-father. The respondents nos.4 and 5 respectively are the

brother and father of the respondent no.2.

2. The petitioner-mother has prayed for the following reliefs :

“(a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in

the nature Habeas Corpus to the Respondent No.1 to

immediately trace and produce the minor children

Lakshaya Ganesh and Bhavin Sai Ganesh before this

Hon’ble Court and deliver their custody to the Petitioner

Mother so as to repatriated them to the U.S. in

compliance with the Order passed by the U.S. Court

dated 30.07.2021.

(b) issue a direction to the Respondent No.3/Director

of CBI to trace the minor children Lakshaya Ganesh

and Bhavin Sai Ganesh and to produce them before

this Hon’ble Court, since the Respondent No.2 is not

traceable.

nature Habeas Corpus to Respondent No.2 to cooperate

with anyone appointed by the Petitioner Ex-Wife to

transport the minor children – Lakshaya Ganesh and

Bhavin Sai Ganesh to the United States within a time

frame;

(d) Pass such other order or further orders and

directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and

in the interest of justice.”

3. The case put up by the petitioner-mother may be

summarised as under :

4. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent

no.2 was solemnized on 31st October 2008 as per the Hindu rites

and rituals at Chennai, India. Within one month from the date of

the marriage, the parties migrated to the Bear, Delaware, USA.

5. The respondent no.2, at the relevant point of time, was

working with the Satyam Computers. Sometime in May 2009,

the parties were constrained to return to Chennai, India, as the

project that the respondent no.2 had been working on with the

Satyam Computers got terminated on account of some internal

issues in the company.

6. On 7th October 2009, the parties were blessed with a

daughter named Lakshaya Ganesh. It appears from the

materials on record that sometime in January 2012, the

respondent no.2 was able to secure a job in Kansas, USA. Since

2012, the parties have been residing in the USA.

7. It further appears that between April 2012 and November

2012, the respondent no.2 lost several jobs, and in such

circumstances, the parties had to shift from Kansas, USA, to

Boston, Massachusetts, USA. Sometime later, they shifted to

Findlay, Ohio, USA. In January 2012, the minor daughter

Lakshaya Ganesh started her preschool at the Owen’s Day Care,

Findlay, Ohio, and thereafter, was admitted to a kindergarten at

the Lincoln Elementary School, Findlay, Ohio. While the minor

daughter Lakshaya was studying in the kindergarten, the

teachers over there noticed that Lakshaya was a gifted child, i.e.

a child with a remarkable IQ level. The parties were blessed

thereafter with a son named Bhavin Sai Ganesh on 20th July

2013 at the Blanchard Valley Hospital, Findlay, Ohio. The minor

son Bhavin Sai Ganesh is a U.S. citizen by naturalization and

holds an American passport.

8. In March 2016, the petitioner cleared her GRE and TOEFL

and secured admission in the Cleveland State University Ohio,

USA. The respondent no.2, on the other hand, lost yet another

job.

9. It is the case of the petitioner that she started living in a

room with eight other girls and her minor children. She attended

the university and had to take up two jobs to feed and take care

of herself and her minor children.

10. By December 2016, both the children started going to

school. It is her case that she used to take care of her children in

all respects. Sometime in August 2016, the respondent no.2

moved for yet another job to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in such

circumstances, the petitioner had to stay all alone with the

minor children and take care of them.

11. In May 2018, the petitioner completed her Master’s in

Computer and Information Science and also obtained a

Graduate Certificate in Data Analytics with the GPA of 3.64. She

started working with the G&S Metal Products. On the other

hand, in April 2019, the respondent no.2-father managed to find

a full time job in Michigan, USA.

12. It is the case of the petitioner that once the respondent

no.2 was able to procure a full time job in Michigan, USA, he

started conceiving ideas of taking away the minor children.

13. It is the case of the petitioner that on 1st June 2019, the

respondent no.2 picked up the minor children and left for

Michigan, USA, from Cleveland, Ohio, without informing the

petitioner-mother.

14. It is alleged that the respondent no.2 also took away all the

legal documents of the petitioner including her passport, State

ID, home keys, car keys along with the documents of the minor

children.

15. It is alleged that the petitioner was locked in her own

house. It is also alleged that with a view to ensure that the

petitioner had no recourse/redressal, the respondent no.2,

before leaving for Michigan, USA, lodged a false complaint with

the local police that the petitioner was mentally ill and that she

had run away from a mental ward.

16. In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner was

constrained to immediately file an Emergency Motion for

Temporary Custody of the minor children along with a complaint

for divorce before the Court of Common Pleas, Division of

Domestic Relations, Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The court

concerned, vide order dated 17th June 2019, granted temporary

custody of the minor children to the petitioner.

17. It is alleged that despite such order being passed by the

court of Common Pleas referred to above, the respondent no.2

paid no heed to such order and continued to keep the children

away without allowing them to talk with their mother.

18. It appears that the petitioner also filed for an Emergency

Motion restraining the removal of the minor children from the

jurisdiction of the Ohio Court. The court concerned passed a

restraint order in favour of the petitioner on the same date, i.e.

17th June 2019.

19. Sometime in July 2019, one Ms. Megan was appointed by

the US Court as the guardian-ad-litem. However, the order

granting the custody of the minor children to the petitioner was

not acted upon by the respondent no.2.

20. In August 2019, the US Court directed supervised

visitation and referred the parties to mental evaluation experts.

21. It is the case of the petitioner that despite the custody

order dated 17th June 2019 passed in favour of her, the

respondent no.2, without seeking permission of the US Court

and without informing the petitioner, removed the minor

children from the specialized school in Ohio to Allegan,

Michigan. While doing so, the respondent no.2 did not even

furnish the details of the petitioner-mother including her contact

number, etc. so as to completely alienate the petitioner from her

children.

22. It is the case of the petitioner that thereafter the

respondent no.2 started administering threats that he would

take away the children to India. As a result of such threats, the

petitioner was constrained to bring the necessary facts to the

notice of the Court concerned. The Court concerned directed that

the passport of both the minor children be put in the Court’s

custody.

23. As the respondent no.2 was not able to remove the minor

children from the USA, he decided to alienate the children from

the petitioner-mother by refusing her unsupervised visitation. It

is alleged that the respondent no.2 prevented the children from

reaching out to their mother and it was only with the

intervention of the expert evaluator, namely Dr.Mark Lovinger,

that the petitioner was allowed to spend time with the minor

children.

24. In November 2019, both the expert evaluators, submitted

their opinion, stating that the petitioner was fit to have

unsupervised time with the children and there was no merit in

any of the allegations levelled by the respondent no.2.

25. In February 2020, the petitioner was able to procure a new

job and obtained H1B visa via sponsorship. The petitioner moved

back to Findlay, Ohio, where the minor son was born and was

able to secure a new apartment with good facilities for the

children. However, according to the petitioner, the respondent

no.2 failed to abide by the custody order dated 17th June 2019

and also failed to abide by the evaluation reports recommending

unsupervised visitation to the petitioner qua the minor children.

It is alleged that the respondent no.2 declined to bring the

children to the petitioner and allowed her to visit them only in

his presence.

26. It appears that a shared parenting plan was arrived at

between the parties vide order dated 12th May 2021 passed by

the Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,

Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The shared parenting means the

parents share the rights and responsibilities as provided for in a

plan approved by the Court as to all or some of the aspects of the

physical and legal care of their children. The mother and the

father together, under a shared parenting agreement, are

granted custody, care and control of the minor children until

further order that may be passed by the Court subject to certain

terms and conditions. By virtue of the shared parenting plan

referred to above, both the parties got joint custody of their

children. The visitation schedule was clearly laid down in the

shared parenting plan dated 12th May 2021. The parties agreed

to not relocate without the consent of the other party and

without the Court’s permission by way of a 60 day prior notice

and the passports of the children were to stay in alternation with

the non-custodian parent while the children were in the custody

of the other parent.

27. It appears that a separation agreement was also entered

upon between the parties dated 27th July 2021. On 28th July

2021, the respondent no.2 sent an email to the US Court in the

form of an intimation that he would like to take his minor

children on a vacation to India and asked the petitioner-mother

to keep the children for three weeks.

28. On 15th August 2021, the respondent no.2 posted a travel

itinerary. The petitioner noticed that the itinerary was such that

the children would miss their school by a week. The petitioner

declined to accept the itinerary. The petitioner requested the

respondent no.2 to go to India for his vacation, and during that

period, the kids would stay with their mother.

29. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent no.2, out

of spite, called upon the local police levelling false allegations

that the petitioner was causing harm to her children owing to an

alleged mental illness. The local police responded to the call and

after due verification arrived at the conclusion that the children

were healthy and were well taken care of by the petitioner. The

case was accordingly closed.

30. It appears that on 16th August 2021, the respondent no.2

lodged one another complaint with the police. The petitioner had

to leave her house with the minor children so as to consult her

lawyer. She requested her friend to take care of her children

while she was gone. When the friend of the petitioner reached

the petitioner’s house, the children were nowhere to be found. In

such circumstances, the petitioner immediately called up the US

police at Findlay, Ohio. At 10:00 pm., the respondent no.2

informed the petitioner that the children were in Michigan.

31. It is the case of the petitioner that on 16/17th August 2021

at 2:55 am, she received a distress call from her minor daughter

Lakshaya Ganesh aged 12. The petitioner noticed that her minor

daughter Lakshaya Ganesh was crying on phone. The minor

daughter also informed the petitioner-mother that she was in

Chicago and the father was intending to take them to India. The

petitioner was shocked to hear what was informed by her

daughter on phone, as the respondent no.2 was not scheduled to

travel to India before 19th August 2021 as per his own itinerary.

The minor daughter revealed to the petitioner-mother that the

respondent no.2-father had sent an incorrect itinerary.

32. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent no.2

clandestinely and with a view to solely removing the children

from the USA and from the joint custody of the petitioner, left for

India with the two minor children on 17th August 2021.

33. On 18th August 2021, being completely unaware of the

respondent no.2 having left for India with the minor children, the

petitioner immediately moved an Emergency Motion for

restraining the respondent no.2 from removing the minor

children from the USA. The Court concerned granted the order

as prayed for by the petitioner. It was after this order that,

according to the petitioner, she checked with the Etihad Airways

to confirm the itinerary of the respondent no.2 and found that

the one submitted by the respondent no.2 was incorrect.

34. The petitioner later discovered that the respondent no.2

had already flown out with the minor children on 17th August

2021 against his own itinerary. The respondent no.2 was

supposed to leave on 19th August 2021.

35. The petitioner desperately tried to get in touch with her

minor daughter on phone between 16th August 2021 and 21st

August 2021 but her phone was found to be switched off. On

21st August 2021, the petitioner received a call from her minor

daughter pleading with the petitioner-mother to take her back to

the USA.

36. The petitioner-mother consoled her minor daughter not to

panic or confront the respondent no.2-father less he would harm

her. The petitioner was also informed by her minor daughter that

the respondent no.2 had first taken them to someone’s house at

Chennai and was thereafter planning to move to the house of

their grandfather.

37. At this stage, we would like to reproduce the verbatim

averments made by the petitioner as contained in paragraphs 25

to 28 respectively. We quote the necessary averments thus :

“25. That the Petitioner Ex-Wife has been deliberately

kept away from the children since 2019 and finally

when the Settlement Agreement/In-Court Agreement

allowed the Petitioner Ex-Wife to enjoy the company of

the minor children that the Respondent no. 2 had

deprived her off, the minor children have now been

abducted by the Respondent No.2 and illegally

removed from the US. That the Respondent No.2

deliberately left with the legal documents of the minor

children in absolute breach of the terms of the

Settlement Agreement dated 30.07.2021 and switched

off the minor daughter’s phone to block any and every

channel of communication with the Petitioner Ex-Wife.

The Respondent No.2 has a manic tendency of

harassing and torturing the Petitioner Ex-Wife to no

extent and in this final blow has misused the children

as a weapon to seek vengeance from the Petitioner ExWife.

26. The minor children are currently nowhere to be

found and the Petitioner’s father has made all possible

attempts to trace the minor children in Chennai. The

Petitioner Ex-Wife’s father tried to trace the minor

children to the Respondent No.2’s brother’s house i.e.

the Respondent No.3 at Tripti Apartments, Apt No.20,

Marshall Enclave, 15/8 Egmore, Chennai but the guard

told him that the said house had been vacated

alongwith the two children. Thereafter, he also checked

at the Respondent No.2’s parental home i.e. the

Respondent no.5’s house at No.5, State Bank Colony,

A.A Road, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu however, the

children were not even found here. The Respondent No.

2 has therefore, fled the US with the minor children

and has been moving around the country completely

unknown to the Petitioner mother and to the complete

detriment to the minor children who have been missing

their school and their home in the US. The Respondent

No. 2 and his family have been hand in glove in

keeping the Petitioner Ex-Wife deprived of the company

of the minor children. That the Petitioner’s father

fearing for the safety and welfare of the minor children

has made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police,

Collectorate Complex, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu on

13.09.2021 requesting him to investigate into the case

of searching for the minor children who have been

illegally removed from their parent nation.

27. That on 21.9,2021 in furtherance to the complaint

made by the Petitioner Ex-Wife’s father, the

Virudhanagar Police, Chennai informed the Petitioner’s

father that the minor children could not be found

neither at the residence of the Respondent No.4 at

Tripti Apartments, Egmore, Chennai nor at the

residence of the grandfather i.e. the Respondent No.5.

Further now the Petitioner Ex-Wife has also found out

through the Police Authorities in Ohio, USA that the

Respondent No.2 is planning to shift to Maharashtra

and shifted his job in Perrigo, Allegan, ‘Michigan, USA

to Maharashtra, India. The Petitioner is thus at a

complete loss is absolutely unaware of the

whereabouts of the minor children and of the

Respondent no. 2.

28. The minor children are being kept away from the

Petitioner Ex-Wife who has equal parental rights and

responsibilities qua the minor children as laid out in

Settlement Agreement dated 30.07.2021. The

Respondent no. 2 Ex-Husband is willfully disobeying

the Orders of the US Court by detaining the minor

children somewhere in India not just contrary to the

Settlement Agreement but also against the wishes and

interest of the minor children who have been plucked

out of their society based on the Respondent ExHusband’s whim. The US Court is the ONLY Court

having jurisdiction over the minor children as the

children are permanent citizens of the USA and the

minor son Bhavin Sai Ganesh is a citizen of the USA

and holds an American Passport. The children’s

education is suffering as they were abducted from the

USA mid-term and despite the Petitioner Ex-Wife’s

incessant efforts to make the Respondent No.2

understand the implications of his actions, the

Respondent No.2 Ex-Husband has become

unresponsive and untraceable alongwith the children.”

38. It would not be out of place to state over here that the

shared parenting plan referred to above by us in paragraph 26

ultimately came to be terminated by the Court at Ohio vide order

dated 9th February 2022 at the instance of the petitioner-mother.

We quote few relevant observations made by the Court at Ohio

as under :

“33. Defendant/Father’s failure to return the children

from India was a clear violation of the consent order,

as follows :

“a. Defendant/Father failed to honor Part

I(C)(1) of the Shared Parenting Plan, whereby he

pledged to “provide the children with an

emotional environment in which the children are

free to continue to love the other Parent and

spend time with them.”

b. Defendant/Father failed to honor Part

I(C)(3) of the Shared Parenting Plan, whereby he

pledged to “allow the children to telephone on a

reasonable basis.”

c. Defendant/Father failed to honor Part

I(C)(4) of the Shared Parenting Plan, whereby he

pledged to “communicate with the other Parent

openly, honestly, and regularly to avoid

misunderstandings which are harmful to the

children.”

d. Defendant/Father failed to honor Part

I(C)(7) of the Shared Parenting Plan, whereby he

pledged “not to withhold time with the other

Parent as a punishment to the children or the

other Parent.”

e. Defendant/Father failed to honor Part

I(C)(10)(a) of the Shared Parenting Plan,

whereby he pledged to honor the children’s

rights to a continuing relationship with both

parents.

f. Defendant/Father failed to honor Part

I(C)(g) of the Shared Parenting Plan, whereby he

pledged to honor the children’s rights to

“experience regular and consistent contact with

both Parents and the right to know the reason

for any cancellation or change of plans.”

g. Defendant/Father has withheld parenting

time from Plaintiff/Mother, as specified above. :

h. Defendant/Father never provided the

children’s passports to the Plaintiff/Mother.

34. It is in the best interests of both children to be

returned immediately to the jurisdiction of the United

States.

35. The children are familiar with and acclimated to

the culture of the United States and have thrived while

studying in schools in the United States. In addition,

the minor children have friends in the United States,

and are acclimated to the surroundings of the United

States.

36. Defendant/Father violated the Shared Parenting

Plan by failing to provide three weeks prior notice of the

itinerary.

37. Defendant/Father violated the Shared Parenting

Plan by failing to place the passports with

Plaintiff/Mother

38. Defendant/Father took the children

surreptitiously to India, a country of which the children

had little familiarity.

39. One of the major components of the Shared

Parenting Plan is that the Plaintiff and Defendant

consistently communicate regarding the best interests

of their children. Defendant/Father has failed to

communicate with Plaintiff/Mother. Plaintiff/Mother

does not know where her minor children are living or if

Defendant/Father ever intends to return them to the

United States.

40. A change of circumstances exists in the children’s

situation, they being surreptitiously removed to India

without notice to Plaintiff/Mother and without any

plans to return.

41. It is in the children’s best interest for the Shared

Parenting Plan to be terminated.

42. It is in the children’s best interest for

Plaintiff/Mother to be named as residential parent and

legal custodian.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that:

1. Plaintiff/Mother’s Motion to Terminate the Shared

Parenting Plan and Designate Plaintiff as Residential

Parent and Legal Custodian (No. 444481) is GRANTED

in the best interests of the minor children.

2. Plaintiff/Mother, Rajeswari Chandresekar is

hereby designated as the residential parent and legal

custodian of daughter Lakshaya Ganesh, DOB

10/7/2009, and son Babvinsai Ganesh, DOB

7/20/2013.

3. Defendant/Father shall make the children

immediately available to communicate with

Plaintiff/Mother and allow for daily communication

between the children and their mother until the

children are in her custody.

4. Defendant/Father shall immediately return the

children’s passports to Plaintiff/Mother, or in the

alternative arrange for and surrender the children’s

passports to the Indian Court or a US Consulate in

India. Plaintiff/Mother may apply for replacement

passports for the minor children without consent of

Defendant/Father.

5. Defendant/Father shall incur all transportation

costs for the return of the children to the United States

of America, per an itinerary to be determined by

Plaintiff/Mother.

6. Defendant/Father shall submit to an

independent psychological evaluation at DeBalzo,

Elugdin, Levine, Risen LLC, with Dr.Mark Lovinger for

the determination of Defendant/Father’s ability to

appropriately care for and co-parent the minor children,

which shall include psychological and chemical

evaluation as deemed appropriate, at

Defendant/Father’s costs.

7. Defendant/Father’s visitation with the minor

children is suspended until this Court can determine if

visitation is appropriate.

8. Plaintiff/Mother shall be responsible for all nonemergency medical decisions, emergency medical

decisions, and educational decisions regarding the

minor children.

9. For school purposes, Plaintiff/Mother’s residence

shall dictate school enrollment for the children.

10. This order is enforceable by any and all law

enforcement agencies, including, but not limited to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Departments,

and Immigration Authorities in both the United States

of America and India.

11. This matter shall be set for further hearing upon

Plaintiff/Mother’s Motion to Show Cause, filed

September 27, 2021 (No. 444480), and the request of

Plaintiff/Mother for attorney’s fees pursuant to ORC

§3105.73 for the change of custody motion.”

39. In such circumstances referred to above, the petitionermother is here before this Court with the present petition under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Habeas

Corpus.

40. Vide order dated 28th September 2021, this Court issued

notice to the respondents, making it returnable within two

weeks.

41. On 8th December 2021, time was prayed for on behalf of

the respondents nos.2, 4 and 5 respectively to file counteraffidavit. Three days’ time was granted to the respondents to file

their counter affidavit.

42. On 28th January 2022, this Court passed the following

order :

“List this matter on 04.02.2022, as in the meantime,

learned counsel for the respondent no.2 has expressed

hope that she would be able to impress upon

respondent no.2 to take appropriate measures for

finding amicable solution between the parties

themselves.”

43. On 28th February 2022, this Court passed the following

order :

“The Mediator’s Report does indicate that the parties

were unable to arrive at an amicable settlement.

Nevertheless, in deference to the observation made by

this Court, learned counsel for the respondent(s) prays

for some more time to find out some workable

arrangement between the parties.

As the respondent(s) has shown willingness in this

regard, by way of indulgence, we defer the hearing of

this matter till 04.04.2022.”

44. On 8th April 2022, this Court passed the following order :

“Learned counsel for respondent no.2 on instructions

submits that respondent no.2 is seeking one week’s

more time to interact with the petitioner and try to work

out amicable arrangement, if possible.

As a result, we give one more chance to respondent

no.2, as prayed.

List this matter on 02.05.2022.”

45. On 2nd May 2022, this Court passed the following order :

“By way of indulgence and on the insistence of learned

counsel for the private respondents, we defer the

hearing of this matter till 13th May 2022.

We make it amply clear that no further request for

adjournment will be entertained at the instance of the

private respondents on future date.”

46. Thus, as the parties were not able to arrive at an amicable

settlement, the matter was finally heard on 13th May 2022.

STANCE OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 :

47. According to the respondent no.2, the present petition filed

by the petitioner seeking custody of her minor children so as to

repatriate them to the USA is nothing but an abuse of the

process of law and not maintainable. According to the

respondent no.2, the present petition is not maintainable as

India is not a signatory to the Hague Convention. The terms of

the Hague Convention are not binding on the Indian parties and

courts.

48. The respondent no.2 had given prior notice to the

petitioner about his travel to India with children for a period of

two weeks via email dated 28th July 2021. The respondent no.2

had also informed the petitioner about the travel date, i.e. 19th

August 2021, via email dated 15th August 2021. The respondent

no.2 had, via email dated 16th August 2021, informed the

petitioner about the address where they would be staying in

India. However, owing to the pandemic, there were changes in

the international travel norms. The transit locations of travel, i.e.

the Middle East countries, were removed from the safety green

list and a stay of 14 days in a transit location was made

necessary before flying to the home country. According to the

respondent no.2, it is on account of such unforeseen

circumstances that he had to make prompt changes in the travel

plan, get the RTPCR test, etc. and then travel to India to avoid a

14 days’ stopover in the Middle East, which would have caused

lot of inconvenience to the children including the financial

burden for three persons.

49. It is the case of the respondent no.2 that the custody of the

children with him cannot be said to be unlawful in any manner.

The custody of the minor children with the father can never be

termed as unlawful or illegal. According to the respondent no.2,

the holiday was planned with the express consent of the

petitioner-mother and both the children had a talk with their

mother, i.e. the petitioner, on 17th August 2021 before leaving for

India. Thereafter also, the children spoke to the petitionermother on 22nd August 2021 on arrival in India. All throughout,

the petitioner was kept informed about the whereabouts of the

minor children.

50. According to the respondent no.2, this litigation is nothing

but an outcome of several mental health issues on the part of

the petitioner. The respondent no.2 has levelled serious

allegations against the petitioner that she has been diagnosed

with several mental health issues and has been on medication

for several issues for treatment of depression, bipolar disorder,

schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorder, etc. According to

the respondent no.2, it is the erratic behaviour of the petitioner

that has resulted in his loss of job. It is alleged that the

petitioner had approached the employer of the respondent no.2,

namely Perrigo, Allegan, Michigan, USA, and created a

distressing seen, thereby resulting in termination of the

respondent no.2’s employment with immediate effect. As the

respondent no.2 is not an American citizen nor is he a Green

Card holder, the loss of job means that he cannot go back to the

US without the work permit.

51. It is the case of the respondent no.2 that it is the petitioner

who created a situation beyond repair, which ultimately led to

the cancellation of visa.

52. According to the respondent no.2, he is not in a position to

go back to the US as he has no means to reach the US and start

a living without a steady job. According to him, he cannot allow

his children to go back to their mother, i.e. the petitioner, having

regard to the alleged mental disorder of the petitioner. According

to the respondent no.2, the mental illness of the petitioner may

increase the risk of the minor children’s emotional and

developmental growth. It is the case of the respondent no.2 that

both the children are very happy residing in India with their

grandparents. Both the children have been admitted in a very

good school at Chennai. Their education is being taken care of in

the best possible manner. All other allegations levelled in the

memorandum of the writ petition have been denied.

53. According to the respondent no.2, he was to return to

Chicago on 2nd September with the children. He had confirmed

tickets of Etihad Airways, but for the unnecessary hue and cry

raised by the petitioner, a situation was brought around by

which the respondent no.2 lost his job and consequently, the

work permit came to be cancelled.

54. In such circumstances, it is the case of the respondent

no.2 that the present petition under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus is not

maintainable. It is not maintainable as the father, being the

natural guardian of his children, the custody of the father

cannot be termed as illegal or unlawful restrain on the minor

children. In that context, no writ of Habeas Corpus can be

issued. It is the case of the respondent no.2 that before a writ of

Habeas Corpus can be issued, it has to be shown that there is

either unlawful detention or custody or there is an imminent or

serious danger to the person detained, particularly if he or she is

a minor.

55. We take notice of the fact that a rejoinder has also been

filed to the reply of the respondent no.2. Few additional affidavits

have also been filed by the respondent no.2, by and large

reiterating what has been referred to above.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER :

56. Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner, vehemently submitted that both the children are not

residents of India. The minor daughter Lakshaya came to the

USA at the age of 2 in the year 2012 and started her schooling

from Findlay, Ohio, USA. She is well entrenched in the social

and cultural milieu of the USA and could be said to have been

plucked out of the same without ascertaining her wishes. The

minor daughter Lakshaya, as on date, is 12 years of age and can

well express her desires. The minor daughter is a permanent

resident of the USA and has been residing, studying and

socializing in the USA. The custody of the minor daughter

Lakshaya with her father, i.e. the respondent no.2, could be

termed as illegal as the same is against the settlement agreement

dated 30th July 2021 that had been mutually arrived at by and

between the parties before the US court. The respondent no.2 –

father has managed to keep the custody of the children by

flouting various orders passed by the US courts. He cannot be a

beneficiary of his own wrongs.

57. The minor son Bhavin Sai Ganesh is an American citizen

holding an American passport and, therefore, he is ordinarily a

resident of the USA. The minor son Ganesh Sai is 8 years of age

and has been in the USA since his birth. His custody with the

respondent no.2 at Chennai could also be said to be illegal, more

particularly, could be said to be in contravention of the

settlement agreement dated 30th July 2021.

58. The allegations levelled by the respondent no.2 that the

petitioner is suffering from various mental disorders are

reckless, far from being true. If the petitioner had any mental

issues and the respondent no.2 was so much concerned about

the interest and welfare of his two minor children, then there

was no good reason for him to go for the settlement agreement

dated 30th July 2021. The respondent no.2 could be said to be in

gross and blatant contempt of the various orders passed by the

US court. He could be said to have kept the custody of the

custody of the minor children illegally. His act has deprived the

petitioner as a mother to take care of her minor children in

accordance with the shared parenting plan and allocation of

parental rights and responsibilities.

59. Mr. Jauhar, the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner, submitted that even with all that the respondent no.2

has done, the petitioner is still ready and willing to abide by the

shared parenting plan and allocation of parental rights and

responsibilities. The respondent no.2 should, at the earliest,

return to the USA with both the minor children and abide by the

various orders passed by the US courts, more particularly, the

shared parenting plan.

60. The learned counsel would submit that the respondent

no.2 should be asked to apply for a fresh visa at the earliest

pointing out to the authorities concerned that he is duty-bound

in law to go back to the USA with both the minor children so as

to abide by the shared parenting plan and the order that may be

passed by this Court.

61. Mr. Jauhar, the learned counsel, has placed strong

reliance, in support of his submissions, on the following caselaw:

(1) Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw,

(1987) 1 SCC 42;

(2) V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India and others,

(2010) 1 SCC 174;

(3) Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral Mittal,

(2010) 1 SCC 591;

(4) Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali,

(2019) 7 SCC 311;

(5) Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu,

(1984) 3 SCC 698.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 :

62. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, the learned senior counsel appearing

for the respondent nos. 2, 4 and 5, on the other hand, has

vehemently opposed this writ petition substantially on the

ground that the same seeking for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is not

maintainable as the custody of the two minor children with their

father, i.e. the respondent no.2, cannot be termed as illegal or

unlawful.

63. Ms. Arora would submit that both the minor children, as

on date, are well-settled at Chennai. They are being taken care of

in the best possible manner. They have been admitted in a very

good school at Chennai. Both the minor children are now wellsettled and to take them back to the USA all of a sudden will

take a very heavy toll on them both; physically and mentally.

64. According to Ms. Arora, when a party is seeking a

discretionary relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,

the court must look into the bona fide and the overall conduct of

such party.

65. The learned senior counsel would submit that it is the

petitioner who has brought around a situation whereby the

respondent no.2 is now not in a position to go back to the USA

and start a new life. The respondent no.2 has no work permit as

his employment has been terminated. It is the petitioner who is

responsible for the termination of services of the respondent no.2

from the company where he was serving earlier. She would

submit that, as on date, if the respondent no.2-father is asked to

go back to the USA with his two minor children and if the

respondent no.2 is not in a position to settle down in the USA,

then he may have to come back to India. In such circumstances,

it would be too dangerous to leave behind both the minor

children all alone with their mother who is suffering from various

mental disorders. The argument of the learned senior counsel is

that in such circumstances why should the father be deprived of

his love and affection towards his own children and also

supervision.

66. It is submitted that it is always open for the petitionermother to travel to India and spend some time with her minor

children rather than insisting that both the minor children

should come back to the USA.

67. The learned senior counsel submitted that it is a wellsettled position of law, more particularly, after the decision of

this Court in the case of Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State

(NCT of Delhi) and another, (2017) 8 SCC 454, that the

paramount consideration in cases like the one on hand, should

be the welfare of the minor child – in respect of whom the

Habeas Corpus writ petition is preferred by one or the other

parent. The other considerations – like comity of courts; orders

passed by foreign courts having jurisdiction in the matter

regarding custody of a minor child; citizenship of the parents

and the child; the ‘intimate connect’; the manner in which the

child is brought in India, i.e. even if it is in breach of order of

competent court in foreign jurisdiction, cannot override the

consideration of child’s welfare, since it is the responsibility of a

court, which exercises parens patriae jurisdiction, to ensure that

the exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction is in the best

interest of the child, and the direction to return the child to a

foreign jurisdiction does not result in any physical, mental,

psychological, or other harm to the child.

68. The learned senior counsel would submit that if it is not in

the best interest and welfare of the minor child that he/she

should return to the foreign jurisdiction, and giving of such

direction would harm his/her interest in the welfare, the other

considerations and principles which may persuade this Court to

take a view in favour of directing the return of the minor child to

the foreign court jurisdiction shall stand relegated and the court

would not direct the return of the child to the place falling within

the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

69. In such circumstances referred to above, Ms. Arora, the

learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2, 4

and 5 respectively prays that there being no merit in the present

writ petition, the same may be rejected.

ANALYSIS :

70. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties

and having gone through the materials on record, the only

question that falls for our consideration is, whether the

petitioner is entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for ?

PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING THE RIGHTS OF THE

PARTIES :

71. The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, was primarily

enacted to consolidate the various Acts then in force keeping in

view the personal law of diverse communities in India. It,

however, did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Courts of

Wards and did not take away any powers vested in the High

Courts or the Supreme Court. A ‘minor’ under the Act has been

defined as a person who, under the provisions of the Indian

Majority Act, 1875, is to be deemed not to have attained his

majority. A ‘guardian’ has been defined as a person having the

care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both his

person and property. Section 6 of the Act provides that no

provision in the Act shall be construed to take away or derogate

from any power to appoint a guardian of a minor's person or

property, or both, which is valid by the law to which the minor is

subject. Section 7 gives power to the Court that if it is satisfied

that it is for the welfare of a minor that an order should be

made, it may make an order appointing a guardian of his person

or property, or both, or declaring a person to be such a

guardian. Section 8 lays down that no order under Section 7 will

be made except on the application of the person desirous of

being, or claiming to be, the guardian of the minor or any

relative or friend of the minor or the Collector of the district in

which the minor ordinarily resides or in which he has property

or the Collector having authority with respect to the class to

which the minor belongs. Section 9 deals with the territorial

jurisdiction of the court. Section 10 lays down the manner in

which an application is to be made and what is to be stated in

the application. Section 11 provides for the procedure on

admission of such an application. Section 12 gives power to the

court to make interlocutory order for production of a minor and

interim protection of his person and property. Section 17 enjoins

upon the court to have due regard to the personal law of the

minor and specially take note of the circumstances which point

towards the welfare of the minor in either appointing a guardian

or declaring a guardian. If the minor is old enough to form an

intelligent preference, the court may be justified to consider that

preference also in coming to the final conclusion. Further, no

person can be appointed as a guardian against his own will.

72. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 was

enacted as a law complementary to the Guardians and Wards

Act, 1890. This defines a ‘minor’ to be a person who has not

completed the age of eighteen years. ‘Guardian’ has been defined

as a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his

property or of both his person and property and includes - (i) a

natural guardian, (ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the

minor's father or mother, (iii) a guardian appointed or declared

by a Court, and (vi) a person empowered to act as such by or

under any enactment relating to any court of wards. ‘Natural

guardian’, according to this Act, means any of the guardians

mentioned in Section 6. Section 6 says that the natural

guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor's person as

well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or her

undivided interest in the joint family property) are - (a) in the

case of a boy or an unmarried girl, the father, and after him, the

mother, provided that the custody of a minor who has not

completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the

mother. Section 8 lays down that the natural guardian of a

Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section,

to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for

the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or

benefit of the minor's estate but the guardian can, in no case,

bind the minor by a personal covenant. Sub-section (5) of

Section 8 lays down that the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890,

shall apply in certain circumstances. Section 13 of the Act lays

down that in the appointment or declaration of any person as

guardian of Hindu minor by a Court, the welfare of the minor

shall be the paramount consideration. Indeed sub-section (2) of

Section 13 lays down that no person shall be entitled to the

guardianship by virtue of the provisions of the Act or of any law

relating to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the Court

is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the

welfare of the minor. This section is complementary to Section

17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 which lays down that

in appointing or declaring the guardian of a minor the Court

shall be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the

minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the

welfare of the minor.

73. A mere reading of the provisions of the two Acts referred to

above makes it obvious that the welfare of the minor

predominates to such an extent that the legal rights of the

persons claiming to be the guardians or claiming to be entitled to

the custody will play a very insignificant role in the

determination by the court.

74. Ms. Arora does not really contest the above proposition.

What she contends is that the father being the natural guardian

of his two minor children, the custody of the father cannot be

termed as illegal or unlawful restraint on the minor. In that

context no writ of Habeas Corpus can issue. Her contention is

that before a writ of Habeas Corpus can issue, it has to be

shown that there is either unlawful detention or custody or there

is imminent or serious danger to the person detained,

particularly if he or she is minor.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS :

75. In a petition seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus in a matter

relating to a claim for custody of a child, the principal issue

which should be taken into consideration is as to whether from

the facts of the case, it can be stated that the custody of the

child is illegal.

76. The writ of Habeas Corpus has always been given due

signification as an effective method to ensure release of the

detained person from prison. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law

Lexicon (1997 edition), while defining ‘habeas corpus’, apart from

other aspects, the following has been stated :

“The ancient prerogative writ of habeas corpus takes

its name from the two mandatory words habeas.

corpus, which it contained at the time when it, in

common with all forms of legal process, was framed in

Latin. The general purpose of these writs, as their

name indicates, was to obtain the production of an

individual.”

77. In Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien

reported in (1923) AC 603 (609), it has been observed that it is

perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law

of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in

all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial

antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year

of Edward I. It has through the ages been jealously maintained

by the Courts of Law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of

power by the Executive at the cost of the liege.

78. The writ of Habeas Corpus is a prerogative writ and an

extraordinary remedy. It is a writ of right and not a writ of

course and may be granted only on reasonable ground or

probable cause being shown, as held by this Court in Mohd.

Ikram Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR

1964 SC 1625 and Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate,

Darjeeling, (1973) 2 SCC 674. The observations made by a

Constitution Bench in the case of Kanu Sanyal (supra) with

regard to the nature and scope of a writ of Habeas Corpus are

being extracted below :

“4. It will be seen from this brief history of the writ of

habeas corpus that it is essentially a procedural writ. It

deals with the machinery of justice, not the substantive

law. The object of the writ is to secure release of a

person who is illegally restrained of his liberty. The

writ is, no doubt, a command addressed to a person

who is alleged to have another person unlawfully in his

custody requiring him to bring the body of such person

before the Court, but the production of the body of the

person detained is directed in order that the

circumstances of his detention may be inquired into, or

to put it differently, “in order that appropriate judgment

be rendered on judicial enquiry into the alleged

unlawful restraint”. The form of the writ employed is

“We command you that you have in the King’s Bench

Division of our High Court of Justice-immediately after

the receipt of this our writ, the body of A.B. being taken

and detained under your custody-together with the day

and cause of his being taken and detained to undergo

and receive all and singular such matters and things

as our court shall then and there consider of concerning

him in this behalf“. The italicized words show that the

writ is primarily designed to give a person restrained of

his liberty a speedy and effective remedy for having

the legality of his detention enquired into and

determined and if the detention is found to be

unlawful, having himself discharged and freed from

such restraint. The most characteristic element of the

writ is its peremptoriness and, as pointed out by Lord

Halsbury, L.C. in Cox v. Hakes (supra), “the essential

and leading theory of the whole procedure is the

immediate determination of the right to the applicant’s

freedom and his release, if the detention is found to be

unlawful. That is the primary purpose of the writ; that

is its substance and end.”

79. The exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction for issuance

of a writ of Habeas Corpus would, therefore, be seen to be

dependent on the jurisdictional fact where the applicant

establishes a prima facie case that the detention is unlawful. It is

only where the aforementioned jurisdictional fact is established

that the applicant becomes entitled to the writ as of right.

80. The object and scope of a writ of Habeas Corpus in the

context of a claim relating to the custody of a minor child fell for

the consideration of this Court in Nithya Anand Raghavan

(supra) and it was held that the principal duty of the court in

such matters should be to ascertain whether the custody of the

child is unlawful and illegal and whether the welfare of the child

requires that his present custody should be changed and the

child be handed over to the care and custody of any other

person.

81. Taking a similar view in the case of Syed Saleemuddin v.

Dr. Rukhsana and others, (2001) 5 SCC 247, it was held by

this Court that in a Habeas Corpus petition seeking transfer of

custody of a child from one parent to the other, the principal

consideration for the court would be to ascertain whether the

custody of the child can be said to be unlawful or illegal and

whether the welfare of the child requires that the present

custody should be changed. It was stated thus :

“11…it is clear that in an application seeking a writ of

Habeas Corpus for custody of minor children the

principal consideration for the Court is to ascertain

whether the custody of the children can be said to be

unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the

children requires that present custody should be

changed and the children should be left in care and

custody of somebody else. The principle is well settled

that in a matter of custody of a child the welfare of the

child is of paramount consideration for the court…”

82. The question of maintainability of a Habeas Corpus

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the

custody of a minor was examined by this Court in Tejaswini

Gaud and others v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari and

others, (2019) 7 SCC 42, and it was held that the petition would

be maintainable where the detention by parents or others is

found to be illegal and without any authority of law and the

extraordinary remedy of a prerogative writ of Habeas Corpus can

be availed in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedy

provided by the law is either unavailable or ineffective. The

observations made in the judgment in this regard are as follows :

“14. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for

securing the liberty of the subject by affording an

effective means of immediate release from an illegal or

improper detention. The writ also extends its influence

to restore the custody of a minor to his guardian when

wrongfully deprived of it. The detention of a minor by a

person who is not entitled to his legal custody is

treated as equivalent to illegal detention for the

purpose of granting writ, directing custody of the minor

child. For restoration of the custody of a minor from a

person who according to the personal law, is not his

legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the writ

court has jurisdiction.

x x x x

19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or

examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus

proceedings is a medium through which the custody of

the child is addressed to the discretion of the court.

Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an

extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in

the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary

remedy provided by the law is either not available or is

ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child

custody matters, the power of the High Court in

granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the

detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to

his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the

issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High

Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of

habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that

the detention of a minor child by a parent or others

was illegal and without any authority of law.

20. In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy lies

only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or

the Guardians and Wards Act as the case may be. In

cases arising out of the proceedings under the

Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court

is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides

within the area on which the court exercises such

jurisdiction. There are significant differences between

the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and

the exercise of powers by a writ court which is of

summary in nature. What is important is the welfare of

the child. In the writ court, rights are determined only

on the basis of affidavits. Where the court is of the view

that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may

decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and

direct the parties to approach the civil court. It is only in

exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the

custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of

extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas

corpus.”

83. In the case of Anjali Kapoor v. Rajiv Baijal, (2009) 7 SCC

322, where the custody of a minor child was being claimed by

the father being the natural parent from the maternal

grandmother, the mother having died in child birth, it was held

that taking proper care and attention in upbringing of the child

is an important factor for granting custody of child, and on facts,

the child having been brought up by the grandmother since her

infancy and having developed emotional bonding, the custody of

the child was allowed to be retained by the maternal

grandmother. While considering the competing rights of natural

guardianships vis-a-vis the welfare of the child, the test for

consideration by the Court was held to be; what would best serve

the welfare and interest of the child. Referring to the earlier

decisions in Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi, (2000) 9 SCC

745; Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, (1973) 1 SCC

840; Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw, (supra) and

Muthuswami Chettiar v. K.M. Chinna Muthuswami

Moopanar, AIR 1935 Mad 195, it was also held that the welfare

of child prevails over the legal rights of the parties while deciding

the custody of minor child. The observations made in the

judgment in this regard are as follows :

“14. The question for our consideration is, whether in

the present scenario would it be proper to direct the

appellant to hand over the custody of the minor child

Anagh to the respondent.

15. Under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the

father is the guardian of the minor child until he is

found unfit to be the guardian of the minor female

child. In deciding such questions, the welfare of the

minor child is the paramount consideration and such a

question cannot be decided merely based upon the

rights of the parties under the law. (See Sumedha

Nagpal vs. State of Delhi.” (2000) 9 SCC 745 (SCC p.

747, paras 2 & 5).

84. In Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (supra), this

Court has observed that :

“7…the principle on which the court should decide the

fitness of the guardian mainly depends on two factors:

(i) the father’s fitness or otherwise to be the guardian,

and (ii) the interests of the minors.”

85. This Court considering the welfare of the child also stated

that : (SCC p. 855, para 15)

“15….The children are not mere chattels: nor are they

mere playthings for their parents. Absolute right of

parents over the destinies and the lives of their

children has, in the modern changed social conditions,

yielded to the considerations of their welfare as human

beings so that they may grow up in a normal balanced

manner to be useful members of the society….”

86. In Elizabeth Dinshaw (supra), this Court has observed

that whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the

custody of the minor child, the matter is to be decided not on

consideration of the legal rights of the parties but on the sole

and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest

and welfare of the child.

87. The question as to how the court would determine what is

best in the interest of the child was considered In Re: McGrath

(Infants), [1893] 1 Ch. 143 C.A., and it was observed by Lindley

L.J., as follows :

“…The dominant matter for the consideration of the

Court is the welfare of the child. But the welfare of a

child is not to be measured by money only, nor by

physical comfort only. The word welfare must be taken

in its widest sense. The moral and religious welfare of

the child must be considered as well as its physical

well-being. Nor can the ties of affection be

disregarded.”

88. The issue as to the welfare of the child again arose In re

“O” (An Infant), [1965] 1 Ch. 23 C.A., where Harman L.J.,

stated as follows :

“It is not, I think, really in dispute that in all cases the

paramount consideration is the welfare of the child; but

that, of course, does not mean you add up shillings

and pence, or situation or prospects, or even religion.

What you look at is the whole background of the child’s

life, and the first consideration you have to take into

account when you are looking at his welfare is : who

are his parents and are they ready to do their duty?”

89. The question as to what would be the dominating factors

while examining the welfare of a child was considered in Walker

v. Walker & Harrison, 1981 New Ze Recent Law 257 and it was

observed that while the material considerations have their place,

they are secondary matters. More important are stability and

security, loving and understanding care and guidance, and

warm and compassionate relationships which are essential for

the development of the child’s character, personality and talents.

It was stated as follows :

“Welfare is an all-encompassing word. It includes

material welfare; both in the sense of adequacy of

resources to provide a pleasant home and a

comfortable standard of living and in the sense of an

adequacy of care to ensure that good health and due

personal pride are maintained. However, while

material considerations have their place they are

secondary matters. More important are the

stability and the security, the loving and

understanding care and guidance, the warm and

compassionate relationships that are essential for the

full development of the child’s own character,

personality and talents.”

90. In the context of consideration of an application by a

parent seeking custody of a child through the medium of a

Habeas Corpus proceeding, it has been stated in American

Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn. Vol. 39 as follows :

“…An application by a parent, through the medium of a

habeas corpus proceeding, for custody of a child is

addressed to the discretion of the court, and custody

may be withheld from the parent where it is made

clearly to appear that by reason of unfitness for the

trust or of other sufficient causes the permanent

interests of the child would be sacrificed by a change of

custody. In determining whether it will be for the best

interest of a child to award its custody to the father or

mother, the court may properly consult the child, if it

has sufficient judgment.”

91. Thus, it is well established that in issuing the writ of

Habeas Corpus in the case of minors, the jurisdiction which the

Court exercises is an inherent jurisdiction as distinct from a

statutory jurisdiction conferred by any particular provision in

any special statute. In other words, the employment of the writ

of Habeas Corpus in child custody cases is not pursuant to, but

independent of any statute. The jurisdiction exercised by the

court rests in such cases on its inherent equitable powers and

exerts the force of the State, as parens patriae, for the protection

of its minor ward, and the very nature and scope of the inquiry

and the result sought to be accomplished call for the exercise of

the jurisdiction of a court of equity. The primary object of a

Habeas Corpus petition, as applied to minor children, is to

determine in whose custody the best interests of the child will

probably be advanced. In a Habeas Corpus proceeding brought

by one parent against the other for the custody of their child, the

court has before it the question of the rights of the parties as

between themselves, and also has before it, if presented by the

pleadings and the evidence, the question of the interest which

the State, as parens patriae, has in promoting the best interests

of the child.

92. The general principle governing the award of custody of a

minor is succinctly stated in the following words in Halsbury's

Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 24, Article 511 at page

217 :

“… Where in any proceedings before any court the

custody or upbringing of a minor is in question, then, in

deciding that question, the court must regard the

minor's welfare as the first and paramount

consideration, and may not take into consideration

whether from any other point of view the father's claim

in respect of that custody or upbringing is superior to

that of the mother, or the mother's claim is superior to

that of the father.”

93. In the American Jurisprudence, Vol. 39, Second Edition,

Para 148 at pages 280-281, the same principle is enunciated in

the following words :

“..... a court is not bound to deliver a child into the

custody of any claimant or of any person, but should,

in the exercise of a sound discretion, after careful

consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as

its welfare at the time appears to require.”

94. In the footnote 14 at page 281, the following extracts from

two American cases are set-out which also emphasise this

point :

“The employment of the forms of habeas corpus in a

child custody case is not for the purpose of testing the

legality of a confinement or restraint as contemplated

by the ancient common law writ, or by statute, but the

primary purpose is to furnish a means by which the

court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, may

determine what is best for the welfare of the child, and

the decision is reached by a consideration of the

equities involved in the welfare of the child, against

which the legal rights of no one, including the parents,

are allowed to militate.” Howarth v. Northcott, 152

Conn 460, 208 A 2d and 540, 17 ALR3d 758.

PRECEDENTS ON THE SUBJECT :

95. As Mr. Jauhar, the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner, has placed strong reliance on the decision of this

Court in the case of V. Ravi Chandran (supra), we must look

into the same. This Court, in V. Ravi Chandran (supra), held as

follows :

“29. While dealing with a case of custody of a child

removed by a parent from one country to another in

contravention of the orders of the Court where the

parties had set up their matrimonial home, the Court in

the country to which the child has been removed must

first consider the question whether the Court could

conduct an elaborate enquiry on the question of

custody or by dealing with the matter summarily order

a parent to return custody of the child to the country

from which the child was removed and all aspects

relating to the child’s welfare be investigated in a Court

in his own country. Should the Court take a view that

an elaborate enquiry is necessary, obviously the Court

is bound to consider the welfare and happiness of the

child as the paramount consideration and go into all

relevant aspects of welfare of the child including

stability and security, loving and understanding care

and guidance and full development of the child’s

character, personality and talents. While doing so, the

order of a foreign Court as to his custody may be given

due weight; the weight and persuasive effect of a

foreign judgment must depend on the circumstances of

each case.

30. However, in a case where the Court decides to

exercise its jurisdiction summarily to return the child to

his own country, keeping in view the jurisdiction of the

Court in the native country which has the closest

concern and the most intimate contact with the issues

arising in the case, the Court may leave the aspects

relating to the welfare of the child to be investigated by

the Court in his own native country as that could be in

the best interests of the child. The indication given in

McKee v. McKee [1951 AC 352 : (1951) 1 All ER 942

(PC)] that there may be cases in which it is proper for a

Court in one jurisdiction to make an order directing that

a child be returned to a foreign jurisdiction without

investigating the merits of the dispute relating to the

care of the child on the ground that such an order is in

the best interests of the child has been explained in L

(Minors), In re [(1974) 1 WLR 250 : (1974) 1 All ER 913

(CA)] and the said view has been approved by this

Court in Dhanwanti Joshi [(1998) 1 SCC 112] . Similar

view taken by the Court of Appeal in H. (Infants), In re

[(1966) 1 WLR 381 (Ch & CA) : (1966) 1 All ER 886

(CA)] has been approved by this Court in Elizabeth

Dinshaw, (1987) 1 SCC 42 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 13]”.

96. This Court then proceeded to consider the issue, whether

the facts of the case before it warranted an elaborate inquiry into

the question of custody of the minor and should the parties be

relegated to the said procedure before an appropriate forum in

India. This Court concluded in its judgment that it was not

necessary to relegate the parties to an elaborate procedure in

India. Its reasons are found in paras 32 to 35, which read as

follows :

“32. Admittedly, Adithya is an American citizen, born

and brought up in the United States of America. He has

spent his initial years there. The natural habitat of

Adithya is in the United States of America. As a matter

of fact, keeping in view the welfare and happiness of

the child and in his best interests, the parties have

obtained a series of consent orders concerning his

custody/parenting rights, maintenance, etc. from the

competent Courts of jurisdiction in America. Initially, on

18.4.2005, a consent order governing the issues of

custody and guardianship of minor Adithya was

passed by the New York State Supreme Court

whereunder the Court granted joint custody of the child

to the petitioner and Respondent 6 and it was

stipulated in the order to keep the other party informed

about the whereabouts of the child. In a separation

agreement entered into between the parties on

28.7.2005, the consent order dated 18.4.2005

regarding custody of minor son Adithya continued.

33. In 8.9.2005 order whereby the marriage between

the petitioner and Respondent 6 was dissolved by the

New York State Supreme Court, again the child custody

order dated 18.4.2005 was incorporated. Then the

petitioner and Respondent 6 agreed for modification of

the custody order and, accordingly, the Family Court of

the State of New York on 18.6.2007 ordered that the

parties shall share joint legal and physical custody of

the minor Adithya and, in this regard, a comprehensive

arrangement in respect of the custody of the child has

been made.

34. The fact that all orders concerning the custody of

the minor child Adithya have been passed by the

American Courts by consent of the parties shows that

the objections raised by Respondent 6 in the counteraffidavit about deprivation of basic rights of the child

by the petitioner in the past; failure of the petitioner to

give medication to the child; denial of education to the

minor child; deprivation of stable environment to the

minor child; and child abuse are hollow and without

any substance. The objection raised by Respondent 6

in the counter-affidavit that the American Courts which

passed the order/decree had no jurisdiction and being

inconsistent with Indian laws cannot be executed in

India also prima facie does not seem to have any merit

since despite the fact that Respondent 6 has been

staying in India for more than two years, she has not

pursued any legal proceeding for the sole custody of

the minor Adithya or for declaration that the orders

passed by the American Courts concerning the custody

of minor child Adithya are null and void and without

jurisdiction. Rather it transpires from the counteraffidavit that initially Respondent 6 initiated the

proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890

but later on withdrew the same.

35. The facts and circumstances noticed above leave

no manner of doubt that merely because the child has

been brought to India by Respondent 6, the custody

issue concerning minor child Adithya does not deserve

to be gone into by the Courts in India and it would be

in accord with principles of comity as well as on facts

to return the child back to the United States of America

from where he has been removed and enable the

parties to establish the case before the Courts in the

native State of the child i.e. the United States of

America for modification of the existing custody orders.

There is nothing on record which may even remotely

suggest that it would be harmful for the child to be

returned to his native country.”

97. Despite the fact that the minor child Adithya had remained

in India for over two years, this Court concluded that it could not

be said that the he had developed his roots in India. This Court

directed the respondent mother to take the child, of her own, to

the USA and to report before the Family Court of the State of

New York. This Court also imposed the condition on the

petitioner that he shall bear all the travelling expenses of the

mother and the minor child and make arrangements for their

residence in the USA till further orders are passed by the

competent Court. He was also directed to request the authorities

that the warrants issued against the mother be dropped and he

was directed not to file or pursue any criminal charge for

violation by the mother of the consent order in USA.

98. In Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2015) 5 SCC

450, the husband and wife both were of the Indian origin but the

husband became a resident and citizen of the UK. The parties

got married in India and had two daughters in the UK. The wife

had acquired the British citizenship and the British passport as

well. Both the parties were working for gain in the UK. The

parties started having some matrimonial problems, as a result of

which the wife came back to India with her two daughters. The

wife filed a petition under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955 seeking divorce in the Family Court,

Coimbatore. Subsequently, the husband filed a petition in the

High Court of Justice in the UK for making the children wards of

the Court. The High Court made the children wards of the Court

during their minority, or until further orders of the Court and

the wife was directed to return the children to the jurisdiction of

the foreign Court. As the wife failed to obey the orders of the

foreign Court, the husband filed a writ petition of Habeas Corpus

seeking production of his children and their return to the UK, in

the Madras High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition.

This Court discussed the law on the custody of the children and

observed the following :

“46. The principle of the comity of Courts is essentially

a principle of self-restraint, applicable when a foreign

Court is seized of the issue of the custody of a child

prior to the domestic Court. There may be a situation

where the foreign Court though seized of the issue does

not pass any effective or substantial order or direction.

In that event, if the domestic Court were to pass an

effective or substantial order or direction prior in point

of time then the foreign Court ought to exercise selfrestraint and respect the direction or order of the

domestic Court (or vice versa), unless there are very

good reasons not to do so.

47. From a review of the above decisions, it is quite

clear that there is complete unanimity that the best

interests and welfare of the child are of paramount

importance. However, it should be clearly understood

that this is the final goal or the final objective to be

achieved — it is not the beginning of the exercise but

the end.

48. Therefore, we are concerned with two principles in

a case such as the present. They are:

(i) the principle of comity of Courts; and

(ii) the principle of the best interests and the welfare

of the child.

These principles have been referred to as “contrasting

principles of law” [Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral Mittal,

(2010) 1 SCC 591 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 192] but they

are not “contrasting” in the sense of one being the

opposite of the other but they are contrasting in the

sense of being different principles that need to be

applied in the facts of a given case.

49. What then are some of the key circumstances

and factors to be taken into consideration for reaching

this final goal or final objective? First, it must be

appreciated that the ‘most intimate contact’ doctrine

and the ‘closest concern’ doctrine of Surinder Kaur

Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu, (1984) 3 SCC 698 :

1984 SCC (Cri) 464 are very much alive and cannot be

ignored only because their application might be

uncomfortable in certain situations. It is not appropriate

that a domestic Court having much less intimate

contact with a child and having much less close

concern with a child and his or her parents (as against

a foreign Court in a given case) should take upon itself

the onerous task of determining the best interests and

welfare of the child. A foreign Court having the most

intimate contact and the closest concern with the child

would be better equipped and perhaps best suited to

appreciate the social and cultural milieu in which the

child has been brought up rather than a domestic

Court. This is a factor that must be kept in mind.

x x x x

52. What are the situations in which an interim or an

interlocutory order of a foreign Court may be ignored ?

There are very few such situations. It is of primary

importance to determine, prima facie, that the foreign

Court has jurisdiction over the child whose custody is

in dispute, based on the fact of the child being

ordinarily resident in the territory over which the

foreign Court exercises jurisdiction. If the foreign Court

does have jurisdiction, the interim or interlocutory order

of the foreign Court should be given due weight and

respect. If the jurisdiction of the foreign Court is not in

doubt, the ‘first strike’ principle would be applicable.

That is to say that due respect and weight must be

given to a substantive order prior in point of time to a

substantive order passed by another Court (foreign or

domestic).

53. There may be a case, as has happened in the

present appeal, where one parent invokes the

jurisdiction of a Court but does not obtain any

substantive order in his or her favour and the other

parent invokes the jurisdiction of another Court and

obtains a substantive order in his or her favour before

the first Court. In such an event, due respect and

weight ought to be given to the substantive order

passed by the second Court since that interim or

interlocutory order was passed prior in point of time.

x x x x

55. Finally, this Court has accepted the view [L.

(Minors), In re, (1974) 1 WLR 250 : (1974) 1 All ER 913

(CA)] that in a given case, it might be appropriate to

have an elaborate inquiry to decide whether a child

should be repatriated to the foreign country and to the

jurisdiction of the foreign Court or in a given case to

have a summary inquiry without going into the merits

of the dispute relating to the best interests and welfare

of the child and repatriating the child to the foreign

country and to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court.”

99. Thus, it is evident that while the paragraph 49 referred to

above recognised the well-settled principle/doctrine of the ‘most

intimate contact’ and the ‘closest concern’ doctrine, the

paragraphs 47, 52 & 53 respectively emphasized the doctrine of

comity of Courts and the first strike principle. Even before

stating the aforesaid principles, in paragraph 47, the Court

observed that there is complete unanimity that the best interests

and welfare of the child are of paramount importance.

100. The Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the UK

Court had passed an effective and substantial order declaring

the children of the parties as wards of that Court and also that

the UK Court has the most intimate contact with the welfare of

the children.

101. In Nithya Anand Raghavan (supra), this Court struck

altogether a different note and gave a new dimension. In that

case, the couple married on 30.11.2006 at Chennai and shifted

to the UK in the early 2007. Disputes between the spouses

arose. The wife having conceived in December 2008, came to

New Delhi in June 2009 and stayed with her parents and gave

birth to a girl child - Nethra on 07.08.2009 at Delhi. After the

husband arrived in India, the couple went back to the UK in

March, 2010 and following certain unsavoury events, the wife

and the daughter returned to India in August 2010. After

exchange of legal correspondence, the wife and her daughter

went back to London in December, 2011, and in January 2012

the daughter was admitted in a nursery in the UK. In December,

2012, the child was granted the UK citizenship and the husband

was also granted the UK citizenship in January 2013. They

bought a home in the UK to which they shifted their family. In

September, 2013 the child was admitted in a primary school in

the UK and she was around four years old. In July, 2014 the

wife returned to India along with her daughter. She again

returned to the UK along with the child. Between late 2014 and

early 2015 the child became ill and was diagnosed with cardiac

disorder. On 02.07.2015, the wife returned to India with her

daughter due to the alleged violent behaviour of her husband.

On 16.12.2015, the wife filed a complaint against the husband

at the CAW Cell, New Delhi, and in spite of the notices to the

husband and her parents, neither of them appeared. The

husband filed a custody/wardship petition on 08.01.2016 in the

UK to seek return of the child. On 23.1.2016, he also filed a

Habeas Corpus petition in the Delhi High Court which was

allowed on 08.07.2016. The wife carried the case to this Court.

This Court strongly relied upon its earlier judgment in

Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, (1998) 1 SCC 112, which in

turn, referred to Mckee v. McKee, 1951 AC 352 : (1951) 1 All ER

942 (PC), where the Privy Council held that the order of the

foreign court would yield to the welfare of the child and that the

comity of courts demanded not its enforcement, but its grave

consideration. While taking note of the fact that India is not a

signatory to the Hague Convention of 1980, on the “Civil Aspects

of International Child Abduction”, this Court, inter alia, held as

under :

“40. … As regards the non-Convention countries, the

law is that the court in the country to which the child

has been removed must consider the question on merits

bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount

importance and reckon the order of the foreign court as

only a factor to be taken into consideration, unless the

court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the

interests of the child and its prompt return is for its

welfare. In exercise of summary jurisdiction, the court

must be satisfied and of the opinion that the

proceeding instituted before it was in close proximity

and filed promptly after the child was removed from

his/her native state and brought within its territorial

jurisdiction, the child has not gained roots here and

further that it will be in the child's welfare to return to

his native state because of the difference in language

spoken or social customs and contacts to which he/she

has been accustomed or such other tangible reasons.

In such a case the court need not resort to an elaborate

inquiry into the merits of the paramount welfare of the

child but leave that inquiry to the foreign court by

directing return of the child. Be it noted that in

exceptional cases the court can still refuse to issue

direction to return the child to the native state and more

particularly in spite of a pre-existing order of the foreign

court in that behalf, if it is satisfied that the child's

return may expose him to a grave risk of harm. This

means that the courts in India, within whose

jurisdiction the minor has been brought must

“ordinarily” consider the question on merits, bearing in

mind the welfare of the child as of paramount

importance whilst reckoning the pre-existing order of

the foreign court if any as only one of the factors and

not get fixated therewith. In either situation—be it a

summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry—the welfare

of the child is of paramount consideration. Thus, while

examining the issue the courts in India are free to

decline the relief of return of the child brought within its

jurisdiction, if it is satisfied that the child is now settled

in its new environment or if it would expose the child to

physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the

child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite

mature and objects to its return. We are in respectful

agreement with the aforementioned exposition.”

102. This Court also relied upon the judgment in V. Ravi

Chandran (supra) and inter alia held that the role of the High

Court in examining the cases of custody of a minor is on the

touchstone of principle of parens patriae jurisdiction, as the

minor is within the jurisdiction of the court. It has held that the

High Court while dealing with the petition for issuance of Habeas

Corpus concerning a minor child in a given case, may direct

return of the child or decline to change the custody of the child

keeping in mind all the attending facts and circumstances

including the settled legal position discussed therein. It has

further added that the decision of the court, in each case, must

depend on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case

brought before it while considering the welfare of the child which

is of paramount consideration and that the order of the foreign

court must yield to the welfare of the child and the remedy of

writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be used for mere enforcement of

the directions given by the foreign court against a person within

its jurisdiction and convert that jurisdiction into that of an

executing court. It has further observed that the writ petitioner

can take recourse to such other remedy as may be permissible in

law for enforcement of the order passed by the foreign court or

resort to any other proceedings as may be permissible in law

before the Indian Court for the custody of the child, if so advised.

This Court has disapproved paragraph 56(a) to (d) in Surya

Vadanan (supra) which reads as follows:

“56. However, if there is a pre-existing order of a

foreign court of competent jurisdiction and the domestic

court decides to conduct an elaborate inquiry (as

against a summary inquiry), it must have special

reasons to do so. An elaborate inquiry should not be

ordered as a matter of course. While deciding whether

a summary or an elaborate inquiry should be

conducted, the domestic court must take into

consideration:

(a) The nature and effect of the interim or interlocutory

order passed by the foreign court.

(b) The existence of special reasons for repatriating or

not repatriating the child to the jurisdiction of the

foreign court.

moral or physical or social or cultural or psychological

harm to the child, nor should it cause any legal harm to

the parent with whom the child is in India. There are

instances where the order of the foreign court may

result in the arrest of the parent on his or her return to

the foreign country. [Arathi Bandi v. Bandi

Jagadrakshaka Rao, (2013) 15 SCC 790: (2014) 5 SCC

(Civ) 475]. In such cases, the domestic court is also

obliged to ensure the physical safety of the parent.

(d) The alacrity with which the parent moves the

foreign court concerned or the domestic court

concerned, is also relevant. If the time gap is unusually

large and is not reasonably explainable and the child

has developed firm roots in India, the domestic court

may be well advised to conduct an elaborate inquiry.”

103. As regards (a) to (c) of paragraph 56 above, this Court

termed the same as tending to drift away from the exposition in

Dhanwanti Joshi (supra) and V. Ravi Chandran (supra) and

with regard to clause (d), the Court disagreed with the same. For

better appreciation, paragraphs 62, 63 and 66 respectively of the

report are extracted herein below :

“62. As regards clauses (a) to (c) above, the same, in

our view, with due respect, tend to drift away from the

exposition in Dhanwanti Joshi case, which has been

quoted with approval by a three-Judge Bench of this

Court in V. Ravi Chandran case. In that, the nature of

inquiry suggested therein inevitably recognises giving

primacy to the order of the foreign court on the issue of

custody of the minor. That has been explicitly negated

in Dhanwanti Joshi case. For, whether it is a case of a

summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry, the

paramount consideration is the interests and welfare of

the child. Further, a pre-existing order of a foreign court

can be reckoned only as one of the factor to be taken

into consideration. We have elaborated on this aspect

in the earlier part of this judgment.

63. As regards the fourth factor noted in clause (d) of

para 56, Surya Vadanan v. State of T.N., (2015) 5 SCC

450: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 94], we respectfully disagree

with the same. The first part gives weightage to the

“first strike” principle. As noted earlier, it is not relevant

as to which party first approached the court or so to

say “first strike” referred to in para 52 of the judgment.

Even the analogy given in para 54 regarding

extrapolating that principle to the courts in India, if an

order is passed by the Indian Court is inapposite. For,

the Indian Courts are strictly governed by the

provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, as

applicable to the issue of custody of the minor within

its jurisdiction.

x x x x

66. The invocation of first strike principle as a

decisive factor, in our opinion, would undermine and

whittle down the wholesome principle of the duty of the

court having jurisdiction to consider the best interests

and welfare of the child, which is of paramount

importance. If the Court is convinced in that regard, the

fact that there is already an order passed by a foreign

court in existence may not be so significant as it must

yield to the welfare of the child. That is only one of the

factors to be taken into consideration. The interests

and welfare of the child are of paramount

consideration. The principle of comity of courts as

observed in Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, (1998)

1 SCC 112, in relation to non-Convention countries is

that the court in the country to which the child is

removed will consider the question on merits bearing

the welfare of the child as of paramount importance

and consider the order of the foreign court as only a

factor to be taken into consideration. While considering

that aspect, the court may reckon the fact that the child

was abducted from his or her country of habitual

residence but the court's overriding consideration must

be the child's welfare.”

104. Finally this Court, in Nithya Anand Raghavan (supra),

concluded as under :

“69. We once again reiterate that the exposition in

Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, (1998) 1 SCC 112 is

a good law and has been quoted with approval by a

three-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Ravi Chandran.

We approve the view taken in Dhanwanti Joshi v.

Madhav Unde, (1998) 1 SCC 112, inter alia, in para 33

that so far as non-Convention countries are concerned,

the law is that the court in the country to which the

child is removed while considering the question must

bear in mind the welfare of the child as of paramount

importance and consider the order of the foreign court

as only a factor to be taken into consideration. The

summary jurisdiction to return the child be exercised in

cases where the child had been removed from its

native land and removed to another country where,

may be, his native language is not spoken, or the child

gets divorced from the social customs and contacts to

which he has been accustomed, or if its education in

his native land is interrupted and the child is being

subjected to a foreign system of education, for these

are all acts which could psychologically disturb the

child. Again the summary jurisdiction be exercised only

if the court to which the child has been removed is

moved promptly and quickly. The overriding

consideration must be the interests and welfare of the

child.”

105. The essence of the judgment in Nithya Anand Raghavan

(supra) is that the doctrines of comity of courts, intimate

connect, orders passed by foreign courts having jurisdiction in

the matter regarding the custody of the minor child, the

citizenship of the parents and the child, etc. cannot override the

consideration of the best interest and the welfare of the child,

and that the direction to return the child to the foreign

jurisdiction must not result in any physical, mental,

psychological, or other harm to the child.

106. As observed by this Court in Vivek Singh v. Romani

Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 231, in cases of this nature, where a child

feels tormented because of the strained relations between her

parents and ideally needs the company of both of them, it

becomes, at times, a difficult choice for the court to decide as to

whom the custody should be given. However, even in such a

dilemma, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the

child. However, at times the prevailing circumstances are so

puzzling that it becomes difficult to weigh the conflicting

parameters and decide on which side the balance tilts.

FINAL ANALYSIS :

107. Keeping in mind the principles of law as explained by this

Court in Nithya Anand Raghavan (supra), we now proceed to

consider, whether it will be in the paramount interest and

welfare of both the minor children to go back to the USA ? To

put it in other words, whether we should direct the respondent

no.2 to go back to the USA with both the minor children and

abide by the shared parenting plan as ordered by the Court of

Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Cuyahoga

County, Ohio, or handover the custody of both the minor

children to the petitioner-mother ?

108. We take notice of the following circumstances emerging

from the materials on record so far as the two minor children are

concerned :

(1) Both the minor children are residents of the USA.

(2) The son is a natural citizen and the daughter is a

permanent resident of the USA.

(3) Both the children have been brought up in the social

and cultural milieu of the USA. They are accustomed to the

lifestyle, language, customs, rules and regulations, etc. of

that country.

(4) The children are residents of the USA. One of whom

is a natural citizen and will have better future prospects if

goes back to the USA.

As observed by this Court in the case of Vasudha Sethi

and others v. Kiran V. Bhaskar and another, (2022)

SCC OnLine SC 43, the natural process of grooming in the

environment of the native country is indispensable for

comprehensive development. We quote the relevant

observations made by this Court in the case of Vivek

Singh (supra) thus :

“9. We have given our utmost serious consideration to

the respective submissions which a case of this nature

deserves to be given. In cases of this nature, where a

child feels tormented because of the strained relations

between her parents and ideally needs the company

of both of them, it becomes, at times, a difficult choice

for the court to decide as to whom the custody should

be given. No doubt, paramount consideration is the

welfare of the child. However, at times the prevailing

circumstances are so puzzling that it becomes difficult

to weigh the conflicting parameters and decide on

which side the balance tilts.

10. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

lays down the principles on which custody disputes

are to be decided. Section 7 of this Act empowers the

Court to make order as to guardianship. Section 17

enumerates the matters which need to be considered

by the Court in appointing guardian and among

others, enshrines the principle of welfare of the minor

child. This is also stated very eloquently in Section 13

which reads as under :

“13. Welfare of minor to be paramount

consideration. (1) In the appointment or

declaration of any person as guardian of a

Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor

shall be the paramount consideration.

(2) No person shall be entitled to the

guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this

Act or of any law relating to guardianship in

marriage among Hindus, if the court is of opinion

that his or her guardianship will not be for the

welfare of the minor.”

11. This Court in the case of Gaurav Nagpal v.

Sumedha Nagpal stated in detail, the law relating to

custody in England and America and pointed out that

even in those jurisdictions, welfare of the minor child

is the first and paramount consideration and in order

to determine child custody, the jurisdiction exercised

by the Court rests on its own inherent equality powers

where the Court acts as 'Parens Patriae'. The Court

further observed that various statutes give legislative

recognition to the aforesaid established principles. The

Court explained the expression 'welfare', occurring in

Section 13 of the said Act in the following manner :

“51. The word “welfare” used in Section 13 of the

Act has to be construed literally and must be

taken in its widest sense. The moral and ethical

welfare of the child must also weigh with the

court as well as its physical well-being. Though

the provisions of the special statutes which

govern the rights of the parents or guardians may

be taken into consideration, there is nothing

which can stand in the way of the court

exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction arising in

such cases.

52. The trump card in the appellant's argument is

that the child is living since long with the father.

The argument is attractive. But the same

overlooks a very significant factor. By flouting

various orders, leading even to initiation of

contempt proceedings, the appellant has

managed to keep custody of the child. He cannot

be a beneficiary of his own wrongs. The High

Court has referred to these aspects in detail in

the impugned judgments.”

12. We understand that the aforesaid principle is

aimed at serving twin objectives. In the first instance,

it is to ensure that the child grows and develops in the

best environment. The best interest of the child has

been placed at the vanguard of family/custody

disputes according the optimal growth and

development of the child primacy over other

considerations. The child is often left to grapple with

the breakdown of an adult institution. While the

parents aim to ensure that the child is least affected

by the outcome, the inevitability of the uncertainty

that follows regarding the child’s growth lingers on till

the new routine sinks in. The effect of separation of

spouses, on children, psychologically, emotionally and

even to some extent physically, spans from negligible

to serious, which could be insignificant to noticeably

critical. It could also have effects that are more

immediate and transitory to long lasting thereby

having a significantly negative repercussion in the

advancement of the child. While these effects don’t

apply to every child of a separated or divorced couple,

nor has any child experienced all these effects, the

deleterious risks of maladjustment remains the

objective of the parents to evade and the court’s intent

to circumvent. This right of the child is also based on

individual dignity.

13. Second justification behind the 'welfare' principle

is the public interest that stand served with the

optimal growth of the children. It is well recognised

that children are the supreme asset of the nation.

Rightful place of the child in the sizeable fabric has

been recognised in many international covenants,

which are adopted in this country as well. Childcentric human rights jurisprudence that has been

evolved over a period of time is founded on the

principle that public good demands proper growth of

the child, who are the future of the nation. It has been

emphasised by this Court also, time and again,

following observations in Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs.

Union of India & Ors. :

“4. The child of today cannot develop to be a

responsible and productive member of tomorrow's

society unless an environment which is conducive

to his social and physical health is assured to

him. Every nation, developed or developing, links

its future with the status of the child. Childhood

holds the potential and also sets the limit to the

future development of the society. Children are

the greatest gift to humanity. Mankind has the

best hold of itself. The parents themselves live for

them. They embody the joy of life in them and in

the innocence relieving the fatigue and drudgery

in their struggle of daily life. Parents regain peace

and happiness in the company of the children.

The children signify eternal optimism in the

human being and always provide the potential for

human development. If the children are better

equipped with a broader human output, the

society will feel happy with them. Neglecting the

children means loss to the society as a whole. If

children are deprived of their childhood —

socially, economically, physically and mentally —

the nation gets deprived of the potential human

resources for social progress, economic

empowerment and peace and order, the social

stability and good citizenry. The Founding

Fathers of the Constitution, therefore, have

emphasised the importance of the role of the child

and the need of its best development.”

14. Same sentiments were earlier expressed in Rosy Jacob

vs. Jacob A. Chakramakkal in the following words:

“15. ...The children are not mere chattels : nor are

they mere play-things for their parents. Absolute

right of parents over the destinies and the lives of

their children has, in the modern changed social

conditions, yielded to the considerations of their

welfare as human beings so that they may grow

up in a normal balanced manner to be useful

members of the society...”

15. It hardly needs to be emphasised that a proper

education encompassing skill development, recreation

and cultural activities has a positive impact on the

child. The children are the most important human

resources whose development has a direct impact on

the development of the nation, for the child of today

with suitable health, sound education and

constructive environment is the productive key

member of the society. The present of the child links to

the future of the nation, and while the children are the

treasures of their parents, they are the assets who

will be responsible for governing the nation. The tools

of education, environment, skill and health shape the

child thereby moulding the nation with the child

equipped to play his part in the different spheres

aiding the public and contributing to economic

progression. The growth and advancement of the child

with the personal interest is accompanied by a

significant public interest, which arises because of the

crucial role they play in nation building.

x x x x

17. While coming to the conclusion that the

respondent as mother was more appropriate to have

the custody of the child and under the given

circumstances the respondent herein was fully

competent to take care of the child, the High Court

proceeded with the following discussion:

“31. The role of the mother in the development of

a child's personality can never be doubted. A

child gets the best protection through the mother.

It is a most natural thing for any child to grow up

in the company of one's mother. The company of

the mother is the most natural thing for a child.

Neither the father nor any other person can give

the same kind of lover, affection, care and

sympathies to a child as that of a mother. The

company of a mother is more valuable to a

growing up female child unless there are

compelling and justifiable reasons, a child should

not be deprived of the company of the mother.

The company of the mother is always in the

welfare of the minor child.

32. It may be noticed that the stand of the

appellant is that since August 04, 2010 she had

been pursuing for the custody of her child. She

had also visited the police station and

approached the CAW Cell. It is also admitted

position that within 22 days, i.e., on August 26,

2010 the petition for the grant of custody of child

was filed by her. Had she abandoned the child of

her own she would not have pursued

continuously thereafter for getting the custody of

the child. Even she had requested the learned

Principal Judge, Family Court for interim custody

of the child which was given to her in the form of

visitation rights thrice in a month and she and

her family had been meeting the child during that

period. After filing the appeal, the appellant has

been taking the interim custody of the child as is

stated above. In these circumstances, it cannot be

said that the appellant has not care for the child.

Further, respondent is any army Officer. During

the course of his service he will be also getting

non- family stations and it will be difficult for him

to keep the child. Further, even though as per him

his parents are looking after the child but when

the natural mother is there and has knocked the

door of the court without any delay and has all

love and affection for the child and is willing to do

her duty with all love and affection and since the

birth of the child she has been keeping the child.

In these circumstances, she should not be

deprived of her right especially considering the

tender age and child being a girl child. The

grandparents cannot be a substitute for natural

mother. There is no substitute for mother’s love in

this world. The grandparents are old. Old age has

its own problems. Considering the totality of facts

and circumstances, the welfare of the child lies

with the mother, i.e, appellant who is educated,

working and earning a good salary and after

school hours has ample time to spend with the

child. In these circumstances, impugned order is

set aside and the request of the appellant for the

grant of custody of the said child to her being

natural mother is allowed and the appellant is

also appointed as guardian of her child being a

natural guardian/mother.”

18. The aforesaid observations, contained in para 31

of the order of the High Court extracted above, apply

with greater force today, when Saesha is 8 years' old

child. She is at a crucial phase when there is a major

shift in thinking ability which may help her to

understand cause and effect better and think about

the future. She would need regular and frequent

contact with each parent as well as shielding from

parental hostility. Involvement of both parents in her

life and regular school attendance are absolutely

essential at this age for her personality development.

She would soon be able to establish her individual

interests and preferences, shaped by her own

individual personality as well as experience. Towards

this end, it also becomes necessary for parents to

exhibit model good behaviour and set healthy and

positive examples as much and as often as possible. It

is the age when her emotional development may be

evolving at a deeper level than ever before. In order to

ensure that she achieves stability and maturity in her

thinking and is able to deal with complex emotions, it

is necessary that she is in the company of her mother

as well, for some time. This Court cannot turn a blind

eye to the fact that there have been strong feelings of

bitterness, betrayal, anger and distress between the

appellant and the respondent, where each party feels

that they are ‘right’ in many of their views on issues

which led to separation. The intensity of negative

feeling of the appellant towards the respondent would

have obvious effect on the psyche of Saesha, who has

remained in the company of her father, to the

exclusion of her mother. The possibility of appellant's

effort to get the child to give up her own positive

perceptions of the other parent, i.e., the mother and

change her to agree with the appellant’s view point

cannot be ruled out thereby diminishing the affection

of Saesha towards her mother. Obviously, the

appellant, during all this period, would not have said

anything about the positive traits of the respondent.

Even the matrimonial discord between the two parties

would have been understood by Saesha, as perceived

by the appellant. Psychologist term it as ‘The Parental

Alienation Syndrome’. It has at least two

psychological destructive effects:

(i) First, it puts the child squarely in the

middle of a contest of loyalty, a contest which

cannot possibly be won. The child is asked to

choose who is the preferred parent. No matter

whatever is the choice, the child is very likely to

end up feeling painfully guilty and confused. This

is because in the overwhelming majority of cases,

what the child wants and needs is to continue a

relationship with each parent, as independent as

possible from their own conflicts.

(ii) Second, the child is required to make a shift

in assessing reality. One parent is presented as

being totally to blame for all problems, and as

someone who is devoid of any positive

characteristics. Both of these assertions

represent one parent's distortions of reality.

19. The aforesaid discussion leads us to feel that

continuous company of the mother with Saesha, for

some time, is absolutely essential. It may also be

underlying that the notion that a child’s primary need

is for the care and love of its mother, where she has

been its primary care giving parent, is supported by a

vast body of psychological literature. Empirical

studies show that mother infant “bonding” begins at

the child’s birth and that infants as young as two

months old frequently show signs of distress when

the mother is replaced by a substitute caregiver. An

infant typically responds preferentially to the sound of

its mother’s voice by four weeks, actively demands

her presence and protests her absence by eight

months, and within the first year has formed a

profound and enduring attachment to her.

Psychological theory hypothesizes that the mother is

the center of an infant’s small world, his psychological

homebase, and that she “must continue to be so for

some years to come.” Developmental psychologists

believe that the quality and strength of this original

bond largely determines the child's later capacity to

fulfill her individual potential and to form attachments

to other individuals and to the human community.”

Thus, what has been explained by this Court as aforesaid

is the doctrine of Parental Alienation Syndrome, i.e. the efforts

made by one parent to get the child to give up his/her own

positive perceptions of the other parent and get him/her to agree

with their own viewpoint. It has two psychological destructive

effects :

(1) It puts the child in the middle of a loyalty

contest, which cannot possibly won by any parent;

(2) It makes the child to assess the reality, thereby

requiring to blame either parent who is supposedly

deprived of positive traits.

The intent of the court should be to circumvent such ill

effects.

109. The minor daughter has a remarkable high IQ. She has

been identified to be a gifted child. In such circumstances, both

the minor children were admitted in a special school meant for

children with such remarkably high IQ in the USA. Such schools

in the USA are specialized in providing education to the gifted

children which, ultimately, helps in the overall development of

such children. The special education ultimately enhances the

potential of such children. Both the children in the present case

have better prospects of getting refined education that may

ultimately enhance their potential they already possess and are

already accustomed to and comfortable with.

110. Both the minor children, in the case on hand, have already

been enrolled in the school in the USA. Therefore, if the minor

children are repatriated to the USA, they will not be subjected

entirely to any foreign system of education. It is the fundamental

right of the petitioner-mother to have the company of her

children and not to be deprived of the same without a reasonable

cause.

FACTS SUPPORTING THE STAY OF THE PETITIONER IN THE

USA :

111. The petitioner is a resident of the USA and has acquired

H1B visa via sponsorship and has a good job at Ranstad, USA.

The petitioner is earning handsome salary and has the resources

to provide for a comfortable life to her children in the USA. The

petitioner is comfortably settled in the USA and is accustomed to

different kind of lifestyle, culture, society, etc.

112. We take notice of the fact that the petitioner worked very

hard to secure admission in the Cleveland State University and

completed her studies with the GPA of more than 3, while taking

care of her children. This is indicative of the fact that she is a

hard working woman and would be in a position to take good

care of her minor children in accordance with the shared

parenting plan.

113. It would be too much for this Court to tell the petitioner

that she may periodically visit India to meet her children but the

children should not be asked to go back to the USA with their

father, i.e. the respondent no.2.

114. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached to the

conclusion that the respondent no.2, at the earliest, should be

directed to go back to the USA with both the minor children and

abide by the shared parenting plan as ordered by the Court at

Ohio. Although, the shared parenting plan as ordered by the

Court at Ohio stood terminated at the instance of the petitionermother, yet the same can be revived once again by the

authorities by going before the concerned court at Ohio. It is for

the parties to take the necessary steps in this regard. The

respondent no.2 shall immediately apply for the visa on the

strength of this order. If the respondent no.2 is in a position to

obtain a job in the USA on the strength of a work permit or any

other document, then it is well and good. However, we are sure

of one thing that it will be in the interest and welfare of both the

children to go back to the USA for the purpose of their

education, etc. The allegations levelled by the respondent no.2

that the petitioner suffers from some mental illness appears to

be absolutely wild and reckless. Even otherwise this issue is a

highly disputed question of fact.

115. We would therefore hold that in the case at bar the

dominant consideration to which all other considerations must

remain subordinate must be the welfare of the child. This is not

to say that the question of custody will be determined by

weighing the economic circumstances of the contending parties.

The matter will not be determined solely on the basis of the

physical comfort and material advantages that may be available

in the home of one contender or the other. The welfare of the

child must be decided on a consideration of these and all other

relevant factors, including the general psychological, spiritual

and emotional welfare of the child. It must be the aim of the

Court, when resolving disputes between the rival claimants for

the custody of a child, to choose the course which will best

provide for the healthy growth, development and education of the

child so that he or she will be equipped to face the problems of

life as a mature adult.

FINAL CONCLUSION :

116. We allow this writ petition with the following directions :

(1) The respondent no.2-father shall, within one

week from today, apply to the authority concerned for

visa to travel to the USA with the two minor children.

(2) The concerned authority may keep the

observations made by this Court in the present

judgment in mind and, in the larger interest of the

two minor children, consider grant of visa to the

respondent no.2-father. Once the visa is granted, the

respondent no.2 shall, within one week thereafter,

proceed to travel to the USA.

(3) Once the two minor children reach the USA,

thereafter, it will be open for the petitioner-mother to

take care of her children.

(4) We leave it open to the respondent no.2-father

to chalk out his own plan.

(5) If the respondent no.2 wants to stay back in the

USA, it is always open for him to do so in accordance

with the law of the country. If the respondent no.2

decides to come back to India, then in such

circumstances, the petitioner-mother shall make both

the minor children speak to their father on-line at

least once every week.

(6) In any event, if the visa is declined to the

respondent no.2, then in such circumstances, the

petitioner-mother shall travel to India and pick up her

two minor children and go back to the USA. In such

an eventuality, the respondent no.2 and his family

members are directed to fully cooperate and not

create any impediment of any nature. If it comes to

the notice of this Court that the respondent no.2 or

any of his family members have created any

impediment for the petitioner-mother, then the same

shall be viewed as the contempt of this Court’s order.

In addition, it will be open to the petitioner-mother to

contact the jurisdictional Commissioner/

Superintendent of Police, who shall thereafter ensure

that the custody of the children is immediately/

forthwith handed over to the petitioner-mother and

submit compliance report in that regard to this Court.

In case of any impediment despite the peremptory

direction, the petitioner-mother may apply for

appropriate directions from this Court, if so advised.

(7) We leave it open for the parties to go back to the

Court at Ohio and revive the shared parenting plan as

was arrived at vide order dated 12th May 2021.

117. Before we close this matter, we would like to convey to the

parties that their two minor children are watching them very

closely. Showing the children that their parents can respect each

other and resolve the conflict respectfully will give them a good

foundation for the conflict that may, God forbid, arise in their

own lives. The parties should try to do their best to remain

relaxed and focused. It is critical to maintain boundaries

between the adult problems and children. It is of utmost interest

to protect the innocence of children and allow them to remain

children. They must not be burdened by any adult problem.

Minor children do not have the coping skills or the intellectual

ability to understand any issues like the financial constraints,

adult relationship issues or their parents unhappiness.

118. We find the observations made by the Delhi High Court, in

the case of K.G. v. State of Delhi and another, dated

16.11.2017 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 374/2017 and

Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2007/2017, quite

commendable, that the best welfare of the child, normally, would

lie in living with both his/her parents in a happy, loving and

caring environment, where the parents contribute to the

upbringing of the child in all spheres of life, and the child

receives emotional, social, physical and material support – to

name a few. In a disturbed marriage, unfortunately, there is

bound to be impairment of some of the inputs which are, ideally,

essential for the best interest of the child.

119. There will be no order as to costs.

120. The Registry shall notify this matter once again after a

period of four weeks to report compliance of our directions.

………………………………………..J.

(A.M. KHANWILKAR)

………………………………………..J.

(J.B. PARDIWALA)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 14, 2022

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Indian Constitution

RAJESWARI CHANDRASEKAR GANESH VERSUS THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

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