SHRI RAM SHRIDHAR CHIMURKAR VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

SHRI RAM SHRIDHAR CHIMURKAR VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.21876 of 2017)
SHRI RAM SHRIDHAR CHIMURKAR ….. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal assails the judgment of the Nagpur Bench of
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 30th November, 2015
wherein Writ Petition No. 2110 of 2003 filed by the Respondents
herein was allowed. Consequently, the judgment and order passed
by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai dated 19th July,
2002, whereby the Original Application filed by the Appellant
herein was allowed, has been set aside.
3. Succinctly stated, the facts giving rise to the instant appeal
are as under:
3.1. That Shridar Chimurkar was serving as a Superintendent
in the office of Respondent No. 2, Deputy Director and HO
2
National Sample Survey Organization, Field Zonal Office,
Nagpur, and retired on attaining superannuation in the
year 1993. He died issueless in the year 1994, leaving
behind his wife, namely, Maya Motghare who thereafter
adopted Sri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar, the Appellant herein
as her son on 6th April, 1996, i.e., nearly two years after the
death of Shridar Chimurkar.
3.2. After the death of Shridar Chimurkar, his wife, Maya
Motghare and the Appellant were living in a portion of a
house owned by Prakash Motghare, the natural father of
the Appellant. Subsequently, in April, 1998, Maya Motghare
married Chandra Prakash, a widower, and began residing
with him at Janakpuri, New Delhi.
3.3. In the aforesaid background, the Appellant claimed family
pension payable to the family of the deceased government
employee, Shridar Chimurkar, from the Respondents, by
addressing a letter in this regard, dated 18th January, 2000.
The claim of the Appellant was rejected by the Respondents
on the ground that children adopted by a widow of a
government servant, after the death of the government
servant, would not be entitled to receive family pension as
per Rule 54 (14) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Pension)
Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “CCS (Pension)
3
Rules” for the sake of brevity). The Respondents’ decision
was communicated to the Appellant by way of letter dated
23rd February, 2000.
3.4. Aggrieved by the Respondents’ rejection of his claim for
family pension, the Appellant filed an Original Application,
being O.A. No. 2166 of 2001, before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai, praying that the order of
the Respondents dated 23rd February, 2000 be quashed and
set aside, as being illegal and unconstitutional. Further, a
declaration that the Appellant is the adopted son of the
deceased government employee and is therefore entitled to
receive family pension, was also sought.
3.5. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai, by an order
dated 19th July, 2002, allowed O.A. No. 2166 of 2001 filed
by the Appellant and directed the Respondents to consider
the Appellant’s claim for family pension by treating him as
the adopted son of the deceased government employee,
Shridar Chimurkar. The salient findings of the Tribunal
may be culled out as under:
i. That Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules,
initially excluded sons or daughters born or adopted by
the government servant after retirement, from the
benefit of family pension. However, by way of
4
amendments to the said Rule in the year 1990 and
1993, the bar against children born or adopted after
retirement, seeking family pension, was removed.
That the order of the Respondents dated 23rd
February, 2000 would not survive in view of the
aforesaid amendments.
ii. That as per Sections 8 and 12 of the Hindu Adoptions
and Maintenance Act, 1956, (‘HAMA Act’, for short) the
widow of a Hindu male is competent to adopt a son or
a daughter without there being a direction/expression
of desire to that effect, by her deceased husband. That
the effect of adoption by a widow would be that the
child so adopted would be deemed to be the child of
her deceased husband also, vide Vijayalakshmamma
vs. B.T. Shankar, (2001) 4 SCC 558
(“Vijayalakshmamma”).
iii. That the adoption of the Appellant by Maya Motghare
would be deemed to be adoption of the Appellant by
her deceased husband Shridar Chimurkar also.
3.6. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Tribunal, the
Respondents herein challenged the same by filing Writ
5
Petition No. 2110 of 2013 before the Nagpur Bench of High
Court of Judicature at Bombay.
3.7. By the impugned judgment and order dated 30th November,
2015, the High Court allowed the said Writ Petition and
reversed reversed judgment and order passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai dated 19th July,
2002. Hence this appeal by the original applicant.
3.8. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to encapsulate
the reasoning of the High Court for allowing the Writ
Petition filed by the appellant herein, as under:
i. That the Appellant herein could have been entitled to
receive family pension had he been legally adopted by
the deceased government servant, which was not the
case in the instant matter.
ii. That the Tribunal had erred in relying on Section 8
and 12 of the HAMA Act, 1956, which generally deals
with, inter alia, adoption by a Hindu widow.
iii. That Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules does
not deal with adoption by a widow of a government
servant after the death of the government servant.
4. We have heard learned Counsel, Mrs. K. Sarada Devi,
appearing on behalf of the Appellant, and learned Additional
6
Solicitor General of India, Mrs. Madhvi Goradia Divan, appearing
on behalf of the Union of India, and perused the material on
record.
Submissions:
5. Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant, at the outset, contended that the High Court erred
in interfering with the findings of the Tribunal, without
appreciating the law on the capacity of a Hindu widow to adopt.
5.1. It was further contended that adoption made by a Hindu
widow would be deemed to be an adoption by her deceased
husband also, as per the provisions of HAMA Act, 1956,
and in view of the said position of law, the High Court
ought not to have interfered with the findings of the
Tribunal. That such a view has stood affirmed by this Court
in Vijayalakshmamma wherein a declaration was made to
the effect that adoption by a Hindu widow would be deemed
to be adoption by her husband also.
5.2. Reliance was also placed on the text of Rule 54 (14) (b) of
the CCS (Pension) Rules, as it initially stood, as contrasted
with the text of the said provision after amendments to the
same in the years 1990 and 1993, to contend that the bar
against children born or adopted after retirement, seeking
7
family pension, was removed by way of the subsequent
amendments. Therefore, children adopted at any time after
retirement of the government servant, including children
adopted by the widow of the government servant after his
death ought to be included under the definition of ‘family’
for the purpose of granting family pension.
5.3. That unlike the position under classical Hindu Law, a
Hindu female under the provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956
is rendered eligible to adopt, not only acting at the behest of
her husband or on seeking his approval, but also in her
own right. Further, Section 12 thereof provides that a child
adopted shall cease to have any ties with the family of
her/his birth and shall only have ties with his adoptive
family. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid propositions,
what emerges is that an adoption by a Hindu widow would
necessarily create a tie between the child so adopted and
her deceased husband.
In that context it was submitted that the Appellant
herein would have ties not only with Maya Motghare, his
adoptive mother, but also with her deceased husband,
Shridar Chimurkar, more so because, as on the date of
adoption, she had not re-married. That, as on the date of
adoption of the Appellant, Maya Motghare was the widow of
8
Shridar Chimurkar and therefore, the Appellant would be
the adopted son of Shridar Chimurkar also and all
enumerated consequences of such adoption would
necessarily follow.
With the aforesaid averments, it was prayed that the
present appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned
judgment of the High Court and restoring the judgment of
the Tribunal.
6. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General Mrs. Madhvi
Goradia Divan, appearing on behalf of the Union of India
submitted that the impugned judgment is based on a faultless
appreciation of the law and does not call for interference by this
Court.
6.1. It was submitted that Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension)
Rules, does not cover adoption by a widow of a government
servant, after the death of such a government servant.
Therefore, the said rule could not be invoked for grant of
family pension to the Appellant herein. That the definition
of ‘family’ in relation to a government servant, as provided
under Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, is not
expansive enough to take within its sweep a child adopted
by the widow of a government servant after his death.
9
6.2. It was contended that reliance placed by the learned
Counsel for the Appellant on Section 8 and 12 of HAMA
Act, 1956, was misplaced. That the said provisions merely
recognize that a female Hindu, including a widow, could
adopt a child under the provisions of the said Act. However,
the said provisions are irrelevant to the present case, which
pertains not merely to a question as to the capacity of a
Hindu widow to adopt, but involves issues of entitlement of
a child so adopted by a Hindu widow, to family pension on
the death of the government servant.
6.3. It was next contended that the adoption of the Appellant by
Maya Motghare, who was the widow of deceased
government servant Shridar Chimurkar, would not relate
back to the date of his retirement from service. Therefore,
the appellant could not claim family pension, in his
capacity as the adopted son of Shridar Chimurkar.
With the aforesaid averments it was prayed on behalf
of the Respondents that the present appeal be dismissed as
being devoid of merit, and the impugned judgment of the
High Court be affirmed.
Points for Consideration:
10
7. Having regard to the submissions of the learned Senior
Counsel and learned Counsel for the respective parties, the
following points would arise for our consideration:
i. Whether a child adopted by a widow of a government servant,
subsequent to the death of the government servant would be
included within the scope of the definition of ‘family’ under
Rule 54 (14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, and would
therefore be entitled to receive family pension payable under
the said Rules?
ii. What order?
Legal Scheme:
8. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the
relevant provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 and the CCS (Pension)
Rules.
8.1. HAMA Act, 1956 seeks to codify the law relating to
adoptions and maintenance among Hindus. Chapter II of
the Act pertains to adoption and prescribes inter-alia, the
manner in which an adoption is to be made, the legal
obligations created by way of adoption and the
consequences that are to follow an adoption.
8.2. Section 5 of the said Act provides that no adoption shall be
made by a Hindu, except in accordance with the provisions
11
of the Act; and any adoption made in contravention of the
provisions of the Act shall be void and shall neither create
any rights in the adoptive family, in favour of the person so
adopted, nor destroy the rights of any person in the family
of his or her birth. Further, Section 6 lists the requisites of
a valid adoption under the said Act. Section 7 pertains to
the capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption, while
Section 8 deals with the capacity of a female Hindu to
adopt. Section 8 is relevant to the present case and is
usefully extracted as under:
“8. Capacity of a female Hindu to take in
adoption.―Any female Hindu who is of sound
mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take
a son or daughter in adoption:
Provided that, if she has a husband living, she
shall not adopt a son or daughter except with
the consent of her husband unless the husband
has completely and finally renounced the world
or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been
declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to
be of unsound mind.”
8.3. Section 12 of HAMA Act, 1956, which is relevant to the
present case, lists the effects or consequences of adoption
by providing that an adopted child shall be deemed to be
the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all
purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from
such date, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her
12
birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those
created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The said
provision is extracted as under:
“12. Effects of adoption. ―An adopted child
shall be deemed to be the child of his or her
adoptive father or mother for all purposes with
effect from the date of the adoption and from
such date all the ties of the child in the family of
his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed
and replaced by those created by the adoption in
the adoptive family:
Provided that― (a) the child cannot marry any
person whom he or she could not have married
if he or she had continued in the family of his or
her birth;
(b) any property which vested in the adopted
child before the adoption shall continue to vest
in such person subject to the obligations, if any,
attaching to the ownership of such property,
including the obligation to maintain relatives in
the family of his or her birth;
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person
of any estate which vested in him or her before
the adoption.”
8.4. However, the present case pertains not merely to a question
as to the capacity of a Hindu widow to adopt, but involves
issues of entitlement of a child adopted by a Hindu widow,
to family pension payable to certain categories of legal heirs
of a deceased government servant. It is necessary to refer to
the relevant Rules of the Central Civil Services (Pension)
Rules, 1972, as amended from time to time.
13
Rule 3(1)(f) of the CCS (Pension) Rules defines the term
‘family pension’ in the following manner:
“Family pension means `Family Pension, 1964',
admissible under Rule 54 but does not include
dearness relief.”
Rule 54 deals, inter alia, with the amount of family
pension payable, and the procedure to be followed for
payment thereof. Rule 54(14)(b) which is relevant to the
present case, defines ‘family’ for the purpose of Rule 54, in
the following terms:
“(b) “family” in relation to a government
servant means –
i. Wife in the case of a male Government
servant, or husband in the case of a
female Government servant;
ia. A judicially separated wife or
husband, such separation not
being granted on the ground of
adultery and the person
surviving was not held guilty of
committing adultery;
ii. Unmarried son who has not attained
the age of twenty-five years and
unmarried or widowed or divorced
daughter, including such son and
daughter adopted legally”;
iii.Dependent parents;
iv.Dependent disabled siblings (i.e.,
brother or sister) of a government
servant.”
14
With that primer, we shall proceed to consider the
question as to the entitlement of a child adopted by a Hindu
widow, to family pension payable under Rule 54 of the CCS
(Pension) Rules.
Analysis:
9. Section 8 of HAMA Act, 1956 pertains to the capacity of a
female Hindu to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The said
provision permits a female Hindu who is not a minor or of
unsound mind, to take a son or daughter in adoption to herself, in
her own right. The provision requires that a female Hindu who has
a husband, shall not adopt except with the express consent of her
husband. However, no such pre-condition is applicable in relation
to a Hindu widow; a divorced female Hindu; or a female Hindu
whose husband has, after marriage, finally renounced the world or
has been declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be of
unsound mind.
9.1. Therefore, there exists an unequivocal statutory declaration
as to the capacity of a female Hindu, including a widow, to
take a son or daughter in adoption, in her own right. The
question would therefore arise as to what would be the
adoptive family of a child who is adopted by a widow, or by
a married woman whose husband has completely and
finally renounced the world, or has been declared to be of
15
unsound mind. The text of Section 12 of the Act lends
limited perspective in this regard. However, this Court has
clarified this aspect by declaring that, on adoption by a
widow, the adopted son or daughter is deemed to be a
member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow,
vide Sawan Ram vs. Kalawanti, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1761.
9.2. Further, in Sitabai vs. Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1970 SC 343,
this Court took note of the consequences of adoption as
listed under Section 12 of the Act, and observed as follows
as to the as to the effects of adoption by a Hindu widow:
“5. […] It is clear on a reading of the main part
of Section 12 and Sub-section (vi) of Section
11 that the effect of adoption under the Act is
that it brings about severance of all ties of the
child given in adoption in the family of his or her
birth. The child altogether ceases to have any ties
with the family of his birth. Correspondingly,
these very ties are automatically replaced by
those created by the adoption in the adoptive
family. The legal effect of giving the child in
adoption must therefore be to transfer the child
from the family of its birth to the family of its
adoption.
The scheme of Sections 11 and 12, therefore, is
that in the case of adoption by a widow the
adopted child becomes absorbed in the adoptive
family to which the widow belonged. In other
words the child adopted is tied with the
relationship of sonship with the deceased
husband of the widow.”
16
10. Having acknowledged the consequences of adoption under
Hindu Law, it is necessary to highlight at this juncture that the
said provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956 determine the rights of a
son adopted by a Hindu widow only vis-à-vis his adoptive family.
Rights and entitlements of an adopted son of a Hindu widow, as
available in Hindu Law, as against his adoptive family, cannot
axiomatically be held to be available to such adopted son, as
against the government, in a case specifically governed by extant
pension rules. The provisions of the HAMA Act, 1956, as discussed
above, relate generally to the capacity of the female Hindu to take
a son or daughter in adoption and the effects that follow such an
adoption. The said provisions do not lend much assistance in the
instant case which does not pertain to the rights of the adoptee
such as the Appellant herein under Hindu Law, but to his rights
and entitlements under the CCS (Pension) Rules. There exists a
vital difference between the rights of an adopted son under Hindu
Law and his rights to draw family pension, which creates a burden
on the public exchequer. It is therefore necessary to determine the
rights and entitlements of the Appellant having regard to Rule 54
(14) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules.
10.1. Rule 54 deals, inter alia, with the amount of family pension
payable, and the procedure to be followed for payment
thereof. Rule 54(14)(b) which is relevant to the present case,
17
defines ‘family’ for the purpose of Rule 54. It is the case of
the Appellant that a “son or daughter adopted legally” by a
government servant is eligible to claim family pension after
the death of the government servant, and therefore, such
benefit ought to be extended in his favour also. That,
although he was adopted by the widow of a government
servant, he must be deemed to be the adopted son of the
deceased government servant and therefore allowed the
benefit of family person.
11. This matter calls for an interpretation of the phrase “in
relation to a government servant” as appearing in Rule 54 (14)(b) of
the CCS (Pension) Rules.
In order to engage with this prong of the matter, i.e., effect of
the phrase “in relation to a government servant” as appearing in
Rule 54 (14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, in determining the
Appellant’s entitlement to family pension, it may be useful to refer
to the decision of this Court in Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299 on the interpretation of the
phrase “in relation to”:
In the said case, this Court held as follows, while interpreting
the phrase “in relation to” in the context of the Swadeshi Cotton
Mills Company Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)
Act, 1986:
18
“50. The expression "in relation to" (so also
"pertaining to"), is very broad expression
which pre-supposes another subject matter.
These are words of comprehensiveness
which might have both a direct significance
as well as an indirect significance depending
on the context…In this connection reference
may be made to 76 Corpus Juris Secundum
at pages 620 and 621 where it is stated that
the term "relate" is also defined as meaning
to bring into association or connection
with. It has been clearly mentioned that
"relating to" has been held to be equivalent
to or synonymous with as to "concerning
with" and "pertaining to". The expression
"pertaining to" is an expression of expansion
and not of contraction.”
 [Emphasis by me]
11.1. The use of the phrase “in relation to” in statutes is with a
view to bring one person or thing into association or
connection with another person or thing. The direct or
indirect nature of such association or connection depends
on the context. In Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules,
the phrase “in relation to a government servant” would
indicate that the categories of persons listed thereunder,
such as wife, husband, judicially separated wife or
husband, son or unmarried daughter who has not attained
the age of twenty-five years, adopted son or daughter, etc.
are sought to be brought into association with the deceased
government servant. The context requires that association
or connection of such persons with the deceased
19
government servant must be direct and not remote. The
said Rule requires that the family member must have a
close nexus with the deceased government servant, and
must have been dependent on him during his lifetime.
Therefore, a son or daughter adopted by the widow of a
deceased government servant, after the death of the
government servant, could not be included within the
definition of ‘family’ under Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS
(Pension) Rules.
12. It may also be appropriate to refer to the decision of this
Court in Poonamal vs. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 345,
wherein the purpose for which ‘family pension’ is granted, was
highlighted by this Court in the following words:
“Family pension came to be conceptualised in
the year 1950. When a Government servant die
in harness or soon after retirement, in the
traditional Indian family on the death of the only
earning member, the widow or the minor
children were not only rendered orphans but
faced more often destitution and starvation.
Traditionally speaking the widow was hardly in a
position to obtain gainful employment. She
suffered the most in as much as she was
deprived of the companionship of the husband
and also became economically orphaned. As a
measure of socioeconomic justice family pension
scheme was devise to help the widows tie over
the crisis and till the minor children attain
majority to extend them some succour. This
appeared to be the underlying motivation in
devising the family pension scheme. It was
20
liberalised from time to time. The liberalisation
was however subject to the condition that the
Government Servant had in his life time agreed
that he shall make a contribution of an amount
equal to two months' emoluments or Rs. 5,000
whichever is less out of the death-cumretirement gratuity. Those Government servants
who did not accept this condition were denied
the benefit of family pension scheme.”
It is evident from the passage quoted above that family
pension was devised as a means to help the dependents of the
deceased government servant tide over the crisis and to extend to
them some succour. Therefore, the definition of the term ‘family’
cannot be extended to include those persons who were not even
dependents of the government servant, at the time of his death.
12.1. The cannon of construction described in the principle,
Nocitur a Sociis, may be applied to the present case. The
said principle posits that the meaning of a phrase must be
construed having regard to the words immediately
surrounding it. In the present case, the heirs listed under
Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules are the
immediate dependents of the deceased government
servant. Therefore, persons who were not dependant on
the government servant prior to his death cannot be held
to be included in the definition of ‘family’ under Rule
54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules.
21
13. Further, we are unable to find favour with the argument of
the learned Counsel for the Appellant that since the bar contained
in Rule 54(14)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules against children born
or adopted after retirement, seeking family pension, was removed
by way of the subsequent amendments to the provision, children
adopted at any time after retirement of the government servant,
including children adopted by the widow of the government
servant after his death ought to be included under the definition
of ‘family’ for the purpose of granting family pension. The
provision could not be as expansive as suggested by the learned
Counsel for the Appellant. It is necessary that the scope of the
benefit of family pension be restricted only to sons or daughters
legally adopted by the government servant, during his/her
lifetime. The definition of ‘family’ is narrowly worded under the
CCS (Pension) Rules, in the specific context of the entitlement to
‘family pension’ and in relation to the government servant.
Therefore, the word “adoption” in Rule 54(14)(b)(ii) of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, in the context of grant of family pension, must be
restricted to an adoption made by a government servant during
his/her lifetime and must not be extended to a case of adoption
made by a surviving spouse of the government servant after
his/her death. This is because the object of the provision is to
lend succour to a son till he attains the age of twenty-five years
22
and unmarried or widowed or divorced daughter; similarly to the
adopted son or unmarried adopted daughter when such an
adoption had been made by the government servant during
his/her lifetime.
14. Further, a case where a child is born to the deceased
government servant after his death has to be contrasted with a
case where a child is adopted by the widow of a government
servant after his death. The former category of heirs are covered
under the definition of family since such a child would be a
posthumous child of the deceased government servant. The
entitlement of such a posthumous child is wholly distinct from a
child being adopted subsequent to the demise of the government
servant by the surviving spouse. The reason for the same is not far
to see. This is because the deceased government servant would
have had no relationship with the adopted child which would have
been adopted subsequent to his demise, as opposed to a
posthumous child. Therefore, the definition of the word “family” in
relation to a government servant means various categories of
persons coming within the nomenclature of the word “family” and
all persons who would have had a familial relationship with the
government servant during his lifetime. Any other interpretation
would lead to abuse of the provision in the matter of grant of
family pension.
23
15. It is also observed that the decision of this Court in
Vijayalakshmamma would not aid the case of the Appellant. The
said case is inapplicable to the facts of the present case for the
reason that the said case pertains to the right of a widow to adopt
and the right of inheritance of a child so adopted. The present case
is concerned only with the definition of ‘family’ under the CCS
(Pension) Rules. The said definition is a restrictive and specific one
and cannot be expanded to take within its sweep, all heirs, as
provided under Hindu law, or other personal laws. It is trite that in
construing a word in a statute, caution has to be exercised in
adopting a meaning ascribed to that word or concept in another
statute.
16. In light of the reasons assigned hereinabove, the present
appeal is liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. The
judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 30th
November, 2015, is hereby affirmed.
Parties to bear their respective costs.
….…………………………..J.
 (K.M. JOSEPH)
….…………………………..J.
 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
NEW DELHI;
17 JANUARY, 2023

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