EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 10499 OF 2022

EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR .... PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.

1. The present special leave petition is directed against the judgment

and order dated 16.11.2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature

for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur, whereby the Division Bench has

allowed the D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 637 of 2021 filed by the

respondents-Union of India (appellants before the Division Bench),

and has set aside the order dated 17.02.2021 passed by the Single

Bench, which had allowed the Civil Writ Petition No. 17475 of 2018

filed by the present petitioner (respondent before the Division Bench).

2. The present petitioner was appointed on the post of constable in the

CISF on 03.11.2007. In April, 2009 the petitioner received a

1

notice/Memorandum of charge under the Rule 36 of CISF Rules 2001

(hereinafter referred to as the “the said Rules”) from the office of

Commandant Discipline, CISF in which it was alleged that the

petitioner at the time of submitting verification of his character

certificate had suppressed the fact that he was involved in a criminal

case for the offence under sections 323, 324 and 341 of IPC in

respect of which an FIR being No. 153/2003 was registered against

him on 21.10.2003; and that on the Investigating Officer in the said

proceedings having submitted the charge-sheet before the concerned

Court, the case was pending for trial before the said Court when the

character certificate was submitted by the petitioner to the CISF

authorities. It was also stated therein that since the act of suppression

of information regarding pendency of the criminal litigation in his

character certificate filed along with the appointment letter, was under

the category of gross misconduct and indiscipline, he was not eligible

to be appointed in a very disciplined police force i.e. CISF. Thereafter,

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. During

the course of disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner accepted his

mistake. The Commandant Discipline, CISF, keeping in view the

young age and future prospects of the petitioner, imposed

2

punishment of reduction of pay by one stage from Rs. 6320- 6070/- in

the pay band of Rs.5200-20,200/- with grade pay. However, on

06.10.2009, the Deputy Inspector General (West Zone), Air Port

Head Quarter – Navi Mumbai – suo motu took the cognizance of the

matter revising the order dated 11.07.2009 and remitted the matter

back for fresh departmental enquiry against the petitioner invoking

Rule 54 of CISF Rules, 2001. The said departmental enquiry

culminated into the removal of the petitioner from service on

09.03.2010, against which the petitioner had filed a departmental

appeal, however, the said appeal came to be dismissed by the

appellate authority vide the order dated 23.06.2010. The revision

petition filed by the petitioner before the competent authority assailing

the said order dated 23.06.2010 also came to be dismissed by the

Revisional Authority vide the order dated 21.12.2010.

3. Being aggrieved by the said orders, passed by the various authorities

of CISF, the petitioner filed a writ petition being No. 8190 of 2012

before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur. The

Single Bench vide order dated 16.02.2018 set aside the order of

removal passed against the petitioner and directed the petitioner to

file a detailed representation before the appointing authority for

reconsideration of his case in the context of the judgment of the

3

Supreme Court in case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors1

and directed the appointing authority to decide the representation of

the petitioner by a reasoned and speaking order with reference to the

said judgment. The Commandant CISF Unit CSIA, Mumbai after

considering the representation of the petitioner in the light of the

judgment in case of Avtar Singh (supra), held that the CISF being an

Armed Force of Union of India, which is deployed in sensitive sectors,

the force personnel are required to maintain discipline of the highest

order, and that the involvement of the petitioner in the grave offences

debarred him from the appointment to such force and, therefore, he

was not found suitable for the appointment in CISF for the post of

constable/GD vide order dated 14.05.2018.

4. The petitioner again filed a writ petition being No. 17475/2018

assailing the said order dated 14.05.2018. The Single Bench again

set aside the said order and allowed the writ petition directing the

respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with all

consequential benefits vide the order dated 17.02.2021. The

respondents filed the Special Writ Appeal before the Division Bench,

against the order passed by the Sigle Bench, which appeal came to

be allowed by the Division Bench vide the impugned order.

1 (2016) 8 SCC 471

4

5. Ms. Asifa Rashid Mir, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

vehemently submitted that the petitioner was involved in a criminal

case when he was hardly aged about 19 years and the said case had

resulted into a compromise between the parties. According to her, on

the basis of the said compromise, the Trial Court had closed the case

on 21.11.2007, and the petitioner was appointed as constable in

CISF on 03.11.2007. Relying upon the various decisions of this Court

and other High Courts, she further submitted that considering the

nature of offence in which the petitioner was allegedly involved, the

removal from service on the ground of non-disclosure of pendency of

the said case could not be said to be a grave misconduct attracting

the harsh punishment of removal from service. The Division Bench of

the High Court, runs the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner,

should not have interfered with the well-reasoned order passed by

the Single Bench which had found the involvement of the petitioner in

a case of trivial nature. According to her, even if a deliberate

suppression by the petitioner as alleged by the respondents was

found to have taken place at the time of filing the character certificate,

a lenient view should have been taken by the respondents

5

considering his age and considering the fact that the petitioner had

accepted his mistake.

6. The Senior Advocate Mr. R. Bala Subramanian, appearing for the

respondents however, taking the Court to the CISF Rules 2001, the

circulars applicable to all Central Armed Police Force (CAPF)

including the CISF regarding the policy guidelines to be followed in

respect of the candidates against whom criminal cases are pending

vide OM dated 01.02.2012, dealing with suppression of information or

submitting false information in the verification form, submitted that the

CISF being very disciplined police force and the post of constable

being very sensitive post, the petitioner who was found to be guilty of

gross misconduct of suppressing the material fact of his involvement

in the criminal case at the time of seeking appointment, could not

have been continued in service, and that the Division Bench has

rightly considered the facts of the case and upheld the decision of the

respondent authority, which may not be interfered with.

7. In the instant case, both the learned counsels for the parties have

relied upon decision of this Court in Avtar Singh (supra) in which a

three-judge Bench emphasizing the need of verification of character

and antecedents of the person to be appointed in the government

service and after considering the various previous judgments of this

6

Court, had summarized the principles in para 38 which reads as

under:

“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and

reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid

discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus:

38.1. Information given to the employer by a

candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or

pendency of a criminal case, whether before or

after entering into service must be true and there

should be no suppression or false mention of

required information.

38.2. While passing order of termination of

services or cancellation of candidature for giving

false information, the employer may take notice of

special circumstances of the case, if any, while

giving such information.

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration

the government orders/instructions/rules,

applicable to the employee, at the time of taking

the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false

information of involvement in a criminal case

where conviction or acquittal had already been

recorded before filling of the

application/verification form and such fact later

comes to knowledge of employer, any of the

following recourses appropriate to the case may

be adopted:

38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which

conviction had been recorded, such as shouting

slogans at young age or for a petty offence which

if disclosed would not have rendered an

incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer

may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of

fact or false information by condoning the lapse.

38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in

case which is not trivial in nature, employer may

cancel candidature or terminate services of the

employee.

7

38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a

case involving moral turpitude or offence of

heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and

it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of

reasonable doubt has been given, the employer

may consider all relevant facts available as to

antecedents, and may take appropriate decision

as to the continuance of the employee.

38.5. In a case where the employee has made

declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal

case, the employer still has the right to consider

antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint

the candidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully

declared in character verification form regarding

pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature,

employer, in facts and circumstances of the case,

in its discretion, may appoint the candidate

subject to decision of such case.

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact

with respect to multiple pending cases such false

information by itself will assume significance and

an employer may pass appropriate order

cancelling candidature or terminating services as

appointment of a person against whom multiple

criminal cases were pending may not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known

to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still

it may have adverse impact and the appointing

authority would take decision after considering

the seriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in

service, holding departmental enquiry would be

necessary before passing order of

termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of

suppression or submitting false

information in verification form.

38.10. For determining suppression or false

information attestation/verification form has to be

specific, not vague. Only such information which

was required to be specifically mentioned has to

be disclosed. If information not asked for but is

relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the

8

same can be considered in an objective manner

while addressing the question of fitness.

However, in such cases action cannot be taken on

basis of suppression or submitting false

information as to a fact which was not even asked

for.

38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio

veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must

be attributable to him”.

8. It may be noted that even after the guiding principles laid down in the

case of Avtar Singh by the three-judge Bench, divergent views were

expressed by the various benches of this Court. Therefore, this Court

in case of Satish Chandra Yadav Vs. Union of India & Others.2

,

after taking into consideration the inconsistent views taken in the

cases of Union of India & Ors. Vs Methu Meda3

; Union of India vs.

Dilip Kumar Mallick4

; Pawan Kumar vs. Union of India & Anr.5

;

Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited & Anr. vs. Anil

Kanwariya6

; Mohammed Imran Vs. State of Maharashtra &

Others7

; etc., further laid down following principles:

“89. The only reason to refer to and look into the

various decisions rendered by this Court as

above over a period of time is that the principles

of law laid therein governing the subject are bit

inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench

2 (2022) SCC Online SC 1300

3 (2022) 1 SCC 1

4 (2022) 6 Scale 108

5 (2022) SCC Online SC 532

6 (2021) 10 SCC 136

7 (2019) 17 SCC 696

9

decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra)

different courts have enunciated different

principles.

90. In such circumstances, we undertook some

exercise to shortlist the broad principles of law

which should be made applicable to the litigations

of the present nature. The principles are as

follows:

a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by

the public employer concerned, through its

designated officials-more so, in the case of

recruitment for the police force, who are under a

duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness,

since their ability to inspire public confidence is a

bulwark to society's security. [See Raj

Kumar (supra)]

b) Even in a case where the employee has made

declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded

criminal case, the employer still has the right to

consider the antecedents, and cannot be

compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal

in a criminal case would not automatically entitle

a candidate for appointment to the post. It would

be still open to the employer to consider the

antecedents and examine whether the candidate

concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to

the post.

c) The suppression of material information and

making a false statement in the verification Form

relating to arrest, prosecution, conviction etc.,

has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and

antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the

employee had suppressed or given false

information in regard to the matters having a

bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he

can be terminated from service.

d) The generalisations about the youth, career

prospects and age of the candidates leading to

condonation of the offenders' conduct, should not

enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.

e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority

concerned whose action is being challenged

acted mala fide.

10

f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of

the Authority?

g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by

the Authority concerned was fair and

reasonable?”

9. Having regard to the guiding principles, laid down in case of Avtar

Singh (supra) and in case of Satish Chandra Yadav (supra), this

Court has no hesitation in holding that the Single Bench of the High

Court had committed an error in interfering with the order passed by

the respondents-authorities. The respondents-authorities had after

taking into consideration the decision in case of Avtar Singh

terminated the services of the petitioner holding inter-alia that while

the petitioner was appointed in CISF, a criminal case was pending

against him at the time of his enrolment in the force, but he did not

reveal the same and that there was deliberate suppression of facts

which was an aggravating circumstance. It was also held that CISF

being an armed force of Union of India, is deployed in sensitive

sectors such as airports, ports, department of atomic energy,

department of space, metro, power and steel, for internal security

duty etc., and therefore, the force personnel are required to maintain

discipline of the highest order; and that the involvement of the

11

petitioner in such grave offences debarred him from the appointment.

Such a well-reasoned and well considered decision of the

respondent-authorities should not have been interfered by the Single

Bench in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution,

more particularly when there were no allegations of malafides or of

non-observance of rules of natural justice or of breach of statutory

rules were attributed against the respondent authorities.

10. The Constitution Bench, in case of State of Orissa & Others vs.

Bidyabhushan Mohapatra8

 had observed way back in 1963 that

having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the

punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose

punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court

under Article 226. A three-judge Bench in case of B.C. Chaturvedi

vs. Union of India & Ors9

 had also held that judicial review is not an

appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the

decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the

individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the

conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the

eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on the charges of

8 AIR 1963 SC 779

9 (1995) 6 SCC 749

12

misconduct by a public servant, the Court or Tribunal would be

concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was

held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and

statutory rules were complied with.

11. In Om Kumar & Others vs. Union of India10 this Court had also

after considering the Wednesbury Principles and the doctrine of

proportionality held that the question of quantum of punishment in

disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the

jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or

of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the

applicability of one or the other of the well-known principles known

as “Wednesbury Principles”11 namely whether the order was contrary

to law, or whether relevant factors were not considered, or whether

irrelevant factors were considered or whether the decision was one

which no reasonable person could have taken.

12. Again, a three-judge Bench in case of Deputy General Manager

(Appellate Authority) & Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava12

10 (2001) 2 SCC 386

11 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

12 (2021) 2 SCC 612

13

circumscribing the power of judicial review by the constitutional courts

held as under:

“24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial

review, of the constitutional courts, is an

evaluation of the decision-making process and

not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure

fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of

conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the

proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in

any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural

justice or in violation of the statutory rules

prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the

conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary

authority is based on no evidence. If the

conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable

person would have ever reached or where the

conclusions upon consideration of the evidence

reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse

or suffer from patent error on the face of record or

based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari

could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial

review cannot be extended to the examination of

correctness or reasonableness of a decision of

authority as a matter of fact.

25. xxxxxxx

26. xxxxxxx

27.xxxxxxxx

28. The constitutional court while exercising its

jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or

Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere

with the findings of fact arrived at in the

departmental enquiry proceedings except in a

case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is

no evidence to support a finding or where a

finding is such that no man acting reasonably and

with objectivity could have arrived at those

findings and so long as there is some evidence to

support the conclusion arrived at by the

departmental authority, the same has to be

sustained.”

14

13. In view of the afore-stated legal position, we are of the opinion that

the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly set aside the order

passed by the Single Bench, which had wrongly interfered with the

order of removal passed by the respondent authorities against the

petitioner. The petitioner having been found to have committed gross

misconduct right at the threshold of entering into disciplined force like

CISF, and the respondent authorities having passed the order of his

removal from service after following due process of law and without

actuated by malafides, the court is not inclined to exercise its limited

jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

14. In that view of the matter the SLP is dismissed.

..………………………. J.

[AJAY RASTOGI]

 …..................................J.

 [BELA M. TRIVEDI]

NEW DELHI

16.01.2023

15