THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA & ANR VERSUS SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA & ANR  VERSUS SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD 

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2023

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 25714-17 OF 2019)

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL,

HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA & ANR. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Leave granted.

2. Challenging a common order passed by the Division Bench of

the High Court of Karnataka, setting aside a penalty of dismissal

from service imposed upon the respondent herein, who happened

to be a Civil Judge (Junior Division), the Registrar General of the

High Court of Karnataka has come up with the above appeals.

3. We have heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior

counsel appearing the appellant-High Court and Ms. Anitha

Shenoy, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent.

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4. The respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior

Division) vide a notification dated 31.01.1995.

5. On certain allegations of gross misconduct, the respondent

was placed under suspension by an order dated 25.01.2005,

followed by the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, with the

issue of Charge Memos dated 23.03.2005 in DI No.2/2005; DI

No.3/2005; DI No.4/2005 and DI No.5/2005.

6. Separate enquiries followed in connection with all the four

Charge Memos namely DI Nos.2,3,4,5 of 2005, after the

culmination of which, separate reports were submitted by the

enquiry officer on 29.03.2007 and 27.04.2007. As per the enquiry

reports, some charges stood proved and the other charges were not

proved.

7. Therefore, second show cause notices were issued and

thereafter the Full Court of the High Court of Karnataka resolved

on 04.10.2008 to impose the penalty of dismissal from service

upon the respondent. Based on the resolution of the Full Court, an

order of dismissal from service was passed by the Governor of

Karnataka, vide order dated 19.03.2009.

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8. Challenging the findings of the enquiry officer, the

respondent filed a set of three writ petitions and challenging the

order of dismissal from service, the respondent filed a separate

writ petition. All these writ petitions were dismissed by a learned

Judge, through a common order dated 30.11.2011.

9. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed intra-court

appeals. Those appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of the

High Court by a very strange order, not only setting aside the order

of penalty and the findings of the enquiry officer but also directing

that no further inquiry can be held against the respondent. It is

against such a common order passed in a batch of four intra-court

appeals that the Registrar General of the High Court has come up

with these civil appeals.

10. Before we proceed to consider the correctness of the view

taken by the High Court, in the light of the rival contentions, it will

be useful to extract in a tabular column the charges framed

against the respondent under each of the Charge Memos; his reply

to each of the charges and the findings of the enquiry officer in

respect of those charges.

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Charges against the Judicial Officer

S.

No.

Charge Reply to Charge Held to be

proved/not

proved by the

Inquiry Officer

Inquiry DI.2/2005

1. That the judicial officer

had granted an order of

status quo on an

interlocutory

application for

temporary injunction

in a civil suit and had

further granted an exparte order of

temporary injunction

in yet another civil.

suit against the State,

which was represented

by the defendants in

violation of Section

80(2) of the Code of

Civil Procedure.

First suit- Absence of the

AGP (Mallaraja Gowda) on

several occasions. Case was

not adjourned

unnecessarily. Within two

months, the interim

injunction granted was

vacated.

Second suit- Case of

forcible eviction.

Plaintiff had shown prima

facie case, therefore order of

status quo had been

granted. This was as per

procedure prescribed under

Order 39, Rule 3. Open to

the defendants to file

application for vacating the

same, or advance the same

depending on urgency, no

such application was filed.

Proved

2. That the judicial officer

had not examined the

witnesses present in

court in several cases

and was merely

adjourning the same

even though it was

possible for him to

have recorded the

evidence of those

witnesses.

Court was engaged in hearing

other cases, and engaged in

Lok Adalat.

Not proved

3. That the judicial,

officer had issued

bailable and nonbailable warrants to

witnesses in spite of

the witnesses in spite

of the witnesses having

appeared and seeking

Court was engaged in hearing

other/old matters

Not proved

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to file applications for

recalling of the

warrants.

4. That the judicial officer

had entertained a

criminal case and

issued a non-bailable

warrant to six

witnesses and when

the witnesses not

appeared, did not

examine them and

ordered that the said

witnesses be bound

over and insisted that

they file applications to

recall the warrants.

Court was engaged in hearing

other/old matters.

Not proved

5. That the judicial officer

had granted bail to an

accused in a case

involving offences

under the Karnataka

Forest Act, 1963.

Forest offence - exclusively

triable by magistrate. Not a

violation of Section 86, 87

nor was it an ivory case.

Was under Section, 104(A),

bail was granted after

hearing APP who was given

opportunity to file

objections. That evidence of

the APP cannot be relied on

has he is an interested

witness, had reported an

incident of misbehaviour of

his after which contempt

proceedings had been

initiated against him, was

now trying to falsely

implicate him.

Proved

Inquiry numbered DI.3/2005

1. The judicial officer

without preparing the

text of the judgment

had pronounced the

operative portion of

the judgment in open

court and that the

judgment was a

actually prepared later.

Denied the charge. Stated that

he had never pronounced a

single judgment without

dictating it in its entirety. He

had a new stenographer, who

was not in the habit of

maintaining the stenographer

book, frequently made

mistakes and was irregular in

taking dictation. The

stenographer had admitted his

shortcomings in a letter

annexed to the reply, had

resigned from service later.

Stenographer was a novice,

Proved

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was negligent and inefficient in

his work. Text had several

typographical errors, on

several occasions needed

retyping. Inefficiency of

stenographer, several memos

issued to him, he had

tendered apology in writing.

No complaints from the parties

in any of the cases, the

complainant set up by

Somasekhar and Mallaraja

Gowda to falsely implicate

him.

Allegations pertain to three

suits- two were money suits

where no written statement

was filed and defendants place

ex-parte.

Third suit, the judgment had

been dictated, transcribed and

pronounced in court. The text

contained several mistakes

and stenographer had been

directed to retype the same.

Signed judgment was kept in

an almirah, key was with the

stenographer, that he had

deliberately reproduced the

typed unsigned text instead of

the signed judgment, was

aiding the two advocatestrying to falsely implicate him.

2. That he had

pronounced the

judgment in a civil

suit on 09.10.2002

whereas the

judgment was

actually dictated on

11.10.2002 which

remained unsigned

by the judicial officer.

Denied the charge. Had

dictated judgment well in

advance and signed it.

Claimed that some mischief

may have been played by

vested interests. There was no

complaint from litigants/ on

advocates in this matter.

That the present complainant

is a fictitious person who is

not a party in any of the cases

mentioned, created by

Advocate Somashekhar and

the Assistant Public

Prosecutor to take revenge

against him.

Stenographer was also new

and not accustomed to taking

Proved

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dictation, had admitted his

shortcomings.

3. That the judicial officer

prepared the judgment

in O.S.31/2001 but did

not sign the judgment.

Denied the charge. That he

signed all judgments before

pronouncement. There was

never any complaint against

him to this effect. That vested

interests acting against him.

His stenographer was new and

irregular in taking dictation,

made mistakes, and admitted

his shortcomings in a letter.

Proved

4. That the judicial officer

prepared the judgment

in a civil suit on

5.2.2002 and it

remained incomplete.

Denied the charge.

That vested interests may have

played mischief by replacing

the signed full judgment with

partly printed judgment.

No complaint from any

persons.

Fictitious person who filed the

complaints.

Stenographer new and

unaccustomed to dictation.

Proved

5. That the judicial officer

pronounced the

judgment in a civil suit

on 23.10.2002 and a

portion of the judgment

was typed on the

order-sheet and a

formal judgment was

prepared only six days

later.

Denied the charge.

That vested interests like

sheristedar may have played

mischief by replacing the

original judgment.

No complaint from any

persons.

Present complainant is a

fictitious person created by

Somasekhar, the APP for

revenge.

Stenographer new and

unaccustomed to dictation.

Proved

Inquiry numbered DI.4/2005

1. The judicial officer had,

in a case involving

offences punishable

under the Karnataka

Forest Act, at the

instance of the counsel

for the accused,

preponed the case and

granted bail and at the

request of the

Additional Public

Prosecutor, the case

Somasekhar was the advocate

appearing for the two accused,

had a grievance against him.

Conditional bail had been

granted, application for

cancellation of bail was filed,

and counsel appearing for the

accused did not refute

allegations in the application

on their failure to comply with

the conditions, Did not file

objections in writing or raise

Proved

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was again preponed

and thereafter an order

was issued for nonbailable warrant to the

accused.

any objections orally.

Non-bailable warrant issued in

the interests of justice, acted

in good faith.

2. The judicial officer did

not pass orders in a

criminal case on the

application filed u/s

457 of Cr.P.C. and

released all the

properties.

Counter-claim by complainant

and accused for release of

same property, therefore did

not pass any order, and case

was to be taken for enquiry or

for trial

Not proved

3. The judicial officer did

not allow Somashekar,

Advocate for the

accused to examine a

witness in a criminal

case.

That the advocate started to

put irrelevant questions to the

witness, even though warned

many times. When he

persisted, case was adjourned

Not proved

4. Application filed by

Somashekar, Advocate

who was not called out,

but to the dismay of

the advocate, it was

found that the case

had been adjourned

earlier in the day

without indicating any

reasons.

Not proved

Inquiry numbered DI.5/2005

1. The judicial officer had

brought properties for

sale in public auction

in criminal cases and

while having brought

to auction certain

articles like choppers,

sickles, etc. had not

placed teak-wood

plants and a motor

cycle for such auction.

But however, had

recorded that the same

was sold at auction to

one Linga Raju who

was related to court

typist and this

apparently was done in

the chambers of the

judge. While it was also

alleged that the

appellant had not

prepared the estimated

value of the properties

Account shreistedar and

property clerk involved in

preparing the sale list - all

ground work done by these

officers.

These material witnesses were

not examined.

Motor cycle was old, parked in

the open thus exposed to rain/

sunlight for more than 6

months - sold for Rs. 7000/-.

Sheristedar misplaced auction

records and thereafter tried to

falsely implicate him to save

himself.

If subordinates had done

something and he had affixed

his signature due to oversight,

should be pardoned for the

lapses.

Proved

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before the same were

sold.

11. It is seen that among the charges held proved, some related

to the judicial orders passed by the respondent. Therefore, we are

prepared straightaway, to ignore those charges and see whether

the order of penalty of dismissal from service was justified qua the

other charges and whether the Division Bench of the High Court

was right in setting aside the same.

12. Once those charges which revolve around the manner of

disposal of certain cases are ignored, what remains are certain

serious charges that revolve around pronouncement of operative

portion of the judgment in open court without the whole text of the

judgment being ready. Take for instance, Charge Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5

in DI No.3/2005. These Charges are very serious in nature, where

the respondent is alleged to have pronounced the operative portion

of the judgment in open court without the whole of the judgment

being ready. Similarly Charge No.1 in DI No.5/2005 related to the

conduct of auction sale of properties, seized during the

investigation. These are very serious in nature and the reply given

by the respondent to these charges is wishy washy.

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13. A judicial officer cannot pronounce the concluding portion of

his judgment in open court without the entire text of the judgment

being prepared/dictated. All that the respondent has done in the

departmental enquiry is just to pass on the responsibility to the

inefficient and allegedly novice stenographer. We do not know how

the findings with regard to such serious charges have been

completely white-washed by the High Court in the impugned

judgment.

14. A look at the impugned judgment of the High Court shows

that the Division Bench of the High Court was swayed away

unduly by the animosity attributed by the respondent to a member

of the local Bar and the Assistant Public Prosecutor. Let us

assume for a minute that the charges were on the basis of

complaints initiated by persons bearing ill-will and motive against

the respondent. Even then, such ill-will and motive may not make

the conduct of the respondent in not preparing judgments but

pronouncing the outcome of the case, a condonable conduct.

15. It is true that some of the charges revolve around judicial

pronouncements and the judicial decision-making processes and

that they cannot per se, without anything more, form the

foundation for departmental proceedings. Therefore, we are

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ignoring those charges. But the charges which revolve around

gross negligence and callousness on the part of the respondent in

not preparing/dictating judgments, but providing a fait accompli,

is completely unacceptable and unbecoming of a judicial officer.

16. The defence taken by the respondent that the lack of

experience and the inefficiency on the part of the stenographer has

to be blamed, for the whole text of the judgment not getting ready

even after several days of pronouncement of the result in open

court, was entirely unacceptable. But unfortunately, the High

Court not only accepted this panchatantra story, but also went to

the extent of blaming the administration for not examining the

stenographer as a witness. Such an approach is wholly

unsustainable. If it was the case of the respondent that the entire

blame lay upon the stenographer, it was for him to have

summoned the stenographer as a witness. The High Court

unfortunately reversed the burden of proof.

17. While considering a challenge to an order of penalty imposed

upon a judicial officer pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings

followed by a resolution of the Full Court of the High Court, the

Court is obliged only to go by established parameters namely,

(i) whether the charges stood proved; (ii) whether the findings of

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the inquiry officer are reasonable and probable and not perverse;

(iii) whether the rules of procedure and the principles of natural

justice have been followed; and (iv) whether the penalty is

completely disproportionate, especially in the light of the gravity of

the misconduct, his past record of service and any other

extenuating circumstances.

18. Unfortunately, the High Court did not test the correctness of

the order of penalty in this case, on the above parameters.

Instead, the High Court has recorded a finding in Paragraph 26 of

the impugned order, as though the learned judges had first hand

information about the problems that the judicial officers faced at

the lower level. The opinion of the High Court in Paragraph 26 of

the impugned order that the acts of omission and commission

attributed to the respondent do not constitute grave misconduct,

is very-very curious. Adding fuel to fire, the High Court has

recorded in Paragraph 36 of the impugned order that “dismissing

him from service itself is very atrocious”. Such a finding is nothing

but a veiled attack on the Full Court of the High Court. After

holding so, the High Court has gone to the extent of certifying the

respondent as an innocent and honest officer. We do not know

wherefrom the High Court came to such a conclusion.

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19. One more reason articulated in the impugned order of the

High Court is that the second show cause notice indicated the

penalty proposed and that therefore, the same was contrary to law.

In this regard the High Court placed reliance upon the decision of

this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board

Limited vs. Mahesh Dahiya1

.

20. But the decision of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State

Electricity Board Limited (supra), is one where the disciplinary

authority-cum-whole time members of the Electricity Board were

found to have formed an opinion to impose a major penalty even

before forwarding the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent.

But in this case the Full Court of the High Court did not consider

the enquiry report and did not take a decision in advance to

impose the penalty of removal from service.

21. As a matter of fact, the history of evolution of law relating to

second show cause notice is almost forty years old. The

requirement of a second show cause notice relating to the

proposed penalty was removed from Article 311 of the Constitution

by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. The same was

upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India

1 (2017) 1 SCC 768

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and Anr. vs. Tulsiram Patel2

. However, a two-member Bench of

this Court opened a small window in Union of India and Ors. vs.

E. Bashyan3

, which led to the decision in Union of India and

Ors. vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan4

, wherein this Court held that the

opportunity to respond to the findings of the inquiry officer is

different from the opportunity to respond to the penalty proposed.

Eventually, the issue got clarified in The Managing Director,

ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. vs. B. Karunakar and Ors.5

.

22. It is not the case of the respondent that the Full Court of the

High Court took a decision to impose the penalty of dismissal from

service even before furnishing the copies of the enquiry reports to

the respondent. The show cause notices enclosing the enquiry

reports, are dated 11.10.2007. The representations made by the

respondent are dated 26.10.2007. It is only thereafter that the

Administrative Committee No.1 considered the matter on

28.08.2008 and it was placed before the Full Court on 04.10.2008.

Therefore, the opinion of the High Court that the second show

2 (1985) 3 SCC 398

3 (1988) 2 SCC 196

4 (1991) 1 SCC 588

5 (1993) 4 SCC 727

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cause notices were in violation of the principles of natural justice

is not factually and legally correct.

23. We have not come across a case where the High Court, while

setting aside an order of penalty has held that there shall not be

any further inquiry against the delinquent. But in this case, the

High Court has done exactly the same, creating a new

jurisprudence. The relevant portion of the impugned order of the

High Court reads as follows:-

“Writ Appeal is allowed. Impugned order passed

by the learned Single Judge in W.P.Nos.10756/2009 &

11030-32 of 2009 (S.DIS) dated 30.11.2011 is hereby

set aside. Punishment order dismissing the appellant

from service is hereby quashed. All Inquiry reports are

quashed. There shall not be any further enquiry

against the appellant. The appellant is to be treated

as if he had been in service till the date of

superannuation and pay all consequential monetary

benefits with interest at 8% p.a. The compliance shall

be within a period of three months.”

24. For all the above reasons, the appeals are liable to be

allowed. Accordingly, they are allowed and the impugned order of

the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The order of

penalty imposed upon the respondent is upheld and the writ

petitions filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. No costs.

…………………………….. J.

(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)

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..………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

New Delhi;

April 10, 2023