The State of Maharashtra & Anr. Versus Dr. Maroti s/o Kashinath Pimpalkar

The State of Maharashtra & Anr. Versus Dr. Maroti s/o Kashinath Pimpalkar

Landmark Cases of India / सुप्रीम कोर्ट के ऐतिहासिक फैसले


Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No.1874 of 2022
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.718
of 2022)
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
…Appellants
Versus
Dr. Maroti s/o Kashinath Pimpalkar
 …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This Court in Shalu Ojha v. Prashant Ojha
1
observed: “this is an unfortunate case where the
provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 are rendered simply a pious hope of
the Parliament and a teasing illusion for the appellant”.
Even while, borrowing those words, we may say, we are
1 (2015) 2 SCC 99
Page 1 of 28
not peeved, but certainly pained, as a legitimate
prosecution under another Act viz., the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short
“POCSO Act”), has been throttled at the threshold by the
exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’), without
permitting the materials in support to it to see the light of
the day in respect of misprision of sexual assault against
minor tribal girls in a girls’ hostel. As per the impugned
judgment, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
Nagpur Bench in Criminal Application (APL) No.841 of
2019 dated 20.04.2021 quashed FIR No.185 of 2019
dated 12.04.2019 of Rajura Police Station and the final
report filed thereon under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C. qua the
Respondent. The raison d'etre for the said opening
remarks would be unraveled by the factual narration and
the legal analysis to be made hereinafter.
3. The stated chargesheet was laid on investigation in
FIR No.185/2019 registered at Rajura Police Station, Distt.
Chandrapur, for the offences under Section 376AB of the
Page 2 of 28
Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 4 and 6 of POCSO Act,
Section 3(1)(w) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and
Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention and Eradication
of Human Sacrifice and other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori
Practices and Black Magic Act, 2013. We may hasten to
add that it was filed under those Sections against the first
five accused and in fact, the Respondent herein was
arraigned as the 6th accused thereunder, essentially for
the failure to report the commission of the offence under
the POCSO Act (then, of course by unknown persons), in
compliance with the legal obligation under Section 19 (1)
of POCSO Act, punishable under Section 21 (1) thereof.
4. The stated FIR came to be registered against
unidentified person(s) on the accusation of commission of
sexual offences against minor tribal girls who were
students of Infant Jesus English Public High School, Rajura
residing in its girls’ hostel. The complaint was lodged by
one Rajesh Tulsidas Dhotkar, Assistant Project Officer,
Integrated Tribal Development Project, Chandrapur.
Page 3 of 28
According to the appellant, on 06.04.2019 the said officer
received a telephonic information from Chhaban
Pandurang Pachare, the Superintendent of the said hostel
which is under the control of the Integrated Tribal
Development Project, Chandrapur that one girl studying in
the 3rd standard and another studying in the 5th standard,
of the said school were not keeping well. Immediately,
he visited the hospital where they were admitted. Later,
he received letter No. 3392/2019 dated 10.02.2019
revealing that the students were shifted from Rural
Hospital Rajura to General Hospital, Chandrapur owing to
their deteriorating health condition. From the General
Hospital, Chandrapur a medical certificate was issued to
the effect that there is suspicion of sexual abuse.
Thereupon, the Project Officer, Integrated Tribal
Development Project, Chandrapur authorised him to lodge
the complaint and accordingly, it was laid. We may state
at this juncture that going by Criminal Application (APL)
No.841/2019, filed along with the present Appeal as
Annexure-P3, the parents of the victims were not happy
Page 4 of 28
with the investigation in the crime and they filed a
Criminal Writ Petition No.342/2019 and subsequently,
Final Report / Charge-Sheet No.43/2019 dated 08.06.2019
was filed.
5. Now, reverting to the case of the appellant, it is to
the effect that during the investigation, Superintendent of
the aforementioned hostel and four others, namely,
Narendra Laxmanrao Virulkar, Sau Neeta alias Kalpana
Mahadeo Thakare, Sau Lata Madhukar Kannake,
Venkateswami Bondaiyaa Jangam were arrested and
arraigned as accused in the crime. During the
investigation, it was found that 17 minor girls were
abused by the accused and on their medical examination
rupture of hymen was found. The respondent herein is the
Medical Practitioner appointed for treatment of girls
admitted to the said Girls’ hostel and the victim girls were
taken to him. The investigation revealed that the
respondent had knowledge about the incidents occurred,
from the victims themselves as the victim girls revealed
in their statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
Page 5 of 28
about their divulgation of sexual assault on them to the
respondent. In fact, some of the victims had specifically
revealed it in their statements recorded under Section
164 Cr.P.C. The respondent who was under a legal
obligation, in terms of the provisions under Section 19(1)
of the POCSO Act upon getting the knowledge about
committing of an offence under the POCSO Act, to provide
such information either to the Special Juvenile Police Unit
or the local police remained silent and did not provide
such information to help the accused, is the gist of the
allegation against him. As already stated, after
investigation a charge sheet was also filed. The
Respondent has been arraigned as accused No. 6 in the
aforesaid crime.
6. Apprehending arrest in connection with the said
crime, the respondent herein filed an anticipatory bail
application before the Ld. Sessions Judge on 10.06.2019
and the same was rejected on 25.06.2019. The said order
was challenged before the High Court and the High Court
allowed the appeal and granted him protection from
Page 6 of 28
arrest. Thereafter, the respondent herein filed Criminal
Application (APL) No.841/2019 under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of the FIR dated 12.04.2019
and the chargesheet dated 08.06.2019 to the extent they
are against him. The High Court passed the impugned
judgment and quashed the FIR as also the chargesheet
qua the respondent. Hence, this appeal.
7. Before considering the merits of the challenge
against the impugned judgment whereby and whereunder
the stated FIR and the chargesheet were quashed, we
think it appropriate to refer to certain aspects and also
the position with respect to scope of exercise of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Exercise of power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an exception and not the rule and it
is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone
Courts exist. This position has been stated and
reiterated by this Court time and again.
Page 7 of 28
8. This Court in the decision in R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab
2
, held that the High Court could not embark upon
an enquiry as to whether the evidence is reliable or not
while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.
3
, at
paragraph 102 this Court held that quashing may be
appropriate where the allegations made in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused and where the allegations in the First
Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
2 A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866
3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
Page 8 of 28
9. In the decision in State of M.P v. Awadh Kishore
Gupta & Ors.
4
, this Court held that the High Court could
not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence
is reliable or not as that would be the function of the Trial
Court. In Dr. Monica Kumar & Anr. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors.
5
, this Court held that the inherent power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to stifle
a legitimate prosecution. In Shiji alias Pappu and Ors.
v. Radhika and Another
6
, a two Judge Bench of this
Court held thus:
“…plenitude of the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High
Court to exercise the same with utmost care and
caution. The width and the nature of the power
itself demands that its exercise is sparing and
only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons
to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance
of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse
of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor
proper for us to enumerate the situations in
which the exercise of power under Section 482
4 (2004) 1 SCC 691
5 (2008) 8 SCC 781
6 AIR 2012 SC 499
Page 9 of 28
may be justified. All that we need to say is that
the exercise of power must be for securing the
ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to
exercise that power may result in the abuse of
the process of law.”
10. Having made such a short survey on authorities on
the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as above,
we will now refer to the object and purposes of the POCSO
Act. Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia confers
powers upon the State to make special provisions for
children and Article 39 (f) provides not only that the State
shall direct its policy towards securing that the children
are given opportunities to develop in a healthy manner
and in conditions of freedom and dignity but also to
ensure that their childhood and youth are protected
against exploitation and against moral and material
abandonment. Recognising the constitutional obligation
and keeping in view the fundamental concept under
Article 15 of the Constitution and also realizing that
sexual offences against children are not adequately
Page 10 of 28
addressed by the existing laws, POCSO Act was enacted.
The provisions thereunder would reveal that it also aims
to ensure that such offenders are not spared and should
be properly booked.
11. To achieve the avowed purpose, a legal obligation for
reporting of offence under the POCSO Act is cast upon on
a person to inform the relevant authorities specified
thereunder when he/she has knowledge that an offence
under the Act had been committed. Such obligation is
also bestowed on person who has apprehension that an
offence under this Act is likely to be committed. Besides
casting such a legal obligation under Section 19, the
Legislature thought it expedient to make failure to
discharge the obligation thereunder as punishable, under
Section 21 thereof. True that under Section 21 (1), failure
to report the commission of an offence under Sub-Section
1 of Section 19 or Section 20 or failure to report such
offence under Sub-Section 2 of Section 19 has been made
punishable with imprisonment of either description which
may extend to six months or with fine or with both. SubPage 11 of 28
Section 2 of Section 21 provides that any person who
being in-charge of any company or an institution (by
whatever name called) who fails to report the commission
of an offence under Sub-Section 1 of Section 19 in respect
of a subordinate under his control, shall be punishable
with imprisonment with a term which may extend to one
year or with fine. Certainly, such provisions are included
in with a view to ensure strict compliance of the
provisions under the POCSO Act and thereby to ensure
that the tender age of children is not being abused and
their childhood and youth is protected against
exploitation.
12. Looking at the penal provisions referred above,
making failure to discharge the obligation under Section
19 (1) punishable only with imprisonment for a short
duration viz., six months, one may think that it is not an
offence to be taken seriously. However, according to us
that by itself is not the test of seriousness or otherwise of
an offence of failure to discharge the legal obligation
under Section 19, punishable under Section 21 of POCSO
Page 12 of 28
Act. We are fortified in our view, by the decisions of a
three Judge Bench of this Court in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
7
 and a two
Judge-Bench in Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of
Maharashtra
8
.
13. In the decision in Shankar Kisanrao Khade’s case
(supra), a two Judge Bench of this Court in paragraph 77.5
and 77.6 issued certain directions for due compliance and
they read thus: -
“77.5. If hospitals, whether government or
privately-owned or medical institutions where
children are being treated come to know that
children admitted are subjected to sexual abuse,
the same will immediately be reported to the
nearest Juvenile Justice Board/SJPU and the
Juvenile Justice Board, in consultation with SJPU,
should take appropriate steps in accordance with
the law safeguarding the interest of the child.
77.6. The non-reporting of the crime by anybody,
after having come to know that a minor child
7 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929
8 (2013) 5 SCC 546
Page 13 of 28
below the age of 18 years was subjected to any
sexual assault, is a serious crime and by not
reporting they are screening the offenders from
legal punishment and hence be held liable under
the ordinary criminal law and prompt action be
taken against them, in accordance with law.”
14. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary’s case (supra), this
Court observed that the length of punishment is not only
the indicator of the gravity of offence and it is to be
judged by a totality of factors, especially keeping in mind
the background in which the offence came to be
recognized by the Legislature in the specific international
context. In this context, it is also relevant to note that
the United Nations Convention on Rights of Children,
which was ratified by India on 11.12.1992, requires the
State parties to undertake all appropriate national,
bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the
inducement or coercion of child to engage in any unlawful
sexual activity, the exploitative use of children in
Page 14 of 28
prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices etc.
Articles 3 (2) and 34 of the Convention have placed a
specific duty on the State to protect the child from all
forms of sexual exploitation and abuse.
15. Prompt and proper reporting of the commission of
offence under the POCSO Act is of utmost importance and
we have no hesitation to state that its failure on coming
to know about the commission of any offence thereunder
would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act. We
say so taking into account the various provisions
thereunder. Medical examination of the victim as also
the accused would give many important clues in a case
that falls under the POCSO Act. Section 27 (1) of the
POCSO Act provides that medical examination of a child in
respect of whom any offence has been committed under
the said Act, shall, notwithstanding that a First
Information Report or complaint has not been registered
for the offence under the Act, be conducted in accordance
with Section 164 A of the Cr.P.C., which provides the
procedures for medical examination of the victim of rape.
Page 15 of 28
In this contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to
Section 53 A of Cr.P.C. that mandates for examination of a
person accused of rape by a medical practitioner. It is also
a fact that clothes of the parties would also offer very
reliable evidence in cases of rape. We refer to the
aforesaid provisions only to stress upon the fact that a
prompt reporting of the commission of an offence under
POCSO Act would enable immediate examination of the
victim concerned and at the same time, if it was
committed by an unknown person, it would also enable
the investigating agency to commence investigation
without wasting time and ultimately to secure the arrest
and medical examination of the culprit. There can be no
two views that in relation to sexual offences medical
evidence has much corroborative value.

16. Bearing in mind the position with respect to the
exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
provisions, penal and procedural, under POCSO Act, we
will proceed to consider the case on hand.
Page 16 of 28
17. The FIR registered in the case on hand would reveal
that it came to be registered on coming to know about
the suspected commission of sexual offence against
minor tribal girl(s) against unidentified person(s). Failure
to report regarding the commission of the offence under
the POCSO Act despite knowledge about the same is the
accusation against the respondent revealed from the
charge-sheet. The FIR reveals the ingredients of an
offence under the POCSO Act and the real magnitude of
the same was revealed during the investigation, as stated
above. On completion of the investigation, based on the
materials collected, the Officer-in-Charge of the police
station concerned formed an opinion that a cognizable
offence as mentioned therein, appears to had been
committed and that the persons named therein, including
the respondent herein, appears to have committed the
offences specified against them and filed final report
under Section 173(2) for prosecuting them. It is the
stated FIR dated 12.04.2019 and the stated chargesheet
Page 17 of 28
dated 08.06.2019 which were sought to be quashed and
consequently quashed as per the impugned judgment.
18. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a
cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section
173(2), Cr.P.C. on completion of investigation based on it
would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence
under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the
persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness,
sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not
matters falling within the purview of exercise of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they are
matters to be done by the Trial Court at the time of trial.
This position is evident from the decisions referred supra.
19. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita
9
, this
court held that while considering the question of quashing
of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate
by way of sifting the materials collected in course of
investigation including the statements recorded under
Section 161, Cr.P.C. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v.
9 JT 2002 (3) SC 89
Page 18 of 28
Baisahab & Ors.
10
, a two Judge Bench of this Court dealt
with question as to the matters that could be considered
by the High Court in quashment proceedings under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was held therein that statements of
witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. being wholly
inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into
consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that case, this Court took
note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of
the witnesses mentioned that the deceased-victim had
informed him about the harassment by the accused,
which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to
commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High
Court to quash the criminal proceedings in that case was
on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C., it was held that statements
thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could
not have been taken into consideration by the Court while
adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It
10 (2020) 3 SCC 317
Page 19 of 28
was also held that the High Court committed an error in
quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
20. There can be no dispute with respect to the position
that statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are
inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the
purposes as provided under Sections 145 and 157 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As a matter of fact,
statement recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can also be
used only for such purposes.
21. In the instant case, a scanning of the recitals in
paragraph No.10 of the impugned judgment would
undoubtedly reveal the fact that the High Court had
formed an opinion on perusal of the statement of a
teacher of the victims and also the statements of the
victims that sexual assault was detected only from the
General Hospital, Chandrapur and then arrived at the
conclusion that the Respondent was not made aware of
sexual assault committed on the victims and there is no
Page 20 of 28
evidence to implicate him in the said crime. Paragraph
No.10 of the impugned judgment reads thus: -
“In the above backdrop, we have gone through
the statements of victims which have been
referred by the prosecution. The statements show
that the applicant had examined the victims. Their
condition was deteriorating. Therefore, they were
sent to General Hospital, Chandrapur. There is no
material on record to show that the applicant was
made aware about the sexual assault committed
on the victims. On the contrary, from the
statement of the teacher of victims it appears that
the sexual assault was detected only in General
Hospital, Chandrapur. Therefore, we are of the
view that there is no evidence to implicate the
applicant in the said crime. Therefore, the
continuation of proceedings against the applicant
would amount to abuse of process of Court.”
(Emphasis added)
Page 21 of 28
22. Thus, a bare perusal of the above extracted recitals
from paragraph No.10 of the impugned judgment would
reveal that the High Court had gone through the
statements of victims/witnesses cited by the prosecution,
to arrive at the conclusion as to the existence or
otherwise of evidence against the respondent. In view of
the provisions referred above and also plethora of
decisions including the decisions in M.L. Bhatt’s case
(Supra) and in Rajeev Kourav’s case (supra), statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in
evidence and, therefore, could not have been made the
basis for arriving at such conclusions. As noted above, the
FIR carries suspicion of commission of sexual assault and
the charge-sheet reveals prima facie against the
respondent in relation to non-reporting of such an offence
under the POCSO Act. The very case of the Appellant is
that some among the seventeen victims have given
statements under Section 161, Cr.P.C. and some others
under Section164 Cr.P.C., specifically stating that the
respondent was informed of the sexual assault on them.
Page 22 of 28
When that be the position, we have no doubt that the
High Court should not have embarked upon an enquiry,
especially by looking into the statements of the victims
recorded as also their teacher to form an opinion
regarding the availability of evidence to connect the
Respondent with the crime. True that the FIR and the
charge sheet still remain in fact in respect of the other
accused. But then, non-reporting of sexual assault
against a minor child despite knowledge is a serious
crime and more often than not, it is an attempt to shield
the offenders of the crime of sexual assault. Be that as it
may in view of the decision in Shankar Kisan Rao
Khade’s case (supra) holding non-reporting of such a
crime as serious and in view of the position obtained from
a conjoint reading of Sections 19(1) and 21 of POCSO Act,
such persons are also liable to be proceeded with, in
accordance with law. In this context, it is also relevant to
refer to an observation made by this Court in the said
case that this Court under parens patriae jurisdiction has
Page 23 of 28
a duty to give directions for compliance of the provisions
under the POCSO Act.
23. The learned counsel for the respondent attempted to
support and get sustained the impugned judgment
contending that it was rendered relying on the decision of
this Court in A.S. Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Kerala
11
and that going by the said decision, the respondent could
not have been accused of having failed to report the
commission of the offence of sexual assault under the
POCSO Act despite possessing knowledge about its
commission. Upon going through the judgment, we have
no hesitation to hold that the said decision is totally
inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of this case,
for more than one reason. Firstly, a bare perusal of the
said judgment would reveal that the question of
knowledge was considered by this Court not at the stage
of looking into the correctness or otherwise of a finding on
knowledge and the consequential quashment of
proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. As a matter of
11 (2004) 11 SCC 576
Page 24 of 28
fact, it was so considered in an appeal against conviction
of the appellants therein under Sections 471, 420 read
with Section 34, IPC. This Court was considering the
expression ‘knows or has reason to believe’ occurring
under Section 471, IPC and while explaining the meanings
of the words “knowledge” and “reason to believe” this
Court held: -
‘9. Under IPC, guilt in respect of almost all the
offences is fastened either on the ground of
“intention” or “knowledge” or “reason to
believe”. We are now concerned with the
expressions “knowledge” and “reason to
believe”. “Knowledge” is an awareness on the
part of the person concerned indicating his state
of mind. “Reason to believe” is another facet of
the state of mind. “Reason to believe” is not the
same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere
seeing also cannot be equated to believing.
“Reason to believe” is a higher level of state of
mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be slightly on a
higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person
can be supposed to know where there is a direct
appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to
have a reason to believe if he has sufficient
cause to believe the same. Section 26 IPC
Page 25 of 28
explains the meaning of the words “reason to
believe” thus:
“26. ‘Reason to believe’. – A person is said
to have ‘reason to believe’ a thing, if he has
sufficient cause to believe that thing but not
otherwise.”
(Emphasis added)
In the contextual situation, it is also worthy to refer the
following recital from para 8 of the said decision:
“Whether the accused knew or had reason to
believe the document in question to be forged
has to be adjudicated on the basis of materials
and the finding recorded in that regard is
essentially factual”.
In the case on hand, the High Court arrived at the
finding of absence of evidence to implicate the respondent
in the crime in question upon going through the
statements of the victims and also the statement of the
teacher of the victims, which recourse is absolutely
impermissible.
Page 26 of 28
24. There is yet another reason to decline the aforesaid
contention of the respondent. We would not have even
perused Annexures- A1 to A8, which are statements of
some of the victims recorded under Section 161/164,
Cr.P.C., recorded much prior to the impugned judgment
dated 20.4.2021 viz., in the year 2019 itself. We do so
solely to verify the verity of the finding of the High Court
to the effect that such statements do not disclose
anything suggesting knowledge of the respondent about
the commission of the crime. In troth, those statements
did mention about divulgation of sexual assault on them
by victims to the respondent. We may hasten to add, at
the risk of repetition, that such statements recorded
under Section 161/164, Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in
evidence, as held in M.L. Bhatt’s case (supra) and in
Rajeev Kourav’s case (supra). In the light of the
circumstances available as above and in the light of
Section 59 of the Evidence Act, the High Court was not
justified in bringing abrupt termination of the proceedings
qua the respondent. The position revealed from the
Page 27 of 28
discussion above constrains us to hold that there is prima
facie case against the respondent for the offence referred
above and hence, the appeal is liable to succeed.
25. In the light of the decisions and the provisions
referred above, the impugned judgment resulting in
quashment of the stated FIR and the charge-sheet
throttling the prosecution at the threshold, without
allowing the materials in support of it to see the light of
the day, cannot be said to be as an exercise done to
secure interests of justice whereas it can only be stated
that such exercise resulted in miscarriage of justice.
26. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High
Court is set aside and the Appeal is, accordingly allowed.
Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.
……………………, J.
(Ajay Rastogi)
……………………, J.
 (C.T. Ravikumar)
New Delhi;
November 02, 2022.
Page 28 of 28

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