SHAH NEWAZ KHAN & ORS. VS. STATE OF NAGALAND & ORS
SHAH NEWAZ KHAN & ORS. VS. STATE OF NAGALAND & ORS
Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले
1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1497/2023
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 4149/2016]
SHAH NEWAZ KHAN & ORS. APPELLANTS
VS.
STATE OF NAGALAND & ORS. RESPONDENTS
WITH
TRANSFER PETITION (C) NO. 307/2016
SHAH NEWAZ KHAN & ORS. PETITIONERS
VS.
STATE OF NAGALAND & ORS. RESPONDENTS
2
JUDGMENT
Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Leave granted.
THE ISSUE
2. An issue, pristinely legal and novel, emerges for decision.
It is novel in the sense that although three different High Courts
of the country have taken views which are entirely consistent,
except the view taken in the judgment and order under
challenge of the Gauhati High Court which impliedly stands
overruled by a larger Bench of the same High Court, this Court
hitherto might not have had the occasion to deal with such an
issue and decide either way.
3. Shortly put, the issue is:
Is the Supreme Court the sole repository of power in terms
of section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity
‘the CPC’) to direct transfer of a suit, appeal or other
proceeding from a Civil Court in one State to a Civil Court
in another State? Or, is it open for a High Court, if it is the
common High Court for two or more States, to entertain
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an application for transfer under section 24 of the CPC and
transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding from a Civil
Court to another Civil Court, both of which are subordinate
to such High Court but situate in different States in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, for consideration
and decision?
FACTS AND THE ORDER UNDER CHALLENGE
4. The facts leading to presentation of this appeal reveal that
the appellants having instituted a suit for declaration of right,
title and interest as well as for perpetual injunction and
damages in the court of the District Judge at Dimapur,
Nagaland sometime in 2007, failed to prosecute it in the right
earnest allegedly due to hostile circumstances created by the
private defendants in the suit resulting in dismissal and
restoration thereof on three occasions. Pleading why it is
impossible for them to continue with prosecution of the suit at
Dimapur, the appellants moved an application under section 24
of the CPC before the Gauhati High Court for an order to
transfer the suit to the court of the District Judge at Guwahati,
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Assam. A learned Judge of the Gauhati High Court, which
presently happens to be the common High Court for the States
of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, presiding
over the Bench at the principal seat at Guwahati, rejected the
application for transfer by a judgment and order dated 10th
December, 2015. While so rejecting, the learned Judge followed
His Lordship’s previous decision in Pomi Sengupta vs.
Biswajit Sengupta1
which, in turn, had entirely relied on the
decision of this Court in Durgesh Sharma vs. Jayshree2
. The
judgment and order of rejection of the application under section
24 of the CPC is under challenge in this appeal.
5. The appellants, by way of abundant caution, have also
applied before this Court under section 25 of the CPC seeking
the same relief that was disallowed by the learned Judge.
APPELLANTS’ CONTENTIONS
1 (2015) 6 GLR 396
2 (2008) 9 SCC 648
5
6. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Goswami, learned
senior counsel contended that:
a. Article 214 of the Constitution of India ordains that there
shall be a High-Court for each State. Article 231 of the
Constitution of India provides for the establishment of a
common High Court for two or more States.
b. The relevant provisions of the CPC for the purpose of a
decision on the present dispute are sections 22 to 25 read with
section 3 thereof dealing with subordination of courts.
c. The power of the High Court and the District Courts to
direct transfer of proceedings is provided in section 24 of the
CPC.
d. The facts of the instant case clearly satisfy all the
ingredients of section 24 CPC, more particularly, sub-clause (ii)
of clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof. A bare perusal of such
provision 24 would indicate that the High Court may, at any
stage, direct transfer of proceedings pending before it to any
court subordinate to it, or transfer proceedings pending in any
court subordinate to it to itself or to any other court
subordinate to it. Thus, the emphasis under the said provision
is on the expression "court subordinate to it". Section 3 of the
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CPC, inter alia, defines the courts subordinate to the High
Court. Thus, on a plain reading of section 24 of the CPC, it is
evident that the common High Court, i.e., the Gauhati High
Court, has the power and jurisdiction to direct inter-State
transfer of proceedings, provided both the transferor and
transferee courts are subordinate to it, and fall within its
territorial jurisdiction, which is the case here.
e. On a harmonious construction of section 24 and section 25
of the CPC, it is clear that the latter will apply only to inter-State
transfer of proceedings between two States where the two
States in question have different High Courts, whereas, in a
case involving inter-State transfer of proceedings within the
territorial jurisdiction of a common High Court, the common
High Court would have the power and jurisdiction to direct
inter-State transfer of proceedings of the nature stated above,
in exercise of its power under section 24 of the CPC.
f. It is a settled proposition of law that in construing a provision,
the consequences that befall on a particular interpretation of a
provision is a relevant consideration. Justice G.P. Singh in his
treatise3 has observed thus:
4. REGARD TO CONSEQUENCES
3 12th Edition of 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' at page 131
7
If the language used is capable of hearing more than one
construction, in selecting the true meaning, regard. Must be had to
the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative
constructions. A construction that results in hardship, serious
inconvenience, injustice, absurdity, or anomaly or which leads to
inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the
statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference
should be given to that construction which avoids such results.
g. This observation was quoted with approval by the
Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of its decision in D. Saibaba v
Bar Council of India & Anr.4
.
h. Therefore, the aforementioned observation would also
lend support to the submission of the appellants in as much as
it would be more convenient for litigants within the territory of
the common High Court to approach the Gauhati High Court for
seeking transfer.
7. Mr. Goswami also cited three other decisions. The first is a
decision of the larger bench of the Gauhati High Court in
Megha Jain vs. Kartik Jain5
. This decision has overruled
Pomi Sengupta (supra), on which the impugned judgment and
order is premised. The second is a decision of the (undivided)
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chalasani Deepthi vs.
Chalasani Krishna Chaitanya6
and the last a decision of the
4 (2003) 6 SCC 186
5 (2019) 6 GLR 379
6 2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 978
8
Bombay High Court in Irene Blanch Khera vs. Glenn John
Vijay7
.
8. Based on his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Goswami urged us
to set aside the order under challenge and to remit the matter
to the Gauhati High Court for fresh consideration of the
application of the appellants under section 24 of the CPC. In the
alternative, he submitted that the application under section 25
may be considered by us on its own merits.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 1 TO 3
9. Opposing the appeal, Mr. Balgopal, learned senior counsel
for the State of Nagaland and its officers, contended as follows:
a. A brief issue with regard to the scope and ambit of section
24 vis-à-vis section 25 of the CPC has arisen before this Court in
the instant case in view of the peculiar circumstances wherein
two States share a common High Court as provided under
Article 231 of the Constitution of India.
b. Section 24(1)(b), CPC gives power to the High Court to
withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any
7 2018 (6) Mh. L.J. 199
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court subordinate to it and to transfer the same for trial or
disposal to any Court subordinate to it which is competent to
try or dispose of the same. As the State of Nagaland does not
have a separate High Court, consequently all courts functioning
in the State of Nagaland are subordinate to the Gauhati High
Court, being the common High Court for the States of Assam,
Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh.
c. However, in order to appreciate whether the common High
Court has the power to withdraw any suit, appeal or other
proceeding pending before any Court subordinate to it from one
State and to transfer the same to any Court subordinate to it, in
another State, the provisions of both sections 24 and 25 of the
Code will have to be examined as it involves an inter-State
transfer and not an intra-State transfer simplicitor.
d. To appreciate the true import and meaning of the
provisions of section 25(1), the said provision will have to be
read in two parts as it contains two-fold power to direct any
suit, appeal or other proceeding to be transferred:
i. From one High Court to another High Court; or
ii. From one Civil Court in one State to another Civil Court
in any other State.
10
This interpretation is substantiated by the observation made by
this Court in Durgesh Sharma (supra).
e. Section 25 is the only provision in the CPC, which refers to
transfer of a case from a Civil Court in one State to a Civil Court
in another State. Incidentally, the appellants themselves are
asking for this relief.
f. Report of the Joint Committee, Lok Sabha of the Code of
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1974 which was passed on 1st
April, 1976 shows that this issue was raised by one of the
North-Eastern States, i.e., State of Meghalaya with regard to
conflict between sections 24 and 25 insofar as the North-East
area is concerned and reading of the minutes suggests that the
Committee assured to look into the issue.
g. In view of the specific provision in section 25(1) of the
CPC, it is only the Supreme Court and no other court which has
the power to direct transfer of the suit instituted by the
appellants from the Civil Court in Dimapur, Nagaland to the
Civil Court in Guwahati, Assam, if at all any ground is set up
therefor.
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10. In view of the aforesaid contentions, it was submitted by
Mr. Balgopal that the impugned judgement needs no
interference and deserves to be upheld.
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS 4 AND 5
11. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents 4 and 5, advanced the following arguments:
a. Power to effect inter-State transfer of any suit, appeal or
other proceeding is not available to be exercised by a High
Court in terms of section 24 of the CPC since such power is
expressly and exclusively provided in section 25 thereof, to be
exercised only by the Supreme Court.
b. Reliance placed by the learned senior counsel for the
appellants on Durgesh Sharma (supra) is misplaced since
that case is distinguishable. The observations in paragraph 47
were made by this Court to decide the issue captured in
paragraph 3 and this Court had no occasion to examine the
issue in the light as it has occurred in the present case. It is
trite to submit that such an observation could at best be
treated as obiter dicta (defined as an incidental remark of a
Judge's expression of opinion uttered in court or in a written
12
judgment, but not essential to the decision and therefore not
legally binding as a precedent).
c. Be that as it may, what has been held by this Court in
paragraph 57 of Durgesh Sharma (supra) nullifies the point
sought to be urged on the behalf of the appellants.
d. In Megha Jain (supra), the Division Bench of the Gauhati
High Court has held that it has jurisdiction to exercise powers
under section 24 of the CPC read with section 23(1) and/or
section 23(2) thereof to transfer a suit, appeal or any other
proceeding from one of the four States under its jurisdiction to
any other State under its jurisdiction for trial. In paragraph 9 of
Megha Jain (supra), reference has been made to section 24(1)
(a) of the CPC to arrive at the conclusion that the High Court or
the District Court may, at any stage, transfer any suit etc.
pending before it to any court subordinate to it and that a
transfer petition seeking transfer from one State to any of the
four States shall be maintainable thereunder. The abovesaid
conclusion is not the correct exposition of law. Sections 22 to 24
of the CPC and section 25 thereof are two different codes within
the CPC and there is no overlapping in relation to the domain
where these two sets of codes operate.
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e. A plain reading of section 22 of the CPC would show that
the words “several Courts” occurring in its last has been
continued in section 23, while no such co-relation exists either
between sections 22 and 25 or sections 23 and 25. Therefore,
application of section 23 together with section 25 appears
completely faulty. Also, in relation to the exercise of power
under section 24, the said power has been made available to
even a District Court, which makes it amply clear that the
power under section 24 is a continuation of sections 22 and 23
only.
f. Further, the power of transfer of suits under section 22
can be exercised, “(W)here a suit may be instituted in any one
of two or more courts and is instituted in one of such courts”.
And this power under section 22 is explained in section 23 for
the purposes as to which court an application for transfer may
lie. Further, after the application is made, under section 24,
such power is explained as to how the same can be exercised.
Therefore, section 22 provides which of the suits, section 23
provides which of the courts and section 24 provides how such
transfers can be effected.
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g. In contrast to the above, the power under section 25 has
been clearly defined and the same does not have any mention
in sections 22 to 24 in the same manner as it occurs in section
25, categoric and precise. Therefore, the legislative intent is
clear that only under section 25 of the CPC a direction that any
suit, appeal or other proceeding may be transferred from a Civil
Court in one State to a Civil Court in any other State and that
can only be made by this Court.
12. Resting on the aforesaid arguments, Mr. Sharma too urged
that no case for interference had been made out by the
appellants and the appeal deserves dismissal.
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW
13. Sections 24 and 25 of the CPC being at the heart of the
debate, the same need to read carefully. To the extent relevant,
the said provisions read as follows:
“24. General power of transfer and withdrawal.—(1)
On the application of any of the parties and after
notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as
desire to be heard, or of its own motion, without such
notice, the High Court or the District Court may, at any
stage—
(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding
pending before it for trial or disposal to any court
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subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of
the same, or
(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding
pending in any court subordinate to it, and
(i) try or dispose of the same; or
(ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any
court subordinate to it and competent to try or
dispose of the same; or
(iii) retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the
court from which it was withdrawn.
(2) Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred
or withdrawn under sub-section (1), the court which
thereafter tries such suit may, subject to any special
directions in the case of an order of transfer, either
retry it or proceed from the point at which it was
transferred or withdrawn.
***”
“25. Power of Supreme Court to transfer suits, etc.—
(1) On the application of a party, and after notice to
the parties, and after hearing such of them as desire
to be heard, the Supreme Court may, at any stage, if
satisfied that an order under this section is expedient
for the ends of justice, direct that any suit, appeal or
other proceeding be transferred from a High Court or
other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other
Civil Court in any other State.
***”
14. Prior to its amendment in 1976, section 25 of the Code
read as follows:
“25. Power of State Government to transfer suits.—(1)
Where any party to a suit, appeal or other proceeding
pending in a High Court presided over by a Single
Judge objects to its being heard by him and the Judge
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the
objection, he shall make a report to the State
Government, which may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, transfer such suit, appeal or proceeding to
any other High Court.
16
Provided that no suit, appeal or proceeding shall be
transferred to a High Court without the consent of the
State Government of the State in which that High
Court has its principal seat.”
15. Since acceptance of the arguments of Mr. Balgopal and Mr.
Sharma would result in denuding a common High Court of the
jurisdiction to even entertain an application under section 24 of
the CPC for transfer of a suit from a Civil Court in one State to a
Civil Court of another State, notwithstanding that exercise of
jurisdiction by such High Court extends to both such States, it is
absolutely necessary to consider Chapter V of the Constitution
of India titled “(T)he High Courts in the States” and more
particularly the terms of Articles 214, 231, 227, 235 and 228
which, to our mind, are of utmost relevance for deciding the
legal issue. At the same time, having regard to the terms of
pre-amended section 25 of the CPC, a peep into the pages of
history as to how the Gauhati High Court became the common
High Court for the State of Assam and the other States seems
to be imperative.
16. Article 214 is clear that there shall be a High Court for
each State. Article 231, inserted in the Constitution by the
Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, is an ordainment
17
that notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding
provisions of Chapter V, Parliament may by law establish a
common High Court for two or more States or for two or more
States and a Union territory. Article 227 is the recognition of the
power of superintendence of every High Court over all courts
and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. The control over all District Courts and
courts subordinate thereto, in terms of Article 235, vests in the
High Court. One other important provision is Article 228. Article
228 empowers the High Court, subject to its satisfaction that a
case pending in a court subordinate to it involves a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and
the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the
case, to withdraw the case and (a) either dispose of the case
itself, or (b) determine the said question of law and return the
case to the court from which the case has been so withdrawn
together with a copy of its judgment on such question,
whereupon the said court shall proceed to dispose of the case
in conformity with such judgment.
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON HIGH COURT
18
17. We now move on to note the origin and evolution of the
common High Court, i.e., the Gauhati High Court and the
trajectory that it has been ordained to follow in relation to the
territories over which it exercises jurisdiction.
18. The precursor of the Gauhati High Court was the High
Court of Assam, which was established on 5th April, 1948 in
terms of the Assam High Court Order, 1948 (for brevity ‘the
1948 Order’) made by the Governor General in exercise of
power conferred by section 229 of the Government of India Act,
1935 and as adopted by the India Provincial Constitution
(Amendment) Order, 1948. In terms of paragraph 4 thereof, the
High Court of Assam was conferred, in respect of the territories
for the time being included in the province of Assam, all such
original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in
force immediately before the prescribed day, was exercisable in
respect of the said territories or any part thereof, by the High
Court in Calcutta or by the Governor of Assam exercising the
functions of a high court.
19. In 1962, by an Act of Parliament titled the State of
Nagaland Act, 1962 (for brevity ‘the 1962 Act’), the State of
Nagaland was formed. While sub-section (1) of section 13 of the
19
1962 Act ordained that there shall be a common high court
called the High Court of Assam and Nagaland, sub-section (3)
thereof provided that expenditure in respect of the salaries and
allowances of the Judges of the common High Court shall be
allocated between the States of Assam and Nagaland in such
proportion as the President may by order determine.
20. The 1962 Act was followed by the North-Eastern Areas
(Reorganisation) Act, 1971 (for brevity ‘the 1971 Act’). This
enactment contained provisions for the establishment of the
States of Manipur and Tripura and for the formation of the State
of Meghalaya, and the Union territories of Mizoram and
Arunachal Pradesh, by reorganizing the existing State of Assam.
Part IV of the 1971 Act titled “High Court” contained sections 28
to 43. Sections 28 and 29, being relevant are quoted below:
“28. Common High Court for Assam, Nagaland,
Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura.—(1) On and from the
appointed day,—
(a) the High Court of Assam and Nagaland shall cease to
function and is hereby abolished;
(b) there shall be a common High Court for the States of
Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura to
be called the Gauhati High Court (the High Court of
Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura);
(c) the Judges of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland
holding office immediately before that day shall,
unless they have elected otherwise, become on that
day the Judges of the common High Court:
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(2) Nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall
prejudice or affect the continued operation of any notice
served, injunction issued, direction given or proceedings
taken before the appointed day by the High Court of
Assam and Nagaland under the powers then conferred
upon that Court.”
“29. Jurisdiction of the common High Court.—On and
from the appointed day, the common High Court shall
have, in respect of the territories comprised in the States
of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura, all
such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the law
in force immediately before the appointed day, are
exercisable in respect of those territories by the High
Court of Assam and Nagaland or the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner for Manipur, or the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner for Tripura, as the case may be.”
21. With the enactment of the State of Arunachal Pradesh Act,
1986 and the State of Mizoram Act, 1986, two new States were
born. Section 18 of the former and section 15 of the latter
legislation, more or less commonly worded, when read together
would evince that a common High Court for the States of
Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and
Arunachal Pradesh to be called the Gauhati High Court (the
High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura,
Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) came into existence. The
common thread that runs through the developments of 1962,
1971 and 1986, noted above, is that as and when the
jurisdiction of the High Court of Assam and thereafter the
Gauhati High Court came to be enlarged and extended to
21
States other than Assam, all seven sister States in the NorthEastern part of the country agreed to bear the expenditure in
respect of the salaries and allowances of the Judges of the
common High Court as shall be allocated amongst the States in
such proportion by an order of the President.
22. In view of the provisions of the 1971 Act, till little over a
decade back, the Gauhati High Court was the common High
Court for the seven sister states. The jurisdiction of the said
High Court extended throughout the territories of Assam,
Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal
Pradesh.
23. However, the 1971 Act came to be amended by the NorthEastern Areas (Re-organisation) and Other Related Laws
(Amendment) Act, 2012 (for brevity ‘the Amendment Act’). It
established separate High Courts for the States of Meghalaya,
Manipur and Tripura. Accordingly, the definition of “common
High Court” in section 2(d) of the 1971 Act was amended. Apart
from insertion of sections 28A to 28K between sections 28 and
29, the Amendment Act, inter alia, also introduced a proviso in
sub-section (1) of section 28, reading as follows:
22
“Provided that on and from the commencement of the
North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) and Other
Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012, the common
High Court shall be the High Court for the States of
Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland
and shall cease to have its jurisdiction, powers and
authority for the States of Meghalaya, Manipur and
Tripura.”
24. Hence, today, the Gauhati High Court is the common High
Court exercising jurisdiction throughout Assam, Nagaland,
Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh; a fortiori, all Civil Courts in
these four States are subordinate to the same High Court, i.e.,
the Gauhati High Court. Thus, it is a High Court which earlier
exercised its jurisdiction over seven different States and is
presently exercising jurisdiction over four different States. This,
by itself, is a unique feature which stands unmatched in the
judicial annals of the country post-independence.
25. We can take judicial notice that Judges of the Gauhati High
Court in the past have been elevated from amongst advocates
and judicial officers hailing from the aforesaid States.
26. Therefore, so far as judicial administration is concerned, in
terms of Article 231 of the Constitution, the Gauhati High Court
is the High Court, inter alia, for the State of Assam as well as
for the State of Nagaland.
23
PRE-AMENDED SECTION 25, CPC
27. Before proceeding further, we may now refer to the preamended section 25 of the Code for the purpose of
understanding what was the mischief that the Parliament
intended to address by radically altering its relevant terms
resulting in its substantial substitution. Bare perusal of the preamended provision clearly reflects that its scope and
applicability were rather limited. Unless the State Governments
were ad idem, a transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding
from a Civil Court in one State to a Civil Court in another State
was not a permissible option. That apart, such transfer of a suit,
appeal or other proceeding instead of being effected by a
judicial act was left to an administrative act and, that too, only
if the two State Governments were in agreement. The Law
Commission having recommended an amendment, section 25
of the CPC came to be amended by the Amendment Act 104 of
1976. A contrast of the pre-amended and present version of
section 25 is clearly suggestive of the distinctive variance qua
the authority to exercise the power of transfer. At this juncture,
the Statement of Objects and Reasons (for brevity ‘the SOR’)
for amending section 25 may also be noted:
24
“Clause 12.—Section 25 of the Code empowers the
State Government to transfer suits, etc. in certain
circumstances from the High Court exercising
jurisdiction in the State to another High Court. This
section is very narrow in scope as it provides only for
the transfer of suit, appeal or other proceeding
pending in a High Court presided over by a Single
Judge. Besides, the State Government, does not seem
to be an appropriate agency for exercising the power
of transfer. Section 25 is, therefore, being substituted
by a new section which provides for the transfer to the
Supreme Court the existing power vested with the
State Government and to confer on the Supreme Court
such wide powers of transfer as it has in criminal
cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. Further, the new section covers
transfer of cases from or to the Original Side of a High
Court to or from any other civil court. The new section
is thus wider in scope than Section 406 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.”
28. Thus, with the amendment of section 25, a serious
impediment in administration of justice by the courts of law was
remedied by conferment of power on this Court to decide on
inter-State transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceeding
pending in a Civil Court of one State to a Civil Court of another
State. Since under the pre-amended section 25, such a transfer
could be made by the transferor State only if the transferee
State were to consent to it, it was rightly observed in the SOR
that it was not the function of the States to decide on such
transfer. Though advisedly, we presume, that there is absence
of any reference in the SOR about the uncertainty centering
around cooperation or the lack of it between the relevant
25
States prior to a transfer of the nature referred to in section 25
being effected, it does not take too long to comprehend that
Parliament did proceed in the right direction and sought to
address the mischief that could ensue if the two States were
not on the same page resulting in depriving a litigant of having
his cause vindicated. Be that as it may.
CONSIDERATION OF THE DECISIONS
29. Having surveyed the provisions of the Constitution relating
to the High Courts in general and how the Gauhati High Court
has taken shape as the common High Court for, inter alia, the
States of Assam and Nagaland, it is time to look into the
decision in Durgesh Sharma (supra), cited by Mr. Balgopal
and by Mr. Goswami as well as the other decisions cited by him
for the appellants.
30. In Durgesh Sharma (supra), this Court was seized of the
question as to whether the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was
justified, on an application under section 23 of the Code, in
ordering transfer of a petition under section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, instituted by the appellant-husband in a
court in Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, to a court in Malegaon, District
26
Nashik, Maharashtra to be tried along with a petition under
section 9 of the said Act instituted by the respondent-wife.
Considering the provisions of law, this Court held as follows:
“46. Having considered the scheme of the Code as
amended from time to time, in our judgment, the law
relating to transfer of cases (suits, appeals and other
proceedings) is well settled. It is found in Sections 22 to
25 of the Code and those provisions are exhaustive in
nature. Whereas Sections 22, 24 and 25 deal with power
of transfer, Section 23 merely provides forum and
specifies the court in which an application for transfer
may be made. Section 23 is not a substantive provision
vesting power in a particular court to order transfer.
47. In our considered opinion, where several courts
having jurisdiction are subordinate to one appellate
court, an application for transfer may be made to such
appellate court and the court may transfer a case from
one court subordinate to it to another court subordinate
to it. Likewise, where such courts are subordinate to the
same High Court, an application may be made and
action may be taken by the High Court transferring a
case from one court subordinate to it to any other court
subordinate to that High Court. But where such courts
are subordinate to different High Courts, it is only the
Supreme Court (this Court) which may pass an order of
transfer. In other words, if two courts are subordinate to
different High Courts, one High Court has no power,
jurisdiction or authority to transfer a case pending in any
court subordinate to that High Court to a court
subordinate to other High Court. It is only the Supreme
Court (this Court) which may order the transfer.
48. Section 25, as originally enacted in the Code of 1908
and the decisions prior to the Amendment Act of 1976,
have no application after substitution of Section 25 as it
stands today. To us, Section 23 has no application to
such cases and the only provision attracted is Section
25.
49. The language of Section 25 also supports the view
which we are inclined to take. Sub-section (1) of Section
25 of the Code enacts that ‘On the application of a
party’, this Court may pass an appropriate order of
transfer. Thus, Section 25 is ‘self-contained code’ and
27
comprises substantive as well as procedural law on the
point. It allows a party to move the Court by making an
application as also it empowers the Court to make an
order of transfer.
50. The matter can be examined from another angle
also. Every court has its own local or territorial limits
beyond which it cannot exercise the jurisdiction. So far
as this Court is concerned, its jurisdiction is not
circumscribed by any territorial limitation and it extends
over any person or authority within the territory of India.
But, it has no jurisdiction outside the country. So far as a
High Court is concerned, its jurisdiction is limited to
territory within which it exercises jurisdiction and not
beyond it. On that analogy also, a High Court cannot
pass an order transferring a case pending in a court
subordinate to it to a court subordinate to another High
Court. It would be inconsistent with the limitation as to
territorial jurisdiction of the Court.
***
54. After the commencement of the Constitution and
establishment of the Supreme Court (this Court),
Parliament thought it proper to amend Section 25 of the
Code and accordingly, it was substituted by empowering
this Court to order transfer from one High Court to
another High Court or to one civil court in one State to
another civil court in any other State.
55. It is no doubt true that even when Section 25 in the
present form was substituted by the Amendment Act of
1976, sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Code has
neither been deleted nor amended. That, however, is not
relevant. Since in our considered view, Section 23 is
merely a procedural provision, no order of transfer can
be made under the said provision. If the case is covered
by Section 25 of the Code, it is only that section which
will apply for both the purposes, namely, for the purpose
of making application and also for the purpose of
effecting transfer. ***”
31. Durgesh Sharma (supra) is an authority having the
effect of a binding precedent for deciding cases where the High
Court for a State seeks to transfer a suit, appeal or proceeding
28
from a court subordinate to it to a court subordinate to the High
Court for another State. We share the views expressed therein.
However, having regard to the fundamental factual
dissimilarities present in this case, the ratio decidendi of
Durgesh Sharma (supra) while answering the core issue may
not apply here.
32. The decision in Megha Jain (supra) was rendered on a
reference being made to a larger Bench by another single Judge
of the Gauhati High Court, who was not persuaded to agree
with the view taken by the coordinate bench in Pomi
Sengupta (supra). A matrimonial proceeding instituted by the
respondent, pending in a court in Aizawl, Mizoram was sought
to be transferred to a court in Kamrup, Guwahati, Assam by the
petitioner by pursuing the remedy provided by section 24 of the
CPC. This is what the Division Bench, speaking through the
Chief Justice, held:
“9. The constitution of the High Court with its Principal Seat
and the Permanent Benches in the manner, as taken note
supra, would indicate that all the courts in all the said four
States are subordinate to the Gauhati High Court and since
no separate High Courts are established in respect of
Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, a provision
under the Notification dated 22.6.1990 is made for the
establishment of the Permanent Bench at Aizawl. Similar
Notifications had been issued in respect of other two States.
These aspects would leave no room for doubt that the
29
Gauhati High Court can exercise its power and jurisdiction
over all Courts in all the four States. If in that light, the
provision as contained in section 24 of the CPC, extracted
above, is taken note, sub-section (1)(a) would indicate that
the High Court or the District Court may, at any stage,
transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before
it for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and
competent to try or dispose of the same. If the said provision
is kept in view and the above noted discussion relating to the
establishment of the High Court and the Permanent Bench is
taken note and in that circumstance, when the subordinate
court in the State of Mizoram as also the subordinate court in
the State of Assam is subordinate to the Gauhati High Court,
a transfer petition filed under section 24 of the CPC before
this court, namely, the Gauhati High Court, even for transfer
of a case from the subordinate court in any of the four
States, as indicated above, to the other State would be
maintainable from the very provision as contained in section
24 itself. In such circumstance, the question of filing a
petition under section 25 of the CPC would not arise since
there are no separate High Courts exercising jurisdiction over
the States referred to above. If in that background, the
observation, as contained in Smt. Pomi Sengupta (supra) is
taken note, the learned Single Judge was not justified in
arriving at the conclusion that if a petition under section 24
of the CPC is entertained, it would amount to adding words
to the provision.”
33. Chalasani Deepthi (supra) arose out of an application
filed by the petitioner-wife seeking withdrawal and transfer of a
suit for restitution of conjugal rights, instituted by the
respondent-husband in the Family Court, Ranga Reddy District,
Telengana to the court of the Judge, Family Court, Vijaywada,
Andhra Pradesh. A learned Judge of the (undivided) Andhra
Pradesh High Court having heard the parties and the Advocates
General of the States of Telengana and Andhra Pradesh and
30
upon consideration of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh
Reorganisation Act, more particularly sections 30 and 31
thereof, together with sections 24 and 25 of the CPC as well as
the decision in Durgesh Sharma (supra), held that both the
courts being subordinate to the Andhra Pradesh High Court,
which was till then the common High Court for the States of
Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, the application for transfer
under section 24 was maintainable.
34. A learned Judge of the Bombay High Court, while following
the decision in Chalasani Deepthi (supra) allowed the
application under section 24 of the CPC filed by the petitionerwife seeking transfer of a matrimonial petition pending on the
file of the Civil Judge in the court at Mapusa, North Goa,
instituted by the respondent-husband, to the Family Court at
Bandra, Mumbai, Maharashtra. Incidentally, the Bombay High
Court is the common High Court for the States of Maharashtra
and Goa as well as the Union territories of Dadra & Nagar
Haveli and Daman & Diu. The learned Judge spurned the
objection of the respondent-husband that the transfer
application ought to have been filed in the Bombay High Court
at Goa and not at its principal seat in Mumbai, for the reasons
31
recorded in the decision. Significantly, no objection was raised
in this case that transfer ought to have been prayed by filing an
application before this Court under section 25 of the CPC.
35. There is, therefore, a host of judicial authorities at the
level of the High Courts that section 25 of the CPC would not
bar entertainment of an application under section 24 thereof by
a High Court, even for an inter-State transfer, if such High Court
is the common High Court for two or more States and transfer,
as prayed, is not to a civil court beyond the said High Court’s
jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
36. As noted, the appellants as plaintiffs have instituted the
civil suit in the court of the District Judge, Dimapur, Nagaland
and now seek transfer of such suit to the court of the District
Judge, Guwahati, Assam. Such a transfer, if allowed, no doubt
would constitute an inter-State transfer. Insofar as inter-State
transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceeding is concerned, a
plain and literal reading of section 25 of the CPC does suggest
that the power to so transfer lies with the Supreme Court only.
Paragraph 54 of Durgesh Sharma (supra), heavily relied upon
32
by Mr. Balgopal, lends support to his contentions. Having regard
to the scheme of section 25 of the CPC and on its plain terms,
read with Durgesh Sharma (supra), Mr. Balgopal seems to
have a point that such an inter-State transfer of the nature
prayed by the appellants cannot be ordered under section 24.
However, something more seems to be visible when we put on
our judicial lens to resolve the issue.
37. Section 24 of the CPC is a general power of ‘transfer and
withdrawal’ capable of being invoked by the High Courts at any
stage either suo motu without notice or on the application of
any of the parties after notice, whereas section 25 confers
exclusive power on the Supreme Court, on the application of
either of the parties and after notice, to transfer suits, etc. from
the Courts stated therein. While section 24 is part of the
general law, section 25 is the special law. Clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 24, which is relevant for the present case,
opens up an avenue for the High Court, upon reaching a
satisfaction that a case for transfer has been made out, to
withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any
court subordinate to it and (i) to try and dispose of the same; or
(ii) to transfer the same for trial or disposal to any court
33
subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same;
or (iii) to retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the court
from which it is withdrawn; whereas, section 25 empowers the
Supreme Court on a satisfaction being recorded that an order is
expedient for the ends of justice to direct that any suit, appeal
or other proceeding be transferred (i) from one High Court to a
High Court; and (ii) from other Civil Court in one State to other
Civil Court in any other State. The text of the two sections,
therefore, makes the position clear about the powers reserved
for the High Courts and the Supreme Court to transfer suits,
appeal or other proceedings. Law is well-settled, and we may
profitably refer to the decision in Amarendra Pratap Singh
vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati8
, that a general law cannot defeat
the provisions of a special law to the extent to which they are in
conflict; else, an effort has to be made at reconciling the two
provisions by homogenous reading. What, therefore, needs to
be seen and appreciated is whether there is any conflict or
inconsistency between the general law (section 24) and the
special law (section 25) for the former to yield to the latter, and
ascertain whether the High Court still has the jurisdiction under
the general law to order an inter-State transfer notwithstanding
8 (2004) 10 SCC 65
34
the special law vesting the Supreme Court with such power of
transfer. There has to be an inconsistency between the two so
as to apply the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant. The
jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court pursuant to the
amendment of section 25 of the CPC in 1976 though special,
invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 24
may not come in conflict and defeat section 25, if jurisdiction is
still found available to be exercised in a given case under the
former without doing violence to the latter.
38. In our considered opinion, section 25 of the CPC would
operate as a bar in cases like the one in Durgesh Sharma
(supra); however, section 25 of the CPC ~ notwithstanding the
scheme envisaged in it ~ does not operate as a complete bar
to denude a common High Court, like the Gauhati High Court,
to entertain an application under section 24 thereof even for an
order to transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding from one
State to another State, provided the States concerned are two
of the four States in relation to which such High Court still
exercises jurisdiction. This is an opinion formed by us, for the
reasons, which we venture to assign now.
35
39. From the factual matrix vis-à-vis the Constitutional and
statutory provisions, there can be no cavil that the courts and
tribunals in the States of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and
Arunachal Pradesh are not only under the superintendence of
the Gauhati High Court in terms of Article 227, all district courts
and courts subordinate thereto in such States are subject to the
control of the Gauhati High Court under Article 235 as well as
subordinate to the same High Court in terms of section 3 of the
CPC. Section 25 has been inserted in the CPC with a definite
purpose of ensuring that no High Court transfers a suit, appeal
or other proceeding pending in a Civil Court in one State to a
Civil Court in another State. The reason for this is that the High
Court to which the application for transfer is made does have
the power in law to transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding
to a Civil Court subordinate to it but it does not have any power
in law to transfer any of the above to a Civil Court which is
subordinate to another High Court. The same situation that
Durgesh Sharma (supra) had to deal with, where the Civil
Courts subordinate to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and
the Bombay High Court were involved. This Court had the
occasion to hold that if two courts are subordinate to different
36
High Courts, one High Court has no power, jurisdiction or
authority to transfer a case pending in any court subordinate to
that High Court to a court subordinate to another High Court
and it is only the Supreme Court which may order the transfer.
The reason for such conclusion seems to be obvious that the
High Court, to which an application for transfer is made, does
neither enjoy any power of superintendence under Article 227
over the Civil Court to which the transfer is sought nor can such
Civil Court be said to be a court over which the High Court
exercises any control of the nature referred to in Article 235.
Also, in such a case, the Civil Court beyond the territory in
relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction cannot be
considered to be a court subordinate to such High Court in the
sense section 3 of the CPC is to be understood.
40. The creases that were sought to be ironed out by radically
altering section 25 of the CPC and presenting it in an altogether
new avatar have to be given due consideration in the light of
the SOR and the provisions of Chapter V of the Constitution.
Bestowing such consideration, we hold that what is of
primordial importance to attract section 25 is the involvement
of two civil courts (transferor and transferee) in the proceedings
37
for transfer, which are not only situate in two different States,
but are also subject to the power of judicial superintendence
and administrative control of the High Courts of each such
State.
41. While focusing on section 25, one cannot be completely
oblivious of the terms of section 24(1)(b)(ii). As and when it is
approached with an application under section 24 for transfer,
the High Court, subject to its satisfaction that the facts and
circumstances do warrant an order to be made, is empowered
to “transfer … to any Court subordinate to it”. These words are
of immense significance. In directing a transfer, the High Court
can transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding to “any Court”
but bearing in mind the fetter that any such court, to which the
relevant case or matter is proposed or sought to be transferred,
must be subordinate to it and otherwise competent to deal with
the subject matter; if such court is either not subordinate or not
competent, the power is not available to be exercised.
However, there is no such fetter in section 24 that power under
sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof cannot be
exercised if the transferee court, though subordinate to the
High Court, is situate in a different State. Similar is the case
38
with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 24. The power is
available so long the Civil Court continues to remain
subordinate to it under Article 227 read with Article 235 and
under section 3 of the CPC. To this extent, the High Court
enjoys a supreme power which is not even subject to the power
of the Supreme Court under section 25. The only caveat is that
this power of transfer under section 24(1)(a) and 24(1)(b)(ii),
however, cannot be exercised by the Gauhati High Court, say
for transfer of a civil suit from a court in Assam or Nagaland to
a Civil Court in Tripura or Manipur or Meghalaya because the
said States, from 2012, are no longer part of the Gauhati High
Court and are since having High Courts of their own.
42. It is time all concerned realize that a High Court ~
howsoever big or small, old or new ~ is as much a
Constitutional Court as this Court is and enjoys wide ranging
powers vested in it by law. No doubt, the power under section
25 is a special power, but the common High Courts of the
country ought not to read section 24 of the CPC in a manner as
if the power of the Supreme Court under section 25 to order an
inter-State transfer is available to be exclusively exercised by it
in all cases of inter-State transfer, thereby denuding the
39
common High Courts of the country of their jurisdiction by mere
reference to involvement of an inter-State transfer and without
anything more being looked at.
43. The States of Assam and Nagaland by reason of the
provisions of the 1962 Act, then the 1971 Act and finally the
Amendment Act have the Gauhati High Court as their common
High Court and it is the Gauhati High Court that enjoys power of
judicial superintendence over all courts within the territories of
these two States. Gauhati High Court also exercises
administrative control over all district courts and courts
subordinate to them. Although the States of Assam and
Nagaland in the political map of India have well demarcated
areas, for the purpose of administration of justice, both States
are mandatorily subject to the jurisdiction of the Gauhati High
Court. Having regard to the special nature of jurisdiction that is
vested in a common High Court like the Gauhati High Court,
there cannot be a truncation of the power available under
clauses (a) and (b) of section 24(1), which includes suo motu
power.
44. Secondly, we are inclined to the view that should the
contention advanced by Mr. Balgopal be accepted, the same is
40
bound to lead to anomalous and incongruous results. If a
common High Court, such as the Gauhati High Court, is
satisfied that a situation for withdrawing a civil suit from a
court, say in Nagaland, does exist, section 24(1)(b)(i) of the
CPC confers power on the Gauhati High Court to withdraw such
suit and dispose of the same itself. We are conscious that the
verb employed in the first part of section 24(1)(b(i) is
‘withdraw’ and not ‘transfer’; also, that clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 24 employs the verbs ‘withdraw’,
‘transfer’ and ‘retransfer’ in the three sub-clauses for achieving
the specified ends. However, would it mean that withdrawal of
a case does never involve a transfer? The verb ‘transfer’, inter
alia, means to move, or to make somebody/something move,
from one place to another. Once, for whatever reason, the
movement of a file from one place to another is involved, may
be by reason of withdrawal, a transfer in the broader sense
does take place. Now, the principal seat of the Gauhati High
Court being at Guwahati, in the State of Assam, were to
exercise the power conferred by section 24(1)(b(i), the effect
thereof upon such a withdrawal is that the suit would stand
transferred to the principal seat at Guwahati from the Civil
41
Court in Nagaland and, possibly, assigned a separate
registration number for the purpose of administrative
convenience, whereafter three options in terms of section 24(1)
(b) are open to the High Court for further course of action for
taking the suit to its logical conclusion. Once the suit is
withdrawn from the court in Nagaland and placed before the
High Court at its principal seat in Guwahati, Assam, would not
that be a case of an inter-State transfer? The answer cannot
possibly but be in the affirmative. The other aspect requiring
consideration in this regard is whether disposal of the civil suit
by the Gauhati High Court, if the same were withdrawn from
the subordinate court, constitute a transfer from one Civil Court
to another Civil Court. The High Courts are Constitutional
Courts and not a ‘Civil Court’ in the sense the term is
understood, so to encompass a transfer from one Civil Court to
another Civil Court. However, if at all such a suit were
withdrawn and finally disposed of by the Gauhati High Court at
its principal seat, it would necessarily be in the exercise of its
ordinary civil jurisdiction and the procedure to be followed
would undoubtedly be guided by the provisions of the CPC. In a
sense, the High Court would step into the shoes of the Civil
42
Court from which the suit has been withdrawn. Could the
provisions in section 25 of the CPC, in such circumstances, be
cited to abrogate the Constitutional and statutory power of the
Gauhati High Court to withdraw a civil suit from a Civil Court in
Nagaland and to decide the same? In course of hearing, we had
invited the attention of Mr. Balgopal to this situation and sought
his response. He could not have and rightly did not dispute that
in such a situation, the power vested in the Gauhati High Court
by the Constitution as well as the CPC cannot be abrogated.
Thus, exercise of the power that section 24(1)(b)(i) confers on
the Gauhati High Court in a given case, would ultimately entail
a transfer of the civil suit from the State of Nagaland to the
High Court, having its principal seat at Guwahati in the State of
Assam. Such a situation is not and cannot be controlled by
section 25, and on a harmonious reading of sections 24 and 25,
it has to be held that section 25 does not in all cases fetter the
power of a common High Court to order inter-State transfer of a
suit, appeal or other proceeding. Otherwise, it would be a
fallacy to believe that while an inter-State transfer would be
permissible in terms of sub-clause (i) but not sub-clause (ii) of
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24. We reiterate, section
43
25 would essentially have to be read as barring transfer of any
suit, appeal or other proceeding from a Civil Court in one State
to a Civil Court in another State if such States have their own
High Courts but not in the case of a common High Court like the
Gauhati High Court.
45. A similar power of withdrawal of any case involving, inter
alia, a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the
Constitution is conferred on the Gauhati High Court by Article
228 of the Constitution. If a situation of the nature
contemplated by Article 228 does exist, the principal seat of
the Gauhati High Court at Guwahati may withdraw such case
from any of the three States of Nagaland, Mizoram and
Arunachal Pradesh and decide which of the two courses of
action is to be opted. That would also constitute an inter-State
transfer. Obviously, section 25 cannot operate as a bar for the
Gauhati High Court to exercise a power conferred on it by the
Constitution.
46. Finally, in our opinion, an approach to construe section 25
of the CPC has to be fair, pragmatic, reasonable and realistic.
Any construction of section 25 which would impede “access to
justice”, considered to be a Fundamental Right, has to be
44
eschewed. A narrow interpretation of section 25 imposing a bar
for entertainment of an application under section 24 for
transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding by a common
High Court like the Gauhati High Court inter-se the four States
in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction could place a heavy
burden and might pose an insurmountable obstacle for litigants
of the far-flung areas of the North-East, if they were made to
approach this Court for such transfer on the specious ground
that the Civil Court to which the same is proposed to be
transferred is in a State other than the State in which the suit
has been instituted. An interpretation of the law that seeks to
address the mischief, that is consistent with the Constitution
and promotes constitutional objectives and that which responds
to the needs of the nation must be adopted. If “access to
justice” has to be real, it becomes the moral responsibility of
the Supreme Court, the supreme guardians/protectors of the
rights of people guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws,
not to construe the substantive part in section 25 of the Code in
a pedantic manner to bring about a situation that would thwart
the initiative of making “access to justice” real.
45
47. What remains is the contention advanced by Mr. Sharma.
We are not impressed, to say the least. Although sections 22 to
25 of the CPC deal with transfers, sections 22 and 23 can be
invoked in situations of the nature contemplated in section 22
by a defendant, and by none else, and the court which is
empowered to entertain such an application is the court
referred to in section 23. Section 22, in our view, permits
transfer on application of the doctrine of forum conveniens and
it has no applicability on facts and in the circumstances where
the application for transfer is at the instance of the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
48. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the issue is answered
by concluding that:
(i) a true and proper interpretation of section 25 of the
CPC leads us to the conclusion that the same applies
to inter-State transfer of a suit, appeal or other
proceeding where both States have a High Court in
terms of Article 214 of the Constitution and not to a
transfer where both States have a common High
Court under Article 231 thereof; and
46
(ii) the power under section 24 of the CPC can be
exercised by the High Court even for inter-State
transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding, if it is
the common High Court for two or more States under
Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil
Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to
it.
The questions framed at the beginning of this judgment are
answered accordingly.
RELIEF
49. The sequitur of this discussion, with respect, is that the
Gauhati High Court while rendering the judgment and order
under challenge proceeded on an erroneous approach, and
such approach has also been found to be flawed in Megha Jain
(supra). The impugned judgment and order being unsustainable
in law has to be and is, accordingly, set aside and the civil
appeal stands allowed. The Gauhati High Court shall now
proceed to decide the application under section 24 of the CPC
afresh, on its own merits.
47
50. In view of the aforesaid order, the transfer petition under
section 25 of the CPC is rendered infructuous; hence, it stands
dismissed.
51. We request the Gauhati High Court to assign reasonable
priority to the application under section 24 of the CPC and to
dispose of the same as early as possible, subject to its
convenience.
52. Parties shall bear their own costs.
……………………………….J
(HRISHIKESH ROY)
...….…………………………J
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
NEW DELHI;
28th FEBRUARY, 2023.
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