The Secretary Ministry of Consumer Affairs Versus Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye & Ors.
The Secretary Ministry of Consumer Affairs Versus Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye & Ors.
Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 831 OF 2023
(@ SLP(C) NO. 19492 OF 2021)
The Secretary Ministry of Consumer Affairs ...Appellant(S)
Versus
Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye & Ors. ...Respondent(S)
with
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 832 OF 2023
with
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 833 OF 2023
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
common judgment and order dated 14.09.2021 passed by
the High Court of Judicature Bombay at Nagpur Bench at
Nagpur in Public Interest Litigation No. 11/2021 and Writ
1
Petition No. 1096 of 2021, by which, the Division Bench of
the High Court has struck down and has declared Rule
3(2)(b), Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of the Consumer
Protection (Qualification for appointment, method of
recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office,
resignation and removal of President and Members of State
Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 2020) as arbitrary,
unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Union of India
and State of Maharashtra have preferred the present
appeals.
2. In exercise of powers conferred by Sections 29 and 43,
read with clauses (n) and (w) of Subsection (2) of Section
101 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act, 2019), the Ministry of Consumer
Affairs, Food and Public Distribution (Department of
Consumer Affairs) framed the Rules, 2020.
2
2.1 Rule 3 of Rules, 2020 provides for qualifications for
appointment of President and members of the State
Commission. Rule 3(2)(b) provided that a person shall not
be qualified for appointment as a member of the State
Commission unless he possesses a bachelor’s degree from
a recognized university and is a person of ability, integrity
and standing, and has special knowledge and professional
experience of not less than twenty years in consumer
affairs, law, public affairs….
2.2 Rule 4 of Rules, 2020 provides for appointment of
President and member of District Commission. Rule 4(2)(c)
provided that a person shall not be qualified for
appointment as a member of the District Commission
unless he is a person of ability, integrity and standing, and
having special knowledge and professional experience of
not less than fifteen years in consumer affairs, law, public
affairs…..
2.3 Rule 6 of Rules 2020 provides for procedure for
appointment. Rule 6(9) provided that the Selection
3
Committee shall determine its procedure for making its
recommendation keeping in view the requirements of the
State Commission or the District Commission and after
taking into account the suitability, record of past
performance, integrity and adjudicatory experience.
2.4 Rule 3(2)(b), Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) were the subject
matter of challenge before the High Court being
unconstitutional, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Rule 3, Rule 4, and Rule 6 reads as
under:
“3. Qualifications for appointment of President and
members of the State Commission.—(1) A person shall
not be qualified for appointment as President, unless he
is, or has been, a Judge of the High Court;
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a
member unless he is of not less than forty years of age
and possesses—
(a) an experience of at least ten years as presiding officer
of a district court or of any tribunal at equivalent level or
combined service as such in the district court and
tribunal:
Provided that not more than fifty percent of such
members shall be appointed; or
(b) a bachelor's degree from a recognised university and is
a person of ability, integrity and standing, and has special
knowledge and professional experience of not less than
twenty years in consumer affairs, law, public affairs,
administration, economics, commerce, industry, finance,
management, engineering, technology, public health or
medicine:
(3) At least one member or the President of the State
Commission shall be a woman.
4
4. Qualifications for appointment of President and
member of District Commission.—(1) A person shall not
be qualified for appointment as President, unless he is, or
has been, or is qualified to be a District Judge.
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as
member unless he—
(a) is of not less than thirtyfive years of age;
(b) possesses a bachelor's degree from a recognised
University; and
(c) is a person of ability, integrity and standing, and
having special knowledge and professional experience of
not less than fifteen years in consumer affairs, law, public
affairs, administration, economics, commerce, industry,
finance, management, engineering, technology, public
health or medicine.
(3) At least one member or the President of the District
Commission shall be a woman.
6. Procedure of appointment.—(1) The President and
members of the State Commission and the District
Commission shall be appointed by the State Government
on the recommendation of a Selection Committee,
consisting of the following persons, namely:—
(a) Chief Justice of the High Court or any Judge of the
High Court nominated by him Chairperson;
(b) Secretary in charge of Consumer Affairs of the State
Government − Member;
(c) Nominee of the Chief Secretary of the State—Member.
(2) The Secretary in charge of Consumer Affairs of the
State Government shall be the convener of the Selection
Committee.
(3) No appointment of the President, or of a member shall
be invalid merely by reason of any vacancy or absence in
the Selection Committee other than a vacancy or absence
of the Chairperson.
(4) The process of appointments shall be initiated by the
State Government at least six months before the vacancy
arises.
(5) If a post falls vacant due to resignation or death of a
member or creation of a new post, the process for filling
the post shall be initiated immediately after the post has
fallen vacant or is created, as the case may be.
(6) The advertisement of a vacancy inviting applications
for the posts from eligible candidates shall be published
in leading newspapers and circulated in such other
manner as the State Government may deem appropriate.
5
(7) After scrutiny of the applications received till the last
date specified for receipt of such applications, a list of
eligible candidates along with their applications shall be
placed before the Selection Committee.
(8) The Selection Committee shall consider all the
applications of eligible applicants referred to it and if it
considers necessary, it may shortlist the applicants in
accordance with such criteria as it may decide.
(9) The Selection Committee shall determine its procedure
for making its recommendation keeping in view the
requirements of the State Commission or the District
Commission and after taking into account the suitability,
record of past performance, integrity and adjudicatory
experience.
(10) The Selection committee shall recommend a panel of
names of candidates for appointment in the order of merit
for the consideration of the State Government.
(11) The State Government shall verify or cause to be
verified the credentials and antecedents of the
recommended candidates.
(12) Every appointment of a President or member shall be
subject to submission of a certificate of physical fitness as
indicated in the annexure appended to these rules, duly
signed by a civil surgeon or District Medical Officer.
(13) Before appointment, the selected candidate shall
furnish an undertaking that he does not and will not have
any such financial or other interest as is likely to affect
prejudicially his functions as a President or member.”
2.5 The validity of the aforesaid rules, namely, Rules 3 (2)(b),
4(2)(c) and 6(9) were challenged before the High Court by
the original writ petitioner on the following grounds:
(a) Uncontrolled discretion and excessive power to the
selection committee to determine its procedure to
recommend candidates to be appointed is arbitrary,
6
unreasonable and in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
(b) Considering the nature of work, the candidate’s
competency needs to be tested before being
recommended for the appointment to discharge
judicial functions. Therefore, the candidates who are
being appointed must have a legal background.
(c) In the absence of the appointment of competent
candidates, the object of the Consumer Protection
Act is likely to be frustrated.
(d) The president and members of the State and District
Commission are empowered with the powers of the
Court. In the appointment of Judicial Magistrate
First Class (JMFC), the candidates are tested by
written examination and viva voce.
(e) The Draft model rules approved by this Hon’ble
Court and accepted by all the parties are not
adhered with. Hence, contrary to the directions of
this Hon’ble Court.
(f) The transparency and selection criteria are absent
in the said rules.
7
(g) In absence of transparency in the matter of
appointments of Chairman and Members, there is
strong apprehension of political and executive
interference.
2.6 It was also the case on behalf of the original writ
petitioners before the High Court that this Court in the
case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. All Uttar
Pradesh Consumer Protection Bar Association; (2017) 1
SCC 444 (hereinafter referred to as the UPCPBA),
directed to frame model rules under the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986. Accordingly, model rules were framed
by this Court and accepted by all the parties. It was also
the case on behalf of the original writ petitioners that by
adopting the model rules, many states notified the
Consumer Protection (Appointment, Salary, Allowance and
Conditions of Service of President and Members of State
Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2017 (hereinafter
referred to as the Rules, 2017) on 18.05.2018. It was
submitted that model rules 2012 were already in existence
in the State of Maharashtra made on 03.01.2012 under
8
Section 30 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the
said Rules already had the provision of written
examination of 100 marks for aspiring
candidates/applicants for the post of President and
Members of District Consumer Forum under Rule 10. It
was submitted that the Consumer Protection Act, 2019
(hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2019) came into force
with effect from 20.07.2020 by repealing the erstwhile
statute Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It was also argued
on behalf of the original writ petitioners that under the
Rules 2020, the power conferred upon the Selection
Committee to determine its own procedure for selection of
President and Members of the District and the State
Commission constituted under the Act, 2019 is in
contravention of the decision of this Court in the case of
UPCPBA (supra). It was also argued on behalf of the
original writ petitioners that looking at the judicial
functions to be performed by President and Members of
the District and State Commissions constituted under the
Act, 2019, the selection without holding written
examination, but, only on the basis of viva voce, would
9
result into selection of unsuitable candidates which will
further result in denial of justice. It was also argued on
behalf of the original writ petitioners that prescribing
minimum experience of 20 years and 15 years for
President and Members of State and District Commission
respectively, is contrary to the directions issued by this
Court in the case of Madras Bar Association Vs. Union of
India and Another; (2021) 7 SCC 369. That thereafter, by
the impugned common judgment and order the High Court
has declared Rule 3(2)(b), Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of the
Rules, 2020 as ultravirus and unconstitutional,
unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India and contrary to the observations and
directions issued by this Court in the case of UPCPBA
(supra). The High Court has specifically observed that
granting complete discretion under the Rules 2020 to the
Selection Committee to determine its own procedure would
result in creating a situation which has been narrated in
the case of UPCPBA (supra) and will again lead to wide
variations in standards as well as a great deal of
10
subjective, bureaucratic and political interference, and
finally it will result in denial of justice which will be in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That
while holding the aforesaid provisions unconstitutional,
unreasonable and arbitrary, the High Court has
considered the historical background of tribunalisation
and the fact that the tribunals are endowed with the
judicial functions with a duty to decide the matters in
judicious manner. Therefore, the High Court has opined
and observed that the standards expected from the judicial
members of the tribunals and standards applied for
appointing such members, should be as nearly as possible
as applicable to the appointment of judges exercising such
powers. That thereafter, following the decisions of this
Court in the case of Madras Bar Association (supra) and
UPCPBA (supra), the High Court has concluded and
passed the final order as under:
i. “The Public Interest Litigation No. 11 of 2021 is
allowed;
ii. The Writ Petition No. 1096/2021 is partly allowed;
11
iii. It is held and declared that Rule 3(2)(b), Rule 4(2) (c)
and Rule 6(9) of the Rules of 2020, are arbitrary,
unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India for the reasons recorded herein
above and hence are quashed and set aside;
iv. The Union of India is directed to provide for
appropriately made Rules as substitutes for Rule 3
(2)(b), Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of the Rules, 2020,
declared unconstitutional, keeping in view the
observations made in the judgment, within four
weeks from the date of the judgment and order;
v. The vacancy notice dated 2nd February, 2021 issued
by the respondent no. 2 for inviting applications for
the post of Members of the State Commission and
President and Members of the District Commission,
is hereby quashed and set aside;
vi. The process of selection of Members of the State
Commission and President and the Members of the
District Commission, initiated in pursuance to the
vacancy notice dated 2nd February, 2021, stands
cancelled;
vii. Fresh process of selection of members of the State
Commission, President and the members of the
District Commission be initiated in accordance with
12
the amended Rules and completed at the earliest as
directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India;
viii. It is made clear that we have not dealt with the
validity of appointment made of the President of
State Commission, Maharashtra State;
ix. No orders as to costs.”
2.7 The impugned common judgment and order passed by the
High Court is the subject matter of present appeals.
3. Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India
has submitted that after the matters were heard by this
Court on 17.11.2022 and 18.11.2022, where this Court
was of the prima facie view that Rule 6(9), which deals with
the procedure of appointment, left too much discretion in
the hands of the selection committee, and that there ought
to have been some objective criteria on the basis of which
the fitness and suitability of candidates be tested, such as
a written examination. It is pointed out that based on the
observations that fell from this Court on the previous dates
of hearing, the matter was considered by the Government
and pursuant thereto, a meeting was called between the
13
Union of India and all the State governments to consider
the desirability and feasibility of conducting a written
examination for appointment to the State and District
Commissions, or in the alternate, to consider as to
whether rules or guidelines can be made which would
reduce the discretion available to the SearchcumSelection Committees while carrying out appointments. It
is submitted that in the course of discussions between the
States, it was observed that most states were not in favour
of conducting written tests. It is submitted that based on
the discussion in the said meeting, it was observed that a
written examination for appointments of members of
tribunals as a uniform policy would be neither feasible nor
desirable, due to, inter alia, the following reasons:
(i) The number of vacancies to tribunals per year is very
low, and in some tribunals only in single digits. It
would not be economically or practically feasible to
conduct an examination for five or six posts. ,
(ii) Most tribunals require appointment of members with
expertise in varied relevant fields, such as consumer
affairs, economics, law, securities, finance, telecom,
electricity, and so on. A single written examination
with a common syllabus would not be possible and
14
one may have to conduct a different examination for
each different area of expertise, which would make
the whole process arbitrary and unwieldy.
(iii) Competent, eminent, and successful persons aged
over thirty five or forty or even fifty may not be willing
to write a written examination and then have their
marks published openly, which would dissuade a
large number of people who may be desirable from
applying.
(iv) Persons with experience of fifteen or twenty years
may no longer have the requisite examination giving
skills, and a written examination may unduly favour
academics or researchers as opposed to people who
are in the field practically or in a corporate
environment or in some other non academic field.
(v) Conducting a written examination may lengthen the
entire process of appointment, which already takes
46 months on account of the requirement of
advertisement, public notice, receipt of applications
and verification of documents, IB inputs, tax and
medical reports, and then a personal interaction with
the Selection Committee. This may end up increasing
the number of vacancies in the tribunals, which is
not desirable.
(vi) Prescribing a uniform requirement of a written
examination across states would fail to take into
account the local requirements of each state for
instance, the number of applications received in the
15
smaller states such as Assam or Goa or Sikkim are
very low, and sometimes even lesser than the
number of posts advertised. A written examination
may lead to greater difficulties in filling up the vacant
posts.
(vii) Prescribing a uniform requirement of a written
examination across tribunals is also not considered
desirable, as each tribunal has its own eligibility
criteria and different categories of persons would fall
in their zone of consideration. For instance, several
posts can only be manned by retired judges, and it
would not be appropriate to subject judges of the
Supreme Court or the High Courts to a written
examination. Equally, very few people are actually
eligible to be appointed as technical members to
specialised tribunals such as TDSAT or APTEL, and
eminent persons in the field of telecom or electricity
may not wish to write examinations to leave lucrative
careers in their areas of expertise. This would lead to
the tribunals losing out on desirable persons, who
may otherwise wish to join these tribunals in the
spirit of public service.
3.1 Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India
has further submitted that based on the further
discussions in the meeting held on 13.01.2023 between
Union of India and all the States/UTs to consider the
uniform measures to guide the Selection Committees in
16
the exercise of their selection processes, it has been
proposed that the following proviso, to provide for the
issuance of necessary instructions to guide the discretion
available to the Selection Committee, could be considered
to be inserted below Rule 6(9) of the Rules, 2020:
“Provided that the Selection Committee shall be guided
by the instructions, as may be issued, by order, by the
Central Government from time to time, while making
assessment of a candidate in regard to his suitability
for appointment as President or member in the State
Commission or the District Commission.”
3.2 It is further submitted that in so far as the development of
uniform measures to be applicable to appointments in the
State Commissions and the District Commissions
(President and Members) across the country is concerned,
the following measures, keeping in view the level of the
posts, the statutory functions to be discharged by the
holders of these posts, the very objective enshrined in the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019, are considered to be
formulated:
17
a. The selection of a candidate for appointment as the
President or member in the State Commission or the
District Commission may be based on the marks
secured by him, out of a total of 100 marks. The total
marks (100) may be the sum of; (i) 60 marks for an
interview; and, (ii) 40 marks for certain special
achievements of a candidate.
b. The aforesaid formulation, if found in order by this
Hon'ble Court, can be treated as an instruction under
the above said proviso.
c. The rationale behind the proposed distribution of
marks in such a way where the interview component
would outweigh the other, is to ensure the selection of
the most suitable candidate, given the level of the
posts and duties attached thereto.
d. The distribution of 40 marks for special achievements
may be considered as under:
S.
No.
Criteria Maximum
Marks
Marking System
1. Number of
years of
experience
15 (i) For the minimum
number of years of
experience required in
terms of the rules
governing the
recruitment conditions
10 marks
(ii) For additional
experience of every 2
years 1 mark
(maximum 5 marks).
In case of experience of fewer
than 2 years, maximum
18
marks for experience of 2
years i.e. 1 mark may be
apportioned according to the
number of years of
experience. Experience of
fewer than six months may be
ignored for this purpose.
2. Higher
Educational
Qualification
s
15 (i) For Graduate 6 marks
(ii) For Post Graduate – 6
marks
(iii) For PhD. 3 marks
3. Prior public
service
rendered
10 For every 4 years of regular
service rendered in or under
the Central/State
Governments and
Constitutional bodies 2
marks (maximum 10 marks)
3.3 It is submitted that on an overall consideration of the
deliberations, it appears that the conduct of a written test
which has several handicaps will not be feasible and shall
not be most suitable measure for the purpose of selection.
19
4. While opposing the present appeals Dr. Uday Prakash
Warnjikar and Dr. Tushar Mandalekar, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respective respondents have
vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances
of the case the High Court has not committed any error in
declaring Rule 3(2)(b) and Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of
Rules, 2020 as arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
4.1 It is submitted that the bone of contention of the present
respondent is to have the highest standards and strict
scrutiny before the candidates are being appointed in the
Consumer State Commission and District Commissions. It
is submitted that the selection method under the Rules,
2020 and the process adopted by the appellant will lead to
the appointment of incompetent candidates to adjudicate
the consumer disputes. It is submitted that under Rule
6(9), the selection committee is empowered with
uncontrolled discretionary powers to determine its
procedure in the appointment of the President and
Members of the State and District Commission. It is
20
submitted that such delegation of uncontrolled powers will
cause undesirable results.
4.2 In support of their submissions that Rule 3(2)(b) and Rule
4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of Rules, 2020 are arbitrary,
unreasonable, and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, it is submitted as under:
(a) That the selection method under Rules, 2020 confers
uncontrolled discretion and excessive power to the
selection committee to determine its procedure to
recommend candidates to be appointed is arbitrary,
unreasonable and in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India;
(b) Considering the nature of work, the candidate’s
competency needs to be tested before being
recommended for the appointment to discharge
judicial functions;
(c) In the absence of the appointment of competent
candidates, the object of the Consumer Protection Act
is likely to be frustrated;
21
(d) The president and members of the State and District
Commission are empowered with the powers of the
Court. In the appointment of Judicial Magistrate First
Class, when the candidates are tested by written
examination and viva voce, the similar procedure to be
adopted for appointment in the District and State
Commissions;
(e) The transparency and selection criteria are absent in
the Rules, 2020;
(g) In absence of transparency in the matter of
appointments of Chairman and Members, there is
strong apprehension of political and executive
interference.
4.3 It is further submitted that even the Law Commission in
its 272nd Report suggested that the members of the newly
constituted tribunals should possess the qualifications
akin to the judges of the High Court and District Court.
The Report further recommended uniformity in the
appointments.
22
4.4 It is further submitted that as such this Court in the case
of UPCPBA (supra) directed to frame model rules under
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It is submitted that by
the said judgment, model rules were approved by this
Court and accepted by all the parties. It is submitted by
adopting the model rules, many states notified the
Consumer Protection (Appointment, Salary, Allowances
and Conditions of Service of President and Members of
State Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2017
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 2017). It is further
submitted that the State of Maharashtra also adopted and
approved the model rules on 24.05.2019 in exercise of
powers conferred under the provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986. It is further submitted that even
prior thereto, model rules 2012 were already in existence
in the State of Maharashtra under Section 30 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the said rules already
had the provision of written examination of 100 marks for
aspiring candidates/applicants for the post of President
and Members of District Consumer Forum under Rule 10.
23
4.5 It is further submitted that as observed hereinabove this
Court approved the uniform model rules for appointment,
salary, service condition etc., for the effective adjudication
of consumer disputes under the Act, 1986. The said model
rules were adopted by all the parties. It is submitted that
the adjudicatory powers of the consumer
fora/commissions are judicial functions. There is no
change in the judicial functions of the President and
Members of the State and District Commission. There is no
change in the judicial functions of President and Members
of the State and District Commission even postConsumer
Protection Act, 2019 (Act, 2019) which have come into
force with effect from 20.07.2020. It is submitted that
there is no change in the legislative scheme concerning
adjudication of consumer disputes under the Act of 2019.
It is submitted that as such the Consumer Protection Act,
2019 has come into force with effect from 20.07.2020 by
repealing the erstwhile statute Consumer Protection Act,
1986. It is submitted that the sole intention of the
legislature is to provide adequate safeguards to the
consumers due to drastic changes in the modern market
24
and the constantly emerging vulnerability of the
consumers. Under the Act, 2019, the pecuniary
jurisdictions of the District and State Commissions are
enhanced substantially. However, there is no substantial
change in the scheme with respect to the adjudication of
the consumer disputes. Therefore, consumer commissions
are quasijudicial authorities empowered to discharge
judicial functions with the adequate powers of the court,
including civil and criminal.
4.6 It is submitted that under Section 71 of the Act, 2019, the
Commissions are empowered with the powers of the civil
court and under Section 72, the Commissions are
empowered with the powers of JMFC. It is submitted that
despite the above when the Rules, 2020 are framed by the
Central Government in exercise of powers under Section
101 of the Act, 2019 which provides for the impugned Rule
3(2)(b) and Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) made the things
worse than the prevailing, prior to Rules, 2020.
4.7 It is further submitted that therefore, when the State and
the District Commissions are performing the quasijudicial
25
functions and judicial functions and exercising the powers
of the Court, to test the competence of the candidate
written examination and vivavoce would be necessary.
Only interviews of the aspiring candidates would lead to
political interference and undeserving results through
such a selection process.
4.8 It is further submitted that Rule 6(9) provides uncontrolled
discretion to the Selection Committee. Uncontrolled
discretion in the matter of recommendations of candidates
to be appointed to discharge judicial functions is in clear
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is
submitted this Court in the case of Madras Bar
Association (supra) declared that “Article 14 clearly
includes a right to have the person’s rights adjudicated by
a forum which exercises judicial powers in an impartial
and independent manner, consistent with the recognized
principles of adjudication.” It is submitted that in the
present case under Rule 6(9) the Central Government has
granted complete discretion to determine the selection
26
procedure without laying down criteria and standards and
the same is unreasonable and arbitrary.
4.9 It is further submitted that even the said provision is also
unreasonable on the ground that there is no check and
balance under Rules, 2020 over the Selection Committee.
The Selection Committee has absolute discretion in the
recommendations of the candidates.
4.10 It is further submitted that there are four sources of
candidates to be appointed as president and members of
the Commissions, viz., serving judicial officers, retired
judicial officers, advocates, or any other individuals having
certain knowledge and experience. It is submitted that the
Rules direct the selection committee to take into account
suitability, a record of past performance, integrity and
adjudicatory experience. The selection committee may
consider the suitability of the retired or serving judicial
candidates based on available record, however, the
suitability of the candidates coming from nonjudicial
sources, cannot be determined without testing the overall
competency. It is submitted that the appointments with
27
bias and without transparency would frustrate the object
of the Consumer Protection Act.
4.11 It is further submitted that the Rules, 2020 as such nullify
the judgment of this Court in the case of UPCPBA (supra).
4.12 It is submitted that as observed and held by this Court in
the case of Madras Bar Association Vs. Union of India &
Anr.; (2021 SCC OnLine SC 463) in Writ Petition (C) No.
502/2021 decided on 14.07.2021 that the permissibility of
legislative override in this country should be in accordance
with the principles laid down by this Court in the catena of
decision which are as under:
“44. The permissibility of legislative override in this country
should be in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court
in the aforementioned as well as other judgments, which have been
culled out as under:
a) The effect of the judgments of the Court can be nullified by
a legislative act removing the basis of the judgment. Such law can be
retrospective. Retrospective amendment should be reasonable and
not arbitrary and must not be violative of the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.
b) The test for determining the validity of a validating
legislation is that the judgment pointing out the defect would not
have been passed, if the altered position as sought to be brought in
by the validating statute existed before the Court at the time of
rendering its judgment. In other words, the defect pointed out
28
should have been cured such that the basis of the judgement
pointing out the defect is removed.
c) Nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be
impermissible legislative exercise [See : S.R. Bhagwat (supra)]. Even
interim directions cannot be reversed by a legislative veto
[See : Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (supra) and Medical Council
of India v. State of Kerala.
d) Transgression of constitutional limitations and intrusion
into the judicial power by the legislature is violative of the principle
of separation of powers, the rule of law and of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.”
4.13 It is further submitted that even the criteria of having
experience of minimum 20 years for appointment of
Member in the State Commission under Rule 3(2)(b) and
criteria of having experience of minimum 15 years for
appointment of Member in District Commission as per
Rule 4(2)(c) is absolutely arbitrary and illegal and
unconstitutional and contrary to the provisions of Article
217 and 233 of the Constitution of India. It is further
submitted that even the same is violative of the judgment
and order passed by this Court in the case of Madras Bar
Association (supra).
4.14 It is submitted that the High Court has rightly quashed the
provision of Rule 4(2)(c) as the requirement of having
29
experience of 15 years for a lawyer in order to get the
appointment as Member in District Forum/Commission is
arbitrary and illegal. It is submitted that even in
accordance with the Article 233 of the Constitution of
India a lawyer needs to have only seven years of practice
as an advocate in High Court. Even in according to the
provisions of Rule 4(1) a person who is eligible to be
appointed as a District Judge (having minimum experience
of seven years as per Article 233 of Constitution of India) is
qualified to be appointed as President of District
Commission. But in order to be appointed as Member, the
Section 4(2)(c) mandates a minimum experience of 15
years which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
4.15 It is further submitted that the scheme envisaged in
appointment of President under Rule 3(1) for President of
State Commission has a different criteria and that of
Member under Rule 3(2)(b) is different and distinct. The
person can be qualified to be a President if he is or has
been a judge of High Court. However, in order to get
30
appointment as a Member of State Commission the Rule
3(2)(b) mandates a minimum experience of 15 years, which
is illegal and violative of Article 14, because the
requirement of qualification and experience of a lawyer to
get appointed as a High Court Judge is only ten years as
per Article 217 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted
that therefore, the High Court has rightly declared that
Rule 3(2)(b) and Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of Rules, 2020
as ultravirus, arbitrary and violative of the Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. It is submitted that while
holding so the High Court has discussed and considered
the decision of this Court in the case of Madras Bar
Association (supra) : (2021) 7 SCC 369.
4.16 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.
5. Heard Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General
for India, appearing on behalf of the appellant(s) and Dr.
Uday Prakash Warunjikar and Dr. Tushar Mandalekar,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
respondent(s).
31
6. By the impugned judgment and order the High Court has
declared Rule 3(2)(b) and Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of the
Consumer Protection (Qualification for appointment,
method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of
office, resignation and removal of President and Members
of State Commission and District Commission) Rules,
2020 as unconstitutional, arbitrary, and violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India. Rule 3(2)(b) and Rule 4(2)
(c) and Rule 6(9) of Rules, 2020 which are declared to be
unconstitutional read as under:
“3. Qualifications for appointment of President and
members of the State Commission.—
xxx
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a
member unless he is of not less than forty years of age
and possesses—
xxx
(b) a bachelor's degree from a recognised university and is
a person of ability, integrity and standing, and has special
knowledge and professional experience of not less than
twenty years in consumer affairs, law, public affairs,
administration, economics, commerce, industry, finance,
management, engineering, technology, public health or
medicine:
4. Qualifications for appointment of President and
member of District Commission.—(1) A person shall not
be qualified for appointment as President, unless he is, or
has been, or is qualified to be a District Judge.
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as
member unless he—
xxx
32
(c) is a person of ability, integrity and standing, and
having special knowledge and professional experience of
not less than fifteen years in consumer affairs, law, public
affairs, administration, economics, commerce, industry,
finance, management, engineering, technology, public
health or medicine.
xxx
6. Procedure of appointment.
xxx
(9) The Selection Committee shall determine its procedure
for making its recommendation keeping in view the
requirements of the State Commission or the District
Commission and after taking into account the suitability,
record of past performance, integrity and adjudicatory
experience.
xxx
6.1 While considering the correctness of the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court and while
considering the constitutional validity of Rule 3(2)(b) and
Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of Rules, 2020, the earlier
decisions of this Court, more particularly, the decision in
the case of UPCPBA (supra) which was under the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 is required to be referred to. The issue
with respect to the conditions of eligibility for appointment
of nonjudicial members was one of the issues before this
Court in the case of UPCPBA (supra). This Court earlier
constituted a committee presided over by Mr. Justice Arijit
Pasayat, a former Judge of this Court to examine various
33
issues including the conditions of eligibility for appointment
of nonjudicial members. The Committee in its interim
report observed that the Fora constituted under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 do not function as
effectively as expected due to a poor organizational setup;
grossly inadequate infrastructure; absence of adequate and
trained manpower and “lack of qualified members” in the
adjudicating bodies. This Court in paragraphs 4 to 6 noted
and observed as under:
“4. The quality of presiding members, especially of nonjudicial members at the State and district levels is poor.
One of the reasons is that the remuneration which is being
paid to nonjudicial members of consumer fora varies from
State to State and is too meagre to attract qualified talent.
Most of the nonjudicial members are not even capable of
writing or dictating small orders. At certain places nonjudicial members act in unison against the Presiding
Officer, while passing orders contrary to law, damaging the
reputation of the adjudicating body. The Presidents, as a
result, prefer a situation where such nonjudicial members
absent themselves from work if only so that judicial work
can be carried out by the Presiding Judge impartially and
objectively. Many nonjudicial members do not maintain
punctuality and others attend to work sporadically once or
twice a week. The Committee has observed that the
problem lies in — (i) absence of proper remuneration; (ii)
appointment of former judicial officers who lack motivation
and zeal; (iii) appointment of practising lawyers as
Presiding Officers of District Fora; and (iv) political and
bureaucratic interference in appointments. Many of the
34
nonjudicial members attend to the place of work only to
sign orders which have been drafted by the Presiding
Officer.
5. The Committee has furnished concrete examples of how
bureaucratic and political influence has marred the
selection process as a result of which the functioning of
consumer fora is detrimentally affected. Three instances
furnished in the Report of the Committee provided a telling
example of the state of affairs:
“(15) The Committee could make out that there has
been considerable bureaucratic and political
influence/interference in the “selection process” and
functioning of the consumer fora. Just to cite a few
instances, the Committee found that relatives of politicians,
bureaucrats and judicial fraternity have been selected. A
nonJudicial Member Mr Jamal Akhtar posted at District
Forum, Meerut has been absenting without permission
since 1152015. The State Government has failed to take
any action against him. Even the plea of the President,
State Commission has gone unheeded. The result is that
his post has not been declared vacant and another nonJudicial Member posted elsewhere has been attached in his
place.
(16) One nonJudicial Member who had her first term
at Lucknow and has now been enjoying her second term,
having been appointed for District Forum, Barabanki but
has been attached to Greater Noida and as per the reports,
comes to Forum once or twice a week. Another woman nonJudicial Member who happens to be wife of a bureaucrat
was appointed for District Forum, Baghpat but was
attached/posted at Greater Noida. These few instances
make it crystal clear that there is definite political influence
and interference and in such a scenario, the work of
District Consumer Fora is affected as it results in lowering
the morale of the President.
35
(17) In Haryana, a nonJudicial Woman Member
did/does not attend the District Forum regularly, as she
has to travel around 150/160 km every day. The President
of one District Forum who happens to be former President
of Bar Association has been serving the second term as
President. Such nonJudicial Members manage to get
selected and then misuse their position as Members, as
they call themselves “Judges”.”
6. The selection of persons as Presiding Officers and as
Members of the fora lacks transparency without a fixed
criteria for selection. The Committee has, in our view with
justification, proposed that a written test should be
conducted to assess the knowledge of persons who apply
for posts in the District Fora. Issues of conflict of interest
also arise when persons appointed from a local area are
appointed to a District Forum in the same area.”
Ultimately in paragraph 28, this Court issued the following
directions:
“28.1. The Union Government shall for the purpose of
ensuring uniformity in the exercise of the rulemaking
power under Section 10(3) and Section 16(2) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 frame model rules for
adoption by the State Governments. The model rules shall
be framed within four months and shall be submitted to
this Court for its approval;
28.2. The Union Government shall also frame within four
months model rules prescribing objective norms for
implementing the provisions of Section 10(1)(b), Section
16(1)(b) and Section 20(1)(b) in regard to the appointment
of members respectively of the District Fora, State
Commissions and National Commission;
36
28.3. The Union Government shall while framing the model
rules have due regard to the formulation of objective norms
for the assessment of the ability, knowledge and experience
required to be possessed by the members of the respective
fora in the domain areas referred to in the statutory
provisions mentioned above. The model rules shall provide
for the payment of salary, allowances and for the conditions
of service of the members of the consumer fora
commensurate with the nature of adjudicatory duties and
the need to attract suitable talent to the adjudicating
bodies. These rules shall be finalised upon due
consultation with the President of the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, within the period
stipulated above;
28.4. Upon the approval of the model rules by this Court,
the State Governments shall proceed to adopt the model
rules by framing appropriate rules in the exercise of the
rulemaking powers under Section 30 of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986;
28.5. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission is requested to formulate regulations under
Section 30A with the previous approval of the Central
Government within a period of three months from today in
order to effectuate the power of administrative control
vested in the National Commission over the State
Commissions under Section 24B(1)(iii) and in respect of
the administrative control of the State Commissions over
the District Fora in terms of Section 24B(2) as explained in
this judgment to effectively implement the objects and
purposes of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.”
6.2 That thereafter, vide a further order dated 18.05.2018
State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. All Uttar Pradesh Consumer
Protection Bar Association – Civil Appeal No.
37
2740/2007 reported in (2018) 7 SCC 423, this Court
considered the draft model rules which were framed by the
Union of India. Before this Court the model rules came to
be accepted by the counsel representing all the parties
before the Court. Therefore, this Court directed that the
State Governments shall frame appropriate rules in
exercise of the rulemaking power under Section 30 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in accordance with the
Final Draft Model Rules submitted by the Union of India. It
appears that thereafter many States notified the Consumer
Protection (appointment, salary, allowances and conditions
of service of President and Members of the State
Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2017. Rules, 2017
which were adopted provided that in every cases, the
selection of Members of the District Fora and State
Commission shall be on the basis of a written test of two
papers (Rules 5 and 7). It appears that even the State of
Maharashtra also adopted and approved the model rules
on 24.05.2019 and framed Rules, 2019 which had a
written examination of 200 marks. It provided that State
Commission shall hold the final examination of 250 marks
38
for the post of Members. Out of 250 marks, 200 marks
shall be for written examination and 50 marks shall be for
vivavoce examination. In the case of Madras Bar
Association (supra) decided on 27.11.2020 – (2017) 7
SCC 369, this Court directed that while considering
Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities
(Qualifications, Experience and other conditions of Service
of Members), the Rules, 2020 shall be amended to make
advocates with an experience of at least 10 years eligible
for appointment as judicial members in the tribunals. That
thereafter, the Central Government framed Tribunal
Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service)
Ordinance, 2021 which fell for consideration before this
Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 502/2021 decided on
14.07.2021 – 2021 SCC Online SC 463. In the said
decision this Court also considered the permissibility of
legislative override. After considering catena of decisions of
this Court on permissibility of legislative override this
Court observed and held in paragraphs 42 to 44 as under:
39
“42. The judgment of this Court in Madan Mohan
Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50 requires a close
scrutiny as it was adverted to and relied upon by both
sides. A writ petition was filed in the High Court of Calcutta
for a mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation
(LIC) to act in accordance with the terms of settlement
dated 24.01.1974 read with administrative instructions
dated 29.03.1974. The writ petition was allowed by the
learned single Judge against which a Letters Patent Appeal
(LPA) was preferred by the LIC. During the pendency of the
LPA, the LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 came
into force. The LPA was withdrawn in view of the
subsequent legislation and the decision of the learned
single Judge became final. Validity of the said statute was
assailed in a writ petition filed under Article 32 by the
employees of the LIC. Justice Bhagwati, speaking for the
majority, was of the opinion that the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court was not a mere declaratory judgment
holding an impost or tax as invalid so that a validating
statute can remove the defect pointed out in the judgment.
He observed that the judgment of the Calcutta High Court
gave effect to the rights of the petitioners by mandamus,
directing the LIC to pay annual cash bonus. As long as the
judgment of the learned single Judge is not reversed in
appeal, it cannot be disregarded or ignored. The LIC was
held to be bound by the writ of mandamus issued by the
Calcutta High Court. Justice Beg, in his concurrent
opinion, held that the rights which accrued to the
employees on the basis of the mandamus issued by the
High Court cannot be taken away either directly or
indirectly by subsequent legislation. Thereafter, Madan
Mohan Pathak (supra) came up for discussion in Sri Ranga
Match Industries v. Union of India 1994 Supp (2) SCC 726.
Justice Jeevan Reddy was of the opinion that the Madan
Mohan Pathak case cannot be treated as an authority for
the proposition that mandamus cannot be set aside by a
legislative act. Justice Hansaria was not in agreement with
such view. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in A.V.
40
Nachane v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 205, Justice
Hansaria held that the legal stand taken by Justice Beg in
the Madan Mohan Pathak case had received majority's
endorsement and it was because of this that retrospectivity
given to the relevant rule assailed in A.V. Nachane was held
to have nullified the effect of the writ and was accordingly
invalid. In view of the difference of opinion, the matter was
referred to a larger bench. We are informed by the leaned
Amicus Curiae that the difference of opinion could not be
resolved as the case was settled out of court.
43. In Virender Singh Hooda (2004) 12 SCC 588, this Court
did not accept the contention of the petitioners therein that
vested rights cannot be taken away by retrospective
legislation. However, it was observed that taking away of
such rights would be impermissible if there is violation of
Articles 14, 16 or any other constitutional provision. The
appointments already made in implementation of a decision
of this Court were protected with the reason that “the law
does not permit the legislature to take away what has been
granted in implementation of the Court's decision. Such a
course is impermissible.” This Court in Cauvery Water
Disputes Tribunal 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2) declared the
ordinance which sought to displace an interim order passed
by the statutory tribunal as unconstitutional as it set side
an individual decision inter partes and therefore, amounted
to a legislative exercise of judicial power. When a
mandamus issued by the Mysore High Court was sought to
be annulled by a legislation, this Court quashed the same
in S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore (1995) 6 SCC 16 on the
ground that it was impermissible legislative exercise.
Setting at naught a decision of the Court without removing
the defect pointed out in the judgment would sound the
death knell of the rule of law. The rule of law would cease
to have any meaning, because then it would be open to the
Government to defy a law and yet to get away with it.50
44. The permissibility of legislative override in this country
should be in accordance with the principles laid down by
41
this Court in the aforementioned as well as other
judgments, which have been culled out as under:
a) The effect of the judgments of the Court can be nullified
by a legislative act removing the basis of the judgment.
Such law can be retrospective. Retrospective amendment
should be reasonable and not arbitrary and must not be
violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.
b) The test for determining the validity of a validating
legislation is that the judgment pointing out the defect
would not have been passed, if the altered position as
sought to be brought in by the validating statute existed
before the Court at the time of rendering its judgment. In
other words, the defect pointed out should have been cured
such that the basis of the judgement pointing out the
defect is removed.
c) Nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be
impermissible legislative exercise [See: S.R.
Bhagwat (supra)]. Even interim directions cannot be
reversed by a legislative veto [See : Cauvery Water Disputes
Tribunal (supra) and Medical Council of India v. State of
Kerala (2019) 13 SCC 185].
d) Transgression of constitutional limitations and intrusion
into the judicial power by the legislature is violative of the
principle of separation of powers, the rule of law and of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”
6.3 In the said decision, this Court struck down and declared
that first proviso to Section 184(1) of the Finance Act,
2017, which provided for 50 years minimum age for
appointment as Chairman or Member as unconstitutional
42
by observing that the said first proviso to Section 184 (1) is
in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as the
judgment of this Court in the case of Madras Bar
Association Vs. Union of India & Anr. – MBA III (2017)
7 SCC 369 decided on 27.11.2020, has been frustrated by
an impermissible legislative override.
6.4 Taking into consideration the aforesaid decisions, the High
Court in the impugned judgment and order has rightly
observed and held that Rule 3(2)(b), Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule
6(9) of the Rules, 2020 which are contrary to the decisions
of this Court in the cases of UPCPBA (supra) and the
Madras Bar Association (supra) are unconstitutional and
arbitrary.
6.5 Even otherwise also we are of the opinion that Rule 6(9)
lacks transparency and it confers uncontrolled discretion
and excessive power to the Selection Committee. Under
Rule 6(9), the Selection Committee is empowered with the
uncontrolled discretionary power to determine its
procedure to recommend candidates to be appointed as
43
President and Members of the State and District
Commission. The transparency and selection criteria are
absent under Rule 6(9). In absence of transparency in the
matter of appointments of President and Members and in
absence of any criteria on merits the undeserving and
unqualified persons may get appointment which may
frustrate the object and purpose of the Consumer
Protection Act. It cannot be disputed that the Commissions
are empowered with the powers of court and are quasijudicial authorities and empowered to discharge judicial
powers with the adequate powers of the court including
civil and criminal. Therefore, the standards expected from
the members of the tribunal should be as nearly as
possible as applicable to the appointment of judges
exercising such powers. Under Rule 6(9) of Rules, 2020,
the Selection Committee is having power to determine its
own procedure. Such provisions are also giving excessive
and uncontrolled discretionary powers to the Selection
Committee. As rightly observed and held by the High
Court, considering the object on behalf of the Consumer
Protection Act, 2019, such uncontrolled discretion power
44
to determine its procedure for making its recommendation
for appointment of President and Members of the District
and the State Commissions is arbitrary and unreasonable.
It is always desirable that while making the appointment
as Members of the District Fora and/or the State
Commission there is a need to assess the skill, ability, and
the competency of the candidates before they are
empanelled and recommended to the State Government.
The Rules, 2020 do not contemplate written examination
so as to test the merits of the candidate. In the case of
UPCPBA (supra), this Court expressed deep concern over
the bureaucratic and political interference in process of
appointments.
6.6 At this stage, it is required to be noted that mechanism of
having written examination was confirmed by this Court
which has been removed under the new Rules, 2020.
6.7 At this stage, it is required to be noted that earlier under
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, there were Rules, 2017 in
so far as some of the States are concerned and Rules,
45
2019 so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned,
which provided for a written examination and viva voce,
which was under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
6.8 The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has been repealed and
the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 has come into force
w.e.f. 24.07.2020 with a sole intention to provide adequate
safeguards to the consumers and the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the District Fora and State Commissions are
enhanced substantially. However, there is no substantial
change in the scheme with respect to the adjudication of
the consumer disputes. No justification at all is shown to
do away with the written examination while framing the
Rules, 2020 under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
Therefore, as rightly observed by the High Court, the Rule
6(9) of the Rules, 2020 is unconstitutional, arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, more
particularly, when the same is wholly impermissible to
override/overrule the earlier decisions of this Court and
that too without any justification. We are in complete
agreement with the view taken by the High Court.
46
7. Now so far as the Rule 3(2)(b) and Rule 4(2)(c) of the Rules,
2020 are concerned, the High Court has rightly quashed
the said provisions which provided for having a minimum
20 years’ experience for appointment as a Member in State
Commission under Rule 3(2)(b) and having a minimum 15
years’ experience for appointment as a Member in District
Commission under Rule 4(2)(c).
7.1 It is required to be noted that under provision 4(1) of
Rules, 2020, a person who is eligible to be appointed as a
district judge (having minimum experience of 7 years) is
qualified to be appointed as President of the District
Commission but in order to be appointed as a Member,
Section 4(2)(c) mandates a minimum experience of 15
years which is rightly held to be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution.
7.2 Similarly providing 20 years’ experience under Rule 3(2)(b)
also rightly held to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14
of the Constitution. It is required to be noted that under
Section 3(2)(b), a presiding officer of a Court having
experience of 10 years is eligible for becoming President of
47
the State Commission. Even under Section 3(1) a judge of
the High Court, present or former, shall be qualified for
appointment of the President. As per Article 233 of the
Constitution, a lawyer needs to have only 7 years of
practice as an advocate in High Court. Under the
circumstances to provide 20 years’ experience under Rule
3(2)(b) is rightly held to be unconstitutional, arbitrary and
violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We
are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High
Court. At this stage, it is required to be noted that in the
case of Madras Bar Association (supra) – MBA III, this
Court directed to consider 10 years’ experience, after detail
reasoning.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we
see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court declaring Rule 3(2)(b),
Rule 4(2)(c) and Rule 6(9) of the Consumer Protection
(Qualification for appointment, method of recruitment,
procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and
removal of President and Members of State Commission
48
and District Commission) Rules, 2020 as arbitrary,
unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. The Central Government and the concerned State
Governments have to amend Rules, 2020, more
particularly, Rule 6(9) of the Rules, 2020, providing that
the Selection Committee shall follow the procedure for
appointment as per Model Rules, 2017 and to make the
appointment of President and Members of the State
Commission and the District Commission on the basis of
the performance in written test consisting of two papers of
100 marks each and 50 marks for viva voce and the
written test consisting of two papers may be as per the
following schemes:
Paper Topics Nature of
test
Max.
mark
s
Duration
PaperI (a) General
Knowledge and
current affairs
(b) Knowledge of
Constitution of India
(c) Knowledge of
various Consumers
related Laws as
indicated in the
Schedule
Objective
Type
100 2 hours
PaperII
(a) One Essay on
topics chosen from
issues on trade and
Descriptive
type
100 3 hours
49
commerce consumer
related issues or
Public Affairs.
(b) One case study of
a consumer case for
testing the abilities of
analysis and cogent
drafting of orders.
8.1 The Central Government and the concerned State
Governments have also to come with an amendment in the
Rules, 2020 to provide 10 years’ experience to become
eligible for appointment of President and Member of the
State Commission as well as the District Commission
instead of 20 years and 15 years respectively, provided in
Rule 3(2)(b) and Rule 4(2)(c) which has been struck down
to the extent providing 20 years and 15 years of
experience, respectively. Till the suitable amendments are
made in Consumer Protection (Qualification for
appointment, method of recruitment, procedure of
appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of
President and Members of State Commission and District
Commission) Rules, 2020 as above, in exercise of powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to do
complete justice, we direct that in future and hereinafter, a
50
person having bachelor’s degree from a recognized
University and who is a person of ability, integrity and
standing, and having special knowledge and professional
experience of not less than 10 years in consumer affairs,
law, public affairs, administration, economics, commerce,
industry, finance, management, engineering, technology,
public health or medicine, shall be treated as qualified for
appointment of President and Members of the State
Commission. Similarly, a person of a person of ability,
integrity and standing, and having special knowledge and
professional experience of not less than 10 years in
consumer affairs, law, public affairs, administration,
economics, commerce, industry, finance, management,
engineering, technology, public health or medicine, shall
be treated as qualified for appointment of President and
Members of the District Commissions. We also direct
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India that for
appointment of President and Members of the State
Commission and District Commission, the appointment
shall be made on the basis of performance in written test
consisting of two papers as per the following scheme:
51
Paper Topics Nature of
test
Max.
mark
s
Duration
PaperI (a) General
Knowledge and
current affairs
(b) Knowledge of
Constitution of India
(c) Knowledge of
various Consumers
related Laws as
indicated in the
Schedule
Objective
Type
100 2 hours
PaperII
(a) One Essay on
topics chosen from
issues on trade and
commerce consumer
related issues or
Public Affairs.
(b) One case study of
a consumer case for
testing the abilities of
analysis and cogent
drafting of orders.
Descriptive
type
100 3 hours
8.3 The qualifying marks in each paper shall be 50 per cent
and there shall be viva voce of 50 marks. Therefore, marks
to be allotted out of 250, which shall consist of a written
test consisting two papers, each of 100 marks and the 50
marks on the basis of viva voce.
52
Present appeals are disposed of in terms of the above
directions.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(M.M. SUNDRESH)
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 03, 2023.
53
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