Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy versus State of Karnataka
Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy versus State of Karnataka
Criminal Appeal @ S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3400 of 2017
Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 942 OF 2023
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3400 of 2017)
Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy …Appellant
versus
State of Karnataka ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
2. The appellant has been convicted for the offences
punishable under Sections 366, 376 and 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). The controversy is limited
to the sentence for the offence punishable under Section 302 of
the IPC. The learned Sessions Judge (FastTrack Court)
sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
the rest of his life. The appellant preferred an appeal before
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the High Court to challenge the conviction and sentence. The
State Government preferred an appeal for enhancement of the
sentence. The High Court, by the impugned judgment,
dismissed both appeals. On 21st April 2017, notice was issued
by this Court only on sentence.
SUBMISSIONS
3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellantaccused
submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. V.
Sriharan alias Murugan & Ors.1
, a modified sentence can be
imposed only by the Constitutional Courts and not by the
Sessions Courts. He submitted that the Constitutional Courts
can grant life sentence either for the entirety of life or for a
specific period, only while commuting the death penalty
imposed on an accused. If the death penalty is not imposed,
the Courts are powerless to impose a modified sentence. He
also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Swamy
Shraddananda (2) alias Murali Manohar Mishra v. State
of Karnataka2
. He invited our attention to paragraph 105 of
the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of V.
1 2016 (7) SCC 1
2 2008 (13) SCC 767
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Sriharan1
, wherein this Court has laid down that a modified
sentence can be an alternative only to the death penalty. He,
therefore, submitted that the Constitution Bench held that a
fixedterm sentence or modified sentence can be imposed by
way of substitution for the death penalty.
4. He submitted that even the subsequent decisions of this
Court show that imposition of a modified sentence was made
only in the cases where the death penalty has been commuted.
He relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Sahib
Hussain alias Sahib Jan v. State of Rajasthan3 and in the
case of Gurvail Singh alias Gala v. State of Punjab4
.
5. On facts, he pointed out that at the time of the
commission of the offence, the appellant’s age was 22 years.
He pointed out that the appellant has a young wife, a small
child and aged parents. Moreover, he has no antecedents and
poses no threat to society. Moreover, his conduct in jail is all
throughout satisfactory and in fact, he has completed B.A.
degree course while in jail. Lastly, he pointed out that the
3 2013 (9) SCC 778
4 2013 (10) SCC 631
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appellant has undergone sentence for approximately seventeen
years and two months.
6. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent – State is that the Constitutional Courts are not
powerless to impose modified sentences considering the gravity
of the offence, the conduct of the accused and other relevant
factors even though the death penalty has not been imposed.
He submitted that the power of the Constitutional Courts to
grant a modified sentence could not be circumscribed by
holding that the said power can be exercised only when the
question is of commuting the death sentence. By pointing out
findings of the Trial Court and the High Court, he submitted
that in the facts of this case, the most stringent punishment
was contemplated. He submitted that in any case, the High
Court, after considering all the factual aspects, has reiterated
the view taken by the Sessions Court by imposing a sentence
for the entirety of the appellant’s life.
OUR VIEW
7. Under Chapter III of the IPC, different punishments have
been provided. Section 53 provides for five categories of
punishments: the death penalty, imprisonment for life,
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imprisonment (either rigorous or simple), forfeiture of property
and fine. It is also a settled position that when an offender is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the incarceration
can continue till the end of the life of the accused. However, it
is subject to a grant of remission under the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) and the
Constitutional powers vested in the Hon’ble Governor and the
Hon’ble President of India, as the case may be. While imposing
a life sentence, if it is directed that the accused shall not be
released for a specific period, it becomes a modified
punishment. In such a case, before the expiry of the fixed
period provided, the power to grant remission under Cr.P.C.
cannot be exercised.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied
upon what is held in paragraph 56 of the decision of this Court
in the case of Swamy Shraddananda2
, which reads thus:
“56. But this leads to a more important
question about the punishment
commensurate to the appellant's crime.
The sentence of imprisonment for a term of
14 years, that goes under the euphemism
of life imprisonment is equally, if not more,
unacceptable. As a matter of fact, Mr.
Hegde informed us that the appellant was
taken in custody on 2831994 and
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submitted that by virtue of the provisions
relating to remission, the sentence of life
imprisonment, without any qualification or
further direction would, in all likelihood,
lead to his release from jail in the first
quarter of 2009 since he has already
completed more than 14 years of
incarceration. This eventuality is simply
not acceptable to this Court. What then is
the answer? The answer lies in breaking
this standardisation that, in practice,
renders the sentence of life imprisonment
equal to imprisonment for a period of no
more than 14 years; in making it clear that
the sentence of life imprisonment when
awarded as a substitute for death
penalty would be carried out strictly as
directed by the Court. This Court,
therefore, must lay down a good and
sound legal basis for putting the
punishment of imprisonment for life,
awarded as substitute for death penalty,
beyond any remission and to be carried
out as directed by the Court so that it
may be followed, in appropriate cases as
a uniform policy not only by this Court
but also by the High Courts, being the
superior courts in their respective
States. A suggestion to this effect was
made by this Court nearly thirty years ago
in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab [(1979) 3
SCC 745 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 848] . In para 14
of the judgment this Court held and
observed as follows: (SCC p. 753)
“14. The sentences of death in the
present appeal are liable to be
reduced to life imprisonment. We
may add a footnote to the ruling
in Rajendra Prasad case [Rajendra
Prasad v. State of U.P., (1979) 3
SCC 646 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 749] .
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Criminal Appeal @ S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3400 of 2017
Taking the cue from the English
legislation on abolition, we may
suggest that life imprisonment
which strictly means imprisonment
for the whole of the men's life but in
practice amounts to incarceration
for a period between 10 and 14
years may, at the option of the
convicting court, be subject to the
condition that the sentence of
imprisonment shall last as long as
life lasts, where there are
exceptional indications of murderous
recidivism and the community
cannot run the risk of the convict
being at large. This takes care of
judicial apprehensions that unless
physically liquidated the culprit
may at some remote time repeat
murder.”
We think that it is time that the course
suggested in Dalbir Singh [(1979) 3 SCC
745 :1979 SCC (Cri) 848] should receive a
formal recognition by the Court.”
(emphasis added)
9. In the case of V. Sriharan1
, the Constitution Bench was
dealing with the question which is quoted in paragraph 50,
which reads thus:
“50. Having thus noted the relevant
provisions in the Constitution, the Penal
Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and
the DSPE Act, we wish to deal with the
questions referred for our consideration in
seriatim. The first question framed for the
consideration of the Constitution Bench
reads as under : (V. Sriharan case [Union of
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Criminal Appeal @ S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3400 of 2017
India v. V. Sriharan, (2014) 11 SCC 1 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 1] , SCC p. 19, para 52)
“52.1. Whether imprisonment for life in
terms of Section 53 read with Section 45
of the Penal Code meant imprisonment
for rest of the life of the prisoner or a
convict undergoing life imprisonment has
a right to claim remission and whether
as per the principles enunciated in paras
91 to 93 of Swamy Shraddananda
(2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State
of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113], a special
category of sentence may be made for
the very few cases where the death
penalty might be substituted by the
punishment of imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term in excess of
fourteen years and to put that category
beyond application of remission?”
10. While answering the question, the Constitution Bench
(majority view) held that imprisonment for life in terms of
Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC means
imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict. In such a
case, right to claim remission, commutation etc. in accordance
with law will always be available. Thereafter, in paragraph
105, the Constitution Bench held thus:
“105. We, therefore, reiterate that the
power derived from the Penal Code for
any modified punishment within the
punishment provided for in the Penal
Code for such specified offences can
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Criminal Appeal @ S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3400 of 2017
only be exercised by the High Court and
in the event of further appeal only by
the Supreme Court and not by any other
court in this country. To put it
differently, the power to impose a modified
punishment providing for any specific term
of incarceration or till the end of the
convict's life as an alternate to death
penalty, can be exercised only by the High
Court and the Supreme Court and not by
any other inferior court.”
(emphasis added)
11. What is held by the Constitution Bench, cannot be
construed in a narrow perspective. The Constitution Bench
has held that there is a power which can be derived from the
IPC to impose a fixed term sentence or modified punishment
which can only be exercised by the High Court or in the event
of any further appeal, by the Supreme Court and not by any
other Court in this country. In addition, the Constitution
Bench held that power to impose a modified punishment of
providing any specific term of incarceration or till the end of
convict’s life as an alternative to death penalty, can be
exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and
not by any other inferior Court.
12. In a given case, while passing an order of conviction for
an offence which is punishable with death penalty, the Trial
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Criminal Appeal @ S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3400 of 2017
Court may come to a conclusion that the case is not a ‘rarest of
the rare’ case. In such a situation, depending upon the
punishment prescribed for the offence committed, the Trial
Court can impose other punishment specifically provided in
Section 53 of the IPC. However, when a Constitutional Court
finds that though a case is not falling in the category of ‘rarest
of the rare’ case, considering the gravity and nature of the
offence and all other relevant factors, it can always impose a
fixedterm sentence so that the benefit of statutory remission,
etc. is not available to the accused. The majority view in the
case of V. Sriharan1 cannot be construed to mean that such a
power cannot be exercised by the Constitutional Courts unless
the question is of commuting the death sentence. This
conclusion is well supported by what the Constitution Bench
held in paragraph 104 of its decision, which reads thus:
“104. That apart, in most of such cases
where death penalty or life imprisonment
is the punishment imposed by the trial
court and confirmed by the Division Bench
of the High Court, the convict concerned
will get an opportunity to get such verdict
tested by filing further appeal by way of
special leave to this Court. By way of
abundant caution and as per the
prescribed law of the Code and the
criminal jurisprudence, we can assert
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Criminal Appeal @ S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3400 of 2017
that after the initial finding of guilt of
such specified grave offences and the
imposition of penalty either death or
life imprisonment, when comes under
the scrutiny of the Division Bench of
the High Court, it is only the High Court
which derives the power under the
Penal Code, which prescribes the capital
and alternate punishment, to alter the
said punishment with one either for the
entirety of the convict's life or for any
specific period of more than 14 years,
say 20, 30 or so on depending upon the
gravity of the crime committed and the
exercise of judicial conscience befitting
such offence found proved to have been
committed.”
(emphasis added)
13. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a case
where capital punishment is not imposed or is not proposed,
the Constitutional Courts can always exercise the power of
imposing a modified or fixedterm sentence by directing that a
life sentence, as contemplated by “secondly” in Section 53 of
the IPC, shall be of a fixed period of more than fourteen years,
for example, of twenty years, thirty years and so on. The fixed
punishment cannot be for a period less than 14 years in view
of the mandate of Section 433A of Cr.P.C.
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14. Now, we come to the facts of the case. The facts are such,
which will shock the conscience of any Court. The deceased
woman, who was happily married, worked in a prominent
company having an office at Electronic City, Bengaluru.
Considering the nature of her duty, she had to work till late
night or even till early in the morning. The company used to
provide her conveyance in the form of a car. The company
used to provide cars to employees on different designated
routes. On the fateful day, the deceased left the office at 2:00
a.m. in a vehicle provided by the company. She used to take a
vehicle plying on route no.131. On that day, she was informed
by the appellant, who was the driver, that the vehicle operating
on route no.131 was not available. The appellant told her that
she will have to travel by his vehicle operating on route no.405.
The deceased, accordingly, sat in the car driven by the
accused. The maternal uncle of the deceased lodged a
complaint by stating that the deceased was missing.
Ultimately, her dead body was recovered at the instance of the
appellant. The clothes on the person of the deceased, footwear,
etc. were found near the dead body. The prosecution
successfully established the charge of the offence of rape,
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punishable under Section 376 of the IPC as well as the offence
under Section 366 of IPC. The appellant–accused was also
convicted for the offence under Section 302. The life of the
victim was cut short in this brutal manner at the age of 28
years.
15. In many leading cities, IT hubs have been established. In
fact, Bengaluru is known as the Silicon Valley of India. Some
of these companies have customers abroad and that is why the
company staff members work at night. A large number of staff
members in such companies are women. The issue is of safety
and security of women working with such companies. We have
perused the judgment of the Trial Court. It is true that the
Trial Court could not have directed that the appellant shall not
be released till the rest of his life. The Trial Court noted the
fact that on the date of conviction, the age of the appellant was
27 years and he had a wife and small child as well as aged
parents. Considering these factors along with the fact that this
was the first offence committed by the appellant, the Trial
Court found that the case was not falling in the category of the
‘rarest of the rare’ cases. We must hasten to add that the fact
that the accused has no antecedents, is no consideration by
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itself for deciding whether the accused will fall in the category
of the ‘rarest of the rare’ cases. It all depends on several
factors. The State Government failed in its endeavour to get
capital punishment by way of filing an appeal.
16. This is one case where a Constitutional Court must
exercise the power of imposing a special category of modified
punishment. The High Court expressed the view that the
punishment imposed by the Trial Court was justified after
considering the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. It is the duty of the Court to consider all
attending circumstances. The Court, while considering the
possibility of reformation of the accused, must note that
showing undue leniency in such a brutal case will adversely
affect the public confidence in the efficacy of the legal system.
The Court must consider the rights of the victim as well. After
having considered these circumstances, we are of the opinion
that this is a case where a fixedterm sentence for a period of
thirty years must be imposed.
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17. Accordingly, we modify the order of sentence of the Trial
Court for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
We direct that the appellant shall undergo imprisonment for
life. We also direct that the appellant shall be released only
after he completes thirty years of actual sentence. The appeal
is partly allowed to the above extent.
.…………………J.
(Abhay S. Oka)
..…………………J.
(Rajesh Bindal)
New Delhi;
March 28, 2023.
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