Mansarovar Commercial Pvt. Ltd Versus Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi

Mansarovar Commercial Pvt. Ltd Versus Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi  

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5769 OF 2022

Mansarovar Commercial Pvt. Ltd. …Appellant

Versus

Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi …Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5773 OF 2022

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5772 OF 2022

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5771 OF 2022

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5770 OF 2022

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the

impugned common judgment and order dated 22.02.2016

passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Income

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 1 of 67

Tax Appeal Nos. 162/2002, 164/2002, 165/2002,

167/2002 & 168/2002, by which the High Court has

allowed the said appeals preferred by the Revenue and

has quashed and set aside the common order dated 08th

January, 2002 passed by the Income Tax Appellate

Tribunal, New Delhi (for short, ‘ITAT’) for Assessment

Years 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 and restored the

orders passed by the Assessing Officer, upheld by the

Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (for short,

‘CIT(A)), the respective assessees have preferred the

present appeals.

Facts:

2. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell

are as under:

The respective assessees, namely, Mansarovar

Commercial Private Limited, Sovereign Commercial

Private Limited, Swastik Commercial Private Limited,

Trishul Commercial Private Limited and Pasupati Nath

Commercial Private Limited were incorporated under the

Registration of Companies (Sikkim) Act, 1961. Each of

the assessee companies claim to be carrying on the

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 2 of 67

business of commercial agents in cardamon and other

agricultural products.

2.1 Sikkim became part of India in April, 1975. The

Constitution (Thirty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 inserted

Article 371-F into the Constitution of India, in terms of

which not all the laws of India were extended to the new

State of Sikkim. Under Article 371-F (k) all laws in force

immediately before the appointed day, i.e., 26th April,

1975, in the territories comprising the State of Sikkim or

any part thereof were to continue to be in force therein

until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or

other competent authority. The Income Tax Act, 1961

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was not made

straightway applicable to the State of Sikkim. Till such

extension of the Act to Sikkim by a notification issued

under Article 371-F(n), income tax was to be charged and

collected under the Sikkim State Income-tax Manual,

1948 (for short, ‘Sikkim Manual, 1948’). The recovery of

tax was under the scheme of the Sikkim (Collection of

Taxes and Prevention of Evasion of Payment of Taxes)

Act, 1987.

2.2 By a notification No. S.O. 1028E dated 7th

November, 1988 issued under Article 371-F(n) of the

Constitution, the Act, the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and the

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 3 of 67

Gift Tax Act, 1958 were extended to the State of Sikkim.

In terms of para 2 of the said notification, the Central

Government appointed, by Notification S.O. 148E dated

23rd February, 1989, the 1st of April, 1989 as the date on

which the Act would come into force in the State of Sikkim

in relation to the previous year relevant to the Assessment

Year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1989. However

subsequently, by virtue of Section 26 of the Finance Act,

1989 the Act was made applicable to the State of Sikkim

from the previous year relevant to the Assessment Year

commencing from 1st April, 1990, thereby extending the

date of applicability of the Act by one year from the date

specified in the notification dated 23rd February, 1989.

2.3 The case of the assessees was that each of them

was a resident of Sikkim, carrying on business in Sikkim

and not elsewhere and that till 31st March, 1990, each of

them were governed by the Sikkim Manual, 1948 and not

the Act. Therefore, the stand of the assessees was that

the income earned by them till that date was income

earned in Sikkim from the business conducted/done in

Sikkim. On the other hand, the case of the Revenue was

that the control and management of each of the assessee

companies was wholly with their auditor, M/s Rattan

Gupta & Co., Chartered Accountants, who had their

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 4 of 67

offices in Karol Bagh, New Delhi and therefore, were

companies’ resident in India in terms of Section 6(3) of the

Act.

2.4 A search was conducted on 15th March, 1990 at the

premises of M/s Rattan Gupta & Co., Chartered

Accountant at Daryaganj, New Delhi and during the

course of the search, books of account, cheque books,

signed blank cheques, vouchers and other income

documents of the assessees were found. The statements

of the partners, former and current, of M/s Rattan Gupta &

Co., CA were recorded.

2.5 On 10th July, 1990, following the search conducted

on 15th March, 1990 at the premises of M/s Rattan Gupta

& Co., CA at Daryaganj, New Delhi, notices were issued

by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (for short,

‘ACIT’) (Investigation), Circle 7(1), New Delhi to each of

the assessees under Section 148 of the Act, in respect of

Assessment Years 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90

(Assessment Years under consideration). An order was

passed on 12th July, 1990 by ACIT (Investigation), Circle

13(1), New Delhi in respect of M/s Rattan Gupta & Co.

under section 132(5) of the Act. It appears that the said

Rattan Gupta informed the assessees about notices

under section 148 of the Act issued to each of them at the

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 5 of 67

address of M/s Rattan Gupta & Co. at Daryaganj, New

Delhi and affixed at the said premises of M/s Rattan

Gupta & Co.

2.6 Meanwhile, each of the assessees filed return of

income in terms of the Sikkim Manual, 1948 for the

Assessment Years in question on 27th April, 1990. A

demand notice was issued to each of them in respect

thereof on 23rd July, 1990.

2.7 The respective assessees filed writ petitions in the

High Court of Sikkim, challenging the notices issued

under section 148 of the Act. The Sikkim High Court

initially passed an interim order staying further

proceedings. The said interim order was modified in

terms of which the Department was permitted to continue

with its enquiry and seek facts and information from the

Directors of the assessee companies. The assessee

companies were required to furnish the necessary

information and also to file returns and produce the books

of accounts before the Assessing Officer, New Delhi in

compliance of the notices under section 148 of the Act.

Thereafter, the Sikkim High Court dismissed the writ

petitions holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the

said writ petitions since no part of the cause of action had

arisen in the State of Sikkim. It was observed that as the

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 6 of 67

notices were issued by the ACIT (Investigation), Circle

7(1), New Delhi and served on the assessees in New

Delhi, it had no jurisdiction over the actions of that

authority. It appears that the Sikkim High Court also

observed that “mere fact that the companies have

registered offices in Sikkim does not confer jurisdiction on

this Court.”

2.8 It appears that in the meanwhile, on the basis of the

returns filed by the assessees in Sikkim, the Income and

Sales Tax Department of Government of Sikkim raised a

revised demand on 30th November, 1990, cancelling the

earlier demand raised on 30th July, 1990.

2.9 After the dismissal of the writ petitions by the Sikkim

High Court on 20th July, 1993, the assessees filed writ

petitions before the Delhi High Court being Writ Petition

Nos. 5565 to 5569 of 1993. Initially, the Delhi High Court

passed an interim order staying the proceedings.

However thereafter on 13th August, 1998, an order was

passed by the Delhi High Court directing the AO to frame

the assessment subject to outcome of the writ petitions.

2.10 That thereafter on 24th August, 1998, notices were

issued to the assessee companies under section 148 of

the ACT by ACIT, Company Circle 2, New Delhi.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 7 of 67

2.11 That on 09th October, 1998, separate assessment

orders were passed by the ACIT, Company Circle 2(2),

New Delhi for each of the Assessment Years in question.

The Assessing Officer concluded that each of the

assessees were “intentionally trying to take advantage of

the prevailing laws at Sikkim by routing money through

Sikkim and ploughing back in India.” The Assessing

Officer also rejected the objections raised by the

assessees as to the jurisdiction. The Assessing Officer

made additions to the income of the assessees for the

aforesaid three Assessment Years in question under

different heads of income, namely, (i) income from

commission (ii) unsecured loan from Dengzong Charitable

Trust (iii) interest accrued/paid on the unsecured loans

and (iv) provision for income tax (which was disallowed).

Separate penalty proceedings were initiated under

sections 271(1)(a). 271(1)(c), 273/274 and 271-B of the

Act.

2.12 The assessees then preferred appeals before the

CIT(A). Subsequently on 08th December, 2000, the writ

petitions filed by the assessees came to be dismissed by

the High Court as the respective assessees moved the

Appellate Authority prescribed under the statute. The

appeals preferred by the assessees before the CIT(A)

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 8 of 67

came to be dismissed vide order(s) dated 30th March,

2001.

2.13 Feeling aggrieved by the order(s) passed by the

CIT(A) dismissing the appeals, the respective assessees

preferred appeals before the ITAT. The ITAT observed

and held that notices under Section 148 of the Act could

not have been served on Mr. Rattan Gupta as the said Mr.

Rattan Gupta cannot be said to be a “Principal Officer” of

the assessees within the meaning of section 2(35)(a) of

the Act and the AO did not serve any notices of his

intention of treating Mr. Rattan Gupta as the “Principal

Officer” for the purposes of section 2(35)(b) of the Act. On

the refusal of Mr. Rattan Gupta to receive notices, ITAT

observed and opined that if Mr. Rattan Gupta refused to

receive such notices, he was justified in doing so and his

refusal did not authorise the AO to resort to substituted

service within the meaning of Rule 20 of Order V of CPC.

The order(s) passed by the ITAT allowing the appeals

preferred by the assessees was/were the subject matter

of appeals before the High Court at the instance of the

Revenue.

2.14 The High Court framed the following questions of

law:

“1. Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the ACIT

exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing notices under section 148

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 9 of 67

of the Act and the notices were not served in accordance

with law?

2. Whether the order made by the ITAT is perverse based

on conjectures and surmises and ignorance of evidence and

material and has relied upon incorrect facts?

3. Whether the income of the assessee is taxable in India?”

At the instance of the Assessees, an additional question

was also framed as under by the same order:

4. Whether the ITAT was right in law in holding that the

assessee is not a resident of India within the meaning of

Section 6(3)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and whether the

said finding of the ITAT is not also vitiated and perverse as it

ignores relevant admissible evidence and materials and

relies upon incorrect facts and has not given due

consideration to several important materials and evidence

relevant for determination of residence of the assessee.”

2.15 By the impugned common judgment and order, the

High Court has answered all the questions in favour of the

Revenue and against the assessees and consequently

has allowed the appeals preferred by the Revenue. The

High Court in the impugned judgment and order has dealt

with and considered the following main issues and both

the parties were heard on the said issues.

1. Objection to the jurisdiction by the ACIT, Circle 7(1), New

Delhi who issued notices to the assessees under Section 148 of

the Act;

2. Control and management in New Delhi;

3. No income accrued or was earned in Sikkim;

4. Service of notice;

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 10 of 67

5. Limitation for issuance of notice under section 147 of the Act;

6. Merits of the reopening of the assessments; and

7. Interest

By the impugned common judgment and order, the

High Court has summarised the conclusion in paragraph

91 as under:

(i) The Assessees, incorporated under the company law of

Sikkim, are resident Indian companies. If any income

accrued to them or was earned by them in India prior to

1

st April 1990, then such income is taxable under the

Act.

(ii) The Revenue is justified in contending that the Assessees

not having raised such objection at the first available

opportunity should not be permitted to urge the ground of

lack of jurisdiction of the Delhi officers to issue notices to

them under Sections 147/148 of the Act.

(iii) Mr. Rattan Gupta was not only doing the audit work of the

five Assessee companies, but determining who should be

the directors of the said companies. This coupled with the

fact that the blank signed cheque books of all the five

companies together with rubber seals, the letter heads, the

blank signed cheques and other records were also found in

the office of Rattan Gupta & Co., the factual determination

by the AO that the management and the control of the five

companies was actually wholly situated in Delhi gets

fortified. The exhaustive evidence gathered by the

Revenue, without being countered by the Assessees

despite opportunity being afforded, serves to substantiate

the case of the Revenue that the management and the

control of the five Assessee companies was in fact located

in Delhi.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 11 of 67

(iv) The findings of the AO that the Assessees failed to prove

that the commission payments were earned by them

exclusively in Sikkim has not been dislodged by the

Assessees by producing any tangible material.

(v) There was an implied authority of Mr. Rattan Gupta to

receive such notices even in terms of Section 252(2) of the

Act, read with Order V Rule 20 CPC. Consequently, the

Court is unable sustain the finding of the ITAT that notice

was not properly served on the Assessees through Rattan

Gupta & Co. There was no need for the Department to have

gone in for substituted service and the refusal by Rattan

Gupta & Co. to receive the notice was sufficient to consider

it as a deemed service of notice.

(vi) The plea of the Assessees that the proceedings under

Section 148 of the Act gets vitiated in the absence of a

specific order vesting the ACIT with the powers under

Section 127 of the Act to issue notice under Section 148 of

the Act is rejected.

(vii) The plea of the Assessees that the notices under Section

142(1) and 143(2) of the Act were issued for the first time in

1998 and were time barred is rejected.

(viii) On merits there were sufficient grounds for exercising the

power under Section 148 of the Act.

(ix) The ITAT's conclusion that the interest under Sections 234

A and 234 B of the Act could not be charged since a

specific notice in that behalf was not issued by the AO is

unsustainable in law and is overruled.”

Concluding as above, the High Court has

accordingly answered the questions framed in favour of

the Revenue and against the assessees. The impugned

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 12 of 67

common judgment and order passed by the High Court is

the subject matter of present appeals.

Submissions:

3. Shri Arvind P Datar and Shri G. Umapathy, learned

senior counsel have appeared on behalf of the respective

assessee companies and Shri N. Venkataraman, learned

Additional Solicitor General of India has appeared on

behalf of the Revenue.

3.1 Shri Arvind P Datar, learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the assessee companies has

submitted that the issue involved in the present appeals

is, as to whether the provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961

shall be applicable to the assessee companies which are

registered under the Sikkim Companies Act and amenable

to Sikkim Tax Manual, 1948 in respect of three

Assessment Years, i.e., 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90

when Income Tax Act, 1961 was not extended to the State

of Sikkim. It is submitted that the further issue is, whether

jurisdiction on the authorities in Delhi can be conferred

solely based on the alleged effective place of control and

management of the assessee companies for the purpose

of applicability of Income Tax Act, 1961.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 13 of 67

3.2 Challenging the impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court, Shri Arvind P Datar, learned

senior counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee

companies has vehemently submitted that the impugned

judgment is based on an erroneous assumption that the

effective control of the companies vested with one Mr.

Rattan Gupta, a resident of Delhi, who was rendering

accounting and auditing services.

3.3 It is submitted that the impugned judgment has

erroneously allowed the Department to levy interest on

the assessee companies without framing the issue as a

specific question of law as mandated by Section 260A of

the Act.

3.4 In support of his submission that the Income Tax

Act, 1961 shall not be applicable for the period during the

relevant assessment years, it is vehemently submitted by

Shri Datar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of

the assessee companies that the Income Tax Act, 1961

came to be extended to the State of Sikkim only on and

after 1st April, 1990. That therefore, the AO exceeded his

jurisdiction.

3.5 It is contended that the assessee companies having

been assessed to tax under the Sikkim Manual, 1948 and

having paid and discharged income tax under the said law

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 14 of 67

cannot be subjected to tax once over again by applying

the “head and brain” rule in the absence of an express

provision under the Income Tax Act, 1961, more so in

view of the well settled law that “a taxing statute should

not be interpreted in such a manner that its effect will be

to cast a burden twice over for the payment of tax on the

taxpayers unless the language of the statute is so

compelling that the Court has no alternative than to

accept it.” That in a case of reasonable doubt, the

construction most beneficial to the taxpayer is to be

adopted.

3.6 It is further contended that as such the present case

is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the

case of Mahaveer Kumar Jain v. CIT, Jaipur, reported

in (2018) 6 SCC 527, wherein this Court considered a

question whether the appellant, who was a resident of

Rajasthan and had won a lottery from Sikkim during the

Assessment Year 1986-87 was liable to be taxed in India

where Income Tax Act, 1961 was in force, notwithstanding

that the said income had accrued or arisen to him at a

place where Income Tax Act, 1961 was not in force, i.e.,

Sikkim, more particularly when the said income had

already been taxed in the State of Sikkim under the

Sikkim Manual, 1948. Reliance is placed on certain

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 15 of 67

observations made in paragraphs 13 to 15 of the said

decision.

3.7 It is next submitted that the assessee companies

filed income tax returns before the appropriate authority

as per Sikkim Manual, 1948 and a demand was raised by

the said authority, which was paid. That the fact that the

appropriate Income Tax Authority under the Sikkim

Manual, 1948 accepted the income tax returns filed by the

assessee companies and raised demand based on such

returns establish the bona fides of the assessee

companies beyond reproach. Therefore, the allegation

that the assessee companies have no real business in

Sikkim is absolutely baseless, unfounded and untenable.

3.8 Making above submissions, it is urged that the

Income Tax Act, 1961 shall not be made applicable so far

as the assessee companies are concerned for the

relevant assessment years.

3.9 It is further submitted that as such the ACIT, Delhi

had no territorial jurisdiction to assess the assessee

companies and therefore clearly exceeded in his

jurisdiction in issuing notices under section 148 of the Act

on the assumption that the assessee companies were

carrying on business in India, on the basis of availability of

books of accounts of the assessee companies at the

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 16 of 67

premises of the Chartered Accountant of the assessee

companies, i.e., M/s Rattan Gupta & Co. It is submitted

that such an approach is wholly untenable in law, besides

being perverse.

3.10 It is further submitted that as observed and held by

this Court in the cases of Ajay Kumar v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 48 and Kiran Singh

v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340, an order passed

by the authority without jurisdiction is a nullity.

3.11 It is contended that the exercise of territorial

jurisdiction by CIT, Delhi is also wholly untenable in law in

view of section 6(3) of the Act as it was at the relevant

point of time. That Mr. Rattan Gupta was a practising

Chartered Accountant and providing accounting and

auditing services to several corporates and individuals

and could have never been the “head and brain” behind

the assessee companies.

3.12 It is further contended that even otherwise the reassessment was impermissible in law in the absence of

any original orders passed under section 143(3) of the

Act. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the

case of trustees of H.E.H, the Nizam’s Supplemental

Family Trust v. CIT, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 501

(paragraphs 10 & 11). It is submitted that the said

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 17 of 67

decision was subsequently followed and affirmed by this

Court in the case of Standard Chartered Finance

Limited v. CIT, Bangalore, (2016) 14 SCC 634 (Civil

Appeal No. 1101 of 2016 dated 9.2.2016).

3.13 It is further submitted by Shri Datar, learned senior

counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee companies

that as such there was no material to substantiate that the

assessee companies’ control and management was

situated wholly in India. That the High Court has

proceeded on an erroneous presumption that the

assessee companies were controlled by one Rattan

Gupta, who was rendering accounting and auditing

services, simply because books of accounts had been

found in his office. It is submitted that no evidence was

produced to the effect that he ever appointed any person

as the Director of the assessee companies or dictated the

manner in which such Directors were to discharge duties

towards assessee companies. That the finding of the

High Court that the control over management vested with

Rattan Gupta and therefore the assessee companies

were situated in India, is therefore wholly untenable and

consequently to draw such presumption is legally

unsustainable.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 18 of 67

3.14 It is further submitted that there was no cogent

material at the time of issuance of notices under section

148 of the Act to form a belief that income was chargeable

under the Income Tax Act, 1961 and that the burden to

prove that the control and management of assessee

companies was situated wholly in India lie with the

Department. That the law is well settled that the onus

was on the Revenue, which has not been discharged.

That on the contrary the High Court has erred in shifting

the onus on the assessee companies to prove that they

had legitimate business interest and income arising from

the State of Sikkim.

3.15 It is contended that the impugned order is based

solely on an erroneous supposition that Mr. Rattan Gupta

was in control of the management of the assessee

companies. That as such until the Assessment Years

1988-89, the audit and accounts of the assessee

companies were being handled by one Ravinder Singh &

Co. That the High Court has committed an error in

treating the said Ravinder Singh to be the partner of M/s

Rattan Gupta & Co. It is submitted that therefore, the

impugned order is based on a flawed presumption of a

critical fact and therefore the impugned judgment

deserves to be set aside by this Court.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 19 of 67

3.16. Shri Datar further submitted that in the absence of

framing of any substantial question of law under Section

260A of the Act on levy of interest, the liability of interest

could not have been fastened upon the assessee

companies. That section 260A of the Income Tax Act is

analogous to Section 100 CPC which mandates framing

of question of law before exercising its jurisdiction on the

said issue. It is submitted that as such no issue of levy of

interest was framed by the High Court. That therefore the

High Court has committed a jurisdictional error in

recording a finding that ITAT’s conclusion that interest

under section 234 A & B of the Act could not be charged

since a specific notice in that behalf was not issued by the

Assessing Officer, is unsustainable in law.

3.17 In addition, it is submitted on the aspect on territorial

jurisdiction of the authorities at Delhi that the assessee

companies were having their registered offices in Sikkim.

Therefore, the issuance of notices under Section 148 of

the Act is beyond jurisdiction. That on the issue of

territorial jurisdiction, the ITAT found that since the

business premises of the assessees were in Sikkim, the

territorial jurisdiction to assess vested with the ACIT,

Gangtok. Therefore, the ITAT rightly held that the ACIT

Delhi who issued notices under section 148 of the Act had

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 20 of 67

no territorial jurisdiction. That the proper course for the

Department was to have the matter entrusted to ACIT,

Gangtok after complying with the mandate of section 127

of the Act for transferring jurisdiction of ACIT, Gangtok to

New Delhi. It is submitted that though the Revenue in its

appearance before the High Court raised a question of

law on the finding recorded by the ITAT on territorial

jurisdiction of the authorities at Delhi, while framing

question(s) of law, the High Court did not frame an issue

with regard to territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the finding with

regard to lack of territorial jurisdiction by ITAT had attained

finality.

3.18 Insofar as the levy of interest is concerned, it is

submitted that the ITAT specifically observed that no

direction was made by the AO for levy of interest.

Therefore relying upon the decision of this Court in the

case of CIT v. Ranchi Club Limited, (2001) 247 ITR 209

taking the view that levy of interest was under Section

234A, B & C of the Act, without a direction by the AO in

the assessment order is not legally sustainable. It is

further submitted that the High Court, while upsetting the

finding recorded by the ITAT on levy of interest, has erred

in relying upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of

Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 21 of 67

Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633 and Commissioner of

Income Tax, Delhi v. Bhagat Construction Company

Private Limited, (2016) 15 SCC 738.

3.19 Shri Datar, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the assessee companies contended that as such

there was no notice served upon the proper person and

the notice served upon Rattan Gupta cannot be said to be

a valid service of notice. That under section 2(35)(b) of

the Act, the Assessing Officer is required to serve a notice

only on persons who are connected with the management

or administration of the assessee company to treat them

as Principal Officer. That Rattan Gupta was never

connected with the management or administration of the

assessee companies so as to treat him as a Principal

Officer. That Rattan Gupta was not the Secretary,

Treasurer, Manager or Agent of the assessee companies

under section 2(35)(a) of the Act. Therefore, the AO

ought to have served a notice on Rattan Gupta informing

him of his intention to treat him as the Principal Officer of

the assessee companies on the ground that he was a

person connected with the management or administration

of the assessee companies under section 2(35)(b) of the

Act. However, in the present case, the AO never served a

notice on Rattan Gupta under section 2(35)(b) of the Act

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 22 of 67

expressing his intention to treat him as the Principal

Officer of the assessee companies. Therefore, this failure

vitiates the entire proceedings.

3.20 It is submitted that there is adequate evidence on

record to establish that:

(a)the business was managed from Gangtok in Sikkim

where the business was carried on by one Mr. Ajay

Kumar Agarwal, Local Director and Mr. H.L. Verma,

(b)the income was earned and assessed to income tax

in Sikkim as per the Sikkim Manual, 1948, and

(c)income tax was paid in Sikkim under Sikkim

Manual, 1948.

3.21 That further, seized vouchers and records clearly

establish that commission payments were received into

the bank accounts of these companies from identified

traders of large cardamom and that department had no

material in its possession to disbelieve that these traders

had made the commission payments only on sale of

cardamom.

3.22 It is submitted that books of accounts, ledgers etc.

which were found at the office premises of Mr. Rattan

Gupta’s office at Daryaganj, Delhi were handed over to

Mr. Rattan Gupta for providing professional accounting

services as he was a practising Chartered Accountant.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 23 of 67

He had clearly stated that the books of accounts, ledgers

etc. were handed over to him for providing professional

services and that the business operations were carried

out from Gangtok in Sikkim by Mr. Ajay Kumar Agarwal,

Local Director and Mr. H.L. Verma and that he had

nothing to do with the business operations of the

assessee companies. A mere allegation that he is in

charge of the conduct of the company is not sufficient to

hold that he is the Principal Officer. There should be

credible material to how his active involvement in the

conduct and management of the business.

3.23 It is next submitted that assumption of jurisdiction

based on the seizure of books of accounts from the office

premises of the practising Chartered Accountant Mr.

Rattan Gupta at New Delhi and treating him as the

Principal Officer or “head and brain” of the companies

incorporated under the Sikkim Companies Registration

Act, 1961 when the said Chartered Accountant had

categorically stated on oath that he was rendering

professional accounting and reconciliation services to the

companies in question, is without jurisdiction, perverse

and deserves to be set aside. The failure of same would

set a very bad precedent and have far reaching

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 24 of 67

consequences on the rights of Chartered Accountants to

carry on their profession.

3.24 Making above submissions and relying upon the

aforesaid decisions, it is prayed that the present appeals

be allowed.

4. The present appeals are vehemently opposed by

Shri N. Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor

General of India appearing on behalf of the Revenue. He

has taken us through the findings recorded by the

Assessing Officer in the Assessment Order, findings of the

CIT(A) vide order dated 30th March, 2001, findings

recorded by the ITAT vide order dated 8th January, 2002

and the findings recorded by the High Court including the

findings recorded regarding the issue pertaining to service

of notice and levy of interest.

4.1 Insofar as the submission on behalf of the

appellants on control and management of affairs of the

companies is concerned, it is submitted that section 6 of

the Act defines residence in India. That the relevant

provision is section 6(3) of the Act. That this principle of

control and management of its affairs is not something

which had originated for the first time in the Income Tax

Act, 1961. This expression had existed even under the

Income Tax Act, 1922. It is submitted that under the

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 25 of 67

erstwhile Income Tax Act, 1922, Section 4A defined

residence in taxable territories. Section 6 of the Act deals

with residence in India and the relevant provision would

be Section 6(3) pre-amendment in 2017 and postamendment 2017 w.e.f. 01.04.2017. He has taken us

through the relevant provisions under the Income Tax Act,

1922 (Section 4A), Section 6(3) of the Act (existed prior to

01.04.2017) and Section 6(3) of the Act substituted by

Finance Act w.e.f. 01.04.2017.

4.2 On the interpretation on the control and

management of affairs, Shri N. Venkataraman, learned

ASG has relied upon the following English, Supreme

Court and High Court judgments both under the Act, 1922

and Act, 1961:

i) San Paulo v. Carter (1896) AC 31 Lord

Halsbury;

ii) V.V.R.N.M. Subbayya Chettiar v. CIT, Madras,

AIR 1951 SC 101;

iii) Erin Estate v. CIT, 1959 SCR 573;

iv) Narottan and Pereira Ltd. v. CIT, Bombay City,

1953 23 ITR 454 (paragraphs 3 & 4) (Bombay High

Court Judgment);

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 26 of 67

v) Estate of A. Mohammed Rowther v. CIT,

Madras, 1963 49 ITR 39, (Madras High Court

Judgment);

vi) CIT v. Chitra Palayakat Co., 1985 156 ITR 730

(Madras High Court Judgment);

vii) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Nandlal

Gandalal, 1960 40 ITR 1 (SC);

viii)A.M.M. Firm v. Reserve Bank of India, 1982 SCC

OnLine Mad. 187 (Madras High Court Judgment);

ix) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bank of China,

1985 SCC OnLine Cal. 24 (Calcutta High Court

Judgment); and

x) Universal Cargo Carriers Inc. v. Commissioner

of Income Tax, 1990 SCC OnLine Cal. 385 (Calcutta

High Court Judgment)

4.3 Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted

as under:

a) Holding lands, receipt of payments and carrying on

trade is of no consequence as long as the control of the

commercial venture and directions governing the

commercial venture are given from elsewhere.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 27 of 67

b) Domicile or registration of the company is not

relevant. The making, maintaining, managing and

working is insufficient.

c) Directors authorised to manage the work and

employees rendering service again are insufficient.

d) The determinative test is where the sole right to

manage and control every department of its affairs lies.

Managers and directors whose services are merely

remunerated is not a relevant criterion. The profits

although received by the employees as remuneration,

do not belong to them and are not in their disposal.

Incurring of debts or payment to agents are of no

consequence.

e) The test is, where the head and seat and directing

power of the affairs of the company is, which works with

some degree of permanence while the expression

‘wholly’ would seem to recognize the possibility of the

seat of such power being divided between two distinct

and separate places.

f) The question to be asked is from where the person

or group of persons control or direct the business.

g) Mere activity by the company does not create

residence.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 28 of 67

h) In case of dual residence, it is necessary to show

that the company performs some of the vital organic

functions incidental to its existence in both the places

so that there are in fact two centres of management.

i) Control and management which must be shown is

not merely theoretical control and power, or de jure

control and power but the de facto control and power

actually exercised in the course of the conduct and

management of the affairs of the firm. Mere presence

of directors or vesting of power in them is insufficient

unless otherwise they had exercised the power

elsewhere in the territory under question.

j) Even acting under a power of attorney is not

sufficient as the same can be cancelled at any moment

and as a power of attorney holder they must submit to

the principal an explanation of what they have been

doing and the principal has the right of keeping a

vigilant eye over their work from the board room and the

power exercised by the power of attorney holder is only

de jure control and not de facto control and

management.

k) The intrinsic test is where the central control and

management actually abides. Mere presence of even

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 29 of 67

the managing partner or mere delegation of power is

insufficient.

l) The expression control and management of its

affairs is much wider than the expression used in some

treatises ‘Control and Management of the business.’

4.4 It is further submitted that in light of the principles

laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is well settled that

a question, as to where the control and management lies

is to be decided in light of the actual or the factual

exercise of control, inasmuch as the Courts consistently

have taken the view that mere presence of a partner firm

in India even when he happens to be the managing

partner, is not conclusive of the issue.

4.5 It is further submitted that to cull out the meaning of

management and control under the old Section 6(3) preamendment 2017, which shall be applicable in the present

case, section 6(3) post 1st April, 2017 is also required to

be considered. That the test under the new law post 1st

April, 2017 is “Key management and commercial

decisions necessary for the conduct of the business as a

whole or in substance.” It is submitted that the place of

effective management (POEM) is the new standard

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 30 of 67

prescribed by the Parliament, w.e.f. 1st April, 2017, in

alignment with the global needs and business practices.

4.6 Taking us to the findings recorded by the AO, CIT(A)

and the High Court which are on appreciation of

evidence/material on record, it is vehemently submitted by

Shri N. Venkataraman, learned ASG that it was rightly

concluded that the control and management of the

companies was in Delhi and that it was a clear design on

the part of the respective assessees to treat the income

as arising from Sikkim to avoid the payment of tax under

the Act, 1961. It is submitted that the control and

management of the companies was being done by Rattan

Gupta from his Delhi office. Therefore, the assessees can

be said to be residence in India and therefore liable to pay

tax under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

4.7 Insofar as the submission on behalf of the

appellants that in the absence of any original assessment,

there shall not be any re-assessment under sections

147/148 of the Act, Shri N. Venkataraman, learned ASG

has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the

case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun

Engineering Works P. Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363

(paragraph 14). It is submitted that in the said decision, it

is observed and held by this Court that under section 147,

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 31 of 67

the AO has been vested with the power to ‘assess or

reassess’ the escaped income of an assessee. That the

term ‘escaped assessment’ includes both “nonassessment” as well as “under assessment.”

4.8 Insofar as the submission on behalf of the

appellants on service of notice is concerned, it is

submitted that the principal place of business is the seat

of control and therefore notice sent to Delhi is sufficient.

On the service of notice at Delhi, Shri N. Venkataraman,

learned ASG has heavily relied upon the

observations/findings recorded by the High Court in the

impugned judgment and order in paragraphs 78 to 83.

Thereafter, relying upon the decision of the Calcutta High

Court in the case of India Glycols Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, 2004 SCC OnLine Cal.

736, it is submitted that notices sent/served at Delhi can

be said to be valid notice/service.

4.9 As regards levy of interest under Section 234A of

the Act is concerned, it is urged by Shri N. Venkataraman,

learned ASG that interest levied under Section 234A is

mandatory and there is no discretion with the AO and

therefore there is no question of non-compliance of

principles of natural justice. It is submitted that so far as

the penalty leviable under section 271 of the Act is

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 32 of 67

concerned, the same is discretionary, however the interest

is not discretionary. Therefore, for imposing penalty,

principles of natural justice are required to be complied

with, however in case of interest, the same being

mandatory in nature and automatic there is no

requirement of following principles of natural justice and/or

even if in the assessment order there is no specific order

to levy the interest but the interest charged is indicated in

the ITNS 150 accompanying the assessment order and

the same would be sufficient compliance for demanding

interest. Heavy reliance is placed on the Constitution

Bench decision of this Court in the case of Anjum M.H.

Ghaswala (supra) as well as subsequent decision in the

case of Karanvir Singh Gossal v. Commissioner of

Income Tax, (2012) 13 SCC 802 and the decision of this

Court in the case of Bhagat Construction Company

Private Limited (supra).

4.10 It is submitted that the ITAT has relied upon the

decision of this Court in the case of Ranchi Club Ltd.

(supra). However, the said decision has been

subsequently overruled and/or held not to be good law in

view of the subsequent decisions in the cases of Anjum

M.H. Ghaswala (supra) and Bhagat Construction

Company Private Limited (supra).

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 33 of 67

4.11 Insofar as the submission regarding non-framing of

the substantial question of law on levy of interest is

concerned, heavy reliance is placed on the decision of

this Court in the case of State Bank of India v. S.N.

Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92 (paragraph 13). It is submitted

that as observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid

decision, when a question of law arises incidentally or

collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, it will

not be a substantial question of law. It is submitted that in

the present case, the Constitution Bench in Anjum M.H.

Ghaswala (supra) has held that the interest is both

mandatory and automatic and the decision of this Court

and various High Courts had concluded that it does not

require a separate notice, hearing and an independent

order. It is submitted that this Court in the case of Bhagat

Construction Company Private Limited (supra) had in

no uncertain terms made the legal position clear by

holding that should the assessing authority enclose an

ITNS 150 form computing the interest liability and

annexed the same with the assessment order, the same

would constitute adequate compliance for sustaining the

interest and upholding it. That the aforesaid judgment

makes it evidently clear that when an issue is incidental or

collateral then it does not give rise to a substantial

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 34 of 67

question of law. Once the tax liability is upheld, interest

become automatic, mandatory and collateral.

4.12 It is next submitted that the final outcome of the tax

liability or the final outcome of the substantial questions

raised and decided by the High Court, had been decided

without any sense of dependence on the issue of interest.

That the final legal outcome of the substantial questions

raised and decided is not dependent or contingent upon a

decision on interest. On the contrary, the moment the tax

liability gets upheld, if the AO had imposed interest at the

first instance, (which in this case is not under dispute)

then interest would get added to the tax liability as it does

not require an independent and stand alone consideration

as to whether the same is leviable.

4.13 As regards the reliance placed upon the decision of

this Court in the case of Shiv Raj Gupta v. CIT, Delhi,

AIR 2020 SC 3556, by the learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants on non-framing of

substantial question of law in terms of Section 260A of the

Act so far as the interest liability is concerned, it is

submitted that the said decision shall not be applicable to

the facts of the case at hand and more particularly in case

of an interest which is automatic and mandatory. It is

submitted that in the said case, the dispute was with

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 35 of 67

respect to capital gains which by its very nature is a

separate head of income and the issue relates to the very

taxability. That therefore, failure to raise a question of

taxability of capital gains in a particular case may

tantamount to a failure in raising a substantial question of

law in terms of Section 260A of the Act. However, the

same may not apply on interest as the interest is

automatic and mandatory.

4.14 Making above submissions and relying upon the

aforesaid decisions, it is prayed that the present appeals

be dismissed.

Consideration:

5. We have heard learned counsel for the respective

parties at length.

We have also gone through the orders passed by

the Assessing Officer, CIT(A), ITAT and the impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court in great

detail.

At the outset, it is required to be noted that the AO

held against the respective assessees on all points

including Rattan Gupta being the main person in

management and control of the respective companies

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 36 of 67

situated in Delhi as well as the jurisdiction of the AO in

Delhi. The findings shall be referred to hereinbelow. The

findings recorded by the AO have been upheld by the

CIT(A), which are also against the respective assessees.

However, the ITAT reversed the order passed by the

CIT(A), which order has been reversed by the High Court

by holding that the decision of the ITAT is perverse both,

on facts and in law.

6. While appreciating the correctness of the impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court and while

appreciating the submissions made by the learned

counsel appearing for the respective parties, the findings

recorded by the AO, CIT(A), ITAT and the High Court in

the impugned judgment and order are required to be

referred to, which are as under:

Findings record by the AO while passing the

Assessment Order:

i) The directors are all from outside Sikkim and had

never been to Sikkim, and the lone director Mr.

Ajay Agarwal was projected as a resident of

Gangtok, Sikkim, which could not be sustained

as no proof or identity was shown;

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 37 of 67

ii) The entire books of accounts were found and

seized at New Delhi at the address of Mr. Rattan

Gupta, Chartered Accountant, 4556/4, Ansari

Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi. Returns were filed

without audit reports and auditors have not

signed balance sheets and the auditors were

also based out of Delhi. Though bank accounts

were available both in Delhi and Sikkim, the

authorized signatories, to operate both the

accounts were located only in Delhi;

iii) The statutory books, registers and the

shareholders were all located in Delhi;

iv) No evidence was ever produced for having

conducted board meetings in Sikkim;

v) When it came to earning of commission from

various agents, the genuineness of the

addresses given at Sikkim could not be proved.

When notices were issued under Section 131 of

the Act, no response was forthcoming and, from

the memorandum and articles of association it

was clear that the agents were kith and kin of the

directors;

vi) Shockingly, the total commission alleged to have

been earned was more than the sale of

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 38 of 67

cardamom and what could have been produced

by the State of Sikkim in a year. These facts

have been corroborated by the intelligence wing

of the department;

vii) There were no employees and no expenses

incurred at Sikkim;

viii) At the time of search and seizure on 15.03.1990

at the premises of Mr. Rattan Gupta & Co., the

following things were seized:

1) Books of accounts

2) Funds

3) Memorandum and Articles of Association

4) Blank cheque books of the bank accounts

held both in New Delhi, Gangtok and Sikkim

5) Pass books of all the 5 companies both Delhi

and Gangtok

6) Blank printed letter pads and rubber stamps

ix) Mr. Rattan Gupta in his statement dated 15th

March, 1990, confirmed that as part of

reconciliation, the persons contacted were

Dalmia Resorts International Private Limited and

Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Limited and other

entities. He further confirmed that Mr. Rajiv Jain

became a director in 3 companies on his

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 39 of 67

instructions and he had also made directors in all

the 5 Sikkim companies and named a few of

them. It was conceded clearly that though these

persons became directors at his behest no work

was performed by these persons except signing

papers;

x) Mr. Rajiv Jain in his statement dated 15th March,

1990 confirmed that cheque books and pass

books were found at the office of Mr. Rattan

Gupta and so is the case with rubber stamps

and blank printed letter heads;

xi) Mr. Ravinder Singh in his statement confirmed

that he had been looking after the day-to-day

affairs of these companies from Delhi till March,

1998, after which Rattan Gupta took over the

position as the only director and the other

directors were his nominees, and Rattan Gupta

functioned and operated only from Delhi and no

office expenses have been incurred in Sikkim;

xii) The AO also entered a finding that there has

been a fund transfer from Delhi into the bank

accounts at Sikkim to claim exemption and these

have been round tripping of money going from

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 40 of 67

Delhi to Sikkim and getting remitted back into

Delhi and claiming exemption in Sikkim; and

xiii) This was done till 31st March, 1989 and the

moment Income Tax Act was extended in 1990

the whole apparatus erased and no commission

was shown by any of the companies.

Findings recorded by the CIT(A):

1) That the appellate authority upheld the findings of

the AO, more specifically regarding commission

alleged to have been received by reiterating that

the summons sent to different persons who had

allegedly paid amounts as commission had not

responded to him and that the assessees had also

not produced any worthwhile evidence to prove the

genuineness of commission received.

2) That even U.P. Karma was examined on 8th

October, 1998 and he confirmed that he had joined

in 1998 and had no idea of earlier annual general

body meetings and could not produce any minutes.

He also confirmed that he did not have any idea

about the business in which all the 5 companies

were involved earlier. That he is a working director

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 41 of 67

claiming that he had never visited Gangtok, which

shows that Sikkim has been merely used without

actual rendition of any affairs.

3) As regards the charging of interest, the CIT(A)

gave a finding that the interest was charged as per

the workings mentioned in ITNS 150 which was

forming part of the assessment order, which is

sufficient and good enough to uphold interest in

terms of the decision of this Court.

Findings recorded by the ITAT:

1) After confirming the fact that the notices were

dispatched only in the name of the respective

companies in c/o Rattan Gupta, Chartered

Accountant, it was observed that Rattan Gupta

would not qualify as a principal officer within the

meaning of section 2(35)(a) of the Act. At this

stage, it is required to be noted that the High Court

has observed that in any event the authorised

representative of the assessee appeared before

the AO and accepted that the notices has been

issued. In that view of the matter, thereafter it is

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 42 of 67

not open for the assessees to make a grievance

with respect to non-service of the notice;

2) On the aspect relating to the control and

management of the affairs, the ITAT recorded the

findings as under:

i) It is important to highlight that the ITAT

had neither reserved nor found the

findings of the AO as upheld by the

CIT(A), as not maintainable or factually

erroneous or perverse.

ii) The findings of fact rendered by the AO

as upheld by the CIT(A) remain

undisturbed and unquestioned.

iii) The entire discussion by the ITAT has

only been an analysis of various case law

on this point without questioning the

underlying findings.

iv) The ITAT finally came to a conclusion that

since all the 5 companies had been

registered in Sikkim, Sikkim will get the

jurisdiction to tax.

Thereafter, the ITAT concluded that the revenue could not

discharge its burden and, therefore, control and

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 43 of 67

management was only in Sikkim and the income had

accrued only in Sikkim.

6.1 While reversing the finding of the AO on whether the

commission was not earned in Gangtok, though the AO

found that the notices were sent to those who had

allegedly paid the commission to the assessees and the

summons under Section 131 had not been complied with,

the ITAT gave a finding that the AO did not proceed further

and thus, since no adverse material has been brought on

record, the AO could not have proceeded to draw adverse

inference as the burden was heavily on the revenue.

6.2 On the levy of interest, the ITAT concluded that the

interest could not have been levied since the AO had not

applied his mind before levying interest following the

decision of the Patna High court in the case of Ranchi

Club Limited (supra).

Findings recorded by the High Court:

1. That a company, though incorporated in Sikkim, if it

had earned any income outside Sikkim and within

India, Income Tax Act, 1961 would apply to such

income and the jurisdiction of the income tax

authorities would not get excluded as long as what

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 44 of 67

is sought to be brought to take is the income of the

company incorporated in Sikkim, which income

accrued to it and was earned in India.

2. While referring to the various statements made by

the directors who are all stationed in Delhi, the High

Court has given the following findings:

i) Rattan Gupta had not acted merely as an

auditor giving professional advice to the 5

entities;

ii) His own employees are appointed as

directors;

iii) The explanation offered for signed cheque

books, rubber seals and letter heads being

available in his office is not convincing;

iv) Rattan Gupta had tried to shift the entire

responsibility of handling of cheques to Mr.

Verma; Mr. Verma was never produced by

the assessee;

v) The burden of proof could not be discharged

in the instant case and therefore, the High

Court upheld the findings of the AO that the

precise role of Mr. Rattan Gupta as being in

de facto control of the 5 entities appears to

be correct;

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 45 of 67

vi) That two persons who had been identified to

have handled the business and supervised

it, namely, H.L. Verma and Uma Shankar

Sitani were produced by the assessees for

their statements to be recorded. The High

Court found that Mr. R.K. Goswami, Mr.

Vedant Mehta and Mr. Rajiv Jain had all

become directors on the request of Mr.

Rattan Gupta, a fact which was not

disproved or found to be incorrect.

6.3 Thereafter, the High Court concluded that the

control and management of affairs was wholly in India for

the following reasons:

a) Rattan Gupta was not only doing audit work but

determining who should be the directors of the said

companies.

b) The rubber seals, letter heads, blank signed

cheques and other records were all found in the office

of Rattan Gupta. The factual determination by the AO

remains undisputed and this fortifies that the control

and management was in Delhi.

c) The statement of Rattan Gupta suggesting that H.L.

Verma or Uma Shankar Sitani were actually handling

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 46 of 67

the affairs of the 5 entities could not be made good by

offering either of them for examination.

d) Once documents were seized and statements were

recorded from various persons, the burden gets shifted

to the assessees to produce some evidence to counter

the picture and, the court found that its extremely

unusual that the seals and the signed blank cheques

would be lying with the Chartered Accountant.

e) The High Court in paragraph 70 held that the

revenue is right as there can be no presumption in law

that control and management is at the registered office.

f) In paragraph 71, the High Court held that “it appears

to the Court that the ITAT has not upset the factual

finding of the AO, which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

The above exhaustive evidence gathered by the

revenue, without being countered by the assessee

despite opportunity being afforded, serves to

substantiate the case of the revenue that the

management and control of the 5 assessee companies

was in fact located in Delhi. The finding by the ITAT in

this regard is plainly perverse and unsustainable in law.”

g) On commission and accrual of income, the High

Court concluded as under:

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 47 of 67

i) The findings by the AO that the assessee had

failed to prove that the commission payments earned

by them is exclusively in Sikkim had not been

dislodged by the assessee by producing any tangible

material;

ii) The evidence produced by the assesses are

only copies of bills and vouchers and receipt of

money from such agents at Sikkim in its bank

accounts and assessments have been made under

the Sikkim Manual, 1948;

iii) The High Court in para 76 held that “none of

the 5 entities named by the assessees as having paid

the commission to them appeared in the course of

assessment proceedings to confirm the payments

having been made to the assessees.” The High

Court also recorded that the rate of commission paid

was unrealistic and beyond human probabilities, nonexistence of any employees in Sikkim, non-incurring

of any expenditure in Sikkim as found in the P&L

account and finally the balance sheet showing that

notwithstanding that the income was from

commission the assets were in the form of

investments in Dalmia Group would stare at the face

of the assessees and remains unrebutted. The High

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 48 of 67

Court concluded that the findings by the ITAT in this

regard is contrary to the record and is based on

surmises and unsustainable in law.

6.4 In light of the above findings, the submissions made

by the learned counsel for the respective parties on

service of notice upon Rattan Gupta being in the control

and management of the respective assessees; the control

and management of the affairs of the assessee

companies; the applicability of the Income Tax Act, 1961;

jurisdiction of the AO and levy of interest are required to

be considered.

7. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record,

the AO, CIT(A) and the High Court have specifically held

against the assessees that in fact Rattan Gupta did not

merely render professional services but had a vital say in

the control and management of the assessee companies

and in fact he was in control and management of the

affairs of the respective assessee companies.

7.1 On control and management of business, few

decisions on interpretation of Section 4A of the erstwhile

Income Tax Act, 1922 and interpretation of Section 6(3) of

the Income Tax Act, 1961 are required to be referred to,

which are as under:

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 49 of 67

i) In the case of V.V.R.N.M. Subbayya Chettiar

(supra), it is observed in paragraph 10 as under:

“10. The principles which are now well established in England

and which will be found to have been very clearly enunciated

in Swedish Central RailwayCo. Ltd. v. Thompson (Inspector of

Taxes) [Swedish Central Railway Co. Ltd. v. Thompson

(Inspector of Taxes), 1925 AC 495 : 9 TC 373 (HL)] , which is

one of the leading cases on the subject, are:

(1) That the conception of residence in the case of a

fictitious “person”, such as a company, is as artificial as the

company itself, and the locality of the residence can only be

determined by analogy, by asking where is the head and seat

and directing power of the affairs of the company. What these

words mean have been explained by M. Patanjali Sastri, J. with

very great clarity in the following passage where he deals with

the meaning of Section 4-A(b) of the Income Tax Act:

“4-A. (b) ‘Control and management’ signifies, in the present

context, the controlling and directive power, ‘the head and

brain’ as it is sometimes called, and ‘situated’ implies the

functioning of such power at a particular place with some

degree of permanence, while ‘wholly’ would seem to recognise

the possibility of the seat of such power being divided between

two distinct and separated places.”

As a general rule, the control and management of a business

remains in the hand of a person or a group of persons, and the

question to be asked is wherefrom the person or group of

persons controls or directs the business.

(2) Mere activity by the company in a place does not create

residence, with the result that a company may be “residing” in

one place and doing a great deal of business in another.

(3) The central management and control of a company may

be divided, and it may keep house and do business in more

than one place, and, if so, it may have more than one

residence.

(4) In case of dual residence, it is necessary to show that

the company performs some of the vital organic functions

incidental to its existence as such in both the places, so that in

fact there are two centres of management.”

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 50 of 67

ii) Thereafter, in the case of Erin Estate (supra), it is

observed in paragraphs 6 & 9 as under:

“6. There is no doubt that the question raised for our decision

is a question of law. Whether or not the appellant is a resident

firm under Section 4-A(b) would depend upon the legal effect

of the facts proved in the case. The status of the appellant

which has to be determined by reference to the relevant

section of the Act is a mixed question of fact and law and in

determining this question the principles of law deducible from

the provisions of the said section will have to be applied. This

position has not been disputed before us in the present

proceedings. Section 4-A(b) provides inter alia that “for the

purpose of the Act, a firm is resident in the taxable territories

unless the control and management of its affairs is situated

wholly without the taxable territories”. This provision shows

that, where the partners of a firm are residents of this country,

the normal presumption would be that the firm is resident in

the taxable territories. This presumption is rebuttable and it

can be effectively rebutted by the assessee showing that the

control and management of the affairs of the firm is situated

wholly without the taxable territories. The onus to rebut the

initial presumption is on the assessee. The control and

management contemplated by the section evidently refers to

the controlling and directing power. Often enough, this power

has been described in judicial decisions as the “head and

brain”; the affairs of the firm which are subject to the said

control and management refer to the affairs which are relevant

for the purpose of taxation and so they must have some

relation to the income of the firm. When the section refers to

the control and management being situated wholly without the

taxable territories it implies that the control and management

can be situated in more places than one. Where the control

and management are situated wholly outside India the initial

presumption arising under the section is effectively rebutted. It

is true that the control and management which must be shown

to, be situated at least partially in India is not the merely

theoretical control and power, not a de jure control and power

but the de facto control and power actually exercised in the

course of the conduct and management of the affairs of the

firm. Theoretically, if the partners reside in India they would

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 51 of 67

naturally have the legal right to control the affairs of the firm

which carries on its operations outside India. The presence of

this theoretical de jure right to control and manage the affairs

of the firm which inevitably vests in all the partners would not

by itself show that the requisite control and management is

situated in India. It must be shown by evidence that control

and management in the affairs of the firm is exercised, may be

to a small extent, in India before it can be held that the control

and management is not situated wholly without the taxable

territories. (Vide B.R. Naik v. CIT [(1945) 13 ITR 124 : (1946)

14 ITR 334] ). The effect and scope of the provisions of

Section 4-A(b) has been considered by this Court

in V.V.R.N.M. Subbayya Chettiar v. CIT [1950 SCC 971 :

(1950) SCR 961, 965] . After examining the relevant decisions

on this point, Fazi Ali, J., who delivered the judgment of the

Court, has observed “(1) that the conception of residence in

the case of a fictitious ‘person’ such as a company, is as

artificial as the company itself and the locality of the residence

can only be determined by analogy, by asking where is the

head and seat and directing power of the affairs of the

company. …(2) Mere activity by the company in a place does

not create residence, with the result that the company may be

residing in one place and doing a great deal of business in

another. (3) The central management and control of a

company may be divided and it may keep house and do

business in more than one place, and, if so, it may have more

than one residence. (4) In case of dual residence, it is

necessary to show that the company performs some of the

vital organic functions incidental to its existence as such in

both the places so that in fact there are two centres of

management”. It is in the light of these principles that Section

4-A(b) has to be construed. Thus, the only question which

remains to be considered is whether the High Court of Madras

was right in holding that the appellant was resident in India

under Section 4-A(b).

xxx xxx xxx

9. Mr Kolah then raised a further point which had not been

urged before the High Court. He contended that the control

and management mentioned in Section 4-A(b) must be control

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and management valid and effective in law. Under Section 12

of the Partnership Act, it is only the majority of partners who

could have given effective directions to the superintendent and

since there is no evidence that the alleged control and

management has been exercised by the majority of partners

acting in concert it would not be possible to hold that any

control and management of the firm's affairs resided in India.

We do not think there is any substance in this argument.

Under Section 12(a), every partner has a right to take part in

the conduct of the business and it is only where difference

arises as to ordinary matters connected with the business of

the firm that the same has to be decided by majority of

partners under sub-section (c) of the said section. It has not

been suggested or shown that there was any difference

between the partners in regard to the matters covered by the

individual partner's letters of instruction to the superintendent.

Indeed the course of conduct evidenced by these letters

shows that Andiappa Pillai who holds the maximum number of

individual shares has purported to act for the partnership and

usually gave instructions in regard to the conduct and

management of the firm's affairs. On the record we see no

trace of any protest against, or disagreement with, this

conduct of Andiappa Pillai. Besides, it was never suggested

during the course of the enquiry before the Income Tax

Officers that the directions given by Andiappa Pillai were not

valid or effective and had not been agreed upon by the

remaining partners. That is why we think this technical point

raised by Mr Kolah must fail.”

iii) That thereafter the Bombay High Court in the case

of Narottam and Pareira Ltd. (supra) through Justice

M.C. Chagla, as His Lordship then was, observed and

held in paragraphs 3 and 4 as under:

“3. It is also necessary that the control and

management of the affairs of the company should be

situated wholly in the taxable territories. Therefore, if

any part of the control and management is outside the

taxable territories then the company would not be

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 53 of 67

resident. In this connection it is perhaps necessary to

look at the converse definition for a Hindu undivided

family, firm or other association of persons. In their

case they are resident unless the control and

management of its affairs is situated wholly without

the taxable territories. Therefore; whereas in the case

of a Hindu undivided family or firm or association of

persons any measure of control and management

within the taxable territories would make them

resident, in the case of a company any measure of

control and management of its affairs outside the

taxable territories would make it non-resident. In

construing the expression “control and management”

it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between

doing of business and the control and management of

business. Business and the whole of it may be done

outside India and yet the control and management of

that business may be wholly within India. In this

particular case considerable emphasis is placed upon

the fact that the whole of the business of the company

is done in Ceylon and the whole of the income which is

liable to tax has been earned in Ceylon. But that is not

a factor which the Legislature has emphasised, It is

entirely irrelevant where the business is done and

where the income has been earned. What is relevant

and material is from which place has that business

been controlled and managed. “Control and

management” referred to in Section 4A(c) is, as we

shall presently point out on the authorities, central

control and management. The control and

management contemplated by this sub-section is not

the carrying on of day to day business by servants,

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 54 of 67

employees or agents. The real test to be applied is,

where is the controlling and directing power, or rather,

where does the controlling and directing power

function or to put it in a different language there is

always a seat of power or the head and brain, and

what has got to be ascertained is, where is this seat of

power, or the head and brain. A company or for the

matter of that a firm or an undivided Hindu family has

got to work through servants and agents, but it is not

the servants and agents that constitute the seat of

power or the controlling and directing power. It is that

authority to which the servants, employees and agents

are subject, it is that authority which controls and

manages them, which is the central authority, and it is

at the place where the central authority functions that

the company resides. It’ may be in some cases that

like an individual a company may have residence in

more than one place. It may exercise control and

management not only from one fixed abode, but it

may have different places. That would again be a

question dependent upon the circumstances of each

case. But the contention which Mr. Kolah has most

strongly pressed before us is entirely unacceptable

that a company controls or manages at a particular

place because its affairs are carried on at a particular

place and they are carried on by people living there

appointed by the company with large powers of

management. A company may have a dozen local

branches at different places outside India, it may send

out agents fully armed with authority to deal with and

carry on business at these branches, and yet it may

retain the central management and control in Bombay

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 55 of 67

and manage and control all the affairs of these

branches from Bombay and at Bombay. It would be

impossible to contend that because there are

authorised agents doing the business of the company

at six different places outside India, therefore the

company is resident not only in Bombay but at all

these six different places.

4. ….It is perfectly true that these two managers do all

the business of the company in Ceylon and in doing

that business naturally a large amount of discretion is

given to them and a considerable amount of authority.

But the mere doing of business does not constitute

these managers the controlling and directing power.

Their power-of-attorney can be cancelled at any

moment, they must carry out any orders given to them

from Bombay, they must submit to Bombay an

explanation of what they have been doing, and

throughout the time that they are working in Ceylon a

vigilant eye is kept over their work from the directors'

board room in Bombay. The correspondence which has

also been relied upon between the company here and

its office in Colombo also goes to show and

emphasises the same state of affairs. Mr. Kolah is right

again when he puts emphasis upon the fact that what

we have to consider in this case is not the power or

the capacity to manage and control, but the actual

control and management, or, in other words, not the

dejure control and management but thede facto

control and management, and in order to hold that the

company is resident during the years of account it

must be established that the company de facto

controlled and managed its affairs in Bombay. Mr.

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 56 of 67

Kolah says that the two powers-of-attorney go to show

that whatever legal or juridical control and

management the company might have had, in fact the

actual management was exercised by the two

managers in Ceylon. In our opinion this is not a case

where the company did nothing with regard to the

actual management and control of its affairs and left it

to some other agency. As we said before, the two

managers were the employees of the company acting

throughout the relevant period under the control and

management of the company, and therefore in the

case we are considering there was not only a dejure

control and management, but also a de facto control

and management.”

That thereafter, Justice Kania, as His Lordship then

was, after referring to the decision in the case of B.R.

Naik v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, (1945)

13 ITR 124 has observed and held that the expression

“control and management” means where the central

control and management actually abides.

iv) The Calcutta High Court in the case of Bank of

China (supra) has specifically held that a company

may be simultaneously resident in more than one place,

but the control and management is where the head and

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 57 of 67

brain is situated. While holding so, in paragraphs 7 to 9,

it is observed and held as under:

“7. Under s. 6(3), a non-Indian company is said to be resident

in India in any previous year if during that year the control and

management of its affairs is situated wholly in India. The

determination as to at what place or places the control and

management of a particular company is situated is essentially

a question of fact to be determined on the facts and

circumstances of the particular case. A company can be

simultaneously resident in more than one place but the

question is whether the control and management is situated

wholly in India during the relevant previous year. The

expression “control and management” signifies the controlling

and directive power, “the head and brain”, as it is sometimes

called, and “situated” implies the functioning of such power at

a particular place with some degree of permanence. The word

“wholly” as used in s. 6(3) would indicate that the seat of such

power may be divided between two distinct and separate

places. The expression “control and management” means de

facto control and management and not merely the right or

power to control and manage. In order to hold that a nonIndian company is resident in India during any previous year, it

must be established that such company de facto controls and

manages its affairs in India. The principles are by now well

settled.

8. Lord Loreburn L.C. in De Beers Consolidated Mines

Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] 5 TC 198 (HL) at page 212, observed as

follows:

“Mr. Cohen propounded a test which had the merits of

simplicity and certitude. He maintained that a company

resides where it is registered, and nowhere else…… I cannot

adopt Mr. Cohen's contention. In applying the conception of

residence to a company, we ought, I think, to proceed as

nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual. A

company cannot eat or sleep, but it can keep house and do

business. We ought, therefore, to see whether it really keeps

house and does business. An individual may be of foreign

nationality, and yet reside in the United Kingdom. So may a

company. Otherwise, it might have its chief seat of

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 58 of 67

management and its centre of trading in England, under the

protection of English law, and yet escape the appropriate

taxation by the simple expedient of being registered abroad

and distributing its dividends abroad. The decision of Chief

Baron Kelly and Baron Huddleston in Calcutta Jute Mills Co.

Ltd. v. Henry Nicholson, [1876] 1 TC 83 : [1876] 1 Ex D 428

and Cesena Sulphur Co. Ltd. v. Henry Nicholson, [1876] 1

TC 83 : [1876] 1 Ex D 428, now thirty years ago, involved the

principle that a company resides for purposes of income-tax

where its real business is carried on. Those decisions have

been acted upon ever since. I regard that as the true rule;

and the real business is carried on where the central

management and control actually abides.”

9. Since that judgment, the words underlined have been taken

as the test, although central management and control has

sometimes been stated in the form “head, seat and directing

power”. The question depends on the fact of the management

and not on the physical situation of the thing that is managed.

A company is managed by the board of directors and if the

meetings of the board of directors are held within India, it may

be said that the central control and management is situated

here. The direction, management and control “the head and

seat and directing power” of a company's affairs is, therefore,

situate at the place where the directors' meetings are held

and, consequently, a non-Indian company would be a resident

in this country if the meetings of the directors who manage

and control the business are held here. The word “affairs”

means affairs which are relevant for the purpose of the I.T. Act

and which have some relation to the income sought to be

assessed. It is not the bare possession of powers by the

directors, but their taking part in or controlling the affairs

relating to the trading, that is of importance in determining the

question of the place where the control is exercised. They

must exercise their power of control in relation to business or

activity wherefrom the profit is derived. (See Egyptian Hotels

Ltd. v. Mitchell, [1915] 6 TC 542 (HL)).”

v) In the case of Nandlal Gandalal (supra), this Court

has held that the expression “control and management”

in Section 4A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, means de

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 59 of 67

facto control and management and not merely the right

or power to control and manage.

8. The sum and substance of the above decisions of

this Court as well as various High Courts would be that

where the head and seat and directing power of the affairs

of the company and the control and management is must

be shown is not merely theoretical control and power, i.e.,

not de jure control and power, but de facto control and

power actually exercised in the course of the conduct and

management of the affairs of the firm; that the domicile or

the registration of the company is not at all relevant and

the determinate test is where the sole right to manage and

control of the company lies.

9. Applying the above principles of law to the facts of

the case at hand, and the findings recorded by the AO,

confirmed by the CIT(A), it is rightly concluded that the

control and management of the affairs of the respective

assessees were with Rattan Gupta, Chartered Accountant

in Delhi. The findings of fact recorded by the AO,

confirmed by the CIT(A) that the control and management

of the affairs of the assessee companies was with Rattan

Gupta are based on the entire material on record. In light

of the aforesaid findings, the High Court has not

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 60 of 67

committed any error in reversing the contrary findings

recorded by the ITAT and it is rightly observed and held

that service of notice upon Rattan Gupta treating him as

the principal officer and/or as a principal officer for and on

behalf of the assessee companies were valid notices and

the High Court has rightly held that the AO at New Delhi

was having the jurisdiction to issue notice under the

Income Tax Act, 1961.

10. Insofar as the case on behalf of the respective

assessees that the entire income was earned in Sikkim by

way of commission on sale of cardamom and therefore

such income shall not be liable to be taxed under the

Income Tax Act, 1961 is concerned, at the outset, it is

required to be noted that there are concurrent findings

recorded by the AO and the CIT(A), as approved by the

High Court, that no income by way of commission, as

claimed by the assessees, has been established and

proved by the assessees. In fact, the AO issued

notices/summons to different persons who had allegedly

paid amounts as commission, however, those persons

had not responded. Therefore, the AO as such has rightly

drawn an adverse inference. At this stage, it is required to

be noted that as such the assessees did not produce any

worthwhile evidence to prove the genuineness of the

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 61 of 67

commission received. Despite the above, the ITAT

reversed the findings of fact recorded by the AO and the

CIT(A) by observing that the AO did not proceed further

(after issuing the summons/notices) and that since no

adverse material has been brought on record the AO

could not have proceeded to draw an adverse inference

as the burden was heavy on the revenue. Once, the AO

issued summons to those who had allegedly paid the

commission to the assessees and the summons were

issued under Section 131 which were not complied with

and it was the assertion on behalf of the respective

assessees that they earned the income of commission

within Sikkim, the burden to prove the same was upon the

assessees. Under the circumstances, the ITAT wrongly

and erroneously shifted the burden upon the AO to prove

the contrary. Therefore, in absence of any material on

record that the commission was earned only in Gangtok,

the assessees cannot be permitted to say that they were

liable to pay the tax under the Sikkim Manual, 1948 and

not under the Income Tax Act, 1961. It appears that the

assessees with mala fide intention and to evade the

payment of tax under the Income Tax Act, 1961 came out

with a case that they earned the income within Sikkim,

which has not been established and proved. It was a

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 62 of 67

clear attempt on the part of the respective assessees to

wriggle out of the clutches of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

11. As regards the submission on behalf of the

respective assessees that as there was no original

assessment under the Income Tax Act, 1961, there could

not have been the re-assessment under sections 147/148

of the Act, 1961 is concerned, the same has no substance

in view of the binding decision of this Court in the case of

Sun Engineering Works P. Ltd. (supra). In paragraph

14 of the said decision, it is observed and held as under:

“14…..Thus, under Section 147, the assessing officer has

been vested with the power to ‘assess or reassess’

the escaped income of an assessee. The use of the

expression “assess or reassess such income or recompute the

loss or depreciation allowance” in Section 147 after the

conditions for reassessment are satisfied, is only relatable to

the preceding expression in clauses (a) and (b) viz., “escaped

assessment”. The term “escaped assessment” includes both

“non-assessment” as well as “under assessment”. Income is

said to have “escaped assessment” within the meaning of this

section when it has not been charged in the hands of an

assessee in the relevant year of assessment. The expression

“assess” refers to a situation where the assessment of the

assessee for a particular year is, for the first time, made by

resorting to the provisions of Section 147 because the

assessment had not been made in the regular manner under

the Act. The expression “reassess” refers to a situation where

an assessment has already been made but the Income Tax

Officer has, on the basis of information in his possession,

reason to believe that there has been under assessment on

account of the existence of any of the grounds contemplated

by the provisions of Section 147(b) read with the Explanation

(1) thereto.”

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 63 of 67

12. Insofar as the submission on behalf of the

respective assessees regarding levy of interest and the

submission on behalf of the assessees that in absence of

any specific order passed in the assessment order to levy

interest, the interest could not have been levied, is

concerned, the said issue as such is concluded against

the assessees in view of the Constitution Bench decision

of this Court in the case of Anjum M.H. Ghaswala

(supra) as well as the subsequent decision in the case of

Karanvir Singh Gossal (supra). The ITAT relied upon

the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of

Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra), however, the decision of the

Patna High Court in the case of Ranchi Club Ltd.

(supra) is held to be not good law, in view of the

Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of

Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (supra).

12.1 In the case of Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (supra), while

dealing with the interest under the provisions of Sections

234A, 234B and 234C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, it is

observed and held that the interest contemplated under

the said provisions is mandatory in nature and the power

of waiver or reduction has not been expressly conferred

on the Commission. The same indicates that insofar as

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 64 of 67

the payment of statutory interest is concerned, the same

is outside the purview of the settlement contemplated in

Chapter XIX-A of the Act. In the present case also, the

levy of interest under Section 234A for default in

furnishing the return of income is mandatory and

automatic. Section 234A of the Act provides that where

the return of income for any assessment year is furnished

after the due date or is not furnished, the assessee shall

be liable to pay simple interest. Thus, interest under

section 234A is statutory interest leviable and payable and

therefore the decision of this Court in the case of Anjum

M.H. Ghaswala (supra) shall be applicable with full force.

Therefore, when the interest is levied as per the workings

mentioned in ITNS 150 which is forming part of the

assessment order, it is rightly held to be sufficient and

good enough to charging interest. (See decision of this

Court in the case of Bhagat Construction Company

Private Limited (supra)).

13. As regards the submission on behalf of the

assessees that no substantial question of law was framed

on levy of interest, at the outset, it is required to be noted

that both the parties made submissions on levy of interest

elaborately which have been dealt with and considered by

the High Court in light of the Constitution Bench decision

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 65 of 67

of this Court in the case of Anjum M.H. Ghaswala

(supra). Even otherwise, the said issue can be said to be

incidental or collateral. Even otherwise, in view of the

decision of this Court in the case of Anjum M.H.

Ghaswala (supra) holding that the levy of interest under

Section 234A is statutory interest and mandatory and

automatic, thereafter the said issue cannot be said to be a

question of law.

Conclusion:

14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated

above and the findings recorded by the AO, CIT(A),

confirmed by the High Court, it cannot be said that the

High Court has committed any error in upsetting the

findings recorded by the ITAT. We are in complete

agreement with the view taken by the AO, CIT(A) and the

High Court on all issues including the issue of control and

management of the affairs of the assessee companies by

Rattan Gupta from Delhi; jurisdiction of the AO at New

Delhi; applicability of the Income Tax Act, 1961; that the

assessees did not prove that the income was earned by

way of commission in Sikkim and therefore the tax was

not liable to be paid under the Income Tax Act, 1961 and

CA 5769/2022 Etc. Page 66 of 67

was liable to be paid under the Sikkim Manual, 1948. We

are also in agreement with the view taken by the High

Court on levy of interest in view of the binding decision of

the Constitution Bench in the case of Anjum M.H.

Ghaswala (supra), which has been subsequently

followed in the case of Karanvir Singh Gossal (supra).

15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated

above, the present appeals fail and the same deserve to

be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. However, in

the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no

order as to costs.

………………………………J.

[M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI; ………………………………J.

APRIL 10, 2023. [B.V. NAGARATHNA]

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