INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS’ FEDERATION OF INDIA (REGD.) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER Case Judgment

INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS’ FEDERATION OF INDIA (REGD.) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 1 of 35

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8162 OF 2012

INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS’ FEDERATION

OF INDIA (REGD.) ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER ... RESPONDENTS

W I T H

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CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6316-6329 OF 2017

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7458 OF 2018

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7459 OF 2018

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7460 OF 2018

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7461 OF 2018

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7462 OF 2018

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 2 of 35

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 12535 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 15069 OF 2015)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 19930 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 3293 OF 2019)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2235 OF 2020)

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 44 OF 2016

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1158 OF 2019

A N D

TRANSFER CASE (CIVIL) NO. 104 OF 2015

J U D G M E N T

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

2. The civil appeals by way of special leave, which impugn the

judgements of the High Court of Allahabad- Lucknow Bench1

, the

1 City Montessori School and Another v. Union of India and Others., Miscellaneous Bench No.

3075/2015; and City Montessari School v. Appellate Authority, Misc. Single No. 4583/2017.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 3 of 35

High Court of Gujarat2

, the High Court of Delhi3

, the High Court of

Bombay- Aurangabad Bench4

, the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana5

, the High Court of Chhattisgarh- Bilaspur Bench6 and the

High Court of Madhya Pradesh,-Indore Bench7

, as well as a batch

of writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, were

heard together as they involve a common question – constitutional

validity of the amendment to Section 2(e) and insertion of Section

13A to the Payment of Gratuity Act, 19728

, with retrospective effect

from 3rd April 1997 vide the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act,

20099

.

3. The PAG Act enacted and enforced with effect from 16th September

1972, requires payment of gratuity to an employee after he has

rendered continuous service for not less than 5 years, on his

2 Saraswati Vidya Mandal v. Ashaben Vinubhai Majmudar and Another, S.C.A. No. 17839/ 2011 and

11 other cases; Jain Citizens Education Society, Surendranagar and Another v. Union of India and

Others, S.C.A. No. 9022/2011 and 1 other Case; and Nalanda Kelavani Mandal v. Shri Amrutbhai

Nathudas Patel and Another, S.C.A. No. 18772/2015, and 5 other cases.

3

Independent Schools’ Federation of India (Regd.) v. Union of India & Anr., W.P. (C) No. 6168/2010;

and Maharishi Shiksha Sansthan Registered Society v. Union of India and Another., W.P(C)

4696/2012.

4 Saint Xaviers High School v. Shailaja Vishnu Deshpande., Writ Petition No. 15344/2017; and Saint

Xaviers High School v. Jayashree Shamal Ghosh, Writ Petition No. 15282/2019.

5 The Sonipat Hindu Educational & Charitable Society v. Union of India and Another, C.W.P. No.

17643/2010 (O&M); Maharishi Dayanand Education Society and others v. Union of India and Others,

C.W.P. 16884/2012; and Independent Schools Association, Chandigarh v. Union of India and Others,

C.W.P. No. 23489/2011.

6 The Secretary, Board of Secondary Education and Others v. Union of India and Others, W.P.L. No.

138/2012 and 1 other case.

7 Bal Niketan Sangh through Smt. Meena Phadke v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others., Writ Petition

No. 5508/ 2014.

8 For short, “PAG Act”.

9 For short, “Amendment Act, 2009”.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 4 of 35

superannuation, retirement or resignation or on his death or

disablement due to accident or disease.10 However, sub-section (3)

to Section 1 of the PAG Act restricts its applicability to the following

establishments :

“1. Short title, extent, application and

commencement. –

xx xx xx

(3) It shall apply to –

(a) every factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port and

railway company;

(b) every shop or establishment within the meaning of

any law for the time being in force in relation to shops

and establishments in a State, in which ten or more

persons are employed, or were employed, on any day

of the preceding twelve months;

(c) such other establishments or class of

establishments, in which ten or more employees are

employed, or were employed, on any day of the

preceding twelve months, as the Central Government

may, by notification, specify in this behalf.”

In the present case, we are only concerned with clause (c)

and not clauses (a) and (b) to sub-section (3) to Section 1 of the

PAG Act. As per clause (c), the PAG Act applies to an

establishment or a class of establishments in which ten or more

employees are employed, as the Central Government may, by

notification, specify on this behalf.11

10 Section 4 of the PAG Act.

11 Sub-section 3A to Section 1, inserted by the Payment of Gratuity (Second Amendment) Act, 1984

with effect from 18th May 1984, states that a shop or establishment to which the PAG Act applies, shall

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 5 of 35

4. In exercise of powers conferred by clause (c) to Section 1(3) of PAG

Act vide notification No. S.O. 239, the provisions of the PAG Act

were made applicable to the “local bodies” in which ten or more

persons are employed, as a class of establishments, with effect

from 8th January 1982. As a result, the schools under the local

bodies with ten or more employees became liable to pay gratuity to

their employees. However, the notification did not apply to private

schools.

5. By Notification No. S-42013/1/95-SS.(II) issued by the Ministry of

Labour and Employment, Government of India on 3rd April, 1997,

the provisions of the PAG Act have been made applicable to the

educational institutions with ten or more employees. The private

schools being educational institutions, in which ten or more persons

are employed, became liable to pay gratuity to their employees as

per the provisions of the PAG Act.

6. However, some private schools raised a dispute claiming that the

teachers in educational institutions or schools are not “employee”

as defined in Section 2(e) of the PAG Act. The expression

continue to be governed by the enactment, notwithstanding the number of persons employed therein,

at any time after the PAG Act has become applicable, falls below ten.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 6 of 35

“employee” in clause (e) to Section 2, post the Payment of Gratuity

(Amendment) Act, 1994, which came into effect from 24th May

1994, at that time, read thus:

“2. Definitions. –

xx xx xx

(e) employee means any person (other than

apprentice) employed on wages, in any establishment,

factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company

or shop, to do any skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled,

manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether

the terms of such employment are express or implied,

and whether or nor such person is employed in a

managerial or administrative capacity, but does not

include any such person who holds a post under the

Central Government or a State Government and is

governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for

payment of gratuity.”

The contention that the teachers did not fulfil the description

of the employees, who are skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled persons

employed on wages, was accepted by the Full Bench of the High

Court of Gujarat vide judgment dated 4th May 200112. Thus, the

teachers were denied the benefit of gratuity, but other employees

of the private schools, were entitled to the benefit of gratuity.

7. This decision of the High Court of Gujarat was impugned by an

association of teachers – Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’

Association, before this Court, but their challenge was rejected vide

12 Shantiben L. Christian v. Administrative Officer, Ahmedabad Municipal School Board, Special Civil

Application No. 5272 of 1987.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 7 of 35

judgment dated 13th January 200413. Applying the doctrine of pari

materia, this Court held that the expression “employee”, as defined

vide clause (e) to Section 2, is restrictive and not expansive. Relying

on decisions in A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman

and Diu and Others14 and Haryana Unrecognised Schools’

Association v. State of Haryana15, while interpreting the definition

of an “employee” under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and the

Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, as also the definition of “workmen”

under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, this Court pointed to the

difference in the definition of word “employee” in the Employees’

Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.

Accordingly, teachers who impart education to students were held

not to be an “employee” under Section 2(e) of the PAG Act as they

do not perform any kind of skilled, unskilled, semi-skilled, manual,

supervisory, managerial, administrative, technical or clerical work.

Reasoning in Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’

Association (supra) is crystalized in paragraph 25 of the judgment,

which reads:

“25. The legislature was alive to various kinds of

definitions of the word “employee” contained in various

previous labour enactments when the Act was passed

in 1972. If it intended to cover in the definition of

13 Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association v. Administrative Officer and Others, (2004) 1

SCC 755.

14 (1988) 4 SCC 42.

15 (1996) 4 SCC 225.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 8 of 35

“employee” all kinds of employees, it could have as well

used such wide language as is contained in Section 2(f)

of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 which

defines “employee” to mean “any person who is

employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or

otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an

establishment …”. Non-use of such wide language in

the definition of “employee” in Section 2(e) of the Act of

1972 reinforces our conclusion that teachers are clearly

not covered in the definition.”

Nevertheless, being conscious that the teachers would be

thereby deprived of the benefit of gratuity, the Court had observed

and clarified:

“26. Our conclusion should not be misunderstood that

teachers although engaged in a very noble profession

of educating our young generation should not be given

any gratuity benefit. There are already in several States

separate statutes, rules and regulations granting

gratuity benefits to teachers in educational institutions

which are more or less beneficial than the gratuity

benefits provided under the Act. It is for the legislature

to take cognizance of situation of such teachers in

various establishments where gratuity benefits are not

available and think of a separate legislation for them in

this regard. That is the subject-matter solely of the

legislature to consider and decide.”

8. On 26th November 2007, the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill,

2007, was introduced in the Parliament seeking to amend the

definition of the word “employee” and thereby rectify the error or

lacuna identified by this Court in Ahmedabad Private Primary

Teachers’ Association (supra). The object and reasons, as stated

and obvious, were to extend the benefit of gratuity to teachers of

private educational institutions. The bill was referred to the

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 9 of 35

Standing Committee on 10th December 2007. After due

deliberations and in-depth consideration, the Standing Committee

deemed it appropriate to suggest changes vide the 26th Standing

Committee Report. The report, on the aspect of grant of gratuity to

teachers with effect from 3rd April, 1997 states:

“36…The Committee feel that implementing the law

from the year 2004 will cause irreparable loss to a large

number of teachers of the country, particularly to those

who have already retired. The Committee, therefore,

call upon the Government to make the law applicable

with retrospective effect, i.e. from the date of notification

in the year 1997. This will provide the needed succour

as well as justice to all those affected persons who were

denied their rightful benefits due to some technical

flaw/legal lacuna in the definition of the term ‘employee’

as contained in Section 2 (e) of the Payment of Gratuity

Act, 1972.”

9. Accepting the said recommendation of the 26th Standing Committee

Report, the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Bill, 2009 was

introduced in the Parliament on 24th February 2009 and was passed

on 31st December 2009. Clause (e) to Section 2 of the PAG Act was

amended with retrospective effect from 3rd April, 1997, and reads:

“2. Definitions. –

xx xx xx

(e) "employee" means any person (other than an

apprentice) who is employed for wages, whether the

terms of such employment are express or implied, in

any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in

connection with the work of a factory, mine, oilfield,

plantation, port, railway company, shop or other

establishment to which this Act applies, but does not

include any such person who holds a post under the

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 10 of 35

Central Government or a State Government and is

governed by any other Act or by any rules providing for

payment of gratuity;”

Further, Section 13A was inserted also with effect from 3rd

April 1997 and reads :

“13A. Validation of payment of gratuity.–

Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgement,

decree or order of any court, for the period commencing

on and from the 3rd day of April, 1997 and ending on

the day on which the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment)

Act, 2009, receives the assent of the President, the

gratuity shall be payable to an employee in pursuance

of the notification of the Government of India in the

Ministry of Labour and Employment vide number S.O.

1080, dated the 3rd day of April, 1997 and the said

notification shall be valid and shall be deemed always

to have been valid as if the Payment of Gratuity

(Amendment) Act, 2009 had been in force at all material

times and the gratuity shall be payable accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall

extend, or be construed to extend, to affect any person

with any punishment or penalty whatsoever by reason

of the non-payment by him of the gratuity during the

period specified in this section which shall become due

in pursuance of the said notification.”

10. The object and reasons for the Amendment Act, 2009 refers to the

judgment in Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association

(supra), and states that the legislature, to cover the definition of

“employee” to all kinds of employees, has used language similar to

the wide language of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Employees’

Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. It is also

crystal clear that the Parliament has passed and enacted the

Amendment Act, 2009 to confer, with retrospective effect from the

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 11 of 35

date of the notification on 3rd April 1997, benefit of gratuity to the

teachers who have rendered continuous service for not less than 5

years, on their superannuation, retirement or resignation, or on their

death or disablement due to accident or disease.

11. Several private schools challenged the constitutional validity of the

amendments, which writ petitions have been dismissed by seven

High Courts, as mentioned in the first paragraph of this judgment.

These appeals by way of special leave impugn these judgments.

Some private schools have also filed writ petitions under Article 32

of the Constitution of India before us.

12. The power of the Parliament and State Legislatures under Articles

245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution of India, as held by this Court

in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arooran Sugar Ltd.16 and several other

decisions of this Court, including State of Gujarat and Another v.

Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Others17

, T.R. Kapur and

Others v. State of Haryana and Others18 and Union of India and

Others v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty and Others19

, to legislate,

embraces the power to amend, delete or obliterate the statute or

enact a statute prospectively or retrospectively. To be fair, the

16 (1997) 1 SCC 326.

17 (1983) 2 SCC 33.

18 (1986) Supp SCC 584.

19 (1994) 5 SCC 450.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 12 of 35

appellants and the writ petitioners do not contest the competency,

and that the legislature has the power to amend an already enacted

law or enact a new law with retrospective effect. They also do not

dispute that the amendment to Section 2(e), and the insertion of

Section 13A have been given retrospective effect. The two main

grounds of challenge raised and required to be considered in

nutshell can be summarised as:

(a) The legislation vide the Amendment Act 2009

overrules the judicial decision in Ahmedabad

Private Primary Teachers’ Association (supra)

and violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

(b) The retrospective amendments are

unreasonable, excessive and harsh, and therefore,

unconstitutional.

13. The first ground should not hold us for long, as the legislation in

question rectifies the infirmities and defects pointed out by the

Court, and the amended clause (e) to Section 2, defining the word

“employee” and the newly inserted Section 13A with retrospective

effect from 3rd April 1997, effectuate and catalyse the object and

purpose of the Notification No. S-42013/1/95-SS.(II). This power to

legislate with retrospective effect, which vests in every sovereign

legislature, is not taken away by a court decision. However, a court

decision cannot be overruled by the legislature. The legislature can

amend the language of the provision that was the subject matter of

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 13 of 35

the court decision, and such an amendment does not overrule the

court decision. Overruling assumes a decision based on the same

law. Where the law, as in the present case, has been amended,

and the defects have been removed or cured, the law changes, and

therefore, the earlier interpretation is no longer applicable and

becomes irrelevant. Doctrine of separation of powers demarcates

the exclusive domains of the legislature, which enacts the laws, and

the courts’, which interpret the law as enacted. The earlier decision

in Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association (supra)

by this Court had interpreted the law, that is, Section 2(e) of the

PAG Act, as it then existed in the statute. The judgment even

acknowledged and prompted the legislature to enact a legislation

granting the benefit of gratuity to teachers, who had been excluded

because of the legal flaw. When the legislature acts within its power

to usher in a valid law and rectify a legal error, even after a court

ruling, the legislature exercises its constitutional power to enact the

law and does not overrule an earlier court decision. This principle

is too well settled to require elaborate quotations, albeit reference

can be made amongst other cases to Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills

Ltd. and Another v. Broach Borough Municipality and Others20

,

20 (1969) 2 SCC 283

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 14 of 35

Ujagar Prints and Others (II) v. Union of India and Others21 and

National Agricultural Cooperative Marking Federation of India

Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others22

.

14. The second ground is again devoid of any merit and substance.

The legislature, vide the Amendment Act, 2009, has given

retrospective effect to the amended provision of Section 2(e) and

the newly inserted Section 13A with effect from 3rd April 1997, which

is also the date of the notification issued by the Government under

Section 1(3)(c), making the PAG Act applicable to the educational

institutions with ten or more employees. The amendment enforces

and gives effect to what was intended by the notification, but could

not be achieved on account of the technical and legal defect. The

lacuna, a distortion in the language that had the unwitting effect of

leaving out teachers, has been rectified so as to achieve the object

and purpose behind the issuance of the notification, making the

PAG Act applicable to all educational institutions. The argument of

the educational institutions that they have been taken by surprise is

incorrect and unacceptable as the legislation had cured the

inadvertent defect in a statute, as pointed out by this Court, through

legislative repair. Private schools, when they claim a vested right

21 (1989) 3 SCC 488.

22 (2003) 5 SCC 23.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 15 of 35

arising from the reason of defect, should not succeed, for

acceptance would be at the expense of teachers who were denied

and deprived of the intended benefit. Marginal inconvenience in the

form of financial outgo or difficulty is of little weight, when curing of

an inadvertent defect is made retrospectively in greater public

interest, which consideration will overrule the interest of one or

some institutions.

23 We find little merit in this argument also for the

reason, that the observations of this Court in Ahmedabad Private

Primary Teachers’ Association (supra) in paragraph 26 were

sufficient to indicate that a legislation should intervene to grant the

benefit of gratuity to teachers. The contention that the private

schools were sure to succeed as to deny the teachers the benefit

of the Notification No. S-42013/1/95-SS.(II) dated 3rd April 1997, is

questionable and farfetched to be accepted. The challenge was

contested and had remained pending before the High Courts and

then this Court. The private schools had relied on some judgments

of this Court, but these judgments have interpreted the word

“employee” under other enactments. The law is subject to

uncertainty ex-ante when two or more views are possible, but there

may be certainty ex-post litigation in view of the law of precedents,

which reduces uncertainty.

23 See paragraph 69 in Ujagar Prints and Others (II) v. Union of India and Others, (1989) 3 SCC 488.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 16 of 35

15. A secondary argument on behalf of the private educational

institutions that they would be liable to pay gratuity for a period of

service prior to 3rd April 1997, and, therefore, the amendments are

unconscionable and tyrannous, is equally fallacious for several

reasons. A somewhat similar controversy had arisen in the case of

Management of Goodyear India Limited. v. Shri K.G.

Devessar24, wherein the employee was in service from 24th

January 1961 to 31st December 1974. On 16th September 1972, the

date when the PAG Act came into effect, he was drawing a salary

of more than Rs. 1,000/- per month and hence, in terms of the then

definition of the word “employee” under the PAG Act, which

excluded those drawing salary of more than Rs. 1,000/- per month,

as per the employer- management, the employee was not entitled

to gratuity. Rejecting the contention, this Court held that the gratuity

is payable to an employee as per the mandate of Section 425 of the

24 (1985) 4 SCC 45.

25 4. Payment of gratuity.––(1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his

employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,––

(a) on his superannuation, or

(b) on his retirement or resignation, or

(c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease:

Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where

the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement:

Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to him shall be

paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees

or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall

invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be

prescribed, until such minor attains majority.

Explanation.–– For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as

incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or

disease resulting in such disablement.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 17 of 35

PAG Act, after he has rendered continuous service for not less than

5 years on his superannuation, retirement or resignation or on his

death or disablement due to accident or disease, when such event

has occurred post the enforcement of the PAG Act. The Court

rejected the submission on behalf of the employer-management

that an employee is entitled to gratuity only when, both on the date

when the PAG Act came into force, and on the date when the

employee retired, he/she was drawing wages not exceeding

(2) For every completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months, the employer

shall pay gratuity to an employee at the rate of fifteen days’ wages based on the rate of wages last

drawn by the employee concerned:

Provided that in the case of a piece-rated employee, daily wages shall be computed on the

average of the total wages received by him for a period of three months immediately preceding the

termination of his employment, and, for this purpose, the wages paid for any overtime work shall not

be taken into account:

Provided further that in the case of an employee who is employed in a seasonal establishment

and who is not so employed throughout the year, the employer shall pay the gratuity at the rate of

seven days’ wages for each season.

Explanation.–– In the case of a monthly rated employee, the fifteen days’ wages shall be

calculated by dividing the monthly rate of wages last drawn by him by twenty-six and multiplying the

quotient by fifteen.

(3) The amount of gratuity payable to an employee shall not exceed such amount as may be

notified by the Central Government from time to time.

(4) For the purpose of computing the gratuity payable to an employee who is employed, after

his disablement, on reduced wages, his wages for the period preceding his disablement shall be taken

to be the wages received by him during that period, and his wages for the period subsequent to his

disablement shall be taken to be the wages as so reduced.

(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of an employee to receive better terms of gratuity

under any award or agreement or contract with the employer.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),––

(a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act,

wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of,

property belonging to the employer shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or

loss so caused;

(b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited

(i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or

disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or

(ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which

constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is

committed by him in the course of his employment.

(7). *********

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 18 of 35

Rs.1,000/- per month. The Court observed that to approve the

submission of the employer-management would render a whole

class of workers, who were during the course of their employment

drawing salary less than Rs. 1,000/- per month but on the eve of

their retirement were getting wages of Rs. 1,000/- per month,

without the benefit of gratuity. This could not have been the

intention of the Parliament. The reasonable way to construe Section

4 in the light of Section 2(e) of the PAG Act would be to hold that

when the employees’ services are terminated for any reason

mentioned in Section 4 after coming into force of the PAG Act, the

employee would be entitled to the payment of gratuity if he has

rendered continuous service for not less than 5 years and for that

period during which he satisfied the definition of “employee” under

Section 2(e). It does not matter whether that period comes before

the commencement of the PAG Act. Once that condition is satisfied,

the next and only question would be regarding the amount of

gratuity payable.

16. The argument of unreasonableness and that the amendment is

financially confiscatory, predicated on past liability, which may predate the notification effective from 3rd April 1997, apart from the

other reasons, is to be rejected as there are upper-cap limits on

payment of gratuity. Therefore, though gratuity is computed with

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 19 of 35

reference to the years of service, in view of the upper-cap limit, the

payment towards gratuity cannot exceed the specified amount,

even if the employee would be entitled to higher amount in view of

the years of the service rendered to the employer.

17. In the context of applicability of an enactment, the courts have

drawn difference between retroactive effect and retrospective

operation. Shanti Conductors Private Limited and Another v.

Assam State Electricity Board and Others26 refers to earlier case

law and elucidates:

“64. The opinion of Gowda, J. dated 31-8-2016

although holds that the Act is not retrospective but he

holds the Act retroactive. The word “retroactive” has

been defined in Black's Law Dictionary in the following

words:

“Retroactive, adj.(17c) (Of a statute, ruling, etc.)

extending in scope or effect to matters that have

occurred in the past. —Also termed retrospective.

Cf. Prospective (1).–retroact, vb.”

65. The two-Judge Bench of this Court in State Bank's

Staff Union (Madras Circle) v. Union of India, had

occasion to examine the concept of retroactive and

retrospective. In paras 20 and 21 of the judgment the

following has been laid down: (SCC p. 593)

“20. Judicial Dictionary (13th Edn.) by K.J. Aiyar,

Butterworth, p. 857, states that the word

“retrospective” when used with reference to an

enactment may mean (i) affecting an existing

contract; or (ii) reopening up of past, closed and

completed transaction; or (iii) affecting accrued

rights and remedies; or (iv) affecting procedure.

Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 37-A,

26 (2019) 19 SCC 529.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 20 of 35

pp. 224-25, defines a “retrospective or retroactive

law” as one which takes away or impairs vested

or accrued rights acquired under existing laws. A

retroactive law takes away or impairs vested

rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a

new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a

new disability, in respect to transactions or

considerations already past.

21. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha

Aiyar (3rd Edn., 2005) the expressions

“retroactive” and “retrospective” have been

defined as follows at p. 4124, Vol. 4:

‘Retroactive.—Acting backward; affecting what is

past.

(Of a statute, ruling, etc.) extending in scope or

effect to matters that have occurred in the past. —

Also termed retrospective. (Black's Law

Dictionary, 7th Edn., 1999)

“Retroactivity” is a term often used by lawyers but

rarely defined. On analysis it soon becomes

apparent, moreover, that it is used to cover at

least two distinct concepts. The first, which may

be called “true retroactivity”, consists in the

application of a new rule of law to an act or

transaction which was completed before the rule

was promulgated. The second concept, which will

be referred to as “quasi-retroactivity”, occurs

when a new rule of law is applied to an act or

transaction in the process of completion … The

foundation of these concepts is the distinction

between completed and pending transactions …

[T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European

Community Law, p. 129 (1981)].

xx xx xx

Retrospective.—Looking back; contemplating

what is past.

Having operation from a past time.

“Retrospective” is somewhat ambiguous and that

good deal of confusion has been caused by the

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 21 of 35

fact that it is used in more senses than one. In

general, however, the courts regard as

retrospective any statute which operates on cases

or facts coming into existence before its

commencement in the sense that it affects, even

if for the future only, the character or

consequences of transactions previously entered

into or of other past conduct. Thus, a statute is not

retrospective merely because it affects existing

rights; nor is it retrospective merely because a

part of the requisite for its action is drawn from a

time antecedent to its passing.’ (Vol. 44,

Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., p. 570,

para 921.)”

66. Further in Jay Mahakali Rolling Mills v. Union of

India, explaining retroactive and retrospective the

following has been laid down: (SCC p. 200, para 8)

“8. “Retrospective” means looking backward,

contemplating what is past, having reference to a

statute or things existing before the statute in

question. Retrospective law means a law which

looks backward or contemplates the past; one,

which is made to affect acts or facts occurring, or

rights occurring, before it comes into force.

Retroactive statute means a statute, which

creates a new obligation on transactions or

considerations or destroys or impairs vested

rights.”

67. Retroactivity in the context of the statute consists of

application of new rule of law to an act or transaction

which has been completed before the rule was

promulgated.”

18. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Others27 observes that

retrospective statute operates backwards and takes away vested

rights accrued under law. The retroactive statute does not operate

retrospectively, but it operates in future, albeit it does not become

27 (2020) 9 SCC 1.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 22 of 35

retrospective in operation when the operation is based on the

character and status that arose earlier. Character or event which

has happened in past or requisites which have been drawn from

antecedent events cannot be necessarily construed as having

retrospective effect. A retrospective statute means a statute which

creates a new obligation on transactions or considerations already

past or destroyed or impaired vested rights on and from the

retrospective date.28 The judgment in Vineeta Sharma (supra)

relies on and quotes from an earlier decision in Darshan Singh v.

Ram Pal Singh and Another,

29

 which portion we would also like

to quote:

“35. Mr Sachar relies on Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari,

Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry , Jose Da

Costa v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim , Govind

Das v. CIT , Henshall v. Porter , United Provinces v.

Atiqa Begum, in support of his submission that the

Amendment Act was not made retrospective by the

legislature either expressly or by necessary implication

as the Act itself expressly provided that it shall be

deemed to have come into force on 23-1-1973; and

therefore there would be no justification to giving it

retrospective operation. The vested right to contest

which was created on the alienation having taken place

and which had been litigated in the court, argues Mr

Sachar, could not be taken away. In other words, the

vested right to contest in appeal was not affected by the

Amendment Act. However, to appreciate this argument

we have to analyse and distinguish between the two

rights involved, namely, the right to contest and the right

28 In the present case, the constitutional mandate of Article 20(1) is not required to be examined and

considered.

29 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 191.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 23 of 35

to appeal against the lower court's decision. Of these

two rights, while the right to contest is a customary right,

the right to appeal is always a creature of statute. The

change of the forum for appeal by enactment may not

affect the right of appeal itself. In the instant case we are

concerned with the right to contest and not with the right

to appeal as such. There is also no dispute as to the

propositions of law regarding vested rights being not

taken away by an enactment which is ex facie or by

implication not retrospective. But merely because an Act

envisages a past act or event in the sweep of its

operation, it may not necessarily be said to be

retrospective. Retrospective, according to Black's Law

Dictionary, means looking backward; contemplating

what is past; having reference to a statute or things

existing before the Act in question. Retrospective law,

according to the same dictionary, means a law which

looks backwards or contemplates the past; one which is

made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights

occurring, before it came into force. Every statute which

takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under

existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a

new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to

transactions or considerations already past. Retroactive

statute means a statute which creates a new obligation

on transactions or considerations already past or

destroys or impairs vested rights.

36. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 44, at

para 921) we find:

“921. Meaning of “retrospective”.—It has been

said that “retrospective” is somewhat ambiguous

and that a good deal of confusion has been

caused by the fact that it is used in more senses

than one. In general, however, the courts regard

as retrospective any statute which operates on

cases or facts coming into existence before its

commencement in the sense that it affects, even

if for the future only, the character or

consequences of transactions previously entered

into or of other past conduct. Thus a statute is not

retrospective merely because it affects existing

rights; or is it retrospective merely because a part

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 24 of 35

of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time

antecedent to its passing.’

37. We are inclined to take the view that in the instant

case the legislature looked back to 23-1-1973 and not

beyond to put an end to the custom and merely because

on that cut-off date some contests were brought to

abrupt end would not make the Amendment Act

retrospective. In other words, it would not be

retrospective merely because a part of the requisites for

its action was drawn from a time antecedent to the

Amendment Act coming into force. We are also of the

view that while providing that “no person shall contest

any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral

or non-ancestral or any appointment of an heir to such

property”, without preserving any right to contest such

alienations or appointments as were made after the

coming into force of the Principal Act and before the

coming into force of the Amendment Act, the intention of

the legislature was to cut off even the vested right; and

that it was so by implication as well. There is no dispute

as to the proposition that retrospective effect is not to be

given to an Act unless, the legislature made it so by

express words or necessary implication. But in the

instant case it appears that this was the intention of the

legislature. Similarly courts will construe a provision as

conferring power to act retroactively when clear words

are used. We find both the intention and language of the

Amendment Act clear in these respects.”

19. The provisions of the PAG Act, even post the retrospective

amendments, will apply only to those teachers who were in service

as on 3rd April 1997, and at the time of termination have rendered

service of not less than 5 years. The period of 5 years may be partly

before 3rd April 1997, as the date on which the person was

employed does not determine the applicability of the PAG Act. The

date of termination of service, in the form of superannuation,

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 25 of 35

retirement, or resignation, or death or disablement due to accident

or disease, should be post the enforcement date, which in the

present case is 3rd April 1997. The entire length of service, including

the service period prior to 3rd April 1997, is to be counted for the

purpose of computing the entitlement condition of 5 years of

service. This is the correct effect of the ratio and decision in

Management of Goodyear India Limited. (supra) and the

decisions explaining retroactive effect of a statute. This legal

position would be equally true and correct when the PAG Act was

first enforced with effect from 16th September 1972, and when

Notification No. S-42013/1/95-SS.(II) under Section 1(3)(c) of the

PAG Act was issued and enforced with effect from 3rd April, 1997.

It would be the position in case of all notifications issued under

Section 1(3)(c) of the PAG Act, unless a contrary intention is

expressed, which is not the situation in the present case and thus

need not be examined.

20. The schools have claimed violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 and

300-A of the Constitution of India which, in our opinion, are not

violated as, to deny gratuity benefits to the teachers upon

enforcement of the notification No. S-42013/1/95-SS.(II) dated 3rd

April 1997 was itself an anomaly which mandated correction. The

effect of the decision in Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 26 of 35

Association (supra) was that although private educational

institutions were covered under the PAG Act, gratuity benefits could

not be extended to teachers in view of the legal flaw in the definition,

consequent to which they were not treated as employees. The

teachers were discriminated to be denied benefit of gratuity, a

terminal benefit, which was payable to other employees of the

private schools/educational institutions, including those engaged in

administrative and managerial work. The amendment with

retrospective effect remedies the injustice and discrimination

suffered by the teachers on account of a legislative mistake, which

was understood after the pronouncement of the judgment in

Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association (supra).

The amendment was necessary to ensure that something which

was due and payable to the teachers is not denied to them due to

a defect in the statute. Payment of gratuity cannot be categorized

as a windfall or a bounty payable by the private schools as it is one

of the minimal conditions of service.

30 In this background, the

argument of the private schools that they do not have capacity and

ability to pay gratuity to the teachers is unapt and parsimonious. All

establishments are bound to follow the law, including the PAG Act.

As observed earlier, the private schools were certainly aware of the

30 See Bakshish Singh v. M/s Darshan Engineering Works and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 9.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 27 of 35

intent of the Government that the educational institutions, as an

establishment, would be covered and must pay gratuity upon issue

of notification No. S-42013/1/95-SS.(II) dated 3rd April 1997. Some

schools have raised an argument relying upon decision of this Court

in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others v. State of Karnataka and

Others31, which observes that as a matter of principle, charging of

capitation fee or profiteering by educational institutions is

impermissible. However, the judgment does not state that the

teachers should not be paid gratuity. In fact, the judgment holds that

the educational institutions are entitled to reasonable surplus to

meet the cost of expansion and augmentation of the facilities and

this does not amount to profiteering. It is possible that in some

States there are fee fixation laws which will have to be complied

with. But compliance with these laws does not mean that the

teachers should be deprived and denied gratuity, which they were/

are entitled to receive as other employees of an educational

institution. Regulation of fee is to ensure that there is no

commercialisation and profiteering, and the effect is not to prohibit

a school from fixing and collecting “just and permissible school fee”,

as has been held by this Court in Indian School, Jodhpur and

31 (2002) 8 SCC 481.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 28 of 35

Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others.

32

21. Reliance placed on the dissenting opinion of Amarendra Nath Sen,

J. in Lohia Machines Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and

Others33 is misplaced. The majority opinion of the Constitution

Bench Judgment of Five Judges, authored by P.N. Bhagwati, J.,

had upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 19-A of the Income

Tax Rules, 1962, enacted vide Finance Act (No.2 of 1980) with

retrospective effect from 1st April 1972, thereby restricting the

deduction available under Section 80-J of the Income Tax Act,

1961. In paragraph 78, Amarendra Nath Sen, J., in his dissenting

opinion, has observed that a validating act validating any fiscal

provision with retrospective operation is usually held not to be

unreasonable and arbitrary, as they are generally made to clarify

an ambiguity or rectify some flaw or defect. Such validating act

should not be construed as having the effect to impose fresh tax

with retrospective effect. Thereafter, Amarendra Nath Sen, J., in the

context of the amendment, observed that it had the effect of

withdrawal of benefit, unequivocally granted by the main provision,

which reason has not been accepted and did not find favour with

the majority judgment. In the present case, there is no withdrawal

32 (2021) 10 SCC 517.

33 (1985) 2 SCC 197.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 29 of 35

of benefit unequivocally granted.

22. A supplementary submission of the private schools was that the

judgments of this Court upholding retrospective amendments are

valid only when there is a tax implication as the Government has to

refund the paid taxes, is unfounded and irrational. The power to

amend, which includes the power to amend the statute with

retrospective effect, is a constitutional power vested with the

legislature, which is not confined and restricted to any particular

type of statutes, namely, tax statutes. We would not accept any

attempt to circumscribe and limit the power vested with the

sovereign legislature, thereby putting fetters when such fetters are

not prescribed by the Constitution. When and which cases to

exercise the power has to be left to the legislature. In case the

constitutional validity of the amendment act is challenged, the court

is entitled to examine the relevant circumstances which prompted

the legislature to make retrospective amendment. Judicial review,

when validity of an amendment act is challenged, is decided on the

grounds of lack of legislative competence, violation of the

fundamental rights or any other provisions of the Constitution of

India. In the present case, the notification No. S-42013/1/95-SS.(II)

dated 3rd April 1997 had ensured that the benevolent provisions

requiring payment of gratuity should be extended to the

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 30 of 35

“employees” of the educational institutions. The amendment with

retrospective effect is to make the benevolent provisions equally

applicable to teachers. The amendment seeks to bring equality and

give fair treatment to the teachers. It can hardly be categorised as

an arbitrary and high-handed exercise.

23. The last contention raised by the private schools and writ petitioners

is predicated on the enactment of the Repealing and Amending Act

201634

, by virtue of which the Amendment Act 2009 was repealed.

The argument, in our opinion, overlooks Section 6A of the General

Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 4 of the Repealing and Amendment

Act, which read thus:

“Section 6A of The General Clauses Act, 1897

6A. Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act

or Regulation.–– Where any Central Act or Regulation

made after the commencement of this Act repeals any

enactment by which the text of any Central Act or

Regulation was amended by the express omission,

insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a

different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect

the continuance of any such amendment made by the

enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of

such repeal.

xx xx xx

Section 4 of The Repealing and Amendment Act, 2016

4. Savings.–– The repeal by this Act of any enactment

shall not affect any other enactment in which the

repealed enactment has been applied, incorporated or

referred to,

34 For short, “Repealing and Amendment Act”.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 31 of 35

and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity,

effect or consequences of anything already done or

suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already

acquired, accrued or incurred, or any remedy or

proceeding in respect thereof, or any release or

discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation,

liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity already

granted, or the proof of any past act or thing;

nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law,

or established jurisdiction, form or course of pleading,

practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom,

privilege, restriction, exemption, office or appointment,

notwithstanding that the same respectively may have

been in any manner affirmed or recognised or derived

by, in or from any enactment hereby repealed;

nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment

revive or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom, liability,

right, title, privilege, restriction, exemption, usage,

practice, procedure or other matter or thing not now

existing or in force.”

24. Section 4 of the Repealing and Amendment Act states that the

repeal shall not affect any of the enactment in which the repealed

enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to. It also

states that the Repealing Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity,

effect or consequences of anything already done or suffered, or any

right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or

incurred etc. This Court in Jethanand Betab v. State of Delhi35

had examined a similar provision of the Repealing and Amendment

Act, 1952, whereby the Indian Wireless Telegraph (Amendment)

Act, 1949 was repealed in its entirety. Reference was made to the

decision of the Judicial Committee in Secretary of State for India

35 (1960) 1 SCR 755.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 32 of 35

in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society,

Ltd.36 and the principle that, where the repealing act states that the

enactment thereof shall not affect any act in which the enactment

has been applied, incorporated or referred to, means that there is

an independent existence of the two acts and, therefore, even on

the death of the amending act, its offspring survives in the

incorporating act. This Court also referred to Halsbury’s Law of

England on the said aspect and the decision of the Calcutta High

Court in Khuda Bux v. Manager, Caledonian Press37

. Relevant

extract from the judgment in Jethanand Betab (supra) reads thus:

“6. The general object of a repealing and amending Act

is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol.

31, at p. 563, thus:

“A statute Law Revision Act does not alter the law,

but simply strikes out certain enactments which

have become unnecessary. It invariably contains

elaborate provisos.”

In Khuda Bux v. Manager, Caledonian Press,

Chakravartti, C.J., neatly brings out the purpose and

scope of such Acts. The learned Chief Justice says at p.

486:

“Such Acts have no Legislative effect, but are

designed for editorial revision, being intended only

to excise dead matter from the statute book and

to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate

amending Acts, because having imparted the

amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have

served their purpose and have no further reason

for their existence. At times, inconsistencies are

also removed by repealing and amending Acts.

36 1931 SCC OnLine PC 37.

37 1954 SCC OnLine Cal 132.

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 33 of 35

The only object of such Acts, which in England are

called Statute Law Revision Acts, is legislative

spring-cleaning and they are not intended to make

any change in the law. Even so, they are guarded

by saving clauses drawn with elaborate care,….”

It is, therefore, clear that the main object of the 1952 Act

was only to strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise

dead matter from the statute book in order to lighten the

burden of ever increasing spate of legislation and to

remove confusion from the public mind. The object of

the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 was only to

expurgate the amending Act of 1949, along with similar

Acts, which had served its purpose.

7. The next question is whether Section 4 of the Act of

1952 saved the operation of the amendments that had

been inserted in the Act of 1933 by the repealed Act.

The relevant part of Section 4 only saved other

enactments in which the repealed enactments have

been applied, incorporated or referred to. Can it be said

that the amendments are covered by the language of the

crucial words in Section 4 of the Act of 1952, namely,

“applied, incorporated or referred to”. We think not.

Section 4 of the said Act is designed to provide for a

different situation, namely, the repeal of an earlier Act

which has been applied, incorporated or referred to in a

later Act. Under that section the repeal of the earlier Act

does not affect the subsequent Act. The said principle

has been succinctly stated in Maxwell on Interpretation

of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 406:

“Where the provisions of one statute are, by

reference, incorporated in another and the earlier

statute is afterwards repealed the provisions so

incorporated obviously continue in force so far as

they form part of the second enactment.”

So too, in Craies on Statute Law, 3rd Edn., the sama

idea is expressed in the following words, at p. 349:

“Sometimes an Act of Parliament, instead of

expressly repeating the words of a section

contained in a former Act, merely refers to it, and

by relation applies its provisions to some new

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 34 of 35

state of things created by the subsequent Act. In

such a case the rule of construction is that where

a statute is incorporated by reference into a

second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a

third does not affect the second”.

The Judicial Committee in Secretary of State for India in

Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society,

Ltd. endorsed the said principle and restated the same,

at p. 267, thus:

“This doctrine finds expression in a common-form

section which regularly appears in the amending

and repealing Acts which are passed from time to

time in India. The section runs: “The repeal by this

Act of any enactment shall not affect any Act…. in

which such enactment has been applied,

incorporated or referred to”. The independent

existence of the two Acts is therefore recognized;

despite the death of the parent Act, its offspring

survives in the incorporating Act. Though no such

saving clause appears in the General clauses Act,

Their Lordships think that the principle involved is

as applicable in India as it is in this country.”

It is, therefore, manifest that Section 4 of the 1952 Act

has no application to a case of a later amending Act

inserting new provisions in an earlier Act, for, where an

earlier Act is amended by a later Act, it cannot be said

that the earlier Act applies, incorporates or refers to the

amending Act. The earlier Act cannot incorporate the

later Act, but can only be amended by it. We cannot,

therefore, agree with the view expressed by the Punjab

High Court in Mohinder Singh v. Mst. Harbhajan Kaur

and Darbara Singh v. Shrimati Karnail Kaur that Section

4 of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 applies to

a case of repeal of an amending Act.

25. In most cases, the prayer for stay, as in Civil Appeal No. 8162 of

2012, was not accepted, albeit in some cases, stay has been

granted for payment of gratuity for the period prior to 3rd April 1997.

As explained above and applying the principle of retroactivity and

Civil Appeal No. 8162 of 2012 and Others Page 35 of 35

as also following the judgment of this Court in Management of

Goodyear India Limited. (supra), this argument raised on behalf

of the private schools should fail and is rejected. The partial stay

order dated 31st January 2020 passed in SLP (C) No. 2235 of 2020,

titled Saint Xaviers High School v. Jayashree Shamal Ghosh, or

in any other case, is vacated.

26. For the reasons mentioned above, the aforesaid appeals, transfer

case and the writ petitions are dismissed. The stay orders, as stated

above, are vacated. The private schools would make payment to

the employees/teachers along with the interest in accordance with

the provisions of the PAG Act within a period of 6 weeks from today

and in case of default, the employees/teachers may move the

appropriate forum to enforce payment in accordance with the

provisions of the PAG Act. In the facts of the case, there will be no

orders as to costs.

......................................J.

( SANJIV KHANNA )

......................................J.

( BELA M. TRIVEDI )

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 29, 2022.